Helicopter - v - crane LONDON

[BOAC]

Are they solely responsible (legally) for their pilot's actions at all times? - not actions I'm sure. Consequences probably. Their 'Ops'/Planning/maintenance/supervision will of course be part of the AAIB investigation. Knowing Philip, I would expect that to be purely a 'routine' investigation.

[Pittsextra]

Some of this is getting painful to read. Its been posted elsewhere but this is useful reading:-

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-E8C0BFC4371D81DB0DACDE1B8FA393CA/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/AIC/P/146-2012/EG_Circ_2012_P_146_en_2012-12-20.pdf

That aside short of an as yet unreported mechanical failure the weather proves once again to be uncompromising.

Whilst we wait here is a thought. Many are lashing against the media which is IMO very silly. As we have seen these people shape public opinion who in turn shape politics.

I'm not sure what % of GDP the helicopter industry yields for the UK but I think we might all agree that the vast majority of UK citizens would be indifferent if there was less of it.

To that end it would be pretty smart to either make PPRuNe a more private site so some discussions can go on in private or some more knowledgable helicopter pilots agree on some established points.

Its not a surprise that an aviation lawyer is suggesting that there might be some sort of case and actually it wouldn't be a surprise if innocent victims in this turned their attentions to the same. You can't control what they are going to do, but you can ensure the other side, the other view is communicated in an effective and intelligent manner. Very often in these pages things just turn into a huge peeing contest.

Like in other cases (EC225?), despite the professionalism, skill and knowledge of very intelligent people things can go wrong. In the coming weeks/months I guess we will see just how intelligent the decisions were that lead to the unfortunate event.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Dear God Flying Lawyer;

I've just read the Stewarts law llp web page about J H-P, do you really spend your days surrounded by such people?

If so no wonder you fly helicopters, at least we know we're perfect, we don't need out side agencies bigging us up that much!

I actually found that web page really rather scary.

[[email protected]]

BOAC - again IIRC, that 600' cloudbase is as reported at LHR not what might actually be present in the helilanes themselves. We all know that there can be significant local variations in the cloudbase, especially when the weather is worsening.

It is possible then that PB was given a SVFR clearance based on the weather at LHR but encountered worse conditions when attempting to get to Battersea. Nothing illegal or unprofessional about that - just unlucky.

[Grenville Fortescue]

FL thanks for the reply.

Originally Posted by Flying Lawyer
NB: We don't yet know the cause(s) of the accident.

Try telling that to your colleague Mr Pratt!

Meanwhile James-Healy Pratt, an aviation lawyer and qualified helicopter pilot, said RotorMotion, the helicopter operator was likely to face damages claims running into millions of pounds following the crash.

[BOAC]

Thanks for posting the link, Pitts. A well thought-out paper in my opinion. A good response to the 'gainsayers' on one of these two threads.

[SARWannabe]

For those interested, here are historical MET actuals for the entire day at Redhill/Gatwick, London City, Elstree, and Heathrow here:

Gatwick/Redhill (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGKR/2013/01/16/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&theprefset=SHOWMETAR&theprefvalue=1)

Elstree (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGTR/2013/01/16/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&theprefset=SHOWMETAR&theprefvalue=1)

London City (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGLC/2013/01/16/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&theprefset=SHOWMETAR&theprefvalue=1)

Heathrow (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGLL/2013/01/16/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&theprefset=SHOWMETAR&theprefvalue=1)

[madflyer26]

A good balanced post PE but every accident speculation thread turns out the same way. Sadly in aviation incidents the pilot is the first to be blamed and in most cases this turns out to be the case. I would never imply that Captain Barnes done anything wrong but it bears resemblance to many previous weather related incidents I have had the displeasure of reading over the years.

[Pittsextra]

BOAC - again IIRC, that 600' cloudbase is as reported at LHR not what might actually be present in the helilanes themselves. We all know that there can be significant local variations in the cloudbase, especially when the weather is worsening.

It is possible then that PB was given a SVFR clearance based on the weather at LHR but encountered worse conditions when attempting to get to Battersea. Nothing illegal or unprofessional about that - just unlucky.

Looking at the relevant METARs at the time (I think either 0650 or even 0720hrs suffice) what does "worse" weather look like?

As for unprofessional, unlucky or illegal - the AAIB won't make that call but given the noises I suspect it might be tested in the future in a court.

[Flying Lawyer]

SNDdo you really spend your days surrounded by such people?No!
Just like everyone else, lawyers' personalities and attitudes vary.


PittsextraTo that end it would be pretty smart (if) ........some more knowledgable helicopter pilots agree on some established points. Some very knowledgable professional helicopter pilots have already agreed on some established points.
They can't force others to accept what they say.
NB: BOAC is not a helicopter pilot.

[SARWannabe]

Looking at the relevant METARs at the time (I think either 0650 or even 0720hrs suffice) what does "worse" weather look like?


And BEFORE the time of take-off at all local aerodromes including departure and destination... Can we get historical TAF's? not sure, but they can't have suggested much different can they?

[Pittsextra]

I was using this site. No reason to believe the site isn't inaccurate.

metars-history (http://www.weatherjackwx.co.uk/metars-history.html)

Edited to add:- sorry this is METAR but given the close prox from lift to Elstree I'd have used METAR as a back up to a phone call.

[SARWannabe]

Pitts, I was agreeing with you... Just adding that before taking off, as well as during, and after, the actuals were not where most would want to be :confused:

edit: i.e. no apparent degradation in weather once airbourne... Regardless of the AAIB derived outcome of this particular tragic accident, or any other more successful flight for that matter, I would question the reasoning behind taking off into these actual local conditions.

[Pittsextra]

SAR - sorry I misread.

I think the onward flight from Elstree (if reports are to be believed) was to Yorkshire, not sure if private site or airfield. But much of the East of England looked grim and IMO given the relative short leg initially neither the TAF or 215 would give me more than a METAR or asking locals on the ground at the destination.

In any event given the state of the weather in the nearby areas I find it hard to really say it could degrade much more.

I've not got 10000hrs or an IR so not qualified to comment on what individual limits are but when you add in the hostile environment of central London - unless other high time IR pilots suggest flying in this weather/environment to Battersea is actually routine - the crane issue seems secondary.

[ShyTorque]

Again - can we all promise no-one will ever mention 'minimum altitude' again on this thread as it seems to easily confuse professional pilots, even those with significant hours spent both teaching and observing the ANO.

BOAC, unfortunately the misunderstanding seems to be yours alone, at least amongst the helicopter pilots here who actually use the routes.

Please let me try to clarify one more time.

The London heli-routes are given maximum altitudes. All aircraft operate on the London QNH whilst operating along them, or anywhere else in the airspace. This is because above the routes are the many airliners operating to and from LHR and LCY airports.

Pilots on the routes are not allowed to fly above those altitudes so that adequate separation is maintained. The maximum altitudes vary along the routes, due to altitude step downs above. Where there is a lowering of the maximum altitude, helicopter pilots have to ensure they are at the next, lower altitude by the associated reporting point.

Pilots are allowed to fly lower, to maintain VMC, albeit they are expected to fly as high as possible within those constraints, for noise reasons. We are continually reminded of the "Fly neighbourly" policy and we do try hard to do so, despite the allegations of some vociferous locals. If flying lower than the appropriate maximum altitude, a pilot is still required to comply with the 500 foot rule (which of course is actually a minum distance, not necessarily a height; it's important to remember that). As I wrote before, how the pilot actually knows he is complying with that rule, is up to him, not ATC. Therefore ATC do not pass a minimum altitude as part of the clearance.

When given a clearance, ATC do include an altitude, based on the London QNH. If flying only on the heli-routes, the clearance will normally be "Standard operating altitudes". This means "Fly not above them and at them if possible".

This means the pilot must know the route well and/or carry the special 50,000 chart which shows the routes and the maximum altitudes. I carry the chart at all times because it's difficult to remember everything and always worth checking, for obvious reasons.

If operating off the routes, as twins are quite legally allowed to do (and often do), ATC will include an actual altitude and obviously give the pilot the London QNH, where the words "at altitude....." will be included. In this case the pilot must advise ATC if he cannot fly at that altitude.

Alternatively, the words "not above...." may be included, in which case the pilot would be expected aim to fly as close to that altitude as possible but obviously not above. However, he may fly lower provided that he ensures the 500 foot rule is complied with.

Heathrow radar controllers unsurprisingly follow helicopter flights in their airspace very closely and will quickly correct a pilot who strays off the designated route, or climbs too high, even by a very small margin. The altitude being flown is obvious to the controller because the Mode C readout is directly available to him. In the event of any investigation the radar recording will of course be prime evidence.


I hope this further explanation is worthwhile.

I must make the comment your attitude here comes across as arrogant. A number of us in the profession have taken quite some time to reply to your questions but you always seem to respond with the implications that no-one but you knows the rules appertaining to the airspace, or basic altimetry. Your username implies you are a whole airline (!) albeit a long defunct one, yet I see you choose not to put any of your professional aviation qualifications on your personal profile. Others do this, it does help put things in perspective for others discussing things with you and can often help avoid misunderstanding.

As for challenging FL's qualifications, I can absolutely verify that he is very well qualified in law and also as a helicopter pilot, so he knows the rules, too. In fact, these days, if any of us transgress the ANO, or any other UK laws, we may well find ourselves appearing before him - and I wouldn't for one want to do so, 'nuff said. :uhoh:

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Shy;

I wouldn't want to appear before Flying lawyer either, but in the good old days before his well deserved elevation there was no other lawyer I would have wanted to represent me in court.

BOAC it appears from one of your posts that you know the MD of RotorMotion. Having first hand knowledge of what he and his staff are going through right now may I suggest that you stop arguing with people such as ShyTorque and others and accept the fact that the details you have been given about flying in the LHR/LCY Zones are VERY accurate and that it is you who seem to either a. not understand or b. are very obtuse and trying to prod a very raw nerve and give the appearance that pilots such as us who may never have looked down from your lofty ALTITUDE don't know what we are doing.

While PB was a friend of mine and many on here, the people at Rotor Motion have lost a much loved friend and colleague as did the family and colleagues of Mathew Wood, and you seem to want to score points by behaving in a frankly ignorant manner. Please list your aviation experience and qualifications because I'm starting to suspect they go no further than Flite Sim.

[BOAC]

Shyt - I did ask folk NOT to bang on about 'minimum altitude' since it is IRRELEVANT - you have chosen to. I am sure you are making my posts up, as:

I have no misunderstanding about altimetry, altitude or height (EDIT: or the ANO)

You were the one who introduced the topic of 'altitude' on this thread - I have no interest in it here

I have not 'challenged FL's qualifications' - where did that come from?? I am well aware of them - in both legal terms and as a heli PPL (if he has progressed to CPL I apologise and doff my wig)yet I see you choose not to put any of your professional aviation qualifications on your personal profile - want to have another look? I also have heli time but that is not there.

I hope this further explanation is worthwhile. - sorry to say no. I repeat
I have no misunderstanding about altimetry, altitude or height

You were the one who introduced the topic - I have no interest in it

There is also, as I said, little relevance in any of your last post to this accident.

Now then, why not be the expert you claim and answer SASless? Why is everyone afraid to?

Last edit: Can anyone detail the icing restriction on the 109 - is it 'known' or 'forecast'? For professional heli-drivers - given deteriorating weather as (possibly) of this accident, would you elect to climb into 'icing' or not to avoid problems? Ignoring any ATC issues, of course.

[Satcop]

And BEFORE the time of take-off at all local aerodromes including departure and destination...
The Redhill weather was as follows:
EGKR 160650Z AUTO 00000KT 3800 BR FEW003/// M04/M04 Q1010
EGKR 160720Z AUTO VRB01KT 3100 BR NCD M05/M05 Q1010
EGKR 160750Z AUTO VRB01KT 3300 HZ NCD M06/M07 Q1010

The special at 0804Z gave visibility 5000m with no significant cloud.

[chopperchappie]

Pittsextra

great reference - I have never seen this document - very reassuring to have a reference point if you need to land unexpectedly due to wx

if nothing else it would be interesting to identify sources like this that may not be commonly known about and put/reference them in a place that people can go and look at them on a otherwise quiet day - maybe a specific (sticky) thread?

just out of interest did you know about this previously or find it recently?

would anyone disagree with the expectation that this would still apply over central london - i suspect it would still take a lot of balls to land in picadilly circus (!)

edit - mind you you'd probably struggle to get a red bus to give way to let you land !!

[SASless]

I wouldn't want to appear before Flying lawyer

I would not either....but not for the reasons most might think.

I know without any doubt whatsoever that Flying Lawyer would render a just, fair, correct verdict that would be decided upon the evidence and testimony presented by the Prosecution and Defense.

It is My outlaw nature and liberal interpretation of the Rules, Laws, and Orders and resulting conduct.....is what would give me pause to have to him deciding my case as I fear he might have good, just, and valid reasons for dropping the Hammer on my Noggin. Also....I know if he did....he would. Likewise I know if the evidence and testimony failed to convince him of my culpability....he would find in my favor.

No matter the outcome....I would know in my Heart I was justly deserving of his decision.

I oft times have disagreed with him.....which does not make him "wrong" when I did....but I highly value his knowledge, background, judgement, and character.

(Note.....next round is on you FL!)

[BOAC]

would anyone disagree with the expectation that this would still apply over central london - i suspect it would still take a lot of balls to land in picadilly circus (!) - I think 4.3 covers that (not Picadilly Circus - Trafalgar Square, maybe?)

[SARWannabe]

Satcop - interesting thanks for that, where did you source those? appears much better than the surrounding actuals both north and south, and does shed a different light on the take-off conditions. However even so, the METARS for enroute and destination could not be much further from where i'd want to be...

[sooty3694]

A lot of unhelpful, uninformed gibberish being spouted by those who are not professional heli-pilots. It's no wonder that the press print the rubbish they do - much of it is sourced from these very pages.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

For anyone not especially familiar with flying in the LHR/LCY Zones this link may help

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/7/EIS%2006.pdf

SND

[DOUBLE BOGEY]

Sooty. I could not agree with you more. Lawyers, pilots and wannabees all spouting ****e.

I am particularly dismayed at the comments re compensation. Are the posters really that stupid not to realise that is precisely why the law requires insurance. Or maybe the would not expect compensation if a machine fell from the air and killed their loved ones.

We know nothing until the AAIB complete their work.

[Old Age Pilot]

A lot of unhelpful, uninformed gibberish being spouted by those who are not professional heli-pilots. It's no wonder that the press print the rubbish they do - much of it is sourced from these very pages.

Well put! My point exactly on post #125 in reference to torquewrench's rather careless and ill-informed statement! Clearly influenced by Joe Public's understandably ridiculous observation! I understand it's a rumor network, but it ain't a gob-****e network!

[Satcop]

Satcop - interesting thanks for that, where did you source those? appears much better than the surrounding actuals both north and south, and does shed a different light on the take-off conditions. However even so, the METARS for enroute and destination could not be much further from where i'd want to be...
SARWannabe - source is the Redhill ATIS Log.

[sky9]

The points that would worry me is the weather report "freezing fog". I've seen rime ice build up on a 737 and it was fast.

[AtomKraft]

Nothing landed at LCY until nearly lunchtime that day.

DA's are as low as 360'.

[Max Shutterspeed]

I'd just like to thank the professionals here who are making every attempt to give clear, technical explanations of both the London Heli Lanes, helicopter precautionary landings and the weather that day. You've helped me, for one, have a far clearer understanding of the issues facing PB in those last few minutes.

When reading the initial overview of PB's considerable experience, plus scanning the condolences thread with a lump in my throat, it's helped me to realise that it can indeed happen to the very best at times.

Thank you for what must be a time consuming amount of keyboard time.

[ShyTorque]

Thankyou BOAC I did look and saw that you have now amended your profile from simply "UK".

Apart from that, thanks again, you obviously went to some trouble to fully reinforce the main point raised in my latter paragraph! :rolleyes:

-----------------------------

I'm obviously no expert to someone of your all-knowing magnificence, and never could be, for daring to try to explain something to you about how helicopters are operated on the helicopter routes, over which you appeared to have some confusion. My apology, I won't try such a thing again.

However, to show just how thick-skinned and stubborn I can be, please deign to allow me to put forward a probably feeble but well intended attempt to answer SASless's earlier question about the A109E and icing conditions:

My copy of the "E" model RFM is no longer up to date but the following words appear therein (AFAIK there has been no change to the icing clearance for the basic aircraft).

LIMITATIONS

TYPE OF OPERATION

This helicopter, in the basic configuration, is approved for operation under day and night VFR, non-icing conditions.
The IFR configured helicopter is certified for IFR operations during day and night, non-icing conditions.

SASless, hope this is of some use, me old mucker! ;)

[nigelh]

The fact that LCY had no landings doesn't prove anything . I have often flown into LBA when there have been no landings due to weather .
I can't believe all the talk re helicopters and icing . As far as I am aware none of the sort of helis we fly have any icing capability ....only the sort of things DB shuttles out to the rigs on will have that . ( ok maybe the new Sikorsky as well )
Icing , I believe is a total red herring here . If you had a problem with it you would definitely go down , and not up ,in that situation over London .

[jellycopter]

Sarwannabe

I got these from 'ogimet' so think they are accurate. They paint a pretty good picture of expected weather around London that morning. Clearly they're not Central London, which often has slightly higher cloudbases due to its microclimate, but nevertheless do give a good idea of anticipated conditions.

