AF 447 Thread No. 11

[Uplinker]

Just having a new procedure in the books does not mean that the pilots know (and understand!) it.

Then again, the environment may have changed since I was in the sharp end ..

Yes, I think it probably has John; Beyond all recognition.

[Volume]

Did that particular crew went through UAS procedure training?
The BEA report covered that in depth It does not cover it in a way I fully understand...
2008-2009 instruction season E33 simulator training. “IAS douteuse” exercise
Note: The A320 type rating programme at Air France in 2004 did not include a “vol avec IAS douteuse” exercise.
General note: The additional A330 and A340 type ratings deal only with the differences in relation to the type ratings already issued on other types (A320, A330, and A340).So what is this saying? They did not train it, because they were trained on the A320 where this is not part of the exercise, and then did not train it when changing to the A330 because it is the same for both models?
The scenario selected for the simulator exercise required the crew to perform the component items of the emergency manoeuvre in a context in which the aircraft remained in normal law and no alarm was triggered.
Based on the information provided by the operator, the pilots of F-GZCP performed this training session on the following dates:
ˆˆ Captain: A330 training on 12 March 2008;
ˆˆ Copilot in left seat: A330 training on 6 December 2008;
ˆˆ Copilot in right seat: A330 training on 2 February 2009.
If all 3 have been trained on the A330, why is there the A320 and the type rating remark?
And all 3 did train UAS procedure once in normal law and at low altitude only?
Could have all been worded a little clearer...

[DozyWannabe]

The one who lost a loved one is looking for the full story, the real one, not a 'recompense' ... Once again, you're way out dozy.

What's in the report *is* the real story. Unless you know different - please enlighten us with what you think happened. Seriously - you've believed in non-existent conspiracies on the part of the French establishment to protect Airbus for so long that you've lost the plot when it comes to separating reality from fantasy.

[CONF iture]

And we need a monks lifetime to decode the 300+ mandatory parameters into a readable format for the ones who cannot read the - RAW - 12 bit Harvard BiPhase Code.
Call these guys, pretty sure they can do something about it.
Flight data visualization & animation software: CEFA FAS (http://www.cefa-aviation.com/en/cefa-fas)

This Solid State Flight Data Recorder (SSFDR) has a recording capacity of at least twenty-five hours. The decoding document, supplied with this airplane, has around 1,300 parameters.
The last 10 minutes should do just fine.

What's in the report *is* the real story. Unless you know different - please enlighten us with what you think happened. Seriously - you've believed in non-existent conspiracies on the part of the French establishment to protect Airbus for so long that you've lost the plot when it comes to separating reality from fantasy.
Full story is in Full data - Why you guys are afraid to see those full data produced to ALL concerned parties is a mystery ... ?
You dozy consider other manufacturers have protected their product but never on earth Airbus would do so.
What is so special about Airbus ?
In which fantasy do YOU live in ?

[DozyWannabe]

Flight data visualization & animation software: CEFA FAS (http://www.cefa-aviation.com/en/cefa-fas)

Look at the site - the product is for FOQA and pilot training use, even the makers, CEFA themselves don't consider it up to use as a fully-blown forensic tool

Full story is in Full data - Why you guys are afraid to see those full data produced to ALL concerned parties is a mystery ... ?

It's not a case of being afraid, it's a case of what's there already being enough to go on. As I said on the Yemenia thread a short while ago, someone with sufficient time and inclination could transcribe the low-res plots of the AF447 report back into a table and run that through FAS, but it won't tell anyone anything they don't already know.

You dozy consider other manufacturers have protected their product but never on earth Airbus would do so.

I said manufacturers did that *in the past* - it invariably made them look foolish when proved wrong, and in the case of McDonnell-Douglas effectively ruined their reputation.

In any matter, with the A330 there's nothing to protect - it's already a success.

[jcjeant]

In any matter, with the A330 there's nothing to protect - it's already a success
Well .. if this is a success .. all must be made for keep it as a succes ...
That's the goal of all manufacturers .. even toys manufacturers !

[DozyWannabe]

@jcj:

That's just it - there's no way to reverse that success at this point. According to Wikipedia they've built 984 of the things, with an order backlog of a further 262. It's a proven and reliable platform, and with the design revisions that came out of this accident investigation it'll be even safer.

By the time those 262 airframes are delivered into service, it's likely that Airbus will begin to wind the programme down in favour of the A350 (about which they've made a big deal regarding a more hands-on control philosophy).

While I remain convinced that the controversy regarding the A320 in the late '80s was at the very least more scuttlebutt than fact, the idea that Airbus might try to protect their investment - being unproven technology (on the line) - at least seemed plausible in a logical sense. Nowadays, with the technology proven, the FBW types having recouped their R&D costs several times over and with Airbus being one of the two largest players in the civil airliner market, the idea makes no sense whatsoever.

[xcitation]

Would there be some proprietary reason for hiding raw data. This might prevent competitors reverse engineering systems?
Personally i can't think of what harm sharing the raw data would cause.
Hearing the full CVR from beginning not just 20mins or whatever would help in understanding the tone and context of the flight deck e.g. briefings, interaction, relationship. Presumably BEA has heard and judged it to not be relevant.
No one can be sure what all of the instruments show and which item is being pointed at by crew. Therefore the report suggests video equipment recording.
Improvement needed in all areas: pilot skill, regulator, training, airline, manufacturer, CRM, culture. The system failed tragically that night.
Still no clear answer to basic faults why PF pull up repeatedly and why PM sees this and repeatedly requests fix but does not aggressively assert control. Very sad and frustrating incident.

[DozyWannabe]

Would there be some proprietary reason for hiding raw data. This might prevent competitors reverse engineering systems?

No - the DFDR is simply recording parameters and cannot reveal anything of that nature. In any case nothing's being "hidden" - it's just that publishing/handling the sheer amount of data is impractical.

[BARKINGMAD]

There's so much on this accident on the forum, apologies for asking what may have been explained already.

1) Have the FTLs under which the crew were working been eliminated as a possible contributary cause of this HF accident? Were they really well rested etc before reporting for duty?

2) Dozy mentions the dissemination of info to crews or its possible failure. After a quarter of a century in airline flying, I've watched with alarm the onset of totally electronic means of promulgating knowledge to our profession.

There was nothing to beat actually having to insert a page in a manual for drawing ones attention to the latest hot news/SOP/Safety Warning. Now I fear the really important stuff is getting lost in the maelstrom of bumph which regularly hits the screen, so much of it because ANYONE with connection to Flight Ops can push out chaff at the touch of a button.

In the days when it had to be composed, proof-read and sent to the printing company FOR A COST, it seems there was less trash to wade through than in our supposedly paperless environment.

Answers on a postcard please.......................................? :ugh:

[jcjeant]

In any case nothing's being "hidden" - it's just that publishing/handling the sheer amount of data is impractical.
Is that you do not see there somewhat paradoxical
If you do not see I can explain

[xcitation]

sheer amount of data is impractical

It could be made available for download or on data media rather than a print out or punch card!

[DozyWannabe]

It could be made available for download or on data media rather than a print out or punch card!

That's not the difficult part. As A33Zab says:
And we need a monks lifetime to decode the 300+ mandatory parameters into a readable format for the ones who cannot read the - RAW - 12 bit Harvard BiPhase Code.

The data is stored in a machine-orientated format that must be converted, then cross-checked by hand to ensure accuracy. We're talking serious man-hours for even 10 minutes of the 300-odd mandatory parameters, let alone the full 1,300 (approx.). Call me kooky, but I'd need some serious evidence that the published data was doubtful before even considering diverting resources into that effort.

As a member of the lay public, I see no such evidence - perhaps those calling for this would care to provide some?

[Capn Bloggs]

After a quarter of a century in airline flying, I've watched with alarm the onset of totally electronic means of promulgating knowledge to our profession.

There was nothing to beat actually having to insert a page in a manual for drawing ones attention to the latest hot news/SOP/Safety Warning. Now I fear the really important stuff is getting lost in the maelstrom of bumph which regularly hits the screen, so much of it because ANYONE with connection to Flight Ops can push out chaff at the touch of a button.

In the days when it had to be composed, proof-read and sent to the printing company FOR A COST, it seems there was less trash to wade through than in our supposedly paperless environment.

Answers on a postcard please.......................................?
This should fit: I agree. My pet hate: no change bars and old change bars not removed. :{

[A33Zab]

If it was published in csv, there are thousands out there, free too.


The request was to publish RAW data, any other format will not satisfy the critics because beforehand data will be edited by the authorities.

[roulishollandais]

As a member of the lay public, I see no such evidence - perhaps those calling for this would care to provide some?The interest of air safety improvement should be that BEA would work like scientists, conforming to science production laws. Everyhing is OPEN to criticizing eyes. That is not the case with BEA reports.
First of that, dangerously missing in BEA reports since "Europe" puts its nose there, are the raw data copy, and the names and adress of people who did the inquiry, analysis and reports.Missing too is the possibility to ask more precisions.
That is how science works. You may keep secrecy so long you are not publishing.Since you are publishing you must prove everything publicly and sign the work. :)

[DozyWannabe]

For those that find my input dubious as a result of my non-pilot status - here's another take (from the Asiana/SFO thread):

I do flight data analysis and know that images and videos created from "data" have both the power to easily convince a credulous and information-seeking audience but can also be significantly in error and can draw parties to incorrect conclusions.

[roulishollandais]

"The Dangers of Interaction with Modular and Self-Healing Avionics Applications: Redundancy Considered Harmful". C.W. Johnson, C. Michael Holloway (2 February 2009). http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/pa...Submission.pdf
Thank you to Australia for the open reports.

Why and how many more odds, computer guys like Chris Johnson & al. after their short and concise work are still wayting to stop that lettal war between designers of complex systems in airliners and pilots. ?

I was both airline pilot and computer guy (the latter first during ten years) and my ethic of science never allowed me to risk the lifes of the users or dependant from my algorithms by designing systems that users are not unanim to request FREELY after due information and explaination. and coordination and long and accurate testing at office. If they don't have enough money to do so, dodn't do it. If they have to much money and think they can buy you, so don't do it. I had to say a strong and definitive "NO" a few times. The scientist knows, the scientist is responsible from such hazardous results.

I say it again an aircraft is not to be designed as a complex system. Otherwise you cannot survive when you have fire on board, loss of electricity, loss of hydraulics, bad waether, and the experienced flight crew here know it happens and had to overcome such flights and possible traumatism with enough motivation to continue to fly, qiet.:)

[CONF iture]

For those that find my input dubious as a result of my non-pilot status - here's another take (from the Asiana/SFO thread):
Your non-pilot status has nothing to do with the fact you can spread totally erroneous information, like this one (http://www.pprune.org/7924933-post42.html).


Flight Safety Improvement : CEFA Aviation (http://www.cefa-aviation.com/en/flight-safety) is a wonderful tool.
No wonder investigatory authorities use it too.

Beside it, PJ2 was mentioning "data" not data, but do you only make the difference ... ?

[DozyWannabe]

@CONF - coming from a poster who venerates and promulgates the opinions of an ex-pilot who was certified delusional and seriously mentally ill, that takes chutzpah.

[xcitation]

That's not the difficult part. As A33Zab says:

Quote:
Originally Posted by A33Zab http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/buttons/viewpost.gif (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/511119-af-447-thread-no-11-a-post7923919.html#post7923919)
And we need a monks lifetime to decode the 300+ mandatory parameters into a readable format for the ones who cannot read the - RAW - 12 bit Harvard BiPhase Code.

The data is stored in a machine-orientated format that must be converted, then cross-checked by hand to ensure accuracy. We're talking serious man-hours for even 10 minutes of the 300-odd mandatory parameters, let alone the full 1,300 (approx.). Call me kooky, but I'd need some serious evidence that the published data was doubtful before even considering diverting resources into that effort.

As a member of the lay public, I see no such evidence - perhaps those calling for this would care to provide some?


If reading the flight data is so nebulus then why are some airlines routinely using it to monitor performance of all pilots (FOQA)?
What about the flight data is inaccurate?

[PJ2]

xcitation;
Re, If reading the flight data is so nebulus then why are some airlines routinely using it to monitor performance of all pilots (FOQA)?
What about the flight data is inaccurate?
The data is easy for airlines to read because they invest tons of money, (hundreds of thousands, in some case millions) in their FOQA programs, which includes the proprietary software which is capable of reading the information that comes from the SSFDR.

This is not "Excel spreadsheet" work, nor is it "hacker's" work.

If, as I take it, you are speaking for those who would have this data on their laptops etc so they can for themselves make up their own minds as to the veridicality of the SSFDR data, please tell me what you know about flight data analysis - not in general; the details, so at least you may establish yourself as someone who comprehends what is being demanded here.

[xcitation]

PJ,
I know nothing about flight data analysis, hence my posts only ask questions on the subject.
What I would speculate is that if data was to be made available then maybe someone sharper than me with access to specialist software/skills might take a look and run analysis. These might be industry professionals, software companies, academics etc. Who knows they might contribute something new to the incident/safety, use it as a case study or corroborate the BEA. What harm could it do?
Perhaps the reality is that the legal council for the stake holders would throw a fit so we are probably wasting time talking data sharing.

[PJ2]

xcitation;
What harm could it do?I realize you're not alone in the view expressed regarding possession of flight data, so I appreciate your response.

From an experienced view, (35 years flying transports, 25 concurrent years doing flight data analysis and running FOQA programs), the general thrust of the interminable argument,"give us the data and we'll make up our own minds about how this accident occurred", notwithstanding a scent of underlying arrogance, has sufficient flaws in it to cause a lot of material harm to established flight safety processes in which the industry has invested billions and for which our passengers may be thankful in terms of real outcomes.

In any one instance we are always a breath away from the threat of subpoena of the data, not for the purposes of advancing this or that principle of operational flight safety but for reasons of legal discovery. Such turns in the purposes of flight data would ultimately destroy these programs which, at the present time, airlines are increasinbly embracing. The industry would rapidly respond to any "public interest release" of flight data with the logical question, "Why voluntarily collect the prosecution's evidence?"

At least in the U.S., the FAA has chosen to protect FOQA data so long as the carrier in question is conducting such a program in accordance with the FARs. In Canada, no such protection and no such legislation exists, (in fact, either under the CARs or the Aeronautics Act, flight data analysis programs are not required in Canada), and in Asia flight data is used by most carriers to fine pilots, punish them and otherwise enforce strict behaviours. It is a most unenlightened use of safety information.

The outcomes of distributing data for a specific accident to all and sundry for individual purposes as per the arguments on these threads are at most, indeterminate, the benefits abundantly unclear, the arguments conflated.

The desire for access to "all" the data is first illusory as there is insufficent data to resolve some of the questions genuinely asked, and second, demonstrates an obvious lack of concern and understanding for why flight data is expensively collected and legally protected (at least in the U.S.), for use in safety programs. Flight data is not for the use of those who have an agenda and wish to use data to prove it. I have encountered many internal requests for such data and always, there is a point of view wanting evidence, the desire to enhance flight safety nowhere to be seen.

The counter-argument is clear: The release through some legal fashion (because it certainly will not occur voluntarily) may satisfy a tiny group's desire for a bit more data but,it will never resolve some questions and will always raise others, and unless one is willing and capable of going where the data leads and does not bring preconceived notions of how and why this accident occurred, more data will resolve nothing.

One only need view what happened when AF447's data was released in May, 2011 (IIRC) which was going to end the questions. For demanding "more", it settled and will settle nothing, primarily because the data was not in accord with their views of how the accident occurred because surely something was being kept hidden and secret or they just plain aren't experienced at interpreting flight data and don't fly airplanes. Believe it or not in this day of internet 'experts', some things do take years to understand in order to employ judiciously, and if one has an agenda, the interpretation of flight data will most certainly cause harm for obvious reasons.

There is one legitimate frustration in terms of there not being sufficient data for those who understand flight data, the frustration was the absence of certain parameters, some being what the PF's PFD & ND displays were showing during the UAS event. Resolving that problem is complicated and expensive and if you wish for further I can delve into the details of why this is so.

I hope this has illustrated why harm can come to flight safety programs and FOQA specifically should the release of flight data occur in the ways contemplated here.

[Lonewolf_50]

PJ, given the overly chatty nature of the NTSB spokesperson regarding the SFO accident, I think I'll post a link to your points on FOQA and safety data in that thread to help some folks understand the problems with flight data release and flight safety culture.

Once again, sir, very well said. :ok:

[DozyWannabe]

PJ2, I believe the term I'm looking for here is "knocked it for six". I fervently hope people will take note.

One only need view what happened when AF447's data was released in May, 2011 (IIRC) which was going to end the questions.

I think there was something of an initial sense of disbelief from most, if not all interested parties at the time, because the data was not what people were expecting.

For demanding "more", it settled and will settle nothing, primarily because the data was not in accord with their views of how the accident occurred because surely something was being kept hidden and secret...

I'd feel more sympathy for their position if they could provide a shred of evidence that such things were done in the last 30 years, when the fact is that they cannot.

There is one legitimate frustration in terms of there not being sufficient data for those who understand flight data, the frustration was the absence of certain parameters, some being what the PF's PFD & ND displays were showing during the UAS event.

Agreed - though the argument that there was little or no discrepancy between the LHS display data (which was recorded) and the RHS (which was not) is a reasonably strong one, due to the fact that there is no mention of any such discrepancy on the CVR.

Again - thanks for a well-reasoned and cogent summary, sir.

[jcjeant]

I fully agree with the very arguments of PJ2 and Doze
So what would the general public with the raw data DFDR? .. nothing ..
All that interests the general public (and even more) was published in the official BEA report on this accident
But as everyone knows .. this is one of the episodes following a plane crash
The first episode took place (the investigation into the accident and the resulting final report) and the second episode has not started yet .. that is to say the court case resulting from the judicial inquiry parallel to the technical investigation of BEA
The trial court has several actors (briefly):
The judge (Juge d'instruction) who lead the inquiry
The judge who will lead the trial
Stakeholders in the process .. that is to say the plaintiffs (victims families etc. ..) and the parties cited by the plaintiffs (Air France Airbus) and their respective attorneys and experts
If the judge in charge of the trial decide that is useful to join in the trial the documents of the BEA report , the plaintiffs (and their experts and attorneys) will have therefore the right (so that the trial is fair for all parties) to have access to all parts that had access other parties (Air France and Airbus)
The raw DFDR data will be one of those pieces

[PJ2]

The raw DFDR data will be one of those pieces
What actually is "the raw DFDR data - what does the term "raw" mean?

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50;

I'm glad the comments were of some use. It's a complicated subject!

We live in a world which increasingly considers itself an expert on anything that will advantage our own interests and so those thus pronouncing do feel free, without conditions and without a defense of personal expertise, to declare rights to such information that so advantages.

What is forgotten is, that such seemingly legitimate requests, occurring as they do in the groupthink environment described above, can (and do) do serious damage to the very processes which, though far more broadly, intend to accomplish the same ends - that of ensuring as high a standard of flight safety as is humanly and technically possible.

Any such contravention of these long-standing and historically-developed principles will unquestionably compromise those hard-won, hard-fought standards even as any one single, unique case may appear to have some semblance of legitimacy and therefore the inappropriate empathy of the courts.

Dozy, thank you for your response. From my viewpoint, it is that very disbelief upon initially viewing the data of what actually occurred on AF447 that I address the principles of good flight data work. It is anything but straightforward and if one does not instantly and immediately recuse oneself of all interests and preconceptions, then one is unfit to examine flight data and reach honest conclusions. Going where the data takes one, no matter who one may be, is the only way to do flight safety work. The gains made through prosecution are limited in scope and generally narrow in effect when compared with spectacularly successful flight safety processes which value data over opinion or politics.

There is little if anthing beyond that which has been cited in the BEA Final Report that can establish facts beyond current understandings.

For example, the possibility of what was displayed on the PF's PFD & ND being different from the PM's displays is always semantically positive but the actual probability, based upon both design and industry experience of such an occurence is vanishingly tiny. Almost certainly they were the same.

More broadly, given all the constraints and past decisions by regulators, airlines and manufacturers regarding logical-frame-layouts, (dataframes for SSFDRs and QARs) we are the beneficiaries of a system that even as some clamour for "more", what is actually available exceeds by factors of 10 or more, the legally-required parameters for such aircraft operating under North American, European, Australian & New Zealand regulations. If we are unsatisfied with such address, the place to enter the argument is not by demanding one flight's data for unique and specific purposes, especially under the notion that something is being hidden from the public interest. That doesn't mean the process is without warts and politics. It just means that giving "all the data", (whatever is meant by that), to a clamourous public gathering is by a very long mile, far worse for everyone for reasons given.

It is illogical that the industry would extend themselves in terms of data capture when such processes are extremely expensive and challenging to do well, and do right. But they do, because the value in knowing vice not knowing is key to the spectacular and enviable-for-any-industry advances in protecting those who use air travel every day. No other industry or government process including other modes of transportation and both private and public healthcare systems can come close to the safety levels achieved in this industry. There are very good reasons why this is so, even as such reasons may be dismissed at times.

[jcjeant]

What actually is "the raw DFDR data - what does the term "raw" mean?
Data that the BEA (collected on the flight data recorder) used to be able to make its final report
I'm certain that data was seen and is in hand of Airbus at least

[A33Zab]

Very valuable contribution by PJ2:ok:

@JCjeant:


The raw DFDR data will be one of those pieces


Although a legimate request, the RAW FDR data (translated into a readable format) will not give the answers.
The final BEA report is not based solely on FDR and CVR data.
System byte(e.g. FMGEC) is an used source but requires both Airbus as manufacturer specialists with in depth knowledge of the system and equipment.

