Not respecting SOPs

[Citation2]

Considering the fact that 75% of aviation accidents are directly related to human factors, pilots should make every effort to respect procedures established by the manufacturer and airline SOPs. Has anyone of you guys come across any of the situations listed below ?Some of the items are for A320. How would you/ could you correct that when a majority of pilots do not respect SOPs or deliberately violate SOPs because they are simply considered as minor items?

Undocumented procedures generally speaking like resetting breakers when not documented.
Cockpit preparation carried out in an anarchic way, switching on or off whatever comes across.
Before start check list requested when external power connected , or takeoff data not inserted, or fuel pumps off.
No headset used for departure and landing and when below FL100.( Eu ops requirement)
Breifing not performed.
Checklist is read by memory
Beacon switched On, with ground personel working and cargo door open.
Reluctant to use Flaps 3 for take off , and considered as " critical flaps setting" although giving the optimum performance.
After start checklist requested with NSW still disconnected and amber on ECAM memo.
Below FL 100 PF head down on MCDU, and performing PNF tasks.
During Lvp take off , ILS pushbutton ON. Not aware of yaw bar function.
During LVP ,Flight control check performed while taxing out.
During LVP, before take off checklist performed while taxing out.
During LVP , taxi speed above maximum authorised speed. " it"s okay I can see the green lights very well "
During LVP not switching on all lights when stopped.
When *the clearance is given *while taxing out, PF is setting the FCU cleared altitude and setting the transponder head down, and in the same time taxing the aircraft . Disregarding SOP and Airbus 3rd golden rule " one head up at all times "
Accepting intersection take off on ATC request although performance data for that intersection is not available "we can do it as it is just 50 meters shift, no problem"
Descent below MSA
No arrival breifing.
Not considering Optimum FL.
When PNF is copying wheather from Volmet, ATIS, PF *listening out *also on volmet or atis frequency with loud volume and nobody listening out on active ATC frequency.
Standby altimeter set and left in QNH *while during descent or just before top od descent in an anticipation way , before being cleared to an altitude.

Approach flown without any chart .
Refuelling with pax on board without dual communication established
Not respectingthe procedure to open the cockpit door.
Any ATC request to the pilot would give an affirmative answer .. Without calculating, without having a look at the performance of the aircraft Can you make *Fl 360 with 10 nm ? Affirm , then climbing until vls is reached.

[Mach E Avelli]

Wow, is this one Captain, or a compilation of many Captains within the one company?
If it is one Captain, I would be refusing to fly with him. If it is an overall company culture, I would be dusting off the CV. An accident waiting to happen....

[9.G]

c2, just change to a reputable operator. Way too many deficiencies to tackle for my taste. :ok:

[PJ2]

Citation2;

Does your company have an operational flight data analysis program?

Even for small operators with small fleets and aircraft with bread-and-butter parameter sets, a decent FDM/FDA/FOQA Program can be run, (provided it has been set up correctly and the data validated.)

A question:
Is this person unique in disregarding SOPs or is this a company-wide trend?

Either way, a flight data analysis program will be able to provide feedback on the daily operation so that these "violations" (Reason's definition etc., not regulatory), may be addressed.

I suspect that a company-wide trend will not welcome a flight data program but the proof is in the results. If such SOP violations are limited to one or two persons, there are other ways to address the matter. As always, such problems if chronic and not once-off's, almost always start at the top of the organization: What is tolerated as an operational standard by senior management is what will occur on the line.

Very often, and where the intent is to improve safety and not resort to ineffective methods such as blame, enforcement and discipline, a flight data program will provide the very basis for change because it provides data not opinions and does not countenance the usual psychological or organizational denial mentality that often those new to flight data analysis can sometimes have.

Good luck. If that is truly the way someone's operation is being routinely carried out, that is seriously disrespectful of one's professional integrity, one's colleagues, one's employer and one's passengers. History shows that it is an accident waiting to occur.

[Citation2]

This is not a unique person behaviour, but rather a wide trend noticed in aviation industry, not everywhere hopefully but enough airlines worldwide. And I am sure that some of you can recognise one or more scenarios listed above.Unfortunately this also happens, sometimes , in reputable airlines which are recognized as being the safest or the best.

I do not understand this lack of discipline , nor the culture and disrespect for the profession that we chose for passion and we all know the result of such behaviour.

The Flight data monitoring has limited capabilities, like it would not be able to detect wether the FMGS entered data was made by PF or PNF, or FCU entered altitude.

[deefer dog]

Citation2, next time we fly together I think a little chat might be in order!

[Microburst2002]

Many of those who "commit" those acts will kill you for really minos deviations, like jot setting the loudspeaker knob at one o'clock or something lime that...

It a part of life :(

[de facto]

The Flight data monitoring has limited capabilities, like it would not be able to detect wether the FMGS entered data was made by PF or PNF, or FCU entered altitude.



You seriously need to get a hobby.

[A37575]

Makes you wonder if the SOP's are too prescriptive leaving nothing left for the pilot to use initiative or be flexible. I simply cannot imagine all these sort of gripes occurring when USAF and RAF bomber crews were flying their single pilot IFR four engine bombers with their crew behind them during missions over enemy territory. And they were getting shot at as well.

While I dips me lid to those old bomber crews I sometimes shake my head in disbelief at the proliferation of verbal "SOP's" and other such unnecessarily complex flight deck 'procedures" foisted upon intelligent crews that I am sure could fly quite safely and efficiently using normal airmanship given half the chance. :ugh:

[john_tullamarine]

Thread inadvertently deleted. Back to the front page in case there be further commentary.

[Rananim]

SOP's are too prescriptive leaving nothing left for the pilot to use initiative or be flexible
I sometimes shake my head in disbelief at the proliferation of verbal "SOP's" and other such unnecessarily complex flight deck 'procedures" foisted upon intelligent crews that I am sure could fly quite safely and efficiently using normal airmanship given half the chance

Nicely said.:DAnd you're Australian and older generation.It had to be.

As for the original post.The failure to brief is poor airmanship.Checklist by memory is also poor airmanship.Checklist discipline is key.I suppose a two item checklist like descent can be done off the top of the head.I dont see a problem with that but it should never be trained that way.Descent below MSA?Well,you do that on every landing but what context?The Captain doing things whilst taxying?Well,it depends what really.And the conditions at the time.Some are very good at it and some arent.I dont agree that a Captain taxying should never do anything else but taxi.A good Captain will know what he/she can do safely.The Beacon on with cargo doors open is a form of communication.Its neither good nor bad airmanship really.It might get the doors closed quicker or it might not.Standby altimeter set in QNH early/late..okay now things are getting a little picky.Dont forget that flying by rote is in itself poor airmanship.Maybe theres a reason he/she wants the QNH.At any rate its something that a good co-pilot would observe,make a mental note of,and say nothing more on the subject.Not considering optimum FL?So many variables here.Turbulence and wind components are two I can think of.Also,as a very general rule,more experienced pilots fly below optimum whilst more inexperienced pilots gleefully climb to optimum and above not knowing just how dangerous it can be.However,flying more than 2000 feet below opt on a regular basis would cost the company and so would also be poor airmanship.The headset not on below 100?yes,it should be worn but the cockpit spkr and handmike will still enable timely comms.Its not a major infraction to be honest.App flown without any chart?Thats poor airmanship unless on a visual approach I suppose but the chart would still be to hand.Not respecting the cockpit door procedure?Well,that one would cost you your job in the States.This is a SOP well worth following I agree.Taxi speed?Again it shows a general pattern to flout rules but in of itself its not of great concern unless taxiway conditions are hazardous.What was the infringement?3 knots?More?