JJ

GATWICK
TAF AMD EGKK 160558Z 1606/1712 07005KT 2500 BR BKN003
PROB30 TEMPO 1606/1610 0300 FZFG BKN001
BECMG 1610/1613 6000 NSW FEW015
BECMG 1618/1621 2000 BR
PROB40 1623/1710 0300 FZFG VV///
BECMG 1710/1712 6000 NSW=

TAF EGKK 160457Z 1606/1712 07005KT 0300 FZFG BKN001
TEMPO 1606/1610 1000 BR BKN002
BECMG 1610/1613 6000 NSW FEW015
BECMG 1618/1621 2000 BR
PROB40 1623/1710 0300 FZFG VV///
BECMG 1710/1712 6000 NSW=

TAF AMD EGKK 160240Z 1602/1706 VRB05KT 3000 BR FEW015
PROB40 1603/1611 0200 FZFG BKN001
BECMG 1611/1614 6000 NSW
BECMG 1618/1620 2000 BR
PROB30 1621/1706 0500 FZFG BKN001=LUTON
TAF EGGW 160458Z 1606/1706 07004KT 0100 FZFG BKN001
PROB30 1608/1610 1200 BR BKN002
BECMG 1610/1613 6000 NSW FEW003
BECMG 1618/1621 2000 BR BKN002
BECMG 1621/1624 0300 FZFG VV///=


HEATHROW
TAF AMD EGLL 160751Z 1607/1712 04004KT 4000 BR SCT002 BKN005
PROB30 TEMPO 1607/1609 0700 FZFG BKN002
BECMG 1609/1611 6000 NSW FEW006
PROB30 TEMPO 1612/1619 9999
BECMG 1622/1701 3000 BR
TEMPO 1702/1710 1200
PROB30 1703/1709 0700 FZFG BKN001=

TAF EGLL 160457Z 1606/1712 04004KT 2500 BR SCT002 BKN004
TEMPO 1606/1610 1200 BKN001
PROB30 TEMPO 1606/1609 0700 FZFG
BECMG 1609/1611 6000 NSW FEW006
PROB30 TEMPO 1612/1619 9999
BECMG 1622/1701 3000 BR
TEMPO 1702/1710 1200
PROB30 1703/1709 0700 FZFG BKN001=

TAF AMD EGLL 160240Z 1602/1706 04003KT 2000 BR SCT002
TEMPO 1603/1609 1200 BCFG BKN001
PROB40 TEMPO 1603/1609 0700 FZFG
BECMG 1608/1611 5000
PROB30 TEMPO 1611/1620 9999 NSW
BECMG 1622/1701 3000 BR
PROB30 TEMPO 1702/1706 0700 FZFG BKN001=


STANSTED
TAF EGSS 160458Z 1606/1712 06004KT 0200 FZFG BKN001
PROB30 1608/1610 1200 BR BKN002
BECMG 1610/1613 7000 NSW FEW004
BECMG 1618/1621 2000 BR BKN002
BECMG 1621/1624 0300 FZFG VV///
BECMG 1709/1712 9999 NSW FEW004=

[101BOY]

And further to the above TAFs, the Metars also paint a similarly poor picture:

Northolt

METAR EGWU 160750Z 06004KT 3200 BR OVC003 M02/M03 Q1011 YLO2
BECMG 4000 YLO2=
METAR EGWU 160650Z 05003KT 3500 BR OVC002 M03/M03 Q1011 AMB
TEMPO 2000 BKN001 RED=

TAF EGWU 160440Z 1606/1624 08004KT 2000 BR BKN003
TEMPO 1606/1609 0700 FZFG BKN001
BECMG 1609/1611 4000 HZ BKN004
BECMG 1611/1613 8000 FEW015=

Luton

METAR EGGW 160750Z VRB03KT 0100 R08/0450 FZFG OVC001 M04/M04
Q1011=
METAR EGGW 160720Z VRB02KT 0100 R08/0375 FG OVC001 M04/M04
Q1010=

Gatwick

METAR EGKK 160720Z 03004KT 0900 R08R/1400 FZFG OVC002 M03/M04
Q1010=

City

METAR EGLC 160720Z VRB03KT 0600 R09/1000 R27/1100 FZFG VV///
M03/M03 Q1012=
METAR EGLC 160650Z VRB03KT 0900 R09/0900 R27/1200 FZFG BKN001
M02/M02 Q1011=

Biggin

METAR EGKB 160720Z 07003KT 0200 R21/0500 FZFG VV/// M03/M03
Q1010=

Not much sign of the much speculated deterioriation, looks pretty poor throughout.

[A30yoyo]

A very tall recovery crane was put in place this weekend to remove the damaged crane from the accident site.
Recovery crane assembled in Vauxhall following helicopter crash | Demotix.com (http://www.demotix.com/news/1738970/recovery-crane-assembled-vauxhall-following-helicopter-crash#media-1738953)

They're following the operation on the tall building forum 'skyscrapercity'....there is a recent nighttime photo of the St George's Wharf tower in relation to the older Millbank tower (i.e. either side of the centre line of the Thames Heliroute in post#2536 on
One St George Wharf (The Tower) | Lambeth | 181m | 49 fl | T/O - Page 127 - SkyscraperCity (http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=221585&page=127)

On the R&N thread on this accident there is a youtube filmed from a helicopter following the London Heliroutes (picks up the Thames at Kew Bridge ca. 12.04 minutes in, (filmed before the St Georges Wharf tower was built)) post#321 on
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/505369-helicopter-crash-central-london-17.html

What height would the youtube be filmed from?

[A310bcal]

nigelh

quote:Icing , I believe is a total red herring here . If you had a problem with it you would definitely go down , and not up ,in that situation over London .

Maybe, just maybe, PB was struggling to go UP, or maintain altitude, and as a result his navigation took second place in the flying .....and he did go down!

But as the ice would have melted and there are no blackboxes to consult....perhaps as some have already hinted, we will never know. There are certainly a few contributors on here who HAVE had rotor and airframe icing, with a result where it was impossible to maintain their desired altitude.:sad:

[SASless]

Excuse me....but going UP is a very effective tactic in dealing with Icing as well as going down. As helicopter pilots we are more inclined to go lower....but that is but one answer to the question.

Going UP....over London gets a bit complicated as compared to trying to stay low.....but there are things to be run into down low....and up high too for that matter.

[deefer dog]

Fixed wing pilot here. Dealing with ice is pretty much an every day event at this time of the year for us. On my type the airplane will happily (continue*) to fly with quite a build up. (*Not tried to take off with it though - and yes it is certified for known icing).

How much ice, if indeed any, can a helicopter take before it necessitates remedial action? Practically speaking (rather than legally) is any ice too much ice on a type that is not certified for it?

[Savoia]

Deefer: I''ve found a handy article published by the Flight Safety Foundation: http://flightsafety.org/hs/hs_nov-dec90.pdf

The rotor blade icing process and its subsequent effect on helicopter performance cannot be analyzed in the straight-forward manner used to explain ice accretion on the leading edges of fixed-wing aircraft. Spanwise elements of a rotor blade, unlike the leading-edges of an airplane's wing, move through the air at various speeds.

Rotor blade icing is made even more complex by the constantly changing angle of attack experienced by the helicopter's main rotor blades in normal forward flight. These obvious and unique characteristics of the helicopter;s lifting system, combined with differing surfaces temperatures along the blades' spanwise sections and smaller airfoil thickness, make helicopter rotor blade icing complex and extremely hazardous.

A while back I recalled my encounter with the late John 'Chalky' White recounting his days test flying the Wessex in known icing conditions and he made no bones about the fact that he thought he may have embarked upon his last flight!

In relation to the above PPRuNer Cornish Jack wrote:

Re: the Wessex and icing trials - not Norway but Canada in the mid 70s the A&AEE winter trials included a quadruple prismatic camera filming the rotor blades in flight. The movements recorded caused not a little 'interest' and one comment to the effect that "had I known that was what was going on I'd never have set foot in the :mad: thing!" Remarkably robust bit of kit!

You may also find the following of interest:

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/405282-what-icing-conditions-3.html

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/240739-helicopter-icing-limitations.html

http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/60508-icing-helicopter.html

[sycamore]

Have a look at `rotorheads around..cockpit views(not videos),page 15 .
Sav; I think Chalky may have been talking(as only Chalky could !) about flying a Seaking in icing near Ottawa and it lost all transmission oil; everyone had chutes on,but they got back to base OK.
If you want a helo to have a clearance to operate in icing,it has to be `designed` in properly,not as an add-on,or `maybe we can do just a bit of icing`; you must have heated main and tail rotors,a properly heated engine intake system,engines that are /have a `robust first and second stage compressor(centrifugal),and heated tailplane ;that needs a pretty big electrical supply,and redundancy.....Sorry for the drift,or `slide` in this weather...

[John R81]

Deeper dog

Helicopters are not like fixed wing in ice. Suppose you get just a little ice on rotors, the degradation to flight performance is more then for a fixed wing. Suppose the rotor sheds a little ice - not like a fixed wing where this could be good news. The FOD can impact other important things at high speed - main or tail rotors. Also, due to that shedding you may have an unbalanced rotor which can cause extreme vibration, to the extent of causing damage.

[500e]

Crane pictures
http://www.demotix.com/news/1738970/...#media-1738959 (http://www.demotix.com/news/1738970/recovery-crane-assembled-vauxhall-following-helicopter-crash#media-1738959)

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by Agaricus bisporus

I can just see how a guys professionalism would make him vulnerable in such a situation.

Saving been forced into a diversion in low cloud and vis you'd be doing all you could to stay as high as poss to avoid both obstructions and excessive noise. It is almost a reflex response to fly as high as you can in such a situation. And pinching it at cloud base is just where you lose forward vis while keeping ground contact, so if there's a crane jib lurking in the cloud that's just where you don't want to be. I wouldn't be surprised that if he'd been a couple of hundred feet lower he'd have had sufficient vis to see and avoid. We just don't think of obstructions growing out of cloud when you can't see an obvious base.

IMHO this talk of enhanced lighting is a red herring and would achieve little or nothing if this event was rerun. Lighting is fine in VMC but pointless if shrouded in cloud.

Sadly it looks like an unfortunate operational accident and rushing into legislatative changes is almost certainly going to be a waste of time.

Questions will doubtless be asked re the wisdom of using battersea as a diversion in such conditions given the atrocious conditions at LCY, and even that of setting off from to elstree in the first place, but that's AAIB territory.

We all know the picture when grubbing along in low cloud/vis, and with obstructions close alongside the route extending up into the clag one is in a vulnerable position.

Very sad.

Tend to agree.

[MightyGem]

Helicopters are not like fixed wing in ice. Suppose you get just a little ice on rotors, the degradation to flight performance is more then for a fixed wing. Suppose the rotor sheds a little ice - not like a fixed wing where this could be good news. The FOD can impact other important things at high speed - main or tail rotors. Also, due to that shedding you may have an unbalanced rotor which can cause extreme vibration, to the extent of causing damage.
And yet, IIRC(it's been 16 years) the Lynx was cleared up to 30mm of clear ice without heated blades.

[handysnaks]

MG. That's because the thing felt like it only had three blades fitted most of the time anyway:E;)

[A30yoyo]

View of the Vauxhall Bridge bend from the London Eye?....Westminster Bridge in foregroundhttp://farm9.staticflickr.com/8234/8349416604_f0561b874a_c.jpg (http://www.flickr.com/photos/vaughanoblapski/8349416604/)
St George Wharf Tower (http://www.flickr.com/photos/vaughanoblapski/8349416604/) by Vaughanoblapski! (http://www.flickr.com/people/vaughanoblapski/), on Flickr

[sycamore]

MG ,perhaps 3 mm...

[Hover Bovver]

3mm or 30 mm, how can you tell unless you stop the blades LOL - the only reason a 109 has windscreen wipers.

[MOSTAFA]

It had an ice accretion meter (ho ho ho) still have the scars on my back 34 years later.

I seem to remember 10mm but there was something about a Q rise which meant you'd never get that far!!

[A30yoyo]

There's more high-rise planned for the Nine Elms/Vauxhall river bank area, posts #4 and #18 on
LONDON | City Tower One Nine Elms Vauxhall | 200m | 656ft | 58 fl | App - SkyscraperCity (http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1455516)

[industry insider]

S-61 and S-76 wipers were also good ice accretion gauges. But I suspect ice isn't the issue here. Although there maybe some mitigating factors, it will probebly just come down to a case of trying to maintain VMC in marginal weather.

When you think about it, very unlucky to hit something with the diameter of a crane among all that airspace.

[[email protected]]

Having struggled to get into places like Regents Park in marginal weather, by day and night, I can vouch for the fact that sitting in the cloudbase is a bad place to be. Much better to risk the complaints and get 50' to 100' lower so you can see where all the obstacles above you are.

[skadi]

It had an ice accretion meter (ho ho ho) still have the scars on my back 34 years later.

I seem to remember 10mm but there was something about a Q rise which meant you'd never get that far!!

Same with the Sea King and as far as I remember, it was 10mm in 30min, but i am not sure.

skadi

[sarboy w****r]

Much better to risk the complaints and get 50' to 100' lower so you can see where all the obstacles above you are.

I agree entirely. That is an option when you work under the military system, particularly so when you work under the dispensations that are afforded to you when on SAROPs. I know I was glad of them at times.

Sadly, I suspect that many other pilots in the civilian world would agree with me when I say that I would fear for my licence if I deliberately broke the 500 feet rule. I know that you are allowed to break the rules if essential for safety's sake, but you do then need to report this in writing to the CAA, and I, for one, would suspect that the CAA would claim that if that became necessary then I shouldn't have been flying in the first place. There's no hiding from CAA/radar traces when you're in London airspace. Poor judgement = no licence. QED.

[Pittsextra]

Sadly, I suspect that many other pilots in the civilian world would agree with me when I say that I would fear for my licence if I deliberately broke the 500 feet rule. I know that you are allowed to break the rules if essential for safety's sake, but you do then need to report this in writing to the CAA, and I, for one, would suspect that the CAA would claim that if that became necessary then I shouldn't have been flying in the first place. There's no hiding from CAA/radar traces when you're in London airspace. Poor judgement = no licence. QED

I suspect that you are right in saying many would fear it but I don't agree the CAA would wade into you in cases of a genuine degrading of wx. It would send a very bad message.

[SASless]

Anyone that worries about his license before he worries about his own Ass....is terminally stupid.

Folks remember this.....Ass, Tin, Ticket....in that order.

First...do what saves yer butt!

Second...the aircraft is a re-useable container that is there to protect the contents....your butt.

Third....the license is renewable....in time you can get it back.

[MightyGem]

MG ,perhaps 3 mm...
No, if it had the correct engine intake guards, then pretty sure that 30mm clear and 60mm of rime were the limits. MOSTAFA's correct about a TQ rise limit, but I can't remember the figures for that. Crab'll probably know.

[misterbonkers]

Sasless - well said!

[Anthony Supplebottom]

SASless - well said indeed but, the problem isn't so much with newbies as it is with high time drivers who've been in similar situations a hundred times before and for them the "bollox" of writing-up a CAA report or admitting defeat or an error of judgement is often something they are loathed to do.

Obviously not applicable to all high timers, more like the odd one here and there.

[Flugplatz]

SASless, Pittsextra

Think you might be right on that one: check out a new Safety (Pink) AIC on the subject: AIC P146/2012

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/pamslight/pdf/4e415453/EG/C/EN/AIC/EG_Circ_2012_P_146_en

Flug :8

[ShyTorque]

Flug, That document is very interesting, but you copied a forbidden link ;)

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/eadbasic/pamslight-0990769BD233255D308A2F2137E95214/7FE5QZZF3FXUS/EN/AIC/P/146-2012/EG_Circ_2012_P_146_en_2012-12-20.pdf

[deefer dog]

Flugplatz......link not working!

Agree entirely with SASless, but can also sympathise with those who might not want to draw attention to themselves by "owning up" to the CAA. Having submitted a report along similar lines many years previously, their response was more along the lines of a bollocking - "you shouldn't have gotten yourself into the situation in the first place."

I'm sure it's still on record.

[SASless]

Edited the post to make it all inclusive.....as it probably should have been to begin with. I assumed....probably wrongly....that the older guys and gals had learned that by this point in their careers.

One thing I might have added....is landing out might be an inconvenience, embarrassing perhaps, and the cause of troubles with the Crats....but it beats running into something that will kill you without remorse or hesitation.

[S76Heavy]

You can argue your case with the CAA, you can't argue your case with mother nature-be it wx or solid matter you run into, there will be no appeal.:{

[[email protected]]

MG, you are right about the accretion limits - the funny thing was that the accretion probe only measured up to 30mm so you theoretically had to reach out and wipe it clean and then wait for a second 30mm to reach your 60mm of rime! I think the engines would have flamed out long before that!

I can't remember the max Tq but 80% seems to stick in my mind - it is 12 years since I last flew one though.

The icing indicator on the Gazelle was much more precise - the homing aerials used to wag in opposition when you started to accrete ice! Yes, I know it didn't have an icing clearance but it was easy to get caught out in the MW IF boxes at 5500'!

That CAA circular will hopefully make it clear that a precautionary landing in deteriorating weather is definitely an acceptable course of action.

[SASless]

Once did an interesting Instrument Rating Check Ride with a CAA fellow....we bagged ADF tracking leg after we iced up to the point the ADF had quit working. He asked what I would do on a Revenue flight and my somewhat bogus reply about "Ah Sir....we just would never fly in Icing Conditions on a Revenue Flight over the North Sea." After a big laugh.....he said that was the right answer.

[RVDT]

109E,

First place you see ice accretion is on the vertical part of the pitot tubes through the skylight.

Ice doesn't really stick that much to this aircraft.

Given my only experience of it is in freezing rain.

Ref: The ticket.

Many moons ago after a spate of weather related VFR accidents CAA knee jerk was to raise VFR minima to stupidly high levels.

An old salt on the way home was told by ATC that the field was closed under the new rules to VFR.

Old salt sez - "Listen son, I am up here because you are down there or is it the other way around?

Silence.

Under stress of weather you can land wherever you like.

As SAS sez - Ass, Tin, Ticket.

[mickjoebill]

For regular media filmwork the 500ft rule translates to working at 750 feet agl down the Thames.
Filming flights down to 500ft have been (very rarely) allowed with prior permission and paperwork without closing vehicular and pedestrian traffic on the bridges.

It seems permission below 500ft requires a Bond film or Olympic Opening ceromony sized budget/project.

From a non pilots perspective it seems perverse that a particular flight regime can be flow with the right paperwork yet same regime is not the highest priority when fate lady luck and human error conspire against the pilot.

Just what are the consequences for a precautionary landing in London or a 300ft agl scud run due weather?


Mickjoebill

[RVDT]

Tail wagging dog?

If the circumstances are against you, be it weather, equipment failure , or a hundred other reasons, identifiable risk against life or limb who gives a tuppenny toss?

Ass, Tin, Ticket. I dont see rulebook in that equation.

[A310bcal]

RVDT:

AGREE 100% !!!!!

[alpineflyers]

SASless: Folks remember this.....Ass, Tin, Ticket....in that order.