[PJ2]

Okay. Not very clear or specific but I understand what you meant.

"Raw" data is understood as binary data which is the form it arrives at the recording equipment in from various aircraft systems and sensors; the flight data we are accustomed to viewing has been translated by proprietary software into engineering units.

As A33Zab has previously, correctly observed and which apparently still requires emphasizing, because no consumer software is capable of processing flight data, there will always be the accusation that the data has been in some fashion manipulated upstream of any software that is capable of displaying the data. The decades-long nonsense over Habsheim abundantly illustrates this fact.

[A33Zab]

To give one an idea of RAW data:

1 word = 12 bits (Harvard BiPhase Code)

not all bits used for value, some words contains only discretes, a combination of value and discrete is also possible (depends on attached computer/equipment)
1 subframe contains 256 or 512 words.

1 frame consists out of 4 subframes (= 4 sec. of data)

not all frames are used identical, e.g. the sample rate for acceleration may be once a second while documentary type may be sampled once every 4th second.
1300 parameters (330 mandatory) are recorded for 25 hrs.

[jcjeant]

@JCjeant:

Quote:
The raw DFDR data will be one of those pieces
Although a legimate request, the RAW FDR data (translated into a readable format) will not give the answers.
The final BEA report is not based solely on FDR and CVR data.
System byte(e.g. FMGEC) is an used source but requires both Airbus as manufacturer specialists with in depth knowledge of the system and equipment. Reminder:
I'm already at the episode 2 .. I will say the trial
It is not a question of quantity of data or complication for analysis or answers given or not ... it is a question of law
All parties must have access to the same documents as part of the trial
If Airbus and Air France have access to the FDR data .. the plaintiffs have the same right (fair trial principle)
What they can do with those data is the problem of their lawyers and experts

[PJ2]

jcjeant;

I won't argue the specific case for protecting the data against use in courts any further.

I see and understand the point you are making, and it is that exact point with which I take issue. This data has not been used in a court of law by the parties mentioned in your note. There is no reciprocity here.

[DozyWannabe]

This data has not been used in a court of law by the parties mentioned in your note. There is no reciprocity here.

Precisely. Those parties will be going to court with the same publicly-available report as everyone else. A report that highlights possible deficiencies from both of those parties.

[jcjeant]

Precisely. Those parties will be going to court with the same publicly-available report as everyone else. A report that highlights possible deficiencies from both of those parties.
I would be more cautious about using the word "precisely"
Await trial ...

[PJ2]

jcjeant;

re your response to Dozy's comment, "I would be more cautious about using the word "precisely"
Await trial ... "

Oh, I and most everyone recognize that the courts will attempt to, and will in many cases do what they may in accordance with "the public interest". Nothing would surprise me in any jurisdiction after Canada's, (actually a Quebec Court's), conditional release* of the "so-called 'protected-by-law' " CVR recordings from an accident a number of years ago.

I am arguing a caution as regards ultimate outcomes in areas of specific interest, namely the aviation safety system which has delivered unquestionably spectacular and enviable results for users and corporations alike due in large measure to the industry's unequalled-in-no-other-venue principles and efforts to protect safety information, gathered both voluntarily at great corporate expense and also as a result of legal SMS data-capturing requirements, from use in narrow legal prosecutions.

I am not arguing that it won't possibly be done, even as it may after much visceral political and legal wrangling at tremendous expense and collateral damage to the aviation safety process.

*TSB opinion on the protection of safety information (http://www.bst-tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/articles/multimodal/2009//ht_200905.asp)

[CONF iture]

Flight data is not for the use of those who have an agenda and wish to use data to prove it
Accidents don't exclusively happen to crew members with an "agenda" (http://www.pprune.org/7746254-post1018.html).

[WillowRun 6-3]

While perhaps well-known to legal counsel whose practices are situated within the air transport industry, the protection against discovery for flight safety data is not, I believe, well-known to litigators in general, or to corporate counsel. Just curious - to any who have posted and esp. PJ2 - could you kindly provide a citation to a section of the FARs which establishes this (or is it statutorily established?), and also, do you know whether the non-discovery protection has been the subject of any litigated court rulings?

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Excellent post.:D Thank you PJ2.:ok:

[PJ2]

WillowRun 6-3;

United States:
Advisory Circular AC No: 120-82 (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/23227)
b. A cornerstone of this new program is the understanding that aggregate data that is provided to the FAA will be kept confidential and the identity of reporting pilots or airlines will remain anonymous as allowed by law. Information submitted to the FAA pursuant to this program will be protected as “voluntarily submitted safety related data” under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 193.

(1) In general, aggregate FOQA data provided to the FAA under 14 CFR part 13, section 13.401 should be stripped of information that could identify the submitting airline prior to leaving the airline premises and, regardless of submission venue, should include the following statement:

WARNING: This FOQA information is protected from disclosure under
49 U.S.C. 40123 and part 193. It may be released only with the written permission of the Federal Aviation Administration Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification.

8000.81 - Designation of Foqa Info as Protected From Public Disclosure Under 14 CFR Part 193 (http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.information/documentID/13521)

FARS 13.401 Flight Operation al Quality assurance program: Prohibition against use of data for enforcement purposes (http://books.google.ca/books?id=Vj_8ClcvKP8C&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=fars+part+193+foqa&source=bl&ots=JjrHBOf5Xk&sig=lptjgbD9lHWMQAna-WHB8vi5hbw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=4sTiUYjgMeiDiwL1s4HwAQ&ved=0CFwQ6AEwBDgK#v=onepage&q=fars%20part%20193%20foqa&f=false)

"Sec. 13.401 — Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program: Prohibition against use of data for enforcement purposes.
(a) Applicability. This section applies to any operator of an aircraft who operates such aircraft under an approved Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program.

(b) Definitions. For the purpose of this section, the terms—

(1) Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program means an FAA-approved program for the routine collection and analysis of digital flight data gathered during aircraft operations, including data currently collected pursuant to existing regulatory provisions, when such data is included in an approved FOQA program.

(2) FOQA data means any digital flight data that has been collected from an individual aircraft pursuant to an FAA-approved FOQA program, regardless of the electronic format of that data.

(3) Aggregate FOQA data means the summary statistical indices that are associated with FOQA event categories, based on an analysis of FOQA data from multiple aircraft operations.

(c) Requirements. In order for paragraph (e) of this section to apply, the operator must submit, maintain, and adhere to a FOQA Implementation and Operation Plan that is approved by the Administrator and which contains the following elements:

(1) A description of the operator's plan for collecting and analyzing flight recorded data from line operations on a routine basis, including identification of the data to be collected;

(2) Procedures for taking corrective action that analysis of the data indicates is necessary in the interest of safety;

(3) Procedures for providing the FAA with aggregate FOQA data;

(4) Procedures for informing the FAA as to any corrective action being undertaken pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section.

(d) Submission of aggregate data. The operator will provide the FAA with aggregate FOQA data in a form and manner acceptable to the Administrator.

(e) Enforcement. Except for criminal or deliberate acts, the Administrator will not use an operator's FOQA data or aggregate FOQA data in an enforcement action against that operator or its employees when such FOQA data or aggregate FOQA data is obtained from a FOQA program that is approved by the Administrator.

(f) Disclosure. FOQA data and aggregate FOQA data, if submitted in accordance with an order designating the information as protected under part 193 of this chapter, will be afforded the nondisclosure protections of part 193 of this chapter.

(g) Withdrawal of program approval. The Administrator may withdraw approval of a previously approved FOQA program for failure to comply with the requirements of this chapter. Grounds for withdrawal of approval may include, but are not limited to—

(1) Failure to implement corrective action that analysis of available FOQA data indicates is necessary in the interest of safety; or

(2) Failure to correct a continuing pattern of violations following notice by the agency; or also

(3) Willful misconduct or willful violation of the FAA regulations in this chapter.

[Doc. No. FAA–2000–7554, 66 FR 55048, Oct. 31, 2001; Amdt. 13–30, 67 FR 31401, May 9, 2002"

14 CFR Part 193 - Protection of Voluntarily Submitted Information - Cornell University Law School - Legal Information Institute (http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/193)Canada:
Canadian TSB and Transportation Safety Act (http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-23.4/page-15.html?texthighlight=recording+cockpit+voice#s-58.):

(3) Where a cockpit voice recording, as defined in section 32 of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board Act, was released to the Canadian Aviation Safety Board or to an investigator before the coming into force of section 41 of this Act, sections 32 to 35 of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board Act, except subsection 33(2), continue to apply in respect of that recording after and notwithstanding the coming into force of section 41 of this Act, and, for that purpose, in the Canadian Aviation Safety Board Act,

(a) “Board” in subsections 33(3) and 34(1) shall be read as “Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board”; (b) subsection 33(4) shall be deemed to read as follows:

Idem
"(4) The Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board shall make available any cockpit voice recording obtained under this Act to

(a) a peace officer authorized by law to gain access thereto;

(b) a coroner who requests access thereto for the purpose of an investigation that the coroner is conducting; or

(c) any person carrying out a co-ordinated investigation under section 18 of the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act or designated as an observer by the Minister of Transport under subsection 23(2) of that Act.";Europe:
Section 1, JAR-OPS 1.160:

(a) Preservation of recordings (etc)

(b) Production of recordings. The operator of an aeroplane on which a flight recorder is carried shall, within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by the Authority, produce any recording made by a flight recorder which is available or has been preserved.

(c) Use of recordings

(1) The cockpit voice recorder recordings may not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or incident subject to mandatory reporting except with the consent of all crew members concerned.

(2) The flight data recorder recordings may not be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or incident subject to mandatory reporting except when such records are:

(i) Used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; or

(ii) De-identified; or

(iii) Disclosed under secure
procedures.
[Amdt. 7, 01.09.04]It is worth noting within the present context that data gathering and analysis by experts is a relatively new approach to flight safety and human factors for North America - the Brits have been doing this since the 50's and share data quite differently.

I know that you will very likely appreciate the complexities inherent in these and any such statutes and policies.

Notwithstanding these complexities, the intent is, as far as is practical and reasonable, to prevent safety information which in many cases, (ie., United States, and for example, ICAO and IOSA "best practises), is collected under one set of goals, intentions, requirements or recommendations, from being formally employed by processes which contemplate precisely the opposite in terms of goals and intentions and requirements.

Now I know that that statement and what is occurring in some jurisdictions is arguable both philosophically and by example, (notably most of Asia and some European countries), but I am a safety person and (retired) pilot not a prosecutor and as far as I am concerned the long view in terms of the viability of safety programs as presently constituted outweigh short-term, specific demands for specific data particularly when it is largely though by some observations not exclusively demonstrated that overall, the safety process works quite well.

This does not under-appreciate the long history which tort law and the notions of "recompense" have developed, to greater or lesser extents, within western societies. I would only argue that the history of data collection for the purposes described has not nearly as long a history and so litigation's accomodation of new information and processes, while painstakingly glacial in adapting to such accomodation still needs to recognize the successful implementation of such relatively-new "protections" in terms of the accident rates within our industry. The medical / healthcare industry and the auto industry to name just two, are envious of such a record and both have made significant progress in adopting aviation's strategies, won and defended at great human and economic sacrifice.

The is not to deny the "benefits" of tort law which, over many, many years may have exercised similar changes in safety processes mainly through the strategic avoidance of punishment, lawsuits etc. But with present approaches to flight safety, the "knowing about the nasty aspects" that is possible through the implementation of safety programs such as ASAP, FOQA, LOSA etc., it cannot be denied that the institutionalized protection of flight safety information is far more effective than the rare examples of "the public interest" which exist.

In fact I would argue, successfully, I think, that "the public interest" is already vastly better served through the present processes than through any narrow prosecutions or discovery actions. A "chill" on the flow of such information would not begin to describe the outcomes of any broad attempts or shifts in policy to make such information available to all who, for multifarious reasons of their own and a vague distrust of those who do this work for a profession, demand it.

I'm not clear regarding the meaning of "statutorily", but accepted (best) practise for the implementation of flight safety programs which collect data for the sole purpose of enhancing flight safety is the strongest possible protection of that data in terms of legal proceedings and lower matters such as pilot discipline, dismissal etc.

[WillowRun 6-3]

PJ2;
I thank you, sir. Thank you for the extensive quoted regulatory information and, as importantly if not more so, the extensive analysis of the underpinnings of the exclusion from legal process of the information in question.

(As a small preliminary item, my invocation of the word "statutorily" was meant merely to allow for the possibility that the legal mechanisms of exclusion were set forth in statutes, rather than the Federal Air Regulations (in the States), inasmuch as regulations, whilst having the force and effect of law (and receiving what is commonly known as "Chevron deference" in US courts), simply do not have the same legal throw-weight, if you will, as an act of Congress. I imagine that the gulf between administrative regulation on the one hand, and legislative enactments on the other, may exist similarly in other nations, but this would not be my field, and thus further comment, I shall not make.)

The analysis of exclusion from legal process of given classes or categories of information is one well-known in the law, at least in American law (as noted above, I hold no particular expertise elsewhere). Not only the privilege for communications between doctor and patient, or between priest and penitent, but indeed the privilege most hallowed in the law -- for communications between attorney and client -- all have their roots in the same general modality of analysis.

But as compared to those other privileges for non-disclosure and their genesis in the law and whatever we are to call the wellsprings from which developments in the law take place, there is another dimension here, to be sure, driven by the intensely deep state of knowledge one must have and hold in order to understand the complexities of the flight path (say) of a Triple 7 which might have been in FLCH mode with A/T armed but not on (until it was too late). These facts (if facts they are), a non-driver can recite, but there is much more to understanding the actual data, one would think, yes?

Certainly, if we are speaking of criminal law matters, I am not sure I can recall more than one instance in the States of an air carrier mishap from which criminal prosecutions took place. Maybe the Air Florida disaster in DC (failure of de-icing), but I don't think there were crimes charged. Or the - what was the name of that carrier - discounter out of Florida and the oxy cannisters ruptured in flight (DC-9, as I recall)....these are the only possible prosecution examples in the States that come to mind. Maybe I'm just not recalling.

And even more certainly, the plaintiffs' bar in the States will yell, scream, shout, make noise, and utter excitedly all manner of liberty, freedom and the rights of man, when it comes to suing someone who may be said to have caused a loss, especially a tragic one. Of course and it should be needless to say, the right to legal recompense is a bedrock of constitutional democracy. But it does not fit, and was not intended to be stretched so as to attempt to be fitted, to every loss.

I wish I had enough knowledge about the safety assurance process (a phrase which may do small justice only to the overall safety consciousness and the record it has yielded) you have so eruditely described in your recent posts, so as to discuss the process with some semblance of intelligence. Still I thank you for the informative and focused content.

[PJ2]

WillowRun 6-3;

Thank you for those examples where confidentiality of exchanges obtains. In fact in some jurisdictions, - Germany, I believe and I would have to confirm this, according to German privacy laws, the flight data captured on their aircraft belongs to the pilots, not to the airline or the state. I suspect in an incident or accident that does not apply and I know it would be more complicated than stated here!

In terms of confidentiality and data protection, when implementing flight data analysis programs great care, expense and energy are expended to ensure the confidentiality of the individual's flight data so that it could accomplish its singular task. It was made clear that confidentiality did not mean anonymity however. If something in the data indicated a serious event, there were and are processes whereby the carrier's due diligence is served. The matter becomes delicate when the data indicates a serious and perhaps even intentional departure from standard operating procedures; very challenging to maintain the integrity of the safety process while addressing such matters effectively in an environment of competing goals and interests.

In re, ". . . there is another dimension here, to be sure, driven by the intensely deep state of knowledge one must have and hold in order to understand the complexities of the flight path (say) of a Triple 7 which might have been in FLCH mode with A/T armed but not on (until it was too late). These facts (if facts they are), a non-driver can recite, but there is much more to understanding the actual data, one would think, yes?"

It is your last comment in the quote passage above that is particularly germane.

Having done flight data work for a number of decades I know only too well that even as one may be an expert in examination, flight data, (which, despite apparent views to the contrary expressed here and elsewhere) is very much an incomplete process and subject to what I would view as "the interpretive gesture". I would venture to say that the FOQA/FDA/FDM community would concur. The flight data process is akin to making up one's mind about what is going on in a pitch-dark room in which there are many people doing things and which is lit by a strobe-light at a "sample rate" of once per second, or perhaps once every eight seconds, or perhaps once every tenth-of-a-second, depending upon how one's "strobe light" is set up. Ideally, a frame rate of 26fps would be wonderful and increasingly possible, (anything is possible with fathomless funding!). But the process of creating, programming and certifying what is called the "Logical Frame Layout" is exceedingly expensive, proprietary to the manufacturer and often the subject of what we call an "STC" - Supplemental Type Certificate, which is an addendum to the aircraft's original type certificate. While not uncommon, the process is extremely expensive and time and resource intensive.

That's just to get more data, (typically onto the QAR - Quick Access Recorder a non-crash-proof box) than is required by the State in its aviation regulations. If parameters are missing and desired, it is anything but a simple matter to fix, even with today's inexpensive and flexible technologies such as Avionica's mini-QARs. The equipment is not the problem.

Once all is up and running, an aircraft may have anywhere from a couple of hundred basic parameters to 40,000 parameters on aircraft like the C-17. The B787 I believe has far more, to the point where if a system event occurs, the recording system reduces parameter capture recording rates for non-related systems and enhances parameter capture rates for specifically related systems.

In older aircraft, the requirements for the number of parameters is tiny depending upon age, type certificate and date of manufacture. Retrofitting aircraft with the necessary equipment beyond what was legally required on the date of manufacture is so prohibitively expensive that the FAA (and other regulatory bodies elsewhere) provide substantial relief in required parameters.

Returning to your last comment then, you have apprehended the matter precisely. For those who do not do this work and therefore do not understand its complexities including the primary need for experience in order to interpret data accurately, the presumption that all one needs is "all the data" just to settle things once and for all, is misplaced.

Whether we are discussing flight data monitoring programs or data from the SSFDR and SSCVR after an accident, there are numerous documents which explain the flight data process quite well. Links to CAP 739 (http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CD0QFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.caa.co.uk%2Fdocs%2F33%2FCAP%2520739%252 0Flight%2520Data%2520Monitoring%25202nd%2520Edition%2520June %25202013%2520%28p%29.pdf&ei=AiTkUbC3FMHKiAKBu4DQAw&usg=AFQjCNHa6W5XgNgr7SYTE6Xr3u8g9AmzLw&sig2=OCbeXl73WeHlSpBtC2mILA&bvm=bv.48705608,d.cGE) and CAP 731 (http://www.google.ca/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CDoQjBAwAQ&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.caa.co.uk%2Fdocs%2F33%2FCAP731.PDF&ei=DC3kUc25M-HniwLEqIHYBw&usg=AFQjCNGvDGrRyDpQiXgHxW44RbmLwTLyQg&sig2=rIDBSr8AfOJ0WvamKyTmuA&bvm=bv.48705608,d.cGE) are among those I have offered previously in order to help others understand the flight data process.

While one does not necessarily have to be a transport pilot to read the data, such experience is immeasurably helpful when interpreting the data. As with any process this complicated there are subtleties and when sample rates are not video rates, interpretation of the "raw" data, (not the binary code but the basic engineering data that is readable) is inevitable.

By the way this is my chief argument against the animations we see increasingly pop up hours or days after an accident when there is nothing but someone's imagination to guide such an exercise. I am similarly quite wary of animations-as-evidence, having done many such videos in FOQA work. The reason is simple: flight data supporting any animations necessarily will require "smoothing", so as to present a smooth flight path and readable, (non-jerky!) set of instrument readings. In fact, all FOQA software I know of will have numerous ways to smooth data, all of them legitimate in the hands of experts who use animations only as a rough guide and briefing tool. While this process is well established, understanding the process of how animations are actually created is important to a correct interpretation simply because any process which involves extrapolation of data in between two recorded data points can (and has, in my experience) led to wrong animations. Animations are extremely powerful in today's visual-image-oriented society and so have the power to convince when there may be no basis whatsoever to conclude. For example, let us say a control stick is sampled once per second. That seems sufficient until we bump up against an event in which rapid movements of the stick during a landing incident would not be captured, and in a not-rare circumstance, we could see two neighbouring control stick parameter data points indicating, say a full-nose-up position, but in between those two points (where there is no data), the stick may have been rapidly placed full-nose-down and returned to the previous position and those reading the data (and viewing the animation) are no wiser. I have seen examples of this phenomenon in ways not described here but no less challenging to interpret.

[llagonne66]

Thanks for your time, your patience, your competencies and your willingness to share your extensive knowledge :ok:

[CONF iture]

Having done flight data work for a number of decades I know only too well that even as one may be an expert in examination, flight data, (which, despite apparent views to the contrary expressed here and elsewhere) is very much an incomplete process and subject to what I would view as "the interpretive gesture".
Still does not explain why the pilots are prevented to get full access to their own data ...
Same reply here (http://www.pprune.org/7746254-post1018.html).