The danger of your post is that the person you describe is someone who has poor airmanship rather than someone who disregards SOP's.By calling good practice/judgement SOP rather than what it really is(ie airmanship),you fuel the fire for an ever-increasing tide of fiddly procedures to be imposed upon perfectly good flight crew who can think very well all by themselves.The only actual "procedure" you mentioned was the cockpit door SOP and that is certainly a good one.

[172_driver]

Every captain I've flown with have their way of doing things. Not always exactly by the book. As long as those are just minor deviations that aren't safety related, I let it pass without giving it a second thought. From the list that would involve things like proper door opening procedure, not climbing all the way to optimum FL, no arrival briefing (when both are familiar) etc. If I have any questions I will ask, otherwise wake him up at TOD. A certain captain is known for reporting people for silly things... not exactly a treat to fly with him. Not the type of reputation I'd like about myself.

Without stepping on their toes too hard and challenge their authority, there are obviously times when you have to put your foot down. It has happened a few times and usually leads to a pretty tensed day with not too much chit-chat. Not that it has to be, but the tensed environment lead to a break down in communication and CRM. Some people have a very task orientated style, some are more person orientated. Dealing with SOP adherence I think requires a little bit of both.

[Sciolistes]

Agree with 172 about briefings, but after reading our ASRs I am changing my attitude to these things as most incidents seem to occur at our base, so complacency maybe rife.

I also agree with not dying in a ditch over non safety deviations. But if the deviation is also clearly inefficient I think it is my duty to press for some kind of acceptale rationale, but at the end of the day he is the boss.

However, when I do have to insist on a different course of action, it thus far has never resulted in a tense day. Quite often the conversation has the potential to get a little tense as some guys can get a bit defensive initially, but so far I have always found a way to get my concern across and dealt with without sacrificing the convivial atmosphere. My most difficult time was with a TRE inappropriately interfereing with the decision making process on a line check! But we survived :}

[A and C]

Good SOP's are the building blocks of a flexable and safe operation not the word of god written in tablets of stone never to be departed from.

[PENKO]

A lot of points you mention are valid, but a lot of points could also fall under the 'seeing the bigger picture' or 'experience'.

-Not calculating if they can reach a certain level before answering 'affirm' to ATC. Experience comes into this. Also the knowledge that they can always timely inform ATC if and when the restriction cannot be made. If you have to calculate each and every ATC request then you will make everyone's life more difficult than necessary 9 out of 10 times.


-Not considering optimum. Well, that depends on what the optimum is based. Do you ask them why they don't climb? Maybe they don't care, but maybe they have a valid reason. Maybe they have route experience about early descents. Ask!

-Before start checklist with external power connected. Is that a problem? How do you do that checklist with an APU inop? :E

-Briefing not performed. Do you brief everything at your home base? Probably not. If not, then you are on the same sliding scale...careful before you point your finger.



Again, most other points you raise are very valid. I just want to impart on you that the world is not always black and white.

[9.G]

sounds like an immature safety culture might be in place or a misconception of the roles assigned. Perhaps a closer look into part A might prove useful to remind ourselves of the authorities and responsibilities. Put it simple: Commander has the authority, apart from responsibilities and F/O responsibility to assist the commander and to contribute towards safe conduct. The commander should ideally balance between being person and task oriented however exercise assertive style, encouraging and promoting open communication channels at the same time. CRM is supposed to be an effective tool and not grounds for competition or abuse. Cultural, ethnical, religious differences can be mitigated by establishing a safety culture revolving around the subject rather than person. Most of the time it's not what you say but how you say it. For the F/Os a piece of advise: remember a commander was in your place you haven't been in his/her, for the commanders: nothing is more worthy than a timely advise from a fellow crew member. There're always bad apples here and there but in a proper safety culture it's down to individuals not the whole entity. :ok:

[misd-agin]

SOP's are not in place to be used as instruments of torture. Following them is excellent guidance. Beating the other guy to death with them isn't.

Strive to follow them. At the end of the day if the other guy thinks you followed every SOP, or has to think about which one's you missed, you've done well.

And deviating from SOP? Figure out the balance. What matters and what's just the latest soup du jour that might be different tomorrow? If every little thing bothers you the other guy isn't the problem and heaven help your FO's when you upgrade.

Once you figure out the balance that works for you remember how the non SOP cockpit made you feel. Use that to be a better Captain to your FO's when you upgrade. :ok:

[RAT 5]

Guidance for wise men and obedience of fools. However, there are times when it is very foolish to deviate. Knowing the difference is for wise men. The sad thing is I've had F/O's who did not know when to deviate and when the SOP was not the best thing to do: e.g. "use V/S 1000fpm when 1000' from cleared altitude. DO NOT use V/S on departure until flaps are up." On a SID with ATC cleared level lower then Jeppe: noise abate 1 so accelerate at 3000' agl. Cleared only 4000' due traffic descending 5000'. TA on said traffic passing 3000', and of course flaps still extended. I suggest V/S to avoid an RA. "We're not allowed to do that." AGH! Airmanship. Wise men stuff.

[Citation2]

SOPs could be deviated if the commander deems necessary for the safe conduct of the flight. As professionals, we all know this basic rule.

The concern is more related to a routine flight where no particular reason dictate a deviation from SOPs.

An altitude that is 4000 ft below the optimum level produces a fuel penalty of 5% as a general rule. This is your contigency fuel.
If this culture is spread througout the company with a fleet of 50 or 100 aircrafts , figure out the financial damage , I will let you do the maths.

This could contribute to the factors that will close your company, and let you jobless.
The commander has a duty to operate safely And economically. Safety being on top of priorities.

Now if your decision is not just arbitrary and you have reasons at flying even 8000 ft below optimum level, and if your common sense , experience and airmanship make you believe that this is the best course of action for the safe conduct of the flight, considering weather , turbulence etc.. then your well intentioned and thought decision is not just praiseworthy but you are an exemple for the aviation community.

Minor or Major deviations ? I do not think that one is able to quantify the severity of the deviation.
Regulations have been written with blood and accidents unfortunately. And I am sure that we could have learnt something from the " bomber of WW2" , like previously posted above, in order not to reproduce some mistakes. They might appear " minor " to you and could be devastating at some point.

Firstly wearing the headset is a EU ops requirement from the moment you take your clearance. Okay not using the headset below FL100? Big deal? Maybe nothing will happen on "that " flight. But you are just adding a contributing factor to an accident, or you are just adding a hole in your Swiss Cheese model. ( you'd better have French cheese at that point)
Communication being the primary tool of a good synergetic cockpit, by deciding not to wear the headset (just because they bother you ) , you are installing a barrier to communication, which could be severe in critical times, or critical phase of flight.