Quite right SASless. Also this:
METAR..... TAF...... FLY or NO FLY or FLY LATER.....in that order.

By the look at the TAF´s in the area, FLY LATER would have been my obvious choice.

[SARWannabe]

Just what are the consequences for a precautionary landing in London or a 300ft agl scud run due weather?

I'd say this is circumstantial. Choosing to take off into the conditions surround this sad incident i'd say it was quite predictable in their eyes, and so would not be taken lightly, but even then temporary license suspension if landing in london or flying excessively low...? Had it been a sudden unforecast change in weather (like sea fog in cornwall, been there), or an operational problem with the aircraft (perhaps OEI and limping clear of a congested area, or along the river) they might take a different stance. Sadly however these conditions looked quite certain and avoidable.

[TRC]

It seems permission below 500ft requires a Bond film or Olympic Opening ceromony sized budget/project.

That's not true at all. It's not so much the budget, but the pre-planning.

From a non pilots perspective it seems perverse that a particular flight regime can be flow with the right paperwork yet same regime is not the highest priority when fate lady luck and human error conspire against the pilot.
The need for the 'right paperwork' is pretty obvious if you're looking for dispensation for low or ultra-low level flight in London or any other congested area.
You need to prove to the authorities - not just the CAA sometimes - that the flying can be performed in a safe and proper manner. The permission and assistance of these authorities are essential beforehand and have enabled us to fly through Tower Bridge on two seperate occasions, landings in Central London and countless other sorties at 250' or lower over congested areas including London.

As has been said already on the threads here, in deteriorating weather a precautionary landing in a park and the subsequent enquiry would be a better bet. Sure, questions would be asked but they'd be very much more palatable than the ones that are being asked right now.

[Swiss Cheese]

Here is a filleted AAIB summary into a recent A109 fatal accident , that was inconclusive. It will be familiar reading to certain diligent rotorheads. My concern is that, inspite of the Herculean efforts of the AAIB, we will get another summary in similar terms in twelve months time.

"The accident occurred when the helicopter flew at a near constant height, heading and groundspeed into XXXX. No technical fault was identified in the examination of the wreckage, but given the extreme disruption of the airframe and flying controls, a full inspection was not possible and therefore a technical fault cannot be completely ruled out. The helicopter impacted the terrain some 100 ft below the summit height of XXXX ft.
Without clearer evidence of the pilot’s actions or intentions, no conclusive causal factors for the accident could be established. However, as possible contributory factors, it is likely that the upper slopes of the ridge were obscured by cloud and some combination of visual or distracting factors led the pilot to consider that he was clear of terrain. Whilst there was no evidence of any pre-existing condition or disease, subtle pilot incapacitation could not be ruled out."

[A30yoyo]

For what it's worth here's a section of Google maps with a convenient 500ft scaler bottom left....500 ft radiuses dotted round the St Georges Wharf point tower(594ft high), 152 Grosvenor Rd opposite which is perhaps 150 ft high and the Millbank tower shown as 360 ft high(other sources 390ft). Much of 'south bank' (actually east there)between the Albert Embankment and the river is built up , guessing average 150ft? but I haven't attempted to dot that side

Is there any instrumentation on the tallest towers in London to transmit accurately visibility 'at the top' to ATC/the flying community?
http://i809.photobucket.com/albums/zz20/A30yoyo/Vauxhallmap.jpg

[Grenville Fortescue]

THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH TO READ SPECULATIVE POSTS - TURN AWAY NOW.

I shall don my Deerstalker and suck on my Calabash once again - to the consternation of Double Bogey and others I am sure.

My supposition is based exclusively on comments made on this and the thread on Rumours and News.

The following is believed to be applicable:

* The weather at St. George Tower at around 7:30am was apparently clear but 30 mins later at 8:00am low level (presumably stratus) had moved in and obscured the top of the building.

* The pilot may have had no means of checking the "actual" weather at Elstree prior to his departure.

* The accident occurred at the point where the pilot was meant to contact Battersea (his diversion destination).

One scenario for that ill-fated Wednesday morning less than a week ago is as follows:

The pilot, a 12,000 hour well known, much admired and by all counts capable professional was tasked to collect a celebrity restaurateur from Elstree last Wednesday morning. The weather at Redhill may have been "passable" but he may have had no way of knowing the actual weather at Elstree.

He wants to perform his tasked mission (good for him and good for the business he is freelancing for). If he has any hesitation about the weather he has at least decided to go have a "look see".

According to the reports in London, at 7:30am the weather was "clear" but 30 mins later that had changed. The pilot no doubt ran into this changing weather on his northward track to Elstree.

Having been stumped by the weather ahead of him he elects to divert to his nearest alternate, Battersea.

Presumably he speaks with the control he was under and advises them of he intentions and makes the left turn.

At this point we are led to understand that there is visibility but that this exists under a fairly low cloud base.

Now this is where the supposition kicks in - there have been posts suggesting that the pilot will have maintained as much height as possible in order to avoid busting low flying rules and noise issues.

I personally think it is naive to imagine that the pilot "should have" automatically descended below the legally permissible minimums as here's why:

This whole saga unfolds from the time the pilot makes his left turn towards Battersea having abandoned hope of tracking north to Elstree due weather. During this westbound journey the flight, quite literally, falls to pieces and, barring mechanical failure, we must look at a pilot induced scenario to explain this.

Those arguing that he should have descended below the legally permissible minimums are assuming that the pilot recognised that he was facing a critical predicament, one which warranted immediate and urgent attention and we absolutely do not know if this is what was going through the pilot's head. But, to me it seems unlikely because had the pilot believed that his deteriorating visibility placed him in imminent life-threatening danger he probably would have busted the rules and taken remedial (even dramatic) action to place him and the helicopter in a situation where the reducing/reduced visibility no longer posed such great risk.

Far more likely (as has been suggested already) is that the pilot, though probably concerned about the deterioration of visibility, believed that "this too shall pass" and which then allows us to assume that his only remaining challenge was that of getting the helicopter to Battersea where he could lick the shallow wounds of having launched the flight but failed to collect (on time) his VIP passenger.

The commercial consideration to make the flight, not only from a revenue perspective for the company he was freelancing for but also in cultivating a good reputation on behalf of this company with their client (for being able to perform the flight) - should not be discounted.

Of even greater relevance is this - what did Pete Barnes have with his experience and at his age that was of worth? The answer is simple and it is the same as for any pilot - reputation.

He's just made a left turn and with that he has sacrificed RotorMotion's ability to turn up on time as promised for their VIP passenger. Some pilots will find this very easy to do while others will feel challenged to satisfy - its a fairly personal approach and without knowing the man's character I can't comment authoritatively.

Assuming however that he felt at least some element of disappointment about being unable to push through to Elstree we now find him heading towards his diversion destination. He's over the city, not just any city, but the City of London. Restrictions, regulations and peering/judgemental eyes are everywhere.

It is unlikely at this point that he is thinking to himself "this weather is seriously dangerous - I need to take drastic measures to make sure this doesn't deteriorate into something I cannot control".

So, he maintains the maximum height he can, basically hugging the cloud base as he gropes for Battersea. His likely thoughts are "this weather is a pig, I hope it improves a little, Battersea should be coming up any minute now".

Descending to an abnormally low height is not on his mind. He's already had to abort his on time arrival at Elstree and he knows the VIP is going to have to wait at the airport. He is not now going to bust the regulations and set in motion the fall out of an incident report in which he could incriminate himself and which may perhaps reflect badly on the company he is freelancing for. No, that's out of the question because it would mean a snowballing of his original decision to launch from Redhill. He's imagining the report "He launched from Redhill in generally poor visibility, the weather en-route became progressively worse, he diverted to the London Heliport and in attempting to reach his destination was forced to fly within just 200 feet (or whatever) of the built-up area along the banks of the Thames."

In his head he's thinking "no way", "there's no way this morning is going to turn into a total disaster - let me push on to Battersea, wait it out and see if we can still move the client from Elstree".

So, he skims the cloudbase remaining as high as he can in order to stay as legal as he can as best as he can. Things will work out, he will push through, Battersea is about to appear.

At this point we need to recognise another "subcontial" element in this scenario which may, or may not, have been a factor.

Helicopter pilots familiar with London know that there is a gathering of tall buildings in the Docklands area. Its impressed into the mindset and the knowledge is there.

The St. George tower, still being completed, is not instinctively something that most pilots may think of such as "Vauxhall Bridge, oh yes, I must watch out for that huge building" - the building is known to be lower than those at Canary Wharf (although with the crane was actually the same height at the tallest of the East London buildings).

So, we have a potential situation where the threat of the St. George Tower may not be as well recognised as those which exist in the east.

Stuck to the cloud base and aiming towards Battersea he receives the QSY to Battersea. It has been said in a previous post that when the AAIB connect power to G-CRST's radios they will immediately know whether he was changing frequency at the time of impact. Presumably if the read-out indicates a frequency between the one he was on and the Battersea frequency (or any unknown frequency) one might make the assumption that he was changing frequency at the time of impact.

If the Battersea frequency was already dialled in then the only two remaining scenarios are 1) that the Tower and its crane appeared just after the frequency change leaving him little or no time to out-manoeuvre the obstruction or 2) had the frequency change been completed some 15 seconds or more beforehand or if he was yet to change frequency - his hugging of the bottom of the cloud base was taking him in and out of VMC and which meant that the impact with the crane happened largely in IMC or significantly reduced visibility.

The moment of impact must have been horrendous with one of the first emotional responses being "no way, not me" to "oh my God, this is really happening".

They say your life flashes before you at such times and I can well believe it. When death is imminent you wonder, almost immediately, about ever seeing your children again, about your spouse and there is still a sense of unbelief that what has happened has in fact happened.

The moment from the blade strike to the capsule impacting the road must have been pure hell and though lasting just a handful of seconds must have felt like an eternity.

I narrate these things for one reason - and is for a reason which has already been given in this and other weather related threads, that if even one person is stirred by this accident and it causes them to shy away from marginal VMC - then it has served its purpose.

Now, all this I have written is conjecture on a massive scale (I know that) but, its my supposition for now pending any further information.

I could be totally wrong [hopefully] but until further notice all the warnings across the whole forum about not flying in poor visibility are sound advice and worth holding onto.

[Jetboxer]

Grenville Fortescue - You have the credentials to become the next 'expert' for the BBC.

I took 5 minutes to read your work ... and came away with .... nothing new.

[SASless]

Ass, Tin, Ticket. I dont see rulebook in that equation.

Now.....do you see it?

Bit of a short plank are you?

[JimBall]

MJB: "Just what are the consequences for a precautionary landing in London or a 300ft agl scud run due weather?"

There is nothing to stop you landing anywhere in an emergency. Even EG R160 states "helicopters should remain able to alight clear.." - that doesn't mean that you can't land in, say, Battersea Park in an emergency. Nil vis would surely qualify.

And with regard to your take on the 500ft rule and filming. The area that mostly gets filmed in London is east of Vauxhall Bridge - in the City Class D. The rules (off route) here are the 1000ft rule - exemptions to this down to 750ft are possible.

(This 1000ft rule is easily breached if you go off-route - The Shard in particular casts its spell as far as about 4 blocks north of the river on the opposite bank to where the building is located.)

Only west of VB is the 1000ft rule exempted because it's Class A airspace, and the 500ft rule applies.

Let's also (in the case of G-CRST) not forget EG R157. Unless you've got an advance clearance (Enhanced Non Standard Flight number) for a specific purpose, you cannot route due north from Vauxhall Bridge beneath 1500ft, due to EG R157. It is unlikely that G-CRST would have an ENSF for a transit. Was 1500ft available that morning at that time?

So, to get north, you need to position west to Battersea to avoid 157.

[Heliport]

Swiss CheeseHere is a filleted AAIB summary into a recent A109 fatal accident , that was inconclusive. It will be familiar reading to certain diligent rotorheads. My concern is that, inspite of the Herculean efforts of the AAIB, we will get another summary in similar terms in twelve months time.

Your 'filleted AAIB summary' is from the report of the A109 crash in the Mourne Mountains in 2010.

Sometimes, after a thorough investigation and careful consideration of the available evidence, the AAIB is unable to establish conclusive causal factors for an accident.
When that is the position, the AAIB is IMHO absolutely right to say so - and, if appropriate, list possible contributory factors from which pilots may learn.

It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families.


In 2007 you posted: The real aviation lawyers around the globe tend to hold back and wait to be asked by the families or referral lawyers to get involved.
Firms that launch PR stunts days after accidents happen are usually doing it for self-serving reasons.
You were talking about American firms at the time but that's why lawyers (of the ambulance chaser variety) around the globe do it.

Can we assume then that you as an aviation lawyer disapprove of lawyer James Healy-Pratt's PR stunts in the days after this accident. His firm's website now boasts that he provided commentary on the crash and discussed the causes in the Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph and Guardian (with links) and even includes a link to a video of him being interviewed on Sky.

A gem from someone who describes himself as an "air safety expert" :rolleyes: -
He said he would happily have flown "as co-pilot" with Pete Barnes based upon his reputation.
Co-pilot??
The man has only recently got his PPL(H) on an EC120!

Disapprove of his PR stunts?
Or too close to home?

(Edit)

I've just noticed you ended a post last year with your email address.
It was jhp@xxxxxxxxlaw
Maybe there are two aviation lawyers with the initials JHP. :confused:

[Bravo73]

Disapprove of his PR stunts?
Or too close to home?

Wow, you're good, Heliport.


This biography sounds familiar:

About Swiss Cheese
Licence Type (eg CPL. Pilots only) PPL (H)
Current a/c Type (eg B737. Pilots only) EC-120
Location Gatwick
Interests Helicopters & Vintage Jets
Occupation Aviation Lawyer for Families and Pilots

And clicking on "Visit Swiss Cheese's homepage! (http://www.stewartslaw.com)" takes you to: Aviation & Travel, Clinical Negligence, Commercial Litigation, Competition Litigation, Divorce (http://www.stewartslaw.com/) (www.stewartslaw.c0m (http://www.stewartslaw.c0m))


:suspect:

[nomorehelosforme]

I can't believe or more importantly understand your assumptions, am merely a bystander with zero experience but!!!!

[Grenville Fortescue]

Swiss Cheese if you are indeed James Healy-Pratt then it was mentioned earlier on in this thread (the post now removed I think) that you apparently sued someone for a piece of flying you observed and that the case resulted in no prosecution towards the pilot.

If this is true (and if it is not then my apologies) my question is, why would you do something like this? The helicopter community (worldwide) is still fairly close and often behaves like a brotherhood and this doesn't come across as very brotherly to me?

Moreover, if safety was your concern - did you speak with the pilot personally in the first instance and discuss this matter with him in order to understand a little more about what he may have been doing and why?

[SASless]

Re Heliport.


Wow, you're good, Heliport.

Wrong!

He is very, very, good!

Crossing foils with Heliport generally results in the sound of hot air whooshing from one's tush.

I have the puncture scars to prove it!:{

[JimBall]

JHP did his PPL at Redhill and has also flown an EC120 from there. I'm sure there will be a warm welcome for him when he returns for his LPC.

My post 223 (http://www.pprune.org/7641399-post223.html) still exists. Heliport, our thanks for a fascinating bit of detective work.

If I was an aviation lawyer, would I file a spurious flying report against an aircraft, just to test the robustness of the CAA's reporting system?

No - JHP (PPL) did not contact the operator, owner or pilot. He simply filed a complaint direct with the CAA - which he knew would have to be investigated. His evidence was shoddy, his witness statements amateurish and inaccurate.

[SASless]

.....and he is as popular as a "Dog Dropping" in a Punch Bowl now!

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Heliport;

Brilliant, just brilliant, I haven't enjoyed a PPrune post so much for years!


Jim Ball;

You do his LPC, I'll write the notes!

SND

[Swiss Cheese]

Some interesting opinions expressed by Heliport, JimBall and SND, most of which are off the mark in terms of content and accuracy. By all means PM me, without being so anonymous.

The relevant issue here is the potential for an inconclusive AAIB report, which will not help the families. Fault in the legal sense (civil or criminal) is something very different. Here, Section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 removes the need for proof of fault. Please go and read it (again).

Heliport commented that -

"It may be disappointing for lawyers but it is far better they do that than assume pilot error when the pilots concerned are not alive to defend themselves - damaging their reputations and with potential dire consequences (legal, financial and emotional) for their grieving families."

Since pilots are insured under aviation liability insurance policies, their reputations are defended where necessary or expedient by those insurers. We all know that insurance companies are profit based and have their own interests. Are you suggesting that grieving families of non-pilots deserve different treatment?

Twenty + years of involvement in air accidents from both sides of the fence, have left me with the distinct impression that the families of the pilots in such cases are least well looked after. An inconclusive accident report simply amplifies that position.

[newjourno]

AAIB special bulletin released today: http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/AAIB%20S1-2013%20G-CRST.pdf

[Heliport]

The AAIB has published a Special Bulletin.


Special Bulletin S1/2013 - Agusta A109E, G-CRST (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/special_bulletins/s1_2013___agusta_a109e__g_crst.cfm)

[Grenville Fortescue]

Hmm .. G-CRST struck the crane 7 seconds after being told to contact Battersea:

Swiss Cheese - I see you've asked people to PM you, meaning you want to answer privately those questions people have about your conduct.

Tell me, this pilot whom you supposedly "dobbed in" to the CAA, did you give him this same chance to explain to you his actions in private?

[sarboy w****r]

AAIB website is unavailable.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Sarboy, temporary overload probably from too many media houses and PPRuNe readers. Will hopefully be back up soon.

[rotorspeed]

Grenville

The contents of the AAIB Special Bulletin demonstrate that your self-indulgent diatribe in your post 329, regarding your predicted scenario, was well wide of the mark in most areas. Which was of no great surprise to me, or I suspect any other pilot familiar with flying IFR twins in the London area.

I suggest it's time, to use your own words, you licked YOUR wounds, pipe down a bit and think before you post. Pete Barnes may have made a mistake here, but he was an outstanding pilot with I suspect vastly more experience of the kind of ops you are trying to be an expert on than you. This whole matter is far too tragic and serious to be treated as some Sherlock Holmes novel.

[industry insider]

Am I reading this correctly?

