Flight International and Future A350 pilots `learn by doing`

[Centaurus]

The most hackneyed phrase in aviation is "Aviate, navigate, and communicate". I must have seen or heard that phrase in one form or another, a thousand times since I first flew a Tiger Moth over 60 years ago. And now here it is again, this time in FI, quoted by Captain Davies head of flight crew training policy at Airbus. He is referring to the astounding news that Airbus is to apply what he says are the three "golden rules" : Fly, navigate and communicate". Using the "appropriate level of automation at all times." Absolutely, of course Your Honour....

Flight International's David Learmount writes: Future A350 pilots to `learn by doing` - quoting Christian Nordern, Airbus's head of flight crew developement who says future Airbus pilots will learn by doing, which not only leads to quick learning, but is also more fun.

Apparently, as a result of pilots manual handling skills declining significantly across the world's fleet, Airbus plan to use hands-on learning process for pilots to familiarise themselves with the aircraft and the manual handling characteristics, once they begin the course using a range of training devices including a full flight simulator.

Now hang on a minute - isn't Airbus trying to re-invent the wheel? Surely, when pilots undergo a conversion to a new type in the simulator, it is good instructional technique to first let the pilot place one hand on the throttles, thrust levers, whatever, his other hand on the control wheel or joy stick (Airbus) and his feet on the rudder pedals, and say here you are old son, get used to flying this kite by hand then a few sessions later you will be shown the marvels of automation.

And if it isn't done that way by the manufacturer's simulator instructors and passed down the line to third party providers and airline operators, then it is no wonder pilots occasionally spear inverted into the ground from an unusual attitude caused by their lack of basic flying ability.

I am surprised that Airbus would make such a profound (?) series of statements about how to teach pilots to fly their product, when flight simulator instructors have always (or should have) taught basic manual handling of jet transport from the first simulator lesson.

While I have always held the greatest respect for David Learmount's articles, methinks, David would have done better to report on some of the tragic aircraft accidents around (no shortage of them) rather than on this occasion, waste valuable space in FI, on meaningless quotes from Airbus flight standards executives.

[Jonty]

If only it were like that.

Unfortunately most conversion courses are Day 1: Typing, Day 10: Typing. (Stole that line) There is very little hand flying in the Airbus conversion course.

The other thing I would pick out is "using the appropriate level of automation at all times" You would be amazed how many pilots of modern planes fail to do just that. Myself included.

[justanotherflyer]

Manufacturers are in love with their machines, and, consciously or otherwise, do their best to engineer out what they see as messy human interference with the beauty of their systems. Pilots have been cowed into the corner of being spectators of these processes.

In the next chapter, the awkward question of passengers will be eliminated too. They will stay at home enjoying virtual immersive experiences of their intended destinations. The machines will soar serenely in the air, with no-one on board.

The manufacturers' nirvana will finally have been achieved.

[LiveryMan]

As a layman, I find it quite worrying that Airbus flight training has to go back to manual flying techniques, etc.

I've always (jokingly) considered Airbus pilots to be glorified computer administrators but I never thought it to be true.

I have a computer driving license, plenty time with flight sims and 10 years experience troubleshooting PC/Software issues. Can I be a Airbus pilot? :E

[Clandestino]

There is very little hand flying in the Airbus conversion course.Depends on the provider, first five sim sessions (4 hours each) of my 320 TR were done raw data, manual, direct law.

Manufacturers are in love with their machines, and, consciously or otherwise, do their best to engineer out what they see as messy human interference with the beauty of their systems. Pilots have been cowed into the corner of being spectators of these processes.And there I was, believing that ever since antitrust laws separated United from Boeing fellows responsible for crew training were operators and not manufacturers.

Granted, manufacturers set minimal training program but it is up to operator and authorities to decide whether bare minimum is good enough for them. That they overwhelmingly decide it to be so is something that not just the manufacturers should be blamed for.

What's the fuss about decrease of manual skills anyway? How statistically safe was 2012 compared to last decade's average?

[keith williams]

I have a computer driving license, plenty time with flight sims and 10 years experience troubleshooting PC/Software issues. Can I be a Airbus pilot?

Yes but you will still have to:

1. Pay an FTO £100000
2. Pass 14 theory exams.
3. Spend 2 years in a hold pool.
4. Pay an airline to permit you to fly the first 500 hours.

[PJ2]

Clandestino;
What's the fuss about decrease of manual skills anyway? How statistically safe was 2012 compared to last decade's average?
Happily, very safe indeed. But we both know that to be meaningful, these must be long-term trends and that isn't the case yet. I think Centaurus is exactly right.

Perhaps the MCPL and automation are indeed the solutions, with a bow towards manual flight during recurrent training sessions. Even as the experience and set of skills are called upon less and less, knowing how to fly an airplane is a fundamental and required skill that can't be replaced.

[John Farley]

Allow me to repeat what I have said before but it produced no response:

I think the time is right for a proper discussion about automatics and the airliner Flight Deck crew of the future.

In the mid 60s I was a safety pilot on a Comet 3B doing cross wind autoland trials with a component of over 30kt. To watch that system flare, smoothly remove the drift angle and squeak the wheels onto the numbers over and over again, convinced me that automatics could achieve standards of ‘flying’ that I could not match.

I say ‘flying’ because I believe words like pilot/piloting/flying mean different things to different people. To avoid ambiguity I suggest we separate out tasks associated with ‘steering' the aircraft from ‘operating' the aircraft.

By steering, I mean controlling any flight parameter. By operating, I mean every other aspect of a flight from pre-flight preparation to filling in the Tech Log afterwards. I believe automatic systems are better at steering tasks while humans are better at operating tasks.

In reply to “What are you going to do when the autopilot fails?” my answer is that future automatic steering systems will not fail in a critical way. Unlike today’s autopilots which disconnect themselves in the event of a problem, future automatics will be designed to fail safe and carry on performing their functions. Just like today’s wing structures. Autoland thanks to special certification standards has not caused a landing accident since it was first used with passengers in the 70s. Sadly there have been quite a few steering errors by aircrew over the same period.

You are a future Captain climbing out of La Guardia when both engines fail. As the operator you decide the crisis needs a landing on the Hudson. You undo the guards protecting the Glide Landing button and press it. With your knowledge of the aircraft’s gliding performance you estimate the touchdown zone on the local area map, draw the final approach track you want with your stylus, press the Glide Landing button again and thank your lucky stars that you did not have to use skill so save your aeroplane. Just knowledge.

As a future passenger I will always want my flight operated by a senior Captain and First Officer who have the knowledge to get us to our destination safely but without the need for them to use skill.

To be the Captain or First Officer of a future airliner is an ambition that any youngster should be proud to have. We will always need airliner Captains and First Officers to operate our automatically steered airliners.

[carlrsymington]

I think the pilots of AF447 were just plain unlucky. I understand Bernoulli's principle and the basics of flying but I think they are a statiscal outlier.
By all means continue the debate but I am willing to do the maths. If A330\A340 \ A380 were burning like 787's I would be worried but. 40 years ago people died. Nobody has died . Period.
I know flying is very, very safe (I have been in (not flown) glider, biplane,helicopter, hot air ballon & 100+ commercial flights). I work with stats most days.
The training system "looks" ok to me but how many Tiger Moth\ Spitfire \ Phantom\ C152 pilots flew their machine into the ground? One in a thousand will make it through.

keep up the good work!

[PJ2]

carlrsymington;
I think the pilots of AF447 were just plain unlucky.
I disagree that "luck" has anything to do with the AF447 accident or for that matter most accidents.