I can't remember dates and time but some time ago , a corporate jetliner crashed because the flight crew failed to cross check the validity of the approach plates . Thats's where " Mr Pilot " should question himself about the pertinence of the validity plate crosscheck. And not just come up with " don't bother me with your 13-2 effective.."

If it's been implemented , bear in mind that it is for a serious reason and not just for decoration.

SOPs are not a one day job research. Nobody came up one day and said " this is how to do it " We learn every day and it is a never ending process.

Learning is done through experience and mistakes . And SOPs are the experience of our predecessors, and manufacturers .They are also made from the feedbacks of many airlines around the world, which experience different environement , they are evolving and not fixed as being " the science" .
That is why you have revisions.

if you have reasons to believe that SOPS will affect safety in that particular situation that s where you will use common sense and airmanship .
That' s where you will address your concern to your airline which will probably forward to the manufacturer, then maybe a revision will come up , and I will learn from you.

[PENKO]

Mate, relax, we know about SOP's. Most of us are very conscientious SOP huggers, at least that is the case in my major LCC, and I guess it is so for most major outfits so there is no need to preach. Now did you read our replies?

[9.G]

penko, C2 is expressing concerns over his outfit and rightfully so as it seems to be widespread phenomena. C2, I salute you for your dedication and persistence. There's no major or minor violations, it's individual attitudes promoted by corporate culture. Whatever the outcome of your efforts might be sooner or later you'll find the right place for you. :ok:

[PENKO]

I know 9.G and I have written about that. If it is a common occurrence that captains in his outfit have a total disregard of SOP then I share his (deep) concern. I think we all do. I just wonder if there is more going on because some of the things he mentions are very mundane.

-Like the two way comms required when fuelling with pax. Even my airline accepts that this can be achieved by banging on the side of the fuselage when there is a need for communication with the fligh tdeck. We're not sitting high up in a 747.
-Headsets to be worn when copying the airway clearance. Again, it's a regulation but there is also a real world out there..

In the end, if we were to follow each and every regulation to the letter we would achieve maybe one take off per day per crew. After which, per regulation, the crew will call in fatigued!

To be absolutely clear, I am not advocating non-compliance to SOP! Not at all. I am a big believer. I marvel at the fact that tomorrow I can be called up to operate in a foreign base with foreign people I have never met and make it look like we have been doing it together for ages. This is only possible through strict adherence to sensible SOP's. And yes, it avoids making stupid mistakes.

[Citation2]

I am not preaching , I just wanted to point out that a deviation without reasonable grounds , being minor or major, could have a significant impact either on safety ,being the primary concern, or economically.
What definition do you give to minor and major deviations? Would you consider flying below MSA more severe as not breifing your approach ? That is where I disagree.

Not crosschecking the approach plate validty has been more detrimental than flying below MSA, in the past.

Considering the deviation as being minor could be just reassuring or comforting in one's decision , not to qualify it as being a lack of discipline.

Airmanship is that portion of flight which didnt fit into your SOPs , where you exercised good judgement. That's why aircraft are not flown by robots which are unable to sense a situation out of the ordinary.

Not being able to distinguish or integrate the environement around you such as weather , performance etc.. Could be as detrimental as respecting blindly SOPs.

As for the rest, the history has shown the results.

[A Squared]

Standby altimeter set and left in QNH *while during descent or just before top of descent in an anticipation way , before being cleared to an altitude.
It's not addressed one way or another in our company SOPs, customarily we set QNH in our ESIS when received at TOD.

Accepting intersection take off on ATC request although performance data for that intersection is not available "we can do it as it is just 50 meters shift, no problem"

Hypothetically, if you had 1000 meters more pavement than you needed and you were 20% lighter than your climb limited MTOW for the conditions, would you say that safety had been dramatically compromised by giving up 50 meters of runway?

[single chime]

This thread does not belong in tech log, it belongs in the CRM forum.

[Cardinal]

SOPs are not a one day job research. Nobody came up one day and said " this is how to do it " We learn every day and it is a never ending process.

I try fairly hard to adhere to SOPs in my daily routine, I find it produces less conflict and I don't have to alter my style relative to the "coolness" of wichever captain I'm flying with.

Principled Adherence should be weighed differently than SOP itself. The former reflects flight discipline and a systematic way of adressing threats. The latter is negotiable, transient, and widely varied. Your airline and mine operate the Airbus family. Yet 8 items on your list either contradict our SOP or are not addressed at all. Yet in our fleets several million hours we haven't bent anything. So there is more than one (safe!) way to skin a cat.

SOP is valuable, but not sacrosanct.

[PENKO]

Principled Adherence should be weighed differently than SOP itself. The former reflects flight discipline and a systematic way of adressing threats. The latter is negotiable, transient, and widely varied. Your airline and mine operate the Airbus family. Yet 8 items on your list either contradict our SOP or are not addressed at all. Yet in our fleets several million hours we haven't bent anything. So there is more than one (safe!) way to skin a cat.

Very wise words.

[grounded27]

Wow this is such a simple subject. Follow SOP and you will have a great career until the unexpected happens and your lack of common sence may result in a disaster creating an admendment of your SOP. Blue Skies to all airmen globally over the holidays!

[Panama Jack]

Good discussion with lots of valid points. I feel that "Airmanship" and "Pilot Technique" has been largely lost in a maelstrom of SOP's and Regulatory Compliance.

I am not trying to discount the importance of both; they are extremely important. I am not the guy who can recite the FCOM or OM by memory, yet often start my crew briefings by clarifying that my objective is to comply with the SOP's and Operations Manual and I encourage any crewmember (from the FO to the most junior FA) to bring it to my attention if they feel that I am not doing so (we all make mistakes). It is important.

But I also mention that it does not mean that we will not deviate from the aforementioned, but it must be a concious decision and we better have good justification for doing so.

[Flappo]

Follow SOP´s and if the situation is not written down, then use the common sense/airmanship.
The main problem nowadays is it can not be sold.

[18-Wheeler]

Has anyone of you guys come across any of the situations listed below ?

Yes I have. The chap in question was one of the ex-Cathay 49'ers and simply refused to follow our SOP's and got very dirty when you didn't follow whatever ones he was doing.
I didn't know what he was doing far too much of the time and went into the office and told them I was refusing to fly with him. I was perhaps more disappointed that he passed the sim rides and was allowed on the line without being corrected.

[A and C]

So I am being told that EASA has decided that it is mandatory for me to listen to the ATC clearance with a headset and not using the cabin speaker ?