During flight in marginal and changing weather that the pilot was having text message exchanges with the "client" and "witness A" or am I being thick and have the times wrong?

[Pittsextra]

Am I reading this correctly?

During flight in marginal and changing weather that the pilot was having text message exchanges with the "client" and "witness A" or am I being thick and have the times wrong?

Exactly - no you aren't reading it wrong

[Heliport]

Swiss Cheese
off the mark in terms of content and accuracy.

Please feel free to point out anything I said which you claim is inaccurate.

BTW, in my earlier post I missed one of your press interviews mentioned on your firm's website: "James Healy-Pratt gives interview to Radio LBC 97.3 on Vauxhall crash"
That was the Ken Livingstone & David Mellor show. You may remember proposing that twin-engine helicopters flying over London should be required to have two pilots.
You also suggested that helicopters should have black boxes but it wasn’t clear if you meant all helicopters or those flying over London.

When asked by Livingstone (who is notoriously anti helicopters) if there has been an increase in helicopter traffic over London over the last 20 years, you said “I can’t tell you exactly but my gut instinct is probably”, adding that you explained that you see helicopters flying up and down the Thames from your 11th floor office.

You can’t be expected to know all the figures for the last 20 years but I’m surprised that, as someone who describes himself as having “considerable experience as an air safety expert in the media”, you weren’t able to point out that the traffic has been decreasing since 2007 and continues to decrease.
Link to Guardian article which contains a summary of the figures and a link to the full CAA stats:
How many helicopters fly over London? (http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2013/jan/16/helicopters-fly-over-london-data)

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Ok someone please help me get the gist of this, was he visual on top while holding east of Battersea and then about to make a descent or below the cloud base?

Much of the trip from central London to Elstree and back seems to have been conducted over 8/8, is this correct?

While he may have been in VMC on top would this not have been an IFR category flight? How come then he was SVFR or does SVFR cover his flight profile?

[Heliport]

Eagle-eyed readers will have noticed that the texts had ceased four minutes before the crash.

[Pittsextra]

Eagle-eyed readers will have noticed that the texts had ceased four minutes before the crash.

FFS. Yeah sure but maybe other eagle eyed readers also noticed:-

At 0731 hrs, having noticed how poor the weather was during his journey, the client called the pilot to suggest that he did not take off until he (the client) had reached Elstree and observed the weather. The pilot replied that he was already starting the engines. The client stated that he repeated his suggestion that the pilot should not take off.

or


0630
Pilot
Client
Weather ok up north but freezing fog at Elstree and Luton not clearing between 8 - 10am I’ve got same at Redhill keep you posted

0640
Pilot
Operator
Freezing fog all london airports ok up north have text [client] clearing between 8 - 10

0705
Witness A
Pilot
Give me a call as I have checked weather and freezing fog around at the moment

quite aside from the operator happy to text and be texted by his pilot as demonstrated here:-

0755
Pilot
Operator
Can’t get in Elstree hdg back assume clear still

0755
Operator
Pilot
Yes it’s fine still here.
NB. This text was not read


I don't know what planet you are on but this is shameful.

[industry insider]

OK so we have an A109 transiting the London Control Zone probably flying at 150 knots (during transit) on a still, very cold SE England morning when the slightest stir of wind or warming by the sun can create fog or low cloud as those of us who are "experienced" know only too well.

The destination is fogged. The weather at Battersea is unknown as the pilot has not yet contacted them, even though the decision to divert there has been made. So, now, with all the attendant route, GPS and frequency changes the pilot is sending texts and talking on the phone...

Not much more to investigate really is there?

But, I would have some questions and observations:

1) Had the "experienced" pilot ever undertaken a single pilot CRM (ADM) or Decision Making Course? Did the operator require such training?

2) Texting while driving is stupid and illegal where I live. Texting while flying is worse, texting while flying single pilot is even worse still and texting while trying to arrange a diversion in the London Control Zone and flying single pilot is beyond my comprehension. Surely it should be made illegal?

3) The company I work for (which contracts millions of $ in helicopter services every year) does not allow single pilot operations at any time, in any weather or in any aircraft. Does Ken Livingstone have a point, especially in marginal weather?

4) The company I work for does not allow any freelance pilots to fly aircraft it contracts or charters at any time. Why? Because of the implied commercial pressure.

This high profile accident will be a case study in Aviation Safety for many years. The holes in this cheese are so big you could fly through them.

[Heliport]

Pitts

What planet am I on?
Unlike some other PPRuNe forums, Rotorheads has a long established reputation for exchanging differing views without being rude. Please don't spoil it.

Since you ask, I'm more interested in what happened immediately preceding the collision with the crane than what the pilot did/didn't do earlier.


H.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Unlike some other PPRuNe forums, Rotorheads has a long established reputation for exchanging differing views without being rude. Please don't spoil it.

Since you ask, I'm more interested in what happened immediately preceding the collision with the crane than what the pilot did/didn't do earlier.

Well said.

Re: texting and flying. Not quite the same as texting and driving, especially if your a/c is fitted with AP. Not recommending it though - just saying its not the same.

[Pittsextra]

Heliport,

the letters FFS is an expression of exasperation and not an insult. Lets just clear that distraction up right away. So to be clear the FFS was not swearing at you, if you take it that way I am sorry. OK so lets get back to the subject.

The wisdom of texting or not is up to the individual - we all know it goes on so it would be foolish to pretend otherwise. Although while you are on a lets look at the lighting on a crane quest don't be surprised if that gets swept away by the text debate.

Actually its the attitude to weather that staggers me.

If this is a reflection of commercial helicopter operations then its dire.

[SASless]

Folks.....time to be honest with ourselves here.

The Reported Weather is such you know there is adverse weather at your destination but is forecasted to clear by mid-morning.

The Client tells you not to bother as the weather is bad.

You tell decide to Take Off and go see for yourself.

You declare you will land in a field if necessary.

You get to your Destination and yes....you cannot get in....after a second message from your Client who says it is a No-Go.

You turn around and head home....change your mind for some reason and try to divert.

You are texting on a goddamned Smart phone while flying Single Pilot in marginal weather in a very complicated area to navigate a safe course.

Does anyone NOT see a problem here?

Barnes may have been a very nice fellow, and a very good pilot....but as we all know....sometimes we just get it wrong.

The sad part....is this did not just happen that one time and I will bet you it is not just Barnes that has done it...is doing it....and will do it again.

Are we subjected to such external pressures and self inflicted pressures that we cannot just say...."NO!" and head for the Tea Pot?

The Client was saying "NO!" for crying out loud.....there is your Sign folks.

We lost a good guy for no good reason.

Can we all learn a lesson from this?

Let's be honest and ask who was applying the pressure....there had to be some or else Barnes would not have taken off based upon the weather reports.

He would not have taken off upon the Client telling him not to...but he did anyway.

Why do you takeoff and "go see"....if the reported weather is below minimums...the weather is below minimums.

When the Client told you a second time the weather was rat ****....why not turn around at that point...why continue on.

The CAA and AAIB need to get squarely in the middle of this and study why this accident occurred.....and I don't mean the running into the Crane. That was the result of the cause of the accident.

There seems to be an issue with the marking of Cranes that needs to be addressed....and a study of how those markings are inspected and monitored....but the real issue is why an experienced, professional, capable Pilot like Barnes....did what he did.

How did he fall into this trap?

[John R81]

Before assuming that his hands / thumbs were busy, also note that some phones can text for you based on speech alone (mine certainly can) so I can text here in the UK legally whilst driving a car. The driving prohibition relates to touching / handling your phone so hands-free speech or text is legal.

Not saying that's what he did, or what he did was right. Just that we don't know the potential importance of this behaviour to the accident sequence yet.

[Old Age Pilot]

the letters FFS is an expression of exasperation and not an insult. Lets just clear that distraction up right away. So to be clear the FFS was not swearing at you, if you take it that way I am sorry.Maybe it stands for Frustrating Fiddlesticks? I'm not sure since you didn't actually go on to say what it does stand for, if it indeed isn't swearing of course.

While I'm not surprised to see that everyone is so quick to jump on the texting thing, I think some are very quick to be harsh. Read John's comments above - nicely pointed out. Also nicely pointed out is Heliport's post. Texting ceased significantly before impact. Some of you will give the wrong idea to the general public and layman!!!

Industry Insider - Really?? Your 'questions and observations' are seriously going to excite the press. Do you not realise they actually read these forums?

[rotorspeed]

There are many issues here that have no relevance to just why the crane was actually hit, and as Heliport says, that is the critical one.

Going to have a look at Elstree was optimistic, but there may have been a hole. There was plenty of fuel to divert, after all. A sensible go around at Elstree was made. The texts incurred no significant risk or danger - in fact the ability to communicate probably reduced pilot stress. The flight to Elstree could easily have been made IFR through City zone in VMC above the fog, and routed right by Vauxhall. The original intention was to return to Redhill, where he weather was ok and far better than many here were claiming. Fog can be 300m vis 500m away from somewhere CAVOK. When the Thames at H4became visual a Battersea divert was attempted.

We still don't know specifically what caused the collision with the crane.

[sarboy w****r]

AAIB website is back up. Figure 3 is interesting.

[Heliport]

Pitts

I've already answered "what planet" I'm on.
As JR81 rightly says, "we don't know the potential importance of this behaviour to the accident sequence yet."


Industry Insider
Not much more to investigate really is there? I'm pleased you aren't an AAIB inspector.


As OAP says, people should bear in mind that journos read these forums and quote from them.


H.

[Grenville Fortescue]

AAIB website is back up. Figure 3 is interesting.


https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/-NNCMitcKCU4/UP_q461_A7I/AAAAAAAALm8/srgiSsiTdoQ/s606/Fig+3.png

[Pittsextra]

My friend I don't want to get into a personal bun fight but seriously these are shocking events, if you don't come to that on your own having read the interim report I'm not going to convince you.

To suggest pilots shouldn't be free to talk about events they themselves find crazy then that is just wrong. If you suggest pilots are put into a position to fly with a gun to the head in this kind of weather then I want the media to be all over it and get it stopped. Either way the operation stinks, if you want to defend this amateur hour carry on.

[FairWeatherFlyer]

AAIB site broken for me currently. Just looking at the track it makes you wonder he was momentarily confused about position on river and trying an approach to the heliport on the wrong section. It doesn't seem likely, but that's what it looks like.

On my walk to work this morning i saw a driver tapping away at his smartphone whilst stationary and then still looking at it as he turned at a junction and drove off. Many distractions in the modern world...

[Old Age Pilot]

My friend I don't want to get into a personal bun fight but seriously these are shocking events, if you don't come to that on your own having read the interim report I'm not going to convince you.This is my point. I think that we are all able to make our own minds up with regards to what's right and what's wrong. Why do you need to convince anyone of anything?

To suggest pilots shouldn't be free to talk about events they themselves find crazy then that is just wrong.

Who's suggesting that? I think maybe what's being suggested is that you find a room and a mate to do it with rather than stand up and blast it to the world and stir up a hornet's nest in the process; what a f*kking mess indeed.

Personally I believe that anyone who is a working professional or is an advocate of helicopters and our industry should realise that there is a limit to what one should post publicly. If not to limit what tripe is reported in the press, then at least to maintain one's humility!

Either way the operation stinks, if you want to defend this amateur hour carry on. To be fair, I understood everything you were trying to say right up until this point.

Why'd you have to go say that??

[industry insider]

No Heliport, I am not an AAIB inspector, but I am someone who in a previous life conducted many charters like this in an S-76 flown single pilot IFR over London and the home counties....before texting phones and even before GPS.

I encountered weather conditions like this many times. It is sunny one minute and foggy the next and very unpredictable. Once VFR on top (IFR to me) I would have asked for a climb, declared IFR and diverted somewhere with an ILS if necessary, that is if I had taken off in the first place from Redhill into conditions conducive to fog and freezing fog formation.

I would not have been grubbing around at low level over London looking to divert to a postage stamp size VFR heliport which I needed good VMC to get to without knowing the weather at Battersea or between where I was and there. If I need to divert, I will make very sure it is to somewhere I know I can get in. ILS to Gatwick with a visual break to Redhill, or a landing at Gatwick, or Luton / Stanstead, all better than the outcome achieved here.

[chopjock]

How about reading a map whilst flying? that dangerous too?

[Lonewolf_50]

Lewy, as noted above, there are a variety of apps that turn voice into text and text into voice. If one is using such, you end up with basically another radio. Pilots have been operating with multiple radios from before I ever flew.

As to "texting while flying" I'd have to say that depending on what your flying condition is and what your task load is, your

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate

Priorities remain unchanged, and you fit in various "communicate" tasks as the situation allows.

Do you fly, sir?

[SASless]

Risk Management....CRM....commonsense all play a role in how we manage our Cockpit duties....and when Single Pilot we have to admit that our workload at the best of times is significant.

Part of CRM and just plain commonsense is that we allocate our time to absolutely neccessary actions and even then put a priority on each of them.

Thus....as Texting is an issue here....where would you rank that task in the order of priorities given the situation under discussion?

We do not know the workload the Pilot was under....if the Auto Pilot was doing the driving....or anything else that would play a factor in that ranking.

I am not passing judgement on Barnes....but sincerely feel the questions need asking as if such a tragedy can happen to him.....it can happen to any of us.

As any tragedy like this....we must learn from what happened and see if we can find a way to ensure it does not happen again for the same reasons....whatever they may turn out to be.

One Man's Opinion....Texting is a NO NO. Using a Cell Phone is a NO NO. I took a stand on that once before. I said with no uncertain terms...when I was a Pilot....I was a Pilot....and running a business from the seat of helicopter in flight just plain was not going to happen.

The difference between a Cell Phone conversation and a radio exchange is the Radio Exchange is short, brief, and concise and all about an essential bit of business...that being flying the machine and coordinating that with ATC.

Cell Phone conversations are a distraction...can be extended (as compared to talking with ATC), and generally can wait until after the aircraft is shut down.

We have to make our own decisions about that as long the activity is not illegal. Just as in every part of this flight....just because something is "legal" does not make it something that should be done or can be done without additional risk.

That the holes in the Swiss Cheese lined up on this one....cannot be denied.

Let's find out what the holes were....and plug them however we can.

[industry insider]

Wolf

.As to "texting while flying" I'd have to say that depending on what your flying condition is and what your task load is, your

Clues:

1) poor with freezing fog and low cloud
2) very high with course and destination changes, radio and frequency changes and commercial plan changes.

I would be communicating using old fashioned radio to an ATC unit who could give me vectors and weather information not a mobile phone, until I was on the ground and safe.

[Old Age Pilot]

Okay Pitts

Man to man. Human to Human.

Can you not see my point re generally spouting off when it comes to the press?

Surely as a registered member of this forum you have an interest in aviation/ helicopters? Someone says something like "Its rank amateur", the newspapers get on it and the general public get riled up and then everything looks bad and the industry suffers.

A lot of people here have lost a great friend and colleague in Peter and making such accusations and statements is going to be offensive and upset a lot of people, not to mention the families reading this. This is where humility comes into the equation.

If there is something to be had with safety here it will be done correctly through the correct channels. Not on an anonymous public forum. Pilots slagging off other pilots and operations just makes us ALL look like a bunch of *****!

As for people asking stupid questions like "is it alright to use my mobile when I'm flying?", well they are here to generate even more negative publicity. I'm not saying it's right or wrong, I'm saying that if you need to ask, you'll never know!

[malc4d]

Just throwing this out there....

Now we all know someone with a newly printed cpl, they most proberly would give their right arm for a chance to fly with an experianced pilot on these charter flights. Most are proberly trained at the company doing the flights anyway. wouldnt it make it a win win for all if an sic was in there helping the work load........

It might help avoid this type of accident in the future.

[Old Age Pilot]

but typical and true to form, people on this forum will just berate you if they don't agree with your comments rather than have a civilised discussion.

Some of us on here do this for a living. We don't dip in and out of Pprune for fun or to be mused. You'll forgive me if I have indeed myself jumped to conclusion in thinking you are trying to entice an interesting debate that may end up plastered all over the paper with the headline "X% of Helicopter Pilots feel it is acceptable to..." and then the industry suffers, while you sip your coffee and get back to your own job.

This is a high profile job and can be sensationalised (either positively or negatively) in a heartbeat.

I think we are entitled to feel protective of our jobs and industry. Don't you?

[A30yoyo]

In the interim report the Notam for the crane gives an obstacle height of 800feet....what minimum height should be flown on route H4 in the stretch of the river by Vauxhall bridge during the Notam period?

[Feathers McGraw]

Looking at the track of the last bit of the flight before the collision, the turn over the Thames from westerly to easterly heading was made to the right, presumably because the pilot is in the right hand seat and it feels more natural to turn that way (??). The second turn back onto a westerly heading was also to the right, and the natural place to look is into the turn, so the building and crane would have passed across the pilot's line of sight quite rapidly. What was the back-drop behind the crane from that point of view? London is a bowl, so there is rising ground to the south of the river.

There were 7 seconds elapsed and about 125m travelled between the Battersea frequency change being acknowleged and the collision with the crane. Given that the frequency was not one anticipated, perhaps this required it to be set on one radio rather than a simple selection of a pre-tuned radio.

A very short time, an obstruction subtending a narrow angle with potentially an urban back-drop, an in-cockpit task...

[Grenville Fortescue]

A lot of seemingly unnecessary arguments taking-place between PPRuNe members since some of the facts have come to light - but never mind.

Originally Posted by malc4D

Just throwing this out there....

Now we all know someone with a newly printed cpl, they most proberly would give their right arm for a chance to fly with an experianced pilot on these charter flights. Most are proberly trained at the company doing the flights anyway. wouldnt it make it a win win for all if an sic was in there helping the work load........

It might help avoid this type of accident in the future.

Good idea.

Originally Posted by Dg800

Yes we do. He turned right into the obstacle, either because he couldn't see it or because, if it was indeed visible to him at the time, he just didn't look. I'm not sure anybody will be able to say for sure which of the two is true, seeing as nobody who was there survived, sadly.

Figure 3. of the report (see map on previous page) recorded his final altitude as 770ft (I don't know where this puts his height in relation to the top of the crane but the crane was advertised in the NOTAM as being at a similar HEIGHT).