I don't know anyone who has flown transports and also done work in flight safety who believes in "luck". The notion of "belief" describes that which isn't understood (yet) and so has a component of faith (that one will be "lucky or unlucky"). The concept doesn't apply in technical work and isn't an explanation for causal events and outcomes.

What looks like "unlucky" to many, actually has clear antecedents which can be defined, examined and original causes addressed. Like other processes/methods of improvement, that's how the aviation safety process works.

The counter-example is to examine the thirty-plus crews to which an unreliable speed event occurred. Thirty crews were not "lucky", they responded in a manner which maintained control of their aircraft, handled the abnormality and wrote it up in the log book. Some filed an incident report so others could learn from the event.

It is not "just plain unlucky" that one does not execute the standard operating procedures as one has been trained to do in responding to an abnormality nor is it unlucky that in an abnormality one does not communicate with the other crew member(s) as to what one is doing with the airplane and instead launches on one's own without the other crew member knowing or understanding what one is doing.

There are also questions regarding training, checking, standards and experience as well as the specific crew relief process followed on the night of the accident.

[bubbers44]

It would be very hard to fly an airbus like AF 447, simply lose AP and AT pull up into an 11 degree pitch attitude, stall with stick shaker going off at high altitude continuously and keep pulling back with stall warning going off and simply call it bad luck. Horrible airmanship might be more appropriate.

[DozyWannabe]

That's the way engineers see it

Hmm - I think there's some oversimplification going on there. What you're actually talking about is how your lecturer in control systems theory taught that part of his module. It's a bit of a stretch to then extend that single occasion to all engineers (including, but not limited to multiple disciplines such as electrical, software, aeronautical and engineering pilots) involved in aircraft development.

Looking at it purely in terms of control systems theory, your lecturer is correct. However what drives the pilot-as-feedback-mechanism is a complex combination of decision-making, experience, motor control etc. I have a strong suspicion that if you'd asked him after the lecture he'd have explained that his description was to be applied to his module only.

...the way we trust traffic lights enough to plough through a green light at speed without caring to check that the other guy's stopped.

Speaking for myself, I had enough minor prangs in my first year of driving (and seen enough of my mates in hospital) that I've never done that.

PJ2 and Clandestino are bang on the money.

[Mac the Knife]

I think John Farley is quite correct in his remarks.

May I venture that the reason is that it is simply too expensive in terms of time and money to train flight crew to "steer", as he puts it, modern large airliners.

Gaining (and maintaining) the requisite manual flying skills to cope with what is becoming an extremely rare eventuality is just no longer practical.

I recall reading somewhere that training a fast-jet jock costs ten times more than training an airline captain - and the FJ pilot will be using his skills every sortie rather than possibly never in a lifetime.

The two professions diverge - the world moves on.

[GlueBall]

There is something far deeper in 447, but no one seems to really want to find it.

The "last chance" warning, a voice generated "STALL/STALL" intermittent for 50+ seconds, was Not Heard? Not Respected? Assumed To Be False?

Even with total sensory overload, crews must be trained to INSTINCTIVELY fly manual attitude and thrust. :{

[Gretchenfrage]

Clandestino's :yuk: gems ....
What's the fuss about decrease of manual skills anyway? How statistically safe was 2012 compared to last decade's average?

... is best put back into oblivion by a quote of a REAL professional:
It’s important not to define safety as the absence of accidents. When we’ve been through a very safe period, it’s easy to think it’s because we are doing everything right. But it may be that we are doing some things right, but not everything. We can’t relax. We have to remain vigilant.

Chesley Sullenberger

[blind pew]

Nice one ventus.
Still question why the French sub picked up 447 boxes beacon but ignored it.

[PJ2]

ventus45;

Re, "Consider this."

I not only considered your points, (decades ago), but did line indoctrination on the A320 at the time and taught these points.

I certainly agree with your observation regarding training. Seen it, done it and it works really well.

If my views are "dead wrong" on the 30 crews example, I think you've just missed my point a bit.

SOPs, CRM and simulator training for abnormals is exactly the training that you describe in your note and it's done all the time.

The point being made is that what kept the thirty-odd crews who also experienced this abnormality from becoming flummoxed was SOPs, CRM and ensuring the priorities of "aviate, navigate, communicate", were adhered to.

There is a very specific, tightly-trained response to abnormalities in the Airbus. The same tightness applies to the Boeing but the procedures are naturally tailored the aircraft.

Your public profile doesn't say and so I don't know if you fly these aircraft or not but I can outline these procedures if you like so you can see how it should be and almost all the time is, done.

Briefly, the first priority is to maintain control of the aircraft, then ensure the flight path is stable then begin the crew-coordinated response to the abnormal by first announcing what is indicated on the "ECAM", (the Electronic Central Aircraft Monitor, IIRC). This is the job and responsibility of the pilot flying.

The pilot not flying awaits the commands from the PF and executes the ECAM actions, confirming non-reversible items as the list is read and cleared from the screen.

On this screen is displayed in tactical order the abnormal that the flight warning system is sensing. In this case the ECAM messages concerned the ADRs - Air Data Computers.

Secondary failures are announced and are dealt with in order after completion of the first priority ECAM checklists.

Once this is complete the status of the affected aircraft systems is read and cleared.

Sometimes there are memorized checklist items that must be accomplished immediately and without reference to checklists. Engine failures/fires are one example.

The UAS checklist has memorized items, primarily (in my opinion) for immediately after takeoff when there isn't time to get into the checklist and find the correct pitch and power settings. Because takeoff and after takeoff are time-compressed phases of flight, an immediate pitch and power setting must be known.

In cruise flight, the loss of airspeed indication is not an emergency and there should be no reason to become "flummoxed". Nothing has happened to the airplane and it is as stable after such loss as it was prior to any such loss. So in essence, there is no need to change anything with regard to pitch or power.

The event is an abnormal, to which a measured response which maintains control of the flight path is required followed by an announcement of the abnormal and a call for the PF to do the ECAM actions while the PF continues to fly the airplane. There was minimal if any such coordination on the flight deck of AF447.

These things are taught, trained and checked against standards.

AF447's two First Officers in command of the airplane did not respond using SOPs nor did they communicate properly using CRM principles. That is the comparison being made and, because there were thirty-odd successful outcomes and one unsuccessful outcome, comparison as to why is natural and invited especially by those who fly these aircraft so the problem is understood and can be learned from. After all, that's partly how training priorities begin, isn't it?

Some will view this as hindsight bias and I do acknowledge that there is a risk of "thinking for the crew" in all this. None of us were there and none of us can know what the thinking was. But the event wasn't a serious emergency or a major, catastrophic failure that affected the ability of the airplane to continue flight. At the very least we can say it was a perceptual matter which caused certain actions to occur vice others which we here can consider with the value of knowing what happened and why (in terms of the system failures).

At some point, learning and understanding must occur and so we must take what we can in the available evidence from the recorders and the ACARS and come to terms with what occurred using experience and knowledge.

[Artie Fufkin]

I read the article and took away from it nothing about manual handling / automation. As I understood it, Airbus' new learn by doing philosophy was a response to the way most people now approach learning new technology.

I remember my grand parents buying a new fangled video recorder back in the 1980s. They had read the entire instruction manual from cover to cover without turning the VCR on. They were completely confused and asked my help to show them what to do. First thing I did when I arrived was press the "on" button.

In contrast, when my iPad turned up, Apple decided positively to supply next to no instruction manual and designed the product to be turned on and played with, only then going to an online manual later to work out the fine detail.

This is what I took to be the new way Airbus is going to teach the A350. Presumably the conversion course will start in the sim, not in the classroom? Seems all very sensible to me.