[9.G]

lotsa terms are thrown into the round however the experience shows that for the most part there're grossly misunderstood. The very foundation of our profession is discipline e.g. the ability to carry out very much same routine day by day for a single purpose reduce potential errors.
Airmanship is skill and knowledge applied to aerial navigation, similar to seamanship in maritime navigation. Airmanship covers a broad range of desirable behaviors and abilities in an aviator. It is not simply a measure of skill or technique, but also a measure of a pilot’s awareness of the aircraft, the environment in which it operates, and of his own capabilities.
Airmanship can be defined as:
A sound acquaintance with the principles of flight, the ability to operate an airplane with competence and precision both on the ground and in the air, and the exercise of sound judgment that results in optimal operational safety and efficiency.
The three fundamental principles of expert airmanship are skill, proficiency, and the discipline to apply them in a safe and efficient manner.
Discipline is the foundation of airmanship.
The complexity of the aviation environment demands a foundation of solid airmanship, and a healthy, positive approach to combating pilot error.
It's resulted in the new approach to CRM called TEM. ergo always be ahead of your aircraft and be able to predict. As for simple compliance of SOP it's not negotiable and not subjective but a must. Any deviation from such is possible but must be warranted and justifiable let alone safe. Wearing the headset is a matter of discipline not convenience. However it always will come down to an individual attitude no matter how many rules are in place. It's the job of the standard dep, QA and training dep. to weed out bad apples. :ok:

[A and C]

Quote :-As for simple compliance of SOP it's not negotiable and not subjective but a must. Any deviation from such is possible but must be warranted and justifiable let alone safe. Wearing the headset is a matter of discipline not convenience. However it always will come down to an individual attitude no matter how many rules are in place. It's the job of the standard dep, QA and training dep. to weed out bad apples.

I'm not altogether sure if you are not a troll who is having a laugh about this subject but your attitude seems to take any hint of flexibility in the way an aircraft is operated.

[9.G]

A&C, you seem offended by my critics. Conflict management is due then, I feel.
Well, let's start with common objective- safety. Flexibility was granted as necessary, as already stated earlier, provided its warranted etc. unlike a violation. A violation is an act of deliberate action. As a crew member you have singed up to comply with valid rules and regulations, haven't you? EU OPS clearly prescribes when headsets are to be worn which is also part of OM. Now if you chose not to wear it coz you don't feel like or didn't do it before you're clearly violating the regs. It's a fail item during any check, btw. You weren't flexible but complacent. Now if you choose to fly NADP1 instead of 2 due to tight turn or altitude constraint that's where you've been flexible. I'd like to see your reaction if you had to re-do the recurrent for silly things like not wearing the HS. I haven't come across many people not being capable of understanding the lesson. Again it's a corporate culture promoting individual qualities let it be positive or negative. :ok:

[misd-agin]

"Headsets to be worn when copying the airway clearance. Again, it's a regulation but there is also a real world out there..\"

Headsets are mandatory for a clearance? That's laughable from the other side of the pond.

[Mach E Avelli]

Laughable, yes, that something like this has to go in national regulations. Sadly we have become over regulated in the apparent interest of our own safety. Here in Oz there is a fetish for flouro-coloured high visibility vests. If you step on to an airfield without one of these you face prosecution. Seriously. The headset rule is common enough in Company Ops Manuals and does make some sense for some types of aircraft I suppose. If a particular SOP causes no hardship, why not just go with the flow instead of bucking the system just to be ornery?

On the other hand if a SOP is contrary to 'best practice' put up a sound written argument to the Chief Pilot to have it changed, lobby via the Safety Group etc.

[mushroom69]

Agree with Rat!

Considering the fact that 75% of aviation accidents are directly related to human factors, pilots should make every effort to respect procedures established by the manufacturer and airline SOPs

That is an interesting introduction when actually studied. I despise the "accidents are related to human factors" argument. It is true.....but it is only a tiny portion of the Truth. So human factors also contribute greatly to traffic accidents, but human factors AVOID the open manhole cover, the diesel spill on the road, the wet leaves in the bend, the fool running the red, the blown tyre. Of course, all the incidents and accidents AVOIDED due to airmanship and ability, "wisdom," are totally ignored in the introductory statement, which is why I get so irritated by hearing it.

There is also an assumption that SOPs improve that human factor ratio. They are a tool and used properly, reduce stress, as they are ingrained procedures, like tying a shoelace, using the clutch and changing gears in a curve on a motorbike (try writing a procedure for either of these activities) BUT use with wisdom.......... One of my "pet" peeves, although a minor one, is that our checklist calls for the "nav lights "on" before APU start. Our NAV lights have no power on batteri, so selecting them "on" is useless, as they will not come on anyway. Selecting them on however, and then selecting the generator on after APU start, blows especially the tail NAV lamps after a short time. Some sort of surge as the generator comes on line. So I deviate from the order of the checklist to selecting the NAV lights on AFTER APU generator on line.

You would be amazed at the FOs who almost cannot sit still at this horrible deviation!

Yet the same FO would depart with an "open door" warning(!) "Don´t you think it is a false message?" or descend below MDA towards a mountain on an island, because he had intermittant ground contact directly below..... not wise........

[A and C]

The headset on for the ATC clearance is clearly a stupid and unnecessary bit of rubbish from a desk bound shinny ass.

As long as both flight crew members clearly hear and understand the clearance then what matters by what audio system it was received from ? No doubt the headset is still required if the clearance comes via the data link.

Once the aircraft is about to move off and until 10,000 ft I can understand and agree with the use of headsets.

I am still not sure if you are troll, very low time and have little or no experience or are paid to write this SOP rubbish.

OH ! If it is the last of these options do you know the guy who in draft one of the new EASA regulations required ASI's to be fitted to free balloons ?

[bubbers44]

SOPS are good because the bad pilots will do ok. Sort of sad but that is the way aviation is going. It wasn't this way when I as flying. Automation is the answer.

[9.G]

A&C, no point commenting on your example as it's irrelevant. Your take on my posts is up to you. The purpose of this thread is to shed some light on different angles. I just gave you a glimpse into what an examiner will do during the check. Mind you that a TRE has got a evaluation sheet for each and every phase, detailed and laid out as per SOP. TRE is obliged to tick off mandatory boxes starting from preparation till shut down during OPC. OPC is all about SOPs, as you well know. During the debrief TRE will ask you why you failed to do this or that to determine the cause of failure. If you say, sorry I forgot or didn't know it's still a failed item but not a violation. If you say, listen troll your SOPs are rubbish, well then you've willfully violated SOPs thus rendering the entire check as failed. The choice is always yours. This is just a flow of actions for a check. Attitude determines altitude. Yours will put you far below MSL. :ok:

When it comes to the regular line operation, without a TRE breathing into neck, it's folks like c2 we rely on.

[PJ2]

9.G;

I've read your posts and you don't 'read' like a troll at all. You read like someone who knows exactly what they're talking about.

I think your discussion points of the value of SOPs, the value of knowledge and airmanship and particularly the value of discipline in all aspects of one's operation are well worth reading especially for those just getting into the business.

The headset example may not be the best one to illustrate what you mean by "discipline" but anyone who understands the value and the great importance of the points you're making regarding SOPs and cockpit behaviours will also understand your example.

I'd like to talk about the notion of "the bad apple" and organizational behaviour for a sec.

The notion of "bad apple" usually means someone within an otherwise healthy organization, who consistently violates the organization's published-trained-and-checked SOPs.

