Helicopter - v - crane LONDON

[jumpseater]

NS
It may also be necessary to give ATC the power to refuse clearance if the data available to them indicates that those minima cannot be met.

No, the responsibility for adhering to flight rules, absolute minima and aerodrome operating minima is, and should be the Pilots. ATC don't have the specific knowledge of aircraft performance/ avionics specifications and fit and crew qualifications to make that determination, or the time to ask for them.

If you looked at a remote weather station, (ignoring who pays for it and its upkeep), as being a wx feed as has been suggested, what do you do if the kit is unservicable, close the airspace?

If a controller is aware of a event that likely contravenes legislation/safety they still have a duty to report it, but not 'police it' at the time of the event.

[chopperchappie]

Quote: stuckgear

"i wouldn't consider the very object projecting into the air, adjacent to a heli route, that the craft impacted with, a red herring."

But even so, if you could see the building clearly would you go anywhere near it (the crane) and therefore being aware of the building (which is more visible) should have been enough. Sure it's better to see the crane as well.

Someone mentioned the original NOTAM was Lat/Long not centered on actual crane - is that a fact or a conversion error between decimal and ye old DMS?

Also, staying 1000' above something;
a) requires you to know it's there IF you cant see it
b) is impractical for landing - by it's very nature you need to get close to the ground!

If you can get an IFR transit just by asking (and you are qualified and have a SPIFR aircraft) then it's not obvious why you would fly VFR/SVFR as that appears not to be an option. Is it "practical" to descend through cloud on an IFR clearance (in London specifically) then land at Battersea?? Thats a genuine not rhetorical question!

BUT the real question underlying is .... you are on top with good/ok viz and you elect to land (for whatever reason) - obviously there were breaks in the cloud to report sighting the bridge, but would you get a clearance to come into Battersea IFR ? Is that supported ?
If so, then in my mind the most important factor is knowing where you are in relation to obstructions and therefore the charts and maps and stuff kick into play, if you MUST be VFR (clear of cloud and in sight of the surface) then I don't see how it's going to work if you must descend through cloud/fog.

Anyone that's ever come into Battersea IFR ?
I don't remember any IFR approach information on the AIP.

EDIT - I don't see how ATC can be the eyes of the pilot and make flight by flight judgements but I do see that there can be a minima that gets enforced over London and it's X criteria for this type of transit (for example you won't get a LHR crossing in bad weather/poor viz or high controller workload).

[NorthSouth]

From EGLW AIP: Type of Traffic permitted: SVFRYou can't get into Battersea IFR. It's also notable thatFor inbound and departing helicopters, the weather minima for the London Heliport are a reported Heliport meteorological visibility of 1000 m or greater and a cloud ceiling of 600 ft agl or greater.

I agree with all those who have pointed out the practical difficulties of supplying additional weather data to ATC to permit them to make weather decisions for the airspace. But if, as crab has said, the issue here is some pilots pushing the 'clear of cloud/in sight of the surface' rule, in an environment where an error endangers many people on the ground as well as the aircraft occupants, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to reinforce the rule by giving ATC a role. They already do for aircraft landing at or departing from airports in CAS, and for aircraft transiting the London CTR through the Heathrow overhead. These days, it's surely not beyond the capabilities of computer whizz kids to devise a system that uses a number of different weather data sources to power a graphic at the ATCO's desk that lights up each of the heli routes through the CTR in red or green.
NS

[TRC]

I wonder if the timing of the release of this Safety Notice (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SafetyNotice2013003.pdf)is just coincidence.

[jellycopter]

There are a few people suggesting even tighter restrictions when flying around London.

The rules are tight enough already. If Clear of Cloud and Surface in Sight had been maintained, (barring any as yet unpublished technical failure) this accident wouldn't have happened. If the 500ft rule had been adhered to, it wouldn't have happened.

Let's not knee jerk into even more restrictions please.

JJ

[Machaca]

When abeam the Eye pilot stated Vauxhall bridge in sight and requested H4.

ATC responded to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster bridges.

He descended and turned away from the river (mistaken glimpse of Battersea rail bridge? Avoid Millbank tower?) and continued past Vauxhall bridge all the way to the Battersea rail bridge where he turned around.

Question for you London rotor drivers: Are river hold boundaries strict?

[chopperchappie]

JC

I agree that the airspace over London is already highly regulated and well controlled and I have never experienced "crowding" as such - one or two reciprocal aircraft is typical with many flights not coming into visual contact with another heli.

Nevertheless the existing rules do put a lot of competent pilots (even high hour instructors) off.

But joe public is going to want to be re-assured and there will be changes I'm sure.


Weather seems to be a significant contributory factor and there absolutely should not be a knee-jerk ban everything attitude but it went off plan in this case.

The response to this tragedy needs to be considered and appropriate to reduce risks but not political, which I think is the real danger.

[ShyTorque]

Sorry but no. The Thames. 40 mile tidal estuary. Sunrise on a calm winter's day after a cold night. As the sun's rays go almost horizontal through the atmosphere, and as London "wakes up" with energy producing lots of heat - you get the most incredible fast-forming mists. I live by the Thames in London - and I've seen the mist grow in seconds from a clear morning.

London airspace is a cage. Once you're in there, you have to cope because there are few escape routes once the mists start moving around. So - don't go there when the wx seems likely to become your enemy.

There ARE minimum alts.

Jim, I don't quite understand why you say "No". I think we are of exactly the same opinion about the weather, that's why I mentioned a minimum altitude for some of the more "obstructed" routes.

I am a regular user of the heli-routes, including the part where this accident took place. I'm aware of the rules regarding altitudes and the restricted area.

The point is, as you say, that pilots are responsible for making the decision regarding prevailing met conditions and how they fit the requirements for SVFR/VFR.

Without a minimum altitude being given, the natural instinct of a helicopter pilot on his way to land at Battersea, encountering increasing cloud at his level, is to descend to maintain compliance with SVFR/VFR rules and VMC. In extremis, a pilot may tend to disregard the 500 foot rule too soon, hoping to "get away with it", in both senses of the expression.

The alternative to a descent is a retreat along a reciprocal track (may not be possible!) or a request for an immediate escape IFR clearance, which of course may well involve a further climb into solid IMC. Not all pilots are qualified to fly in IMC and not all helicopters using these the routes are so equipped.

A minimum altitude along that particular stretch of H4, i.e. between London Bridge and Vauxhall Bridge could take into account the 500 foot rule and give a safe(r) clearance from the ever increasing number of tall obstructions.

The publication of a mandatory minimum altitude would be a strong reminder to pilots to think more carefully about what they are asking for and to keep an idea of what they are actually doing.

If a pilot encounters met conditions that would require descent below the minimum published altitude for the route, he would then have to inform ATC and go from there. If this means aborting the flight or diverting, then so be it, nothing new there. This should already happen, but we know it sometimes doesn't, because the limits for SVFR/VFR get "stretched" too far.

There is also a real need for increased levels of conspicuity for the taller obstructions close to the river. From my own fairly widespread practical experience of using the routes over many years, I know very well that the standard mandatory "ANO" red lights are often totally ineffective against the background of multi-coloured cultural lighting even at the best of times. In a dark countryside, these lights stand out well, e.g. where fitted to something like an isolated mast. Over London, they do not.

[jumpseater]

NS it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to reinforce the rule by giving ATC a role. They already do for aircraft landing at or departing from airports in CAS, and for aircraft transiting the London CTR through the Heathrow overhead.

No they don't. Mats Part 1 Sec3 CH1 P7 Para 9.4.1 - 9.4.3 covers it.
Whilst that specifically covers aerodrome operating minima the same applies for flight rules, they are in simple terms the aircraft commanders/pilots responsibility to adhere to them. If ATC are to 'police' as you say then your perfect storm is three or four aircraft on approach travelling at three miles a minute, all non native language speakers, being questioned as to their operating procedures and capabilities. A very quick way to an accident or incident, due to misunderstanding/overload which is part of why absolute minima procedures within MAts Pt1 changed significantly in 2012, to those outlined above.

The crew know what they and the aircraft are capable of, its up to them to ensure they stay within the rules, or operate outside them for very good reasons.

[toptobottom]

SS: I think someone mentioned the ac being fitted with Garmin 430 - If the next frequency isn't selected, it takes approx 6 secs to change the frequency and flip it across.

Even if the a/c was fitted with one radio (unlikely) and he had been listening to EGTR on 122.4, then LHR special on 125.625, it would have taken 1 second to change to 122.9 and QSY to Batt

[Devil 49]

I can think of about a million reasonable circumstances that could result in an incident like this, proof that with sufficient risk exposure, an incident of some sort is inevitable. All one can do is try to make small mistakes. Other than preventing helicopter flight in that area, further regulation wouldn't affect this outcome.

It's conceivable that the rules actually contributed to this event, limiting options and providing distractions that don't contribute to safety of flight.

Here's one scenario: flying a low level route, deciding on a right turn, visual check to the right, obstacle behind pilot visual field (and/or obscured in clutter), right turn commenced, roof now obscures obstacle, visual field in direction of turn mostly down or up thru windscreen or forward thru skylight- one might never see a mast.

My experience with TAWS in the 400 series is that the alert screen either distracts or is late. Our setup includes a console button to deactivate the system that's a potential issue. It's useful for planning,but not effective in avoidance.

[readgeoff]

I have a question about whether anyone reviews flights that have taken place in known poor conditions to see if pilots are sticking to the rules or is it just the AAIB that does this when a tragic accident like this occurs.

Mr Barnes routing, in particular once over central London as well as his radio calls clearly show rules being broken. This can't have been the only time he or other commercial heli pilots have pushed the rules and routes/heights in tricky conditions.

If no one is ever checking this then the temptation to push the rules is that much greater surely. If a pilot knows its being checked or there is a good chance it will be checked then maybe different decisions will be made and rules will be stuck to?

What use is a law that is not enforced?

And sorry if that sounds like a slippery slope....

[gulliBell]

I have a question about whether anyone reviews flights that have taken place in known poor conditions to see if pilots are sticking to the rules or is it just the AAIB that does this when a tragic accident like this occurs...

Yes indeed, a slippery slope. I was a lead pilot at a remote operating base and one of our VFR aircraft arrived in the most ****e weather one day, weather that I wouldn't even contemplate flying IFR in. The pilot, who was very experienced, landed and was obviously shaken by the experience, he told me he ended up out over the sea at very low level with no external references and he almost lost it. I suggested to him he stay with us overnight and give it a go tomorrow. Instead he ordered fuel and took off again into the same weather, only now heading up into the mountains. The reason he stated for the urgency was the Company needed the helicopter back at HQ that day. He got away with it that day, but a few months later he was killed doing the same thing, flew into a mountain in bad weather, together with his 3 passengers all killed.

As the lead pilot who'd observed what I considered to be an unsafe act I had a responsibility to report the matter to the Company at the time. And if I had done so maybe the Company would have counselled the pilot and he'd still be alive today. But in all likelihood, knowing the people involved, nothing would have been done and reporting the incident would have only resulted in certain grief for myself.

So I chose to say nothing. Reason being: firstly, I got fired from my previous job for reporting a pilot doing a very unsafe act, as reporting such things was seen as "not being a team player." So this time I was not inclined to risk a repeat episode (the culture in the Company was much the same as the other Company from where I was fired). Secondly, the pilot involved was very experienced, even more-so than me, so I took some comfort in that "he must know what he's doing because he's been doing it for a long time".

With this sort of culture in the workspace, where very experienced pilots are blatantly busting the rules to get a job done, with the tacit knowledge and approval of their employer, despite safety management reporting systems being in place, then as an Industry we are bound to repeat the mistakes of the past time and time again. Only at some point some people don't get to repeat them anymore because they become the victim of their own behavior. It's particularly regrettable when the innocent become victims as well.

[stuckgear]

The response to this tragedy needs to be considered and appropriate to reduce risks but not political, which I think is the real danger.

i have to agree with that. there is also a lot of pressure from those with vested interests to see such acitivities curtailed due a specific agenda, noise, climate change [sic] or development potential of certain sites.

it would be a tragic loss to see operations curtailed for an agenda or political reason.

[mark one eyeball]

I totally agree with readgeoff's comments
One accident how many previous close shaves usually factor by x times

Mr Barnes might have been a heli hero to some but now he will be remembered for his last tragic flight and the final report doesn't look like good reading
Some people say it takes an accident to change the rules, this might be the one

How many rules were broken in this short flight, quite a few I think

No-one commenting much on the release of safety notice post number 509 by TRC
If I was caught using PED by present company it would be instant dismissal I am sure, but then I don't work in the UK right now

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by mark one eyeball
No-one commenting much on the release of safety notice (http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/SafetyNotice2013003.pdf) post number 509 by TRC

Perhaps because its just so obvious that this was released in response to last Wednesday's crash.

[TRC]

Grenville, this is not the first time in this thread that you have stated the bleedin' obvious.

[SilsoeSid]

SS: I think someone mentioned the ac being fitted with Garmin 430 - If the next frequency isn't selected, it takes approx 6 secs to change the frequency and flip it across.

Ttb: Even if the a/c was fitted with one radio (unlikely) and he had been listening to EGTR on 122.4, then LHR special on 125.625, it would have taken 1 second to change to 122.9 and QSY to Batt

Fair one, I didn't realise the freqs were so close.
Was Elstree open at that time to call up and are you assuming that a blind call was made on 122.9?

There's no mention in the SB of informing anyone of a freq change en route and perhaps Northolt ATIS was dialled up instead.

Sorry, you'll have to give some of us not familiar with that part of the country a bit of lee way.

[AnFI]

big instrument panels mean less window

for 'visual flight' helicopters with windows are easier

[Flying Lawyer]

TC
Well reasoned post. :ok: and thanks for the kind comment.
As you know, I can't post as freely as I used to.

I agree about the PPRuNe ethos, I've learnt an enormous amount from the professional pilots here over the years, but there are some PPRuNe habits that I've never liked. Whenever there's an incident or accident, there are always posters (including some pilots) who spend a great deal of effort trying to prove that the pilot was at fault/broke some rule(s) in some way or other and, quite often, gratuitously make very unpleasant comments which add nothing whatsoever to the store of knowledge. They aren't trying to learn (they know it all :rolleyes:) and I don't believe for a moment their motive is to try to help others learn. The other irritation, which hasn't been nearly as bad here as on the thread in R&N where everyone and his dog has an opinion, is people who clearly know little or nothing about about flying (or the relevant flying) distracting from sensible discussion/learning with their constant inane witterings. Thankfully, both threads have been cleaned up a bit now.
You are not afraid to be punchy (one of the reasons I enjoy reading your posts :)) but you realise there's a time and place and, unlike some others, your suggestions, whether correct or not, were not only measured but showed compassion for someone who lost his life.

jellycopterLet's not knee jerk into even more restrictions please. I entirely agree that no more flying restrictions are necessary.
However, I agree with ShyTorque and others that the conspicuity of the taller obstructions close to the River needs to be improved.

Posters not familiar with London may not fully appreciate the height of the raised jib of this crane. To put it into perspective, when the crane was in raised/parked position, as it was when the accident occurred, the jib was almost as high as the tallest tower at Canary Wharf - which was the tallest building in the UK for 19 years until 2010.
The lighting may well have complied with current legislation, but the effect of that legislation is that such cranes are barely lit during the night and not lit at all during daylight - regardless of weather/visibility. That IMHO is inadequate in an area of known helicopter activity, and particularly so close to a heliport.

I held that view even before this accident. I've flown the heli routes many times and driven along the River morning and night virtually every working day for almost 40 years. (I drove past the north side of Vauxhall Bridge about 15 minutes after the accident.) I've become increasingly concerned as the number of high rise buildings, and tall cranes in particular, has increased.

We'll probably never know if more effective lighting would have prevented this accident. However, if the jib had been better lit, the pilot might have seen it in time to avoid it. At that life or death moment, whether he should or should not have been there is irrelevant.

A30yoyo do helicopter pilots prefer fixed wing style holds .......... to 'hover holds' I wouldn't presume to answer for professional pilots in twins but FWIW, as a PPL in a single, I wouldn't hover.

Grenville Perhaps because its just so obvious that this was released in response to last Wednesday's crash. Really?
The FAA issued this 'Notice of proposed rulemaking' the day before the crash? Link: NPRM (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/pagedetails.action?browsePath=2013%2F01%2F01-15%5C%2F3%2FFederal+Aviation+Administration&granuleId=2013-00608&packageId=FR-2013-01-15&fromBrowse=true)
The fact is that a number of aviation authorities have been looking into this issue for some time, the FAA since at least 2010. The CAA make it clear in Paras 1.1 and 2.1 of the Safety Notice that it was issued as a result of several incidents.

In the context of this thread it's also important to bear in mind:
that there is no evidence the pilot was using his mobile at the time of the crash;
that the last text was 4 minutes before the crash; and
that the available evidence (AAIB SB) points strongly towards the pilot not using his mobile in the intervening period.

mark one eyeball Mr Barnes might have been a heli hero to some but now he will be remembered for his last tragic flight and the final report doesn't look like good reading He'll remain a 'heli hero' to people grateful to him for helping to save their lives.
No-one who knew him will forget how he died, but those who respected his ability as a pilot are unlikely to change their minds just because of one tragic incident and those who knew Barnesy personally will remember him as one of the friendliest, kindest people they could hope to meet, always happy to help anyone and a guaranteed laugh. He was a thoroughly decent man, devoted to his partner and two young children. To use one of his favourite expressions, a 'top bloke'.
I knew him, and flew with him several times, and I'd be very happy to fly with him again if he'd survived. I can also say with total confidence that if this had been someone else, any comment he made (if pressed to do so) would have been restrained and caring.
Some people say it takes an accident to change the rules, this might be the one The general consensus seems to be that the accident happened because he didn't keep to the rules.
Which rules are you suggesting should be changed? :confused:



.

[SASless]

I just awoke from a nice Kip.....did I oversleep by a year or two?


The general consensus is that the accident happened because he didn't keep to the rules.

My recollection of the posts in this thread have not suggested he did violate any rules. The comments by level headed professionals familiar with the business of flying around London in helicopters have been very careful to discuss the tragedy without passing judgement whatsoever on Captain Barnes.

Whether he broke any rules shall be a very hard thing to ascertain for a number of very good reasons. Whether he did or not is a very low priority in the scheme of things.

Finding the causes of the crash is what is important and when the AAIB issues its final report, and other investigations by the CAA and other UK agencies shall shed a lot of light on the entire situation extant at the time of the aircraft's collision with the Crane.

We are very likely to see some Rules being changed, more strict enforcement of some Rules, and perhaps....maybe....some of those changes and increased enforcement might involve the "flying" Rules but I shall bet a great many of them shall involve "Non-Flying" interests.

One thing is for sure. Our Industry lost a good Man who remains in good standing with those who knew him, flew with him, and have benefitted from his actions flying Helicopters in many kinds of roles.

[Flying Lawyer]

SASless
I stand corrected. Written in haste. I should have said 'some people' instead of consensus.

The comments by level headed professionals familiar with the business of flying around London in helicopters have been very careful to discuss the tragedy without passing judgement whatsoever on Captain Barnes. True. And I respect them for it.

As you'll recall, I have also flown a few hours with you and I regard it as a great privilege to have done so.

[sarboy w****r]

My recollection of the posts in this thread have not suggested he did violate any rules.

Posts 495 & 504 = R157.

[Richard Westnot]

Flying Lawyer - Thank you for your well reasoned and balanced posts. It is a breath of fresh air from somebody of your ilk and stature that is able to frequent this forum and not be shy in assisting and speaking very positively of a fellow pilot/s.

I did not know PB personally, but from what I have read, he sounded like a really nice guy.

I have been truly amazed at some of the adverse comments made.

I have always found fellow pilots to be helpful when needed and likewise, I have always gone to their assistance if required. We share one passion whether it is fixed wing / rotary wing or both. It is such a shame that a few personalities change when they are behind a keyboard.

Mechanical failures/ accidents etc can happen to any one of us.
None of us are infallible.

[SASless]

FL....that wonderful flight and day....was my last ever helicopter flight. Done in a wonderful old Huey with a true Gentleman in the cockpit with me. We had a very good day for sure....and of course for me a most memorable last day behind a Cyclic Stick.

[SASless]

Well now Sarboy....lay out your case for why there might have been a Rule broken.

Do be specific and lay out your evidence....not your opinion please.