[RAT 5]

"stall with stick shaker going off at high altitude continuously and keep pulling back with stall warning going off and simply call it bad luck."

Correct me if wrong, but I thought there was another point. They pulled back and the stall warning stopped. When they lowered the nose and speed increased the warning returned. If so, that would be extremely confusing. However, this could have triggered the knowledge circuits and the brain could have said, "this is not correct." Sit on your hands a moment; restore the a/c to known attitude, thrust and X-check gnd spd. Is it flying? yes/no? It should be. Now there can begin a period of diagnosis. Slowly make a flight control input and see what the instruments tell you. Are they believable? Yes/No? Which ones are correct and which are erroneous? All the time the a/c is still flying. Eventually you will have worked out what works and what doesn't. Then you can devise a plan to survive. Yanking around in the dark without any idea of what is true or false is not a good idea at any problem solving scenario; in many walks of life.

"They are being deliberately de-trained, so that the likelyhood of them actually saving the day, when **** happens, is declining. "[/I

A highly inflammatory conspiracy theory, but sadly it has some element of truth. I think it is a consequence of the self-funded training system. How to keep the training to a minimum to keep the cost down. Airliners are automated SOP controlled aircraft. The airline wants an SOP wizz-kid and the XAA's want to issue a licence to someone who can demonstrate the very very basic of handling skills in a not too difficult non-normal situation. Previously, in low powered multi-engine a/c, before performance A, losing thrust at V1 was a big deal. It was a challenging manoeuvre. Not anymore; or it should not be. Try losing 50% thrust just as you raise the gear, (bird strike). Much more testing, and perhaps more likely than being on the ground, as is usually tested. I know the test is between V1 & V2, but to avoid too many student failures it is common to insert failure on the ground. Even more interesting to insert it just as you make an all engine G/A. These would be testing piloting skills, but the XAA's would have to define such a change.
I just watched the Nat Geo reconstruction of the China Airlines B747 that went aerobatic at crz level. (Lets forget that the captain was knackered from FTL's. The FAA NTSB were very tight lipped and politically correct-ugh- at saying only that his mutli-timezone schedule could have been a contributory factor.)

Put simply the NTSB analyst said that [I]"there is only one thing required of a pilot in an emergency and that is to 'save the a/c'. Inherent will be the saving of any pax. They did indeed save the a/c. They may have caused the emergency by their actions, aka Atlantic glider, but they saved the a/c. It is necessary to have confidence that the pilots at the sharp end, when confronted with an unusual situation and failure, which is not covered by checklists nor training, can use their knowledge and skill to work out what is needed the save the a/c.?" I concur, not out of some macho/ hero worship thing, but because I believe the pax the pax regard us as their final insurance policy. They expect it to pay out.

[a1anx]

I have a computer driving license, plenty time with flight sims and 10 years experience troubleshooting PC/Software issues. Can I be a Airbus pilot?

LiveryMan

Not so far from the truth.

Like all occupations aviation has been ruthlessly de-skilled.

[Centaurus]

As a future passenger I will always want my flight operated by a senior Captain and First Officer who have the knowledge to get us to our destination safely but without the need for them to use skill.


I don't know about "senior" captains. The term "senior" means nothing. Any captain will do as long as he is qualified and competent.

The name of the game is redundancy. There are airworthiness system redundancy requirements for ETOPS and in the design of aircraft in general.
Pilots are also part of the redundancy systems - they just happen to be human beings suitably skilled and certified competent (or should be) in all facets of automatic and manual flying when an operation does not go according to plan.

[CONF iture]

These things are taught, trained and checked against standards.
But UAS in cruise has never been taught, trained and checked against standards.
Airbus had everything to do something about it before AF447 happened but failed to act ...

The necessary was obvious and simple.
I would have loved to practice this (http://www.pprune.org/7450265-post576.html).

I'm still waiting ...

[aguadalte]

J. F.:
In reply to “What are you going to do when the autopilot fails?” my answer is that future automatic steering systems will not fail in a critical way. Unlike today’s autopilots which disconnect themselves in the event of a problem, future automatics will be designed to fail safe and carry on performing their functions. Just like today’s wing structures. Autoland thanks to special certification standards has not caused a landing accident since it was first used with passengers in the 70s. Sadly there have been quite a few steering errors by aircrew over the same period.

In the following case, reported in David Learmount's blog (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2012/12/airmanship-lives.html), the auto-pilot didn't disconnect. In fact, even with AP disconnected the pilots wouldn't be able to counter-act the Alpha-Prot "stall-protection system" without changing its flight controls rules to ALT LAW.

How would a redundant/fail safe future system cope with this particular situation?

I think human errors on accident statistics should be compared to every day accident/incident avoided cases due to pilot awareness and subsequent actions...

Airmanship lives - Learmount (http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/learmount/2012/12/airmanship-lives.html)

[John Farley]

aguadalte

By definition a fail safe system is that. Fail safe. Current autopliots are not designed to that spec. So in my view it is not reasonable to have thoughts about future ops based on present systems. A fail safe system will have to be developed from a clean sheet of paper not a few mods to today's kit.

How many years it will take for fail safe systems to evolve and become cost effective in production I have no idea. But I am sure they will in the end because as time goes by it will become clearer and clearer that there is a need for them.

I was 17 when I started a five year apprenticeship at the RAE in 1950 so I grew up surrounded by some of the best boffins in the business. I apolgise if that upbringing makes me lean towards what R&D is capable of producing given time and need.

[Mac the Knife]

"A fail safe system will have to be developed from a clean sheet of paper not a few mods to today's kit."

An AP which on receiving UAS data continues flying pitch and power which annunciating same to pilots does not need a "clean sheet".

"Attention! Unreliable pitot-derived airspeed detected. Maintaining current pitch and power. You must evaluate other AS indications."


In my field, this would be like an anaesthetic machine that just stops ventilating if it finds an error in the blood oxygen saturation detector circuit (which it doesn't, tho' it does generate a warning).

[PJ2]

CONF iture;
But UAS in cruise has never been taught, trained and checked against standards. Airbus had everything to do something about it before AF447 happened but failed to act ...You're in the business and should already be well aware that training, standards and checking as well as SOPs are up to the individual airline within their OpsSpecs and the JARS/FARS/CARS etc.

The manufacturer supplies a basic SOPs, Abnormal and Emergency drills and checklists as well as the aircraft's essential requirements. Airlines are free to modify them and as you would already know, do modify them, sometimes extensively.

That the UAS event was never taught in cruise in the face of known industry events from 1996 onwards is a question with which individual airlines must come to terms. You are also, or should be aware that UAS events in cruise as well as increased focus on hand-flying skills are now part of recurrent training scripts as a result of the AF447 accident, like Colgan, 'watershed accidents' in my view. Whether such training could have actually prevented an accident like AF447 cannot be determined conclusively.

Regarding the ECAM which had to be dealt with, there exists already an example of a far more complex set of circumstances in QF32, handled successfully by the crew in a real and very serious emergency which actually did threaten the safety of the aircraft.

Re, "Learn-by-doing"...manufacturers aren't stupid so I'll wait and see the details of what Airbus means by this. Some systems knowledge is required but self-diagnosing / self-fixing systems are not an impossibility.

Some of the comments here are, I think, quite thoughtful and prescient and will prove "ordinary" at some future point.

For those raised on nuts-and-bolts courses and high standards for airmanship and flying the airplane this seems a step too far, not, as some have pointed out here, because it can't be done but because with individually-directed play one tends to run out of road very swiftly if all a crew member knows is which button to push to make the airplane go.

The old must give way to the new, often in surprising and unanticipated ways.