This means:

a) He was moving in and out of cloud and simply flew into it because he didn't see it, or

b) He was visual with the Tower but was distracted (either changing frequency or something else) and again didn't see it and flew into it, or

c) The same as (b) above but saw the obstruction at the last second when it was too late to make enough deviation to avoid contact with the crane

[JimBall]

If the AAIB read this, I just would like to state that I am so glad to be able to fly in the UK.

Any government organisation that can deliver such a detailed report within one week of an accident is, indeed, remarkable. (And, yes, I realise that the immense political, media and public pressure meant it had to be done - making the work even more praiseworthy.)

The complexities of this particular flight no doubt made the report even more difficult to compile.

For those who haven't read the full report, please do so.

[Helinut]

I second JB's comment. The AAIB have done a huge amount of work in such a short time to publish this interim bulletin. It helps those of us who want to understand this event, to have a much better appreciation of what happened as soon as possible.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Passenger urged helicopter crash pilot not to fly - Daily Telegraph

Pete Barnes, the pilot of the helicopter which crashed in London last week killing two people, was urged to abandon the trip by the passenger he was due to collect, air accident investigators have found.

Less than half an hour before the Agusta 109 hit a crane in Vauxhall, Richard Caring, the owner of the Ivy, advised Mr Barnes not to take off.

“The pilot replied that he was already starting the engines. The client stated he repeated his suggestion that the pilot should not take off.”

Passenger urged helicopter crash pilot not to fly - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/aviation/9821196/Passenger-urged-helicopter-crash-pilot-not-to-fly.html)

Helicopter crash pilot ‘ignored weather warnings’ http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/uk/article3666073.ece

Passenger suggested pilot should put off trip London helicopter crash: passenger suggested pilot should put off trip | UK news | guardian.co.uk (http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jan/23/london-helicopter-crash-passenger-pilot-trip)

Helicopter hit crane while pilot was turning to head for heliport (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/helicopter-hit-crane-while-pilot-was-turning-to-head-for-heliport-investigators-381408/)

[Rotors]

JimBall - I agree; hopefully a lot of pointless speculation (including on this website) can be addressed but I fear the texting issue will only generate more waffle from m'learned friends - and others.

3 comments: I have flown the 206 into Battersea and seem to remember the visual circuit being at 1000'

Secondly, speed at impact does not seem to have been mentioned. If flying at normal A109 cruise speed then the trajectory of the falling machine would surely have carried it further from the crash site?

Finally, I have witnessed an S61N rotor strike and there were bits of blade everywhere (OK more blades) but in the Vauxhall instance no mention of high-speed blade debris causing damage has been stated.

[Feathers McGraw]

Report says 7 seconds to travel ~125m, and that blade and other debris damaged buildings close to the collision site, breaking glass panes etc.

Distance/time suggests speed was below 40kts, I suspect that actually the path was longer and curved so actually likely to be higher but not by a large factor.

[Jed A1]

Malc4D Absolutely spot on. That's exactly how I got a start in this industry.

[BossEyed]

but in the Vauxhall instance no mention of high-speed blade debris causing damage has been stated.


Not quite right. On p8 under "Other Damage", it says:

A residential building below
the crane suffered minor structural damage, including
broken glass panels, from impact by released sections of
the helicopter’s main rotor blades.

Concur with others' comments about the AAIB's impressive ability to produce and release such a clear and readable factual report in a little under a week.

[Anthony Supplebottom]

posted by industry insider -

VFR on top (IFR to me) I would have asked for a climb, declared IFR and diverted somewhere with an ILS if necessary, that is if I had taken off in the first place from Redhill into conditions conducive to fog and freezing fog formation.

I would not have been grubbing around at low level over London looking to divert to a postage stamp size VFR heliport which I needed good VMC to get to without knowing the weather at Battersea or between where I was and there. If I need to divert, I will make very sure it is to somewhere I know I can get in. ILS to Gatwick with a visual break to Redhill, or a landing at Gatwick, or Luton / Stanstead, all better than the outcome achieved here.

VFR on top (IFR to me)

Me too.

If I need to divert, I will make very sure it is to somewhere I know I can get in. ILS to Gatwick with a visual break to Redhill, or a landing at Gatwick, or Luton / Stanstead, all better than the outcome achieved here.

Agree wholeheartedly.

[Gemini Twin]

As I sadly reveiw the couple of hundred posts above, half of which are utter BS, I'm prompted to say that most professional pilots have probably been in similar situations. Knowing that things could turn out badly, but through skill and luck, the flight is completed without further event. I,m sorry to see the lastest torrent of "I told him not to go" newspaper articles but that's par for the course. So rest in peace Pete, this flight is over and a new flight has begun.

[NorthSouth]

I find it strange that the report quotes Thames Radar as offering him "VFR if you can or Special VFR" for a transit through the London CTR. VFR is not possible in the London CTR. It's Class A airspace.
NS

[Art of flight]

Is 'VFR on top' still a legal form of flight in the UK? Thought it had changed some time ago so being unable to see the surface is IMC and therefore IFR flight?

[sarboy w****r]

Would anyone else consider the routing/altitudes in Fig 3 normal? R157?

[readgeoff]

No one so far seems to have picked up on the timing of events around 07.55

5 mins prior to 07.55 Mr Barnes' client phoned Battersea Heliport to see if it was open and was told it was.

at 07.55 Mr Barnes received a text message from his client saying that Battersea was open. It looks like he then radiod to see if Battersea was open (edited - the radio call was 1 minute after 7.55 as pointed out by Ambient sheep in the post #411).

If he chose to divert to Battersea at the specific suggestion of his client then the premise that his diversion was due to weather is incorrect. In fact the report shows he was "safe" VMC on top with a clear stated intention to return to base before 7.55's text and could have accepted an IFR transit offered if this wasn't the case. We also know the pilot couldn't see Battersea when overhead just 10-15 minutes earlier.

The 07.53 text "least we tried" indicated the pilots state of mind to try and do what he could to please the client.

The radio message "IF I COULD HEAD TO BATTERSEA THAT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL" is also interesting. Would "useful" be a word you would use for a weather diversion?


In which case commercial pressures look likely to be the specific reason he was anyway near the impact site in weather that was not VFR (or SVFR) legal.

[Low Flier]

“ROCKET 2 APPROVED VIA THE LONDON EYE NOT
ABOVE ALTITUDE 1,500 FEET VFR IF YOU CAN OR
SPECIAL VFR, QNH 1012”.

The pilot replied:
“YEAH, WE CAN, 1012 AND NOT ABOVE 1500, VFR
OR SPECIAL VFR ROCKET 2”.

At 0753 hrs,
the controller asked:
“ROCKET 2 DO YOU HAVE VMC OR WOULD YOU
LIKE AN IFR TRANSIT?”

The pilot replied:
“I HAVE GOOD VMC ON TOP HERE, THAT’S FINE,
ROCKET 2”.


So, what was the contract? (S)VFR? Or IFR?

ATC was aware of the wx - temp/dew -5/-5; fog/mist/low stratus etc.

The pilot had clearly stated that he was not in VMC. The oxymoron of "Victor Mike on top" is fully understood.

Why was a VFR or SVFR clearance issued (and accepted) in what was so clearly not VMC?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Why was a VFR or SVFR clearance issued (and accepted) in what was so clearly not VMC?

Sad thing is that it could actually have been Thames Radar trying to help.

readgeoff - yes we see it and you're suggesting that the client was the one who proposed Battersea. Yes, seems like it. But, Barnes would still have to concur (which evidently he did).

As I said (in a much slagged-off) earlier post - pressure to perform?

[Ambient Sheep]

No one so far seems to have picked up on the timing of events at 07.55

Mr Barnes received a text message from his client saying that Battersea was open. It looks like he then radiod to see if Battersea was open (the radio call was also at 7.55 so its hard to see if this sequence is correct or not).

Well spotted! In fact, the report makes it clear the radio call was at 7.56...

At 0755 hrs, G-CRST was put under radar control as it entered the London CTR. One minute later, the pilot asked:

“ROCKET 2, IS BATTERSEA OPEN DO YOU KNOW?”


(emphasis mine)

...so it would seem that was indeed the sequence of events after all.

[SASless]

I thought the existing weather at the airfield controlled the status of the airspace and ATC tells the Pilot what that status is by means of the ATC Clearance issued to the Pilot. When does a Pilot get the choice from ATC?

[Anthony Supplebottom]

Sad thing is that it could actually have been Thames Radar trying to help.

SVFR is already an act of faith from a controller towards a driver.

[Pittsextra]

One question. What is the operators involvement or expected involvment in this?

I see a text at 0640hrs from the pilot to the Operator that says:-

Freezing fog all london airports ok up north have text [client] clearing between 8 - 10


but I don't see anything back.

[NorthSouth]

Why was a VFR or SVFR clearance issued (and accepted) in what was so clearly not VMC?VMC is defined in the ANO as "weather permitting flight in accordance with the Visual Flight Rules" so is not relevant to this accident because it could not, legally, have been undertaken under the VFR. Only SVFR or IFR were possible. SVFR clearances do not require the aircraft to comply with the VFR - or indeed the IFR. AIP ENR 1.2 contains the slightly ambivalent wording "When operating on a Special VFR clearance, the pilot must comply with ATC instructions and remain at all times in flight conditions which enable him to determine his flight path and to keep clear of obstacles. Therefore, it is implicit in all Special VFR clearances that the aircraft remains clear of cloud and in sight of the surface." However the Rules of the Air Regs Rule (1)(k) clearly states that "special VFR flight means a flight...in the course of which the aircraft complies with any instructions given by that unit and the aircraft remains clear of cloud and with the surface in sight".

I think we can expect some clarification of what SVFR means in the AAIB report's recommendations, as well as such things as whether VMC on top is an acceptable way to transit the London CTR, what clearances ATC can offer into the London CTR, and who decides what the weather conditions are in the London CTR for the purposes of authorising transit clearances (in Class D zones, the ATC unit responsible for the airspace decides what the visibility is. There's no equivalent for the London CTR).

NS

[NorthSouth]

SASless:I thought the existing weather at the airfield controlled the status of the airspace and ATC tells the Pilot what that status is by means of the ATC Clearance issued to the Pilot. When does a Pilot get the choice from ATC? Only in Class D so not applicable here.
NS

[NorthSouth]

readgeoff - yes we see it and you're suggesting that the client was the one who proposed Battersea. Yes, seems like it. But, Barnes would still have to concur (which evidently he did).

As I said (in a much slagged-off) earlier post - pressure to perform?I initially thought that was the most important question too but given that the client specifically, twice, advised the pilot not to take off, advice which he rejected, why would the pilot then regard the client's suggestion of Battersea as "commercial pressure"? That could only be the case if the client had said "if you can get into Battersea I'll meet you there". That clearly didn't happen - unless some messages are missing.
NS

[Jed A1]

PE, you ask about operator involvement.

I would ask who is Witness A?

[SASless]

NS.....who determines if an Airspace is IFR or VFR....each pilot or ATC?

If it is "Controlled Airspace"....some ATC unit has "control" of that airspace.

If no ATC unit has "control" then how does one do SVFR or IFR without an ATC Clearance?

Are we seeing a huge hole in the ATC System around London here?

I only flew over London once....and that was by mistake....amply pointed out to me and my Mate by serious powers that were at Redhill's upper floors. We did not know it was London....but we did know exactly what time it was when we determined where we were....and where we were not.

[Cows getting bigger]

Read it whatever way you like but for me the accident commenced when the client takes a chill-pill and suggests that PB waits a while. Flip, how many of us have really pushed things because the client is barking at us like a rabid dog? (That Scouse chap who sang a few song in the sixties comes to mind as an example of an excellent pilot succumbing to unnecessary pressure). PB is on the ground at Redhill when This client quite clearly indicates that the weather ain't good and he isn't in a rush. From a charter perspective, things doesn't get any better than that. So why did PB push on and launch despite there being no need?

[Pittsextra]

Jed - yeah but then why identify the Witness A and Operator as different entities?

But its amazing that the only one that seems to say "are you sure?" is the client!!

[mark one eyeball]

So many strange things going on with this short flight
I agree with previous post no pressure to get into the air "chill pill" good way of putting it and yes that might have been the beginning of the Swiss cheese scenario
Weather around London poor, single pilot operation over central London
Texting using mobile phone from the helicopter in flight, that's a new one for me is that allowed? I know a train driver being dismissed for that kind of thing
Special VFR clearances around London seem too open ended recipe for future incidents
Holding close to a large building in poor visibility
Wow!
I think The CAA has a lot to consider here for future helicopter flights over London

[zkdli]

With regard to VFR and SVFR. The determination of whether a pilot can comply with the minima for operation in VMC lies with the pilot. There are specific limits applied for aircraft operating in a control zone VFR or SVFR inbound or outbound from an airfield.

However when transiting a control zone, in general the requirement for a helicopter operating in class "D" airspace below 3,000ft amsl, the pilot must operate in sight of the surface and with a minimum inflight visibility of 1,500m. It lies with the pilot to determine if he has that flight visbility. Regarding the in sight of the surface point, I believe that all METARS in the area the the pilot was flying reported a broken cloud base. Given that broken is anything from 5 oktas to 7 oktas, it is possible that the pilot could see the surface even when he was "good VMC" on top - the pilot never said it was an undercast.
More evidence on this is when the pilot reported that he could see Vauxhall bridge, at this time the pilot was in sight of the surface.
The UK AIP gives weather minima for various zones etc, one point in the Heathrow entry (EGLL AD2.2) is that to operate in the CTR on a heli route the minimum vis to do so is 1,000m.

[Hummingfrog]

SASLESS

I only flew over London once....and that was by mistake....amply pointed out to me and my Mate by serious powers that were at Redhill's upper floors. We did not know it was London....but we did know exactly what time it was when we determined where we were....and where we were not.

I think this also happened, at night, in 1940 but it wasn't in a helicopter and the pilot and nav had an interview without coffee with a big cheese in Berlin;)

HF

[SASless]

The determination of whether a pilot can comply with the minima for operation in VMC lies with the pilot

I agree with that statement but that avoids the question I posed.

ATC issues the Clearance based upon some reported weather minima determined NOT by the Pilot. ATC has to decide if the Controlled Airspace can be done VFR, SVFR, or IFR. When issued a VFR or SVFR Pilot....compliance with that Clearance requires the Pilot to operate within the limitations of the ATC Clearance as to route, height, and any special instructions. If the Pilot is unable to maintain VFR or SVFR he has to report that to ATC and announce his intentions/desires to include requesting an IFR clearance.

Is that how it works over London?

Or is there Uncontrolled Airspace over London that does not require an ATC clearance at all....or would not require an SVFR or IFR Clearance when weather minimum for that airspace is below VFR minima?

Is there a clear cut answer to this....that someone knowing can answer?

[Lonewolf_50]

1) poor with freezing fog and low cloud
2) very high with course and destination changes, radio and frequency changes and commercial plan changes.

I would be communicating using old fashioned radio to an ATC unit who could give me vectors and weather information not a mobile phone, until I was on the ground and safe.

Based on the evidence to date, that is what he was doing, industry insider.

Walking through the time line as I understand it, the "text" communication ceased from the cockpit about four minutes before the mishap. If you look at the radio transmissions being discussed and available, he was absolutely doing the old fashioned "work with ATC" drill that all of us are familiar with ... using a radio.

Why was he talking to them? To see if he can get into a helioport or not, or if he has to adapt another course of action. (Some are suggesting that RTB is what he had chose when the helo and crane tried to occupy the same space).

Unless further information is available, I find the issue of "texting" to be a red herring.

Four minutes at 60-70 knots is how far? Four miles, and more, depends on winds.

Anyway, I am out of this thread, sorry to have intruded.

[Stevie B]

Friend of mine has just pointed out the Lat/Long of the crane that was published in the Notam. Not sure how accurate Google Earth is, but 5129N 00007W seems to be about half a mile to the East, just on the Western edge of The Oval cricket ground.....I could be mistaken.

Mind you, the Notam does say "Within 1nm of" the above position...

[AnFI]

The flight was completely safe above bkn cloud in very good visibility all the way to elstree (where there were "no holes"), and the divert to redhill, which was clear, was a fine plan that would have presented no difficulty. A careful look at the txt exchange shows that it was useful and positively helpful (the best up to date information, and no distraction of any kind). It became awkward when it appeared that Battersea was "open" - OPEN is a loaded word and can be taken to mean a number of things... like perhaps the wx is ok for example. The only unread msg was saying conditions at Redhill were good and it was useful information - which nearly got through.

The heli was in very good conditions "VMC on top" of broken cloud.
There was no txt distraction during the negotiation to go to Batt - indeed only radio as an 'extra workload' including an unlucky frequency change 7seconds before collision.

I am amazed that obstacles are not lit by high intensity lighting especially in close proximity to aerodromes - yes it might have made the difference
You can't be sure he was in cloud despite it appearing so from some perspectives - and anyway clouds still have visibilty sometimes of several hundred meters - so a suitable light may have been seen especially on a boom which was implausibly far from a tall building (which may have been in sight (probably was))

I saw blue sky nearby, so his local conditions are hard to call.

This pilot was famously WRONGLY blamed before for an accident which turned out sometime later to have been a mechanical failure... so it is completely unacceptable to rule out a malfunction, or some other factor, of some kind in this case.

[zkdli]

SASLESS
From the report - The pilot was given a clearance through controlled airspace via the london eye enroute to his destination which was not in the London City or London CTR. The minima regarding aircraft inbound or outbound from an airfield in the zone therefore did not apply. He was give a choice between VFR or Special VFR - this allowed the pilot to comply with either criteria. He was given a maximum altitude to fly in the zone.
You can see from all CAA publications and the AAIB report that the route was in CAS and a clearance was given. It is the responsibility of the pilot to advise if he cannot comply with the clearance and relevent parts of rule 5. The report also shows that the controller asked the pilot if he wanted an IFR clearance - the pilot declined this opportunity and said the he was VMC" on top" - given the weather reports, this did not necessarily mean that he was not complying with the VFR.

[readgeoff]

@NorthSouth. I am not suggesting the client is to blame for commercial pressure in this incident. Indeed as pointed out the client was suggesting not to take off from Redhill in the first place.... Twice.

By commercial pressure I mean in the mind of Mr Barnes for whatever reason real or imagined. Several radio messages and texts look to me to show a pressure to perform or at least be seen to try his best "at least we tried" "just put it down in a field if I have to" etc.