[sAx_R54]

@JR81

Before assuming that his hands / thumbs were busy, also note that some phones can text for you based on speech alone (mine certainly can) so I can text here in the UK legally whilst driving a car. The driving prohibition relates to touching / handling your phone so hands-free speech or text is legal.

Not saying that's what he did, or what he did was right. Just that we don't know the potential importance of this behaviour to the accident sequence yet.

It is dangerous to assume in this particular case for sure. However, the suggestion (yours and post #372) would imply that there was a programmable device that had voice recognition software, such that calls and text could be made without the use of the hand.

Noting the following transmission:

No hole hdg back to red

Abbreviation suggests voice recognition of particular sophistication.

[ShyTorque]

Anyone who is familiar with the A109 cockpit noise levels knows that speaking on a mobile phone / voice recognition to text is totally out of the question.

[AnFI]

It might be considered irresponsible not to have used a text device - since it provided powerful and up to date information - in accordance with the principles of good single crew CRM - it is clear that it had no negative bearing on the safety of the flight (accident 4' after last text exchange) - the VHF freq change was the most probable 'distraction' perhaps.

[ShyTorque]

Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement.

[John Eacott]

Anyone who is familiar with the A109 cockpit noise levels knows that speaking on a mobile phone / voice recognition to text is totally out of the question.

From that I gather the CAA do not allow mobiles to be hard wired and connected through the intercom system, as we do in Oz?

Nonetheless there are numerous headsets which allow a Bluetooth phone connection which would allow either a phone call or speech to text, or are those not allowed in the UK either?

[toptobottom]

The freq change would have involved a flick of a chinese hat and maybe a quick glance at the display to check the pre-entered frequency was then active.

Re mobiles/texts, ANR headsets like the A20 allow clear conversations and speech input via bluetooth to a handset, but only after manually activating the feature on the handset. As someone said, the language used in the text exchange wasn't the product of a 'speech to text' feature e.g. "hdg"

[ShyTorque]

John, I haven't seen any AAIB evidence that this was the case, but bearing in mind that PB was flying a leased aircraft as a freelance pilot and may have used his own headset, I don't know. The A109 that I fly doesn't have the facility and I've not seen an option for that type of equipment in the RFM Supplements. My "E" model RFM is no longer amended so it is possible that something has been produced for that variant and not others, in the last couple of years.

Apart from that (conjecture) if I were inclined to snd txts in the air (and I do not do this, it's difficult enough on the ground), I wud send abbrev msgs.

[ShyTorque]

ttb, The freq change would have involved a flick of a chinese hat and maybe a quick glance at the display to check the pre-entered frequency was then active.

Chinese hat? That's not how to change frequency on a GNS430, if that's what he was using, which it appears he was.

However, it's obviously a perfectly normal thing to change ATC frequency and hardly a major distraction. I normally dial up new frequencies by counting the number of clicks needed to go from the one already set in the lower window, so I can continue looking out, look in to check it's correct, then use the "flip/flop" changeover button adjacent to the frequency change knobs to select it.

[Hover Bovver]

ShyTorque,
I don't want to disagree with your experience, but in the 109s that I have flown it is possible to use a phone whilst flying and the dictatext will work.

[ShyTorque]

In which case, it's possible this was the scenario here. Hopefully the AAIB will be able to find the correct answer.

[sarboy w****r]

Sasless:

Well now Sarboy....lay out your case for why there might have been a Rule broken.

Do be specific and lay out your evidence....not your opinion please.

I'm genuinely not trying to be antagonistic Sasless, as I generally agree with the majority of what you post, but you are not allowed to fly through restricted areas unless you comply with the restrictions that are laid down for that restricted area.

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/7/EIS%2006.pdf

Quoting from this doc:

Restricted Areas

There are a number of Restricted Areas that lie within both the London and London City CTR’s; the boundaries of which are clearly displayed on the London Helicopter chart overleaf. A restricted area is an area of defined dimensions within which the flight of aircraft is restricted in accordance with certain specified conditions. The following offers a brief summary of the Restricted Areas and the conditions attached to them:

EG R157 (Hyde Park), EG R158 (City of London) and EG R159 (Isle of Dogs) are all established from surface level up to 1,400 feet. Flights are permitted within each of these restricted areas providing they are in the service of the Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police District, are flying in accordance with a Special Flight Notification (SFN) issued by the appropriate ATC unit, are flying along Helicopter Route H4, or are flying in accordance with an Enhanced Non-Standard Flight (ENSF) clearance issued by the appropriate ATC unit.

SFN’s can be applied to a variety of special aerial tasks, which may take place throughout an extended period of time. The most common are Police Authority Air Support Unit (ASU) and Air Operations Unit (AOU) flights, Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) flights and HM Government-sponsored flights (including Ministry of Defence and other flights). The nature of SFN flights is such that they will often require to be afforded priority over most other flights.

ENSF’s are subject to security considerations by the Metropolitan Police and may be refused on public interest grounds. There are a number of helicopter operators that have an annual ENSF clearance due to the numerous tasks that they are required to undertake within the restricted areas, for example, those operators responsible for conducting aerial filming on behalf of the major TV News channels. On any occasion that such operators wish to manoeuvre within any of the restricted areas, they are required to obtain a permission number from the Diplomatic Protection Group (DPG), which validates their flight within it.

I can't see why the aircraft took the route that it did between Lambeth Bridge until it turned eastbound at Chelsea Bridge. This took it well and truly inside R157. It needed, at the altitudes it was flying (considerably < 1400'), to fly along the line of the Thames. The elephant in the room is why this wasn't done? In my opinion, the texting issue is irrelevant - at the time these texts took place, the aircraft was VMC on top of cloud, a long way from the scene of the accident and almost certainly with the flight director plugged in.

The last 3 paras from post 504/Jim Ball are relevant. I suggest, supported by the pictures immediately after the incident and from personally seeing the cloudbase on the south side of the river near to the accident scene shortly before the crash, that there was an area of low cloud/fog on that bend by Vauxhall Bridge. One possible reason for the height loss (~200' in a very short space of time) immediately north of New Covent Garden is that the aircraft was attempting to remain clear of the cloudbase there, and the subsequent climb was an attempt to abide by the 500' rule. This put the aircraft too close to the cloudbase to achieve sufficient visibility in the direction of the crane/building for it to be seen in time and avoided.

[SASless]

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/7/20100316LondonHeliChart.pdf

The Link takes you to a map of the London Helicopter Lanes.

As I know naught of the Lanes....I have to leave it to others in the know...to correct me if I am wrong here.

H-4 on the map appears to run through the Southeastern corner of R-157.

R-157 shows a minimum height of 1400 feet MSL.

The Agusta 109 is a Twin Engined Helicopter thus is not limited to just the Helicopter Lanes if under a Clearance from ATC.

The subject aircraft was under such a clearance from ATC and could have been on a SVFR Clearance which I am led to believe removes the Altitude limitation.

Considering the flight path as depicted by the Radar Trace provided by the CAA in their SB, the ATC Clearance and instructions given the Aircraft by ATC, and the Reported Altitudes given by the Radar Trace data.....was there a Violation of the Rules governing Restricted Area 157 as Sarboy is suggesting.

That Sarboy is the kind of evidence I would like to examine before passing judgement or voicing an assumption about R-157.

Lets compare the Rules, the Clearance, the Aircraft's track and height, then limit ourselves to just that in our decision. None of us are clairvoyant and cannot say what the Pilot did, what he saw, whether he was in or out of cloud, what made him fly the track and height he did. That requres us to make assumptions and that is not something I am prepared to do or accept.

So....the ball is back into your court. Lay out your case.

[sarboy w****r]

Absolutely, H4 does run through R157. You may fly through R157 if you follow H4. I have flown G-CRST, I fly the helilanes professionally, I do know a little of which I speak. You need one or more of the following conditions to legally fly through R157:

1. In the service of the Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police District.
2. Flying in accordance with a Special Flight Notification (SFN) issued by the appropriate ATC unit.
3. Flying along Helicopter Route H4.
4. Flying in accordance with an Enhanced Non-Standard Flight (ENSF) clearance issued by the appropriate ATC unit.

Other than these exceptions, you are not allowed. R157 covers the Houses of Paliament, Buckingham Palace etc, and this is why R157 exists. Unfortunately in this instance, it is that simple and clearcut.

The subject aircraft was under such a clearance from ATC and could have been on a SVFR Clearance which I am led to believe removes the Altitude limitation.

The clearance was into London CTR, not R157. This is clear from the transcript. The SVFR clearance doesn't do anything about the R157 restriction of 1400', it simply means that the "not below 1000 feet" restriction inside the CTR is removed.

[SASless]

What does all this have to do with the collision with the Crane?

[sarboy w****r]

Quite simply because the flight profile depicted from Lambeth Bridge is completely at odds with any normal flight profile I have seen or flown. Heathrow ATC normally get very upset if you stray off the helilanes, even slightly. And that's in the rest of the CTR, not when your track is taking you through a restricted area into which you are not allowed to fly.

Why did the aircraft fly that route? Why did it not fly along the Thames like it was supposed to? What possible reason could there be for not continuing along the Thames from Lambeth Bridge (i.e. following H4)? Why did it veer away from the route along the Thames (the change in direction is about 45 degrees)?

The pilot reports no technical problems. The pilot continues to respond normally to radio calls beyond Lambeth Bridge. There was clearly some other reason as to why the pilot did not go into that bend in the river. If it's not weather, what other possible reasons could there be?

[toptobottom]

ST - I assume he was using a King as well, but even on the 430 it's a single button push, so hardly a distraction and certainly not more than a second, even if the frequency wasn't lined up ready.

I agree, the texting thang is a red herring and I doubt it directly had any material effect on those last few seconds.

[ShyTorque]

ST - I assume he was using a King as well, but even on the 430 it's a single button push, so hardly a distraction and certainly not more than a second, even if the frequency wasn't lined up ready.

Yes, agreed, I use a GNS430 every time I fly. Changing the frequency set on the radio (whatever the type) is absolutely routine stuff and therefore shouldn't to be considered a "distraction". But I think it's important to be precise about the way it's used due to a whole lot of semantics being posted here for all to see.

However, the CAA have very quickly made quite clear their official stance on pilots using "PED"s in the cockpit.

[[email protected]]

It is never clear whether he is on a VFR clearance (with a maximum altitude) on top and therefore must be 1000' clear of cloud vertically or a SVFR clearance (must keep in sight of the ground) - he is offered both but the actual service isn't decided.

[JimBall]

So - narrowing down to facts that seem plausible.

Look at the northbound track, which goes west of the heliport towards Brent - the standard way to avoid 157 (in a twin) if your clearance is "not above 1000ft". This pilot was fully aware of the restriction.

Look at the contorted route from Westminster to the incident. Going off-route, G-CRST loses its exemption to 157. With a pilot like PB, there would be a serious reason to do so. For some reason, he couldn't glue himself to the river and track slowly to the Heliport, when cleared. If he could, he surely would, because it's the safest route with no high obstacles. The river route must have been obscured.

An option would normally be to climb back on top. But that maybe wasn't open to him due to the height restrictions imposed by Heathrow at that part of the airspace.

He also knew that once he was west of VB, he was in Class A and exempt from the 1000ft rule. And he knew that he would be exempted from the 500ft rule once he was "landing in accordance with normal aviation practice."

The heliport's zone kisses the west edge of VB. So, once past VB, he could claim he was on approach to Battersea once he had the clearance.

He may also had to revert to his heli routes chart. Someone like PB would have this memorised - but when the vis drops, that chart is very useful. Except that the current version doesn't show the 770ft St Georges obstruction. And, if you missed the NOTAM,.......

[sarboy w****r]

Crab:

It is never clear whether he is on a VFR clearance

I can see how he could have been on either when in City CTR (Class D), but it had to have been a SVFR clearance inside London CTR - it's Class A. I agree, however, that the phraseology used between the two parties is not clear in this regard.

JimBall:

Look at the contorted route from Westminster to the incident. Going off-route, G-CRST loses its exemption to 157. With a pilot like PB, there would be a serious reason to do so. For some reason, he couldn't glue himself to the river and track slowly to the Heliport, when cleared. If he could, he surely would, because it's the safest route with no high obstacles. The river route must have been obscured.

My point exactly. And the reason for the deviation in the route is the elephant in the room.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

In conditions like this I've been naughty in the past(20 years ago). Gone up 150ft in to the restricted airspace on the basis that there would be nothing to hit up there but lot's to hit downstairs. I could have explained the incursion if needs be by wrong altimeter setting:oh:

Let's face it an incursion of a few hundred feet will not bring Heathrow traffic falling over London.:ok:

[SASless]

Cook Book Pilots see Rules as being etched in Stone and are quite happy to assess all sorts of blame to any straying from them no matter the reason or extent.....unfortunately. The good news is Cook Bookers...generally sort themselves out in dramatic ways all the time slapping themselves on their own back prior to hitting the ground at steep angles and high speeds.

In the current case.....ATC did not seem to object to what was going on even if they were watching.

No Harm....no Foul....just like in sports play is it not?

[SilsoeSid]

AnFI
- the VHF freq change was the most probable 'distraction' perhaps.

ShyTorque
Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement.


Surely that would only be totally routine if you expected to go there.

At 07:55, 4mins before being told to contact Battersea, The question was asked, "Is Battersea open do you know?"

That would suggest to me that at 07:55, 122.9 wasn't dialled up as Battersea wasn't yet a cleared destination. Was the freq dialled up in anticipation that Battersea was open and would accept? Who knows.

Perhaps, as this was so 'routine' it would be expected that the frequency would already be dialled up, perhaps when the frequency change took place, it was seen that 122.9 wasn't dialled up already....after all, every other time before going into Battersea, it would have been.

I think I'm fairly proficient on the 430 and given the scenario of, acknowledging freq change, (start clock) flipping freqs over, flipping them back, dialling up 122.9 then flipping over again, took 8 seconds. (Not re-flipping would drop a second)

I don't know the 109 so won't know where the radio would be positioned, but if it was out of line of sight, the dialled up freqs might not be so in your face given the scenario. Also, when do the wheels get lowered?

[Ye Olde Pilot]

Of course the elephant in the room question is did pride stop him declaring an emergency and being recovered by clearance from Heathrow?

[sarboy w****r]

ATC would need to be asked why there was no objection at the time, but one reason why perhaps they did not say anything at the time was because they knew the weather to be poor and the pilot to be working hard and simply chose not to highlight the point until a later stage. Why put undue pressure on a pilot in poor weather, who has just effectively asked for a weather div and who is manoeuvring at low level to position for finals?

Furthermore, rules are there for a reason. Sometimes rules need to be broken, I agree entirely. But that is in emergencies, not because "we need to get the job done." If the rules don't allow you to get the job done, then you need to question the rules or question what it is that you are trying to achieve. That's not Cook Book Piloting, it's simply being professional. Maybe you didn't intend for it to come across the way I have read it, but "no harm, no foul" is pretty cavalier, wouldn't you say?

I know of professional pilots who have done what this pilot appears to have done, i.e. push the weather limits inside London CTR. I don't like to admit it, but I have been one of them. In fact, the circumstantial evidence is that G-CRST was probably being flown like that. "No harm, no foul" flying, getting the job done. All very professional, non-Cook Book Piloting.

Right up to the point that the aircraft flew into an obstacle and killed someone who was just going about his business, walking to work.

YOP:

Of course the elephant in the room question is did pride stop him declaring an emergency and being recovered by clearance from Heathrow?


Or admitting at Lambeth Bridge that today is not your day, climb back up in the gap in which you're descending until VMC on top again and head south, RTB Redhill.

[SASless]

Sarboy.....sounds like you have a hidden agenda that is beginning to show itself. Care to come clean and tell us exactly what you are trying to achieve here?

You continue to make assumptions and then make pronouncements based upon the assumptions.

[rotorspeed]

YOP - very unlikely. There seems to have been a presumption by many that the whole of the south east of the UK was subject to fog or low cloud at the time of the accident, and that a major airport ILS let down was the only safe option available to PB. This is wrong. Some of the southeast - within 30 miles of London - had no fog at all with clear blue skys. G-CRST had enough fuel to fly over 200 miles. I do not believe PB would have had any major concerns as to how he was going to be able to safely land somewhere. His predicament did not constitute an emergency.

Particularly with fog, it is very easy to assume the few METARS that are available before 09.00 represent the widespread picture. It can be better - or indeed worse - within a short distance, with hill tops often being clear too.

[sarboy w****r]

No hidden agenda. I really liked PB, although I only met him a couple of times in passing.

I just think that all of the initial evidence released by the AAIB seems to indicate that he probably got it wrong and got caught out by the weather - and all the holes lined up just when he ran out of options.

G-CRST should not have gone past Lambeth Bridge. A lot of evidence points to the fact that perhaps he shouldn't have even taken off. Whether it was one single issue that caused the accident or several in combination is largely irrelevant. This is the first recorded helicopter fatality in London. It's just important that those of us that operate over London ask ourselves whether our current practices resemble this incident - we don't need another.

[readgeoff]

I have to agree completely with Sarboy. His posts have been objective throughout and based on what looks to me to be a complete understanding of the exact rules of flying in and around the lanes and normal behaviour there. He has just applied logic to that knowledge and the reported facts to reach the obvious conclusion. I cannot see how any assessment of the last 5 minutes of the flight as described in the AAIB report can lead you to any other interpretation (although am open to seeing suggestions). PB was just too experienced for it to be anything other than pushing the weather too far given the facts stated. If he had any sort of visibility/situational awareness how would it have happened?

I flew down the lanes through London for the first time since the accident today and considered again the routes and heights as I was flying it. One thing that really struck me was just how low 770ft is in relation to that part of town. I am usually 1500+ through that section and even that is not far away from a number of the taller buildings dotted around. The thought of hitting that crane sent a cold chill through me as I considered it from above.

[ANW]

The following link remains active at the time of this post.
1997 Agusta 109E Power (G-CRST) (http://www.castleair.co.uk/1997-agusta-109e-power-g-crst.html)

Perhaps it will be removed some time soon. I am surprised it is still there.
The i/p layout of G-CRST is depicted. The Avionics spec shows the following fit

* Bendix King KMD 150 MFD
* Collins ADF 60
* Collins DME 42
* Collins VHF 22A x 1
* Collins VIR 32 x 1
* Garmin GMA 340 Intercom
* Garmin GNS 430 x 1 VHF/NAV
* Garmin GTX 330 Mode S TPDR
* Please note avionic equipment fit subject to confirmation and survey
* Skywatch 497 TAS
* Sperry Helicas II Flight Director
* Sperry Rad Alt RT300

The pdf file states Information correct as at 03/01/2013.

http://www.castleair.co.uk/images/pictures/aircraft/g-crst-4_1328599149.jpg

[jeepys]

I have been keeping occasional tabs on this thread so I apologise if this has been covered already.

I did not know PB but my initial thoughts after the incident was that his luck run out that day. He made a decision, maybe a 50/50 but unfortunately he chose the wrong one. It happens to all of us numerous times but that fateful day was not going to be his best, however, now that the initial AAIB report is out I think a little different.

Firstly the text "I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to" says a lot to me. Maybe it does not really mean much to many but to me it sets the tone.

Secondly texting when in the phase of flight that he was in my opinion is not my common practice. Some say that this was NOT detrimental to the outcome but I disagree. In the area that he was and the issues he was having texting is yet another unnecessary distraction. For those who are familiar with being in IMC or bad weather low level with obstacles around that are going to hurt if you hit them it's not a nice place and requires the utmost concentration to remain as safe as possible. Distractions are not welcome in those instances.

I have text when flying but cannot remember doing it in a crucial phase of flight but I will remember this incident and be careful when I text if I do at all.

Nothing can be done now to turn the clock back and prevent this terrible accident from happening and I hope all the family and friends of the two victims can find salvation somewhere soon.

All pilots can no doubt learn from this, I know I have.

What may be frightening is the number of us who have been or could have been in the exact same position and got away with it.

Now these are MY opinions and thoughts and are in no way there to represent others.

RIP PB.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Jeepys;

Sadly the "land in a field" bit was a classic Barnseism. PB knew the customer well, and I suspect that one of the reasons the customer enjoyed flying with him was a rather loud, joyous and ironic sense of humour.

I strongly doubt there was any intention to do any such thing and I believe that may be backed up by the fact he didn't go below 1000' at Elstree. Knowing the man as well as I did it was the sort of remark he would make in fun. A classic reminder to all of us that whatever we do, it will all be found out in the sweep-up when we aren't there to answer the questions.

SND

[readgeoff]

Sir Niall makes a very good point. There are many things we say in jest that we would never actually do in reality. This could well be one of them.