[John Farley]

An AP which on receiving UAS data continues flying pitch and power which annunciating same to pilots does not need a "clean sheet"

Couldn't agree more. I have suggested this very thing earlier earlier on one of the 447 threads. It is such a minor re-write of a bit of code that I really hope it happens soon.

[CONF iture]

You're in the business and should already be well aware that training, standards and checking as well as SOPs are up to the individual airline within their OpsSpecs and the JARS/FARS/CARS etc.
How an Airline could be aware of a recurrent issue if the information stays in the Manufacturer headquarters ?

Air Caraibes meeting took place nowhere else than in Toulouse - That one had to be a wake up call where pilots were clearly stating how uncomfortable they had been with the overall situation.

What did Airbus ?

That was 6 months before AF447.

[aguadalte]

John Farley,

Fail Safe philosophy is being used by all manufactures since the Comet accidents. I believe AI was having Fail Safe in mind when building an aircraft created "against pilot error". And it was with that philosophy in mind that Airbus designers decided to add Alfa Prot (and all other protections) as a fail safe device to prevent pilots to over stress their airliners.
Ultimately Fail Safe is a unachievable goal due to the extreme complexity of the aviation world. One can always dream about perfection and science fiction, but the "real world" always finds ways to relegate us all to our humbleness.
And by the way, I was not talking only about AP, I was also addressing AI's FBW flight controls design/laws. And to that regard, I was asking how would it be possible to solve a problem, with a (supposed to be fail safe) design that was receiving wrong inputs by the failure of all AOA probes...
In that particular case, it was up to the pilots to save the day and act as the real "failsafe device".
We will have indeed to wait for a long time, until a complete failsafe system is born. But until then, human intelligence (and experience) will have to be in the top of the chain.

[Clandestino]

Happily, very safe indeed. But we both know that to be meaningful, these must be long-term trends and that isn't the case yet. Trend is pretty clear: overall airlines safety has been radically improved compared to 90-ies, not to mention 80-ies. In fact, Joe Public of thirty years ago was every couple of months faced with smoking, bodies filled crater of air disaster that happened in the first world, while (despite fantastic growth of air traffic) his modern equivalent is so seldom faced with the ugly truth of air travel being very hazardous that he is easily lulled into belief it is not dangerous at all. So when disaster strikes, attempts to reconcile very wrong picture of the way aeronautical world works with the stark reality result in some spectacularly funny mental gymnastics and that's what made bulk of AF447 threads.

Now, some of us have the privilege of really flying the airliners and with it comes attached access to boring pieces of information contained in internal safety publications that never catch the public eye. There you can see that instruments or autopilot failures are not oh-so-horrible-once-in-a lifetime-events-that-can-get-the-best-of-crews but rather many-times-a-day occurrences that most of the times get handled in a way that makes passengers not realize something is wrong with their aeroplane.

Personally, I don't think flying the bus sim fully manually increased my manual skills a bit; I rather suspect it was intended to weed out those manually inept at the early stage. Unsurprisingly, no one ever failed it at my gang; those who didn't make it were usually unable to get to grips with FMGS.

Even as the experience and set of skills are called upon less and less, knowing how to fly an airplane is a fundamental and required skill that can't be replaced. Exactly! Overwhelming majority of pilots when faced with trouble aloft performs safely, even if it is their first time they see such a thing or they were never trained for such an eventuality. If you think you'd read about it on Avherald, chances are small. Not even every tenth safety occurrence we had was reported there and we are not operating in some backwaters - unless FRA, MUC, CPH, LHR, FCO, CDG could be considered as such.

To be the Captain or First Officer of a future airliner is an ambition that any youngster should be proud to have.Hopefully so. Present is pretty bleak, unless one has some private means and flies half the normal hours for fun.

I disagree that "luck" has anything to do with the AF447 accident or for that matter most accidents.Yup. We call it "fate". It is still the hunter.

Now I have your attention, I'd like to say that world does not conform strictly to Newtonian mechanistic cause-effect view. It's nature is so complex, our best chance of making sense of it is to think of it in statistical terms. Pilot who is dedicated to his profession stands far better chance of making it to retirement than some ignorant risk-taker but this is still a chance; he might be abruptly terminated if the circumstances conspire against him while the second one could have long life of minima-busting, scud running, overweight take-offs etc. Folks who have problem understanding this are those who believe that if they got away with e.g. taking-off with snow on the wings, they will get away every time.

I don't know anyone who has flown transports and also done work in flight safety who believes in "luck". Must be a cultural thing. I don't know anyone who believes otherwise but then every pilot I know 1) knows it should not be pushed under any circumstance 2) would turn away if he suspects that it would take to have luck involved even in ppms to execute the original plan successfully. Presence of luck is oft acknowledged post festum.

Thirty crews were not "lucky", they responded in a manner which maintained control of their aircraft,Yup. Even as most of them did not responded in prescribed manner. Makes one think.

It is not "just plain unlucky" that one does not execute the standard operating procedures as one has been trained to do in responding to an abnormality nor is it unlucky that in an abnormality one does not communicate with the other crew member(s) as to what one is doing with the airplane and instead launches on one's own without the other crew member knowing or understanding what one is doing.Correct. This is not unlucky. This is suicide through panic.

UAV technology has arrived.
Pilot(s) are not (operationally) required, at any level, any more.
Groundies, dispatchers, atc, can all do the necessaries.If you have a slightest idea how to make this statement of yours true, USAF would like to have a word with you.

May I venture that the reason is that it is simply too expensive in terms of time and money to train flight crew to "steer", as he puts it, modern large airliners.Pilots are cheap. Lots of them nowadays come with negative price. Steering is easy. Knowing where to steer and when is a bit more difficult.

Gaining (and maintaining) the requisite manual flying skills to cope with what is becoming an extremely rare eventuality is just no longer practical.Was always. Still is. It's the matter of perspective - and those booooooring safety bulletins.

Clandestino's gems ....Ah, just the usual balanced and well supported arguments we are used to receiving from this source.

... is best put back into oblivion by a quote of a REAL professional:Now you mention it; both Habsheim and Hudson have one more common trait besides both involving A320: both aeroplanes hit the deck in alpha floor (EDIT: I had a brainf@rt here, I meant alpha prot, not alpha floor, alpha floor is autothrust mode which was not applicable in either case) with significant aft stick displacement. If flight controls were classical or brand B FBW with overridable limits, outcome would be much worse.

The point being made is that what kept the thirty-odd crews who also experienced this abnormality from becoming flummoxed was SOPs, CRM and ensuring the priorities of "aviate, navigate, communicate", were adhered to.Not always. A lot of the crews were utterly puzzled but they did nothing - which turned out to be the safe thing to do.

Presumably the conversion course will start in the sim, not in the classroom? Seems all very sensible to me. Could be. On my 320 course we didn't follow classic "first groundschool then sim" but before each abnormal session dedicated to specific system, we'd go through CBT.

But UAS in cruise has never been taught, trained and checked against standards.So? Other AF crews negotiated UAS successfully.

Airbus had everything to do something about it before AF447 happened but failed to act ...Act upon what? Non-events? In every case there was pitot blockade, then there wasn't. Everyone passed through it without a scratch. It was reasonable to require pitot replacement but there was no reason to make it high priority.

I think human errors on accident statistics should be compared to every day accident/incident avoided cases due to pilot awareness and subsequent actions... That would be smart thing to do if we are really interested in meaningful aviation safety discussion.

I apolgise if that upbringing makes me lean towards what R&D is capable of producing given time and need.And financing, of course. That's why we still fly ILS and not far superior MLS.