That ultimately looks to have led to Mr Barnes chosing to try to get to Battersea at his clients suggestion descending from a safe VMC position above the tops in an IFR machine into poorer weather below above central London.

As others have said and is so often the case this report has many alarm bells ringing throughout the chain of events.

[Helinut]

SASless,

There are 2 Control Zones that cover the area of (Centralish) London:

The London Control Zone and the City Zone.

The former is Class A airspace and the latter is Class D. It is not clear to me at all times during the flight which of these 2 zones the helicopter was in: sometimes it would not be in either zone. [In the areas in the vicinity of Redhill and Elstree the helicopter would be in uncontrolled airspace below the London Terminal Manouevring Area (which starts at 2500ft)] Vauxhall Bridge and St George's Wharf are fairly close to the boundary between the 2 zones. My recollection (no chart to hand) is that they are both just in the Class D City Zone.

In Class A airspace IFR is the norm. VFR is not permitted and non IFR traffic may be permitted SVFR.
In Class D VFR and IFR are permitted, although non-IFR traffic may have to be SVFR in some circumstances.

The flight rules not only affect the visibility and weather limits but also the low flying rules that apply. For example, when under SVFR an aircraft is exempt from the 1,000 ft rule, but not when VFR.

[Pittsextra]

Given this:-

0640
Pilot
Operator
Freezing fog all london airports ok up north have text [client] clearing between 8 - 10

0705
Witness A
Pilot
Give me a call as I have checked weather and freezing fog around at the moment

What does the limitations section say about icing for a 109E?

[AnFI]

There is no indication that he flew in any icing conditions - not a factor.

[JimBall]

Maybe some silence, pending the final AAIB report?

They have so many things to consider with this flight. Its return journey to London from the aborted Elstree landing went straight into Class D. To remain legal off-routes, G-CRST would have to consider the 1000ft rule and the impact of EGR 157. (Note - the northbound track shows an awareness of 157, kinking left for Brent.)

Looking at the detailed track from Westminster (157), it seems he may have been forced lower as he tried to avoid 157. Given his experience, this could mean that he was in cloud from after leaving Westminster Bridge, heading west.

These so-called secure areas of 157, 158, 159 don't do the job they should. And may cause problems for low level traffic.

But that's it from me on this.

Too sad.

[Pittsextra]

Really??? you're kidding... AAIB:-

At 0720 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 3,100 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C and QNH was 1010 hPa.
At 0738 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 1,300 m, the temperature was -6° C, the dew point was -6° C and QNH was 1010 hPa.
At 0804 hrs, the wind was variable in direction at 1 kt, visibility was 5,000 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C and QNH was 1011 hPa.


Much of the area was prone to widespread low cloud, poor visibility and patches of freezing fog. Cloud bases were in the range of 100 ft to 400 ft agl at 0800 hrs. Visibility was generally below 4,000 m, with several areas of London, including London City Airport, reporting freezing fog with visibility of approximately 700 m.

Visibility at nearby airports (London Heathrow, London City and Royal Air Force Northolt) was generally less than 4,000 m at 0800 hrs, and as low as 700 m at London City Airport. Freezing fog was forecast for Redhill and Elstree Aerodromes, and at London Heliport until 1000 hrs.

[OvertHawk]

I have many thoughts on this, but the one that appears not have have been mentioned thus far is - "The Passenger reported that he twice told the pilot that the weather at Elstree was bad and recommended that he should not take off"

Call me a cynic, but he would say that wouldn't he? We've only got his word for that and he's hardly likely to turn round and say "oh yeah - i told him there were some holes around Elstree and really encouraged him to try" is he?

Whilst the texts are a matter of record, the contents of phone calls are not.

[jimf671]

Friend of mine has just pointed out the Lat/Long of the crane that was published in the Notam. Not sure how accurate Google Earth is, but 5129N 00007W seems to be about half a mile to the East, just on the Western edge of The Oval cricket ground.....I could be mistaken.

Mind you, the Notam does say "Within 1nm of" the above position...

Yes. Using notamdecoder.com that position, from the Q line, resolves to the grounds of Ibberton House which is most of the way to the Clapham Road and 800m from the crane (over 3000' from centre of river?).

However, as you point out, the NOTAM states WI 1NM, and this is reflected in the 2nm diameter circle displayed for this notice on notaminfo.com.

Two interesting small discrepancies emerge though.
1. The notaminfo.com map displays the location at a more accurate position within 150m of the crane and a similar distance from the river.
2. The NOTAM E line shows seconds figures in the position information and resolves to Pascal St outside Covent House which is 600m from the crane and the same, about 2000', from the centre of the river.


"... and offers no analysis."

[AnFI]

"3,100 m, the temperature was -5° C, the dew point was -5° C" - is not icing conditions.

Most of his flight was in crystal blue bone dry air, with a shallow presence of colder moister air below him - but no indication of flying IN icing conditions - it might be a red herring.

Just because FZFG is present at some locations does not mean he was in it.

[Pittsextra]

AnFi - with the addition of this:-

"Much of the area was prone to widespread low cloud, poor visibility and patches of freezing fog. Cloud bases were in the range of 100 ft to 400 ft agl at 0800 hrs."

I don't think you can say with certainty that there was no possibility of meeting icing.

Of course you can say just because the met briefing says XYZ doesn't mean you are in it, so from that I agree, but I don't plan my flight with the mindset "what the hell I'll have a go and stick it in a field"...

If thats how we are going to advocate we go flying its not for me.

[NorthSouth]

zkdli:The pilot was given a clearance through controlled airspace via the london eye enroute to his destination which was not in the London City or London CTR. The minima regarding aircraft inbound or outbound from an airfield in the zone therefore did not apply. He was give a choice between VFR or Special VFR - this allowed the pilot to comply with either criteria. He was given a maximum altitude to fly in the zone.Elstree to the London Eye goes through the London CTR and R157 - the Eye is inside R157. A clearance into the London CTR cannot be VFR, it can only be SVFR or IFR. And the report says "At 0755 hrs, G-CRST was put under radar control as it entered the London CTR." So there is surely a question of what kind of clearance was offered and how that might have affected the conduct of the flight.

readgeoff, re the decision to go to Redhill, NB that AFTER his client told him Battersea was open, the pilot texted his operator asking if Redhill was still clear, but the AAIB notes that the reply "Yes it’s fine still here" "was not read". So the pilot had no confirmation of conditions at Redhill, but had some inkling that Battersea might be possible. So I can't see that it necessarily indicates any kind of commercial pressure mindset. Couldn't it equally have been the client showing concern for the pilot, knowing he had taken off despite the client's advice, and trying to do his best to find somewhere for him to divert safely? He went to the trouble of phoning Battersea - apparently unprompted.
NS

[Richard Westnot]

NorthSouth - is on the money ;)

[robin]

When I fly my fixed wing toy, I am barrelling along at 100kts + but at 2000' or so. PB was flying much lower but the worrying thing for me was that there was quite a lot of text traffic. I know I can dictate a text on my smartphone so I don't have to key it in. Reading a reply is something different. I would be surprised if AAIB didn't remark on this in the final report

[Torquetalk]

AnFI

If there is widespread FZFG, low cloud, poor visibility, temperatures around -5 & -6 and nil spread - how can you can you be so adamant in dismissing icing?

Even if you can fly in clear dry air (it was over London in nil wind so I seriously doubt it was crystal blue!), you still have to land. And you will be flying in cold air in a cold aircraft. So unless you are flying above an inversion - the incipient icing conditions below would almost certainly accumulate on the aircraft once you descend back into the saturated air below. And the ice might like your aircraft anyway, even if it is initially warmer than the icing conditions.

Seriouly AnFI - what do think is causing visibility to be poor, if not ice-cold condensation?

[Richard Westnot]

robin - what are the differences that you would deem important between a/ reading a map or b/ reading a text ?

I would suggest that the last text was not read for a reason.

[SASless]

Our discussion about Air Space, Rules, Minimum heights are all well and good.

But....we have to recall one small important point....the basic requirement to maintain adequate visibility to see and avoid obstacles and other traffic.

Ultimately....something happened that worked to allow the aircraft to strike the Crane....and that is where the focus of the investigation needs to be with all these other issues being ancillary to that singular focus.

[A30yoyo]

The St Georges Wharf site was known as the Vauxhall-Effra site for some time in the town-planning world (CAA input para 5.29)
http://www.lambeth.gov.uk/moderngov/Data/Planning%20Applications%20Committee%20(replaced%20by%20PAC%2 01%20and%20PAC%20A%20on%2025.05.07)/20031118/Agenda/Report%20-%20Planning%20Report%20-%2018-11-2003.pdf

Para 4.7, same document, notes the 50-storey residential block replacing the 7-storey office 'Block L' of the earlier scheme approved ca.1999-2001

(I believe the Effra was a South London river which drained into the Thames nearby)

[Richard Westnot]

SASless - Not much that you have said I disagree with.

Notwithstanding that, the crane was notamed. The height information was available to the controller as was the position and height to the A109.

[fairflyer]

On the subject of cold helicopters flying in cold conditions, did the interim report identify if the airframe had been cold-soaked all night outside, or wheeled out of a hangar, and if so when during the morning was it wheeled out and was the hangar heated overnight?

Aircraft and their instrumentation and electronics generally like to be warmed, gently.

A cold-soaked helicopter going into the prevailing conditions would be more likely to have associated problems.

[Jed A1]

RW seriously - what's the difference between a map and reading / sending a text?? Try it, even sat at home behind a computer desk.

Instead of seconds with regard to a map, fractions of minutes with texts. 20 - 30 seconds a go at best with texts. In that time the whole situation and outside world has changed.

Anybody trying to defend a single pilot in marginal conditions at low level texting is barking up the wrong tree.

[firebird_uk]

One factor I have not seen reflected in this thread yet is the commercial pressure the pilot was applying to himself.

Working as a contractor he was (presumably) only paid when he got to fly. The winter slowdown and recent poor weather may have made this day one of only a few in his diary (though I concede that I may be completely wrong here). The commercial pressure could be his financial pressure.

Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?

[SASless]

Notwithstanding that, the crane was notamed. The height information was available to the controller as was the position and height to the A109.

That is true.

Yet something happened to allow the aircraft to hit it....and only two basic choices exist....either it was in cloud/fog and could not be seen.....or it was visible and something happened that caused the aircraft to hit it despite being visible.

If it was in cloud...so was the aircraft.

It it was not in cloud....why did the Pilot not see and avoid the Crane?

[chopperchappie]

I wouldn't dream of speculating on someone I'd never met's integrity but based on human nature, I would be inclined to suggest most motorists involved in an accident walk away convinced there was some reason it wasn't their fault. They can't all be correct!

The thought had occurred to me reading through that an average person in the position of the client may slant the words and emphasise the bit that later turned out to be important. Without the rest of the conversation that bit could be insignificant. That said its the bit the papers replay.... Nuff said.

I am very impressed by AAIBs response but still confused about 2 things though;

1) no mention about that the building had not yet made it onto aviation charts or approach plates - as discussed here a few days ago.

This would have been a significant factor IF the NOTAM was miles out geographically and even more so if the top of the building was in cloud (at 590ft) and the aircraft was descending/flying through that cloud as the AAIB radar height plot suggests.

Irrespective of anything else I struggle to believe such an experienced pilot would fly that close to the building itself - the only inference I can draw is that not only did he not see the crane he wasn't situationally aware of the building itself (maybe as there's nothing else around above 332ft on the charts)

2) NATS (apparently) released a statement to the press very very quickly saying that the aircraft had been previously under a service but wasn't at the time of the accident. Howcome? It was either in ClassA or ClassD talking to Thames Radar and being given instructions about where he could and couldn't go.
Did I misunderstand the statement or did it get reported wrong?

AAIB "at 07.55 GCRST was put under radar control..."

I have no axe to grind and just want to sort the wheat from the chaff but just become suspicious when there is a statement relating to the NOTAM but not the geographic accuracy of the notam IF that is questionable, no information on what the charts say but info on the ANO is quoted etc and I didn't see anything in the AAIB report stating that the ATC advised the aircraft of the NOTAM and/or the building - given the height (i know - altitude) of the aircraft (even if it is the pilots responsibility to ensure terrain clearance) it looks to me that the pilot and the controller were both not aware how close the obstacle was.

It sounds obvious but all the speculation about texting and icing seem to ignore the basic question - its a huge building and if you were aware it was there why would you even consider going that close that you could hit the crane?

So all said and done readgeoff asks a good question, you are en-route back to Redhill - client advises Battersea may be open. If not to just save a few minutes flying time why bother to land at Battersea ?

A) you have to as the weather seems too bad to continue - seems not by the casual R/T reference to it being "useful"

If you don't declare a wx diversion I assume you get charged full wack so probably marginal difference between the cost to RTB. Vs? Landing - why bother?

B) you suspect (or know) client intends to meet at Battersea to complete flight

Doesn't quite tally with the chill pill - I'm not that fussed if we don't go suggestion!

EDIT - please note i was typing while SASless was posting but both arrive at same key facts and were independent works!!

EDIT2 - OK I just re-read the AAIB RT transcripts - Thames Radar asked the pilot to call Battersea 7 seconds before impact. So even though it was only by a few seconds, technically not under NATS control. It has been speculated that a frequency change caused distraction, I'd have Battersea selected as my next flip-flop flying down H4 even if I didn't intend / need to call them just in case.

[Richard Westnot]

SASless - Indeed. Knowing that the pilot is spoken about here as being as professional. (and I do not doubt that for one minute) Could it not be that he was marginally on top of a layer and did not see the crane ?

I see no avoiding actions given to the A109 in the ATC transcript published by the AAIB.

[SASless]

That would bring up another issue....Cloud Separation requirements in the varying airspaces and under the various clearances given.

[reynoldsno1]

May or may not be a factor - cold temperature correction on a baro altimeter? At 800ft, could be over-reading 40-60ft depending on ground temp ...

[Prazum]

How rude of you all, to look back in hindsight with 'this and that' arguments. None of you have waited for the official report before you commented.

From reading the forum, many of you appear to be an intrinsic part of the aaib. Or so it would seem.

Many people will have viewed this forum about what happened and what they will have seen is a bunch of non qualified opinions about what happened. Your view will be the basis of their view and I have no doubt will also become a reported view. Confirmed or otherwise.

None of us know what actually happened. Lets the aaib understand, reflect, report and advise before you all give your opinion.

[Sioux4D]

IMHO, notwithstanding all the other questions regarding the decision to fly, and in-cockpit distractions, I think that the pilot was unfortunately,and tragically, geographically disorientated, if only for a fraction of the flight.

The AAIB ATC transcript reads that the captain stated he had visual with Vauxhall [Bridge - I assume] and requests entry onto H4 to head West to Battersea Heliport.

He is instructed to hold between Vauxhall and Westminster Bridge pending a decision from Battersea regarding his diversion request.

At this point from the radar track we see he descends, turns, and heads straight for...Grosvenor bridge (West of Vauxhall).

Could it be that in the poor conditions and at 1500ft he had a brief glimpse of Grosvenor bridge (GB) through a gap in the clouds, and simply mistook it for Vauxhall bridge (VB).

If he was correctly visually aware of his location, why would he head past his holding point, against ATC direction, unless he thought he was in the right place. The stretch of water between GB and VB is of a similar length to that of the stretch between VB and Westminster Bridge (WB).

His arc to the right side of the Thames prior to GB, then makes sense given he assumed there was a tall building lurking beyond the bridge on the left bank...which would have been true if he was indeed approaching Vauxhall.

Once given clearance to land at Battersea he turns to the right over what he assumes was WB area, way above any hazards below.

Up to this point the flight seemed to be impeccable (regardless of whether he should have been there), so it does not seem fitting that he would ignore ATC direction at a well known holding point, unless he had momentarily lost his situational awareness.

This is by no means a professional judgement, nor should it be taken as such. I am not an aviator, professional or otherwise, however I do have the utmost respect for those who are.

Apologies for any inaccuracies, I will certainly edit/remove the post if it causes any offence.

[Richard Westnot]

Prazum - Eh ? :confused:

Some of us have debated about what is in the preliminary AAIB report.

Some of us have debated about what is so far missing from the AAIB report.

And some just do not have a clue.

[SASless]

Prazum,

Do tell us about it will you!


what they will have seen is a bunch of non qualified opinions about what happened.

What's the old saying about the Pot and Kettle?

[gulliBell]

...Working as a contractor he was (presumably) only paid when he got to fly. The winter slowdown and recent poor weather may have made this day one of only a few in his diary (though I concede that I may be completely wrong here). The commercial pressure could be his financial pressure.

Was his decision to launch made because he was hoping for the best and in need of a "pay day"?

Just to speak hypothetically on this aspect. If a client calls the pilot and says "don't start the job because the weather is ****e (or whatever), but the pilot does otherwise and gives it a go but turns around because the weather is as the client said, is the Company going to invoice the client for this flight time? Is the contractor pilot going to claim his flight pay because he flew despite the client cancelling? If I were the client I wouldn't pay. If I were the pilot I'd stay on the ground if the client cancelled the job, otherwise the boss isn't going to be happy about the non-revenue flight time.

In this instance (in light of the information in the public arena so far, if true), I'm just left to wonder why, after the client cancelled, that the job still went ahead. To my way of thinking no point starting a job if you're not going to get paid for it, and particularly if it's going to cost the boss money.

[Steve76]

The report states he was in cloud when he hit the crane. Not a nice way for it to happen but we have all done stupid things and unless you have been trying to say VFR in inclement weather, you won't have an idea how easy it is to make this error.
I have yet to see a helicopter drop from the sky due icing and I have accrued a far bit at times. Freezing Fog is the worst but when you are in cloud, low level and you suspect it is clear on top - it pays to climb.

[Senior Pilot]

If thats how we are going to advocate we go flying its not for me.

I think we will all breath a sigh of relief with that statement. For such a low time PPL(H) you have managed to alienate most professionals on both threads on this subject with your witterings.