[DozyWannabe]

I have to jump in again and doff my cap to PJ2, who is doing a sterling job of laying out the complexities of the situation regarding flight data - not just in terms of the ramifications regarding disclosure, but also in terms of the scientific nature of forensic use of that data. To reiterate, the raw data must be processed heavily from its initial digital format into a format that can be read by humans as well as machines - whether that be the tabular format in the earlier examples shown or the plotted graph format as used in the AF447 report. Running that into a 3D animation requires further processing (e.g. smoothing) that, if not done properly, runs the risk of providing a misleading presentation of what went on. That, due to the relative ease of understanding such an animation can illustrate to non-technical people can cause widespread public misunderstanding and lead to long-running misconceptions about accidents becoming received wisdom. This is enough of a problem anyway, given the press's habit of promulgating unproven information to the public.

The irony is that flight data and CVR recordings/transcripts are so tightly regulated in terms of disclosure precisely because of the pilots' unions refusing to countenance use of these recorders unless such assurances regarding disclosure were given back when they were first introduced. A few of those same pilots unions have called for further disclosure and second opinions when the outcome of an investigation is not to their liking, and I can't help but feel that you can't have it both ways.

What is even more puzzling in the case of AF447 is that the investigation report, while acknowledging dubious actions on the part of the crew, goes to great lengths to highlight that the likely roots of those actions include improper or insufficient training on the part of the airline, insufficient oversight on the part of the regulator and possible design issues on the part of the manufacturer. Cursory use of the "Find" tool on any of the reports reveals that nowhere is the phrase "pilot error" used, nor any other phrases to that effect.

As a result of this, in a criminal or civil case neither Air France, the DGAC nor Airbus can point to the report to limit their liability because their part in the genesis of the accident is part and parcel of that report. I'd be prepared to wager that if the raw data were released, converted and parsed by the legal teams of the union and the families (which to do scientifically and correctly would in and of itself be a massively expensive undertaking), they'd find no germane information that they didn't already have.

[PJ2]

Dozy, llagonne66, thank you for your responses. My goal is education and learning.

In my view, flight data is "neutral" in its character.

One must go where the data leads and so your observation regarding the "irony of data" is correct; - the door of "proof" (for one theory or another of "causation"), swings both ways. In data, there is no guarantee of congeniality or favour. It is what it is, within stated limitations.

One cannot obtain and view the data with preconceptions as to how it will/should/may go. It may just go precisely where, "to one's surprise/disappointment/chagrin/delight, (name it), one wants/does not want, it to go".

Such prior conceptions certainly aren't about flight safety work, which this capturing of flight data enterprise is wholly and uniquely intended to support.

To put it in unmistakable terms, if one is seeking proof for one's theories rather than understanding of what occurred (within the limitations of the flight data process as described above), flight data is "Door #1, Door #2, or Door #3".

The foundations of this approach to flight data work regarding protections and the clear requirement for confidentiality as well as the requirement for caution in terms of reaching conclusions, should be abundantly clear.

[DozyWannabe]

One cannot obtain and view the data with preconceptions as to how it will/should/may go. It may just go precisely where, "to one's surprise/disappointment/chagrin/delight, (name it), one wants/does not want, it to go".

Quite. And I'm certain that one of the primary motivations behind the agreed restrictions was precisely to keep the data in the scientific realm, and out of the hands of interested parties who would try to "spin" it.

Now it seems to me that those parties demanding the release of the data have thus far been very cagey about exactly what the grounds are for doing so, outside of a gross misrepresentation of the final report's conclusions - they claim the report puts the accident down to pilot error (when it does not), and makes scant reference to the THS behaviour (when the writeup on that aspect is not only present, but also fairly detailed).

Given this misrepresentation, I can't help but feel that said parties are less interested in flight safety than they are trying to insert a note of doubt into public opinion via the press, in much the same way they did with AF296.

[PJ2]

Hi Dozy;

Perhaps. I'm speaking at the level of policy vice specifics which will always have their uniqueness and therefore the need for close examination of such matters and their genesis. There will always be well-springs at the margins, and they must be examined on their merits alone, always within the context of flight safety work.

It is nevertheless disturbing that in the last four years there have been four fatal air carrier accidents due to loss-of-control by stalling otherwise-serviceable transport aircraft, adding to the dozen or so in less recent years. The Asiana accident is deeply troubling.

[DozyWannabe]

There will always be well-springs at the margins, and they must be examined on their merits alone, always within the context of flight safety work.

Wholeheartedly agreed.

It is nevertheless disturbing that in the last four years there have been four fatal air carrier accidents due to loss-of-control by stalling otherwise-serviceable transport aircraft, adding to the dozen or so in less recent years. The Asiana accident is deeply troubling.

Which four are you referring to? As far as I can tell, Asiana did not stall as such, they allowed a low-and-slow situation to progress beyond a recoverable point. That said, I agree completely that this is troubling - but until the flight and CVR data is properly reviewed, I feel that significant commentary merely adds to the noise quotient.

[ EDIT:

What I find more troubling than the accidents themselves is a significant cross-section of the responses I've seen on here. For example, the number of self-identified pilots dismissing the ColganAir crash as down to the actions of an incompetent Captain, when all the report actually said was that he was of below-average ability (along with 50% of all the line pilots in the US). Likewise putting the AF447 PF's actions down to lack of handflying experience (which said posters implied they have in spades). Startle response is an aspect of human factors that hasn't even begun to be explored with any significant depth, and the apparent rush to sweep it under the carpet as an outgrowth of lack of ability is truly frightening to me.

As was the sudden rush to put the Asiana accident down to aspects of Korean culture based on anecdotal evidence that was anything up to a couple of decades old.

Surely until the facts are known and confirmed it would be far more fitting to adopt a "there but for the grace..." attitude, no?

[Lonewolf_50]

Dozy, please don't forget the following points that are troubling to many who fly:

Being able to fly straight and level, on instruments, is a core skill required of a professional pilot. The pilot at the controls in AF 447 was unable to do that. He didn't do it. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Being able to fly a visual approach, a stable approach, is a core competency of a professional pilot. The crew in Asiana did not. Professional pilots know that you should wave off an unstable approach (go around) rather than try to land it. The crew didn't, and made the go around decision many seconds too late. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Flying in icing conditions, one has to use and know how to use the de=ice equipment, and one has to keep one's airspeed on profile on approach in instrument conditions. (For Colgan, fatigue, and the culture of the company are of course rightly indicted.) I say again, you have to fly on airspeed, on profile, if you are a professional pilot. For whatever reason you'd like to offer, the crew in the Colgan didn't. Why? That needs to be addressed.

But do you really think that root causes will be addressed?

Check out a post Fox3wheresmybanana made in the Aisana thread. It has to do with why he didn't end up flying commercially as his second career.
What he said is very troubling.
My gut feel is that he is right.

If he is, it's very troubling.

[DozyWannabe]

Dozy, please don't forget the following points that are troubling to many who fly:

I don't and haven't - it's just that there are aspects to all of these that require closer examination.

Being able to fly straight and level, on instruments, is a core skill required of a professional pilot. The pilot at the controls in AF 447 was unable to do that. He didn't do it. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Exactly, and this illustrates the point I was making about understanding startle response. Everything about the PF's background (being a qualified glider pilot, among other things) suggests that he should have been more than competent to handle the situation despite the lack of HA manual handling training, yet it would appear he was so spooked that his abilities deserted him at the worst possible moment - why?

Being able to fly a visual approach, a stable approach, is a core competency of a professional pilot. The crew in Asiana did not. ... The crew ... made the go around decision many seconds too late. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Of course it does. But at the same time, one has to consider that pushing on with an approach when conditions are marginal has caused a plethora of incidents and accidents for airlines of any nationality you care to name. Colloquially known as "get-there-itis", the problem is as old as dirt.

Flying in icing conditions, one has to use and know how to use the de=ice equipment, and one has to keep one's airspeed on profile on approach in instrument conditions. (For Colgan, fatigue, and the culture of the company are of course rightly indicted.) I say again, you have to fly on airspeed, on profile, if you are a professional pilot. For whatever reason you'd like to offer, the crew in the Colgan didn't. Why? That needs to be addressed.

Colgan weren't in significant icing conditions when they crashed, that was the point. Fatigue and culture were as you say rightly indicted, but an opportunity to explore startle response was missed.

But do you really think that root causes will be addressed?

They'd better - or we're in trouble.

[EDIT : Just read Fox3's post, and for what it's worth I reckon the 74 skipper he spoke to did his profession a disservice by being so unrelentingly cynical. In my experience the only way to make a difference for the better is to work from the inside out, and if to do so would not cause too much financial hardship, then being in a position to be the kind of mentor the new guys need despite the industry would likely be a hell of a satisfying career move. On the other hand I must confess that despite being paid a compliment that keeps me warm on cold nights from the TRE on our sim experiments (namely that he thought I more than had it in me to be a decent pilot), my honest answer was that I simply couldn't afford it. ]

[WillowRun 6-3]

So, several posters here all have railed against the evident gaps in flight safety protocols (meaning all the faults, gaps, deficiencies, deficits, propensities to error, and so on, attributed to, or proven to have been factors in, mishaps).

Who has oversight of NTSB in its work, so as to assure that the investigation and investigatory process reach all the evident concerns, issues and questions? Is it the NTSB hierarchy itself? The Congress (choke!)?, and if so, which committee/sub-committee has the staff who actually understand this? Or is it an informal sort of thing, old hands who keep tabs on what's happening and make sure their concerns are carried forward and carried on? I am not, readback/repeat not, casting aspersions on the NTSB, but does it not seem that the technical aspects of the flight safety protocol (again, a word I am using to represent the aggregation of all the safety dynamics iterated on this and other threads) may be getting just a little....bit....ahead of the customary NTSB methods, not withstanding its very cool, very efficacious track record? Let me restate the query this way: do you have the sense that after you read the eventual Board report, you'll be saying, "well done, as far as it goes....but what about the larger systemic concerns, issues, questions"?

* Not * a driver, but intensely interested in aviation safety, kind of like sorta, as if I were running for U.S. Public Aviation Safety Advocate as a delegate to ICAO this fall (Sister Belinda, pray with me that the Brits don't have some putz-icle acronym meaning for PASA....)

[DozyWannabe]

@WillowRun 6-3:

The NTSB is a nominally independent organisation whose charter specifies that its investigatory authority is seconded to and beholden to no other organisation. In this aspect it is quite unusual in that while - to give a few examples - the BEA of France, AAIB of the UK, BFU of Germany and ATSB of Australia are equally independent, they are still branches of the civil service and as such they must restrict their reportage to facts and cannot directly apportion responsibility.

However what the NTSB does have in common with those agencies is that their remit extends only to recommendations which the regulator has final say over the decision to enforce. The FAA and Congress have no power to influence the NTSB's findings (just as the DGAC and French government have no such power over the BEA), but the regulators are not compelled to act on the recommendations. That said, the recommendations are ignored at their peril (Google "DC-10 Gentlemens Agreement" for an example of why).

I heartily recommend doing some research on the subject - the history is fascinating.

[CONF iture]

Given this misrepresentation, I can't help but feel that said parties are less interested in flight safety than they are trying to insert a note of doubt into public opinion via the press, in much the same way they did with AF296.
Exactly right !
Who the day after gave to the press the comment made by the copilot "Gauthier y va bander hein !" if not the BEA and/or Airbus ... ?

[CONF iture]

Animations are extremely powerful in today's visual-image-oriented society and so have the power to convince when there may be no basis whatsoever to conclude. For example, let us say a control stick is sampled once per second. That seems sufficient until we bump up against an event in which rapid movements of the stick during a landing incident would not be captured, and in a not-rare circumstance, we could see two neighbouring control stick parameter data points indicating, say a full-nose-up position, but in between those two points (where there is no data), the stick may have been rapidly placed full-nose-down and returned to the previous position and those reading the data (and viewing the animation) are no wiser.

If at each time the strobe light is flashing the stick is at full nose up position but when in the dark it is at full nose down then something of interest will show up on the elevator trace.
Animation is a wonderful tool for both pilots and investigatory bodies.

PJ2, you still do not produce any reason why the pilots should not get their data at the same time the manufacturer and the investigatory authority put their hands on them ... ?

[roulishollandais]

Who the day after gave to the press the comment made by the copilot "Gauthier y va bander hein !" if not the BEA and/orAirbus?
Other possible were Mr Tenenbaum, GTA, raw CVR reader... and other RG and F.M.networks :.:O

[DozyWannabe]

This thread isn't about AF296, so let's keep this quick.

Thus far the only reference I can find to the phrase:
- Putain! Gauthier! Gauthier, il va bander! Hein?

is within Asseline's own written rebuttal ("Le pilote est-il coupable?" or "Is the pilot guilty?"). Seeing as it is a phrase that sticks in his memory:

"Pierre's reflection made ​​me smile. It reminds me of the dispute he had with the Captain Jacques Gauthier, safety officer of Air France flights, following a low pass, with a Boeing 737 on the runway at Toulouse-Montaudran. In fact, during escorts aircraft to Air France workshops, this was common practice, the Head of Training Centre of the company not being the last to give the wrong example!

could it not be within the realms of possibility that it was M. Asseline or his lawyers themselves that leaked the phrase to the press based on his recollection rather than on the CVR?

The problem with events where press attention and scrutiny is so strong, is that who actually said what tends to become blurred in the retelling, and time (25 years now!) only serves to obscure things more. As mentioned above, the BEA is a civil service investigatory authority and is restricted in terms of the conclusions it can draw (even then, it could not apportion responsibility).

I'm also interested in the timescale we're talking here - "the day after..." what? The day after the accident there is simply no way that the BEA would have had even a draft transcript of the CVR ready to brief the press on it, so I would suspect that the only possible sources of the comment would be from an inadvertent ATC transmission, or from one of the others on the flight deck present to hear it.

[EDIT : One more thing. The idea of Airbus and the BEA somehow colluding off-the-record to point the finger at Asseline is in my opinion considerably undermined by the fact that the former allowed the latter to use their facilities at Toulouse to verify the veracity of Asseline's claims - some of which were correct, and those that were made their way into the report. Of the interested parties involved, it was Air France whose case was the most shaky (and indeed several deficiencies were found in the briefing materials supplied, not to mention the fact that their guidelines regarding displays diverged considerably from what was usually practised). Yet the people (and the union) who tried to champion Asseline's case seemed very reluctant to go after AF with the same vigour they did Airbus - a cynical interpretation of which would be that they weren't about to defecate where they eat (AF employing the lion's share of the union's members)...]

[jcjeant]

As you are there Dozywannabe ...

Conf
Originally Posted by dozy
while the BEA is independent it can only issue reports either if invited to do so
by who exactly ?
Doze
I doubt you need me to tell you that. They are involved by default when an accident or incident occurs to a French-registered aircraft, over French territory or if the aircraft was built in France. In the first and third cases, they are usually guests of the host investigating agency if the accident happened overseas. Sometimes they are called in by other countries' agencies as an independent assessor.
They are not exactly involved by default .. BEA go into action at the request of the Department (Minister) of the French transport as this governement branch is the real boss of the BEA

[DozyWannabe]

BEA go into action at the request of the Department (Minister) of the French transport as this governement branch is the real boss of the BEA

Yes, but once they are involved as the primary agency, no other ministry or agency is permitted to interfere with or influence the outcome of their investigation, and all communication with entities outside the investigatory process is directly handled by the BEA themselves. It's the same arrangement as exists with the UK AAIB, Canada's TSB and Australia's ATSB - the US NTSB has a similar arrangement, but its charter does allow for their reports to apportion responsibility.

The French authorities have probably been more aware of how such interference can blow up in the faces of the interested parties than most, as the accident which exposed industry and regulatory collusion (namely the DC-10 "Gentlemen's Agreement" between McDonnell-Douglas and the FAA) happened on their soil.

I've yet to hear an explanation for why the "judicial report on behalf of the families" regarding AF447 claims that the BEA report presents a conclusion of pilot error, when in fact it does no such thing.

[jcjeant]

The French authorities have probably been more aware of how such interference can blow up in the faces of the interested parties than mostI'll tell you a fictional story
You been the victim of a road accident as a pedestrian and you must be amputated of one leg
Your lawyer and yourself ask the competent court to prosecute the driver responsible for the accident for involuntary bodily injury and the court accepts this charge
Some time later the judiciary organize an accident reconstruction but only the driver is present .. and your presence is denied ..
Do you find that normal?
Turning now has a real history
The families of the victims of AF447 and their lawyers had filed a complaint against Airbus and Air France for manslaughter and this charge was accepted by the competent court
Later .. during the mission to reclaim parts of the AF447 wreck .. BEA .. french judicial representatives .. representatives from Airbus and Air France (two companies indicted of manslaughter) .. representatives of the Brazilian government are present .. but not representative of the victims (request denied by the french authorities)
Do you find it normal ?
As I already said .. I closed the book BEA .. and I expect the opening of the first page of the book of the trial which will undoubtedly also interesting than the BEA book

[CONF iture]

I'm also interested in the timescale we're talking here - "the day after..." what? The day after the accident there is simply no way that the BEA would have had even a draft transcript of the CVR ready to brief the press on it,
Far more time than necessary to listen to the tape and leak what is of 'interest'.

[roulishollandais]

@Dozywannaby, jcjeant, Conf_iture,
The passengers were mostly the winners of a lottery organized by a local newspaper "l'Alsace". One of their journalists was there, aswell as a reporter of the local TV FR#3. Both were in the cockpit and got later the head of the victims association. Ma333ybe the forest landing has been filmed from the cockpit -I did never see it- and the trivial sentence recorded. Why would it be so important?
The crew did also sing an old nazy song beefore take off, was it reminded at the trial. Singing nazy songs was also reported in another French airfield...

[CONF iture]

2 persons were on the jump seats, but they were flight attendants.

[DozyWannabe]

@roulishollandais:

The cameraman was interviewed for the "ACI/Mayday" episode on the subject and never made any mention of the flight deck. Both his testimony and the reconstruction have both him and his camera (which was off) in the passenger cabin at the time of the accident.

Again, this thread is not about AF296.

[CONF iture]

Again, this thread is not about AF296.
Then stop being the first to mention it if you don't want to talk about it ...
Or is it your exclusivity ?

[DozyWannabe]

Actually it was not me who started discussion on AF296, I merely said:

Given this misrepresentation, I can't help but feel that said parties are less interested in flight safety than they are trying to insert a note of doubt into public opinion via the press, in much the same way they did with AF296.

To which you replied:

Exactly right !
Who the day after gave to the press the comment made by the copilot "Gauthier y va bander hein !" if not the BEA and/or Airbus ... ?

In effect admitting that you're more interested in talking about the (discredited, and somewhat outlandish) AF296 conspiracy theories than you are flight safety aspects regarding AF447.

But don't let me stop you. Please, carry on - this is fascinating...

[Linktrained]

A different aircraft, but perhaps with some similar characteristics :

In the January 2011 issue of Safety First, Jacques Roysay discusses Stall Warning and Stall. He says:

"A practical exercise done in flight in DIRECT LAW on an A340-600 and well reproduced on the simulator consists in performing a low level flight deceleration at idle until the SW is triggered, and then to push the THR to TOGA while continuing to pull on the stick to maintain the altitude.
The results of such a manoeuvre are:
In clean configuration, even if the pilot reacts immediately to the SW by commanding TOGA, when the thrust actually reaches TOGA ( 20 seconds later), the aircraft stalls.
In approach configuration, if the pilot reacts immediately to the SW, the aircraft reaches AoA stall - 2 degrees.
In approach configuration, if the pilot reacts with a delay of 2 seconds to the SW the aircraft stalls."

The example that I had done to me on a Britannia with a new Captain who HAD to go from Flight Idle to Overshoot, MAY have been faster... But it seemed an age. (A Merlin would have been even better.)

I would like to count the seconds OUT LOUD to remind myself just how long it really takes. ( On a sim, of course !)

( The usual Approach Power on a Britannia would have been about " 300 Torque". After THAT example, I never used less than " 250 Torque ".)

[DozyWannabe]

The example that I had done to me on a Britannia with a new Captain who HAD to go from Flight Idle to Overshoot, MAY have been faster... But it seemed an age. (A Merlin would have been even better.)

Yup, that seems to be the thing with jets. In fact according to my copy of HTBJ, a lot of early problems during the prop-to-jet transition came from pilots who hadn't quite internalised the knowledge that with jets there was a significant increase in lag between a thrust command and that thrust being available compared to the old propliners they were used to.

That behaviour in Direct Law makes sense - it behaves just as any conventional aircraft would in that situation. If you're low and slow, then you have to sacrifice some altitude while the thrust increases to a point at which you can initiate a climb, no?

AF447 is a little different, being a high-altitude stall, and additionally the aircraft had sufficient thrust at the onset of AP disconnect to keep flying. It was the pitch up command that led to the bleeding-off of airspeed - but this wasn't a "maintain altitude" magnitude of pitch-up order, it was of a magnitude much greater.

[Linktrained]

Dozy,
IIRC my " new Britannia Captain" had come to us from flying Caravelles. Perhaps HE needed to be reminded that turbines' reaction to a demand for an increase of power needs some time, " thinking time ?", even if there is a propeller fitted to the front ( He did not stay for long.)

Even as trainees we had been taught to use a powered approach on Oxfords and Ansons, to be ready for a low overshoot.

( Later, at the gliding Centre to the east of Toulouse it was possible to do a low overshoot in a glider - the main strip was along a ridge, so one could turn over the side of the ridge and gained height or landed in a field at the bottom.)

[DozyWannabe]

Back to the subject at hand after this - promise, but:

IIRC my " new Britannia Captain" had come to us from flying Caravelles.

Well, Caravelles were famous for their excellent gliding characteristics, Britannias - not so much.