An AP which on receiving UAS data continues flying pitch and power which annunciating same to pilots does not need a "clean sheet". Unfortunately, it needs not just clean sheet, it needs computer vastly superior to anything we have today.

Every computer can recognize failed speed. None can unreliable. Comparing so radically different categories as pitch, power and speed to see which one is wrong cannot be done without applying intelligence and real intelligence is what every computer so far lacks.

It is such a minor re-write of a bit of code that I really hope it happens soon. It would be pretty major as, unlike ATR or DHC-8, Airbus has no attitude hold mode. Her autopilot is actually simpler than those of typical turboprop. I haven't flown many types but A320 was smoothest and easiest to fly of any, even in direct law where there is direct stick to controls displacement and only manual trim is available through trim wheel. It was very easy to precisely set the desired attitude on her. Trick (very easy one) was knowing which attitude was the right one.

Ultimately Fail Safe is a unachievable goal due to the extreme complexity of the aviation world. Absolute fail safe is indeed unachievable. When something aeronautical is certified and referred to as fail safe, it means it is fail safe except when one-in-a-couple-of-millions occurrence happens. HTBJ is still very much relevant.

[DozyWannabe]

How an Airline could be aware of a recurrent issue if the information stays in the Manufacturer headquarters ?

Air Caraibes meeting took place nowhere else than in Toulouse - That one had to be a wake up call where pilots were clearly stating how uncomfortable they had been with the overall situation.

What did Airbus ?

You mean apart from setting a programme in motion to replace the problematic pitot tubes which was underway, and publishing bulletins to airlines notifying them of recent UAS issues and of the importance of UAS procedures - both of which happened prior to AF447?

You can argue whether they were slow off the mark, but it's not like they did nothing.

[CONF iture]

Now you mention it; both Habsheim and Hudson have one more common trait besides both involving A320: both aeroplanes hit the deck in alpha floor with significant aft stick displacement. If flight controls were classical or brand B FBW with overridable limits, outcome would be much worse.
Pure disinformation on both reports.

Ah, just the usual balanced and well supported arguments we are used to receiving from this source.
Sarcasm applied to yourself.

publishing bulletins to airlines notifying them of recent UAS issues and of the importance of UAS procedures
Where are they ... ?

[Slasher]

Gaining (and maintaining) the requisite manual flying skills to cope with
what is becoming an extremely rare eventuality is just no longer practical.

Somehow I think Sully would disagree with that.


Rare events, "isolated incidents" (how I hate that bloody phrase!), "freak accidents",
etc - only need to happen once. And its THAT which I diligently maintain my manual
flying skills, even on the 320 suck-squirt.

Show me an event where the FMC, A/P or A/T saved an aircraft and I'll :oh:

[KAG]

Show me an event where the FMC, A/P or A/T saved an aircraft and I'll It will be a non event by definition, so impossible to show you.
Anybody on pprune knows A/P, A/T... saved the day many times.
That's obviously not a reason for giving up on flying skills, but ignoring the role and task of the A/P in the thousands daily worldwilde flights is simply amazing.

[Clandestino]

Pure disinformation on both reports.

1. it's not disinformation, it is my mistake; I meant alpha prot but wrote alpha floor. Anyone knowing a bit about Airbus FBW would recognize the error. Alpha prot is AoA limiting feature of FBW, alpha floor is automatic application of TOGA thrust at high AoA which wasn't applicable in either case. At Habsheim through autothrust being deactivated and aeroplane flying below 100 ft RA anyway while engines being wrecked is what precipitated the Hudson ditching. Alpha floor is autothrottle mode also available on B737NG and there it's called... alpha floor.

2. if you substitute "floor" for "prot", does it contradict the official reports?

Now sit and watch the outburst of usual tales how investigating bodies hate the pilots and protect the evil Airbus.

3. Ah, just the usual balanced and well supported arguments we are used to receiving from this source.

[Centaurus]

Airbus plan to use hands-on learning process for pilots to familiarise themselves with the aircraft and the manual handling characteristics,

It will be instructive to view the additional training syllabus that Airbus plan to use to teach pilots how to fly the Airbus by hand.

Until that syllabus is published we will not know whether it is just another motherhood statement (hot air) or something that really is revolutionary (:E) like practice circuits and landings with and without strong crosswinds, raw data manual throttle instrument approaches and circling approaches without waypoints spread all over the MAP mode. Unless this revised training syllabus means flying without the flight director and autothrottles, it is doomed to being a waste of time as far as cadet pilots and those new to type are concerned

[Slasher]

Anybody on PPRuNe knows A/P, A/T... saved the day many times.

Ok KAG - let's see how many Pruners can quote events where the fancy stuff
saved the day. You didn't provide any examples which doesn't surprise me in
the least.

[KAG]

If you beleive the A/P and A/T have never saved anybody's day, so there is no need to talk to you, at that level I am afraid there is nothing we can do for you.

[deptrai]

I am still calling you in to provide even just one example where automatics saved an aircraft

most likely you won't hear much about such examples, exactly because they became non-events. What qualifies as "automatics"? Does ILS count as automatics? I wouldn't fly with the eagle-eyed supernatural hero pilot who thinks he can do better without, in low visibility.

Columbus didn't cross the Atlantic using ancient Roman technology either. It's easy to vilify (new) technology, but learning to use what you have at your disposal it in a safe way, and maximise it's benefits will probably get you farther.

[Slasher]

If you beleive the A/P and A/T have never saved anybody's day, so there is
no need to talk to you, at that level I am afraid there is nothing we can do
for you.

Who's "we"? There's no "we" when it comes to you Mr KAG, or haven't you realised
that yet?

Anybody on PPRuNe knows A/P, A/T... saved the day many times.


I am still calling you in to provide even just one example where automatics saved
an aircraft.

When you find you can't I suggest you retract your statement.

[CONF iture]

Now you mention it; both Habsheim and Hudson have one more common trait besides both involving A320: both aeroplanes hit the deck in alpha prot with significant aft stick displacement. If flight controls were classical or brand B FBW with overridable limits, outcome would be much worse.
No, could have been better as alpha max was just not there yet ... Taking some branches and leaves back for a normal landing in Mulhouse and an improved touchdown on the Hudson.

Now sit and watch the outburst of usual tales how investigating bodies hate the pilots and protect the evil Airbus.
Sorry, just no feeling here, just damage control.
N/A and not necessary to the NTSB on the Hudson though.

[jcjeant]

Originally Posted by Dozy
publishing bulletins to airlines notifying them of recent UAS issues and of the importance of UAS proceduresSeems procedures are not enough for the FAA
FAA
http://i.imgur.com/lI2M0Ph.jpg
We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from forming on air data system sensors and consequent loss of or misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.”

Boeing
Boeing stated that loss of, or erroneous, airspeed indications do not necessarily lead to loss of control because other indications can be used to safely fly the airplane. Boeing noted that multiple in-service events have occurred without loss of control when the flight crew followed the procedures that mitigate loss of air data.

FAA
We disagree /…/ Although some in-service events might have occurred without loss of control, loss of, or misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems can, in fact, lead to an unsafe condition of loss of airplane control. FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-11A, dated June 21, 2007 typically classifies loss of all airspeed displays (including the standby display) as a ''catastrophic'' failure condition.

[RAT 5]

This is normally addressed by obsessively proceduralising everything so that as few as possible 'judgement calls' are required from the pilot.

Where there isn't automation there are procedures - the less room for 'crew creativity' the better as far as safety designers are concerned.