[mark one eyeball]

I for one find this incident and thread quite captivating, I am interested to read any comments here before the AAIB do its final report while its fresh in everyones mind
There seems to be certain things going on in helicopters ops over the City of London that a lot of folks didnt seem to know about
I am certainly finding out things just by reading this particular thread

So I am definitely in favour of more comments on this thread as a lot of it is good stuff

The incident reminds me of a time I was sitting in the back of an army helicopter going out into the rainforest in Brunei doing the flying doctor service there
As a qualified helicopter pilot I asked the army if I could go along on one of their flying doctor flights just to watch
I got the permission
We took off early in the morning and on the way to the landing site the cloud cover increased until just like this London incident we were VMC on top but on top of complete cloud cover, no hills or rainforest in sight
We got to the landing site area but there were no holes, thank god I thought as I didnt want the pilot to find one and go for it.
Holes have a tendency to fill in very quickly
Unfortunately after holding for about 30 minutes little holes began to develop and became bigger due to the rising sun and temperature
I am wearing a headset plugged in at the back so I can hear the conversation going on with his crewman (this was single pilot op with a crewman in the back).
Pilot said he could see landing area thru the forming holes, so now I started to feel uneasy I guessed what was coming up
He elected to go for a hole and shortly after entering hole we were quickly engulfed in cloud, I saw only cloud nothing else
We might have been 1500' above the ground and now IMC
The pilot says to his crewman I am in cloud look out for the trees!
At this moment I braced for impact thinking the worst, time goes slowly when in this sort of situation
Luckily we came out of cloud over a river and not a hill, that was a lucky escape

So I remember in the AAIB report the pilot commenting he could land in a field if he had to
Its this kind of go mindedness that usually leads to eventually losing the big picture

So now following this incident I want the AAIB/CAA to look more closely into helicopter operations over London especially single crew operations
I think this incident shows up a lot of shortcomings in the present situation
The airspace rules are complicated and restrictive in London

Please keep comments rolling in whoever you are we can still learn a lot about this particular incident and other folks experiences and knowledge

[pilot and apprentice]

Just throwing this out there....

Now we all know someone with a newly printed cpl, they most proberly would give their right arm for a chance to fly with an experianced pilot on these charter flights. Most are proberly trained at the company doing the flights anyway. wouldnt it make it a win win for all if an sic was in there helping the work load........

It might help avoid this type of accident in the future.

Again, unrelated to this incident:

Not necessarily. In good weather and a low workload environment (a teaching environment) yes. Otherwise, the very inexperienced pilot is just one more unpredictable system to manage. It isn't as cut and dried as people on here make out.

There is also the issue of cost for getting this student up to speed. I'd be extremely surprised to see a CPL course being run on a 109.

[paco]

"So now following this incident I want the AAIB/CAA to look more closely into helicopter operations over London especially single crew operations
I think this incident shows up a lot of shortcomings in the present situation
The airspace rules are complicated and restrictive in London"

Nonsense. This incident could have happened anywhere and is a situation faced by charter pilots daily all over the world. The UK (especially London) already has probably the most restrictive rules for flying over cities etc (with the possible exception of Canada). It really needs to be put in perspective - I've been flying around London since 1977-ish, and this is the first incident of its type. It's highly unlikely there will be any more.

If anything, it highlights a possible need for more CRM training, not more rules which will only serve to help the industry die even further.

Phil

[Agusta]

Well said Prazum! :D

A lot of us knew Pete, let the AAIB do their job before making comment or putting him down for being there.

[500N]

Question re the article in the DM today with photos of the Chinnook.

Was that just a media beat up as it didn't look that close.

Crane driver captures 'near miss' with Army Chinook on camera just weeks before fatal helicopter crash | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2267027/Crane-driver-captures-near-miss-Army-Chinook-camera-just-weeks-fatal-helicopter-crash.html)


I did look back through the thread but couldn't see it.

[cave dweller]

Just for the record, I was on the reception desk at Battersea of the morning of the accident, At no time do I recall receiving a telephone call from the client asking if we were open. I did however take a call from Thames Radar requesting to be put through to ATC

[Lon More]

re the article in the DM todayIt gives the mail a chance to re-run its shock-horror story and republish a lot of sickening photos..

I think there's a lot that hasn't yet been covered in the report. Not least, will Battersea remain open as the airspace around it becomes more densely occupied by cumulocement, or will pressure by the rich and not-so-famous be applied for their convenience?

[500N]

Lon More

Thanks :ok: figured as much.

[206 jock]

Nonsense. This incident could have happened anywhere and is a situation faced by charter pilots daily all over the world. The UK (especially London) already has probably the most restrictive rules for flying over cities etc (with the possible exception of Canada). It really needs to be put in perspective - I've been flying around London since 1977-ish, and this is the first incident of its type. It's highly unlikely there will be any more.

This is possibly true. However, I read an interview with the crane driver that helicopters regularly flew below the height of the jib. So there is no room for complacency.

I just wonder what the reaction on Rotorheads would have been if the pilot had been a 500 hour PPL(H) and not a Skygod. Somewhat different, methinks.

[chopperchappie]

Cave Dweller

Thanks for the post - interesting

I am assuming that AAIB have verified calls/texts actually were logged even if they can't prove the exact contents of voice calls.

That said - what would be the benefit of telling the pilot that Battersea was open ?

[Grenville Fortescue]

An alternative graphic (in metres) of the final flight profile -

https://lh6.googleusercontent.com/-i0kFumCMtjs/UQD6HY3M75I/AAAAAAAALn0/s10GhcRI7Es/s712/Helicopter-crash-graphic-002.jpg

[Bravo73]

Just for the record, I was on the reception desk at Battersea of the morning of the accident, At no time do I recall receiving a telephone call from the client asking if we were open. I did however take a call from Thames Radar requesting to be put through to ATC

Have you told the AAIB about your 'record'?

[readgeoff]

@NorthSouth said "readgeoff, re the decision to go to Redhill, NB that AFTER his client told him Battersea was open, the pilot texted his operator asking if Redhill was still clear, but the AAIB notes that the reply "Yes it’s fine still here" "was not read". So the pilot had no confirmation of conditions at Redhill, but had some inkling that Battersea might be possible. So I can't see that it necessarily indicates any kind of commercial pressure mindset. Couldn't it equally have been the client showing concern for the pilot, knowing he had taken off despite the client's advice, and trying to do his best to find somewhere for him to divert safely? He went to the trouble of phoning Battersea - apparently unprompted"

The AAIB report has the text to his operator also timed at 07.55 so it is plausible Mr Barnes was writing and sending this text before or while receiving the text from the client. Your interpreted sequence and suggestions are also plausible of course.

In my view it is entirely reasonable for a client to look for an alternative pick up point (or suggest an alternative wx diversion). It is then down to the pilot to decide the actual course of action.

[John Eacott]

I've followed this with interest, and especially appreciate the input of those with good knowledge of the route and the locality.

As with so many PPRuNe discussions there are always the keyboard warriors in love with their own opinion, but I feel many here may not appreciate that the A109E is both very stable and is easily flown with the Sperry helipilot and flight director system. Hands off control is quite usual and texting would hardly be an issue, not like many GA light helicopters: it certainly shouldn't be looked upon as a sign of poor airmanship by the pilot. Far rather, it should be seen as a sign that Peter was proactively seeking first hand information to add to his decision making ability.

I have seen nothing in the report(s) to date to indicate the speed of the helicopter, which is possibly nearly as important as the height when considering the ability to avoid obstacles. Because the Power is capable of 160kias cruise doesn't mean that Peter was not using good airmanship and flying at a slower speed, e.g. vMin? Just curious to know if there has been any reporting of plotted speeds.

[212man]

John, the AAIB bulletin shows radar traces that would appear to be at 1 second intervals. I think some cross-correlation with google earth would give you the ground speed.

[paco]

"I just wonder what the reaction on Rotorheads would have been if the pilot had been a 500 hour PPL(H) and not a Skygod. Somewhat different, methinks."

I can't see why. My reaction and comments would have been exactly the same.

Phil

[206 jock]

Phil, I should have made clearer the distinction between my two points. The second was a lot wider in context.

[SilsoeSid]

Just one thing ref the last text, "Yes it's fine still here";

Although in the SB it says, "NB. This text was not read", this doesn't necessarily mean that the text wasn't seen. Although we don't know which type of smartphone was used, certainly with iPhones and Samsung Galaxy, a message as short as 'Yes it's fine still here' can be read without 'opening' the phone.

[bookworm]

Elstree to the London Eye goes through the London CTR and R157 - the Eye is inside R157. A clearance into the London CTR cannot be VFR, it can only be SVFR or IFR. And the report says "At 0755 hrs, G-CRST was put under radar control as it entered the London CTR." So there is surely a question of what kind of clearance was offered and how that might have affected the conduct of the flight.

I think you're splitting hairs.

The track shown in Figure 1 looks as if it skirts the edge of the class A London CTR where it meets the class D London City CTR. You'd need more detail to see if he were 200 yards to one side of the boundary or the other. The Eye is right at the boundary, and is used as a landmark for N-S transits passing through the western edge of the City CTR.

Thus for the original clearance, "VFR IF YOU CAN OR SPECIAL VFR" is pragmatic and reasonable, and if VFR then flying it "VMC on top" of low fog is also reasonable. It is rare in such circumstances not to have the surface in sight at all (even though it might not be a useful bit of the surface) so it probably met the letter of the SVFR conditions, if not the spirit.

The consequences of the difference between SVFR and VFR are twofold: the separation requirements are not pertinent here -- there was no other aircraft that was relevant. Thus it's only the 1000 ft congested area rule that applies to VFR and not SVFR. Since the collision itself requires a breach of the 500 ft rule anyway, it doesn't really matter if the 1000 ft rule applied or not.

He was talking to "Thames Radar", which controls the City CTR, though it was on the same "Heathrow Radar" frequency that controls the London CTR. When the pilot requested the diversion to Battersea, both parties probably had more important things to do than consider whether the clearance was VFR or SVFR. Either way, the responsibility lay squarely with the pilot for assessing if the weather conditions permitted avoiding obstacles visually.

I'd rather have ATC concentrating on providing a service than worrying about the niceties of the peculiar classification of the London CTR, wouldn't you?

[sarboy w****r]

It was my understanding of the rules that the only flights within R157 that are permitted are along (i.e. overhead) the Thames, i.e. H4 (excluding helimed, police and flights for which exemption has been obtained from the Diplomatic & Protection section of the police Special Branch). Or am I mistaken?

[rattle]

PPL(H) warning before I get a battering.

Fascinating reading different opinions. I have a question about weather diverts and pan calls. I assume that when Battersea took the call from Thames, the ATCO at Battersea has to get permission to accept an unscheduled aircraft, maybe for insurance reasons, or simply because the few spaces available are booked up (though probably unlikely to be used that morning?). One post discussed ILS into LCY or LHR. Financially (as commercial reasoning is being discussed a lot here), what are the costs of doing this? Would LCY only accept a heli for a Pan call? Looking at the track, would immediate clearance into Battersea (if, as suggested, he wasn't unsure of which bridge he was over) have potentially have save this incident? It wasn't a pan call as there was no issue as far as we know, but should some allowance be made for weather diverts - land now, discuss later at Battersea?

I think there was an event a couple of years ago where a heli diverted into Luton and got stung for a lot of money. Safer than picking a field outside the boundary, but financially penalised for making the right decision about the weather.

To reply to one post, I see the client as thinking he can drive to Battersea for his flight (if it was open). Comparing the costs of a landing fee there to the extra costs of returning to Redhill doesn't matter - who would want to drive from Elstree to Redhill at 0800 on a weekday? Be quicker to drive to the intended destination.

[Feathers McGraw]

I'm wondering about the change in heading that happened before crossing the north river bank. Heading is pretty much directly towards Vauxhall Bridge but then there is a shallow S-turn which results in crossing the bank significantly west of Vauxhall Bridge and then reversing course back towards the bridge after a right turn.

What would be the reason for the S-turn? Avoiding sensitive areas, Houses of Parliament etc., or something else?

[Satcop]

I'm wondering about the change in heading that happened before crossing the north river bank. Heading is pretty much directly towards Vauxhall Bridge but then there is a shallow S-turn which results in crossing the bank significantly west of Vauxhall Bridge and then reversing course back towards the bridge after a right turn.
“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE
MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER
BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.
Holding waiting for Battersea to open.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Plus,

Thames Radar
“AND YOU CAN MAKE IT QUITE A WIDE HOLD, YOU CAN GO AS FAR AS LONDON BRIDGE”

...........

[fairflyer]

See the last AIP plate for Heliport (18 October 2012) identifies St. Georges tower at 322 ft, not actual 594 ft today.

Appreciate there are NOTAMs updating figures, nevertheless, that tower has grown a lot since October. AIP details often take say three or more months to be updated.

Whose responsibility is it to monitor rising building heights and feed data through CAA system such that they appear correctly in AIP (and swiftly)? Who would give CAA the update on current building height?

See below:

http://www.ead.eurocontrol.int/pamslight/pdf/4e415453/EG/C/EN/Charts/AD/EG_AD_3_EGLW_4-1_en

[Feathers McGraw]

"Holding waiting for Battersea to open."

But the S-turn took place before he reached the river, and was followed by a right turn onto the river centreline towards Grosvenor Bridge followed by a right turn to fly back east towards Vauxhall Bridge. London Bridge (the "quite a wide hold" point) is a couple of miles to the east of Vauxhall Bridge.

I was wondering why he would deviate from his direct to Vauxhall Bridge initial heading. And a hold between Vauxhall and London bridges would have required a left turn onto the river centreline.

Just trying to understand his position relative to Vauxhall Bridge...

[edit] Just noticed Sioux4D's post about just this positional anomaly, we both seem to have picked up on it at a similar time.

[fairflyer]

Are developers obliged to give SRG/CAA regular updates on heights of buildings under construction, or the local authority perhaps? There must be some obligation/procedure on the part of some body or organisation to feed the information to the CAA.

In this instance, who told the CAA what height the building was or would be at any point in time? The developer (Berkeley Group?), construction company, architechs, Lambeth Council (if that's the right one?). Where's the legislation dictating who must inform whom of increasing building heights and timescales?

[ShyTorque]

“ROCKET 2, YOU CAN HOLD ON THE RIVER FOR THE
MINUTE BETWEEN VAUXHALL AND WESTMINSTER
BRIDGES AND I’LL CALL YOU BACK”.

Interesting to compare this to the boxed information at the bottom of page 11 of the AAIB bulletin.

[jellycopter]

I used to fly G-CRST extensively a few years ago just after it had been fitted with updated avionics including a Garmin 430 GPS/Nav/Com and TAS. One really irritating 'helpful' feature of the 430 was that the GPS Screen would go yellow and give a terrain alert within 500ft of anything in its database.

From memory, it was possible to turn off the alerts at the start of the flight but not possible to inhibit them completely (at least that's all I could get it to do). Every time the unit was turned on, it would default to terrain alerts on. What this meant was that every time the aircraft descended below 500ft on approach, or maybe to dodge a cloud, the bloody screen would go yellow losing the GPS map (and traffic alert screen). This tended to distract me from flying whilst the I cycled through the menus to turn the alert off. I found it a complete pain in the arse.

I've no idea of knowing whether the alert was switched off for the accident flight, but if it wasn't, it would have probably been ignored anyway as this was probably 'conditioned' into the pilot of G-CRST. It reminds me of one of Aesop's Fables about the little boy that cried wolf.

It's sad to think that this peice of technology, correctly managed, could have saved the day. There were similar parallels in AJ's crash in Ireland where the EGPWS has been disabled.

Has the on-shore charter/free-lance industry got anything to learn from this?

[Grenville Fortescue]

Jelly, not being funny but you might just want to send off a short email to the AAIB repeating what you've just posted.

You never know, they could find it useful. To be honest, the more information they have the better.

[email protected]

[Richard Westnot]

jellycopter - a very interesting post and valid point/s.

I suggest that this type of distraction far outways a quick glance at any text message. (5 mins earlier)

I think that it is also true to say that the Rocket2 was preparing for a landing and that is why perhaps a decent was in progress under svfr.

[chopperchappie]

Quote; fairflyer

See the last AIP plate for Heliport (18 October 2012) identifies St. Georges tower at 322 ft, not actual 594 ft today.

Appreciate there are NOTAMs updating figures, nevertheless, that tower has grown a lot since October. AIP details often take say three or more months to be updated.

The building(s) showing 332 (322) were there on Ed 13 2008 Heliroute chart, so it appears that represents next door not St George Wharf Tower!
It was photographed as being substantially taller than (the 332') next door in Feb 2012 (source Wikipedia)

Quote; jellycopter

Terrain Alerts
I used to fly G-CRST extensively a few years ago just after it had been fitted with updated avionics including a Garmin 430 GPS/Nav/Com and TAS. One really irritating 'helpful' feature of the 430 was that the GPS Screen would go yellow and give a terrain alert within 500ft of anything in its database.

But presumably not if they haven't been put on the official charts yet!

As far as I can tell even sky demon that downloads from the internet real-time superimposes the NOTAM and pops up a warning would be fairly useless as an avoidance tool in London as the vertical and lateral limits you'd look for outside such a built up area would just have pop up after pop up - therefore if you were flying 6-700 ft above you wouldn't want an alert (it is tuneable but I don't think people are going to reconfigure alerting settings before each flight)

[TeeS]

I'm sorry guys but there are only two ways to safely avoid a building like that, either look out of the front window or fly 1000' above it. All the technology in the World is just a comfort blanket after that.

TeeS

[chopperchappie]

John, the AAIB bulletin shows radar traces that would appear to be at 1 second intervals. I think some cross-correlation with google earth would give you the ground speed.

What makes you think the plot is every second?
Just wondering as there's quite a big dip to 500-odd feet (which could always be an isolated dodgy reading) but that's a short period of time to drop and rise again (is it) which made me think the interval could be more than 1 sec, based on assumption rather than fact though.

[Thomas coupling]

Wow! Must be one of the most actively mined threads in pprune for years. Even Heliport and Flying Lawyer have come out of the closet :ok: Good to hear from you guys. Other credible contributions from less known posters (industry insider/grenville et al - fascinating and enlightening reading).
But - for me after reading this whole sorry saga from beginning to end I am now wondering whether complacency was the real cause for the untimely ending to this guys life.