[SilsoeSid]

readgeoff Sir Niall makes a very good point. There are many things we say in jest that we would never actually do in reality. This could well be one of them.


Maybe so, but it could be said that although he may well have said it in jest at the time, maybe to lighten the atmosphere and to assure the client, the fact that he said "I’m coming anyway will land in a field if I have to" appears to me that he realised that landing in a field was very much a possibility as a last resort to make the pick up.

The reason we say things but don't carry our words out, is because circumstances turn out where we don't have to do what we earlier said.

Are you saying that if he got over Elstree (as he did), binned it due to the cloud cover (as he did), but when turning back southbound saw a field through a gap in the cloud, he wouldn't have considered going for a field close to Elstree to pick up the client? I would suggest that the field option was always in his head

I'm just thinking that from being VMC on top and enquiring if Battersea was open, it's very interesting that the very next call after being told it was open was “I can actually see Vauxhall, If I could maybe head down to H3... H4 sorry”

Given where he was when this call took place, are you really telling us that the 'landing in a field' in a rural area scenario, was never an option that morning?


Going back to ST's earlier post of;
"Distraction? I doubt it. The frequency change at that point, i.e. just before entering the EGLW ATZ, is a totally routine and mandatory requirement."
Wouldn't knowing which route you are on also be a routine and mandatory requirement?

[stuckgear]

i think that SND makes the point well..

I'm not just saying that as confirmation of my own viewpoint but the facts did not bear the situation out.. there was no attempt to land a field made, a landing at Elstree could not be attempted so it was canned for RTB.

Would the client have been picked up in a random field ? Most likely not. Dumping a car in a random field for x length of time or having a driver traipse around the vicinity looking for a particular field isn't going to cut it.

There's too much accusation and stock being placed in a jocular off the cuff comment.

[Heliport]

Sid

Knowing PB's personality and jocular manner, as I did, I entirely agree with SND's analysis of that exchange.



Wouldn't knowing which route you are on also be a routine and mandatory requirement? You really are scraping the barrel now.
The reference to 'H3' was clearly a slip of the tongue which he corrected immediately.
Perhaps you never make such a slip, but most of us mere mortals do from time to time.

H.

[sarboy w****r]

Readgeoff:

I flew down the lanes through London for the first time since the accident today and considered again the routes and heights as I was flying it. One thing that really struck me was just how low 770ft is in relation to that part of town. I am usually 1500+ through that section and even that is not far away from a number of the taller buildings dotted around. The thought of hitting that crane sent a cold chill through me as I considered it from above.

Yes, it's a sobering thought. What's also worth bearing in mind is the Shard (slightly < 1100'?). We now have 2 extremely tall obstacles on the south side of the river and which lie in the direct path of a typical north/south routing across London/City CTR to/from Alexander Palace. We need to have these in the forefront of our minds when the next typical London winter day (or night, worse still) appears.

[sAx_R54]

@sarboy

Quite simply because the flight profile depicted from Lambeth Bridge is completely at odds with any normal flight profile I have seen or flown. Heathrow ATC normally get very upset if you stray off the helilanes, even slightly. And that's in the rest of the CTR, not when your track is taking you through a restricted area into which you are not allowed to fly.

Why did the aircraft fly that route? Why did it not fly along the Thames like it was supposed to? What possible reason could there be for not continuing along the Thames from Lambeth Bridge (i.e. following H4)? Why did it veer away from the route along the Thames (the change in direction is about 45 degrees)?

The pilot reports no technical problems. The pilot continues to respond normally to radio calls beyond Lambeth Bridge. There was clearly some other reason as to why the pilot did not go into that bend in the river. If it's not weather, what other possible reasons could there be?

Thanks for updating the conventional approach inbound to Battersea. A further curiosity I had was if the inbound track was to be via London-eye, why an approach was flown a fair-degree south west of this point? It may well be that a temperature inversion over the Thames basin forced the change and may have been what preceded the elliptical manoeuvre to get back on track.

[SilsoeSid]

Stuck gear;
I'm not just saying that as confirmation of my own viewpoint but the facts did not bear the situation out.. there was no attempt to land a field made, a landing at Elstree could not be attempted so it was canned for RTB.

Facts - "G-CRST climbed to 1,500 ft on track to Elstree and cleared the northern boundary of the London CTR at 0746 hrs, when it began a descent. It passed Elstree Aerodrome at 0748 hrs in a descent through 1,200 ft before reaching a minimum altitude of 1,000 ft. At 0749 hrs, G-CRST was 2 nm north-west of Elstree Aerodrome when it climbed and turned right onto a south-easterly track towards central London."

Fact - Elstree elevation is 332' so the descent took him down to 668' aal (below normal cabair circuit height) 2nm north-west of the field.

Fact - "Helicopter arrivals to position to the northern grass at 500 ft QFE."
http://www.londonelstreeaerodrome.com/resources/EG_AD_2_EGTR_en_2010-12-16.pdf
Airport Information (http://www.londonelstreeaerodrome.com/styled/index.html)


Supposition;
Perhaps no further descent was made because he knew of the multiple pylons in the area, especially to the north-west ....or maybe the lowest height of this part of the flight just so happened to be in the sector around Elstree where the open land and fields seem to be. Is the Golf club...a known site?

IMHO, the facts indicate, contrary to your post, that something was indeed attempted.

[SilsoeSid]

You really are scraping the barrel now.
The reference to 'H3' was clearly a slip of the tongue which he corrected immediately.
Perhaps you never make such a slip, but most of us mere mortals do from time to time.

Yes I probably am scraping the barrel, but all I'm saying is that it could be an indicator of workload.

Me..., sometimes I double flip, don't flip enough or end up calling Tower, either Radar, Approach or Director having talked to all 3 within the last dynamic 5 mins, while trying to anticipate, by half-earing the other handful of radios or other crew members, wether we do or don't need to go through the centreline at the half mile final point with Ryanair, Emirates and Baby inbound.. and where we will be going after that.
On the other hand on a nice quiet day I might call Halfpenny Green, Wellesbourne.

My point was that some here are saying the radio change is not to be considered a distracting factor. The point is H3/H4 may well be a slip of the tongue, or could it be the only thing that is indicating an increasing workload.

H3/H4 could well be a slip, as much as dialling up 122.4 instead of 122.9, a slip which might have been in the process of being corrected when told to change freq.

[jumpseater]

SG
Would the client have been picked up in a random field ? Most likely not. Dumping a car in a random field for x length of time or having a driver traipse around the vicinity looking for a particular field isn't going to cut it.


In the past I used to drive and collect/test customer cars for just this sort of clientelle. SG's assessment quoted above fits my first hand experience of this type of client exactly. When I first read the report, my first thought was I wouldn't want to be in the field when the client arrived, and I wouldn't expect any subsequent custom. A pick up from a prior arranged private site/field etc yes, an ad hoc departure from a farmers field, perhaps with Farmer Giles requesting you 'get orf his land' etc doesn't seem customer orientated for an experienced VIP pilot.

Flippant yes, in seriousness, I'd doubt it even without knowing the pilot.

[SilsoeSid]

Might that explain the continuation of the flight to the north-west of Elstree, the little kink just to the south of the golf club, flying directly overhead the golf club before commencing the right turn back to London?
With jumpseaters post in mind and of course the client not being too happy with a field pick up, possibly the golf club was being considered as an option?

[SASless]

It seems the discussion has been round the houses and still the answer to the only questions that matter remains unanswered/unresolved.

Why did the aircraft collide with the Crane?

Was the crane visible to the Pilot?

If so....why did he fly into it?

If it wasn't....why did he fly into it?

[Low Flier]

The answer's in your question, SASless.

[SilsoeSid]

You're quite right SASless, however the answer to the first question, possible mechanical or medical issues aside, is that the pilot flew it into it; which leaves just the one question.

'Why did he fly into it?'

The answer to which, IMHO will be found more through a look at possible CRM issues than lights, heights and numbers of flights. Was this really, as it seems some here seem to think, an accident waiting to happen?

[Heliport]

Low Flier The answer's in your question, SASless.

If the answers to the questions were so clear, one of the most widely experienced helicopter pilots in this forum wouldn't be asking them.

[A30yoyo]

In which document is the width of H4 defined? It seems to be accepted practice to veer slightly outside the Thames river banks on occasion.
One place where the width of H4 is precisely defined now is alongside the St Georges Wharf Tower ('The Vauxhall Narrows'?) and when the cloudbase drops to less than the Notam height plus 500ft the width is halved by my reckoning.
If it is accepted that H4 is now narrower at Vauxhall should there not be some simple 'Highway Code' rules in place relating to passing oncoming traffic on the right and performing 'U-turns'?And it might be wise to move the boundary of the Heliport Control Zone so there is no loop-hole to allow the 500ft rule to be ignored 'in a descent to the heliport'.
As noted in an earlier post two more tall towers have planning permission at Vauxhall, slightly further from the river than the St Georges Wharf Tower but slightly higher. Presumably this doesn't have any further impact on H4 flying?

[SilsoeSid]

I've had my thrupence worth with my opinion of the CRM side of things, so that's me out.

However, here's one that must have a definitive answer;

If a client calls to suggest that a pilot doesn't take off until there is a clearer observation of the weather at the pick up point, but the pilot replies that he's going to lift anyway, to which the client repeats his suggestion that the pilot shouldn't take off..but the pilot takes off anyway...gets overhead the intended pick up point, and then ends up having to rtb because of the bad weather...

...if the pilot is freelance, flying an aircraft loaned from a different company than the pilot is flying for....who pays for that flight?

[JimBall]

A30yoyo: In which document is the width of H4 defined? It seems to be accepted practice to veer slightly outside the Thames river banks on occasion.

The exact definition of H4 is between the high water marks on either bank - CAA source.

[Heliport]

A30yoyo

JimB has already given you the defined width of H4.
The width of the river at Vauxhall Bridge is about 900 feet.
The length of the bridge, clear of the abutments, is 860 feet.


MacRS
That may be so but the pilot wasn't going to Redhill. He intended to follow the river (along Route H4) to Battersea Heliport and had asked for permission to do so. (AAIB report.)

[mickjoebill]

What was the likely visibility for the turn at London Eye and trip down Thames?
Could some of Londons taller landmarks have been visible? Could it have been flown primarily using GPS for navigation?



Mickjoebill

[Art of flight]

MJB, Don't know about your first 2 questions but you probably know, GPS cannot be used as the legal primary method of navigation in the UK.

[SilsoeSid]

Is this the overnight position of the crane?

Click Link (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/Flickr_-_Duncan~_-_St_George_Wharf_Tower.jpg)

..because if it was, the big building small crane viewpoint might be flawed

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/01/16/article-2263250-16F87670000005DC-887_634x798.jpg


If the crane operator was not late, would the jib have been in a lower operating position?

[rotorspeed]

Some of us have consistently focussed on the one big question, as SASless repeated recently, which is why did G-CRST actually hit the crane? With a bit of time to look at this more carefully, I think that it may well indeed have been because PB inadvertently went into very poor VMC as he was changing frequency to Battersea.

From the radar trace in the AAIB SB, we see G-CRST descending gradually from Westminster Bridge towards Chelsea Bridge. Given this descent, and the fact that he was a bit north of track, I suspect that he was not yet in good VMC. Then 200m east of Chelsea Bridge G-CRST turns tightly to the right through 225 degrees – too tightly for any coupled turn on autopilot. Such a tight turn to the right could well have been executed because PB had found relatively good VMC conditions, at the indicated 770ft, and wanted to keep good visual contact with the ground, looking both through the screen and his door window, whilst also avoiding going too far north beyond the river. With the cloudbase possibly then lowering a bit as he tracks east, he descends to the indicated 570ft, but is probably anxious to climb, so nudges upwards as much as he can.

During the majority of this leg back east PB was talking with ATC, finally ending with a frequency change instruction when he was 150m from Vauxhall Bridge - and the crane G-CRST hit. So he would have been changing frequency whilst starting to turn for Battersea and trying to keep as high as possible in poor VMC. Even a few seconds with eyes in the cockpit now could have been enough for G-CRST to end up virtually in IMC again, so PB could not turn too tightly, nor did he have good visual references, and tragically fate intervened and his path took him into the crane that he had perhaps forgotten was so high, was spindly and hard to see with inadequate lighting.

A witness was quoted as saying that he saw the helicopter going east between Chelsea and Vauxhall, before it went into cloud, so it seems PB was in reasonable VMC at this point, so really, all the hard work should have been done. Who knows, but perhaps if PB had indeed held between Vauxhall and Westminster, he could have maintained VMC on top at up 1500ft, changed to Battersea then made his approach without distraction. But then perhaps he was concerned that the hole he had seen might disappear.

All supposition, of course.

[readgeoff]

In regard to the "land in the field if I have to" I said that Sir Niall raised a good point that it COULD be just something that someone has said in jest but never actually intended to do. I didnt know PB personally and hadnt considered this could be something he would say in jest when i first read the report - it was just another red flag amongst many. Thus Sir Niall who DID KNOW PB made a valid point. You would need to have known PB and his previous actions (did he ever previously pick up from a field when primary site was not available etc) to make a judgement.

For me though, other than possibly indicating a particular attitude to risk, that comment is not that relevent to the actual crash.

My view is that the accident sequence started when PB made a decision to try and get into Battersea from his safe position on top of the fog. From everything I have seen and read in the AAIB report and on this forum including in particular the descent path and the routing through R157 I can only deduce he was decending through cloud with maybe patches of viz here and there. The descent doesnt suggest a drop through a "hole". He was in an IFR machine and presumably held an Instrument licence (does an ATPL included Insrument or is instrument additional?) so may have felt perfectly able to "safely" decend through the muck. Again I would want to know if this sort of thing had been done before by PB before drawing conclusions.

The question then was asked Why did he hit the Crane? For me there is a much bigger question. Why did he fly JUST OVER a BLOODY GREAT BUILDING. If he knew the building was there flying over it would have been a clear 500ft violation. I can only deduce that he didnt know the building was there and the clear inference from that is because he had limited or no vizibility and maybe also wasnt completely sure of his exact location (his hold was not where his clearance to hold had been given and he had passed through R157).

The discussion about the Cranes overnight position, how it was lit etc etc all are relevent in maybe having provided PB a get out of jail free card but they are not the cause of this accident in my view.

[Art of flight]

Rotorspeed, you describe a scenario many of us will have experienced over the years. The London airspace and the ever taller 'encroachment of' buildings leave little room for error or malfunction in the reported weather conditions. Terms such as poor VMC, good VMC, VMC on top, decending through holes in cloud layers, are the unwritten lines in the regulations that corporate VFR helicopter pilots deal with most days in the UK to provide a viable service..

[SASless]

A lot of assuming going on.

Basic question for me remains the same....the Pilot did not see the Crane or did not see it in time....to avoid the Collision.

His Clearance was either VFR or SVFR....either or both which require he maintain adequate visual contact with the Surface or External References to be able to control the aircraft and avoid other Traffic, Obstacles, or terrain.

Altitude by itself is not an issue contingent to being able to see ahead.

Course by itself is not an issue contingent to being able to see ahead.

Speed....becomes an issue with the decrease in distance one can see ahead.

Rules...by and of themselves really do not matter if you can see and avoid terrain and obstacles. They may play a role later when one has a very sterile chat with the CAA fellas... but not as a casual factor.

Questioning how he got to the height to hit the Crane is an issue.
Questioning how his track took him to the Crane is an issue.
Questioning why he did not see the Crane is an issue.

There has been some very good thinking and rational analysis of all that.

Key Question...."How do we figure out what he was thinking and doing that led him to that exact point in space and he not be able to see that Crane?"

I am not sure we shall ever know.

What I do know....there is ample information for the rest of us to draw some pretty accurate conclusions on what not to do if we are ever confronted with similar circumstances.

That is the value of discussions such as we are having here.

For those lessons to utilized...we not only have to spell them out...but we have to make them know to the industry and then implement them in our every day operations.

I see the answer as being very simple but determining the actual cause is going to be nearly impossible.

Either his vision was blocked by Cloud or Fog, Mist on the Windscreen, or some other external cause. Or, he was distracted and looking inside at a critical moment while flying in limited visibility thus preventing him from taking avoiding action having allowed his altitude control to be affected by the weather and altitude limitations in the area he was flying in. He must have found it more expedient to fly lower rather than higher.

Which one of those were the cause.....I make no choice.....I just see them as the more logical choices of many.

[SilsoeSid]

RG;
The question then was asked Why did he hit the Crane? For me there is a much bigger question. Why did he fly JUST OVER a BLOODY GREAT BUILDING. If he knew the building was there flying over it would have been a clear 500ft violation. I can only deduce that he didnt know the building was there and the clear inference from that is because he had limited or no vizibility and maybe also wasnt completely sure of his exact location (his hold was not where his clearance to hold had been given and he had passed through R157).


Perhaps given the circumstances, flying over what you know to be the biggest building around was considered a good choice. Ok, so it may well have been 'violating the 500', but flying over the highest object ensures that other objects are below you and may be a good thing to hang a hat on. The jib possibly simply wasn't seen or maybe even being looked for.

Unfortunately...

From the SB;
During out-of-service periods, such as overnight, the jib was parked in the ‘minimum jib’ position, at a 65° angle above the horizontal. At the time of the accident this gave a total height from the ground to the tip of the jib of 719 ft.

As I said, flying over the biggest building in the area, given the circumstances, might have been intentional. As it happened, unfortunately the jib was still raised in its overnight position and 125ft above the building, because the operator was late for work.
The top of the building is 594ft (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/St_George_Wharf_Tower) and looking at the raised height of the jib and the impact point of about half way along be jib (counting the structure boxes), he flew around 65ft above the top of the building. Ok violating 500ft, but if the operator had been in work that hour earlier...on time, the jib height would have been that 125ft lower than it was. In that case, the incident wouldn't have happened.

One big thing to take away from this, is if the impact didn't occur, in all probability we wouldn't have heard how close it was.

[readgeoff]

'What I do know....there is ample information for the rest of us to draw some pretty accurate conclusions on what not to do if we are ever confronted with similar circumstances.'

Very well put SASless.

[Pace]

SASLess

the problem with flying within VFR/SVFR Legal limits is its all great on paper but may not be reality in the field.
You could have 10 K vis in one area and 700 meters half a mile away.
You could have 2000 feet cloudbase in one area and 500 feet half a mile away.
Then we have the dreaded scud running, punching in and out of bits of mist cloud and getting quick glimpses of the ground or river.
At that point the river is very narrow so room for error is tiny ie a glance at a chart and the aircraft can easily not be on course.
Hit a patch of cloud/mist still thinking you are over clear air below the aircraft and its a rude awakening whn you are confronted with a building in front.
Instant reaction to turn away maybe seeing the main stem of a Crane but missing a thinner long arm unlighted conceiled by cloud mist.
My guess is that is what happened and the first the poor pilot realized turning away was a load crash as he hit the concealed arm.

Pace

[readgeoff]

@SilsoeSid. There is of course logic in your suggestion. I am just a PPL(h) so wouldn't like to comment on the likelihood of this. I have been taught to fly over pilons to keep away from wires so maybe the pros do the same with buildings when everything else is going bad?

Your point "One big thing to take away from this, is if the impact didn't occur, in all probability we wouldn't have heard how close it was" is very valid. How can we learn lessons from near misses when they aren't reported? Or even investigated?

[SASless]

Am I being silly....but flying over the Tallest Obstacle in bad weather is the last thing I would do. I look for the lowest obstacles and avoid the higher ones because I want to be able to stay out of the murk and see as much as possible.

At the risk of sounding like a Cowboy....given a choice of good vis at street level or next to no Vis at a higher Altitude....this old Goat goes low and accepts the fact Second Guessers might take fault with me.

That gets me back to my concept of "Ass. Tin, Ticket!".

In flying helicopters "Visibility" is King. You don't run into what you see.

If I find max vis....even if I violate the Sacred 500 Foot Rule....make it home safely without putting a dent into the Helicopter....then (if) required....I will offer up my pitiful tale of woe and hope it is accepted. One also has to remember it is far easier to get Forgiveness than Permission sometimes. You just have to remember not to wear your Welcome out in certain Houses with certain people.



Read....you were taught that technique because Pylons are easier to see than Wires....and the Wires will be no higher than the Pylons (for the set of wires that run across the pylons you are looking at.)