( Later, at the gliding Centre to the east of Toulouse it was possible to do a low overshoot in a glider - the main strip was along a ridge, so one could turn over the side of the ridge and gained height or landed in a field at the bottom.)

I bet that was a case of serious brown trousers the first time and brilliant fun thereafter. :ok:

[HazelNuts39]

AF447 is a little different, being a high-altitude stall, and additionally the aircraft had sufficient thrust at the onset of AP disconnect to keep flying.Regarding stall warning and stall, the differences are indeed not that big.

In clean configuration, level flight at low altitude with idle thrust, Jaques Rosay would have decelerated at about 1.2 to 1.3 kt/sec.

AF447 decelerated at about 1.7 to 1.8 kt/sec which is somewhat faster, but OTOH the margin between stall warning and stall is greater.

The point that Rosay is making, that selecting TOGA in response to stall warning doesn't keep you out of a stall, applies equally to AF447.

[DozyWannabe]

The point that De Rosnay is making, that selecting TOGA in response to stall warning doesn't keep you out of a stall, applies equally to AF447.

Indeed - which is why one of the big factors to come out of the investigation was that the industry's approach to recurrent training around stall warnings at the time - i.e. stall avoidance only - was insufficient. But we've already covered this aspect several times over, have we not? ;)

[CONF iture]

Actually it was not me who started discussion on AF296, I merely said: ...
As said (http://www.pprune.org/7353389-post1212.html) previously, go into Politics dozy, you're dishonest enough to succeed.

[HazelNuts39]

Yes, we have indeed.

Didn't the changes in the industry's approach to recurrent training around stall warnings come out of the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid?

EDIT: Rosay's paper is dated January 2011, F-GZCP's wreckage was found in April 2011.

[DozyWannabe]

Didn't the changes in the industry's approach to recurrent training around stall warnings come out of the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid?

It could have been part of it, I'm not sure. I was thinking more of the joint Boeing-Airbus effort leading up to the event mentioned in this article:

Stall training still constrained by limits of knowledge (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/stall-training-still-constrained-by-limits-of-knowledge-383565/)

According to the FSF's website page here:
Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid | Flight Safety Foundation (http://flightsafety.org/archives-and-resources/airplane-upset-recovery-training-aid)

Revision 2 of the Airplane Upset Recovery Training Aid was published in November 2008.

@CONF iture - I stated that I felt some posters were less concerned with safety issues regarding AF447 than they were dredging up AF296, then you replied in the affirmative. If that was a mis-statement on your part then that's fine, but I used both our words verbatim - how is that dishonest?

[CONF iture]

Dishonest to the point to not admit you're the very one to bring up AF296 on this thread.
Stop mentioning a topic if you don't want to be confronted on it.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Quote:
"As said previously, go into Politics dozy, you're dishonest enough to succeed."

Or, go to law school.

[DozyWannabe]

Show me just where in the hell I've been dishonest. Bet you can't.

[Linktrained]

Dozy #324 ish,

That gliding centre was unusual in that it WAS possible to do a low over-shoot in a glider. The other six or more that I had used were on flattish airfields. I had seen others using that technique, so my Instructor did not have a scared pupil - and he spoke in Franglais to me. ( Their Met man and I used the plotting symbols for a restricted conversation ... A common language of sorts ?)

The Report on AF296 stated that " TOGA is applied at 12.45.35. Four seconds later, the aircraft begins striking the tree tops."

Being now 15 degrees NU and at 122 kts... While the engines operated to specification, they did not have very long to have their effect on the aircraft.

THAT is why I would like to count aloud the number of seconds to get power from Flight Idle to TOGA ( On a sim, of course !)

LT

[Boslandew]

I'm sure this must have been covered in one of the threads but I can't find the reference.

I would have thought that in those conditions the pitot heat would have been on as standard. Has that been commented on?

[Lonewolf_50]

If you review the first two or three AF447 threads, you'll find considerable discussion of pitot tubes, and pitot heat, and the phenomenon the flight encountered.

If you go to the first page of this thread, john tullamarine provides a nice template for using the search function to look into those threads with any term you insert. If you use pitot heat, I think you'll get to see how the discussion went.

You can try

pitot af447 site:http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/ (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/)
or
pitot heat af447 site:http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/ (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/)

and see how many posts commenting on the system there are. Then pick and choose from those.

[Boslandew]

Many thanks, Lonewolf

[freshgasflow]

The next few pages are merged from an R&N thread discussing a Coronial finding in respect of the mishap.


Pilots at the controls of a jet that plunged into the Atlantic Ocean killing 228 people were not adequately trained for the emergency, a coroner has said.

Michael Oakley, North Yorkshire coroner, was speaking at the inquest into the deaths of two British men in the Air France jet disaster, in 2009.

Arthur Coakley, 61, of Whitby and Neil Warrier, 48, from London, both died.

The crash, during a Brazil-to-France flight, was blamed on technical failure and pilot errors.

Recording a narrative verdict on the men, who both died from multiple injuries, Mr Oakley said there had been a series of "systematic failures".

BBC News - Air France crash pilots not emergency-trained, says coroner (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-24352480)

[DozyWannabe]

The crash, during a Brazil-to-France flight, was blamed on technical failure and pilot errors.

And that's how things get misunderstood. The crash hasn't been "blamed" on anything, because the court case hasn't even started yet. The crash investigators' report was a finding of fact, nothing more.

[fantom]

because the court case hasn't even started yet.

I think you will find a Coronor's court is a court.

[Ian W]

I think you will find a Coronor's court is a court.

Correct, this is a legal finding. The report later says:

""The air disaster highlights serious public concern of whether pilots are overly dependent on technology and are not retaining the skills required to properly fly complex commercial aircraft.""

That is actually not a bad summary of what was being said on the AF447 thread here.

[Capetonian]

Whatever the findings are, the underlying cause will be the poor and distant management at Air France and the culture of arrogance and buck-passing which pervades French companies.

[DozyWannabe]

Yes, but this was a UK-based inquest into the deaths of two British citizens who died in the crash, not the proceedings in France where I suspect the feathers will really fly.

Anyway, all I was saying was that the article seems to be implying that the investigators' report apportioned responsibility, which it did not.

[Swiss Cheese]

The Coroner's narrative verdict is worth reading in full. Civil proceedings are unlikely in most cases since they have been settled by the majority of the families. The other legal activity is the French Criminal Investigation, into involuntary homicide. The investigation proceeds and the Judge has yet to even consider whether charges will be made.

[AvNews]

Michael Oakley, voiced concern at the level of training received by pilots while delivering a narrative verdict into deaths of two of the 228 passengers and crew who were killed when an Air France flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris plummeted into Atlantic on June 1 2009.

"The air disaster highlights serious public concern of whether pilots are overly dependent on technology and are not retaining the skills required to properly fly complex commercial aircraft," said Mr Oakley.

Pilots becoming overdependent on technology: coroner warns - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/10347640/Pilots-becoming-overdependent-on-technology-coroner-warns.html)

[Old and Horrified]

According to today's Times, it was the aircraft's "pathfinding" pitot tubes that froze.:ugh:

[talkpedlar]

This recently-retired old-stager has, during recent years, been involved in simulator-assessment of prospective pilot candidates. Two issues were patently clear almost every day...

1 Candidates with considerable glass-cockpit/advanced-automation equipment very frequently lacked the necessary limited-panel skills... often taking far too long to identify and master system failures.

2 Candidates fresh from ab-initio schools normally fared much better when faced with a requirement to fly limited-panel.. particularly if they were relatively current on limited-panel recovery by reference to clockwork instruments.

This appeared to be a cultural/national issue however.. substantially confined to certain nations.. but not including US,UK, Oz or NZ candidates who generally performed well under limited-panel conditions.

All these computer-laws and nanny-systems can be wonderful things IF they are mounted atop a sound foundation of solid, oft-practiced basic airmanship procedures. IMHO of course.

[Vertico]

Well said, Capetonian. Completely justified in the light of this sorry saga (and others).

[Vertico]

Again, well said, talkpedlar. It's the need to be able to fly on not just basic but sub-basic (ie, limited panel) information which seems to be in danger of being lost in these automated days.

[TioPablo]

It has been argued for years: the responsibility of those who cause accidents. Whether in the streets, in the depths of the sea or in the heights of heaven. We've all seen that we try to make the best (each in their own way), yet we continue to fail. I think it's time to take decisions about these problems as soon as possible. In regard to aviation, it is my personal opinion that trying to automate extremely complex systems for our understanding is a risk that must be assumed. And it is very easy to point to a colleague .. After the failure ... IMHO...

[A37575]

As one Boeing 787 simulator instructor in Seattle was told by one of the designing team "We have designed the 787 on the basis it will be flown by incompetent pilots - hence the emphasis on automation. :confused:

[bubbers44]

Please tell me the B787 is not going into the same hole as Airbus did.

[clayne]

Please tell me the B787 is not going into the same hole as Airbus did.

You can bet your bottom dollars the share holders will make sure they damn well do. These days, everything is about $$$ - and those who have it care very little about integrity or preservation of the ideals which got us where we are.

[silverhawk]

Clayne, agree entirely.

[bubbers44]

This is the new world.

[Ian W]

You can bet your bottom dollars the share holders will make sure they damn well do. These days, everything is about $$$ - and those who have it care very little about integrity or preservation of the ideals which got us where we are.

You have to put your arguments in terms that these people understand, Talk about 'integrity' and 'preservation of ideals' and you will see their eyes glaze over. You have to put things in terms of monetary risk if you can't they are not interested - despite mouthing all the platitudes about safety being first priority etc., if you can't put your argument into dollars they will not be even listen.

[Lonewolf_50]

What a coroner knows about aviation, and aviation safety, strikes me as a valid question regarding this report and its credibility.

I have a question:
did he have access to the training records and quals for all three pilots?
If so, did Air France make them available to him?

Just wondering.

[DaveReidUK]

What a coroner knows about aviation, and aviation safety, strikes me as a valid question regarding this report and its credibility.

There are a million and one ways in which people can die. If a coroner was expected to be an expert in every one of them, I doubt that there would be anyone qualified for the role.

[PURPLE PITOT]

Exactly. He is perfectly qualified to suggest that they died due to traumatic impact with the ocean. How the hell is he supposed to know if a pilot has been trained in stall recoveries without access to training records.

Reasonable to assume that at least one of the pilots had once held a ppl, and therefore must have been trained in stall recovery. ( and recognition of the condition)

[Trim Stab]

I have a question:
did he have access to the training records and quals for all three pilots?
If so, did Air France make them available to him?

I would guess that is extremely unlikely. AF would not be likely to hand over the records voluntarily, and UK coroner would have had to go through French courts to sub-poena them.

[DaveReidUK]

He is perfectly qualified to suggest that they died due to traumatic impact with the ocean. How the hell is he supposed to know if a pilot has been trained in stall recoveries without access to training records.The coroner did not make any judgement on the training of the crew or their ability to recognise/recover from a stall, other than referring to the findings in the Final Report on the BEA accident investigation - which he was perfectly entitled to do.

[Lonewolf_50]

There are a million and one ways in which people can die. If a coroner was expected to be an expert in every one of them, I doubt that there would be anyone qualified for the role.
Thank you Dave.
I must then ask why it is that the coroner's report goes into areas where he knows BFA.
If the BEA report is the ref, well ... it's already been done.
I guess one must follow protocol when one holds the job.

[Turkish777]

As one Boeing 787 simulator instructor in Seattle was told by one of the designing team "We have designed the 787 on the basis it will be flown by incompetent pilots - hence the emphasis on automation



It appears the Boeing 787 was designed by incompetent designers - hence all the problems....:D

[Hardbutt]

There they go, blame the pilots and training. The Europeans with those 'Side stick flying the airplane through the autopilot' and those silly 'none moving Auto Throttles', having had billions invested already in this system philosophy, will not retract and admit to the stupidity of this Airbus concept.:mad:

[Ian W]

There they go, blame the pilots and training. The Europeans with those 'Side stick flying the airplane through the autopilot' and those silly 'none moving Auto Throttles', having had billions invested already in this system philosophy, will not retract and admit to the stupidity of this Airbus concept.:mad:

Do you expect a 'logical' outcome to a legal case for damages?

One thing it could do is monetize the risk of for example, training regimes, in a way that will wake up the beancounters not only at Air France but at all airlines. But do not expect there to be any logic in the final outcome.

[DozyWannabe]

@Hardbutt - you're displaying as much ignorance as you are prejudice with that post. For one thing the sidesticks do not control the aircraft via the autopilot, and the thrust lever design, while originally unorthodox, has been proven safe and reliable through 25 years of service.

[Hardbutt]

Dozywannabe, whose the ignorant one. The side stick inputs go to the flight control computers (same as autopilot) which will have the final say on the flight control movements. And to add to confusion, pilot on one side have absolute no clue what the other side's stick input is. And as for the non moving Auto Throttles, how many deadly crashes have we seen where the pilot tries to 'figure out' what the f@#& the auto thrust is doing. Like I said Airbus are too far down the road and will not admit they had a silly concept with which they started with. :mad:

[rottenray]

North Yorkshire coronercoroner

Obviously. every investigatory board in Europe is WAY, WAY ahead of the NTSB - we still have to rely on forensic investigators to determine whether or not pilot training played a part in a crash.

Kudos to the coroner - his "findings" will certainly help increase the safety of air transit.

[airsound]

LonewolfI must then ask why it is that the coroner's report goes into areas where he knows BFA. I sat through virtually the whole duration of the coroner's inquests into the deaths in the RAF Hercules that was shot down in Iraq and the Nimrod that blew up in Afghanistan. I came away with a great admiration for both coroners.

Neither had, as far as I know, any previous aviation expertise, but both had clearly done detailed research into the necessary areas. They demonstrated an impressive ability to understand the detailed technical evidence placed before them. They were able to conduct forensic cross-examination of witnesses, and I was particularly impressed by the way they could sort the wheat from the chaff.

So I suspect that the coroner in this case was probably similarly well prepared and professionally capable.

[DaveReidUK]

So I suspect that the coroner in this case was probably similarly well prepared and professionally capable.As well as having the benefit of a 200-page report from one of the longest and most thorough accident investigations in aviation history, from which all of his comments on the circumstances of the accident were drawn.

A fact that his critics on here seem determined to ignore. :ugh:

[Uplinker]

UK Judges and Coroners are no fools. You only have to sit in a courtroom and watch to realise this.

They are extremely learned and intelligent. They collect evidence and come to neutral unbiased pronouncements.



I think the real question about the recent A330 and A310 crashes is not necessarily that the Airbus is flawed any more than a Boeing is, but why any pilot would think that holding full backstick/yoke at 37,000' or aggressively pumping the rudder pedals in turbulence was an 'acceptable' thing to do to an airliner??? Both these actions would have crashed a Boeing just as it did the Airbuses.

The real investigation needed here is how do some pilots somehow get through the system with these fatal flaws in their thinking. Why weren't they checked?

[Capetonian]

This is why :

Whatever the findings are, the underlying cause will be the poor and distant management at Air France and the culture of arrogance and buck-passing which pervades French companies.

Post #5

[edmundronald]

I would assume that the real problem preventing a change to the Airbus sidestick system is an implied admission that these controls are unsafe. However AF447 can be an opportunity, as it can now be argued that the decreasing competence of normally-trained pilots mandates simpler twinned controls.

Edmund

[pontifex]

Gentlemen(and possibly ladies),

I have been a Pruner for many years and have read with increasing irritation the inevitable descent of any thread into B vs AB rubbish. Both makes of aircraft have superb safety records but, like anything which has a human input, cannot be absolutely perfect. I have flown well over 100 airctaft types from single engined spam cans to the largest military aircraft in existence. I have also extensively operated both B and AB. In the case of AB, the FBW comes quite naturally after about an hour in the sim and the non moving throttle can be regarded as an advantage if its principles are understood. I have found it a delightful machine to fly manually. The B is equally likeable and, although I do have a favourite, there is nothing really to choose between them. The constant carping that takes place on this web site does nothing to enhance its status and merely give journos false ideas with which to titillate the public and drives the majority of readers to the more intelligent discussions in the Military section.

[DozyWannabe]

I would assume that the real problem preventing a change to the Airbus sidestick system is an implied admission that these controls are unsafe.

If that were the case, then why would Bombardier have adopted a similar system in their new C-Series airliners? More to the point there have been crashes in very similar circumstances involving a B727 and a B757, both of which have traditional controls - I suggest your argument is somewhat misplaced.

[Gretchenfrage]

pontifex

The constant carping that takes place on this web site does nothing to enhance its status and merely give journos false ideas with which to titillate the public and drives the majority of readers to the more intelligent discussions in the Military section.

Your argumentation does even less to enhance anything, especially safety, even if its status is admirably high it can always be enhanced. Unfortunately not with arguments like yours.

The carping happens because the industry stubbornly refuses to accept flaws in their products. The reason is simply cost and makes such refusal cynical.

Take B with the speedbrake issue, other designs being far less prone to error. Take the AB’s absence of tactile feedback, many accidents and inquiries do not directly blame it on this flaw, but any sharp reader can deduct that if it was present, there would have been a higher chance of not leading to catastrophe.
In both products a simple adaptation of the philososphy would increase resilience to incidents, and basically this refusal by pretending that it would not, brings out all the carping, because it is cynical.

It is to a certain extent understandable because of the cost involved. What I will never understand is that professionals sing the same lame song. They should demand and welcome any measure that enhances safety, or they come out to be either lobbyists or to be not that professional after all.

As an example let me cite you once more:

an hour in the sim and the non moving throttle can be regarded as an advantage if its principles are understood.

Any design with room for error can be regarded as advantage from a certain angel if its principles are understood, even if the advantage is only weight reduction ……
But if we want to increase safety, then we must take into account that understanding principles has its limits with the actual state of training and experience of pilots, and this state is certainly not improving! So such an argument resounds cynical, because it takes away blame from designs, from engineers, and puts it squarely onto the end-user, the pilots.
Designs can be overcomplicated or not adapted to human behaviour and such designs should be exposed.
Even small flaws can be changed, but to call professionals who expose flaws ‘carpers’ only disqualifies the caller.

[DozyWannabe]

Take the AB’s absence of tactile feedback, many accidents and inquiries do not directly blame it on this flaw, but any sharp reader can deduct that if it was present, there would have been a higher chance of not leading to catastrophe.

In order to do so, then your "sharp reader" would have to dismiss out of hand the documented evidence showing exactly the same kind of mishaps happening to aircraft with conventional controls roughly as often (for AF447, read Birgenair 301 and NWA 6231 - and for LH in Hamburg read the recent Southwest prang at LGA). To call what is actually a design *difference* a flaw is a misnomer, because the design has not resulted in any more mishaps than the other kind, and the length of reliable service this design has given thus far clearly refutes the doom-and-gloom predictions of the naysayers.

[PAXboy]

CapetonianWhatever the findings are, the underlying cause will be the poor and distant management at Air France and the culture of arrogance and buck-passing which pervades French companies.In my experience, this statement can be applied to a considerable number of Western countries. After working in commerce for 35 years, across a very wide range of different types of company and internationally, the move towards 'hand-off' management is nearly complete. In large companies it is the standard.

As to 'B' following 'AB' down the same route of production materials and processes (not to mention flight deck concepts) - it has been obvious for many years that that is exactly what they are doing. Of itself, that is neither bad nor good.

It is the management of the carrier that set the mood, style, practice, tolerances, acceptable practice and the 'never-under-any-circumatances'. There will be failures down the line but the buck USED to stop with the Managing Director and the Board. In the era of the CEO, the buck gets killed long before it reaches his doormat.

[edmundronald]

Dozy,

I'm not saying the sidestick is the *cause* of anything, rather that it might need modification or adaptation to render it *better*. Must everything be set in stone?

[DozyWannabe]

Not at all - but a dispassionate reading of the evidence does not support the assertion that linking the controls would make the design any safer. That much should be beyond dispute.

[pax britanica]

Pax Boy

You share my views on the priorities and capabilities of much senior management today. Unable to make any judgments without reducing everything to numbers-a process fraught with errors and lack of any specialist knowledge about the operations of a company.
I wonder how many big airline CEOs could actually recognise the different aircraft types they operated let alone the inner workings of the flight deck.
More on track for this thread it is interesting to se the approach of more modern UK coroners-for years it was an open verdict on pretty much anything now we have people like this individual making a bold and serious statement and the people involved in the re analysis of the Hillsborough tragedy taking an equally forthright approach. All that's aid though I was pretty shocked that an experienced AF FO managed to get trapped into the AF447 situation -I would have expected better but I suppose that's easy to say from behind my desk rather than a lonely dark flight deck in mid atlantic turbulence.

[Lonewolf_50]

I have also extensively operated both B and AB. In the case of AB, the FBW comes quite naturally after about an hour in the sim and the non moving throttle can be regarded as an advantage if its principles are understood
Isn't that the rub for any system in an aircraft? ;)

[PJ2]

Lonewolf_50, re, "Isn't that the rub for any system in an aircraft? http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif"

Yes, it certainly is.

I've been thinking that there isn't an "automation" problem, there is a knowledge problem. It is becoming apparent that a lack of knowledge of systems is the problem - the success of thousands of pilots speaks for itself.

