Risk Assessment mantra at top of descent - the Magic wand of Blind Faith.

[Tee Emm]

Pprune readers are doubtless aware of the Flight Safety Foundation's ALAR (Approach and landing Accident Reduction) "Tool Kit" or Risk Awareness Tool (RAT)
Part 3- of this "tool" asks the reader "Is the Flight Safety Foundation Approach and landing RAT provided to flight crews and it's use required before every approach? Keeping in mind there there are over 19 boxes to be ticked to satisfy the pilots that they have covered every conceivable "risk assessment" before start of top of descent.

Recently a major Indonesian 737 airline has introduced the reading or ticking the boxes of this "Tool" to be read at top of descent. The reason for this is the increase of pilot error over-runs, incidents etc in the airline. Apparently the faithful reading of this checklist Tool, is hoped to lead to a decrease in prangs. At top of descent this Tool is produced and read by the first officer to his captain who nods dutifully as 19 questions are asked of him and is ticked off. Having done that, and the magic wand put back in it's Tool Box, it simply remains a case of let the battle commence to land this bloody plane.

Surely, those who mandate the reading of this ALA "Tool" which takes some time if each item is discused in detail, are living in la la land if they think it will make pilots more competent. Instead of wasting time on a useless exercise in reading still more checklists in flight, time would be better spent, for example, teaching pilots in the simulator how to land on a wet runway without excessive airspeed, rate of descent on short final and over-runs due long floats, incorrect use of brakes and reverse and so on. In other words practical instruction

It is unbelievable that operators really think that reading all that superfluous bumpf at top of descent will be the magic wand to stop incompetent pilots crashing their aircraft due to basic poor flying skills in the first place.:ugh:

[BOAC]

Ah, but, Tee Emm, it ticks the good old box and 'protects' the managers so we are all ok..............:{. Nevermind reality. I suppose IF the list triggers the realisation that something has not been taken account of, then it has done its job (as long as..........).

[alf5071h]

BOACs somewhat cynical view may actually align with of the realities of modern safety management.
More seriously is the concern that crews will take these ‘mantras’ at face value as ensuring safety, or even as providing legal cover if there is a mishap. Perhaps this is an unfortunate result of an overburdening SOP culture.

It’s not clear which version of the ‘RAT’ that TM refers to. The latest version that I can find on line (May 2009) is embedded within the report on ‘Reducing the Risk of Runway Excursions’ (www.iata.org/iata/RERR-toolkit/assets/Content/Contributing%20Reports/FSF_Runway_Excursions_Report.pdf) (page 19).
The ‘tool’ appears to list and rate all risk factors, which may be onerous, but it is prefaced by - “Elements of this tool should be integrated, as appropriate, with the standard approach and departure briefings to improve awareness of factors that can increase the risk of a runway excursion”.

“It is unbelievable that operators really think that … …”, maybe, but a real problem is that many operators do not think, explore, evaluate, or apply specific aspects of risk applicable to their operation – they don’t know which elements of the RAT to add to their checklists.
However, in some parts of the world reading the RAT is better than nothing, but how long will any small improvement last?

The Flight Safety Foundation apparently fails to appreciate the difficulties of interpreting and applying the extensive (and well meant) information in some parts of the world.
And has the FSF (a non-profit organisation) succumbed to commercialism by locking the ALAR and RERR initiatives away in the member’s only area; are they expecting ‘these’ operators to buy safety?

[BOAC]

BOACs somewhat cynical view may actually align with of the realities of modern safety management.
More seriously is the concern.................. - I think we agree. Cynicism or realism?

It is back to the age-old dilemma of how do you teach airmanship, and we know the answer to that. We are, sadly, heading for a world in which very few 'skills' are needed, since a/c systems 'protect' the crew from abnormalities (NB as 'programmed' into the system) and 'check lists' and SOPs detail all the items that need to be consider (NB as determined by the checklist writers). The logical extension of the process is that the crews we place in a/c have little innate ability to 'think outside' those boxes. We will have to accept the low statistical risk of an occurrence outside the crew's ability following failure of the 'system' to protect, and tolerate the tooth sucking and 'I told you so' that will arise at each occurrence. The other option is regrettably unacceptable for commercial reasons.

[Sciolistes]

It is back to the age-old dilemma of how do you teach airmanship, and we know the answer to that.
Teaching airmanship is easy. Recruiting independently minded yet team oriented, conscientious and disciplined human beings with high standards who are receptive to such training is the really really tricky part.