You can not foresee all eventualities and write procedures for everything. Things unusual will happen. Go back a read what I reported was the NTSB statement after the aerobatic China airlines B747. OK, the other side of the coin is that if the crew had followed airmanship procedures diligently they should not have arrived in the poo; but they did and they survived. It was a classic case of a demo about the definition of an ace pilot. The skills should have been used to avoid the scenario rather tan being used to escape from it.

I spent a good few years with cadet F/O's who could handle the a/c OK, but did not know what to think about in an unusual scenario. Their first act was not to act with airmanship, but to try and remember what was written in the SOP book. While that thinking was going on the a/c was still travelling very fast and sometimes not doing what you wanted. There wasa delay in action. Then there was the realisation that there was nothing in the book, or that what was described did not quite fit the scenario. Now they were lost. What to do? Should I deviate from the nearest SOP. They were afraid to. Dilly & dally while the situation became worse. That's one of the major problems with SOP gurus being accelerated into command.

[PJ2]

How an Airline could be aware of a recurrent issue if the information stays in the Manufacturer headquarters ?
. . . .

What did Airbus ?
You may not be aware that Airbus publishes a number of communications, (FAST, Status of the Fleet reviews, etc), discussing issues with their aircraft among which topics in the past have been stall warning, ADRs, tailplane vibration, and so on. An OLM (http://www.iag-inc.com/premium/AirbusUnreliableSpeeds.pdf) was published in 2006 discussing new developments in the UAS procedures. Another technical communication (Barthes) was published in 2007. Perhaps you may recall as well that the UAS drill & checklist has gone through an evolutionary process which began with two B757 accidents where airspeed information was unreliable?

Essentially, communications regarding ADR/airspeed problems began in 1996. Information to airlines about Pitot/ADR/Airspeed problems was widely available in varying formats.

As mentioned previously, it is up to individual airlines to use manufacturer's information to best advantage in terms of training, standards and checking.
That's one of the major problems with SOP gurus being accelerated into command.
Precisely.

The predisposition towards the present "SOP / Automation tight coupling" is a response to cover off a chronic lack of actual flying experience and/or the ability to think in an airplane.

Airmanship cannot be taught; it requires time in and more than a few shots of adrenaline before it sinks in that flying does not consist of running a software platform at a desk but can instead kill one and everyone else on board, (in AF447's case in less time than it takes to wait in line for a Starbucks coffee).

[Clandestino]

Sorry, just no feeling here, just damage control.Well, my post was intended to be self-defeating prophecy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-defeating_prophecy) but anyway, thank you for putting forward your physics-defying notions in polite manner. There is such thing as excessive pitch at ditching and there's no such thing as the magical area of spectacular climb performance below Vx.

The predisposition towards the present "SOP / Automation tight coupling" is a response to cover off a chronic lack of actual flying experience and/or the ability to think in an airplane. I'd agree with everything but experience. My preference would be to replace it with "aptitude" as I couldn't find significant positive correlation between hours flown and quality as a pilot when it comes professional flying (mind you: things are radically different in general aviation without the benefit of highly structured training). There were good and bad ones between both graybeards and greenhorns. Experience is important but not as much as it is usually held to be - it is not panacea to all ailments aeronautical.

Anyway, while I recognize there is problem with pilots' manual and mental skills, and something ought to be done about it, it is not as bad as some doomsayers around here suggest, basing their dire warnings on nothing but a few high-profile accidents.
Airmanship cannot be taught; it requires time in and more than a few shots of adrenaline before it sinks in that flying does not consist of running a software platform at a desk but can instead kill one and everyone else on board, (in AF447's case in less time than it takes to wait in line for a Starbucks coffee). Theory of airmanship can be taught and learnt but it can't be put in practice by someone with lousy attitude towards the flying. Folks that don't realize that air is exacting and cruel (but very seldom unfair) mistress, have no business being in control of paraglider, let alone passenger transport aeroplane. Pilot realizing his own mortality only when nature and machine conspire to overburden him is liable to succumb to panic. His eventual demise, occasionally documented in accident report, often causes casual reader to ask himself a question: "What the hell was he thinking when he did that?". Answer is quite simple: nothing at all.

[CONF iture]

There is such thing as excessive pitch at ditching
Forget about any excess as the Airbus recommended pitch for ditching was already refused to Sully, consequence of an obscure alpha limitation, well short of alpha max.

there's no such thing as the magical area of spectacular climb performance below Vx
No need for magical or spectacular, just that little something to not catch too much of the trees to keep flying. But wait a minute, that's exactly what alpha max can provide when both engines are pushing as hard as the report states they were ...
Now if you think Airbus has it all wrong with the 'climb perf below Vx' give them a call because that's really what they want us to do to save us from the ground.

[Slasher]

Their first act was not to act with airmanship, but to try and remember what
was written in the SOP book.

Quite true RAT 5 - of course that's because, unlike most of us here, they have no experience
to fall back on. Back when I joined a major with only 1700hrs in Chieftains and other various
twins, I'd already learnt what was going to kill me and what isn't......with a good measure of
lateral thinking practice. And I had good ab-initio training with a serious old fart who instilled
airmanship from the very beginning.

No one can blame these cadets for being unable to gain GA experience but, and this is what
I find objectionable - they are thrown into the RHS (ie SIC) with bugger-all under their belts
and minimal to non-existent airmanship instilling. At SQ yonks ago, anyone who joined with
less than 1000 hrs was slam-dunked to being the captain's sexual advisor for no less than 2
yrs and after that was checked to COMMAND status, then given the RHS. I am no fan of SIA
but back then they had their heads screwed on right.

...Since the advent of these lousy low-cost low-class outfits we've seen the degradation of
good quality training of cadets. Indeed it has permeated through to many premium airlines
who've realised there are bucks to be made by putting a kid where a pilot should be and in
doing so put the onus on line Captains to a maintain safe operation under the worn cliche
of "use CRM". CRM is useless with a kid who a) hasn't been competently trained, and b) has
no interest in furthering any pilotage or thinking skills except that of the bare minimum.

I've just done a sim all-nighter with 10 cadets so I admit I'm bloody tired right now, but out
of the lot only 3 are very keen to learn this "airmanship thing". The rest couldn't give a crap
and just want to get through with the bare minimum. I can see these 3 one day becoming
good commanders - out of the remaining 7 only 4 will be passable by our standards, and the
remaining 3 I won't dare put my wife and kid on board if they ever make it to the LHS - but
of course they eventually will.

[CONF iture]

You may not be aware that Airbus publishes a number of communications, (FAST, Status of the Fleet reviews, etc), discussing issues with their aircraft
But none addressing that specific trend of recurrent UAS in cruise.

Where is the expected reflection following Air Caraibes events ?
In addition, Airbus engineers have understood all the difficulty encountered by the crew for a rapid and effective implementation of the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION procedure.
They agreed to the admissibility of our remarks and reflect therefore on a modification for the checklists.
Modification for the checklists ... have we seen any ?

A pro-active attitude (http://www.pprune.org/7450265-post576.html) was necessary, and still is.

[Clandestino]

Sorry, just no feeling here, just damage control.
N/A and not necessary to the NTSB on the Hudson though.

Forget about any excess as the Airbus recommended pitch for ditching was already refused to Sully, consequence of an obscure alpha limitation, well short of alpha max.

Well, for those unable (or pretending to be) to understand the alpha, speed, flighpath and RoD numbers in report, there is explicit NTSB statement:

The A320 alpha-protection mode incorporates features that can attenuate pilot sidestick pitch inputs. Because of these features, the airplane could not reach the maximum AOA attainable in pitch normal law for the airplane weight and configuration; however, the airplane did provide maximum performance for the weight and configuration at that time.