Let's talk "Scud Running" here......bluntly put....if you punch into a "Cloud" even for only a few seconds and thus lose your forward visibility.....you are not "Scud Running"....you are attempting Suicide. If that wee wispy thing in front of you hides a solid wall....what then? You have just done yourself into an IIMC event....something that KILLS Helicopter Pilots.

I am a Veteran "Rud Scunner"....anyone who works for a living flying helicopters in certain parts of the World have to be in order to accomplish the job and earn a living. Sadly....that is the Real World of Utility helicopter flying.

I learned over the years that one Rule applies to such dangerous activity.....never lose sight of the ground....and always maximize your forward visibility and fly as slowly as you must to be able to STOP, HOVER, REVERSE COURSE, and AVOID OBSTACLES and HAZARDS.

I do not avocate Rud Scunning....but if you must do it....do it as safely as you can....and only over ground you know like the back of your hand.

[Hover Bovver]

Anyone who suggests PB was overloaded or struggling to cope with the situation, either doesn't know him or what he has done - Does anyone remember the conditions that PB had to cope with when the scissor link broke all those years ago, and the outcome ?

[A30yoyo]

'lumberjack' on the skyscrapercity forum continues to post interesting photos e.g view along H4 in #2611 on
One St George Wharf (The Tower) | Lambeth | 181m | 49 fl | T/O - Page 131 - SkyscraperCity (http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=221585&page=131)

[SASless]

Just a thought.....anyone have access to photos taken very close to the time of the Accident?

It would be interesting to see what the Vis/Cloud was at the time.

[readgeoff]

@sasless post #593 is an excellent post and clearly extremely sound advice. I for one really appreciate these sorts of posts and the learning that comes from them.

[Flying Lawyer]

readgeoff

How can we learn lessons from near misses when they aren't reported? Or even investigated?

Or even investigated?
I can assure you that the CAA Aviation Regulation and Enforcement Department thoroughly investigates alleged low flying and if, in its opinion, there is sufficient evidence to take action (incl prosecution) the CAA does so.

The last thing that should be encouraged is more reporting.
Bear in mind that estimating height is notoriously difficult, and most allegations of low flying and so-called 'near misses' are made by members of the public who are unable to judge distance accurately and, on occasions, greatly exaggerate.

Innocent pilots notified that a complaint has been received then go through months of worry before knowing whether any action is to be taken against them and, if they are prosecuted, incur expense defending false allegations and more months of worry until the case is heard and the matter finally resolved.
That would be worrying enough for us as PPLs, but it is much more worrying for professional pilots whose livelihood depends upon their licence and their good reputation.


Hover Bovver
Yes, I do. And, regrettably, there was a very long delay between the incident and the true reason for it being discovered.



FL

[readgeoff]

@flying lawyer.

I don't know what actually happens in terms of enforcement of rules. Clearly if there is a complaint by the public this is investigated and as a pilot I am most certainly not advocating more of that of course.

What I do wonder is how enforcement of the rules is made outside of a complaint by the public or an accident. The AAIB have done a great job in a short time in this incident. Should there be similar random reviews of flights in known poor weather or is that just impractical/too costly? In this example would Heathrow Radar have reported the transgression into r157 or their concern about the weather during that flight "accept VFR if you can"?

Accepting earlier comments on the impracticalities of analysing localised weather and providing a commercial service in these sorts of variable conditions.

Apologies if this is ground that has been covered many times before.

[SilsoeSid]

Read....you were taught that technique because Pylons are easier to see than Wires....and the Wires will be no higher than the Pylons (for the set of wires that run across the pylons you are looking at.)

Perhaps on this occasion, the thought was... buildings are easier to see than cranes and this crane was usually no higher than the building.



Hover Bovver;
Anyone who suggests PB was overloaded or struggling to cope with the situation, either doesn't know him or what he has done.

Pretty strange words to say in this day and age.

[JimBall]

Readgeoff: Why did he fly JUST OVER a BLOODY GREAT BUILDING. If he knew the building was there flying over it would have been a clear 500ft violation.

For the last time, helicopters are exempted from the 500 foot rule when "landing in accordance with normal aviation practice". G-CRST was inside Battersea's zone and preparing to land.

I'm sure PB would rather have known he was over the middle of the river for his approach. But it seems he didn't exactly know his position. To answer your question: because he was unaware of the building until too late, and he didn't see the crane going even higher than the building. Had he read and plotted NOTAMS?

This obstruction is inside an ATZ. As such, all approaching the ATZ should be reminded of it. (My view - but apparently not a rule) Maybe, because it's right on the edge, that reminder has to come from Heathrow before handover to Battersea?

[Andy Mayes]

This obstruction is inside an ATZ. As such, all approaching the ATZ should be reminded of it. (My view - but apparently not a rule) Maybe, because it's right on the edge, that reminder has to come from Heathrow before handover to Battersea?

Surely this is the reason the NOTAM system exists?

You are correct that there is no rule for ATC to warn those approaching the ATZ of the obstruction, unless of course it has not been subject to NOTAM (this one was and was valid from 7th January), there is however, a rule for pilots to take all reasonable steps so as to be satisfied the flight can safely be made, taking into account the latest information available as to the route and aerodrome to be used, the weather reports and forecasts available and any alternative course of action which can be adopted in case the flight cannot be completed as planned.

[SilsoeSid]

For the last time, helicopters are exempted from the 500 foot rule when "landing in accordance with normal aviation practice". G-CRST was inside Battersea's zone and preparing to land.


Isn't the tower actually outside the Battersea zone?

LONDON HELIPORT INBOUND/OUTBOUND FLIGHT PROCEDURES (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-A7CB0A760406E2013C8442A429FED0AE/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/EG_AD_3_EGLW_4-1_en_2012-10-18.pdf)

[Andy Mayes]

Isn't the tower actually outside the Battersea zone?

I understand that technically it is outside the ATZ. That said, it is outside by not very much at all.

[[email protected]]

Is it normal aviation practice to say you are landing when you are a. outside the zone you are going to land in and b. not actually talking to the people who control that zone?

He didn't see the building or the crane or know where he was because he was in cloud - that is the elephant in the room.

[toptobottom]

He didn't see the building or the crane [or know where he was] because he was in cloud - that is the elephant in the room.

I think that's the obvious and sad reality. Square brackets because I think he may have known where he was (having seen Vauxhall bridge), but either 'forgot' about the new building/crane because he was distracted by the poor viz, or simply wasn't aware of the NOTAM

[Flying Lawyer]

readgeoff

If the AAIB considers that safety recommendations should be made it will do so either in an Interim Report or in the final Report, or both. The CAA is already well aware that weather is a significant factor in aircraft accidents. I have seen nothing which makes me think they are failing in their duty as the Regulator and I see no reason for their current approach to be changed. I have no idea whether ATC would have reported the alleged 'transgression into r157' but they would have no reason to report what you describe as their 'concern' about the weather, based upon your quote which isn't complete. ATC simply offered two options at that stage, "Not above altitude 1500 feet VFR if you can or Special VFR" and then gave the QNH.
There is often a press/public outcry that 'something should be done', and a corresponding risk of a knee-jerk reaction, following a widely publicised accident, in this case at Vauxhall. I hope the industry and the CAA will point out the facts to the public: The safety record of flights in the London helicopter routes is outstandingly good.
The excellent safety record is not just good luck. It's because the regulations are rightly very strict and because of the professionalism of the pilots who use them.
I hope that helps. Perhaps best not to distract further from discussion of the accident now? ;)


FL

[sarboy w****r]

Sasless, post 596:

Just a thought.....anyone have access to photos taken very close to the time of the Accident?

It would be interesting to see what the Vis/Cloud was at the time.

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02452/helicopter-batters_2452930b.jpg

Image is taken from the Telegraph newspaper, showing the top of the tower shortly after the crash. It's similar to what I could see of the weather on the south side of the river that morning at about that time.

[JimBall]

Andy Mayes: you are correct about NOTAMs, Andy. But my question was had they been read? Had the Operator provided them to the pilot as part of a CAT operation preflight?

If the NOTAM system worked without fail, then the Red Arrows could display without fear of incursion. And we all know that's not the case!

Siloe Sid: Yes - just outside. My mistake. But Vauxhall Bridge is, by tradition, where it all begins for Battersea. I'm just saying that, given what has now happened, we should insist that all enormous structures on the edge of or inside an ATZ should be mentioned by NATS when vis is bad. Particularly ones which can change height dramatically according to whether the operator is present or not.

I saw one early statement from the developers of the tower denying that the crane operator was late for work. They said that they don't permit operation of the crane if there's cloud around the building because the operator can't guarantee seeing the ground.

If that's the case, the NOTAM should mention the variable height of the structure.

[SASless]

Sarboy......what was the Vis under the overcast?

[SASless]

I think I am now down to a single option for the question of whether the aircraft was in cloud or not at the time of the collision.

The next question is why was the aircraft at the altitude it was if it was in cloud, had not contacted the Heliport yet, and was only seconds away from making the initial radio call. It would appear the aircraft would have entered the Control Zone without having made contact with the Heliport to obtain landing clearance.

Looking down through and undercast....the holes are best seen from some height above the undercast....not right on top of the layer.

What was the existing weather at the Heliport?

[sarboy w****r]

From what I remember of the vis when walking around about 2 miles away near the river, it was several km. METARs at the time show Heathrow at about 4000m, London City perhaps 700m: Battersea is between the two. GF's post 126 shows the following (the visibility in the bottom right picture is little deceptive - prob better than at the time of the accident - in that this is clearly some time after the accident and from memory, the weather picked up reasonably quickly later that morning):

http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2013/01/16/article-2263213-16F87736000005DC-730_964x690.jpg

[mike-wsm]

I am shocked by FL's attitude towards the poor people who have been burned to death, critically injured, or made homeless. It is not a case of 'moving on', it is necessary to ensure that this cannot happen again, bearing in mind the attitudes expressed by some pilots on this thread. The helicopter could have come down on a building full of people or in the path of a crowded commuter train. There is a world of difference between those voluntarily risking aviation and those poor souls who have the risks of aviation thrust upon them.

Bear in mind that estimating height is notoriously difficult, and most allegations of low flying and so-called 'near misses' are made by members of the public who are unable to judge distance accurately and, on occasions, greatly exaggerate.

Just wait for the next Red Arrows visit to Weston super Mare, if they fly too low they will be on camera as such.

[OvertHawk]

Don't bring your own, already well-known, agenda to this discussion Mike. It's irrelevant and insulting.

Also - don't criticise FL for his rational and considered opinions and guidance.

OH

[Grenville Fortescue]

https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-NNCMitcKCU4/UP_q461_A7I/AAAAAAAALm8/srgiSsiTdoQ/s606/Fig+3.png

Taking another look at the radar plot it is feasible to assume that:

a) At 570ft he would have had visibility beneath the overcast and that he could probably even see the base or lower section of the tower?

b) That he then decides to climb through the layer as he already knows how thick it is we assume - in order to track for Battersea and find a "better" hole rather than groping along the river?

[jumpseater]

Mwsm

Originally Posted by FL

Bear in mind that estimating height is notoriously difficult, and most allegations of low flying and so-called 'near misses' are made by members of the public who are unable to judge distance accurately and, on occasions, greatly exaggerate.

Just wait for the next Red Arrows visit to Weston super Mare, if they fly too low they will be on camera as such.

Flying Lawyer is on the money. I have professionally investigated public noise and low flying complaints correlating specific radar tracks against location/time/date. In terms of gross exaggeration that too is correct, I can't remember the number of times I was told an aircraft was scraping the roof tops to find it was at the normal height for an aircraft in that phase of flight, be it departure or arrival. Off the top of my head I'd estimate from spending five years doing these investigations, day in day out, that 90% of all height estimates were out by a minimum of 1,000ft. It's not only the lay public that can't accurately guess altitude from the ground, its professionals as well, though in general terms they were often more 'realistic'. To make the point I used to take visitors to the tower and ask them what height an aircraft was at, they'd guess and then I'd show them the altitude on the air traffic monitor. For those visitors it was a real eye opener in showning what was actually occuring as opposed to their opinion of what was happening.

[XV666]

From what I remember of the vis when walking around about 2 miles away near the river, it was several km. METARs at the time show Heathrow at about 4000m, London City perhaps 700m: Battersea is between the two. GF's post 126 shows the following (the visibility in the bottom right picture is little deceptive - prob better than at the time of the accident - in that this is clearly some time after the accident and from memory, the weather picked up reasonably quickly later that morning):


Surely the bottom right picture is not "some time after the accident" as it clearly shows the burning wreckage which was extinguished reasonably promptly? Rather the earlier shot you posted of the damaged crane taken from the street could have been an hour after the collision: and the weather can change significantly in 5 minutes, let alone an hour?

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/BAt4idLCMAEk437.jpg

Grenville F,

When referencing the radar track it is important to remember the note at top left indicating a +50ft or - 50ft reliability. This can reduce the height differences by 100ft or increase them the same amount, so they should not be relied upon as an absolute.

[mark one eyeball]

I remember making oilrig and platform approaches in the early 80's
on the North Sea these were straight in approaches to the structure using the NDB on the rig and the helicopter weather radar
Our minima in those days was down to half a mile and flying below the height of the derrick....Gulp! yeah we did those approaches legally

Of course quite a few of these approaches ended up in a go around
and quite a few go arounds were dangerously close to hitting the Rig sometimes the only thing seen was the flare at the end of the flarestack passing by the side of the window

A few years later the approach was amended to a 15 degree offset and 3/4 mile minima...bliss!

This was a two crew operation with pilot flying and pilot monitoring and involved a lot of concentration

The problem I have is the "SVFR clearance" in London where the onus is on the Captain to fly within the rules... so whats stopping Captain "go mindedness" just accepting these rather precarious and gray area clearances in very marginal weather where in the single crew environment workload will probably be extremely high and safety margins degraded significantly and all this being done over a very large city full of people

Doesnt this need to be reviewed?

[sarboy w****r]

I don't know for how long the fire burned before it was extinguished. That's why I said that the photo was taken some time after the crash. It might have been immediately, it might have been 15 mins. Either way, the photo shows that visibility at the bottom of the building (~150-200ft elevation?) at the time that the photo was taken was several km.

[John R81]

Very shortly after the crash (closest in time I saw) the top of the tower was visible but not the very top of the remaining crane. Shortly after the crash, news reports on Sky and BBC showed the overcast gradually dropping so that the upper floors of the building were lost from sight, and at the lowest height of overcast the damage to the crane could not be seen. By 10:00 the news transmisions show the sky to be 999 NSW.

The weather-related low-level (below 1200ft) flying conditions changed by the minute that morning.

[Grenville Fortescue]

mark one eyeball - SVFR is a generous provision by aviation authorities and has enabled many pilots to get on with the business of flying when they might otherwise have been grounded or diverted.

As I wrote before - it is an act of trust in a pilot by a controller and it would be a sad thing to lose this privilege. Whether it should apply in certain circumstances over the city of London is another matter.

Another example of handing over responsibility to a pilot was when I was flying with a former colleague out of New York's LaGuardia and we were given clearance to cross both active runways in our own time and to avoid aircraft landing AND taking off across both runways at our own discretion. With this clearance was given the requirement that our next report should be when leaving the zone. I asked if this was normal and my friend said that this was standard practice.

The point being, "at your own discretion" or even SVFR gives the pilot some leeway which in theory should make his job easier and allow heli ops to integrate more effectively into rigid control environments but as with any form of trust if it is abused it can very quickly turn pear-shaped.

I would hate to see the privileges of SVFR restricted in any way but are we saying here that pilots have shown themselves to be incapable of displaying professional judgement in exercising the privileges of SVFR?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

One for the melting pot;

There are reported differences between witness statements about the crane being in/out of cloud. I'd cancelled my trip for that morning at 17:00 the night before as I couldn't guarantee getting the customer to his destination and I was due to be in that area at that time, but canned it due to freezing levels and the possibility of fog.

PB claimed he could see Vauxhall, and I don't doubt that, I also don't doubt that there was low cloud in the area, and from the City ATIS fog as well, BUT, when CRST crashed there was a large fire, with the attendant large plume of smoke. Combined with low temperatures, relatively high humidity and a slack wind gradient could the poor viz shown by the photos of the aftermath have been radiation fog due to the mixing and disturbance the fire caused?

Asbestos knickers on: flame away.

SND

[SASless]

The smoke column is quite distinct and localized....as seen in the photo.

[Pace]

I do think Notams are irrelevant in this situation as the pilot was very experienced and familiar with the area!
One witness stated the Helicopter appeared out of a patch of mist and cloud which makes me believe that for some reason the pilot was unaware of where he was!
Couple that with the fact that he was unlikely to on purpose fly that close to a building indicates that he thought he was over clear air and river.

Something put him off track ! It's likely that he had a patch if scud cloud and elected to punch through rather than descend under and was then confronted with the building.
Realising his mistake he would have pulled away!
He would not have seen the long arm coming off the main Crane structure as it was adequately lit and covered in cloud!

My guess the first he knew was the collision ! Very tragic very sad! High intensity strobe lighting IMO would have alerted him but we will never know!

This building is very tall and on a very narrow piece of river!
There is little room for such an error!
I am sure lighting on these high invisible structures will need to be re examined as they are totally inadequate!

Looking at SVFR regulations they are a structure to operate in Sadly weather is not so constant and uniform!
You may have 10K vis and 2000 cloudbase in one point and half a mile away 700 meters and 500 feet!
Being a realist pilots do punch cloud if they think its for a few seconds and they have plenty if clear air underneath! Sadly he did not !

Pace

[SASless]

Being a realist pilots do punch cloud if they think its for a few seconds and they have plenty if clear air underneath!

If a Pilot does that....he is putting a loaded revolver to his head and pulling the Trigger hoping the Hammer falls on an empty chamber!

The Rules clearly state....."Clear of Cloud" and for very good reasons.

[Pace]

Totally agree and totally opposed to scud running as it is a very risky practise but reality is that some do and one witness stated the Helicopter appeared exiting cloud mist! Any other reason why a pilot of his experience would be so near a building ? If not by accident

Pace

[sarboy w****r]

Pace,

Any other reason why a pilot of his experience would be so near a building ? If not by accident

I suggest that you look on a map at where the building is. Having done that, now look at where helicopter route H4 runs.

[Grenville Fortescue]

It is a fair to say then that a clearance to route via H4 under SVFR is something to be avoided by Thames Radar in the future? If that is what happened.

[[email protected]]

Pace, why do you think high intensity strobe lighting would have saved the day? Firstly he was in cloud, secondly he did not hit either the top of the building nor the top end of the crane jib (the 2 places where a strobe might have been located) - he hit the jib about a 1/4 of the way up.

Staying clear of cloud and in sight of the surface would have prevented this sad accident, littering the tops of obstacles with lights would not.

[Pace]

I am a realist and what you should do and what people do can be separate!
Imagine pilot A on a SVFR clearance to Jersey over the sea? He is VFR and VMC at 2000 feet 25 miles out! The weather at Jersey is 3000 overcast with viz within SVFR limits
He sees an isolated patch of cloud across his path descending to 800 feet over the sea
Will he descend to 700 feet or decide to punch it For 3 minutes maintaining 2000 feet ?
My guess is some would descend while others would loose sight of the sea for a few minutes!
Why would he get so close to the building if he was visual with it?
As for seeing strobe lighting ? It is visual in cloud and can be seen in some conditions out of cloud!
I am
Not for one minute suggesting that the Crane arm would have been avoided if it had been properly lit but there is a chance it may have been seen!
A chance is better than NO chance

Pace

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Strobe lighting, even the most powerful, can easily be rendered ineffective during daylight especially in low-lying sun and conditions of glare. Daytime fog can also EASILY conceal hazard lights. Strobes in fog refract among the moisture-laden fog particles creating a weak short range luminescence which is normally only visible from any distance at night.

As Crab has said, obstruction lights tend to be at the summit of an obstacle although for buildings and obstacles above a certain height additional lights are required at intervals along the length of the obstruction.

Either way the spacing would not have been sufficient to warn the pilot of the crane jib where he hit it and the field of luminescence from a strobe surrounded by fog would only have been visible a few feet away from the obstruction during daylight hours.

To support Crab and others who have said the same, this is NOT an issue about lighting especially given that it was a daytime accident.

[HEATHROW DIRECTOR]

<<It is a fair to say then that a clearance to route via H4 under SVFR is something to be avoided by Thames Radar in the future? >>

What would you suggest then? Close H4?

[SASless]

Any thought there might be another Dumb Ass coming the opposite direction doing the same stupid thing?

What part of staying out of Cloud when flying VFR escapes you Pace?