"What's it doing now?", offered lots of times in humour, if serious, is an easily-answered question - get the CRM going, then click, click - disconnect the AP and pull the thrust levers back out of the CLB detent and use them just like ordinary throttles/thrust levers, fly the airplane, sort out what ever it was that was temporarily confusing one, re-engage when comfortable. To me, any pilot who doesn't/can't/won't disconnect the autothrust on an Airbus is admitting that they don't know their airplane. The machine flies beautifully with everything off.

PJ2

[Uplinker]

Capetonian; yes but it's not just AF is it? Colgan, whoever the finless A310 belonged to, and the carrier that recently crashed the 777 at SFO were not AF. This is a general problem - not enough time is spent training and practicing this. On the ATPL course, we did recovery from unusual attitudes* In my case; in a PA28. I have never done that in an Airbus SIM. (I've never flown Boeing).

pontifex; Yes, I couldn't agree more - A vs B is very tiresome. They both design and produce fantastic machines of the highest quality. (Unfortunately, they are nowadays operated by pilots with very variable ability and training).


*One is told to close one's eyes and take hands and feet off the controls. The instructor then puts the aircraft into an unusual attitude, for example, 30 degree bank, nose high - approaching a stall, and then one is told to "open your eyes: you have control". You have to instantly assimilate the situation and attitude and quickly return the aircraft to straight and level flight with the appropriate power, configuration and attitude using just your instruments. A very good exercise.

[MungoP]

I still feel that there's a fundamental flaw in expecting humans to monitor computers.. Computers make an excellent job of monitoring.. they'll happily monitor away for a million years..
Now tell a human to take a look at his watch.. and tell him to carefully monitor it for the next 3 1/2 hours to see that it doesn't falter...:bored:
Pilots need to be designed back into the loop.. with the computer monitoring us.

[DozyWannabe]

Dozywannabe, whose the ignorant one.

On the basis of this statement:

The side stick inputs go to the flight control computers (same as autopilot)

That would still be you. The flight control computers are part of the FBW system, which as many have explained over and over on here is a completely separate system from the autopilot.

In the most simple terms, all the FBW system does is replace the old cable and/or electromechanical/hydraulic connections with electronic ones. FBW simply translates control input from the pilot (or the automation) to the flight surfaces and engines, it is not an automated system in and of itself. Furthermore, the envelope protection aspects do not "overrule" the pilot, they just keep the aircraft within the safe limits of the flight envelope of the airframe.

[IcePack]

Sometimes a small excursion outside the safe limits may be required Mother Nature doesn't know the limits. Boeing recognise this airbus doesn't

[Uplinker]

Yes, but we are not monitoring computers per se, we are monitoring the flight path. In other words, the computers should be following what we have programmed them to do, and one of our many functions in the cockpit is to monitor the flight path and the instruments to confirm that the computers are in fact doing so.


A bit off-thread, but: That half-wit who wrote to the Times about pilots falling asleep because of the autopilot missed the point, as so many non-airliner pilots do. We are not sitting bored and going to sleep because of the computers* - there is more than enough for both pilots to do throughout a flight**. The computers may be controlling the flight surfaces during the cruise, but we, the pilots are still doing the flying, navigating and communicating required.

(An analogy is: a cruise control in a car looks after the speed, but you the driver are very much still involved in decisions and considerations, and are checking your mirrors every 10 seconds and keeping tabs on other traffic around you etc.).



*fatigue caused by poor rostering - long hours and minimum sleeping time between duties - is the cause of sleep incidents, despite what Europe may think, and is something that urgently needs to be addressed if we are to avoid any more Colgans etc.

**fuel and fuel system checks (are there any leaks?); navigation checks; keeping an eye on all the aircraft systems; radio work; position accuracy checks; avoiding thunderstorms by 20-30 miles and flying round them, plotting one's position; checking the weather conditions and diversion airfields along the route, (in case of engine failure, pressurisation failure, or medical emergency for example); checking position and that of others when beyond radar coverage; ditto when overflying states with minimal air traffic control facilities, and/or navigation beacons; avoiding turbulence, special checks and considerations during ETOPS phases; checking the pressurisation and air conditioning etc. etc.

Oh yes, there's plenty to do, and using an autopilot increases safety because that way we are doing all those other tasks as well and not using our total concentration to keep an airliner within +/- 200' of it's cleared altitude, at 37,000' doing 500mph, while being just 1000' feet above or below other airliners coming in the opposite direction!

[jcjeant]

Oh yes, there's plenty to do, and using an autopilot increases safety because that way we are doing all those other tasks as wellWhat are the other tasks ?
Piloting the aircraft ? :rolleyes:

[Feather #3]

jcjeant,

Try VERY carefully reading Uplinker's post prior to yours!

Cheers ;)

[RexBanner]

Uplinker please know (or indeed remember) a fact about the A330 when discussing the performance of the First Officer that night, the A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed. It is incredibly unfortunate because when the First Officer was pulling back on the stick the audible warnings were going away. Therefore he (wrongly) believed he was doing the right thing at the time. From what I read about the crash the picture in the flight deck was incredibly confused and I don't think they really trusted anything instrument wise. Would anyone conceive that an airborne A330 could be travelling at an airspeed LESS than 60 knots? Incredible but all so sadly true in this case.

Yes the crash was poorly handled as we know. But don't treat the guy like an idiot because the only one who sat in his seat at the time was him alone. It is highly possibly he believed the aircraft to be overspeeding given the lack of airspeed information and an audible warning that went away when he applied back pressure. Which of us could honestly say that we definitely wouldn't have been led into the same trap given the same set of unfortunate circumstances in the middle of the night on a long haul flight crossing time zones? It would be incredibly arrogant to rule it out.

[bubbers44]

They just needed the real pilot up there at that time who would have handled it but he was taking his rest break. No pilot who had a clue what he was doing would pull the nose up over 20 degrees at that altitude and not know he was going to stall. These guys were not qualified to hand fly obviously and killed everybody. Putting out the stall warning alert at 60 knots should not make a competent pilot feel all is well with that deck angle at that altitude.

[RAT 5]

Pilots need to be designed back into the loop.. with the computer monitoring us.

Bring on the dog; ah, but it's there to keep us out of the loop. Tacho's in the cockpit? They've already thought of cameras; add a motion sensor and an alarm; job done.

It is highly possibly he believed the aircraft to be overspeeding given the lack of airspeed information and an audible warning that went away when he applied back pressure.

This has been hashed about already. It's a very modern a/c with ground speed read outs. The lack of air-speed is a red herring. What was the ground speed readout? Back to basics. If you are not sure what is going on you put the a/c into a known state and wait & watch; generally level flight. Pitch & power and assess. If you don't know the basics it's impossible. There in lies the root cause. BASICS!
It's like the various crashes with blocked tubes. The instruments might work in the wrong sense. Back to Basics. Level flight at a known power setting. Gently move the stick and watch what the instruments do. If they are obviously daft then assess, but don't start pushing & pulling is gay abandon hoping to finds the exit to the maze of confusion.

[172510]

Purple Pitot: How the hell is he supposed to know if a pilot has been trained in stall recoveries without access to training records."
I think it is a fact that the crew did not do what they where supposed to do to recover from the stall.
You can only conclude that they were unsufficiently trained to recover from a stall.

[Swiss Cheese]

Just so everyone is fully informed of what happened:

The Coroner reviewed the full accident report, the relevant medical and pathological evidence, then called the AAIB as expert witnesses to explain the sequence of events and the findings of the BEA report.

Evidence was also admitted relating to Thales pitot tube problems on A321 aircraft in 2012 (see AAIB Bulletin 9/13), equipped with the same later mod tubes that were specified in the AD for the A330/A340.

After all of that, and some questions from the families, the Coroner handed down a considered narrative verdict. He did a thorough and even handed job, and the families were satisfied with the result.

(Coroners in the UK are judicial officers charged with conducting Judicial Inquests into unnatural deaths, not to be confused with US Coroners.)

[DozyWannabe]

They just needed the real pilot up there at that time who would have handled it but he was taking his rest break.

Bubs - they were all real pilots. For one thing the much-maligned PF was a highly-qualified sailplane pilot and would probably have had more handflying experience than his peers (albeit at relatively low levels). The PNF was clearly concerned at the start of the sequence, but seemed to be overcome with indecision as time progressed. When the Captain arrived, even he couldn't make head or tail of what was going on until it was too late.

No pilot who had a clue what he was doing would pull the nose up over 20 degrees at that altitude and not know he was going to stall.

As I've said many times, the old "no pilot would X" claim is something of a convenient excuse, because if the circumstances conspire in certain ways, then even the best and most experienced pilots can make horrific mistakes (e.g. taking off without clearance, retracting high-lift devices too soon, attempting a landing in a thunderstorm that exceeds minima etc.). As we covered in the original threads in Tech Log, the circumstance here seems to have been a startle response that got out of hand - combined with a lack of high-altitude manual handling training and a lack of recurrent stall recovery practice.

[Yancey Slide]

"They just needed the real pilot up there at that time who would have handled it but he was taking his rest break. No pilot who had a clue what he was doing would pull the nose up over 20 degrees at that altitude and not know he was going to stall. These guys were not qualified to hand fly obviously and killed everybody. Putting out the stall warning alert at 60 knots should not make a competent pilot feel all is well with that deck angle at that altitude."

Not having flown anything this big yet - would just one sensor can make the aircraft go into ground mode? Wouldn't it be airspeed+squat switch+(stuff)?

[DozyWannabe]

@Yancey Slide:

I know it's a bit of a big ask, but I recommend going through the Tech Log discussions on AF447 before risking starting the old hamster wheel up again. The <60kts IAS limitation on the validity of AoA data has nothing to do with ground mode, but if you want more detail, then the threads are there for your perusal.

The long and the short of it is that the aircraft did not go into any unusual modes, and the only technical problem was the icing of the pitot tubes. Even that had cleared prior to the aircraft stalling. It should be pointed out that the stall was allowed to develop to a point where the aircraft was so far outside of the flight envelope that any instrumentation would likely have given readings that didn't make much sense.

[Yancey Slide]

I'll go dredge the tech log, thanks. The question wasn't so much re 447 as it was a generic inquiry about redundancy in ground/air mode logic. I wouldn't have thought one sensor was sufficient.

[BOAC]

Yancey - to save you having 'hours of fun', accept that the designers expected (not unreasonably!) the a/c to be 'on the ground' at 60kts or less and therefore designed the software to close the warning. They now realise, thanks to AF, the error of their ways.

[DozyWannabe]

@Yancey - You're right, it isn't and there are several conditions that need to be satisfied for the systems to switch to ground mode. It's important to understand that the <60kts rule was added to the spec regardless of air/ground mode though - it's purely because the AoA vanes' certification states that they cannot provide useful data below that IAS.

There was a lot of discussion over the relationship between that limit and the stall warning in the Tech Log threads, and the only thing that could be considered a consensus opinion was that it is a very tricky problem to solve. This is because a behaviour that may be valid in some scenarios would not be valid in others, and could be downright dangerous in many of them.

The take I came away with is that no matter whether your instrumentation is of the old "steam gauge" variety or of a more modern vintage, it can only provide useful information when inside the flight envelope, or to an extent when slightly outside. The further outside the flight envelope you go, the less useful some of the instruments and warning systems become.

EDIT : @BOAC - see my first paragraph. The <60kts limitation is not related to ground mode, and the designers made no such assumption. What they couldn't take into account was a scenario in which the aircraft was as far outside the flight envelope as AF447 became.

[BOAC]

The <60kts limitation is not related to ground mode - and I didn't say it was?

[DozyWannabe]

@BOAC:

I may have misinterpreted then:

the designers expected (not unreasonably!) the a/c to be 'on the ground' at 60kts or less and therefore designed the software to close the warning

As you seem to be equating the AoA <60kts inhibition with being on the ground as a design feature, when it is not. It is an implicit side-effect of the design, but it was not intended to apply only on the ground.

[Lonewolf_50]

For the love of all that is Guinness, let's not recreate the 10 threads of AF447 here ... :=

[DozyWannabe]

For the love of all that is Guinness, let's not recreate the 10 threads of AF447 here ... :=

Amen. (That's why I was trying to keep it brief! As well as recommending referring to the existing threads.)

[BARKINGMAD]

Dozy, is this a new EASA/JAA/ICAO Ops limit which has escaped my attention to date?

If possible please supply chapter and verse so's I can avoid the specified conditions when they occur or are forecast. :)

[DozyWannabe]

@BARKINGMAD - I was thinking of AA1420.

[Capn Bloggs]

What they couldn't take into account was a scenario in which the aircraft was as far outside the flight envelope as AF447 became.

Not "couldn't", "didn't". Poor design.

BOAC did put 'on the ground' in quotes, the inference which is obvious.

[DozyWannabe]

Not "couldn't", "didn't". Poor design.

How so? Can you name and show a design which works consistently and in all scenarios when that far outside of the envelope? Bet you can't.

BOAC did put 'on the ground' in quotes, the inference which is obvious.

Again, how so? As far as the systems are concerned an IAS of <60kts does not mean the same as "on the ground".

[Capn Bloggs]

How so? Can you name and show a design which works consistently and in all scenarios when that far outside of the envelope? Bet you can't.

I don't need to, Dozy, nor did I ever say there was one. Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall warning on! Why is that concept so hard for you to grasp?

It's obvious what BOAC meant.

[DozyWannabe]

I don't need to, Dozy, nor did I ever say there was one. Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall warning on! Why is that concept so hard for you to grasp?

We went over this several times on the Tech Log threads - the designers did not intend to inhibit the Stall Warning below 60kts IAS, the Stall Warning was silenced because the AoA data was not valid below that IAS. I'd be prepared to wager any amount you'd care to name that this is true for most, if not all, modern types. As was discussed on the Tech Log threads, latching Stall Warning on would work in this scenario, but would not work in a scenario where the <60kts IAS value was false.

It's obvious what BOAC meant.

Would you care to enlighten me? In all seriousness, I'm here to learn.

[aerobat77]

You can only conclude that they were unsufficiently trained to recover from a stall.

well, to recover would be the next step , but when i understand it right they all did not even realized they are in a stall.

its not a forum,s job to blame the crew but we have to remember , all this happened out of a level flight with a constant Speed and altitude - with a stabilized and properly trimmed aircraft.

so of course doing nothing beyond maintaining altitude and wings level would be much smarter then just giving a full pull on the yoke and so forcing to stall. the question why he did this will never be answered i guess.

further its confusing not to realize it for several minutes by three people - when you have 20 deg pitch up but go down like a rock - what could it be other than a stalled condition ?

some might think that any ppl holder would have realized and managed it better and so Coroners start to blame the skills.

i have to give a point that in this very particular Situation - blocked tubes, stall inhibit below 60 kts - the design of the System might have further confused the crew, but this Situation is so dramatically out of any flight envelope of this aircraft and you have to make such fundamental piloting errors to force an airliner into this situation that not even Airbus thought of it designing the stall warning system.

best regards

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Let's review some points.

Uplinker please know (or indeed remember) a fact about the A330 when discussing the performance of the First Officer that night, the A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed.
The stall warning is suppressed below 60 kts IAS because below that value, the AoA reading are deemed unreliable. The fact that this also avoids false alarm when on the ground is incidental, not (prime) causal.

It is incredibly unfortunate because when the First Officer was pulling back on the stick the audible warnings were going away. Therefore he (wrongly) believed he was doing the right thing at the time. From what I read about the crash the picture in the flight deck was incredibly confused and I don't think they really trusted anything instrument wise.
The F/Os (both) were confused before that point. They didn't react to the Stall Warning. I agree that the S/W suppression would only have added more confusion (and perhaps prevented the CPT of making his mind on what really was ongoing when he came back to the F/D) but the crew mistrusted instruments early, i.e. before that S/W suppression. Maybe, maybe, if the S/W had not been suppressed, the outcome would have been better. But that's only a guess, seeing how the S/W was previously ignored.

Would anyone conceive that an airborne A330 could be travelling at an airspeed LESS than 60 knots? Incredible but all so sadly true in this case.
To be precise, it was not exactly true. The sensed IAS was below 60 kts. The real IAS was somewhere above 100 kts (as calculated later), but the extreme AoA prevented the fixed-axis pitot probes to catch all the dynamic pressure. Sad.

It is highly possibly he believed the aircraft to be overspeeding given the lack of airspeed information and an audible warning that went away when he applied back pressure.
This is possible indeed. Was not voiced as such, so we don't know. And would imply that "STALL STALL" was not recognized as what it means, so it's sadly not better for the crew.

[Lonewolf_50]

Coroners in the UK are judicial officers charged with conducting Judicial Inquests into unnatural deaths, not to be confused with US Coroners.
There is nothing unnatural about dying when one's body is subjected to dynamic impact with the ocean's surface as a result of falling roughly 10,000 fpm. :p

What would be both unusual and unnatural (maybe a robot?) would be surviving same impact.

[BOAC]

There is nothing unnatural about dying when one's body is subjected to dynamic impact with the ocean's surface as a result of falling roughly 10,000 fpm - really? What an interesting life you must lead.

[alf5071h]

“You can only conclude that they were unsufficiently trained to recover from a stall.”

Not at all, the conclusion is made with hindsight which infers that because an aircraft stalled – was not recovered, crew training was a cause.

A better inference from the data could be that the crew did not fly the aircraft as expected immediately after the failure. This assumes that the ‘expectation’ was that any crew could fly without airspeed, in the prevailing conditions and with all of the consequential system aspects of the initial failure. In support of this was the recent crew training for flight without airspeed.
The accident data might be better interpreted as the crew following the procedure for loss of airspeed after take-off / climb, a memory item which perhaps was better practiced / stressed in teaching (and better recalled in stressed conditions) instead of the level flight case.
The stall resulted from this misapplication. Furthermore the stalled condition was such that few if any crews would have been trained for; full nose-up trim, conflicting alerts and warnings, at night, and near convective weather.
With due respect to the coroner, there did not appear to be any evidence linking public concern, automation dependency, and the adequacy of training.

This and other discussions might similarly falsely conclude that that modern aircraft and automation ‘cause’ accidents due to the reduction in manual flying, yet completely overlook the everyday successes, presumably with some manual flight, and the very low accident rate. Yes the industry can do better, but not by focussing on one aspect.

The UK coroner stated that – ‘The pilots were not adequately trained to handle the aircraft safely in the particular high-altitude emergency situation that night’. There is no inference as to whether the training given was matched to the situation and the prevailing human factors; there appeared to be a systematic weakness. However, with the usual inability to identify the effect of each contribution – regulator, manufacturer, operator, crew, individual, it might be difficult to allocate ‘blame’ which the legal systems prefer, as opposed to understanding the contributors and alleviation sought by aviation.

[Lonewolf_50]

BOAC, you may wish to look up the term "play on words" ...

[172510]

The question of training is to my opinion the key one.
Is it possible to train a crew so that in case of another failure of the same equipment in the same weather conditions etc. the aircrew would not crash?
If the answer is yes, then the training of the crashed aircraft crew was not adequate.
If the answer is no, or if the answer is that it's not reasonably doable to train crews to get out of any kind of failure that might happen, then either you accept that public air transportation safety cannot be improved, or you do something.

Amongst the things that might be done, maybe
-initial training of pilots (verbal reasoning etc.) , the EASA ATPL written exam does not require any sort of reasoning ability.
-dialog between the computer and the crew, for instance, if the angle of attack values are discrepant from one sensor to another, show the raw data to the crew instead of letting the computer decide on his own that the bad ones are good without telling the crew; (cf canet plage accident), if a stall is reported by the computer, show the raw data used by the computer to draw that conclusion (angle of attack values, etc.).

[IcePack]

On the CVR a couple of comments intrigued me.
1) we have no vertical speed & later
2) we have no indications.

Um inadequate training on no instrumentation flight. Maybe, but who knows why 2 reasonable flight time pilots thought 16 deg NU at 35000 was ok. We will never know.
But whatever definitely a lack of training coroner probably got it right.

[Flyingmole]

Anyone who wants a more informed view on this aspect of it should just go to AF447 full.mov - YouTube and listen to David Learmount's very persuasive case. His view is that it is not - as he puts it - a loss of flying skills but a loss of situation awareness and cognition.

[DozyWannabe]

Um inadequate training on no instrumentation flight.

Except we know that the LHS instrumentation (at least) was OK, because it was recorded on the DFDR.

Learmount's summary is substantively correct in most senses, but what he does not acknowledge is that during the initial events of the sequence, the PNF tries to draw attention several times to the PF that he thinks the aircraft is being mishandled. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, the PNF elects to defer the decision to begin corrective action until the Captain has been summoned to the flight deck.

[jimjim1]

@dozy

the PNF elects to defer the decision to begin corrective action until the Captain

No.

The PNF made his best effort to persuade the PF to put the nose down.

However:-

From memory, meaning I have not re-read the reports recently, I think that there was one crucial moment that set the scene for the crash.

As the Captain left the flight deck he kind of casually inferred that the less experienced pilot (who happened to be in the LH Seat) was "acting Captain".

As it happened the LHS pilot declined to accept the (very good) advice coming from a less (perhaps inadequately) assertive but far more experienced pilot who's role was Pilot Monitoring. Quite simply I suspect that his (the pilot flying's) head was too big for his boots.

I think that this was the Captains crucial error. (Well apart from leaving the flight deck at all given the proximity of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone and the associated radar visible thunderstorms, which were a mere 10 minutes ahead).

I feel quite strongly that if the Captain had not given the "acting captain" nod to the inexperienced PF that the crash would very likely not have occurred.

[bubbers44]

But why have pilots in airplanes designated as PIC somebody that does not know how to fly? He did a stupid maneuver pitching up between the two of them to an impossible attitude to a full stall. No pilot I have ever met would ever do that because they know how to fly.