[Tee Emm]

Boeing (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing.html) and Singapore Airlines' regional carrier SilkAir have signed a five-year pilot training agreement to support SilkAir's fleet transition to Boeing (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing.html) aircraft.
The announcement comes after SilkAir finalised an order in November 2012 for 23 Boeing 737-800s and 31 Boeing 737 (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing%20737.html) Max 8s.
Boeing Flight Services, a unit of Boeing Commercial Aviation Services, will provide flight training at Boeing's Singapore training campus for the airline's new 737 (http://www.flightglobal.com/landingpage/Boeing%20737.html) fleet.

That was from Flight Global.

Now here is a first class opportunity for Boeing to lead the way back to teaching airline pilots how to fly their aircraft rather than watch it fly itself like a drone under automatic guidance.
That subject leads to:

It is back to the age-old dilemma of how do you teach airmanship, and we know the answer to that

The 4 January 2013 FAA SAFO (Safety Alert for Operators) has at long last seen the writing on the wall when it warns: "A recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors.

The FAA believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations...operators are encouraged to take an integrated approach by incorporating emphasis of manual flight operations into both line operations and training (initial/upgrade and recurrent....Airline operational policies should ensure that all pilots have the appropriate opportunities to exercise the aforementioned knowledge and skills in flight operations."

Now you can't get more clearer than that. Yet, experience has shown that in some parts of the industry, ethnic culture will always prevail over commonsense. Thus, it wouldn't be surprising to see operators outside of the US who, if they ever get around to reading the FAA SAFO, will conveniently dismiss its message as applicable only to USA - not to them.

Boeing could get the ball rolling in SE Asia by implementing the FAA SAFO manual flying recommendation.

[alf5071h]

BOAC, ‘Cynicism or realism?’ perhaps both; - where the cynic is a concerned realist.

Sciolistes, whilst the old adage – ‘hire for attitude, train for aptitude’ is still relevant, I do not agree that training airmanship as such is easy. An alternative view is that the required standard is not being achieved in today’s commercially pressured training scenarios.

TM the ‘flying’ view may inadvertently focus on the act of flying in preference to the thinking processes required for operating; perhaps the more significant issue is how to ‘operate’ an aircraft, which forms the core of most definitions of airmanship.
Our differing viewpoints may only be in semantics, but if physical flying skills are promoted over mental operating skills (perhaps as in the SAFO) then operators remain at risk from incidents of ‘airmanship’.

With respect, I do not interpret the SAFO as presented in #6. As before, this difference may be in semantics or inference, in that the SAFO is not specific, e.g. it does not relate the manual handling errors with ‘operating’ skills. Thus the flying recommendation is open to interpretation, as is the all-important context of operating - the situations to be assessed, risks to be judged, and the flight management required to avoid 'manual handling errors'.

Using Kern’s definition of Airmanship: – Discipline, Skill and Proficiency, Knowledge, Situation Awareness, and Judgement, then the physical skills of ‘flying and proficiency’ are few in comparison with the other skills of ‘operating’. This is not to judge their relative importance, as all are required - they complement each other.
Thus the debate perhaps should be if pilots have had the required training or have opportunity to exercise the complete range of skills, not just a subset.
The higher skills of awareness and judgement are usually associated with experience and have greater significance in the more demanding operational scenarios. They are key aspects of risk assessment, particularly before landing. Here, pilots need to prepare their ‘flight plan for the mind’, and not just read a list of risks as per the RAT. Actual risks have to be identified and assessed in context, and managed – the execution or adjustment of the mental flight plan.

Give or take semantics or inference I think that we agree; but semantics and inference are important aspects of assessment and judgement. Operators who propose checklist use like the RAT, or as with the FAA in their call for more manual flying (SAFO), might wish to reflect on these important aspects of communication and variation in understanding in their attempts to improve safety.

[Piltdown Man]

Let's just say that this ALAR RAT is the bee's knees. But on one particular day, one or a few of these magic boxes couldn't be ticked. What happens then? Do they crash? And how long are the boxes valid for? My descents appear to take about 25-30 minutes. Until the next ATIS or runway state message? And do these boxes require a sharp pencil or will a child's crayon do? I don't care to much for rubbish like this but could I have some of what this airline's management are taking - it's a pretty strong hallucinogen.

PM

I bet these are these are the same sort of boxes that Tesco, Aldi, Findus, Asda etc. use to ensure product compliance and conformality.