Crab,

Can there be too many, too bright, lights on Obstacles? Current rules do not always specify Strobe lights....but oft times rely upon standard white or red lights at varying powers of brightness. Which is more visible....Strobes or Steady Incandescent lights?

On a day with decent vis...but some Haze....Strobes can be seen a fair ways off....so long as there is not a brighter or more conspicuous light behind them when viewed from the Aircraft.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by HEATHROW DIRECTOR
What would you suggest then? Close H4?


How about making it VFR only, ie. no provision for SVFR.

[JimBall]

Pace: I do think Notams are irrelevant in this situation as the pilot was very experienced and familiar with the area!

I do think you are going too far with your assumptions. You should wait for the evidence to emerge. It doesn't matter how experienced a pilot is or how often he may have flown that route. The obstacle was fundamentally changed by a NOTAM issued Jan 7.

Questions :
Had PB flown that route in the period Jan 7-Jan 15?
Was he NOTAM aware?"

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Which is more visible....Strobes or Steady Incandescent lights?

There are numerous variables. Omnidirectional strobes (normally xenon filament) are generally brighter than omnidirectional incandescent lights (usually halogen) but this depends on the strobe capacitor and amperage. Omnidirectional lights are typically used at the summit of an obstruction.

Unidirectional lighting (brighter through the use of focussed beam shaft and base reflectors) again tend to be brighter in daylight with the use of high amperage strobes although similar lighting intensity can be achieved with halogen lamps but they are generally not used at the brightest power levels as they burn out too quickly.

Strobes therefore are generally better for both omni and unidirectional lighting (during daylight hours) but incandescent lighting is better at night in both roles because it is less distracting. High amperage strobes at night are a distraction and those which are used for this purpose are generally lower power or possess a photoelectric cell which switches the power source through a different (lower amperage) capacitor.

On a day with decent vis...but some Haze....Strobes can be seen a fair ways off....so long as there is not a brighter or more conspicuous light behind them when viewed from the Aircraft.

This again depends on the type of strobe used (Crystal Palace has the high intensity [high amperage] type) but, far more importantly on the fog/cloud density. If there is partial fog yes, they can penetrate over some considerable distance as with low density cloud/fog. If the fog is dense then you will get the luminescent cloud I mentioned and which dissipates within a few metres.

[rotorspeed]

Grenville - H4 runs through Class A airspace.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by rotorspeed
Grenville - H4 runs through Class A airspace.

Obviously! :rolleyes:

This does not however mean that exceptions do not exist, they do: VFR in Class-A Airspace? (http://www.avweb.com/news/system/182429-1.html)

I am suggesting that with "new" obstructions along H4 that consideration be given to making the route VFR or at very least under the same control provision but with prevailing VMC.

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-6vgbrum-zp4/UQajRJkeNlI/AAAAAAAALto/Y2g2JmJ_X_Y/s850/H4.png

My question is this - is it not possible to make H4, with all its twists and turns and new buildings, subject to the standard VFR minima as the mandatory requirement to fly this route, especially inbound?

[Pace]

SASless

Any thought there might be another Dumb Ass coming the opposite direction doing the same stupid thing?
What part of staying out of Cloud when flying VFR escapes you Pace?

Just for your information fixed wing pilots fly for prolonged periods in cloud OCAS with no radar coverage and have done so for years and years what happens to the Dumb Ass coming the opposite direction while climbing or descending in that situation.

What escapes me?? Its what pilots do and should not do. As stated a witness witnessed the Helicopter come out of cloud what in your pretty brain do you think he was doing there coming out of cloud?
What do you thing the Pilot was doing sticking part of the Helicopter into cloud which contained a structure? Get real!!! about what you think should be the case and what was! Yes he should have stayed visual at all times and CLEAR OF CLOUD (not part of the Helicopter being in it)but obviously he did not otherwise this discussion would not be taking place.

Pace

[SilsoeSid]

Pace;I do think Notams are irrelevant in this situation as the pilot was very experienced and familiar with the area!

Familiarity breeds contempt?

I would say that NOTAMS are only remembered in certain situations, for example;

a. When they actually make a change to your flight. (Restriction of airspace, unavailability of a service etc.)
b. When they are marked on a map, that will be referred to in flight.
c. FREDA checks when leaving the turning/ref point.
d. If you've actually seen them and noted their height/posn in relation to your normal ops.
..and I'm sure there are more

A crane that is constantly NOTAM'd, that has never been an issue in the past, that has never made a difference to a flights profile and hasn't really been given a second thought because if all the other similar structures around, will soon fall into the back of the mind.

This incident has highlighted an anomaly in the 'human part' of the NOTAM system and I can assure you that changes have taken place at at least one location, because of it.

[SilsoeSid]

Pace;
If a cloud is positioned in between an aircraft and an observer in the ground, it doesn't necessarily mean that the ac is in cloud.. although it would appear to the observer on the ground that it is.

Do you need a picture?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by SilsoeSid
I can assure you that changes have taken place at at least one location, because of it.

Do you mean such as pilot's having to sign-off having read all NOTAMS relevant to their flight prior to departure?

[SASless]

Sid,

You are batting a sticky wicket here....I quite agree with what you are saying. Perception is based upon perspective and what appears to be "in cloud" to someone on the ground may very well not be in reality.

At this point no one KNOWS if the helicopter was "IN" cloud. There are ASSUMPTIONS being made that may or may not be accurate re that situation the morning of the collision between the aircraft and the crane.

Pace,

Imperial Airways and Pan Am during the flying boat days did a lot of that using rudimentary flight instruments and Celestrial Nav....but then there was not a lot of air traffic.

Also bear in mind we are talking Air Taxi and Public Transport operations here....and those rules and standards apply.

I have done quite a bit of blundering around in cloud and fog OCAS in Third World Countries but we always had some sort of Traffic Separation methods even if done by the Operators alone and without benefit of Government run ATC services.

There is a heck of a difference between that kind of cloud boring than what you have been suggesting.

You have advocated or implied that you see flying non-standard altitudes and headings without any ATC traffic separation or Control and entering Cloud for short periods of time as being acceptable.

I suggest you are flat wrong if you really think that.

VFR requires (operative word.....REQUIRES) one to stay clear of Cloud and usually sets for minimums for Cloud Separation to ensure IFR aircraft passing through cloud or cloud layers while ascending/descending or enroute do not encounter other VFR aircraft at the very edges of a Cloud or Cloud layer.

Do you wish to clarify your comments if I have misunderstood the point you were trying to make?

[Grenville Fortescue]

And unless the AAIB manage to retrieve video footage of the London skyline covering the Vauxhall Bridge area at the time of impact, we may never know.

[rotorspeed]

Grenville - H4 would be impassable as VFR even if the London CTR was Class D, as the ceiling of 1500ft is too low for an aircraft to maintain 1000ft above anything within 600m of the route. Eg St George Wharf. H3 would be even more impossible with a ceiling of 1000ft. Hence the requirement for SVFR, to waive the 1000ft above requirement. What is your problem with SVFR? This accident did not occur due to any deficiency of the existing regulations.

Grenville - and anyone else believing regulations should be changed - have you ever raised the issue of London heli regulations being inadequate before the G-CRST accident? I don't recollect ever seeing any threads on Pprune saying the regulations are inadequate and need tightening up. Or Grenville, have you not had sufficient experience of London heli ops to form a view? Until now of course, after the accident.

It must be appreciated that this accident was something of a freak. Never happened before. And probably never will happen again, even assuming no regulation changes. Those that regularly fly these routes in IFR twins probably have a good enough idea of what happened to take away the lessons that should be learnt.

The only caveat is the threat of ever taller and fast growing buildings. How these are integrated with heli ops may require some consideration.

[FC80]

I do think Notams are irrelevant in this situation as the pilot was very experienced and familiar with the area!

:hmm:

What have familiarity with an area or experience got to do with NOTAMS?

"Ah well, won't bother reading any NOTAMS today! I do have 20,000 hours after all, plus I've been here before."

One of the daftest statements on this thread, and that's going some, especially from someone who claims to be a professional pilot.

[SilsoeSid]

GF; That is already in place.

SASless; I'm not saying wether the ac was in cloud or not, I am replying to Paces comment; "As stated a witness witnessed the Helicopter come out of cloud what in your pretty brain do you think he was doing there coming out of cloud?"

I think you understand that I am saying that just because someone on the ground saw the ac in cloud, because of the perspective, it doesn't necessarily mean that it was.

[SASless]

Sid,

I fully agree with everything you have said.

It is Pace that I find making some statements that I find to be quite wrong.

Unless i am mistaken....he is a Corporate Jet Pilot and unless I misread his public profile....is not a licensed helicopter pilot.

If my perceptions re his Licenses and background are incorrect I am sure he will respond and tell me where I erred.

[Bronx]

GF It is a fair to say then that a clearance to route via H4 under SVFR is something to be avoided by Thames Radar in the future? If that is what happened.
No, it is not fair to say that. It's a ridiculous over reaction.
Just because something went badly wrong on one occasion doesn't mean the system needs changing.

I guess it's not as ridiculous your theory about what the guy was doing that you posted a few hours ago and got removed by the Mods.

B.

[Pace]

SilsoSid

I must admit I considered the same as you that what may appear to be an aircraft coming out of cloud could be one appearing over the top of a thin layer etc.

But that still does not answer his proximity to the building and turning away into the cloud containing a Crane Arm? I still think He was not where he expected to be?

Sticking blindly to SVFR limits means the collision with the Crane by dipping the Helicopter blades or the Helicopter itself into cloud dense enough to conceal a Crane was itself against the SVFR rules. The Remaining clear of clouds bit!

Pace

[fairflyer]

Video showing tower top obscured by cloud just after accident:

TwnLf73nqrs

Of course heat from fire below may have caused some 'fog' post accident. There's bound to be CCTV footage elsewhere that may have pointed in that direction at 7:59 that morning?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by fairflyer
There's bound to be CCTV footage elsewhere that may have pointed in that direction at 7:59 that morning?

And that is when we shall have evidence as to whether he was in IMC. If he was then the question which has been asked over an again is - why?

From your video it is clear that he would not have seen the crane's tower which appears to be concealed behind the building in relation to his direction of approach.

Visibility beneath the cloud is however flyable (at reduced speed) even if outside the minimum height rules.

[Pace]

Looking at the conditions video it pretty obvious what occurred but ??? draw your own conclusions

From your video it is clear that he would not have seen the crane's tower which appears to be concealed behind the building in relation to his direction of approach.

But not the Arm extending up into the clouds the main Crane body Yes



Pace

[SilsoeSid]

Looks to me that the Vid was taken from Lambeth bridge.
So vis at Lambeth at least 1000m and the cloud base, looking at the tower, around 500ft at Vauxhall.

[ShyTorque]

Unfortunately, if the London helicopter routes were made VFR, rather than SVFR, they would be closed for much of the time.

However, as I said before, but got "shot down" by others, the introduction of a minimum altitude along that stretch would "nudge" pilots to make an early decision to turn around and try something else. i.e. fly no lower than the minimum altitude for the sector because you're likely to bust the 500 foot rule if you do.

I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.

[Pace]

You have advocated or implied that you see flying non-standard altitudes and headings without any ATC traffic separation or Control and entering Cloud for short periods of time as being acceptable.
I suggest you are flat wrong if you really think that

SASless

You are putting words into my mouth! Where have I suggested thats its ok to scud run! or fly in cloud on a SVFR clearance?

Yes I fly corporate jets and no I do not fly Helicopters although would love to! Yes there is a similarity between both operations fixed wing and Helicopters which allows one to make comments about the other!

If you go back a couple of pages you will find a link to the AAIB accident investigation on the tragic Navajo Crash at Welshpool!
Both very experienced and careful pilots one an Ex EasyJet Captain and one a very experienced and cautious multi thousand hour pilot!
Both were very good friends of mine ! Yet there is a strong similarity between the two crashes.
Any pilot SEP in the UK with an IMCR can only fly IMC OCAS and many do albeit to the quadrantle rule in the cruise but not in the climb descent in cloud.

Even IFR today into somewhere like LondonDerry you are flying OCAS without radar control after leaving airways and approaches are procedural and that includes 737s so you are not correct in your assumptions.

FC80

My reference to NOTAMS being little relevance to this incident is that I am sure the pilot was well aware of the tower and cranes from numerous flights and did not need a notam to tell him that!
That fact further reinforces the fact that I do not think he knew exactly where he was and hence notams would not have helped him.
If that makes me ridiculous or unprofessional so be it :ugh:
Are you suggesting that if he had read the notams which he may very well have done he would have been aware of a tower and crane he had passed many times and avoided it?

Pace

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by ShyTorque
I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.

The implication of which is what?

[ShyTorque]

Make your own implications, if you will.

I simply made an observation based on knowledge of the facts, i.e. the regulations.

[SASless]

Pace,

Here is what you said......


I am a realist and what you should do and what people do can be separate!
Imagine pilot A on a SVFR clearance to Jersey over the sea? He is VFR and VMC at 2000 feet 25 miles out! The weather at Jersey is 3000 overcast with viz within SVFR limits
He sees an isolated patch of cloud across his path descending to 800 feet over the sea
Will he descend to 700 feet or decide to punch it For 3 minutes maintaining 2000 feet ?
My guess is some would descend while others would loose sight of the sea for a few minutes!

If you had pointed out the fact that to "punch it for three minutes maintaining 2000 feet" would be illegal....then I would not see you advocating doing that.

As you give equal weight to both options....we have to assume you see nothing wrong with the one despite it being improper to enter cloud.

To follow your example.....what if the guy punches in....and the weather deteriorates as he trundles towards Jersey? Now you have a situation where the Pilot has violated his clearance for if he is on a SVFR Clearance as you state.....he is now IMC but flying SVFR which we all know is wrong.

So when you had a chance to support proper techniques and rule following.....you did not.

Thus, I still say you are putting out bum poop without regard to the fact we have fledgling aviators who read what is posted here and we experienced folk have a moral obligation to advocate for safe, legal techniques and procedures whenever we post.

As you seem to have drawn some flack over your post about NOTAMS usage....perhaps you might want to go back and review what you have said and see if there are any changes you might wish to make.

It does not matter what license or experience one has when it comes to posting here....all are welcome. We just need to remember what we say here can have an influence over what others think might be useful in their flying....and make sure we pass on solidly safe correct information.

As to NOTAMS....one as PIC....has an absolute requirement to check all current NOTAMS that might relate to the flight one is about to undertake. I don't care if you got there ten times a day, seven days a week. If your flight takes place after new NOTAMS are issued....you have to check them again to make sure nothing has changed since you last read them.

That is being a Professional Pilot....and that is why you earn the big bucks.

[Pace]

You have advocated or implied that you see flying non-standard altitudes and headings without any ATC traffic separation or Control and entering Cloud for short periods of time as being acceptable.
I suggest you are flat wrong if you really think that

SASless

You are being grossly unfair in your assumptions! Where have I said its fine to punch in and out of cloud I am simply stating things I know happen and have from the past.
99% of my flying today is in private jets in CAS the last SVFR clearance I took was ages ago.
So please do not be so arrogant rude and presumptious in your posts!!!

As you seem to have drawn some flack over your post about NOTAMS usage....perhaps you might want to go back and review what you have said and see if there are any changes you might wish to make.

Again where have I suggested that you should not check the Notams before a flight please direct me?
If you have evidence that he missed a Notam which contributed to this accident state it!

You are Making insinuations which are absolute Bollox

So he obeyed all the rules was not flying in cloud was vmc per regulations so he must have seen the crane arm which was not in cloud and which he did not enter with any part of the Helicopter and the accident never happened in your perfect world!!!
Great fantastic contribution!!Get real



Pace

[ShyTorque]

Looks like a number of new NOTAMs for London airspace have been posted w.e.f today, referring to cranes.

[pilot and apprentice]

SilsoeSid
Pace;
If a cloud is positioned in between an aircraft and an observer in the ground, it doesn't necessarily mean that the ac is in cloud.. although it would appear to the observer on the ground that it is.

Do you need a picture?

I'm glad I wasn't the only one thinking this. I can't count the number of times someone on the ground has been adamant that they knew what my vis from the cockpit was, and better than I did! Sometimes better, sometimes worse.

SAS: I have a lot of respect but:

I have done quite a bit of blundering around in cloud and fog OCAS in Third World Countries but we always had some sort of Traffic Separation methods even if done by the Operators alone and without benefit of Government run ATC services.

Like Canada? Both offshore and in the north it happens all the time. We talk to each other.

At this point no one KNOWS if the helicopter was "IN" cloud.

Yes, but many are stating unequivocally that it was. You have sounded like you were headed that way yourself.

You have advocated or implied that you see flying non-standard altitudes and headings without any ATC traffic separation or Control and entering Cloud for short periods of time as being acceptable.

Quadrantals aren't governing at that level and the SVFR clearance is ATC involvement. There is nothing inherently flawed with SVFR. The opposite traffic would be on freq if ATC was willing to clear it.

Pace: I'll just address this one quote amongst the many.

So he obeyed all the rules was not flying in cloud was vmc per regulations so he must have seen the crane arm which was not in cloud and which he did not enter with any part of the Helicopter and the accident never happened in your perfect world!!!

In the cluttered low-level environment that helicopters are forced to play in, the crane does not need to be in cloud to be missed. Non-contrasting colours, poor depth perception in reducing vis, expectation: all can contribute to an 'obvious' hazard being missed. Even something as simple as the difficulty focusing on an object in the foreground (not the resting focal point). We've all learned about this stuff in the basic PPL/CPL/ATPL theory.

In busy airspace the regulators generally seperate fixed and rotary traffic by pushing the rotary lower. It is absolutely a different environment than 90% of fixed-wing work, I'd say closer to 100% of airline/corporate. We are accustomed to departing, arriving, landing and operating in cluttered environments

It is painfully easy to miss the manmade objects in an urban environment (towers, cranes, etc) which is why I always appreciate flying with a second set of eyes and prefer to stay well above it. I have had days where the vis was great, our reporting/turn point was the tower, and we still couldn't pick it out of the ground clutter until the last minute. Better lights? Maybe, I certainly don't know for sure.

If I look at the whole incident from the outside, the only time I am unsure I would have done the same was at the very beginning. But then, I don't know the client, the job he was on, or the area well enough to judge the decision to go.

[AnFI]

SASless speaks great sense esp thread 593 regarding staying visual at the expense of other 'niceties' ...

Pressure of regulation may have led to making less than optimal flight decisions 400ft would have been easy (and obviously legal in the USA, legal in UK with 'rule interpretation measures')

From the photos the local vis is clearly in excess of 3-4km (perhaps 7km) but the cloud is blotchy, blue sky in places and some lower cloud - to stay in good/easy visual conditions would have required being ruder with height and he may have felt undue pressure not to break too many eggs for his omelet.

When you are trying to compromise between the rules and safety it is sometimes easy to put too much effort into rule obeyance. This was a polite and respectful guy being too polite and respectful - not wanting to dissapoint the punter trying to do his best for everyone - not wanting to abort Batt having got it agreed (not wanting to mess them all about). A great guy trying his best to do his best - 1 frequency change away from pleasing nearly everyone.

You can tell he was trying not to be too 'rude' because he didn't land at the (other) HeliPad which he passed laterally 400ft from at only about 800ft as he joined the river.

His head might have been 75% full of rule mitigation.

I recon the top of the building would have been visible (perhaps just in but visible) and being avoided (adequately) with a very hard to spot, spindly little jib pointing, most unfeasibly, at you with it's mast obscured by the building with no flashing light and very little relative motion with the background town, painted in camouflage black against black streets. (of course a flashing light is visible through 50m vis cloud, if it is turned on)

People talk nonsense about the flight being difficult - it was in beautiful blue sky from Red to Elstree - with a 'look' at Elstree establishing non-viability and an intended return in the blue sky to Red (the unread txt that Red was clear was good and useful info) - the dip into Batt was suggested by a txt from the "Client", declaring Batt as "OPEN" which can be interpreted as open in all respects inc wx.

Knee jerk re-action is politically demanded - although the CAA know that is unlikely to be appropriate, great pressure to 'do something'... ban private pilots I suppose?

[SASless]

PA,

I have posed a couple of questions along the line of in cloud or not....and listed a couple of options that would explain the collision. What I have not done is suggest I know what happened. I did suggest I was leaning a particular way but that is all I meant....as I firmly believe we shall never know what actually happened.

I would not call Canada a Third World Country....but as you say....out in the middle of nowhere, the kinds of places helicopters do most of their work....we have to rely upon ourselves quite often to organize our flying to ensure we don't run into one another.