I know, it is the new generation of pilots so get used to it. I think I will take the train.

[DaveReidUK]

As the Captain left the flight deck he kind of casually inferred that the less experienced pilot (who happened to be in the LH Seat) was "acting Captain".

"casually inferred" ? what on earth does that mean ?

[bubbers44]

He probably didn't know how incompetent the pilot in the left seat was. With an equally incompetent pilot in the right seat pulling up into a full stall it was all over. Hopefully we haven't reached this state in the US. We are getting close with the pilot mills qualifying pilots who really can't really fly without automation.

We need to hire real pilots that don't need automation to fly. I know they were all qualified to fly but by what standards? Knowing which button to push?

[DozyWannabe]

No.

The PNF made his best effort to persuade the PF to put the nose down.

And when persuasion failed, the next thing to do should have been to take control, especially if one thinks that the conduct of the flight is becoming dangerous. It was the (possibly subconscious) decision to defer actively taking control until after the Captain returned - by which time the situation had got significantly more dangerous, and the PNF himself seemed to have been confused into indecision - that I was referring to.

@bubs - There you go again with "No pilot would X", and throwing around accusations of incompetence - the PF was a highly-qualified sailplane pilot, and to the best of my knowledge gliders don't have automation. Yes, he lacked training in high-altitude manual handling, but that's a long way from "not knowing how to fly". As such, a more likely explanation was that he was overwhelmed by the situation - compounded by startle effect.

As we touched on not long ago, even pilots who are considered to be super-competent can, typically when under significant pressure, make horrendous mistakes - probably the most infamous being the KLM Captain (Chief training Captain on the 747, no less) who tried to take off without clearance at Tenerife in 1977. So a pilot doesn't need to be incompetent to foul up, but - and this is one of the reasons I respect the responsibility you lot carry - in aviation you only need to foul up once at the wrong time to end a career, a reputation, and hundreds of lives.

[bubbers44]

OK DW they were both totally competent pilots. You must be right because somebody signed them off to fly without the captain in the cockpit. I am sure everybody agrees with you.

[wozzo]

Interesting problem, but it's hard to find an answer beyond personal opinions and sensitivities. Why did PF pull into a stall? Even the Human Factor Group at BEA didn't find a convincing answer. He maybe thought of an overspeed situation. But how did he come to this conclusion? And why didn't PM stop this catastrophe?

Were they incompetent? They passed all tests, and there were no incidents that we know of. Where they competent? Well, at least the lack of situational awareness and bad CRM doesn't show Air France as a breeding ground for good practices.

I think (speculate) that Bonin had an acute attack of fear of falling down, i.e. panic (the professional term "startle factor" is just an euphemism). That's something pilots (I'm not one) probably don't talk about very much, because people who like to fly don't suffer in any meaningful way from it, it's trained away, and experience does the rest. But I'm asking if somewhere in the old "reptilian" brain regions something is still screaming (but not heard): "That's dangerous now, leaving the ground!".

I also wonder if it's a factor that Bonin previously was on vacation with his wife (fiancee?) on board. BEA noticed his nervousness in the 2 hours preceding the event. So maybe his mental state wasn't completely in "pilot mode", and the professional barriers broke down more easily.

[PJ2]

wozzo;

On July 27, 2011 when the 3rd Interim Report came out with the flight data and we saw for the first time what actually occurred, I posited the notion that the PF increased the pitch because that what he was taught in his last (A320) sim session when given this problem. I maintain that the memory drill for UAS is confusing and poorly-written. It has in fact been modified prior to the accident, clarifying how the drill will be done, as has the way it is taught since the accident.

IIRC, his training for the UAS event was right after takeoff. The memorized pitch attitude is 15° and TOGA for those circumstances. Rather than climb on board the another hamster wheel, the original post is here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-40.html#post6600248).

Many disagree with this notion but I have seen no other explanations with greater plausibility and lots of psychological etc explanations which may or may not be true. I believe that he believed he was doing exactly as he was trained, uncertain though the stick inputs were, but did not have the experience to know what was about to happen to the energy of the aircraft. If he had pulled to 5deg as the checklist seems to indicate, (and then when above MSL or circuit altitude, level off for troubleshooting, which is what cruise altitude already is), I think it would have not resulted in the stall. I think he kept pulling because the airplane wasn't at 15° - all in all a series of inputs that speak to uncertainty and hesitation.

As I have pointed out numerous times, likely in all eleventeen threads on this accident, cockpit discipline, meaning their SOPs and CRM, fell apart instantly and that in my view is the root cause of the accident because, by following SOPs, (ECAM drills, paper drills, status, etc etc) and using correct CRM procedures to maintain discipline and sort out the problem before independently leaping into (unknown) individual actions, the accident could have been prevented because there were a number of points along the pathway to the stall that would have altered the course of this accident had such been employed.

Again as I have pointed out numerous times, a UAS event is NOT an emergency and does not require instant, un-coordinated, undisciplined action. It is not an engine fire, a depressurization, an hydraulic failure etc. The airplane itself does not 'care' what the airspeed indication is.

I am certainly not going to argue the "competent-incompetent" case. I have been in and seen too many things in 35 years of flying tranports and had sufficient personal "lessons" offered by the airplane I was flying to ever place myself in a position of judging. However, the basics of successful transport flying are, (and have never wavered from being) Standard Operating Procedures, and, since late eighties, Crew Resource Management, and these were/are no doubt heavily emphasized at AF as at all other carriers, neither of which this crew carried out when it came time to do so. I am unconvinced of "startle" - everyone is 'startled' to begin with - I have experienced a massive hydraulic failure on the same equipment and yes, it was initially startling but one reverts to training and deals with the ECAM accordingly. I have no idea why it came apart so swiftly and we'll never know. All we can do is re-emphasize what would have saved this airplane, this crew and these passengers, because this was not an emergency and there was no requirment to do anything other than ensure the airplane was stable while the ECAM drill was done according to Airbus SOPs. A pitch-up to 5° would not result in a stall so even if the PF had done the drill correctly, the accident likely would not have occurred. Anything after the airplane was stalled is untravelled territory and nobody can offer advice except that which is already in the books, specifically, if you have a high rate of descent that cannot be arrested by pulling back, you are stalled and need to unload the wing and reduce the angle of attack to unstall the wing, and then be very gentle on the pull-through.

All of this and more from many others exists in the AF447 series of threads. I genuinely hope we are not on another hamster wheel.

[bubbers44]

You can not blame training on pilot actions because pilots should know before the airline job how to handle an airplane. They should just need differences training and SOP's for that airline.

[wozzo]

Really don't want to start the hamster wheel again, but ...

On July 27, 2011 when the 3rd Interim Report came out with the flight data and we saw for the first time what actually occurred, I posited the notion that the PF increased the pitch because that what he was taught in his last (A320) sim session when given this problem. I maintain that the memory drill for UAS is confusing and poorly-written. It has in fact been modified prior to the accident, clarifying how the drill will be done, as has the way it is taught since the accident.

IIRC, his training for the UAS event was right after takeoff. The memorized pitch attitude is 15° and TOGA for those circumstances. Rather than climb on board the another hamster wheel, the original post is here (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/456874-af-447-thread-no-5-a-40.html#post6600248). (...)

… I remember that, and it would tell us that Bonin indeed had a plan (if the fatally wrong one). But just for clarification: That wouldn't explain the behavior *after* the stall warning went off (considering hat Bonin had a few seconds before realized that he indeed was climbing), would it?

[PJ2]

wozzo, please see my above post which I have edited and added remarks.

The best we can hope for is realistic suppositions as to "reasons why". There is nothing on the CVR that would settle this beyond the improbability of another's interpretation of the words.

When we first tried out the UAS checklist in conversion training it became very apparent that it was confusing. It still has that potential but we now have an accident that may settle some minds as to what to do. But I would never, ever pull a transport aircraft even to 5deg pitch with a UAS event and said so a couple of weeks after the accident, because it destabilizes a stable airplane. Leave pitch-and-power alone because the airplane was fine moments before the data got lost. The systems will sort themselves out during and after the ECAM actions but the airplane itself as a physical entity had all the energy and thrust it needed to continue to destination, without airspeed indications etc etc. There are numerous alternate ways, long discussed, in how one might determine speed and maintain altitude with such indications lost.

Lest anyone shudder at the re-arguing of this view, fear not. It's done.

[bubbers44]

At high altitudes no pilot would have a pitch even approaching 5 degrees. They went over 20 so of course stalled. They were of course fully qualified pilots on their airline. Makes you wonder doesn't it?

[Mr Optimistic]

....makes me wonder what the Captain was doing when he could more usefully have been in his seat.

[DozyWannabe]

Guys - the mods merged a thread from R&N into this one. There was nothing in that thread that was not covered in this one - or the previous ten threads on the subject. I highly recommend we leave it be.

[bubbers44]

MO, he needs to not exceed duty time, therefore three pilots are required. He can not be on duty the whole flight. It is illegal for over an 8hr flight.

[Mr Optimistic]

True but it didn't have to be just then and there are some oddities to the events. At least one of the pilots was anxious for his return and questioned the delay in returning and there is no mention in the released transcript of his reference to being bell'ed back or having just got his head down. Still, no need to upset Dozy ;)

[Chris Scott]

Hi PJ2,

Good to see this October Inquest discussion, including your two posts, finding its proper place in Tech Log.

Thanks for reminding us all of the deficiencies of the UAS memory drill (and even the written procedure) current at the time, and the probability that it encouraged the initial pitch-up.

As I've said before, I also wonder if the APPARENT sudden loss of about 300 ft of altitude (due to the removal of correction for airspeed when the IAS went AWOL) might have provoked a knee-jerk (of the wrist) response. But the realisation that this was just another of those UAS events should quickly have dawned, followed by a return to the familiar pitch-attitude for cruise flight. As you say, simply maintain the status-quo...

Inappropriate initial reaction is one thing, but what happened after AF447 had completely vacated FL350 climbing was irrational and inexplicable in a competent pilot who had spent many hours monitoring the flight instruments in the cruise and step-climbs on dark nights - much like the one in question.

[DozyWannabe]

Question : If the PF was consciously following the prescribed procedure for UAS - then why did he not, at any point, tell his colleagues he was doing so?

In fact one of the overriding perceptions of the sequence as a whole was that there was never at any point a co-ordinated effort to troubleshoot and apply procedure. When the PNF stated "you're going up", the PF did not respond with "I'm following UAS procedure" - which would in all likelihood have unlocked the mystery for the PNF and allowed for corrective action.

As a non-pilot I am constantly and sympathetically aware that I cannot feel the visceral hold to the idea that there must have been some reasonable explanation for the actions of the PF. I accept that there's a possibility that he was applying a half-remembered UAS procedure, but for the life of me I cannot understand why he would not say he was doing so.

[Machinbird]

The aircrew actions in the AF447 accident seem strange to those of us looking back on this accident.

There are a few observations I would like to make about the situation that this crew faced. I think the known facts do not contradict this view, but I am working from memory and it's been a while since I reviewed the accident, so feel free to correct me where I stray from the facts.

First, let us start with the PNF, Robert. He had just been awakened from sleep by the Captain and had been told that the guy flying the aircraft would be in charge. He was undoubtedly awake, but I suspect he was suffering from sleep inertia and was not fully "with it." When the A/P and Autothrottle disconnected, he had been sitting in the seat for about 10 minutes. He was aware of the mishandling of the aircraft, particularly the upward roll of the altimeter numbers and tic marks but was really not mentally locked on to the actual altitudes they were going through, thus his strange comment, " You are going up, so go down." Maybe it is just my old fashioned way of flying, but I would have thought he would have said something like 'You are 1500' above assigned altitude. Get the nose down!' His reluctance to take control might well have been a result of his sleep inertia which he would have been aware of. Likely he did not yet trust himself to perform.

Then there is Bonin, the PF. He was suddenly thrust from quietly monitoring the instruments into NOISE.
The cavalry charge, then the C chord altitude alert, and a few chirps from the stall warning on top of that. No sooner did he grab the stick and begin to correct the roll angle when the aircraft over-responded in an unfamiliar way and he began a roll oscillation. (Alt2b Law was now in effect) The aircraft was in roll direct. He apparently he had no prior experience in flying in Alt2b Law in the simulator at altitude and likely, no experience in flying in Direct law at altitude. As a result, his mental model of the aircraft response was out of calibration and his control inputs were well beyond appropriate for roll.

I do not know how many of you have experienced a roll PIO in any setting, or for that matter any PIO (pilot induced oscillation). From my one roll PIO experience in an early simulator, I found it to be extremely startling and attention getting and I would expect that Bonin experienced a similar feeling of startlement and concern. This likely fully focused his attention on the roll problem to the exclusion of almost everything else. His solution to the problem was to try to get ahead of the oscillation. It eventually worked after 30+ seconds of fighting the aircraft, but one of the reasons it worked is that the roll response was decreasing as the aircraft slowed. (The preferred solution is to stop aggravating the aircraft)

It is very likely that Bonin's nose up efforts were initially inadvertent as he struggled with the roll, then later, deliberate as he either reverted to seat of the pants flying or started flying the flight director. His thought processes were not logical by then and he was focused on a narrow part of his surroundings to the exclusion of almost all else.

By this point in time Bonin was in full fight or flight mode and Robert was getting concerned as well. They were not working together and the aircraft was departing controlled flight and they were entering test pilot territory.

My personal opinion is that if Bonin had not overcontrolled the aircraft initially, the accident would not have happened. He would have begun to follow his training, however imperfectly and the crew would have begun to work together sufficiently well to continue the flight. The lack of experience in direct law at altitude was a key contributing factor that allowed a roll PIO to develop, and from there, it all snowballed downhill.

[DozyWannabe]

It is very likely that Bonin's nose up efforts were initially inadvertent as he struggled with the roll...

You could be right, but the query I have regarding this is that - while my only personal experience of the flight deck is in a simulator - the spring loading on the sidestick means that if roll is all you want to control then the springs will hold you steady at zero in the Y axis unless you make an effort against them. Even in Alt2b law, the aircraft will try to maintain the last commanded pitch so there is no need to keep pulling back to maintain it.

The sidestick on an A330 is a far cry from the kind of cheap controller you can pick up for your computer - it's a chunky piece of kit!

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi DW,
the spring loading on the sidestick means that if roll is all you want to control then the springs will hold you steady at zero in the Y axis unless you make an effort against them.
Correct.
However some some crews move their seats after take off into a more "comfortable" position. This places their hand and arm in a completely different position relative to the side stick. I think that's why Bonin inadvertently applied light back pressure whilst he struggled to hold wings level in Alt Law.

Since the crew didn't turn off the FD switches, when the FDs automatically reappeared, they were in modes HDG & VS. The crew seem to have simply continued to follow those erroneous commands.

[HazelNuts39]

However some some crews move their seats after take off into a more "comfortable" position.From memory - the BEA looked into that and established the seat position from the post-crash marks on the seats recovered.

[Linktrained]

Bonin as PF might be expected to scan his instruments.
Robert as PNF may have had the opportunity to look around. According to one earlier thread, the THS which had been around 3 degrees NU at 2.10.50, moved steadily, reaching 13 degrees NU at 2.11.50, where it stayed. ( This would have been in response to Bonin's input, I think.)

This was not commented on by either pilot, and perhaps it was unseen. Someone said that the THS is not in ones normal scan on an AB 330.

Would the rotation of the THS be more readily noticeable from the corner of a pilot's eye if (for example) a white mark made any movement noticeable ?

I do not know the "gearing" of the wheel but a movement in just ONE direction over a period of a minute might have warranted further investigation, by either pilot.

Does PNF have PM ( Pilot Monitoring) responsibilities ?

[Winnerhofer]

There is evidence that all three were tired.

Robert reported upon his return that he did not sleep well but only "dozed a little."

His seat remained fully back and to the left in the parked position the entire time.

Robert should have taken over at the first sign that Bonin wasn't flying as required "you're going up so go down" but that was strictly against the AF culture.

In fact, few (if any) PMs anywhere are trained to take over the airplane.

I've never heard of it being practised in the simulator or as part of actual hands-on training exercise.

In the future, it must be, for the ability of the average pilot to fly manually without any little green bars to follow is diminishing with time.

Soon, the engineers will be able to address the leading cause of accidents today - LOC - in flight due to the pilots not being able to handle the situation.

They will do this by removing the pilots and frankly we will have deserved it if we don't take action.

The alternative is for pilots to become pilots again and learn to control and recover the airplane from extreme situations.

[Linktrained]

AF447 was hardly in an extreme situation... At least initially.

I was a totally untrained newbie 2nd Officer on a York, ordered by the Captain to hand fly at cruising level, to give the F/O a rest for an hour. ( The A/P was U/S) It was daylight, and I was told "Not to wander about". The next sector was at night, and I did "my hour" again, I assume, adequately.

I understand that a York was perhaps easier to hand fly at cruising level than many more modern aircraft ( if they were allowed - RVSM etc.) Pilots have much better training than was available then. ( Some 62 years ago.)

[DozyWannabe]

True but it didn't have to be just then and there are some oddities to the events. At least one of the pilots was anxious for his return and questioned the delay in returning and there is no mention in the released transcript of his reference to being bell'ed back or having just got his head down. Still, no need to upset Dozy ;)

Hi Mr. O. Firstly, feel free to "upset" me all you like - it's not about that and I'd never presume to have such delusions of grandeur. It's just that most if not all of the questions asked in the R&N thread that was merged into this one - and those that have arisen subsequently - have already been covered in the existing threads. I'm sure I'm not the only one who doesn't want to see the hamster-wheel spun up again!

Since the crew didn't turn off the FD switches, when the FDs automatically reappeared, they were in modes HDG & VS. The crew seem to have simply continued to follow those erroneous commands.

While your second sentence is informed conjecture (it's a possibility, but only one of many), your first is absolutely correct. Additionally, failure to turn off the FDs - which was, IIRC, part of the UAS procedure - implies to me that the PF was not in fact applying that procedure, as others have suggested.

[FO Robert's] seat remained fully back and to the left in the parked position the entire time.

Did it? I know Bill Palmer made that claim in his excellent book on the subject, and I know the LHS was apparently in the "storage" position upon impact, but the CVR did record a "noise of seat being adjusted" at 2:03:38 (i.e. after Robert took his seat and the Captain vacated the flight deck). This raises several possibilities, including:


The noise was from Bonin moving the RHS forward
The noise was from Robert moving the LHS forward, and he may have returned it to the "storage" position to accommodate the Captain on his return


The second possibility can make sense if one takes into account that the cockpit noise had increased significantly at the onset of stall, and rendered the seat motor noise unintelligible to the Cockpit Area Microphone.

As for the position of the RHS, and its importance to Bonin's leverage on the sidestick, the report is crystal clear on that point.

The right side seat was positioned 5.5 cm from the most forward position with a right side armrest bearing the indication of A3 adjustment. This adjustment is consistent with the piloting position of a pilot with the morphology of the PF. The pilot (PF) was attached via lap and crotch belts.

My plea to avoid the return of the hamster wheel remains - not just because of the sheer amount of information and questions answered in the previous threads, but also as the existence of the report - which, combined, should provide all the information that can be proven. I know that as pilots, you'll all feel an especially visceral need to answer the questions that cannot be proven - above all why the PF acted as he did. But all we have there is conjecture, and that conjecture has already been minutely examined in the existing threads.

[Winnerhofer]

AF447 conjecture will remain unless the DCVR is released in its entirety but the BEA has instead provided inedible hashed morsels.

The juge d'instruction can force the BEA to do it.

Why has she not?

The transcript is over-edited and the flow of converstion is not linear.

Why is that?

Did Bonin use his S/S as a handle to pull himself up whilst adjsuting his seat and by doing so caused the initial pitch-up coinciding with start of this misadventure?

Was there was a PAX seated on the jumpseat which would explain Bonin's unrelinquished grip - figuratively and literally - on the S/S and as PF?
Was that PAX Mme Bonin?
In the final judicial experts' report (not BEA), there is an unidentified 4th voice on the DCVR.

This would explain as to why Dubois was not seated when he came back onto the F/D.

Then there is the licence question and yes it has been discussed.
According to the 1st BEA report, he held a "Frozen ATPL" or "Writtten ATPL" but by the 3rd report, he was mysteriously promoted to ATPL proper the same way De Gaulle promoted himself from Colonel to General whilst in exile.

The BEA must explain why this misreporting occurred.

So you want to know if Bonin really had a proper licence?
The answer is on his payslips.
AF give their crew a 6% premium on every flying hour if they hold a "full" licence.

Which neatly brings us to AF selection.
In 2008, 30 F/As were fast-tracked onto the RHS and were exempted from psychometric testing.
Why on earth did Dubois utter to Bonin: "T'as le PL, toi?"
Simply because he had a doubt himself as an ex-F/A who belatedly and reluctantly became a Captain having failed his linecheck in 2007.

[HazelNuts39]

The juge d'instruction can force the BEA to do it.Reading the report of the group of experts appointed by the juge d'instruction one is left with the distinct impression that those experts have had access to the full sound recording, not just the transcript.

Since both the DFDR and the CVR memory modules were put under judicial seal as soon as they arrived on deck of the salvage vessel, and contain important evidence in a criminal proceeding, I guess that the judge has full access to both sets of data.

[BOAC]

Winnerhofer throws a small hand grenade into this turgid thread.................