But if the organization tolerates this in the training and checking process, or if the organization doesn't even know that an individual is not adhering to SOPs and other behaviours known to sustain a safety culture, then it is the organization, not the individual, which has a problem.

The notion of "bad apple" persists and may have some validity in highlighting an individual problem which needs addressing, but since Charles Perrow's ground-breaking insights and work on organizational behaviour (Normal Accidents, 1984) and a huge amount of work done since then by such authors as Reason, Dekker, Helmreich, Foushee and others, the focus is not on the individual but on the organizational environment in which individuals work.

That was Perrow's insight...that organizational values directly affect the work environment including the organization's safety culture. If individual employees perceive that there is an unwritten tolerance for deviations from SOPs then that is the organization's culture and that is how employees will behave.

While there are always varying levels of skill, ability and capacity, SOPs, (as you have pointed out) are intended to provide solid if not straightforward guidance for all. In such an approach, deviations are the exception whereas the notion of the "bad apple", by definition, tolerates the exception.

Nice contribution to the discussion, thanks.

[9.G]

PJ2, thanx. No doubt corporate culture heavily influences individual attitudes.
It's not possible to change someone's temperament but it's surely possible to change the attitude. That's the main task of those creating corporate culture/ ideology. Creating a corporate culture/ideology where an individual identifies him/herself as part of the group sharing common values and pursuing same goals creates probably the strongest profit generator: motivation. For us the ultimate goal is safety so it's all about the safety culture. Somewhat easier achievable in a homogeneous, in terms of values, culture, language etc, environment with a raised and "tuned" generation of the same "breed", if you will, and far more difficult in a heterogeneous one with different cultures, values, languages, backgrounds, experiences etc. With the commercial pressure on top priorities might shift towards profitability reducing the margins, creating tense and unhealthy working conditions. Then there's punitive and non punitive culture, heavily influencing the safety culture as well. It ranges from flying FOQA instead of an airplane and not giving a damn bout SOP coz no actions will be taken apart from a little chit chat or email. SOPs are not flawless and not a panacea but a valid guideline. However a professional attitude towards SOPs should be complied with unless deviation is required due to situation and safety isn't compromised. A professional will use proper channels to contribute towards more efficiency but will lead by an example of a disciplined approach towards SOPs. It's probably the most difficult task to establish a safety culture which advocates for the right attitudes, promotes professionalism, encourages individualism, creates intolerance towards violations and develops consciousness for consequences. :ok:

[Big Pistons Forever]

Wow this is such a simple subject. Follow SOP and you will have a great career until the unexpected happens and your lack of common sence may result in a disaster creating an admendment of your SOP. Blue Skies to all airmen globally over the holidays!

For every accident where following SOPs was a causal factor there are according to one safety study I have read, over 20 accidents where not following SOPs was a causal factor.

My personal experience is that those pilots who continually fudge/modify/ignore/change SOPs are the ones who are most in need of the operational protection that following SOPs gives and is reflective of a broader pattern of a lack of personal and professional discipline.

The SOP should always be the starting point for every action/situation , but of course there will be cases where the SOP may be inappropriate and this is where good CRM will keep the other guy in the loop and contributing.

With respect to the original poster if the SOP violations described are routine and widespread then his/her company has a culture problem which will sooner or later manifest itself in an accident.......

[PJ2]

BPF...Re, "The SOP should always be the starting point for every action/situation , but of course there will be cases where the SOP may be inappropriate and this is where good CRM will keep the other guy in the loop and contributing."

Precisely.

...and re, "With respect to the original poster if the SOP violations described are routine and widespread then his/her company has a culture problem which will sooner or later manifest itself in an accident....... "

Yes, I think so. I would add however, that if it's only one pilot, his/her company still has a problem and it isn't just the one pilot.

[A and C]

You have finally convinced me that you are not a troll, your level of PC retoric is far beond what any troll could achive and as usual with the PC of this world you take the subject far past what is reasonable, a sort of SOP Taliban or Klu Klux Clan, taking reasonable philosophies to extremes and totaly perverting the original good ideas.

As I said on one of my first posts on the subject SOP's are the building blocks of a safe operation but your extreme veiws about the aderance to the letter of the SOP remove all chance of flexible problem solving.

Fortunaly I see very little of your attitude in the airline I fly with, we have a good set of SOP's based on the manufacturers recommendations and aided by modifications to enhance saftey in the prevailing operating environment.

What we are free of is the nif-naf & trivia of people who mandate each last trivial action while failing to understand the very essence of airmanship.

[9.G]

A&C, last attempt to explain. A description of the OPC chart flow isn't my attitude but a regulatory guideline as much as there's a table for acceptable tolerances during mandatory maneuvers for the skill test.
My attitude is plain simple:
compliance with the SOPs is not extremism but professionalism.
complacency isn't equal to flexibility.
Deviations are acceptable provided safety isn't compromised and everybody is kept in the loop.
Violations aren't acceptable.

You're the one who got upset bout the headset requirement and I simply classified your actions. Merry Xmas to you too.:ok:

[have another coffee]

Very nice discussion (for a very long time on pprune)...
The basic question turns around the definition of SOP violation versus freedom of SOP flexibility. I will refrain myself from giving any definition here (not willing to take any beating :hmm:). For sure one can make a proposition around these two definitions to dig any further into the matter.
It is for sure that a simple stance, described as SOP Taliban, or words of that matter will not enlighten any of us. I am sure the writers taking this side are also able to give examples were they could wish for some more adherence (by others of course) to company procedures for the sake of professionalism.
Do not bother to come along with "roque pilots" or not having enough "airmanship". These terms do not, in my view, describe a meaningfull concept at all. How airmanship can fail is beyond my imagination. Although many efforts to describe these concepts have been made in the past I have yet to encounter a good one. Before (any of) you start a reply along these lines, answer this question first; if "airmanship fails or lacks" what concept replaces it (vacuum not taken for an answer!).
How much flexibility is really needed to do a professional job? Which or what SOP will drive me into a mountain/ground/sea etc... Although I personally prefer less on the SOP side, in the end I am being payed to do as Is written in the books. Furthermore I am still covered to go beyond anything written in case safety is at stake. But to be honest it did not happen often to really say safety was a reason not to comply. Usually any shortcoming in this way is quickly corrected.
So what remains? Culture? If defined as a collection of norms and values by a defined and closed group, it will definitely be interesting in terms of organisational behaviour. I fully agree on the notion that a company with a persistent "bad apple" has a bigger problem than the "bad apple" itself. The thread starter even sees a wider trend in the industry as a whole. Is the noticed trend already past a point where this we created a common ground (or lost ground) on SOP adherence? I don't think so. It is however worrisome that some individuals or even organisations completely underestimate the power of corporate culture. Janis wrote something along the lines where the stronger groupthink existed (esprit de corps) less independent critical thinking could exist (to the point of inhuman and irrational actions). For more reading also try and understand some of Weick's work....
As a last note I fail to see how Perrow comes into work here. In my memory he made the important point of certain industries are too complex AND suffer from tight interaction which make them prone to accidents beyond the point where humans cannot longer effectively intervene. I believe his cultural (or better political) part came from the fact that certain groups of people (poor or otherwise with less influence) within a society have bigger changes to be effected by accidents of complex and tightly coupled systems. I stand to be corrected (but give me time to find the book somewhere in between the Christmas carols and fireworks :hmm:)

[PJ2]

Claybird;

Re, "This reminds me of how the Space Shuttle Columbia's accident investigation board described NASA's approach to safety."