Obscure limitation? Yeah, right.

The NTSB recommends that the FAA require Airbus operators to expand the AOA-protection envelope limitations ground-school training to inform pilots about alpha-protection mode features while in normal law that can affect the pitch response of the airplane.

The operator may cry "It was evil French-lead consortium that lead us to believe we can put concierges in cockpit so that was exactly what we did" but there is small chance such excuses would provoke sympathy on the part of the judiciary if proverbial hits the fan. Development and application of flight crew training (syllabus, manuals, etc.) is operators responsibility, not manufacturers. Some operators do include info about aeroplane's behaviour in alpha protection mode and give their crews hands-on sim training in it, some just don't, wishfully hoping the dry information contained in FCOM will be absorbed by the crews.

No need for magical or spectacular, just that little something to not catch too much of the trees to keep flying. But wait a minute, that's exactly what alpha max can provide when both engines are pushing as hard as the report states they were ...Idea of going promptly to alpha max is to convert forward momentum into RoC as quickly as possible. Once it's spent and aeroplane climbs away on alpha max with constant speed there is still a lot of excess power available to climb even if it needs not be exactly the best climb angle speed and hold full stick aft is quite simple procedure to follow under duress, far easier than "adjust attitude to achieve intermittent shaker activation". Even if we accept there was secret organization that tampered with FDRs, there is still that all too infamous video which pretty vividly shows just what was the energy state of the aeroplane before she made controlled flight into trees.

Now if you think Airbus has it all wrong with the 'climb perf below Vx' give them a call because that's really what they want us to do to save us from the ground. I'd estimate number of sleepless night at Toulouse caused by PPRuNe critics to be between 0 and 0.001.

Slasher, spot on :ok:

I'm afraid what was meant to be benevolent advice will come to haunt us as a dire warning:

The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline's pilot task.

[sheppey]

I spent a good few years with cadet F/O's who could handle the a/c OK, but did not know what to think about in an unusual scenario. Their first act was not to act with airmanship, but to try and remember what was written in the SOP book. While that thinking was going on the a/c was still travelling very fast and sometimes not doing what you wanted. There wasa delay in action. Then there was the realisation that there was nothing in the book, or that what was described did not quite fit the scenario. Now they were lost. What to do? Should I deviate from the nearest SOP. They were afraid to. Dilly & dally while the situation became worse. That's one of the major problems with SOP gurus being accelerated into command

I firmly believe these comments neatly sums up the true situation in the majority of the world's airlines. The well known "Children of the Magenta Line" training film, bears this out.

[Gretchenfrage]

That's one of the major problems with SOP gurus being accelerated into command

.... and by today they moved up to TRI/TRE's

.... and they are the most pretentious contributors on this forum

[CONF iture]

Some operators do include info about aeroplane's behaviour in alpha protection mode and give their crews hands-on sim training in it, some just don't, wishfully hoping the dry information contained in FCOM will be absorbed by the crews.
Problem : FCOM is sometimes that dry that the quote from NTSB AAR/10/03, pages 97-98 is just not into it, and even Sully did not seem aware, but that guy could be just another concierge after all ?

As designed, the airplane did provide maximum performance for the weight and configuration at that time, but prevented the pilot from taking advantage of his experience to optimize the flare for the best possible touchdown.
But please give me the debrief on alpha, speed, flighpath and RoD numbers in report that I see where I'm way out. You may add the attitude as well ...

Even if we accept there was secret organization that tampered with FDRs, there is still that all too infamous video which pretty vividly shows just what was the energy state of the aeroplane before she made controlled flight into trees.
Watch the video as your own convenience but the FDR data, tampered or not, already pretty vividly reveal a margin to get to alpha max and a real opportunity to not get stuck into the trees.

I'd estimate number of sleepless night at Toulouse caused by PPRuNe critics to be between 0 and 0.001.
Not a mere critics delivered by a mere ppruner ... but what could be critical info directly from Clandestino - Don't be shy now, give them that call.

[Clandestino]

I have no problem with Airbus procedures or manuals as they are, knowing very well how "perfect" often is an enemy of "good enough". As the aerospace landscape changes, they will be changed but by no means in a way to satisfy someone whose notions about flying in general and Airbus in particular can't be put in coherent shape useful for anything more than shouting from internet soapbox.

PPRuNe is anonymous forum where anyone interested in flying can freely exchange ideas, opinions, experiences, advices, etc. Price we have to pay for this is necessity to endure the occasional outbursts of opinionated nonsense from attention seekers. I'd say it's well worth paying.

[CONF iture]

As the aerospace landscape changes, they will be changed but by no means in a way to satisfy someone whose notions about flying in general and Airbus in particular can't be put in coherent shape useful for anything more than shouting from internet soapbox.

Price we have to pay for this is necessity to endure the occasional outbursts of opinionated nonsense from attention seekers.

Good ... Anything on the technical side (http://www.pprune.org/7714991-post55.html) ?

[DozyWannabe]

but prevented the pilot from taking advantage of his experience to optimize the flare for the best possible touchdown.

To the best of my knowledge you've been banging on this point for about two years now and you're still the only one who's making it. Perhaps someone can find an aero engineer to run the numbers to get a definitive answer (such material would be perfect for a new thread in AH&N or Tech Log), but forgive me if I remain sceptical until such material becomes available.

The pilot-related contributing factors to the incident you're referring to were never about being able to clear the trees, they were about poor decision-making prior to and during the approach. Put bluntly, even if the incident had been non-fatal, the Captain would still have been held responsible for these factors with a similarly negative impact on his career.

[GlueBall]

UAV technology has arrived.
Pilot(s) are not (operationally) required, at any level, any more.


Huh? Problem is that too many UAVs have NOT returned to base. The exact number of "missing" UAVs remains classified, probably so as not to spook the taxpayers. :{

[CONF iture]

To the best of my knowledge you've been banging on this point for about two years now and you're still the only one who's making it. Perhaps someone can find an aero engineer to run the numbers to get a definitive answer (such material would be perfect for a new thread in AH&N or Tech Log), but forgive me if I remain sceptical until such material becomes available.
Being the only one is not an issue but don't discount Sully :

The captain progressively pulled aft on the sidestick as the airplane descended below 100 feet, and he pulled the sidestick to its aft stop in the last 50 feet, indicating that he was attempting to raise the airplane nose to flare and soften the touchdown on the water.

Now if you think you need an aero engineer to validate the point just go for it.


The pilot-related contributing factors to the incident you're referring to were never about being able to clear the trees, they were about poor decision-making prior to and during the approach. Put bluntly, even if the incident had been non-fatal, the Captain would still have been held responsible for these factors with a similarly negative impact on his career.
Nothing new (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/482356-af-447-thread-no-8-a-7.html#post7150688) here really but do not focus on the guy to better avoid the numbers ...

[John Farley]

On the other hand some might say the touchdown attitude achieved was just right and avoided a nose high touchdown that could have given a violent pitch down when the tail made contact followed by a plough under.

[DozyWannabe]

...do not focus on the guy to better avoid the numbers ...

You're assuming that the numbers will support your assertion before we know what the numbers actually say. AFAIK they're being worked on, so let's hold off until we know.

[Owain Glyndwr]

Dozy,
Perhaps someone can find an aero engineer to run the numbers to get a definitive answer. I don’t usually dare post in Rumours and News, but since you ask ..................