[DozyWannabe]

Winnerhofer sounds a lot like jcjeant, to be honest...

[Winnerhofer]

A second panel of "experts" has now been ordered at the behest of Airbus who although were happy with the first panel's report even though none of the panel had ever flown an Airbus.
The new panel has a Swiss Professor as well as 2 other non-French members out of a total of 5.
On the judicial front, Zimmermann will retire in 2014 and the trial is expected in 2016.
Experts: COMPAGNIE NATIONALE des EXPERTS de JUSTICE AERONAUTIQUE et ESPACE (http://cnejae.org/CNEJAE/Accueil.html)

[AlphaZuluRomeo]

Would the rotation of the THS be more readily noticeable from the corner of a pilot's eye if (for example) a white mark made any movement noticeable ?
They already are white-marked... Photos: Airbus A330-203 Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/photo/Air-France/Airbus-A330-203/1872181/L/) ;)

[Owain Glyndwr]

Since both the DFDR and the CVR memory modules were put under judicial seal as soon as they arrived on deck of the salvage vessel, and contain important evidence in a criminal proceeding, I guess that the judge has full access to both sets of data.

And to preserve the integrity of the evidence to be presented at that trial she will no doubt control what BEA are allowed to publish.

[jcjeant]

Dozy
Winnerhofer sounds a lot like jcjeant, to be honest...
To be honest I think it's a lot like jcjeant on this particular subject (AF447 case) but fortunately for you (because you would be tired of answering) they are not all member of PPrune or don't post their opinions and griefs :)

[Winnerhofer]

And to preserve the integrity of the evidence to be presented at that trial she will no doubt control what BEA are allowed to publish.

Therein lies the much politicised rub.
Don't forget pressure by Unions are extremely powerful but in the end Airbus will get off the hook because commercially AF is a light-weight compared with Airbus.
Might is right.

Remember that the BEA is not independent at all and all their reporting is wishy-washy made up of oui, mais, peut-être obsessed by not ruffling any feathers.
This "No Blame" nonsense is an antithesis to safety.

I rate the TSB the best of all hands-down and their SR111 report has yet to be surpassed.
Going off topic, Zimmermann was A320 instructor before he became an MD-11 one.
A320 procedure in case of smoke/fire is LAND ASAP and till this day I can't understand why he didn't use that as a Pavlovian fallback instead of going though an endless checklist.

[Clandestino]

Sometimes a small excursion outside the safe limits may be required Mother Nature doesn't know the limits. Boeing recognise this airbus doesn't Would you be so kind to provide reference where small (or big) excursion outside the safe limits saved the day in airliner while it wasn't preceded by severe brainfart (e.g. hung engine leading to high altitude stall in quad) or bizarre failure pushing aeroplane out of envelope? There is abnormal alternate law on FBW Airbi but then it seems not knowing anything about the subject discussed is not considered to be disqulifier when it comes to posting disparaging comments here.

Yes, but we are not monitoring computers per se, we are monitoring the flight path.At least, that what aviation authorities believe we are doing. That's why non-backdriven flight and engine controls were certified without objections - their position is demand, while what pilots need to know is result as seen on instruments.

The A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed.For 15th time at least: go make AoA vane that will work reliable at 500 and 5 kt. You'll make millions out of it, I guarantee you. Well, at least you'll have a hobby that will last you a lifetime.

The Coroner reviewed the full accident report, the relevant medical and pathological evidence, then called the AAIB as expert witnesses to explain the sequence of events and the findings of the BEA report. Therefore making his opinion legally worthless. Introduction to BEA report refers.

When the Captain arrived, even he couldn't make head or tail of what was going on until it was too late.I know what you are referring to but just to make it clear for everyone: there is no indication that anyone in the cockpit ever could make head or tail of anything, even the split second before they were wiped of out existence.

Not "couldn't", "didn't". Poor design.So say you and when asked to elaborate:

I don't need to, Dozy, nor did I ever say there was one. Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall warning on! Why is that concept so hard for you to grasp?There is someone around unable to grasp the concept of difficulties of accurately measuring alpha at wildly different q and why it is acceptable to have the instrument that can't measure it where no sane-minded pilot would ever go. It's not DozyWannabe, if you wonder.

Is it possible to train a crew so that in case of another failure of the same equipment in the same weather conditions etc. the aircrew would not crash? Other crews flying the same aeroplane, for the same company, getting the same failure didn't crash or hurt anyone or damaged anything (source: interim2). Now what?

Anyone who wants a more informed view on this aspect of it should just (...) listen to David Learmount's very persuasive case. His view is that it is not - as he puts it - a loss of flying skills but a loss of situation awareness and cognition. Absolutely right, even as this video was out after interim3 got out and before final. Now I don't want to detract from this absolutely superb piece of aeronautical journalism (no irony here) just to add a bit: LOC is the greatest killer nowadays because TAWS has virtually eliminated CFIT and we are currently enjoying the historical low of accident rates and pilots of yesteryear occasionally lost control too.

As it happened the LHS pilot declined to accept the (very good) advice coming from a less (perhaps inadequately) assertive but far more experienced pilot who's role was Pilot Monitoring. Quite simply I suspect that his (the pilot flying's) head was too big for his boots.Realistically, matter of command didn't boil down to "Fish or steak for dinner?" but it was rather matter of life and death and neither CM2 or CM1 were able to recognize it because they couldn't recall the most basic aeroplane energy management lessons.

I think that this was the Captains crucial error. (Well apart from leaving the flight deck at all given the proximity of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone and the associated radar visible thunderstorms, which were a mere 10 minutes ahead).It was done this way millions times before and hundred of thousand times after without any adverse consequence so what is the problem with it?

No pilot I have ever met would ever do that because they know how to fly.If I could travel through time and tell every deceased colleague the way they would meet their eventual demise in aeroplane I am absolutely sure everyone would vehemently deny they would be that stupid to perform it.

Basically, your statements boils down to: "I have no idea about human factors but I'll keep myself opinionated around here".

IIRC, his training for the UAS event was right after takeoff. The memorized pitch attitude is 15° and TOGA for those circumstances
To which I replied that it must be hard for pilot to discern between 400 ft AGL and FL350 over the middle of Atlantic. I don't care about the law or PPRuNers' opinions but I would care a lot if my unfamiliarity with emergency procedures would cost me a life.

in my view is the root cause of the accident because, by following SOPs, (ECAM drills, paper drills, status, etc etc) and using correct CRM procedures to maintain discipline and sort out the problem before independently leaping into (unknown) individual actions, the accident could have been preventedActually, not many crews in A330 UAS used procedure, CRM or brains at all. Most of them blankly stared until problem went away by itself. Some ignored stall warning but kept pitch control neutral. Some pulled until stall warning, then pushed, then pulled giving their customers a hell of roller-coaster ride. AF447 crew were only that both pulled and ignored the stall warning. The others lived happily ever after.

Again as I have pointed out numerous times, a UAS event is NOT an emergency and does not require instant, un-coordinated, undisciplined action. It is not an engine fire, a depressurization, an hydraulic failure etc. The airplane itself does not 'care' what the airspeed indication is.Again, I fully agree just to make it perfectly clear: no emergency requires uncoordinated or undisciplined action, even "instant" in transport aeroplane means 3-5 seconds.

As I've said before, I also wonder if the APPARENT sudden loss of about 300 ft of altitude (due to the removal of correction for airspeed when the IAS went AWOL) might have provoked a knee-jerk (of the wrist) response. I only wish it were so - there would be general mushing around new indicated FL350 but not a few thousand feet climb.

The aircraft was in roll direct. He apparently he had no prior experience in flying in Alt2b Law in the simulator at altitude and likely, no experience in flying in Direct law at altitude. As a result, his mental model of the aircraft response was out of calibration and his control inputs were well beyond appropriate for roll.No they were not. He put roll under control pretty efficiently and way before stall warning went off third and the longest time.

It is very likely that Bonin's nose up efforts were initially inadvertent as he struggled with the roll, then later, deliberate as he either reverted to seat of the pants flying or started flying the flight director.At some points he kept nose well above FD bar, at some points he pulled when there was no FD available.

The lack of experience in direct law at altitude was a key contributing factor that allowed a roll PIO to develop, and from there, it all snowballed downhill. There were about forty A330 crews that went through similar predicament. Every single one was inexperienced. Just one perished.

The crew seem to have simply continued to follow those erroneous commands. True, if we take just what was happening from 2:11:10 and ignore everything that went before. Now, give me a good reason why we would do that.

In fact, few (if any) PMs anywhere are trained to take over the airplane.

I've never heard of it being practised in the simulator or as part of actual hands-on training exercise. Duuuude! You are blissfully unaware that everyone in developed world nowadays is trained to take over and was so even way before AF447.

AF447 conjecture will remain unless the DCVR is released in its entirety but the BEA has instead provided inedible hashed morsels.Dude, two posts and you are already acting like some veterans around here... wait a sec... did someone got banned recently?

The juge d'instruction can force the BEA to do it.

Can't.

Why has she not?UN, more precisely: ICAO. Now if France would consider leaving ICAO a small price to pay for BEA judicially being forced to release transcript...

[Linktrained]

AZR

Thank you for the photos of the THS. (I can put my paints away !)

But it STILL leaves the THS moving for a whole minute going fully NU. Surely this should be unusual in (what was nominally) cruising flight.

Some smaller movements could be expected to be due to the routine automatic transfer of fuel or even passengers moving.

Both F/Os ought to have been alert and looking. Some of this is recorded on the CVR.

[Machinbird]

Clandestino,
You are being a naughty boy;). You are trying to spin this thread up to max RPM by using poorly researched and poorly supported comments.

FYI, the AOA probe on my F-4 would be alive with normal wind over the deck on the ship and was also good for over 750 knots worth of Q. I don't think anyone is going to make serious money re-inventing that item.

AF447 IAS if it could have been accurately read never got below 150 KT after the departure from controlled flight, so I do not understand this fascination with an AOA able to operate at 5 knots. The only way an airborne jet is going to do that is by climbing vertically, and then only briefly, and most guys flying heavy iron know that is a really bad idea. The AOA probes were functioning, but there was no way to present that information to the crew in AF447.

Bloggs is right when he says
Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall warning on!Even BEA thought that EASA should review that concept.

pilots of yesteryear occasionally lost control too.
Sure, several times, but we also knew how to regain control.:}

Quote:
I think that this was the Captains crucial error. (Well apart from leaving the flight deck at all given the proximity of the Inter Tropical Convergence Zone and the associated radar visible thunderstorms, which were a mere 10 minutes ahead).
It was done this way millions times before and hundred of thousand times after without any adverse consequence so what is the problem with it? Well, it seems that someone finally had a problem with it, didn't they?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Machinbird
The aircraft was in roll direct. He apparently he had no prior experience in flying in Alt2b Law in the simulator at altitude and likely, no experience in flying in Direct law at altitude. As a result, his mental model of the aircraft response was out of calibration and his control inputs were well beyond appropriate for roll.

No they were not. He put roll under control pretty efficiently and way before stall warning went off third and the longest time.
So 30 seconds worth of beating snakes with a side stick is your definition of efficiently gaining control? Wow!

[bubbers44]

MB, good for you, you finally beat him at his best repetitive game, nailing all of us like he is the ace of the base. Thanks. We have grown tired of hearing his constant I am smarter than you crap.

[roulishollandais]

I'm joigning you Machinbird, with bubbers44 :)

[bubbers44]

Just to remind everybody where this came from AF447 crashed in the Atlantic Ocean RIO to PAR flight because two copilots with captain taking required rest was in back sleeping. They encountered precipitation and pitot tubes froze up causing no airspeed indication so autopilot disconnected so PF pulled up 15 degrees at 35,000 ft and of course stalled. The FO assisting did nothing but request the captain to return to cockpit. By then they were in a deep stall and when the captain arrived it was too late so they crashed and everybody died. All that was necessary was one pilot who could hand fly but he was sleeping. I think this our next generation of pilots.

[bubbers44]

We haven't hired a pilot since 9/11 so our guys are still seasoned and capable but some foreign airlines hire pilots right out of flight school to fly with another almost equally incompetent pilot while the captain takes his required break. Is this the wave of the future??

[A33Zab]

@Machinebird:



Bloggs is right when he says

Some bright spark thought that aeroplanes couldn't fly below 60KIAS so
decided that they'd turn the stall warning off below that. Bad decision. If the
aeroplane's in the air and below stall speed/above stall AoA, keep the stall
warning on!


NOT, the stall warning is NEVER turned off, not even by WOW.
It is a general (others brands are NOT immune!) ADIRU issue:

NCD AoA when air data senses low airspeed.

[Machinbird]

NOT, the stall warning is NEVER turned off, not even by WOW.
It is a general (others brands are NOT immune!) ADIRU issue:

NCD AoA when air data senses low airspeed. 24th Oct 2013 22:23
A33Zab,
Of course, you are literally correct. It is the NCD issue that turns off the stall warning. Essentially, it is an engineering problem that was too hard to solve at the time and they waved the magic wand and decided that an aircraft in flight would never get in that situation. AF447 proved that that reasoning was a bit flawed.

It is not an insoluble problem however. I've flown older aircraft that had a stall warning that did not have the NCD problem. Were they properly corrected for Mach Number in the absence of A/S? No they weren't, but they still gave warning before you completely lost control because they were not digital.

The engineers need to scratch their heads a bit more so that the system handles things like A/S failures gracefully. NCD for such a critical system is not acceptable.

[tdracer]

NCD AoA when air data senses low airspeed.


The link doesn't work, but at least on the Boeing aircraft I'm familiar with (basically everything save the 737), airspeed doesn't go NCD until 30 knots.

[Chris Scott]

Clandestino,

In your eagerness to respond in a single post to several pages and many contributors, you have a tendency to select snippets of text out of context, and comment rather dismissively on them. In doing so, you misrepresent the contributor's argument. (I'm wondering if you suffer from a short attention-span - not unusual in hot-headed youth...)

Quote from me (replying to PJ2), as quoted by you about 18 hours ago:
As I've said before, I also wonder if the APPARENT sudden loss of about 300 ft of altitude (due to the removal of correction for airspeed when the IAS went AWOL) might have provoked a knee-jerk (of the wrist) response.

Your response:
I only wish it were so - there would be general mushing around new indicated FL350 but not a few thousand feet climb.

You have ignored the rest of my paragraph.

This is what I went on to say:
But the realisation that this was just another of those UAS events should quickly have dawned, followed by a return to the familiar pitch-attitude for cruise flight. As you say, simply maintain the status-quo...
Inappropriate initial reaction is one thing, but what happened after AF447 had completely vacated FL350 climbing was irrational and inexplicable in a competent pilot who had spent many hours monitoring the flight instruments in the cruise and step-climbs on dark nights - much like the one in question.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Clandestino,

Originally Posted by RexBanner
The A330 stall warner is suppressed below 60 knots because the computers believe the aircraft to be on the ground below that speed.
Clandestino's reply
For 15th time at least: go make AoA vane that will work reliable at 500 and 5 kt. You'll make millions out of it, I guarantee you. Well, at least you'll have a hobby that will last you a lifetime.
Please explain why you dismiss, for the 15th time at least, a vertical descent rate of 10,000 ft per minute (about 100 kts) does not qualify as a valid speed for angle of attack vanes.

The continued stall warning, whilst they were stalled, might just have improved the Captains' SA.
Edit. Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground, Or valid when airborne?

[HazelNuts39]

on the Boeing aircraft I'm familiar with (basically everything save the 737), airspeed doesn't go NCD until 30 knots.When the AoA exceeded about 30 degrees the IAS dropped rapidly. There was about 1 second between 60 and 30 kts IAS, and another second to negative IAS.

[vilas]

It was sad but it was slaughter of the innocent. It is very clear that the pilots in the cockpit simply had no idea of stall phenominon and unreliable speed technique. They did not seem to know the normal pitch in level flight. Instead of TOGA had they just switched off ATHR, AP went off anyway and done nothing else they may have been safe till the captain got back. Alternate law except protections is like normal law. But they do not seem to have been trained properly for the situation. Even continuos stall warning although desirable would have made no difference in this case.

[Winnerhofer]

The most damning report by the ISR on AF.
Get the .pdf :
http://theairlinewebsite.com/topic/400924-alt-2-a-b/?p=1612830

[DozyWannabe]

Edit. Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground, Or valid when airborne?

When you have AoA vanes that are only certified to operate at >=60kts IAS, and the unavoidable fact that Stall Warning is a function of AoA - absolutely!

Regarding your point about the airflow from the VS in the stall - I don't know. You'd need a proper aero engineer to be certain, but I'd say there would be too many variables involved to allow for considering readings in that scenario as accurate. Certainly the DFDR output from the AoA vanes once the stall is established seems to degenerate very quickly into flipping between extremes - and to my mind would only cause more confusion.

@tdracer - we're not talking about IAS going NCD, we're talking about AoA vanes that are only certified to operate reliably above 60kts IAS.

Machinbird's F4 would have had the wind over the deck plus the airspeed generated by the motion of the ship - a very different (and somewhat simpler) design problem to solve. An F4 is a fighter, and the AoA systems specification would by the very nature of difference in application be a very different kettle of fish. Machinbird - your AoA vanes may have been "live", but with all due respect I doubt you paid a significant amount of attention to how reliable the readings were in that scenario - and I think you'd have been far too sensible to try and test the theory by stalling your F4 to the extent that your pitot tubes were being fouled and registering IAS below 60kts!

@vilas:

It is very clear that the pilots in the cockpit simply had no idea of stall phenominon and unreliable speed technique.

I have a very tough time believing that a highly-qualified sailplane/glider pilot* (such as PF FO Bonin) would have been completely clueless about stall - which is why I've long maintained that he had some kind of psychological shock response which threw him sufficiently to get muddled. PNF FO Robert tries to correct him verbally several times regarding his pitch attitude ("you're going up, so go down") during the initial zoom climb, but as the aircraft moves into the stall regime and more of the instrument readings stop "making sense" he seems to lose his earlier confidence - which was undoubtedly a tragic shame.

We've been through this countless times before and no consensus was reached - in part because many posters are wedded to their own notions of what the real problems were here, but one thing that needs to be remembered above all was that the Stall Warning functioned correctly for at least around a minute before the aircraft went too far out of the flight envelope, and it was apparently completely disregarded**. For those that want to compare brand A with brand B, one only has to look at the Birgenair 301 B757 crash, where the Captain disregarded the stick shaker in favour of the first (erroneous) warning he got, which was overspeed.

* - EDIT - I'm not saying 'no pilot would...' here, I'm saying that in order to fly a sailplane/glider to a high degree of competency one has to have a very thorough appreciation of the mechanics of flight, because in a glider there is no TOGA detent or switch - approaching stall one has no option but to trade altitude for airspeed!

** - EDIT 2 - The point I'm trying to reinforce here is that while the Stall Warning was silenced at approximately the same time the Captain returned, it sounded correctly and continuously for long enough that the two FOs should have at least acknowledged it. And there were enough secondary indications (unstable pitch, dubious airspeed, rapidly unwinding altimeter) that a Captain should have been able to use to diagnose a stall.

[DonH]

Chris Scott - in your response to Clandestino, I concur with your remarks. I think quoting and responding has its merits and offers succinct thinking and keeps posts to reasonable lengths!, but it is very important to retain the context of the original remarks being critiqued. Sometimes there is a historical dialogue going on and brief quotes which appear out of context to others are really in context in "the long line" but I thought yours and perhaps one other's were a taken a bit out of context. I think reference-links to actual Post # being quoted so others could refer back would resolve the matter, and others can make up their own minds regarding the critique offered.

As regards the matter at hand and as I know you know, whether an actual pitch-change and altitude loss or purely an indication issue, (which this was), one never responds swiftly in a transport aircraft, particularly at cruise altitudes where aerodynamic damping is much lower. The argument that the roll was PIO and that the pitch up was a response to the indicated loss of 300ft are both defeated by subsequent occurrences - the first because the more-sensitive roll was brought under relatively quick control, and second because, once the 300' "altitude loss" had been "regained", the PF kept pulling.

The majority of stick positions is, by the data, "stick back". As said many times, I think there is probably something to the stall warning NCD matter but, as you have observed, it isn't a C-150 where the little piece of metal is permitted to flip forward due to reduced airflow at it's point of installation setting off the approach-to-the-stall buzzer! The designers had to resolve the matter within purely digital systems to avoid the greater problem of false warnings at critical times, and, rightly in my view as an experienced A330 captain, concluded that no crew was going to stall the airplane and keep it there such that the AoA was so great, (45° +), as to actually render the pitot's unserviceable, (entry angle too great - no speed indication, ergo speed < 60 = NCD).

[jcjeant]

And there were enough secondary indications (unstable pitch, dubious airspeed, rapidly unwinding altimeter) that a Captain should have been able to use to diagnose a stall. More again about Dubois :
The first words he pronounce when entering the flight deck are (Ref CVR)
What are you doing ?
So .. as the rest space is only equipped with a buzzer ( employed by Robert) and no phone communication ... before entering in the flight deck Dubois know that's something is wrong .. and he don't ask "what happend ?" but instead the famous
What are you doing ?
Is this question is related with the feeling of not full confidence he can have in his crew ?

[Winnerhofer]

Exactly.
Dubois wasn't in the Crew Rest Area but seated and relaxing next to his ladyfriend.
This is why the buzzer was useless because he wasn't lying on his bunk.
Remember that F-GZCP wasn't equipped with an intercom in the CRA as it is an option but standard chez DL so the buzzer was the only means of communicating.
Why did he come charging back onto the F/D?
Because he felt the plane was rocking and rolling.
What was his first reaction?
Not what's up, what's wrong or what's happening but an emphatic "WTF are you guys doing!?"