Diane Vaughan, writing in "The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA", described the lowering of standards due to past successes as the "normalization of deviance." In the case of Challenger, successful launches occurred at lower temperatures with only moderate burn-through of the sealing O-rings. The engineers argued that launches had not occurred in such low temperatures but management over-ruled the engineers, citing history. Lack of resiliency was considered but until Feynman's now-famous demonstration with a small piece of O-ring, a pair of small vice-grip pliers and his glass of ice-water, the true effects of low temperatures had not been appreciated by the managers and leadership.

The important factor here, aside from normalization deviance is the "new" understanding of organizational behaviour that everyone thought they were doing exactly the right thing. It is a variation on the groupthink theme. Vaughan concluded that there had been no "amoral calculation", (intentional avoidance of standards, and/or negligence). The normalization of deviance concept made visible previously invisible organizational behaviour patterns.

The argument for SOP adherence is grounded in these notions. It can be successfully argued I think that individualism in cockpits, (where a pilot, or the captain makes up his own procedures) can and does work until it doesn't and there is a (perhaps preventable) accident.

In such circumstances the rest of the crew is on his/her own in terms of CRM and otherwise assisting. I argued this in the AF447 thread; - the PF launched individual actions (pitching up) on his own without announcing, (as required by SOPs), what he was doing, without calling for the ECAM actions (as required by SOPs), and, ignoring CRM SOPs by not responding to verbal interventions, (mild as they were) from the PNF.

Judgement is always required in flying airplanes and that is not inconsistent with SOPs. One must know when SOPs must be strictly adhered to for the safety of the flight, and when they must be flexible also to ensure the safety of the flight. Is the problem today not knowing that boundary? I don't know. I do know that despite a slavish requirements which sometimes do not appear to make sense, SOPs are an advancement in flight safety. I know this because as a young oiler I used to keep notes on every captain I flew with and that had ended by the time I had become a First Officer. The one case that comes to mind where a compromise in cockpit SOPs caused the loss of the aircraft and all on board is the Air Canada DC8 accident at Toronto in 1970. See p.91 - 98 of the Report (http://web.archive.org/web/20050529144217/http://www.avsaf.org/reports/CANADA/1970.07.05_AirCanada_McDonnellDouglasDC-8-63.pdf), (give it a moment to load).

There is no argument today for a wholesale setting aside SOPs in favour of individually-created "safer" procedures, especially in air carrier operations.

Perhaps a question that would help here could be, "What circumstances might be more safely handled by varying or even ignoring SOPs, and what operational circumstances demand strict adherence to SOPs?" We all know that both circumstances do exist, otherwise the thread would not be so interesting!

[9.G]

SKYbrary - Airmanship (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Airmanship) Any operator striving for safety must have, apart from the mandatory programs like QA, FOQA etc. well established human resources manual addressing various topics but more importantly conveying a clear message of what the company's philosophy is. :ok:

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Company_Safety_Culture_(OGHFA_BN)

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Adherence_to_SOPs_(OGHFA_BN)

I leave it to each and everyone to decide and choose. :ok:

[Roger Greendeck]

There are two parts to this problem. There is undoubtably an issue of corporate culture that affects compliance with SOPS but there is, I believe, a more important issue: the quality of the company SOPS and regulatory instructions above it.

Where an operation has poor SOPS there is a high likelyhood that people will deviate from them. This results in the normalisation spoken about above.

Poor SOPS can come from a number of factors. But examples I can think of include inappropriate procedures (eg from a different aircraft type that don't apply), procedures resulting from incorrect risk assessment (eg a procedure designed to prevent a risk causes a different, greater one) and excessive procedures.

The last, in my humble opinion, is the biggest issue. We live in a world with a surfeit of lawyers and the answer to most incidents is 'write a rule' to prevent it happening again. This results in a complex interplay of legislation, manuals, memos etc that on paper should make us safer but in most cases rules overlap and contradict. It doesn't take much reading of Pprune to see how wide a variety of understandings there are of what rule applies when, before we even get to what is a good idea!

If we have an operation with a succinct set of rule of what shall and shall not be done coupled with guidance of what should be done and a clear understanding of which is which, it all works. People should and generally will follow the SOPS. But if we have a mixiblob of conflicting, impractical, and incorrect instructions coupled with so many pages of minutiae that no one can remember every rule people won't follow it.

[9.G]

CAT.OP.MPA.215 Use of headset — aeroplanes
(a) Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone or equivalent. The headset shall be used as the primary device for voice communications with ATS:
(1) when on the ground:
(i) when receiving the ATC departure clearance via voice communication; and
(ii) when engines are running;
(2) when in flight:
(i) below transition altitude; or (ii) 10 000 ft, whichever is higher; and
(3) whenever deemed necessary by the commander.
(b) In the conditions of (a), the boom microphone or equivalent shall be in a position that permits its use for two-way radio communications.

Now can anyone tell me what's unreasonable bout this rule? We take it for granted that SOP are the best way to operate. Apart from SOPs there's OM A which also sets forth the framework we're all bound by. Last but not least an abundance of reading material was given with definitions, descriptions and examples to distinct speculations from solid theories. So far I've only come across one case where some of the procedures were modified from its' original version due to an attempt to establish a common procedure across all fleets, mainly Boeing and Bus. That's the worst an operator can do in my personal opinion. Part A is common grounds for operational strategy, tactics, policies etc. SOPs should be kept as it was intended by the manufacturer not at last due to easiest way to keep up with the updates and modifications. :ok:

[misd-agin]

What's unreasonable about the rule?

There are times that we do use our headsets to obtain clearances. Guys have been flying for ages realize when it might be needed. Make it a regulation? :{

"Compton 3G, squawk 1234" requires a headset to understand? :ugh:

[9.G]

Guys have been flying for ages realize when it might be needed. Make it a regulation? the very same notion can be applied to English proficiency. Why all of the sudden after 100 years of aviation history make a reg bout the English proficiency? The answer is: due to hiccups in the past.

Neither am I against it nor for it I simply follow it.:ok:

[Rananim]

may actually agree with each other more than they suppose.I believe in airmanship and judgment,borne from experience and cognition.Airmanship will include many things and is often looked down upon by the SOP technocrats.But actually,the good SOP's,the ones that count and make pure sense as an aviator,come from airmanship.They are the lessons of dead men.So the "airmanship" camp do NOT disregard and disrespect the good SOP's because to do so would be poor airmanship.

Any procedure that is "trifling" is a waste.It adds nothing to airmanship whatsoever.It is there out of someone's misguided need for pedantry.