For me, the scene has been set as I run through the scenario in my head as if it were me flying on that fateful day:

"..weather's worse than I'd expected/been told. I've had enough of this - going to divert till it clears. [Clipping the top of the weather - in and out of light wispy cloud for a few seconds at a time]. I'll clear it with ATC. Battersea it is, they want me to hold till they get the all clear from them. [Cab slows and establishes a lazy S pattern between the bridges].
OK let's clean up before I start the descent....radios done ( look in)...make a quick call to the client...done (look in) . All done. Bring it round and descend about now....final look in for landing checks and.........................

I don't agree with some when they say we should refrain from denigrating our own on a public forum. I certainly don't wish to denigrate PB. This forum is littered with exceptional and very experienced aviators from all walks of life. One can only walk away from having read threads like this - a little wiser I would suggest. Don't knock the ethos therefore, that is Pprune.
PB's background suggests he was what most of the rest of us aspire to. BUT for me, complacency is what killed him that fateful day. It crosses all boundaries and pilots must continue to guard against it.
I know that as I was clocking up the hours it was getting harder to maintain that "edge" because one thinks one has been it and done it all. There surely can't be any further "great" surprises. I must not have succumbed therefore, to that dark unforgiving shadow that is complacency because I made it to retirement in one piece after 30 years of mil/public/private helo flying. But I do remember courting complacency on those rare occasions.
I hope that those still immersed in the profession (regardless of experience) will read this thread atleast once and understand that you can never drop your guard...not for one second - not when you're in the driver's seat.

Perhaps I am way off the mark, but a lot of the nearly 500 posts to date suggest PB was distracted in time and space and his SA desserted him when he most needed it. Blink and you're gone. RIP.

[Lonewolf_50]

I hope that those still immersed in the profession (regardless of experience) will read this thread atleast once and understand that you can never drop your guard...not for one second - not when you're in the driver's seat.

Perhaps I am way off the mark, but a lot of the nearly 500 posts to date suggest PB was distracted in time and space and his SA desserted him when he most needed it. Blink and you're gone. RIP.
Interesting take. I have an idea that the AAIB may be looking into two separate concerns. (As Mr B was not on an IFR flight plan ...)

a. You can't avoid what you don't see. Per your thoughts above, if the attention was diverted inward, how does one produce the evidence to support that line of inquiry?

b. You can't avoid what you don't see. If attention was outwards, why then crane not in sight, and avoidance move not made? How does one produce the evidence to support that line of inquiry?

[BossEyed]

Tc, a well painted picture. A further thought and possible correction - I don't think a particular element of your detailed scenario:

[Cab slows and establishes a lazy S pattern between the bridges]. OK let's clean up before I start the descent....radios done ( look in)...make a quick call to the client...done (look in) . All done. Bring it round and descend about now....final look in for landing checks and.........................

...quite fits part of the Special Bulletin information.

The way I read it, text comms with the client was complete before the aircraft descended to the river and took up the lazy S, so quick call to the client after "radios done" seems the wrong order.

Given that impact was only 7 seconds after the final RT call acknowledging the Battersea freq, it may be that the end sequence was instead:

... radios done (look in) and...

:(

Disclaimer - safety engineer, not RW pilot.

[sycamore]

C-C, the radar plots may be a compilation from different radars,but generally radars turn at about 5-10 rpm ,I think,unless for GCA/Sra.
Based on the AAIB pictures, I calculate that his Radius of turn,and possible rate of turn is about 400ft,and about 18-20 deg/sec; this would calculate to a speed of about 75kts,and about 45 deg of bank.If the numbers are changed,the radius will decrease,or increase with speed changes,or bank angle,and rate of turn.(Someone cleverer will probably come up to shoot me down..)
As the aircraft had been cold-soaked for a while in flight,it may also be possible that having entered some cloud/fog ,that the windscreen may have become partially obscured,unless heated,or maybe the wipers were in use.
Likewise,as the sun was rising,a grey spindly crane `skeleton` would also be difficult to see.

[Pace]

I will not post in the other thread but this one is OK.

I do not know if complacency is the right word? Overconfidence in his abilities to handle all that was thrown at him? (maybe)

But at the end of the day he was unlucky a small mistake leading to Catastrophic results!

Sadly two very close friends of mine were killed recently flying in a Navajo fixed wing twin! One an ex Easy Jet Captain the other a very cautious and experienced multi thousand hour pilot.

They dipped a wing into cloud tops which concealed a tree! Tree! Crane??? When turning base to a landing. Both Killed!
When the cards do not fall right ??

I have examined many of the Cranes in London. Many have minimal lighting, some solar powered! Some not working all inadequate.

As our Legal friend hints at! the lighting regulations need tightening up on these temporary structures which tower very high and blend into the grey skies! High intensity lighting has to be a must!

Even the ordinary guy in the street points out the mass of Cranes littering the skyline and casts doubt on inadequate lighting.

The aircraft I fly has to have TAWS fitted because pilots are not perfect beasts and we need protecting from our own mistakes.

Would proper lighting have alerted him? We will never know but inadequate turned off lighting did not help him one iota.

These Skyscrapers cost £billions proper lighting is a fraction of cost to incur and they should be on equally on poor weather grey days as at night!Please not those pathetic light bulb red things.

It is too easy to try and make the poor pilot a scapegoat for all ills

Pace

[OvertHawk]

"They dipped a wing into a cloud that contained a tree"???

WTF???!

That's why we have altimeters, maps, GPS, moving maps, Radalts and common sense for God's sake!

[gulliBell]

...The aircraft I fly has to have TAWS fitted because pilots are not perfect beasts and we need protecting from our own mistakes.


The aircraft I used to fly had TAWS fitted and it threw up so many distracting false alarms I usually turned it off.....that might have been because it was an aeroplane TAWS unit fitted in an IFR Helicopter, dedicated HTAWS units are probably better. My other memory of TAWS is one day I did fly past a bloody big hill in bad weather and it was only through visual reference that I avoided flying into the hill. TAWS Terrain warning gave me no prior indication what-so-ever. In that instance it was only visual reference and looking outside and not relying on TAWS that protected me from making a mistake. In the low level environment you MUST be able to see where you are going with or without TAWS, and that of course means no scud running in clouds!

[A30yoyo]

With an 800ft Notam obstacle on the river's edge how is it possible to fly on H4 in that sector legally below 1300ft ?

[SARWannabe]

by not flying over the top of it - lateral separation

[212man]

"They dipped a wing into a cloud that contained a tree"???

Air Accidents Investigation: Download PDF document (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Piper%20PA-31-325%20Navajo%20C-R%20G-BWHF%2008-12.pdf)

[Pace]

Your accident report link shows a remarkable similarity in the sense that in both cases it involved a collision with an obscured object in cloud and both with highly experienced and regarded pilots and shows that even the best can get it wrong with tragic results.

That's why we have altimeters, maps, GPS, moving maps, Radalts and common sense for God's sake!

But then why bother even marking high buildings with lights in the first place? Or for that matter making Jets like I fly carry expensive TAWS?

The facts are that CFIT accidents still feature highly in accident stats and the argument that he should not have been such a silly boy is not enough.
Maybe compulsory fitting of high intensity lighting on Cranes which tower above high buildings, in densely populated areas near aircraft routes should be an extra safeguard.

They may not have saved this pilot we will never know but maybe they would have. Not having any lights at all certainly did not and having the lights mandated at night only is crazy!!
One stupid little static light bulb like red light is not good enough!!!

Pace

[NorthSouth]

Maybe compulsory fitting of high intensity lighting on Cranes which tower above high buildings, in densely populated areas near aircraft routes should be an extra safeguardMaybe. Or imposing ATC-defined weather minima on ops in such areas, as is the case for Class D zones. To answer those that say this places too much burden/power on ATCOs who can't account for local variation in e.g. cloudbase, it could be backed up with more weather recording stations transmitting data to the relevant ATC unit e.g. ceilometers/transmissometers on the roofs of key buildings?
NS

[stuckgear]

North and South,

I'm also 'out' of the other thread and wont post as it seems it was intent on a blame game and making unsubstantiated accusations as to the late Peter Barnes character. That has no place, even in the gutter press.

i lost a couple of freinds in a fixed wing incident on a respositioning flight on a corporate jet; in imc on ifr they turned for RTB with an engine issue and drilled into the ground near vertical. it would seem that in imc dealing with an issue the aircraft got away from them and were unable to recover at the height they were at.

accidents, as we have seen, can happen to the best of us, even in the most routine of circumstances.

the point that Pace, and I have been making is that of course there is no guarantee that lighing of hazards would prevented the accident, visibly marking hazards to flight can only serve a benefit, i can think of no realistic detrimental result of lighting hazards to flight.

you rotor guys, i sincerely tip my hat to you all. you conduct operations often at low altitude with threats and hazards in closer proximity than fixed wing commercial ops.

as we've seen, the section of the river is narrow and with hazards abutting the flight route, manouvering space is limited. could the crane being lit have prevented the accident ? we dont know. could it have helped in preventing it ? possibly.

is there any detriment to crane and jib marker lighting ?

[sarboy w****r]

Lonewolf:

Interesting take. I have an idea that the AAIB may be looking into two separate concerns. (As Mr B was not on an IFR flight plan ...)

a. You can't avoid what you don't see. Per your thoughts above, if the attention was diverted inward, how does one produce the evidence to support that line of inquiry?

b. You can't avoid what you don't see. If attention was outwards, why then crane not in sight, and avoidance move not made? How does one produce the evidence to support that line of inquiry?

Re b:

Restricted area 157 (R157) extends to 1400' AMSL. You are permitted to fly through it at less than this, provided that you are following H4 (overhead the Thames). I'm happy to be corrected if someone knows differently. Unless I'm very much mistaken, the trace clearly shows the aircraft well and truly inside R157 - a very long way to the north/west of Vauxhall bridge (the aircraft was half-way to Victoria station, nearly 1km inside R157 according to my map).

Why would you do this?

Unless perhaps there is cloud over the Thames and the hole you are following down is slightly to the north of the river and there is cloud over the Thames itself. Get down to height for an approach near Westminster Bridge, cut the corner of the Thames because of low cloud ahead but a clear area to the right (at Lambeth Bridge) and continue the descent, S-turn between Chelsea Bridge/railway bridge and Vauxhall whilst holding then turn inbound towards the river whilst scud running and... don't see what's hidden by the cloud/fog by the south bank. (And whilst possibly being distracted by radios or misted screens etc). The early photos of the scene show the level of the fog/cloud, and I went past near there that morning just before the time of the crash and saw the weather. The cloud/fog was obscuring the tops of buildings.

[bookworm]

Maybe. Or imposing ATC-defined weather minima on ops in such areas, as is the case for Class D zones. To answer those that say this places too much burden/power on ATCOs who can't account for local variation in e.g. cloudbase, it could be backed up with more weather recording stations transmitting data to the relevant ATC unit e.g. ceilometers/transmissometers on the roofs of key buildings?

The "ATC-defined" minima in class D are applicable to arrivals and departures only, not transits, for good reason. The "ATC-defined" weather is observed at the airport, not over the whole of the zone.

[NorthSouth]

The "ATC-defined" minima in class D are applicable to arrivals and departures only, not transits, for good reason. The "ATC-defined" weather is observed at the airport, not over the whole of the zone.Fair point. But perhaps the current responsibility on helicopter pilots on SVFR clearances through the London CTR to maintain 1km vis, clear of cloud and in sight of surface could be beefed up with better weather info. It may also be necessary to give ATC the power to refuse clearance if the data available to them indicates that those minima cannot be met.
NS

[[email protected]]

NorthSouth - no I think the real issue is that there are those who insist on kicking the backside out of the 'clear of cloud in sight of the ground' definition and push on when they are neither.

Corporate charter relies on getting the job done - so much so that there will always be those who 'go the extra mile' to satisfy the client and often it goes wrong.

When it doesn't go wrong, someone pats themselves on the back for a job well done and no lessons are learned.

At the Grayrigg train crash in Feb 07 where several SAR assets were working in poor conditions (low cloud in the dark) suddenly out of nowhere appeared a civilian helicopter bringing a Railtrack executive to the scene. Self-positioning GPS letdown through cloud in poor weather into a live TDA with SAROps on, at night with no NVG. Some pilot thought that was an acceptable risk to get the job done - had he speared in he would have been villified on these pages (and rightly so) - I hope he learned his lesson, but I doubt it.

Quite how you legislate or educate to prevent such stupidity I just don't know.

[Grenville Fortescue]

Originally Posted by [email protected]
Corporate charter relies on getting the job done - so much so that there will always be those who 'go the extra mile' to satisfy the client and often it goes wrong.

When it doesn't go wrong, someone pats themselves on the back for a job well done and no lessons are learned.

The words nail and head spring to mind.

Edited to add: I do however see how PB got into this fix. It was not as if he was flying into storm cells and freezing rain, in fact his VFR on top status may have provided a certain level of comfort in his mind. Indeed he knew that this low lying stratus would eventually lift (from the very reports he received prior to take off).

By all counts (if I read it right) he was on his way back to Redhill and had said "at least we tried" when the suggestion apparently came through from Richard Caring saying "Battersea is open".

We all want to be angry ABOUT this crash (not at PB) but the truth is there is no single element which is exclusively to blame for this tragedy. It is, as it almost always is, a combination of factors uppermost of which are weather and pilot attitude.

[SilsoeSid]

I think someone mentioned the ac being fitted with Garmin 430 - If the next frequency isn't selected, it takes approx 6 secs to change the frequency and flip it across. I guess unless they are completely burnt out, the dialled up and selected frequencies can be examined.

(Are other systems much different?)

[bookworm]

Fair point. But perhaps the current responsibility on helicopter pilots on SVFR clearances through the London CTR to maintain 1km vis, clear of cloud and in sight of surface could be beefed up with better weather info. It may also be necessary to give ATC the power to refuse clearance if the data available to them indicates that those minima cannot be met.

I agree with the "better weather info" bit. But ATM/ATC (and controlled airspace associated with its provision) is there to keep aircraft apart, not to keep aircraft from CFIT in marginal weather. The current paradigm is to leave the latter to pilots, and, while pilots self-evidently make mistakes from time to time, the system as a whole works better if ATC sticks to its core competence. Weather is sufficiently patchy and variable that it can only be properly assessed from the cockpit.

[SASless]

That works when making an Instrument Approach and you arrive at DH/DA....but to allow Pilots to make the determination of weather minima for a certain parcel of Airspace....how would that work if you have several Aircraft in different parts of the Airspace, each with different weather?

Example.....a small airport in Washington State is renown for the Fog hanging over the Terminal/FBO area where the AWOS is located while the other 4,000 plus feet of Runway can be Clear, Blue, and 22....thus the Control Zone is IFR and requires either an IFR or SVFR Clearance for any operation. VFR is not an option in that situation.

There has to be a set Weather Minima to trigger IFR/VFR operations....and a single source to make that determination. It isn't a perfect world...but you have to start somewhere.

[ShyTorque]

I think the answer is to re-write the rules to include a mandatory minimum altitude, as well as a maximum, on certain sections of the heli-routes. This one in particular, and for ATC to include that in the route clearance.

[JimBall]

ST: I think the answer is to re-write the rules to include a mandatory minimum altitude, as well as a maximum, on certain sections of the heli-routes. This one in particular, and for ATC to include that in the route clearance.

Sorry but no. The Thames. 40 mile tidal estuary. Sunrise on a calm winter's day after a cold night. As the sun's rays go almost horizontal through the atmosphere, and as London "wakes up" with energy producing lots of heat - you get the most incredible fast-forming mists. I live by the Thames in London - and I've seen the mist grow in seconds from a clear morning.

London airspace is a cage. Once you're in there, you have to cope because there are few escape routes once the mists start moving around. So - don't go there when the wx seems likely to become your enemy.

There ARE minimum alts. G-CRST broke several of them and flew through restricted airspace - all because he seems to have been trying in vain to stay visual. Look at the track from Lambeth Bridge over Victoria on the "north" bank. Class D, Off-route, 1000ft above nearest highest object within 600m??? And well inside R157. He then went into the Class A and took full advantage of his exemption from the 1000ft rule - and even the 500ft rule as he became ready to land in accordance with "normal aviation practice".

This was a pilot beaten by the wx. The AAIB may tell us why. But I think we all know.

[Ye Olde Pilot]

I have to say that this is one of the best bits of advice I have read anywhere in the last few years. This advice applies to fixed wing as well as helicopters.
Some of the best in motorsport and business have been killed by "The Edge".

Thanks to Rotorhead/Thomas Coupling for the following.....

Wow! Must be one of the most actively mined threads in PPRuNe for years. Even Heliport and Flying Lawyer have come out of the closet Good to hear from you guys. Other credible contributions from less known posters (industry insider/grenville et al - fascinating and enlightening reading).
But - for me after reading this whole sorry saga from beginning to end I am now wondering whether complacency was the real cause for the untimely ending to this guys life.

For me, the scene has been set as I run through the scenario in my head as if it were me flying on that fateful day:

"..weather's worse than I'd expected/been told. I've had enough of this - going to divert till it clears. [Clipping the top of the weather - in and out of light wispy cloud for a few seconds at a time]. I'll clear it with ATC. Battersea it is, they want me to hold till they get the all clear from them. [Cab slows and establishes a lazy S pattern between the bridges].
OK let's clean up before I start the descent....radios done ( look in)...make a quick call to the client...done (look in) . All done. Bring it round and descend about now....final look in for landing checks and.........................

I don't agree with some when they say we should refrain from denigrating our own on a public forum. I certainly don't wish to denigrate PB. This forum is littered with exceptional and very experienced aviators from all walks of life. One can only walk away from having read threads like this - a little wiser I would suggest. Don't knock the ethos therefore, that is PPRuNe.
PB's background suggests he was what most of the rest of us aspire to. BUT for me, complacency is what killed him that fateful day. It crosses all boundaries and pilots must continue to guard against it.
I know that as I was clocking up the hours it was getting harder to maintain that "edge" because one thinks one has been it and done it all. There surely can't be any further "great" surprises. I must not have succumbed therefore, to that dark unforgiving shadow that is complacency because I made it to retirement in one piece after 30 years of mil/public/private helo flying. But I do remember courting complacency on those rare occasions.
I hope that those still immersed in the profession (regardless of experience) will read this thread atleast once and understand that you can never drop your guard...not for one second - not when you're in the driver's seat.

Perhaps I am way off the mark, but a lot of the nearly 500 posts to date suggest PB was distracted in time and space and his SA desserted him when he most needed it. Blink and you're gone. RIP.