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BOAC
24th May 2013, 13:27
In view of the BA Airbus which had bits 'dropping off' it, and its recovery flight path, is it perhaps pertinent to undertake a review of where such aircraft are directed to land? We already have dedicated 'security' locations after all.

When you think back to the BA777 'glider' (although 'non-emergency' initially), imagine where that would have crashed had the crew needed power before they did.

HEATHROW DIRECTOR
24th May 2013, 18:38
I've no idea what procedures exist nowadays but during my time there were no instructions for ATC to avoid built-up areas when vectoring emergency traffic. In the case of a departure requesting an immediate return it was given the shortest track distance the crew wanted. Emergencies can happen any time (BA 777 on short final) so I think it would be difficult to legislate for every possibility.

BOAC
25th May 2013, 07:34
I've no idea what procedures exist nowadays but during my time there were no instructions for ATC to avoid built-up areas when vectoring emergency traffic. - I believe still the same. The point of my post was should there be?

We need to look at a few key points:

1) The Captain is (rightly) empowered by (marine and) aviation law to make decisions based on the safety of his 'vessel', passengers/cargo and crew and should be relied on to do so.

2) In the case of 'security' related incidents, it is established that 'normal' procedure would be to divert to a specific nominated location. A Captain has, again, the right to decline this IAW 1), but I wonder how many BA pilots would 'insist' on returning to base with a bombed up aircraft because it is 'easier'? How many BA simulator 'security' exercises result in a crew declining Stansted or other airport in favour of home base?

3) I do not particularly wish to draw comment on the latest incident, but here was a case where large bits of metal were falling off an aircraft and it is not inconceivable that in this case or some future case, larger bits might fall off.

So, should there be, as with 'security' incidents, some established procedure where routing AVOIDING the largest built-up areas in the UK should be in place, known to the crews and offered by ATC? Again, the Captain is at full liberty to decline such an offer but would be accountable for any resulting injuries/deaths or damage on the ground (and obviously the need for an immediate emergency landing over-rides all).

Is anyone aware of similar procedures in other countries?

spekesoftly
25th May 2013, 09:07
I've no idea what procedures exist nowadays but during my time there were no instructions for ATC to avoid built-up areas when vectoring emergency traffic

- I believe still the same.

The following guidance to UK ATCOs has been in CAP493 for many years.


It is desirable that aircraft in an emergency should not be routed over densely populated areas, particularly if there is reason to believe that the aircraft’s ability to remain in controlled flight is compromised or that parts of the aircraft could detach in flight. If this is inconsistent with providing the most appropriate service to the aircraft, for example when any extended routeing could further jeopardise the safety of the aircraft, the most expeditious route is the one that should be given. Where possible,
when expeditious routeing is not required, suggestions of alternative runways or aerodromes together with the rationale that the routeing would avoid densely populated areas and be consistent with safety, shall be passed to the pilot and his intentions requested.

It is recognised that controllers providing en route services at ACCs may not be aware of the boundaries of major cities, towns or villages. However, controllers providing aerodrome, approach or approach radar control services should be familiar with the centres of population within their areas of jurisdiction.

Controllers should be aware that aircraft experiencing engine failure may also
experience associated handling difficulties and should therefore limit manoeuvring instructions to the minimum necessary.

BOAC
25th May 2013, 10:38
Perhaps, then, as I posted at #1, time to look at some sort of 'standard' div for structurally damaged aircraft at LHR. I think MAN/LGW/STN/?BHX? are OK since there are mostly 'green fields' around.

If this were to become 'SOP' in airlines, crews would be better prepared for it, could be 'offered' the choice and then make their decision. Fortunately the incidence of things dropping from aircraft at LHR is rare - I think the last one was a stowaway, but a hot, many kg jet engine falling off a damaged pylon onto HMQ's 'ead at the Chelsea flower show would focus a few minds (not least Boris's :)).