Example: It matters nothing that you wear a headset when receiving a clearance.What matters is that you hear the clearance,read it back correctly to ATC,and cross-check it with the flt plan and your colleague.If you cant hear it because of extraneous noise,then don your headset and ask ATC to repeat.You,as PILOT,decide this all on your own.

Example 2:It matters nothing which pilot enters the data in the FMC prior liftoff.You can quite easily work that out between yourselves as 2 adults..What matters is that ONE PILOT enters the data and the other pilot x-checks prior liftoff.Or if in flight,the PNF enters the data,the PF x-checks and then the PNF executes.It is the concept of one pilot doing and one pilot checking that is sacrosanct,nothing else.

ALL SOPS can and should be broken where appropiate.Knowing when comes from experience and knowledge.This includes things like we've already discussed like not climbing to flight plan-recommended LEVEL even though the FMC and your over-anxious FO says its okay to do so.Or foregoing checklist discipline to affect an immediate landing if the situation is bad.Or exceeding taxi speed if on a long backtrack and asked to expedite for traffic.Or staying above glidepath(if in a medium ac) to avoid wake if you anticipate it or experience it.Or as said before,two pilots both familiar with home base foregoing a briefing even though it is SOP and airmanship to do one.
All that is required is common sense and good judgment.If the SOP's are good,clear and simple then they'll hardly ever be conflicting.

[RTO]

Each flight crew member required to be on duty in the flight crew compartment shall wear a headset with boom microphone or equivalent. The headset shall be used as the primary device for voice communications with ATS:
(1) when on the ground:
(i) when receiving the ATC departure clearance via voice communication
Regulations like this among with countless retarded SOP's erode the respect for said regs and SOP's. Whats the purpose? Will the airplane fall down and kill people if the FO from far away misses his clearance the first time? Would the use of a headset enhance his comprehension of English? Is it practical to wear a noise cancelling headset during turnaround when you need to speak to the people around you?

Like in one company I was told they add an extra flap check on the list every time a management pilot forgets it. Quite a bit of said type of pilots like to put their mark on something, hence making up something silly in the SOP's. Look at Spanair, their 4 flap checks or so failed, is the answer to increase the amount of flap checks to 6? A well known company introduced Boeing 737's to their fleet with MD80/DC9 procedures, panel scan? what is that?

Some Ill-conceived SOP's are counter productive and ruin the whole purpose. A good guideline is that if you think you know better than Boeing how to operate an aircraft, you are on the wrong track.

I'm not advocating a departure from SOP's but offering ideas why they might not stick in a company.

[9.G]

RTO, the quote is not part of a SOP but a regulation and it's part of OM A. Let's start with comparing apples with apples. SOPs don't tell you to wear a uniform either but OM A does. In the end why do we need all those rules and regs. and SOPs if we all simply use common sense and act responsibly. Statistics prove otherwise. 70% of accidents are due to human failure. Go figure.:ok:

[have another coffee]

I feel somehow challenged to reply to post #54 where a link is provided to "airmanship". The following is not intended to nihilate the concept of "airmanship". I will try to bring forward arguments why this concept cannot serve as an explanation of certain behavior. Furthermore I will try to convince why this concept may even be counterproductive in an approach to safety.
Looking at the definition provided in the link (skybrary...) it makes use of the terms consistent, good and well developed. It is not clear from this definition what the reference point is to measure/compare these standards with. When is good, good enough? How well-developed does ones skills need to be? If I make an error on these skills or judgement do I cross the line between airmanship and not-airmanship? How small may the error be to be just on the edge, 5 kts or 10% of my judgments? It is impossible to score 10/10, as I am human and therefore prone to making (small) errors.
In my eyes it gets even worse when looking at the " corner stones" in the link provided, besides that these corner stones refer to the airmanship concept themselves (understanding the challenges posed to airmanship...). These cornerstones have such a wide range of descriptions it basically describes the pilot, all the skills, knowledge and attitudes are described. The way airmanship is described it will, at the surface, always apply and therefore must be correct (for the layman not willing to dig deeper). Not adhering to SOP or rules might be a "discipline" aspect of airmanship. The solution, according to this broad concept, can only be more airmanship (or discipline). It does not, however, gives us an explantion why or how pilots do not comply. Deeper questions and well argued (and possible measured) arguments will possible lead us to better solutions. This concept do not point us in that direction.
Looking with a broader view it is, in my opinion, just a way to describe how a professional is defined. Airmanship (seamanship, craftmanship...) is just a common denoter of a "professional" in the aviation world. Not an useful explanation of anything.
The danger I like to point out is that the concept of airmanship puts the "one at the sharp end" central. If we apply the definition of airmanship at the quoted 70% of accidents are human errors where do we need to improve? Look at the inconsistency of ones judgement, bad judgement or under developed skills? In other words remove the culprit from the scene and replace him/her with somebody with more airmanship... In hindsight it is always easy to find the errors, inconsistency, bad handling etc... in somebodies behavior. Especially if we establish where the bar of "good", "consistent" and " well developed" needs to be after the occurence. The airmanship concept fortifies these thoughts. Furthermore another result might be more rules/SOP to avoid the next bad airmanship experience.
If we use the "airmanship" concept carefully (in the bar, with a beer :ok:) and look at human behavior with more detailed and refined concepts (and used by people with knowledge of these concepts AND aviation) we might be able to steer more in the direction where we can really make progress. Good examples are given in previous posts. Hopefully SMS concepts (and some more knowledgeable people in rule making/ government/ industry) will be able to step beyond "airmanship".
:oh:

[9.G]

I think, I'll have another coffee. :ok:

[TheRobe]

New Member. Hi!

It's obvious that a crew not reading checklists, acting like cowboys shouldn't be in charge of aircraft.

But pros should know when the situation calls for working outside of the SOPs, and not robotically fly to the scene of the accident reading their checklists.

The problem with a SOP can arise when say during an engine restart, they require a full shut down/cage procedure, and you have a mountain just ahead. Or maybe you just leveled at FL450 and there is nothing about checking your O2/mask. ( I added that)

Disregarding SOPs out of hand is silly and unprofessional, but at the same time, there are a ton of accidents where the SOPs got in the way, for instance always trying a fly an aircraft off after VR. Consdier the Jack screw Alaska issue. Instead of flying for another hour, calling dispatch, flipping through manuals, someone should have said, 'hey we've got a flight control problem, that supercedes schedules, my retirment, chain of command, union issues, the check list, let's get it down'.

So optimally we have pilots who can make a judgments where the SOPs mitigate 99% of the potential problems, but maybe you are faced with something where the variables aren't covered in the book. Now make a decision. Some will call a guy a cowboy for disregarding a SOP but the litmus has always been 'yeah, but I saved a plane load of passengers'.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
One of the sad things about the Australian approach to matters such as 9G raises, the "headset rule", is that the final line of the Australian rule would read:

Strict Liability Offense, XX penalty points. For Strict Liability Offense, see Section XX of the Criminal Code.

The present draft of an Australian Part 91 makes "interesting" reading, with some rules incapable of legal definition, but a breach, nevertheless, is a criminal offence.

For example, what is "normal fuel flow" for any aircraft, when it comes to calculation of such as Fixed Final Reserve or other reserves. The CASA answer is to require a manual that has flat block figures, regardless of weight and temperature. That is just one example.