When addressing Pace's Jersey SVFR example....I was pointing out his suggestion that some might just punch into Cloud assuming it will be for just a minute or two....or that the weather will facilitate a return to visual flight at some point was not a wise idea. The issue is not the SVFR Clearance....but the going IMC that is the issue. Accepting a SVFR clearance requires you to maintain cloud separation and visibility and to not do so is improper. If one cannot maintain the required vis and cloud separation....then requesting an IFR Clearance is the correct step.

[Lonewolf_50]

In Re SASless:
I learned over the years that one Rule applies to such dangerous
activity.....never lose sight of the ground....and always maximize your forward visibility and fly as slowly as you must to be able to STOP, HOVER, REVERSE COURSE, and AVOID OBSTACLES and HAZARDS.
That's a piece of SVFR wisdom that kept me out of a few jams. SVFR usually meant to me to slow down a little, or even a lot, else I'd outrun my visibility and be reacting/behind the aircraft, rather than trying to say ahead of it.
FL
Off the top of my head I'd estimate from spending five years doing these investigations, day in day out, that 90% of all height estimates were out by a minimum of 1,000ft. It's not only the lay public that can't accurately guess altitude from the ground, its professionals as well, though in general terms they were often more 'realistic'.
I have had numerous occasions to tell ignorant members of the public that "he's flying too low" observations were utter horseapples. On more than one occasion, I returned with VFR sectionals and OPS charts to show them what I meant, in once case my Father in Law.

Fairflyer, thanks for that video link.

Shy Torque, thanks for pointing this out.
I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.
Putting on an accident investigation hat:
if Mr Barnes was familiar with the area and typical ops in this part of London, such a hold may have been yet another "not quite right" element of his flight, adding to his mental task load for the mission.
An FI: how fast we he going as he made that last turn?
That's a critical question in trying to answer SAS's core questions about "did he see/not see, and why/why not?" back a few pages.

I suspect the AAIB, from radar track and perhaps other data, will be able to reconstruct that. The implication (for our non-SVFR helicopter flying colleagues on this board) of that data point is related to SASless' point on SVFR at the top of this post.

There is bountiful learning to do in this thread.

As to "something must be done" considerations:

If all rules were followed, and a mishap still occurred, mayhap a rule revision would be called for. (** caveat)

If all rules were NOT followed, then changing a rule may not be a suitable response to such a mishap.

caveat = ** The lighting of obstructions, however, is a fair point to ponder. Do the rules on that requirement suffice?

Questions for the AAIB to hopefully answer:

1. Had the crane operator been to work on time, would there have been different lighting already set? (Guessing no, but I have no idea).

2. Are most lighting rules (for urban buildings and cranes and such) aimed at "day/night" interface? (Lights in fog can "blossom" on you a bit ... )

It's been years since I flew a river route in a major city.
More years since I did so SVFR.

RIP, Mr Barnes. :sad:

[AnFI]

An FI: Quote:
how fast we he going as he made that last turn?

not a quote from me

[Exo.]

I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.

He wasn't though. The clearance according to the AAIB bulletin, as given in that bulletin is:

“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.

Which is the standard clearance to remain outside of Heathrow's Class A airspace until appropriate permissions are obtained. The controller also widens it for the aircraft to extend east to London Bridge if needed, which is very normal, although the weather was worse, I believe, to the east.

What is curious is that the controller does not comment on the fact that the aircraft appears to adopt a hold within Heathrow airspace, prior to being given the clearance to head to Battersea, and it is in the act of turning back to the East, having been given the freq change that the routing goes awry. The aircraft avoids Vauxhall bridge entirely south west bound, and even avoids overflying Millbank house (just south of Thames House - MI5), but then turns back to the east moments before Chelsea Bridge, at about the time of the clearance to go to Battersea.

The controller's phrase of Cleared to Battersea is also an interesting one, in that it doesn't specify a zone entry clearance into the London CTR (Class A), as the rest of the routing (back from Elstree) is via the City CTR (which I think was closed at that time, and therefore called the London CTR as well, confusingly).

It is, as can be seen happens to the best of us, a tragic chain of events that lead to this result.

[SilsoeSid]

Quote:
I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.

He wasn't though. The clearance according to the AAIB bulletin, as given in that bulletin is:

“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.

Which is the standard clearance to remain outside of Heathrow's Class A airspace until appropriate permissions are obtained. The controller also widens it for the aircraft to extend east to London Bridge if needed, which is very normal, although the weather was worse, I believe, to the east.


This is the problem with posts that quote regulations without a link. Hopefully this link to he AIP helps.
http://va-transaero.ru/files/charts/EGLL.pdf


Page 24
EGLL AD 2.22 – FLIGHT PROCEDURES
10 Helicopter Routes in the London Control Zone and London/City Control Zone


Looking at the heli lanes map on page 42, Vauxhall is a compulsory reporting point, because its triangle doesn't have an 'H' in it, it is fair to say that it is a point at which you wouldn't normally expect to be asked to hold.

Page 25 confirms this;
Note 1: There are no Holding Points on H4 east of London Heliport. The nearest Holding Point is at Greenwich Marshes, outside the 'Specified Area'.

Also on page 25;
Note 4: No helicopters to hold on that portion of H4 that lies between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridges. This does not apply to traffic operating under flight priority Category A or B.

[NorthSouth]

lonewolf 50: If all rules were NOT followed, then changing a rule may not be a suitable response to such a mishapIndeed. But finding ways to improve compliance with the existing rules may well be.
NS

[SilsoeSid]

Anyone else spot this;

“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.


Page 25;
Note 4: No helicopters to hold on that portion of H4 that lies between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridges. This does not apply to traffic operating under flight priority Category A or B.

[SilsoeSid]

Exo, are you saying that it is a 'standard clearance' to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster, when the AIP says helicopters are not to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster?.....and that pilots comply?

Do pilots given that hold ever question it?

[Pace]

When addressing Pace's Jersey SVFR example....I was pointing out his suggestion that some might just punch into Cloud assuming it will be for just a minute or two....or that the weather will facilitate a return to visual flight at some point was not a wise idea. The issue is not the SVFR Clearance....but the going IMC that is the issue. Accepting a SVFR clearance requires you to maintain cloud separation and visibility and to not do so is improper. If one cannot maintain the required vis and cloud separation....then requesting an IFR Clearance is the correct step.

SASLess

Starting again with you ;) I have a lot of multi engine piston time over many places but a lot in Northern, Southern Ireland and Scotland.
Some was IFR some was IFR OCAS, Some was into airports with approaches some not.
Now I fly totally jets IFR so a very regulated environment and I have to say the safest environment.
I have also flown some ferry work but never singles as I am not that brave :ok:
As to Helicopters sadly not and in this case not a situation a fixed wing pilot cannot contribute too.
But touch wood I am still here while several of my friends are not so I have a good guardian Angel or have done something right in the past or been plain lucky.
I discussed flying OCAS or even SVFR and what some pilots do to get the job done.
For that I am accused of being some sort of cowboy or minima buster by 757 driver and yourself.
Had PB flown to the SVFR limits and been visual at all times this accident would not have occurred.
Witnesses stated he popped out of the clouds and veered away from the building.
I acknowledge witnesses can get things wrong and popping out of the clouds could be something very different.
Putting that aside we do know the arm off the crane was hidden in cloud.
He did not see it and placed the Helicopter partially into that cloud enough to collide with the Crane Arm.
So for that fact alone he entered cloud on a SVFR clearance.
SVFR are limits that you can legally operate to in that airspace.
Sadly SVFR limits are defined weather is not so it is perfectly feasible to find yourself below those limits and to have to extricate yourself by either turning back! (which does not always work) Or to declare a problem, ask for a climb and as you put it an IFR clearance.
PB was a very respected experienced pilot! The reason I talk about cloud punching etc is not to condone it but to realize that it does go on and probably did so in this case with tragic consequences.

It is all to easy to say you shouldnt do this or that or regulation xyz says bla bla bla the fact is that pilots do do this or that some intentionally some not and in this case with awful and sad consequences.

Pace

[JimBall]

Slightly shocked by the sudden rush of NOTAMs for high obstacles and cranes in London, released yesterday. Someone get the WD40 for the stable door hinges......

One is an "unverified" for a crane in Leadenhall. "Unverified". After what happened less than 2 weeks ago?

And the one for the crane at St George's - which must be the crane they have in to repair the damage - is NOTAMed as "unlit". :sad:

[SASless]

Will the CAA now review every "new" NOTAM re Cranes to see how long the Cranes were present BEFORE being reported to determine if a reporting Violation has occurred?

[Pace]

SASLess

This was one of the major reasons I got involved in the other thread!
I live in London not far from Vauxhall Bridge and fairly close to Tower Bridge.
I was frankly horrified at the Skyline of Cranes.
After the accident I was more horrified examining them at dusk! Some correctly lit! Some totally unlit, some with one structure lit while an even longer arm unlit!

The public feeling on the ground was that inadequate lighting was partially to blame for this accident.
I am not surprised in the slightest that now there is a scurry of activity in Notams (pretty useless if no Notam existed)
I am not surprised that there is a scurry of activity fixing defective or missing lights on the Cranes.
Are the regulations sufficient regarding how these structures which exceed the tower block buildings are lit? I have no doubts the answer is NO!
Pilots even the best are not perfect and all it takes is one minor error or distraction to have disasterous consequences.
No a pilot should be visual at all times but situations arise where for one reason or another they get in a mess.
They either know they are in a mess or are totally oblivious to that fact until too late as in this case.
High intensity lighting up these structures and not only on the top MAY have alerted the pilot to his mistake.
I stress MAY but that is better than no lighting which most certainly did not alert him.
Are there illegal compliances with the cranes I have little doubt over that!

Regulations alone are not sufficient! You should not do this so you will not!
I believe the average motorist breaks 32 regulations on the road a day?
Regulations are fixed weather is not

Pace

[SilsoeSid]

Ref my last,

It would seem that Vauxhall along with Chelsea changed from being solely a 'compulsory reporting point', to a reporting point 'where holding may be required' sometime last year;

12 Jan '12 chart
http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/EG_AD_2_EGLL_3-2_en_2012-01-12.pdf

18 Oct '12 chart
http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/EG_AD_3_EGLW_4-1_en_2012-10-18.pdf



However, in reference to the lastest amendments to the AIP, why was PB told to "..HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES.."

When the AD 2.EGLL-28 UNITED KINGDOM AIP 10 Jan 2013 (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/AIP/AD/EG_AD_2_EGLL_en_2013-01-10.pdf) clearly states;

Page 27
9 Non-IFR Helicopter Flights in the London CTR
(e) Holding
(i) Non-IFR helicopters, particularly those using London Heathrow or the routes close to it, may be required to hold at
any of the locations on the route, shown in column 1 at paragraph 11 and on the illustration at AD 2-EGLL-3-2 except
on that portion of H4 that lies between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridge.

Page 31;
UNITED KINGDOM AIP AD 2.EGLL-31 10 Jan 2013
Note 4: No helicopters to hold on that portion of H4 that lies between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridges. This does not apply to
traffic operating under flight priority Category A or B.

:confused:

[Devil 49]

I don't recall it being mentioned anywhere in this thread, so I'll bring it up: Pilots (airplane and helicopter both) hit towers in CAVU conditions fairly frequently. Pilots hit obstacles they are familiar with in CAVU conditions. It happens to pilots of all experience levels.
If aircraft fly into pylons in the most advantageous situation imaginable, the adding poor obstacle marking/lighting, a complicated visual field that overwhelms with signal, a high workload planning constant changes in restrictive air space, weather issues, the risk becomes significant that "all the holes in the swiss cheese could line up" fatally.

Whatever else I take from this discussion, it's a reminder that accidents happen to better pilots than I am.

[Exo.]

Silsoe,

When we're routing westbound along the river from City CTR into the London CTR, we are often given a clearance limit of Vauxhall Bridge as it sits on the boundary between Class D and A. Most of the time, however, the clearance is lifted by the time we arrive at Vauxhall to provide our onward routing.

You're absolutely right about the textual data for EGLL though (EGLL Textual Data (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/AIP/AD/EG_AD_2_EGLL_en_2013-01-10.pdf)) and the fact that it specifies holds will not be given between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridges.

But whether City is active or not, I'll often receive a "Clearance Limit of Vauxhall Bridge" - typically after receiving London Bridge as a Clearance limit (which is standard for travelling eastbound as well when City is in use, particularly on 09).

Interesting find, and in answer to your final question, in my experience, no, is the simple answer. I have never heard a pilot question a hold at Vauxhall. Nor a hold when travelling eastbound, in which due to a longer delay, or multiple helicopters on the route (have had five before holding west of London Bridge), that adds in the allowance to hold between Vauxhall and London Bridge.

[SilsoeSid]

Abeam the eye @ 1500', Vauxhall bridge was called 'in sight' and the hold between Vauxhall and Westminster reply from ATC was made.

In fig 3 of the SB you can see that abeam Lambeth bridge, a turn away from the river was made direct to Chelsea. Once on the river a 270 was made to route down the river towards Vauxhall where a right turn was made.

Is it possible that PB thought that Chelsea bridge was Vauxhall and was holding between Chelsea and Vauxhall instead of Vauxhall and Westminster?

[ShyTorque]

Sid, re your post#674,

That's the information I referred to in my post #475 at 17:24 on Jan 24th.

And again #653 at 17:47 on 28th Jan.

I'm glad to see at least one other contributor is awake, actually looking to find pertinent facts and not just speculating out of ignorance or misconception. Well done!

[ShyTorque]

Exo,

I said: I'm quite surprised that no-one else has noticed that this helicopter was directed to hold on the one stretch of the Thames specifically outlined in the regulations for the helicopter routes where helicopters pilots are not to expect to be held.


You replied:

He wasn't though. The clearance according to the AAIB bulletin, as given in that bulletin is:

“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.

Which is the standard clearance to remain outside of Heathrow's Class A airspace until appropriate permissions are obtained.

Not according to the rules in the AIP for Route H4.

[Exo.]

True Shy, but from an experience point of view, it is a standard hold expectation.

Whether as a result of the amendment due to Battersea's LFA (see Sid's link (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/EG_AD_3_EGLW_4-1_en_2012-10-18.pdf) with the applicable Hold points identified, including London Bridge), or because it is what controllers are used to giving despite the AIP guidance; it is what I am used to hearing on H4 westbound toward Battersea.

Which was more the point I was making, albeit without clarifying the fact I was using my experience of the routes.

[ShyTorque]

True Shy, but from an experience point of view, it is a standard hold expectation.

So do you operate under priority category A, or category B? :confused:

[SASless]

This argument about rules, holds, and clearances is fine.

Can we connect all that is being said to what happened the day of the collision with the crane?

Are we dealing with trivia or does it all have a actual role to play in what happened?

How easy is it to identify the various bridges....are they unique enough in design, location to buildings, or in any other way, that there is no confusing them?

Is there a required bit of training before being allowed to use the Heli-Lanes?

Should there be?

[Pace]

Is there a required bit of training before being allowed to use the Heli-Lanes?

From a non Heli pilot angle but from
One familiar with the Cranes a few points !
There is certain training which would be beneficial!
Diagrams of the various Cranes and designs in use as well as their operations, heights and lighting as well as location would be of use.
Maybe a good VFR familiarisation of the route and landmarks which could be done on video!
PB was very familiar with the route and no training could teach you to operate in minimal VFR conditions maybe a better understanding and awareness of the Crane construction may have helped him in being aware of the long arm off the main Crane construction ?

Pace

[Old Age Pilot]

"Diagrams of the various Cranes and designs in use as well as their operations"

Oh for goodness sakes. Talk about ott!

I suppose if the crew that hit the tree knew more about the particular species they may have been able to avoid it!

[Anthony Supplebottom]

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e105/CommentCrazyGirl/Smileys%20Action/Office%20Computer/th_sleep3.gif
......................

[Pace]

I suppose if the crew that hit the tree knew more about the particular species they may have been able to avoid it!

Now there's a good idea

:ok::ok::ok:

[Andy Mayes]

as the rest of the routing (back from Elstree) is via the City CTR (which I think was closed at that time, and therefore called the London CTR as well, confusingly).

London City was open (they opened at 0630) however, AIUI movements were reduced due to de-icing because of the FZFG (visibility at London City was 700m at the time of the accident, and 600m when PB departed from Redhill).

The City CTR (and CTA) are H24 and are always called "the City Control Zone (and the City Control Area)".

It used to be the case (prior to 9/11) that when London City were closed, the City CTR (no CTA existed back then) reverted to Class G but it was never called the London CTR. You maybe confused because outside the hours of Thames Radar and Heathrow Radar, the Controlling Authority becomes Heathrow Director.

[SASless]

From a non Heli pilot angle

From there.....it ends.

Pace....you have reached the point where perhaps Rumour and News might be the better place for you to discuss this accident.

You have no basis from which to consider helicopter flight on the London Heli-Lanes as you have never done it....you are not qualified to do it....and bluntly....you just don't know what you are talking about when you try to inject yourself into such a discussion.

This is a hard discussion to follow even when you know what it is all about....as evidenced by the back and forth by qualified professional helicopter pilots who actually fly in this environment.

I am not suggesting you are not a professional aviator....but your background and current employment does not give you a basis to comment upon much of what is being discussed.

[SilsoeSid]

They say a picture paints a thousand words.

http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/London1.jpg



Link to Special Bulletin (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S1-2013%20G-CRST.pdf)
Link to LONDON HELIPORT INBOUND/OUTBOUND FLIGHT PROCEDURES Chart (http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-B2E85AA5F9C095607E638C7E6E2C694B/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/Charts/AD/AIRAC/EG_AD_3_EGLW_4-1_en_2012-10-18.pdf)
Link to AIP Information for London Heliport - EGLW (http://www.nats-uk.ead-it.com/public/index.php%3Foption=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=173&Itemid=64.html)

[industry insider]

Pace......I have not read such rubbish regarding crane familiarization.

[Richard Westnot]

Pace's post's are usually well received and balanced.

I don't understand his posts here and agree with what SASless has said.

I have only known 1 previous carp post from Pace and that was a forwarded message.

Pace - shudup ;)

[deefer dog]

As a non heli driver I had intended to keep out of this, but I really do think that Pace has hit the nail on the head.

This really is something that should be included in the flight craning syllabus!

[SASless]

As a non-Heli Driver....please do stay out this please. You want to contribute...please go to Rumour and News....you'll find a warmer welcome there.

Now Chaps and Chapettes.....where were we?

[JimBall]

Barring any further solid information, I'd say this is exhausted SASless. SiloeSid's graphic tells the story clearly - it's just devoid of the actual weather over the Thames that morning.

G-CRST's failure to hold between Westminster & VB - and not going east as far as London Bridge as offered - would seem to indicate that he was having immense vis problems. (I'm not certain what the controller was seeing on the screen at 0758 when the tx was "you can make it quite a wide hold etc." G-CRST was already west of VB and into Class A. Did the controller see this? The radio message doesn't really match the circs.)

We also need to know who G-CRST monitored or spoke to on the northern Elstree-bound route. If you're going to overhead Batt at 0740, wouldn't you put in a call as a safety? It's not in the AAIB log.

And Elstree - doesn't open until 0900. So no tower, no weather - except for client telling him that his enroute to Elstree was bad. Could have diverted to Denham (0800 open) - but maybe couldn't see a route clear?

Let the AAIB finish their work.

[Bronx]

SiloeSid's graphic tells the story clearly - it's just devoid of the actual weather over the Thames that morning. So, apart from that ........!
Apart from that Mrs Lincoln, how did you enjoy the play?

We also need to know who G-CRST monitored or spoke to on the northern Elstree-bound route. If you're going to overhead Batt at 0740, wouldn't you put in a call as a safety? It's not in the AAIB log.Why do "we" (you) need to know if he did those things when he was heading north to Elstree?
Seems like you and some others here are trying to find as many ways you can to try to crucify the already dead guy?
All part of the so-called 'learning' ethos of Pprune of course. Like hell. :rolleyes:

Let the AAIB finish their work. If the AAIB have been following the thread I guess the final report will out in a few weeks, allowing time for making diagrams, checking for typos etc.
Some of you guys have given them all the answers.

[jumpseater]

JB(I'm not certain what the controller was seeing on the screen at 0758 when the tx was "you can make it quite a wide hold etc.")