Out of interest, what would be the implications of a BA LHR crew 'declining' to divert to Stansted with a Red bomb threat on the basis of 'home base preferred'?

eglnyt
25th May 2013, 16:12
This was considered after a previous incident and the AAIB made the following recommendation to the CAA:

AAIB Safety Recommendation 2005-069, "The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) should review the guidance provided in the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS) Part 1 and Civil Aviation Publication (CAP)475 (The Directory Of CAA Approved Organisations) and consider whether ATC Unit Training for Unusual Circumstances and Emergencies (TRUCE) plans adequately
prepare controllers to handle aircraft in emergency, and in particular, whether sufficient guidance is provided on the avoidance of built-up areas when vectoring aircraft in emergency. Where considered necessary, this guidance
should be amended as soon as practicable.

In that case the aircraft had been vectored over Central London after the crew expressed some doubt about reaching the runway but the AAIB declined to say whether or not that was a good choice. The main question highlighted in that report is balancing the risk to the aircraft and the people on it versus the risk to those on the ground.

MATS Part 2 was revised and now contains the advice to avoid built up areas unless inconsistent with providing the most appropriate service to the aircraft. It then goes on to suggest that controllers should limit manoeuvring instructions to the minimum necessary for aircraft experiencing engine failure

That probably isn't entirely helpful but it would be next to impossible to come up with a set of rules which could account for all circumstances.

BOAC
26th May 2013, 07:44
Thanks eglnyt - my query was not directed so much at ATC as to the airlines/regulators to ask whether it was appropriate to include 'advice' (or stronger) to crews. ATC as always can only 'assist' in this instance and must provide the requested service to the best of their ability. If that involves landing on the reciprocal runway, landing on a closed runway, landing below limits, so be it. Short of driving machinery onto a runway it cannot be 'closed' to an aircraft in an emergency. The Captain WILL subsequently be required to justify any action (via PPRune, of course:)) and through an enquiry. These decisions are the ones that define the role of Captain.

Quoting your wordingthe AAIB declined to say whether or not that was a good choice - makes a lot of sense. It is certainly right to raise the 'question' in the report. The 'workload' in diverting to another airfield in an emergency is certainly raised but in a modern aircraft not excessive, and there are times when the standard 'briefing' procedure is just not applicable - just put it down. The crew must be free to make the 'best' decision for the circumstances. It is to some extent the definition of 'best' that I query, taking into account the circumstances and risks to those on the ground.

Agaricus bisporus
26th May 2013, 15:39
Thanks BOAC!

If I may add my two penn'orth.

As someone who operates from one of those "unfamiliar" airports in the untamed bundhu outside the M25 my perspective is probably rather different than a LHR based crew might have (and esp. a long haul crew)

I think its fair to say that few of my colleagues would contemplate diverting to LHR under anything but utterly immediate life-threatening circumstances. Indeed, we went for many years without it even being in the FMS database or carrying plates for it. It just wasn't considered suitable for use as a diversion. Why? Not sure but suspect it was felt just too busy to work well and there are a number of other options that are operationally easier.

Where I come from we're at such an altitude passing LHR that STN and LGW are closer (we'll never get the meeja and non aviators to understand that an airfield directly below you by 20,000ft may in fact further away than one 50 miles distant). Otherwise there's Bournemouth in one direction, Brize in another, Birmingham and E Mids to the N.

Some acquaintances who have worked for Big Bird Airways at LHR have been surprisingly parochial about other airfields, regarding LTN or Bournemouth as absolutely beyond the pale and STN somewhere fit only for Ryanair (shudder) or scabby freighters. Neither seem to rate as fully paid-up airfields. It may or may not be a representative opinion, merely reporting a personal observation.

I must say one of my first thoughts on seeing the pic of the smoking engine allegedly over Canary Wharf and associated reports of visible flames was, "What the £@$% is he doing going to LHR in that state". If my arse was on fire leading up to that point ("downwind" at Potter's Bar for instance) I think I'd be seriously thinking of even a downwind landing at STN but it's all to easy to second guess the guy who was on the spot.