So far as it goes, Confiture has to be right; he is after all just quoting from the NTSB report. Unfortunately it is a selective quotation. The full version would be:
The A320 alpha-protection mode incorporates features that can attenuate pilot sidestick pitch inputs. Because of these features, the airplane could not reach the maximum AOA attainable in pitch normal law for the airplane weight and configuration; however, the airplane did provide maximum performance for the weight and configuration at that time. IOW, the flare ability was restricted, but it didn’t matter a damn. If one probes a little it is easy to see why they said that.
The NTSB report states:



The January 21, 1988, Airbus certification test report stated that the fuselage of an A320 would “undergo no destruction liable to create a water passage” if the airplane ditched with the following parameters:
landing gear retracted,
11° pitch,
-0.5° glideslope, and
flaps in landing configuration for minimum speed.


According to Airbus, the ditching certification criteria also assumed that engine power was available, that the descent rate was 3.5 feet per second (fps), and that the airplane landed longitudinal to any water swells. These criteria are consistent with the test results published in the NACA reports.
That defines a package of conditions, you cannot pick just one out and say that is the criterion by which the process should be judged. In particular, the AI conditions include engine power available. There is no way you are going to get – 0.5deg glide slope, or even the -1deg of the actual certification demonstration, with no thrust. That being so, why pick out 11deg pitch as being optimum for the engines out case? Why, for that matter, assume that higher AoAs translate into more favourable ditching results?
The A320 ditching tests, according to the AI submission to the NTSB,
“were performed with scale models to identify the approach scenario (in terms of slope, pitch and speed) which gave the best overall aircraft behavior during ditching; i.e.

No nose-diving or loss of aircraft control
No break-up of fuselage
Minimum lower fuselage deformation
The rear fuselage loads, which affect all of these considerations, come in two parts:
Pressure loads, which we may reasonably suppose to be proportional to (speed squared) times (Pitch plus FPA = AoA) and
Inertia (impulse) loads which will be proportional to the rate of descent at splashdown.
If you run the sums (I have) it turns out that the pressure loads increase slightly if you hit the water at higher AoA, because the AoA effect outweighs the speed reduction. The rate of descent though is more or less independent of AoA at impact because the aircraft, being thoroughly on the back of the drag curve, has a much worse L/D at higher AoA and the increased glide slope angle offsets the speed reduction.
There is therefore nothing to suggest that pulling to a bigger AoA at impact would have improved the outcome.
I’m not convinced by :
but despite the full backstick, the protections did not allow more than 9.5 degrees and the pilots could do nothing to decrease that impressive vertical speed of 750 feet a minute.
The 11 degrees attitude was refused to the pilot even if adequate margin in the AoA before attaining alpha max was available ...
He could not pull more than 9.5 degrees attitude in the flare due to obscure system restriction.
For sure he could do little to reduce the vertical speed, but I’m not convinced that the ”obscure system restriction” limits the aircraft to 9.5 degrees attitude. If that were true Habsheim (where the aircraft got to 15deg AoA at 30 ft AGL) could not have happened!
I suggest that rather than restricting the actual pitch or AoA, the system actually attenuates the pilot input by changing the stick/elevator gearing. Somewhere I have either read or heard that in early flight test the aircraft was prone to PIO in the flare and that the laws were changed to eliminate this tendency. Reducing system gain would be a classic way of doing this. Such a feature would certainly have the effect of reducing the pilot’s ability to flare in a short period, but would not in fact be a hard limit on AoA.

The NTSB report also says:

...... a total of 14 runs were performed in the engineering simulator in which pilots attempted to touch down on the water within a target flightpath angle of -0.5°, consistent with the structural ditching certification criteria. Two of the 14 runs were discarded because of poor data. Of the remaining 12 runs, 4 were attempted using CONF 2, 4 were attempted using CONF 3, and 4 were attempted using CONF 3/Slats only.
In 11 of the 12 runs, the touchdown flightpath angle ranged between -1.5° and -3.6° (the touchdown flightpath angle achieved on the accident flight was -3.4°). In 1 of these 12 runs, a -0.2° touchdown flightpath angle was achieved by an Airbus test pilot who used a technique that involved approaching the water at a high speed, leveling the airplane a few feet above the water with the help of the radar altimeter, and then bleeding off airspeed in ground effect until the airplane settled into the water

Those sentences make a nonsense of any assertion that the attenuation of pilot's control input in some mysterious way condemned the aircraft to never bettering - 3.5 deg FPA in the engine out ditching case.

[CONF iture]

There is no way you are going to get – 0.5deg glide slope, or even the -1deg of the actual certification demonstration, with no thrust.
Absolutely you could. What matters is the vertical speed at splashdown.

That being so, why pick out 11deg pitch as being optimum for the engines out case?
11 degrees attitude is optimum for all cases, thrust or none.

The rate of descent though is more or less independent of AoA at impact because the aircraft, being thoroughly on the back of the drag curve, has a much worse L/D at higher AoA and the increased glide slope angle offsets the speed reduction.
Again, what matters is the vertical speed at touchdown. Don't flare too high and forget about the negative effect of the drag. That's where experience matters, and Sully had some.

I suggest that rather than restricting the actual pitch or AoA, the system actually attenuates the pilot input by changing the stick/elevator gearing. Somewhere I have either read or heard that in early flight test the aircraft was prone to PIO in the flare and that the laws were changed to eliminate this tendency. Reducing system gain would be a classic way of doing this. Such a feature would certainly have the effect of reducing the pilot’s ability to flare in a short period, but would not in fact be a hard limit on AoA.
If electronic cannot deliver the needed accuracy, experience is still a very valuable option. In his final attempt to improve the touchdown, Sully may have been better served with a direct law with no interference.

Those sentences make a nonsense of any assertion that the attenuation of pilot's control input in some mysterious way condemned the aircraft to never bettering - 3.5 deg FPA in the engine out ditching case.
Who made such assertion ?

[Owain Glyndwr]

Originally Posted by Owain Glyndwr
There is no way you are going to get – 0.5deg glide slope, or even the -1deg of the actual certification demonstration, with no thrust.
Absolutely you could.

I agree- my bad - I take that back.

Who made such assertion ?

Sorry, I thought you were from your remarks. If you aren't then that's OK isn't it

[Linktrained]

Owain Glyndwr

I was told that the Solent ( and other?) flying boats used a very slow rate of descent (100ft/min? or less) from 300ft. to the surface, and at a suitably slow ASI. This helped with a calm (or obscured surface). No radar altimeter, then, but plenty of landing distance, usually.
Perhaps this was somewhat similar to the test pilot's -0.2 degree touchdown reported, but he had a radar altimeter.

I recall that the B47 was said to be rather fussy about its touch-down speed, NO " sit-up and beg" !

I tried to join Aquila, twice, but only flew on four sectors as SLF shortly before they ended in 1958.

[Centaurus]

I was told that the Solent ( and other?) flying boats used a very slow rate of descent (100ft/min? or less) from 300ft. to the surface, and at a suitably slow ASI

That sounds about right. Back in the mid- Fifties we flew Long Nose Lincoln Mk 31 on maritme recce. The aircraft carried lots of flame-floats and we would make a practice approach to ditching at night. It assumed we had not run out of fuel but would ditch before that happened. The flame-floats would be dropped in a line then the aircraft manoevred for approach. The technique was full flap, airspeed accurate at Vref and rate of descent adjusted by power at no more than 200 feet per minute until simulated impact. Glad it never happened for real because the Pacific had big waves out there.

Part of the standard instrument rating test in the Lincoln was to make a simulated ditching run on instruments at a safe altitude of around 2000 ft.

Gave a student a similar effort in the 737 simulator recently and it was clear the pilot was out of his depth (literally) and he would have torpedoed under on impact due lack of instrument flying raw data skills while attempting to fly in landing attitude at 300 fpm on instruments. That's what automation dependency does for you. :E