[DozyWannabe]

And your evidence for that "theory"* is?

* - In lieu of a suitable sobriquet for "unsubstantiated rubbish that you just made up".

[HazelNuts39]

Just a question I've always wanted to ask: Is there a handset in the cockpit to contact the cabin crew?

What intrigued me is the sound as from a microphone striking a wall, and sometime later a female voice asking repeatedly "hello?", as if answering a call but not getting a response.

[DonH]

HazelNuts39;

Re, "Is there a handset in the cockpit to contact the cabin crew?"

Yes, the control panel for the handset is on the overhead panel and the handset is mounted on the aft pedestal, captain's side. The "Cabin Rest" is a call to the Cabin Crew Rest Area/Module. In some aircraft it is a permanent installation, usually in the aft end of the aircraft below the passenger deck whereas the portable crew module, as on AF447, is located just aft of door L3 below the passenger deck.

As shown on the panel, there are also communications to the Flight Crew Rest area wherever that may be - the asterisk inside the triangle means, "as installed". On the B777 it is upstairs; I don't know what the arrangement is on AF's A330's. The one with which I'm familiar was seat in Business that would fully recline and was curtained off. In this arrangement, there are no communications at the seat, so any urgent need for the crew member, (normally the captain) would have to be first communicated to one of the F/As who would then go to the seat and alert the crew member.

http://www.smugmug.com/photos/i-jjbND4L/0/L/i-jjbND4L-L.jpg

[Winnerhofer]

In the Judicial Experts' Report (not BEA) ordered by the Investigating Judge there's a 4th unidentified voice on the DCVR.
There'll be now a 2nd Judicial Experts' Report as demanded by Airbus with a new panel who happen to fly Airbus rather than the theoretical 1st panel.
Airbus were 90% happy with the 1st panel's report but this time they really want to come out fireproof pre-trial to get a "non-lieu" i.e. insufficient grounds to proceed.
Airbus' attorneys are invisibly off radar but beware of those who don't bark for their bite is most brutal.
Airbus doesn't depend on AF to survive.

[DozyWannabe]

In the Judicial Experts' Report (not BEA) ordered by the Investigating Judge there's a 4th unidentified voice on the DCVR.

Yes - the cabin crew member.

After the PNF asks "(!) where is he er?" at 2:10:49.8 there is a "high-low" chime consistent with a CC call at 2:10:53.5. The "feminine voice" saying "hello?" is recorded at 2:10:55.9. This would likely be consistent with the PNF buzzing the CC to find out where the Captain is as a failsafe measure.

There'll be now a 2nd Judicial Experts' Report as demanded by Airbus with a new panel who happen to fly Airbus rather than the theoretical 1st panel.
Airbus were 90% happy with the 1st panel's report but this time they really want to come out fireproof pre-trial to get a "non-lieu" i.e. insufficient grounds to proceed.

No - the first panel was convened by the SNPL using the families' group as a cover (and the report contains several glaring errors). Airbus probably don't have an opinion either way. Even if the legal process finds Airbus liable for some aspects of the accident it will have very little or no tangible effect on the company.

[Winnerhofer]

There's been a split in French Victims' Association.
Some 10 members including ex-Head left to go solo.
A new Head took over as of 01 June 2013.
NB: The Dubois and Robert families have never been part of any Victims' Association only the Bonin family.
What's odd is that not a trace of Robert's corpse was ever found.

[HazelNuts39]

In the Judicial Experts' Report (not BEA) ordered by the Investigating Judge there's a 4th unidentified voice on the DCVR.It's also in BEA's report: female voice on track 1 "allo?" ... "oui" ... "allo?"
then: "bruits similaires à un combiné de l’interphone cabine qu’on essaye de raccrocher" (the english translation omits the "trying to").

Keep in mind that the airplane is in "deterrent buffet".

[jcjeant]

No - the first panel was convened by the SNPL using the families' group as a cover (and the report contains several glaring errors)
Well .. sorry but I must ask you what you are smoking ....
The panel of experts (the judicial experts) was ordered by the "juge d'instruction" and was required to answer a lot of precises questions
Those experts are from a group of experts who are stand by for such judicial requests
Families and unions have nothing to do with their investigations and reports

[chrisN]

I do not think that anyone should be misled by thoughts of the gliding qualifications of Bonin (FO, PF). All I have seen is that at some time before the accident he obtained a French glider pilot’s licence. He was qualified (at a point in time) but not necessarily “highly” qualified, nor necessarily current.

More to the point, however, there have been enough stall/spin accidents to glider pilots of all levels of experience and currency to show that no class of person is immune to failure to recognise and recover from such departures when they happen unexpectedly, invariably as a result of pilot error/mishandling. I had access to all the UK gliding accident reports for many years, and one included a fatal accident to a 19000-hour ATPL who converted to gliding and spun in when flying solo. Almost every year in the UK there was a fatal accident from stall/spin, not corrected properly by the glider pilot. Sometimes more than one.

A rare survivor of an inadvertent spin at low level told me exactly how it had happened; he was fixed on a wrong diagnosis of what had gone wrong (as I suspect Bonin did) and never reverted to his training. (In this case, he had a cable break, during a winch launch, and with incorrect pilot reaction, the nose dropped as it would. He wrongly thought that the tail had fallen off, forgot all his stall/spin awareness training, and remained convinced that nothing he could do would restore normal flight. He was lucky to survive.)

By the way, ignoring warning sounds and other indications when one has a wrong idea of what is happening is far from unknown. There are sufficient numbers of recorded events demonstrating this. I am not an expert, but I have read that the auditory channel to the brain is the first to get blocked out under overload. It is well known in instructing circles (or was when I was an instructor) that the only way to get through to a student pilot in brain-freeze mode is to physically get their attention. Speaking/shouting becomes ineffective. Another classic example is the video clip of three people in an aircraft, at least two being qualified pilots, who ignore the persistent undercarriage warning noise and land wheels-up.

[Owain Glyndwr]

tdracer

The link doesn't work, but at least on the Boeing aircraft I'm familiar with (basically everything save the 737), airspeed doesn't go NCD until 30 knots. Interesting - it raises the thought that when considering the range of system reliability the airframe manufacturer must use the limits defined in the equipment manufacturer's Declaration of Design Performance (DDP) not values picked out of a hat. If one probe manufacturer says OK above 30 kts and another above 60 kts then those numbers will be what the airframer will use. Which leads to the question - does anyone know what make/model AoA probes are used on the Boeing fleet and Airbus fleet?

rudderrudderrat

Please explain why you dismiss, for the 15th time at least, a vertical descent rate of 10,000 ft per minute (about 100 kts) does not qualify as a valid speed for angle of attack vanes.

The continued stall warning, whilst they were stalled, might just have improved the Captains' SA.
Edit. Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground, Or valid when airborne?
When one puts V/S and ground speed together, the aircraft never got below about 150 kts throughout the whole process. That means the AoA probes as probes were working properly and supplying valid signals (as long as the AoA did not go out of the probe range). As has been explained many times, the problem was that the extremely high AoA took the aircraft right out of any sensible AoA range for which the PEC algorithms might have been defined. Consequently the measured airspeed was wildly different from the actual airspeed and fell to below 60 kts IAS. That, taken with the probe manufacturer's DDP was the reason for the AoA signals to be declared non valid.

I agree that a continued stall warning might have made a difference. I have said it before, but I will repeat it, the aircraft was designed to meet JAR 25 Change 13, which says:

Stall warning must continue throughout the demonstration, until the angle of attack is reduced to approximately that at which stall warning is initiated.

and for the demonstration

As soon as the aeroplane is stalled, recover by normal recovery techniquesThis differs from the latest rules (CS 25)

Once initiated, stall warning must continue until the angle of attack is reduced to approximately that at which stall warning began. Clearly, it was not intended (and is not intended) that the stall demonstration should be taken too far into the stall, so there was no requirement to maintain stall warning through a prolonged stall. If present rules are interpreted as requiring a valid signal that angle of attack has been reduced to below stall warning then this would IMO cover the AF447 situation.

As for "Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground" I can only say that it would be a futile exercise as it is virtually impossible to stall an aircraft with the wheels on the ground since it would be attitude limited well below any stall AoA.

Dozy

Regarding your point about the airflow from the VS in the stall - I don't know. You'd need a proper aero engineer to be certain, but I'd say there would be too many variables involved to allow for considering readings in that scenario as accurate. Certainly the DFDR output from the AoA vanes once the stall is established seems to degenerate very quickly into flipping between extremes - and to my mind would only cause more confusion.
I covered your first point above. The 'flipping' of the AoA signal on the DFDR is I think caused by the AoA going above the range of the instrumenation (50 deg plus!!!)
No - the first panel was convened by the SNPL using the families' group as a cover (and the report contains several glaring errors). Airbus probably don't have an opinion either way.
I agree with jcjeant - the experts panel was convened by the French judiciary, and in fact this is said explicitly in the preamble to the French original.

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Owain Glyndwr,

Thanks for your explanation of the present rules CS 25.
I can only say that it would be a futile exercise as it is virtually impossible to stall an aircraft with the wheels on the ground since it would be attitude limited well below any stall AoA.
The reason for 30 or 60 kts logic is to prevent nuisance stall warnings whist on the ground due to the vanes being blown around randomly.
However it is better to know that you have a false stall warning around 60 kts during the take off than only receiving it once you get airborne with only WOW logic. (see ASN Aircraft accident Lockheed L-1011 TriStar 1 N11002 New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19920730-0)
"...the aircraft lifted off the runway. At that moment the stick shaker activated and the first officer, who was making the takeoff, sensed a loss of performance. The captain than took over control and decided to abort the takeoff. The TriStar touched down again (at a vertical descent rate of 14 feet/sec - the structural design limit being 6 feet/sec -) after being airborne for about 6 seconds."

With the benefit of hindsight of AF447, I still believe it would be better to have had the stall warning on continuously whilst they were stalled, rather than be turned off simply because IAS<60 kts. It must have sounded like a spurious "computer" glitch - and hence be initially disregarded.

[Owain Glyndwr]

rudderrudderrat

With the benefit of hindsight of AF447, I still believe it would be better to have had the stall warning on continuously whilst they were stalled, rather than be turned off simply because IAS<60 kts. It must have sounded like a spurious "computer" glitch - and hence be initially disregarded. I agree with you there.


However it is better to know that you have a false stall warning around 60 kts during the take off than only receiving it once you get airborne with only WOW logic.I'm not sure I follow the logic here. It would surely be better to have no false stall warnings at all? I stand to be corrected, but I thought that the present AI system has no WOW logic for stall warning, just the 60 kt discriminant on valid AoA signals. That way if there is a faulty AoA signal it becomes apparent immediately one passes 60 kts, but random nuisance warnings are suppressed, so doesn't that satisfy your requirements?

[rudderrudderrat]

Hi Owain Glyndwr,
It would surely be better to have no false stall warnings at all?
I agree. Unfortunately no one has yet designed a system which never fails.

so doesn't that satisfy your requirements?
No.
As you so eloquently explain in your earlier post Consequently the measured airspeed was wildly different from the actual airspeed and fell to below 60 kts IAS. That, taken with the probe manufacturer's DDP was the reason for the AoA signals to be declared non valid. despite "the aircraft never got below about 150 kts throughout the whole process."

Therefore the 60 kts IAS logic inhibited the valid AoA probe information.
The stall warning should be independent of IAS when airborne.

[Mr Optimistic]

Think you are being a bit harsh there Dozy calling it 'rubbish', unless it's about the possibility of a female on the FD in which case fair enough. the Cpt didn't return with a 'what do you want', or 'what's the problem', or 'can't I leave you for even 10 minutes without calling me back'. His opening gambit is entirely consistent with him challenging the crew about a situation he has discerned himself and not with being summoned back.

Relevance as to where he had been ? Well if it was a mandatory rest break and he wasn't resting: whether other factors bore on his decision as when to have his break: whether 'social' tensions affected CRM (including his choice of who was to command): the mental alertness/fatigue arising from how they spent the stopover, etc.

On the AoA, a continuing stall warning may have helped the Cpt diagnose the situation but there were sufficient other factors surely, even excluding the period when it did warn. Wouldn't be excoriating the design on that one.

[Owain Glyndwr]

rudderrudderrat

I agree. Unfortunately no one has yet designed a system which never fails.And never will, but in this case (take-off) we were addressing a situation where there were no system failures, just vanes moving as a result of atmospheric turbulence I think.

Therefore the 60 kts IAS logic inhibited the valid AoA probe information.
The stall warning should be independent of IAS when airborne. Strictly speaking the stall warning cannot be independent of IAS because one needs some sort of speed signal to cater for warning threshold variations with Mach Number.

I agree that the logic inhibited valid AoA data, but as I said earlier keeping the stall warning sounding irrespective of measured IAS until there is a valid return to AoA below the threshold would fix that. I assume here that excursions in measured AoA outside the S/W threshold below 60 kts and on the ground would be transients so that the conditions for switching off the warning would be quickly satisfied.
Perhaps I should also say that so far as I can see, it would not be necessary to change the existing AoA validity logic to make this work. All that is required is that the stall warning logic be changed to remove the warning only when a VALID AoA signal shows that safe conditions are restored.

[rudderrudderrat]

I assume here that excursions in measured AoA outside the S/W threshold below 60 kts and on the ground would be transients
Not necessarily. e.g. On a parallel taxiway to the runway, whilst heading towards the holding point in a stiff breeze will cause the vanes to align 180 degs away from zero. Hence the need for the 60 kt logic when on the ground.

Unfortunately no one ever imagined anyone could pull an aircraft into such a stalled AoA without realising it. However this crew succeeded. But why were they so confused? Intermittent warnings didn't help the Captain to diagnose the problem. One tends to think that particular problem has been solved when the warning stops, and so move onto the next problem. e.g. Why are the altimeters winding down to electrical zero?

Edit. Hi Owain. Changed " didn't help the crew to diagnose" to "..Captain .." since the two FOs hadn't a clue between them.

[Owain Glyndwr]

rudderrudderrat

OK, I accept the case, but I think the vanes would go to one or other of their mechanical stops not rotate through 180 deg.

That said, refer to my edited version of my previous post where I suggest that the 60 kt inhibition could in fact be maintained as is.

I agree intermittent warnings don't help diagnose the problem, but this only applied to the latter stages after the captain's return to the cockpit. 54 seconds continuous operation is hardly intermittent, although this is not affected by the 60 kts affair.

[HazelNuts39]

As for "Is it really that difficult to have stall warning Valid >60kts AND on ground" I can only say that it would be a futile exercise as it is virtually impossible to stall an aircraft with the wheels on the ground since it would be attitude limited well below any stall AoA. Just for accuracy - that may well be true for the A330 but not all aircraft are attitude limited.

[vilas]

DozyWannabe
My conclusion that they had no idea of stall recovery is based on the action they took to solve the problem. Had they been trained properly for stall recovery they would have been instinctively pitching well below the horizon for the altitude they were flying which never happened instead they applied TOGA and zoomed into the sky. Their action was perfect for GPWS warning and not a stall warning. In any case subsequent monitoring of pitch, altitude,ROC/ROD, or asking for UAS procedure nothing was done.The airline's training programme deserves more blame than the pilot. Pilot doesn't decide what he should be trained for before being cleared as relief crew. Problems during cruise high altitude stall recovery and especially unreliable speed should have top priority in training of cruise captain. He doesn't do approach and landing.

[Ian W]

rudderrudderrat

OK, I accept the case, but I think the vanes would go to one or other of their mechanical stops not rotate through 180 deg.

That said, refer to my edited version of my previous post where I suggest that the 60 kt inhibition could in fact be maintained as is.

I agree intermittent warnings don't help diagnose the problem, but this only applied to the latter stages after the captain's return to the cockpit. 54 seconds continuous operation is hardly intermittent, although this is not affected by the 60 kts affair.

The problem with human cognition is that it is often not 'logical'. A continuous aural warming can be disregarded as the aural cognitive channel overloads. The cessation of the warning however can have an immediate - what's that just happened' effect. So if the aircraft had sat in deep stall effectively the wrong side of the drag curve with the stall warming sounding the PF and PNF in that situation could well not actually realize the sound was there (as was shown on the infamous wheels up video). The captain however on return to the cockpit would have not been so cognitively overloaded and would have noticed the stall warning.

The advantage of stick shakers is that they are a haptic input (feeling and touch) this cognitive channel does not shut down so fast and as instructors well know a sharp clip around the back of the student's head is often the only way to remove the tunnel vision (attentional tunneling) of an overloaded student.

The effect of cognitive overload seems to be overlooked despite a considerable mass of research demonstrating how it is possible for humans even in relatively low stress exercises to ignore the blindingly obvious. It may even be that the more noise and cavalry charges, flags and flashing lights there are, the more the stressed individual actively disregards them and focuses on the one aspect that they are trying to control. This is when PNF is meant to break in 'haptically' perhaps, but in this case his 'focus' seemed to be recalling the captain.

[HazelNuts39]

The captain however on return to the cockpit would have not been so cognitively overloaded and would have noticed the stall warning.He didn't. Nor did he link it to the other symptoms, i.e. buffet, low airspeed, high rate of descent with a NU attitude, abnormal motions in roll and in pitch, apparently difficult to control.

[Winnerhofer]

Dubois was overloaded with personal problems.
Torn between his ladyfriend and strife on the home front, his spirit was elsewhere.

[DonH]

Winnerhofer;
Such statements cannot be taken seriously as they come from unidentified sources, which typically signals that there is an agenda behind the statements.

Describing and interpreting psychological aspects of crew members behaviour is where angel's fear and as such, is where a very conservative approach is warranted and even demanded.

For me anyway, unsubstantiated rumour without sources, particularly regarding a flight crew member's state of mind prior to an accident is emminently worth ignoring and has no place in a Tech discussion.

Owain & rudderrudderrat, I am particularly enjoying your exchanges.

[Ozlander1]

tdracer

When one puts V/S and ground speed together, the aircraft never got below about 150 kts throughout the whole process.

Ground speed has nothing to do with air speed, never has, never will. :=

[Winnerhofer]

Bonin: "On a pas une bonne annonce de vitesse" when he should have at said "...vitesses douteuses..." (UAS).
"...annonce..." is never used
Further, he said: "...on a une vitesse de fou.." when he should have said "...on est en survitesse..." (IAS Overspeed).

[Winnerhofer]

Crash de l'AF 447*: la fatigue des pilotes mise en cause (http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/03/15/01016-20130315ARTFIG00509-crash-de-l-af-447-la-fatigue-des-pilotes-mise-en-cause.php)

Mais pourquoi une telle fatigue?
Le matin même, l'équipage s'est offert une virée en hélicoptère dans la baie de Rio. Selon le pilote de l'hélicoptère, que j'ai interrogé sur place, l'équipe montre déjà des signes d'épuisement. En réalité l'un des pilotes s'est rendu à Rio en compagnie de sa femme. Le commandant de bord, lui, un homme d'environ 55 ans, en instance de divorce, est également accompagné de sa maîtresse. Les hommes de l'équipage et leurs compagnes descendent au Sofitel de Copacabana. On peut penser qu'ils se rendent à Rio dans un esprit plus festif que professionnel, et que ce jour-là, après une nuit trop courte, le commandant de bord n'était pas en état de réaliser ce vol.

But why such a strain?
The same morning, the crew went on a ride in a helicopter in the bay of Rio. According to the pilot of the helicopter, I asked on the spot, the crew was already showing signs of exhaustion. In fact one of the pilots went to Rio with his wife. The captain himself, a man of about 55 years, divorcing, was also accompanied by his mistress. The men of the crew and their companions were staying at the Sofitel Copacabana. Presumably they went to Rio in a festive rather than professional spirit, and that day, after a short night, the captain was not in shape for the return flight.

[Owain Glyndwr]

Ozlander
Ground speed has nothing to do with air speed, never has, never will.I beg to differ - ground speed correlates directly with airspeed in level flight and zero wind conditions.

If you have been following earlier exchanges on the various threads of this voluminous tale you might remember that at one time it was being suggested that ground speed, or at least some sort of GPS derived speed, could have been used to give the crew some idea of their actual speed in the absence of genuine airspeed data. What I was trying to convey was that you cannot just take V/S when assessing what the airspeed might have been, but you can combine V/S with an inertial speed to get an approximation of the actual airspeed ignoring any wind effects. No more than that. I am well aware that doing that does not yield airspeed, but it serves in the absence of valid pitot static data, and certainly is a better approximation to the truth than the airspeed deduced from the standard system at 50 deg AoA or thereabouts. Read what I wrote:

When one puts V/S and ground speed together, the aircraft never got below about 150 kts throughout the whole processThe sole object of mentioning the real airspeed was to point out that the AoA probes were operating in an acceptable speed range. In that respect any "errors" from neglecting wind effects are not important.

[DonH]

If you have been following earlier exchanges on the various threads of this voluminous tale you might remember that at one time it was being suggested that ground speed, or at least some sort of GPS derived speed, could have been used to give the crew some idea of their actual speed in the absence of genuine airspeed data. In fact the use of the IRS groundspeed as displayed on the FMS MCDU is formally recognized and as such is recommended in several A330 flight crew training manuals. The earliest I can find such recommendation is from early 2005.