As far as legislating or even advising re emergency approaches over London you'd be right into a legal quagmire with accusations that if this is unsafe as you've all but admitted by making the suggestion then surely all aircraft ops at LHR are fundamentally unsafe. It would be hard - no, impossible - to win that argument in the full glare of the ensuing publicity. Would you say Easterlies are OK but not Westerlies? If not why not, there's not much under the approach on easterlies.

The writing is on the wall for LHR. It is a 1940s airfield that had its heyday in the 60s to 90s and is now too constrained by transport infrastructure, surrounding development, sheer lack of space and antedelluvian facilities to work as a global - never mind the global hub. It's an anachronism, must it take a four figure body-count to prompt us to do something about it - because that might have happened of the 777 had iced up its fuel system thirty seconds earlier.

A bit like the proverbial asparagus bed, we should have started years ago. We missed the opportunity to build Maplin Sands in the 70s which would now be vastly outperforming LHR (which would now be housing and industry as befits the site) we should and must start Boris Island or a near variant very very soon indeed or give up all aspirations to host a major transport hub.

Just consider the inevitable backlash if there were a serious accident in central London. What would happen to LHR's business plan? Would it be allowed to carry on as before? Would the public allow it? In the gross overreaction and safety-obsessed feeding frenzy that would follow I think LHR operations would simply be emasculated - and UK PLC would risk losing it all almost overnight. Then the 20 years to build Boris Island would be pointless as we'd never regain the business.

We're almost in that situation commercially with LHR now. There isn't any time to lose unless we are willing to roll over and give up on being a big player in international travel.

Sorry - thread drift there, but it all stems from the events of last week.

chevvron
28th May 2013, 00:41
When Heathrow Approach was actually at Heathrow, I'm sure most controllers would have been aware of the density of local built up areas, but now they're a considerable distance away, I'm not so sure.
In this case, I would have thought either Stansted or Southend would be the 'nearest suitable airfield' for an emergency of this type, but the Captain's choice (and it is his call) of airfields might have been influenced by the availablity of maintenance facilities for this type of aircraft.

BOAC
28th May 2013, 07:44
chevvie - "influenced by the availablity of maintenance facilities for this type of aircraft" - in terms of this topic (and I prefer not to be drawn into discussion of the BA incident) in a situation with (?unknown?) structural damage, this should never be a factor. The priority must be putting the aircraft on the ground with as little risk as possible to ALL and let someone else worry about mending the wreck.

NigelOnDraft
29th May 2013, 17:24
A fine theory, but in practice? Some specifics:which had bits 'dropping off' itbut here was a case where large bits of metal were falling off an aircraft and it is not inconceivable that in this case or some future case, larger bits might fall offFirstly, by all accounts, I think it likely whatever fell off, had fallen off either on the runway or very shortly thereafter i.e. well before anyone "up front" was even aware what was happening, let alone formulate a plan as a result.

Secondly, as has been established, Airbus A320 series, and especially V2500 version, cowls coming off is now almost "SOP". They come off on takeoff, or shortly after, and that's it. So had anybody chosen to follow either BOAC's line, or the ATC advice, I would think the conclusion would be "nothing further likely to fall off" given knowledge at the time.

BOAC then correctly (IMHO) goes on to state:and obviously the need for an immediate emergency landing over-rides allI would find it hard to find a situation where:
This did not apply and
It was thought likely further bits would fall off
The more usual situation would be "all bits fallen off" and a "stable" situaiton where now the longer diverison might be OK, but the reason for it not :confused:

In time I think the BA incident will provide food for thought along the lines of what the crew thought was happening, what ATC thought, and what was actually happening. And as noted above, whilst the ATC advice is sound in a case where ATC are asked for a routing even diversion, in practice the contrary factors mean rarely used in practice.

NoD

BOAC
29th May 2013, 18:38
NoD - I have tried (unsuccessfully) to separate the recent incident as much as possible from the proposals, but obviously it was the trigger for the 'thought process'.

You say that the crew were probably 'unaware' of the damage initially and certainly unaware of what other damage may or may not have been caused, and probably so until they got out on the runway. Would they be certain there was no likelihood of further separation of structure of any sort or control surface damage?