Perhaps nothing, i.e. no traffic likely to conflict, and offered a more flexible hold pattern being mindful of poor wx in the vicinity.
'Wide' in this context as I interpret it may mean that if there were a delay in co-ordinating the handover or subsequent LW approach the pilot would have a more relaxed elongated holding pattern. I'm thinking if referring to an east west 'swathe' (authorised to LB 0758z) rather than the much shorter VB-WB originally passed. This would reduce workload/co-ordination/transmissions if the aircraft needed a changed hold pattern due wx, whilst co-ordination was taking place between the two units. The controller may also have been working/co-ordinating other aircraft and anticipating a tx sequence in advance, hence they make their life a bit easier giving the a/c more flexibility within a defined space, reducing workload and transmissions.

Alternatively as the a/c was a twin it could refer to a wider than normal north-south swathe of the VB-LB hold authorised for operational flexibility.

There may be clarification in the final report of this aspect.

[Gordy]

deefer dog

This really is something that should be included in the flight craning syllabus!

:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

I thought it was funny...... and I is a hili pielet....... :cool:

[pilot and apprentice]

Sorry SAS, I think we are more on the same page than I thought.

SASLess

Starting again with you http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/wink2.gif I have a lot of multi engine piston time over many places but a lot in Northern, Southern Ireland and Scotland.
Some was IFR some was IFR OCAS, Some was into airports with approaches some not.
Now I fly totally jets IFR so a very regulated environment and I have to say the safest environment.
I have also flown some ferry work but never singles as I am not that brave http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif
As to Helicopters sadly not and in this case not a situation a fixed wing pilot cannot contribute too.
But touch wood I am still here while several of my friends are not so I have a good guardian Angel or have done something right in the past or been plain lucky.
I discussed flying OCAS or even SVFR and what some pilots do to get the job done.
For that I am accused of being some sort of cowboy or minima buster by 757 driver and yourself.
Had PB flown to the SVFR limits and been visual at all times this accident would not have occurred.
Witnesses stated he popped out of the clouds and veered away from the building.
I acknowledge witnesses can get things wrong and popping out of the clouds could be something very different.
Putting that aside we do know the arm off the crane was hidden in cloud.
He did not see it and placed the Helicopter partially into that cloud enough to collide with the Crane Arm.
So for that fact alone he entered cloud on a SVFR clearance.
SVFR are limits that you can legally operate to in that airspace.
Sadly SVFR limits are defined weather is not so it is perfectly feasible to find yourself below those limits and to have to extricate yourself by either turning back! (which does not always work) Or to declare a problem, ask for a climb and as you put it an IFR clearance.
PB was a very respected experienced pilot! The reason I talk about cloud punching etc is not to condone it but to realize that it does go on and probably did so in this case with tragic consequences.

It is all to easy to say you shouldnt do this or that or regulation xyz says bla bla bla the fact is that pilots do do this or that some intentionally some not and in this case with awful and sad consequences.

Pace I've highlighted 3 sections above Pace.

1. But you continue to. This is not a high-level IFR environment and the assumptions you are making are flawed.

2. As I (and others) have stated before, one does not need to be blinded or in cloud to fail to see, or even to strike, man-made structures of this type.

3. Another assumption. Looking at the various pictures posted here, and reading the various 'eyewitness' accounts by ppruners, I fail to see proof of a defined ceiling below the height of the crane. This forum does not have the information to establish the in-flight visibility. Again, the AAIB should have the data to make a real decision about that.

4. That is the mother of all assumptions right there. I can't think of anyone I have ever flown with that would deliberately fly through a cloud at that level. Failed to see an obstruction, yes. In cloud, no.

================

As for ATC giving him leeway (the other posts): on those occassions when I have been in the lone (or close to lone) a/c in the airspace due to an issue like weather or some other hazard, the controllers have always tried to let us do our work, then wait until it was finished to ask why we did it that way. Unless, of course, they saw a conflict.

================

edited to add reply to Pace, who cannot post here:

From AAIB report:
Witness and CCTV evidence collected to date indicate
that the top of the crane and the top of the building to
which it was attached were obscured by cloud at the time
of impact
In my experience operating to rigs and elevated platforms/buildings, the fact that a structure is obscured from ground level isn't a guarantee that from a higher vantage, it is in a cloud. Mist and haze aren't as rigidly edged as that.

Because of this, I don't feel it is correct to make an absolute judgement so quickly.

We will have to disagree I think, but thanks for taking the effort to talk to me.

Take care and fly safe.

[Richard Westnot]

After careful consideration, my client has been advised to refrain from any further discussion on this board. ;)

[SilsoeSid]

SASless;
How easy is it to identify the various bridges....are they unique enough in design, location to buildings, or in any other way, that there is no confusing them?

A very good question.

Just to recap, JB called visual with Vauxhall abeam 'the eye', and then adjusted course to the right towards Chelsea, but they look totally different, don't they!

Vauxhall
http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/VauxhallBridge2.png

Chelsea
http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/ChelseaBridge.png


As you can see, quite different, HOWEVER looking at the bigger picture...

http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/Bridges.png

...you will notice that just to the East of Chelsea bridge is the rail bridge.
What difference does that make, you may be thinking..


Thanks to google street view;

Vauxhall Bridge
http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/VauxhallBridge.png

Chelsea Rail Bridge
http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/ChelseaRail.png


No Bronx, we aren't trying to crucify anyone, just trying to understand why these things like this happen!

[Helinut]

A regular pilot will also use the known surroundings of bridges to help to ID them.

[SilsoeSid]

Helinut;
A regular pilot will also use the known surroundings of bridges to help to ID them.

...if those known surroundings can be seen!

[cats_five]

So what do they look like from the altitude he was flying at?

[SilsoeSid]

So what do they look like from the altitude he was flying at?

...the same perhaps!

If it's getting down to bridge and surroundings recognition, surely flying over the Houses of Parliament or even the direction of the river, might have helped with the positional awareness!

[SASless]

The second Vauxhall Bridge Photo holds a lot of interest to me.

The Jib is sticking up in the approximate position it was the day of the collision.

Approaching from the River...it would have been very hard to see in the general weather conditions prevailing that Morning.

The Chelsea bridges (road and rail) make them easy to ID as compared to the single Vauxhall Bridge, Add in the direction the river runs at each of them and again they should be easy to pick out from one another IF one is really familiar with the area or is using some sort of Map, Chart, GPS in with a Map Scale that clearly depicts the River and its bends and turns.....and one has the visibility and time to compare the Map/Chart/GPS to what is seen outside.

As Rule One is Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.....we know the flying part was being done, and to some degree the navigating was being done....but with evidence that there might have been a bit of confusion as to exactly where the aircraft was....and the communication was going on though with some delay as approval for entering the Battersea Control Zone was being negotiated.

I fall back to asking myself....why was the aircraft so low before asking for clearance to Battersea....when loitering on top would have been so much easier and safer.

[24Carrot]

So what do they look like from the altitude he was flying at?

Not a great pic, (sorry about the headset), but here is Chelsea Bridge and the Railway bridge, with Vauxhall Bridge in the distance.

http://i.imgur.com/rEClcmt.jpg

[SilsoeSid]

So what do they look like from the altitude he was flying at?

Something like...

http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/Londonsbridges.jpg

Starting from the top of the picture, the order of the bridges following the Thames downstream is;

Chelsea
Chelsea Rail
Vauxhall
Lambeth
Westminster
Hungerford Rail
Waterloo

Now then, which of those bridges looks most like;

http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/VauxhallBridge2.png

[ShyTorque]

There are many bridges across the Thames and speaking for myself, I don't hold a "bridge recognition library" in my head.

I rely more on the Helicopter Routes chart and the lie of the land around the bridges (or whatever) to identify the reporting points. At ground level, of course it's relatively easy, but from "standard operating altitudes" it becomes far less so, especially if the visibility is marginal. If you are not able to see the lie of the land, identifying a bridge in isolation through a gap in the mist or cloud could be very difficult.

[John R81]

SSS - what height was your top picture taken from? I ask because it looks to me to be a little higher than the 800 - 1500ft range that PB might have been in.

[chopperchappie]

Given the circumstances, I think it would be very easy to call one bridge another if you only got a glimpse through poor weather.

When you fly London in clear visibility there are so many other features that make the bridges more obvious (like the Houses of Parlaiment, the Eye etc).

There are the obvious bloopers, like many people thing that Tower Bridge is London Bridge 'cos it sounds more logical that the fancy bridge would be called London Bridge. I also often use an iPad with AirNavPro and Sky Demon as ANP with the helichart loaded serves a good reference point.

But I probably couldn't be flown down down the river by someone else with my eyes closed and open them on command for one second and know which bridge I was looking at if I couldn't see the lay of the land around.


Someone asked about training, well there is a video by NATS/CAA that is downloadable from the flight safety page that shows and actually flies the different routes.

Having said all of that - I would not do anything tricky and complicated for the first time without doing it with someone else who was more experienced and lest we forget there are both PPLs that have flown through London tens/hundreds of times and high hour FI/CPLs that have never done it because they don't like the thought of it.

The ticket and number of hours a pilot has, may give a huge amount of experience to draw on but doesn't necessarily help in all circumstances.

[SilsoeSid]

JohnR81, I've no idea of the height, however it gives a good picture of where everything is.

One question it must raise is, given the sequence of events...

At 0757 hrs, G-CRST was abeam the London Eye at 1,500 ft and the pilot said: “ROCKET 2, I CAN ACTUALLY SEE VAUXHALL, IF I COULD MAYBE HEAD DOWN TO H3… H4 SORRY” ... The ATC controller replied: “ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.

...with Vauxhall in sight and descending overhead Westminster Palace, why deviate to the right and continue to a point further down the river than cleared, rather than maintain the heading towards Vauxhall and establish the cleared hold between Vauxhall and Westminster?

When the right turn was commenced, the track line was only 200m at most from the river. This means to me that although Vauxhall Bridge was in sight, the part of the river running back towards Westminster only 200m away wasn't...!

[SASless]

Why the descent to begin with....why not linger on top and wait for the clearance to proceed?



“ROCKET 2, I CAN ACTUALLY SEE VAUXHALL.....,

Which means to me there was other landmarks he could not see.

Clearance into the Zone where he intended to land would give him access to the entire Zone and once over/very near the Landing Site he could have looked for visual contact with the Heliport/Environs then do a descent.

Was there some reason he could not stay at 1500 feet that caused him to elect to descend where he did?

[A310bcal]

I have read and re-read the posts and prelim AAIB report regarding this tragic accident and after the past few days of comments am hesitant to offer my thoughts amongst the helicopter fraternity for fear of offending anyone.
But , without prejudice, I offer my idea of a possible reason for the flight ending up where it did.
When passing abeam the London Eye, and looking up ahead, PB seeing a gap up ahead,mis-identified the Chelsea Railway Bridge for Vauxhall. Having been cleared to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster, he headed straight down towards Chelsea R/Bridge thinking he was on track for Vauxhall. As he reached the river he went straight into the holding pattern which he would presumably fly visually with reference to the river, routing back towards the next bridge up the river which he would think would be Lambeth Bridge, but in reality was Vauxhall. .
I agree this is only speculation, but just do not think that someone as experienced as PB obviously was,would make that right turn unless HE was certain he knew where he was..... and with the hostile conditions prevailing , it seems like it could have been a very easy mistake to make.
The flaw in my theory is that I presume his GPS would be showing something different for the desired track to Vauxhall , but this is the only idea I can see for his actions.
Mmm , I know...wait for the AAIB report!

[ShyTorque]

He might have seen Chelsea bridge (in isolation) and mistaken it for Vauxhall bridge and begun his descent prematurely, thinking he was going to be allowed straight into the Battersea ATZ to land.

If you are going to Battersea in normal circumstances (i.e. not as in this case, via a very short notice diversion request), the Heathrow/Thames controller will normally pass on the inbound aircraft details in advance and you will be expected by Battersea ATC. This is due to the pre-booked landing slot requirement. So normally there is no delay in getting permission to enter the Battersea ATZ from Vauxhall.

[toptobottom]

SS - Street view shows a totally different perspective compared with PB's view from 800'. Vauxhall bridge is blindingly conspicuous to anyone familiar with H10/H4 - it's bright red and can be seen from miles away in CAVOK. Even in poor viz, once eyeballed, it's obvious which one it is. PB would have had no problem recognising it IMO after even the briefest of glimpses through the clouds (it also has the rather imposing MI6 building towering over it...).

Apart from the railway bridge immediately adjacent (and the fact that it's not bright red!), Chelsea Bridge has pylons/suspension cables and white arches - not to mention Battersea Power station a stone's throw away.

There's no way the two could have been confused.

I'm flying H10/H4 tomorrow, so will try and get some more representative piccies...

[John R81]

SASless - when there is a hole in the right place it must be tempting to go through it and loiter below. Loiter on top, and there might not be another useable hole.


Speculation:
I am inclined to think that PB knew where he was on the run of H4. I wonder if he appreciated that he was as close to the South bank as he was when he started his final turn to run-in to Battersea.

[SilsoeSid]

Ttb,

I'm not saying Chelsea and Vauxhall are alike, I'm saying the Rail bridge to the East of Chelsea looks very much like Vauxhall. Vauxhall may well be red, but given the conditions, I woud say not bright enough.

Would you really say that on a grey overcast morning looking through a gap in the fog, that Vauxhall looks totally different than the rail bridge?

http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/VauxhallBridge.png
http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/ChelseaRail.png

Not really wanting to start a discussion on colour and its properties in low light conditions, but I would say that the curves on the arches on the rail bridge would easily lead to it being confused with Vauxhall.

I feel some of those optical illusion pix coming on :8


If you could get some from off river, as in more like the route PB took over the HoP, that would be better than from actually over the river. Looking at my high photo, I suspect that from abeam the eye, Vauxhall would be obscured by the RBS building.
:ok:

[JimL]

This is an interesting thread with - in my view - too much concentration on trying to second guess what occurred in the last seconds of the flight.

Diving through a funk-hole is not part of professional operations - especially when there are other more responsible courses of action available to the pilot.

If we are to prevent another such accident - which has many similarities with HEMS accidents in the US - it might be by concentrating on other causal links in this chain.

Specifically:

was operational control exercised (by the operator) over the decision to launch under conditions where the conduct of the whole flight under VFR might be questionable (i.e. the call from the client at Elstree);


what was the dispatch criteria of the operator for a VFR flight and was it fulfilled; and


what was the operator's procedure for a pilot who finds himself VMC above cloud.

All of these questions will be asked by the AAIB and/or the CAA. However, it should be clear to all the readers of this thread that we should avoid being at the point where we are relying on the toss of the dice - under circumstances where the dice may be loaded against us.

Most of the precursors to this accident occurred (weeks or even months) before the decision to let down through cloud over central London. Dealing with some of these issues might be more rewarding in the long run.

Jim

[sAx_R54]

Someone asked about training, well there is a video by NATS/CAA that is downloadable from the flight safety page that shows and actually flies the different routes.

CAA VFR - Video Guides (http://vfr.airspacesafety.com/content/)

[SASless]

JimL,

On the 16th and 17th....I said the investigation should look at the chain of events that led up to this accident and asked what responsibility the AOC holder had re Operational Control, Dispatch, Flight Following, and SAR should an aircraft become overdue or be reported down.

I fully agree with the issues you raise but you are a bit late to the Party.

The CAA is sure late to the Party.

Now a few comments about the CAA's failures in this.

I guess those issues you noted are a complete damn surprise to the CAA and have gone hidden all these years?

I would suggest, that just as the FAA one day got hit by Lightning in a NTSB Report, suddenly discovered the US Helicopter EMS Operators were quite plainly ignoring the very same issues and had been forever. That was despite all of the FAA Inspections and Oversight by their POI's over the years.

The CAA is going to get hit by that very same Lightning in the AAIB Report I would bet.....if the AAIB does as good a job as I suspect they will.

All I can say to the Operators is bend over and hang on.....there is a new wave of Inspections and Rules and Regulations coming....as the CAA is going to imitate the FAA and get into Ass Covering Mode.

The end result will be an increase in Safety but at a lot of cost and some cumbersome procedures. It shall absolutely require Operators to start Dispatching and Following Flights, ensuring Weather and NOTAMs are checked, and someone in Management shall have to sign off on a Flight Release of some sort to certify the Flight can be done in compliance with the Law, Rules, and Regulations.

For those interested....do a bit of research on what transpired after the NTSB criticized the industry AND the FAA for the lack of Operational Control of EMS Flights by the Operators.

It will make for interesting reading and when the AAIB files its final report....to see how the CAA pretty much imitates the FAA in its reaction.

I would not be surprised to see the end of the "Free Lance" Pilot relationship as it exists now. That would be something in and of itself....would enhance Safety as it would firmly place the Pilot into a "Employee" status and thus gain some protection under Law re "Unjust Dismissal" and other issues.

Perhaps this Accident will be the Catalyst for the CAA and the Industry to improve how things are done and serve to benefit everyone involved as regard to Safety.

[JimL]

None of the issues I raised are hidden to anyone - they are the rules that are in place at this time. The operator is responsible for safety not the CAA. The rules of the air are known to all operators and pilots. Adequate procedures are also in place to control the use of casual pilots in commercial operations - but they have to be followed by the operator.

It would be impossible for any authority to provide oversight for every flight and it is just not their job; they are responsible mainly for ensuring that there is a system in place.

If, as you say, a more stringent oversight programme is required, it will be at a substantial cost to industry (and would result in a reintroduction of the audit of pre and post flight documentation). What might be more appropriate is for the operators to acknowledge their role and understand what is meant by operational control.

Jim

[SASless]

Jim,

Thank you for a good laugh.

The CAA is not responsible for Safety?

Do explain what you mean by that statement please. Just what function does the CAA actually serve then if they have no role in Aviation Safety? If the CAA has a role....then it has "responsibility" to the extent it is adequately meeting its remit. After all....the CAA is damned expensive Bureaucracy funded by the Aviation Industry in the UK. Surely, the CAA must have some valid role to play in ensuring Aviation Safety in the UK and thus must be held accountable for their performance in that role.

Adequate Rules are in place to control the use of Casual Pilots? Perhaps so in certain contexts. But....are "Casual Pilots" protected and well served by those "Control" measures? Are "Casual Pilots" subject to commercial pressures that full time Employees are less vulnerable to as UK Employment Law affords them avenues of redress that "Casual Pilots" are not?


I agree the CAA cannot provide Oversight for every flight. The CAA can however have a Monitoring and Inspection Process that ensures the Operators have effective and appropriate Operational Control and the CAA's Inspection and Audit system for Operators is effective in detecting failures by the Operator to comply. Merely ensuring the mechanism is in place sounds good but unless the CAA confirms the mechanisms are in place, are being used, and are effective...then I would see that as a failure of the CAA's system.

May I assume from your comment:

If, as you say, a more stringent oversight programme is required, it will be at a substantial cost to industry (and would result in a reintroduction of the audit of pre and post flight documentation).

That there used to be a formal CAA Audit Process that is no longer active?

Does the CAA do the equivalent of NASIP Inspections as done by the FAA?

Why would an Inspection System "cost" the Operator. If they are performing their duties imposed by the ANO and their AOC....all they have to do is grant access to the CAA Inspectors to their Facilities, Records, and Aircraft. Or....would the CAA insist upon being paid by the Operator for the conduct of the Inspection/Audit?

For the Not Knowing....an FAA NASIP Inspection can be summarized as being "A Day or few Days in the Life of a Helicopter Operator", where every single document, work order, fuel ticket, credit card charge, log book entry, payroll record, pilot logbook entry, Time and Duty Log.....everything to do with the Operation of the Operator is audited and compared to ensure the Operation is being run in accordance with established law, rules, orders, regulations, and business practices. It is a no notice Inspection....where a Team of FAA Inspectors show up and announce the Inspection.

The general premise is not so much as looking for violations with the intent of punitive action but to ensure adequate internal controls exist to confirm the Operator is doing business properly. If serious violations are found....then action may be taken against the Operator.

The FAA has undergone a lot of rebuke, criticism, and earned a reputation for having inadequate performance in their oversight practices over the years. Things like Valu-Jet and other Fixed Wind operations, the Helicopter EMS industry, the Helicopter Sight Seeing Industry, have all had embarrassing revelations made public. It took the NTSB and Media Attention to get the FAA to address the EMS problems.

So....Jim.....is the CAA adequately monitoring all of the Operators in the UK? Is the CAA without fault in this and other accidents or is it a perfect operation you folks have in the UK?

[misterbonkers]

Technically EASA is now responsible for safety.

EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency

The GBR CAA were before EASA. Now they are responsible, amongst other things, for the enforcement of the regulations imposed by EASA.

[SASless]

they are responsible, amongst other things, for the enforcement of the regulations imposed by EASA

State Rests its Case Your Honour!

[Sir Niall Dementia]

SASless;

JimL is right, much as it hurts me to agree with my ex boss. He knows his way through the system very well as the ex-head of policy for both the CAA and JAR. As chief Pilot here I know it is the responsibility of the operator in the shape of ops, CP and Accountable Manager to ensure that their procedures, as laid down in their operations manual are adhered to. and that in the event of an accident it is our nuts on the block along with those of the pilot concerned. And knowing how ops manuals look for similar operators I know that the procedures he listed ARE laid down in company paperwork. As the Ops Manual is prescribed in law it effectively becomes the legislation the operator must run to.

It sounds daft, but it is a very historic CAA procedure, and has worked until now.

SND

[Helinut]

I (very tentatively) suggest "responsibility" comes in various forms, times and places.

[SASless]

I have no problem with the concept that the Operator, Pilot, Engineer, Dispatcher, etc....are held to account for what they do or don't do. That is not my point.

My point is the CAA is the "Authority" and is the organization that is charged with "Enforcing" the compliance of Operators et al.

From their web site:

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), which is a public corporation, was established by Parliament in 1972 as an independent specialist aviation regulator and provider of air traffic services.

The UK Government requires that the CAA’s costs are met entirely from its charges on those whom it regulates. Unlike many other countries, there is no direct Government funding of the CAA’s work.

What we do:



Strategic Objectives:

Our work is focussed on:

Enhancing aviation safety performance by pursuing targeted and continuous improvements in systems, culture, processes and capability.
Improving choice and value for aviation consumers now and in the future by promoting competitive markets, contributing to consumers' ability to make informed decisions and protecting them where appropriate.
Improving environmental performance through more efficient use of airspace and make an efficient contribution to reducing the aviation industry's environmental impacts.
Ensuring that the CAA is an efficient and effective organisation which meets Better Regulation principles


Which means to me they do hold a responsibility no matter how they want to squirm and wiggle. As they are the Oversight Organization....they have a requirement to effectively perform those actions.



I do not hold Jim or anyone at the CAA personally responsible beyond the extent of judging whether the CAA auditing/inspection of Operators has allowed for slack compliance with the Regulations over time and perhaps to that extent....the CAA does hold some responsibility for part of the chain of events that led to this particular accident.

I will bet you Donuts to Dog Droppings and you can hold the stakes in your mouth.....the Operator in this Accident shall be given very close scrutiny by the CAA after the accident.

The question I pose is did the CAA effectively monitor the Operator and other Operators in the same business before this accident.

We on this side of the Atlantic saw just that situation in the Helicopter EMS Industry until the Media and NTSB roasted the FAA for their failure to prevent the gross failure of the Operators in complying with PART 135 OpSpecs and Part 135 FAR's re Operational Control.

Government wants to be smack dab in the middle of things....demand we pay for them to be there....and when things go wrong....they drop a shoulder and deny any responsibility. When I hear that said.....my neck hairs go up.

Final question: Can we say there was no deficiency in the CAA's oversight, inspection/audit of this Operator that may have been part of the accident chain that led to this Accident?

[SASless]

Who evaluates the CAA for performance?

[ShyTorque]

But irrespective of any regulations, policy or ops inspection, sometimes the actions of an individual in the cockpit on the day allow an accident to "slip through the safety net".

[Hughes500]

SASless

You might be interested to know that if you visit The CAA at Gatwick it doesnt say CAA otside it has in very bold worlds Safety Regulation Group !!

[bondu]

SAS,

I once had cause to speak to a Flight Ops Inspector from the CAA Safety Regulation Group about a issue causing concern. His reply was, and I quote, "my job is to observe not to enforce".
This was a few years ago, but I don't think the SRG attitude has changed much!

bondu:ugh::ugh:

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

SAS - if you really believe that the CAA are responsible for this accident then you are more naive than I thought you were!!

The rules and procedures described in European Legislation and the Operators Operations Manual do not provide for flight in IMC when there is a remote possibility that you might bump into something.

Do you really think the CAA allows people to manouvre in between buildings in London when they are actually in clouds???

I do not want to second guess the AAIB but in reality, the responsibility for bumping into an obstacle rests only with one person!!!! Its a shame but there it is.

DB

[nigelh]

I'm with DB on this one . Other than having a CAA enforcer on each flight these things can still happen regardless of rules or even monitoring . Sadly sometimes things go very wrong even the very first time you break a rule , so there may well have been no sign of misdemeanours in the past . I don't think there is any way to get around the fact that the pilot is paid to use his judgement and abide by the rules and the buck will , and SHOULD stop with him . That is after all what we have all been trained for at great expense .

[chester2005]

I have to agree with SAS on the fact that the CAA are responsible for ensuring that operators are following the rules.
Had the operator in this case previewed the flight in question before its commencement, would they have agreed to it, knowing that if an incident occurred, they would be the "second signature" that approved it?
Although actions by pilots are not the responsibility of the operator, they are human after all, some responsibility should lie with an operator as to the go/no go of flights. thereby absolving some of the responsibility of the pilot and potentially relieving them of any possible commercial pressure.

just my two penneth worth
RIP PB

Chester:ok:

[SASless]

if you really believe that the CAA are responsible for this accident then you are more naive than I thought you were!!

Never said that Nigel.....but I have gone on record that perhaps some shoddy oversight could have very well played a part in allowing an environment that would be conducive to Operators not living up to the requirements of their AOC and the ANO.....and other pertinent regulations, policies, and rules that exist.

No one can expect a fool proof system even one created by the self announced World's finest Aviation Authority (quoting them folks.....right off their web site).

Yes...Pilots and Engineers can do some stupid things....some more often than others....as we are all Humans.

I am well familiar with horror stories about lax inspection standards which vary by time, place, and folks involved....though I am sure there are few here would come forth and recount them for us out of fear of repercussions from those who would take exception to that.

I await JimL's response to my question about the Audit of Flight Documentation that I asked. I know load manifests have to be retained for a period of time, that Pilot Log books are subject to audit, and that perhaps if a real Audit of an Operator was done similar to the NASIP procedure I mentioned....some Eyes would be opened really wide open at what they found.

Anyone here ever departed over the allowed MAUW for Temp and Alititude? You reckon a comparison of the Load Manifest and Passenger Manifest might show a discrepancy?

You think a check of Metars and TAFs....and Flight Records might show some inconvenient information?

If you knew the friendly CAA might very well come calling and do such an Audit....you might play a bit closer to the Rules?

The Rub is when most do play by the Rules and the Few do not....and thus get an unfair advantage over the Operators that are trying to run a completely legitimate business.

Nope....I will wait for someone to prove me wrong before I give the CAA a complete pass on this. I can be convinced....but it will take more than a simple shrug of a shoulder and a "Nothing to do with us Mate!"

No matter a Pilot or Engineer do something stupid.....the Operator is still liable for their actions while they are in his employ.

[nigelh]

Very fair post . But would this flight have NOT got the go ahead if operating to the rules ??? I don't see that it was an inherently dangerous one .... It was operated in clear skies with an intent to land at Elstree ... Nothing wrong there .
I have , on numerous occasions set off to point B knowing it is ' currently ' at below my minimums .... But I have taken an educated guess that the wx will have improved by the time I get there . ( with fog and clear sky above this can happen in minutes ) . More often than not I get to point B and the problem has gone . If not I land short and wait or return . My point is that the decision to depart was not in itself dangerous ( as it happens it was the wrong call but that is the percentage game we all play ) . I believe it only went wrong when he diverted from the plan . He was led to believe Battersea was open and operating as normal and probably thought the pax was en route to there for a pick up . If he had stuck to the plan and returned to base we would never have heard of this flight . In this scenario no amount of ticking boxes before would help . Does this therefore mean that an AOC flight cannot change en route and stay legal ....or in future will not be allowed to ???
If that happens the non AOC boys will have a field day ...because the one thing you want to be able to do when spanking thousands on charter is to be flexible ....
Ps. It wasn't me who made the quote you highlighted SAS , it was DB ...

[SASless]

Sorry Nigel.....it was DB to whom I should have replied.

[SilsoeSid]

Toptobottom
SS - Street view shows a totally different perspective compared with PB's view from 800'. Vauxhall bridge is blindingly conspicuous to anyone familiar with H10/H4 - it's bright red and can be seen from miles away in CAVOK. Even in poor viz, once eyeballed, it's obvious which one it is. PB would have had no problem recognising it IMO after even the briefest of glimpses through the clouds (it also has the rather imposing MI6 building towering over it...).

Apart from the railway bridge immediately adjacent (and the fact that it's not bright red!), Chelsea Bridge has pylons/suspension cables and white arches - not to mention Battersea Power station a stone's throw away.

There's no way the two could have been confused.

Actually, according to the SB, he called visual with Vauxhall at 1,500ft.

At 0757 hrs, G-CRST was abeam the London Eye at 1,500 ft and the pilot said:
“ROCKET 2, I CAN ACTUALLY SEE VAUXHALL,

So, how blindingly conspicuous is Vauxhall on a murky morning, let alone through a hole in the fog?
Here are some pics taken from Millbank Tower, a couple of hundred metres away. LondonSE1 on Flickr (http://www.flickr.com/photos/se1website/4888752123/in/set-72157624718676906)

"it's bright red and can be seen from miles away in CAVOK. Even in poor viz, once eyeballed, it's obvious which one it is."

Mmm, perhaps only on a really bright sunny day! Besides, I've never said there has been any confusion between Vauxhall and Chelsea , it's Vauxhall and the rail bridge that I think are easily confusable.

If you are so confident that he saw Vauxhall, I'd love to know why you think he physically turned away from Vauxhall after being told to hold between it and Westminster/London and headed off towards Chelsea rail, enter the zone without clearance and then turn back eastwards on reaching the rail bridge, despite no further instructions from ATC ....as if once he got to Chelsea rail, he realised that it wasn't Vauxhall after all. :confused:


Rather than keep going round in circles on this one ttb, I think we will have to agree to disagree on this one :hmm:

[SilsoeSid]

Vauxhall bridge is blindingly conspicuous to anyone familiar with H10/H4 - it's bright red and can be seen from miles away in CAVOK. Even in poor viz, once eyeballed, it's obvious which one it is. PB would have had no problem recognising it IMO after even the briefest of glimpses through the clouds...

Apart from the railway bridge immediately adjacent (and the fact that it's not bright red!), Chelsea Bridge has pylons/suspension cables and white arches - not to mention Battersea Power station a stone's throw away.

There's no way the two could have been confused.



http://i52.photobucket.com/albums/g11/silsoesid/13e5216af83556d820185079ef02326f_zpsc30e455d.jpg


Bear in mind also that on a southwesterly heading the power station would be in the murk, on the far side of the river.

[24Carrot]

This was the middle of the London rush hour.

The railway bridge would most likely have had trains on it.

Vauxhall Bridge would certainly have had queuing cars on it.

[SilsoeSid]

This was the middle of the London rush hour.

The railway bridge would most likely have had trains on it.

Vauxhall Bridge would certainly have had queuing cars on it.

Just 3 things;
a. Rush hour - wouldn't all the car bridges have cars on them?
b. Trains can be red and stationary.
c. Queuing cars may not be readily noticeable as there is no movement!

In HD on a 27" screen at about 5 seconds, you can see the glint of cars going over Chelsea bridge, which would appear at that angle to be above the rail bridge, possibly with a red train on it, giving the illusion of cars on a red bridge.

London Aerial Footage - London Eye - YouTube

Given the weather of the morning I suggest the video is watched at the 240p setting.
The bright glint at 10 secs is just about where the 'Vauxhall in sight' call was made at 1500', Imho, making Vauxhall and that part of the river there less obvious, and the river near Chelsea appear to open up more.

[sarboy w****r]

Are allegedly professional pilots really discussing whether other professional pilots identify bridges from 1500ft inside busy London airspace on the basis of the colour of the arches when viewed from the side?

Seriously?

Vauxhall Bridge is Vauxhall Bridge because it is at the apex of a bend in the river, it is the only bridge in that bend in the river and because it has a bloody big MI6 building on one side of the southern edge and a bloody big set of flats in the same colour on the other side of the southern edge of the bridge. That is how one identifies Vauxhall Bridge.

And as for why the pilot may have elected to go to Battersea rather than return to Redhill, or even take off at all in the first place, ask yourselves what information that is in the preliminary AAIB report can be independently verified by them and proven to be true? What information cannot be independently proven to be true? What has been merely assumed to be accurate?

Now ask yourselves why a signed statement has been submitted to the AAIB from someone (a professional pilot) who spoke to the pilot that morning about that specific flight (not Witness A) but is not mentioned in the AAIB report or subsequently? This post is highly likely to be removed by the Mods because of potential libel difficulties if this post elaborates any further.

What is the overriding contributory factor of HEMS accidents in the USA?

[SASless]

I CAN ACTUALLY SEE VAUXHALL,

As compared to "Vauxhall in sight." or "Visual with Vauxhall." or no mention at all and just talk about the Clearance......just wondering about the significance (if any) of the wording....as it is certainly not a "Standard" turn of phrase we would normally use.

[Old Age Pilot]

"Are allegedly professional pilots really discussing whether other professional pilots identify bridges from 1500ft inside busy London airspace on the basis of the colour of the arches when viewed from the side?"

I too find this utterly ridiculous. And all this posting pictures / YouTube footage and subsequent extensive typing of theories, what is the purpose? Do you not have any work to do? Or maybe any chums to hang out with instead?

[Anthony Supplebottom]

OAP - I tend to agree with you.

I do have a question for which I would value any sensible responses.

If I was an aviation consultant hired for example by a foreign company to investigate why one of their executives had lost his life in a helicopter charter in the UK and if the circumstances were similar to this crash - would I be out of line if in my initial findings I recommended that the only circumstances under which this flight should have been made was if it had been IFR - or is that too simplistic?

Should our driver had gone IFR say to Northolt (or wherever is nearest to Elstree) and then planned to fly the following sector IFR to the nearest instrument approach equipped airport in the hope of being able to breakaway to conclude the final portion visual and, if not, to complete the trip at the destination IFR airport?

Lastly, how would a large corporation protect themselves from exposing their personnel to something like this or can it not be protected against?

[SASless]

IFR as you suggest would work.

VFR on Top works....until you have to make an approach and land.

Far better to make an Instrument Approach using an established and approved procedure then if able....go SVFR to your destination perhaps if it is very close by.

The question remains about how safe is it to do the SVFR portion of the flight and what do you do should you encounter IMC weather during that portion of the flight.

If the answer is to go IFR then the safest method would be to use a departure point and destination that both have IFR Approaches....and have an Alternate that does as well and all three have the Minimum Weather for the operation.

[tropeognathus]

I am unutterably filled with despair at the ignorance of so many of the posters on this thread. There seem to be so many from trolls or those who have no in-depth knowledge of anything to do with aviation and some from people who seem to me to be suffering from terminal stupidity and I can't believe are really pilots. There are a (very) few which are relevant from knowledgeable posters (such as JimL), some which are somewhat relevant from posters who know a lot about some aviation matters but (like me) have been somewhat removed from them for some years (like SASless), but all too many are meaningless, irrelevant speculation. I used to know PB and I spent many years flying in the London control zone in different jobs and roles and I find many of the posts on here meaningless rubbish. If I should ever have wished to fly in a helicopter along the London helicopter routes along the Thames again to show my grandchildren London from the air, I have been totally dissuaded from that idea now by the thought that one of the posters from here could be my pilot - God help me :mad::\.

I have my own views and theories as to what happened, but I'll offer no speculation on this accident, just offer my condolences to the families of the 2 people who needlessly died and the wish that even some of the self-professed "tin gods" on this thread may, just for once, learn something from this accident - though I doubt it. Congenital stupidity seems to be on the increase :{

[Flying Lawyer]

As JimL says, the rules of the air are known to all operators and pilots.
IMO they are also adequate.

UK aviation is already highly regulated. To those UK helicopter pilots who would like to see more stringent rules introduced for the helicopter routes and/or other aspects of rotary aviation: Be careful what you wish for.

There's an old legal adage that 'Hard cases make bad law.' (One bad event is a not a good basis for introducing a general law which would then cover a range of less extreme circumstances.)
There's a great deal of truth in it.


FL

[SASless]

I would suggest the Heli-Routes control could probably be eased by adopting a single ATC function similar to Approach Control. Define the Airspace by track and max/min height, define a few reporting points, perhaps even make some of the tracks one direction only. The trick would be to facilitate departures and arrivals at Landing sites that unlay or very closely adjojn the Heli-Routes.

If one had to file a flight plan prior to entering the Controlled Airspace with that ATC unit...avoided the restricted Altitudes until in radio contact with the ATC unit...it would be a lot easier for all concerned (IMHO).

Actually that is far more restrictive than most high activity Offshore Oil Field Operations as we usually did not have an ATC service except for Flight Following and the odd Traffic Advisory.

Sometimes taking a big step back and thinking about how it "could be done" might work better than trying to figure out how to modify and existing system.

But....knowing the Bureaucracy.....that ain't gonna happen.

An example....require traffic to hold to a 1,000 feet one direction, and 1500 feet (or say....700 feet and 1200 feet) the other and that would grant traffic separation by height and still leave some room for landing and departing traffic while ensuring a 500 foot Rule margin under VFR conditions.

If the Weather goes below VFR....then ATC turns it into a positive control zone for all traffic and issues SVFR clearances.

Just a thought....what you think?

[airpolice]

Just a thought....what you think?


I think that if you remain clear of cloud, in sight of the surface, it's hard to bump into anything.

[SASless]

A Police Unit learned that the hard way one night as I recall.

[toptobottom]

SS
Rather than keep going round in circles on this one ttb, I think we will have to agree to disagree on this one
I think the only one "going around in circles" is you; I posted once, offering an opinion and you seem to have spent the last few days trawling for images and inventing bizarre theories to justify your obscure 'mis-identification' theory :ugh:

In HD on a 27" screen at about 5 seconds, you can see the glint of cars going over Chelsea bridge, which would appear at that angle to be above the rail bridge, possibly with a red train on it, giving the illusion of cars on a red bridge.

WTF? With respect, this is nonsense. Have you actually flown the routes? I don't think so. If you had, you'd realise that PB would not have confused the railway bridge next to Chelsea bridge, with the Vauxhall road bridge. Period.

You're beginning to sound like some of the other armchair 'experts', clutching at straws and letting your imagination get the better of you. I think it's perfectly clear what happened that morning and that will be published quite soon.

[tropeognathus]

I do apologise that in my earlier invective against certain types of poster on this forum, I failed to mention Flying Lawyer amongst that handful of posters whose posts are both meaningful and relevant. Like SASless, I don't necessarily agree with everything he says (and I certainly don't agree with a lot of what SASless says in relation to events in Europe), but I place a very high value on his considered opinions. Too many pilots like to think of themselves as "professionals", like doctors and lawyers, but truth-to-tell, piloting is merely a co-ordination skill, like juggler, tight-rope walker involving anvery little technical or "professional" knowledge. I'd trust myself and my family in a helicopter with FL at the controls, knowing that here is a true professional who, knowing his limitations would take as proper care of them as he would od his own professional reputation.

There are some posters on this thread who go around in circles so much, I think they would remain in a hold until they had to force land when out of fuel. Jim L and FL have cut through to the heart of the matter with no speculation or judgement and to quote them both "the rules of the air are known to all operators and pilots. IMO they are also adequate."

A true "professional" knows the rules, his company and his passengers have the right to believe that he/she also knows and operate to them, and check that (to the best of their knowledge as evidenced by a proficiency check) they do so. The regulatory authority sets and, to some extent polices the rules and relies on an operator to ensure that pilots it employs in any capacity adheres to those rules. Most companies these days have a fairly detailed Safety Management System and as part of their Quality Management structure carry out internal operational, engineering and safety audits, in addition to external and regulatory audits. Sometimes, accountable managers chose to ignore or override internal recommendations (usually for commercial reasons) and this is where the Regulator has a responsibility. Maybe it's time that helicopter operators were also required by regulation, to have some form of satellite or onboardflight-following system so a closer eye could be kept upon what and where their aircraft are doing when they are away from base, especially in the case of charter companies who are the ones most likely to be using contract pilots who are more difficult to standardise to a company standard and who are operating to non-fixed bases OCAS.