I do feel that the 'I'm going to LHR 'cos its my base' comes over too strongly in the other thread. That thread has now opened into the issue of whether an emergency DOES require an 'SOP briefing/performance etc' study. I asked whether BA would insist on landing at LHR on the same 'familiarity' basis with a red bomb threat - no-one has answered. I suspect certain parts of the security services might be unhappy with such a decision.

Anyway, let's take this into 'general land' - do you have any objection to the nomination of designated airfields around LHR where a/c that MAY have significant structural damage MIGHT preferably go to avoid the largest conurbation in the UK? Subject to etc etc of course - understood. Stansted appears to again be ideal, and surely BA LHR crews are familiar with it and its procedures - what if it was the only available diversion - is it too difficult to go there, possibly a little short of fuel having 'committed' to LHR when the airfield closes? Southend and Manston are others (I used Manston in 2000 in a BA 732 when there was nowhere else, and we did not worry about 'performance' or much of a briefing as the tanks were getting exciting). At least introducing the concept into the mentality would be a start. Getting the idea into the system even better. ATC and UK crews (and possibly others) would then consider the option - it can never be mandatory.

NigelOnDraft
29th May 2013, 22:27
Hi BOAC

You say that the crew were probably 'unaware' of the damage initially and certainly unaware of what other damage may or may not have been caused, and probably so until they got out on the runway. Would they be certain there was no likelihood of further separation of structure of any sort or control surface damage?Not certain, but who is ever "certain" that even a perfectly serviceable aircraft might not suddenly decide to shed parts of itself? 747s seem to have quite a dislike of their flaps for instance!

History counted against this one, since A320s have frequently lost cowls, and no more. Whether this then followed that pattern we shall see?

do you have any objection to the nomination of designated airfields around LHR where a/c that MAY have significant structural damage MIGHT preferably go to avoid the largest conurbation in the UK?None at all. Just as above, I think the practical conclusion to use it is unlikley?

Stansted appears to again be ideal, and surely BA LHR crews are familiar with it and its procedures I doubt many are familiar, but no issue - listent to the YouTube of Ops on the day and they were being sent to BOH, SOU and MSE. STN would be easier. I brief STN04 sometimes as a good div after LHR09 dept, but only if, for whatever reason, I have followed the SID someway. But then this is 100% against your argument, since LHR09 approach is less populated in some ways than STN04! [Bishops Stortford / Harlow v Windsor]

The question is right and interesting to ask and debate. However, I think it will take a major change in training and crew attitudes to "assume the worst" i.e. we might all die against the pure blind optimism we tend to work to.

Even when we do "double engine failure" training, I never recall built up areas being a factor - it's all about the best/closest runway. I have never experienced any airline training or advice, in or out of BA, to compare to our earlier employer's line of "point it in a clear area and pull the handle" (and hope you're not near Tintagel!)

Keep the debate going
NoD

BOAC
30th May 2013, 07:51
Not certain, but who is ever "certain" that even a perfectly serviceable aircraft might not suddenly decide to shed parts of itself? 747s seem to have quite a dislike of their flaps for instance! -:eek:. I think this is a line we should not follow, or we will ban all movements at LHR to Boris's delight. Let's just look at known problems? Ill-logic would also have all aircraft going somewhere else in case there was bomb on board! My 'proposal' would only affect a tiny number of aircraft - not even the 'illegal immigrant dropper' nor the BA777. I brief STN04 sometimes as a good div after LHR09 dept, - good to hear. Did I say 05 - whoops! I feel STN should be part of any LHR pilot's 'built-in box of tricks' on any runway.since LHR09 approach is less populated in some ways - indeed, and should therefore be part of the 'plan'? Even when we do "double engine failure" training, I never recall built up areas being a factor - it's all about the best/closest runway. I have never experienced any airline training or advice, in or out of BA, - me neither, but again, let's think 'outside the box'? In range of STN, MSE, BZN and LHR. Is there any merit in choosing one against the other?