Similarly, all the provisions of an "accepted" Operations Manual (in Australia they are "accepted". not "approved") which will contains SOPs, are enforceable, and a breach is essentially a criminal act, unless the PIC can prove otherwise --- reverse onus of proof.

It certainly hasn't done anything for the Australian air safety record --- based on ICAO accident definitions, not Australian "modified" definitions --- just have a look at the record.

Tootle pip!!

[9.G]

L.S. this approach is adapted not not only by CASA but many others. Worth a while to note that each jurisdiction will press for its' legislation in case something happens. A movie Flight comes to my mind where an exceptionally skilled Mr.Washington has saved the day and yet went to jail for betraying the public trust. The principle in this particular example is what really matters namely the reason for the mechanical failure causing almost a crash is irrelevant when it comes to scrutinizing the human actions. Some investigators are very keen to connect the dots and call negligence a contributing factor. Does it ring the bell? Last but not least, there's theory and there's the real world with judges, juries and prisons. Any commander out there always thinks bit like a lawyer unlike f/o, nothing wrong with that as it's just a matter of experience. No matter how we feel bout the rules and regs, that's what the lawyers, judges, juries and investigators will go by. The choice is yours. :ok:

P.S. Official investigation and media speculation. The likely cause of the crash is a pilot error, but the investigation is still in progress. Two flight data recorders recovered at the scene are being examined by Interstate Aviation Committee experts. Moscow plane crash: Carnage caught on camera, investigation in progress (VIDEO, PHOTOS) — RT (http://rt.com/news/moscow-plane-crash-video-095/)

[LeadSled]

9G,
I would not entirely agree with you about many other county's rules, the US being a prime example, not all offenses under the FARs are criminal offenses, many are civil or administrative offenses.

In Australia, the whole of the aviation regulatory structure is criminal law. Making an arithmetic error in adding up your log book is a strict liability criminal offense.

A basic tenant of criminal law is that there must be intent --- in the case of a strict liability offense under Australian aviation (or any) law, there is no need to show intent, the prosecution only needs to demonstrate the facts of the offense.

In the Australian criminal code, the only defense is "honest and reasonable mistake", and it cannot your mistake, but something over which you had no control, that caused the offense. For example, you violated controlled airspace without a clearance, because of a mistake in an aeronautical chart, and there was no NOTAM about the mistake.

In an area where pilot judgement and decision making is called for, in legal theory you cannot have a strict liability offense, because the facts of the offense cannot be "black and white".
That doesn't stop our lot.

Many years ago, Qantas had a jet upset, due to an instrument malfunction. The pilot who saved the aircraft was not even on the flight deck at the time. In the ensuing investigation, his contribution to the event was ignored, he was threatened with prosecution for reducing to structural damage speed, in the absence of the Captain, who, on return to the flight deck, thanked the F/O for so doing, with comments along the line of "I should have thought of that".
However, what the investigator heard on the voice recorder was the Captain ordering "standard cruise", and in the absence of the Captain, the F/O "ordered" structural damage cruise -- and the damage was significant.
As far as the Airstapo was concerned , that was "mutiny on the high seas".
After very strong union agitation, and some political intervention, the charge was dropped, but nevertheless, the F/O who saved the aircraft was the only pilot who was officially reprimanded.

An outstanding example of the stupidity that can occur, and continues to occur with the Australian approach to aviation law and enforcement.

Of course, one you wind up with a criminal record, particularly an aviation criminal record, you access to international travel can be severely limited, just look at the USvisa/Homeland Security rules.

As many Australia pilots have discovered, to their severe professional cost.

Tootle pip

[Gretchenfrage]

The term in itself says it all: Standard operating procedures.

The word standard implies its counterpart non-standard.
As pilots we should be trained to expect the unexpected, thus expect the non-standard and be able to act accordingly. If this is limited to emergency situations, the limits are too rigid, because we face the non-standard on a daily base.

If the approach of any company or regulator is that the non-standard automatically means non-compliance with the standard, we face the "pomstralian conundrum"! Any company or regulator who considers such non-standards as punishable or in some cases even criminal, is not helping to enhance safety.

We are quick to condemn the culturally tied mentalities who would "rather crash than lose face", but we should also be careful not to cultivate the "rather crash than deviate from sops".

The real danger however is the trend to train only up to sops and nothing beyond. The trend of installing very young TRI/Es coming out of this generation does not help either. It definitely explains the rigid clinging to sops, because there is nothing more, but it is counterproductive to overall safety in civil aviation.

Sops are a perfect base for training and operation, but airmenship, common sense and experience should never be allowed to be pushed aside by religiously enforcing sops.

[9.G]

L.S. Civil aviation legislation (http://flysafe.raa.asn.au/regulations/civilact.html) I couldn't agree more with you regarding the Ozz approach however not entirely as well. The words appearing under some CARs or CASRs 'An offense against regulation ... is an offense of strict liability' imply that the offense is such that it is not necessary to show a criminal intent in order to prove a breach of the regulation — much the same as the road traffic regulations. The criminal law will be applied where referred to and in case a fault element for a particular physical element such as intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence is present. In case of an accident with casualties for sure. Otherwise penalties as per civil aviation act are applied. That's what I meant by saying many other countries apply the same principle. They include penalties section in their legislation specifically applicable to aviation.

Section 20A

Reckless operation of aircraft
(1) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the life of another person.

(2) A person must not operate an aircraft being reckless as to whether the manner of operation could endanger the person or property of another person.

[For penalty see Section 29.]

Imprisonment for 5 years. .

Simple negligence is the least culpable level of legal liability. It is usually defined as the failure to exercise "ordinary care in the circumstances." Liability does not attach to such misconduct unless the negligence is a cause of injury or damages. In the aviation industry, the violation of regulations such as the FARs, and failure to comply with good operating practices or procedures, may constitute a breach of the duty to exercise ordinary care. In this regard, airline and Part 135 charter operators are held to the "highest duty of care" because they act as common carriers when holding themselves out to the public — they carry anyone for hire. Private operators on the other hand are generally held to the standard of "ordinary care."

Criminal Liability in Aviation (http://www.avweb.com/news/avlaw/181901-1.html)

[9.G]

Gretchenfrage, SOP as such isn't a binding document that's why EU OPS has mandated OPS manual as OM A,B,C,D. OM A is an approved and the rest is accepted by authorities. Violations of those manuals under normal circumstances are offenses. Usually operators establish policies of manual compliance to protect themselves from liability. So does the manufacturer. The bottom line is the pilot is the easiest target in any case. A pilot can do him/herself a favor by simply complying with manuals. :ok:

[Gretchenfrage]

True, but if you look at todays OMAs, they are thicker than they were some time ago, because more and more sops are written in stone in them. The rest is in FCOMs, agreed, but a lot of references there to the OMA. The main part of todays training goes into memorising articles, sops and endless briefings until we are numb to any real world common sense. I'd love some more hands on rather than "that's not the correct call".

We have come a long way from "don't hurt anything or anyone" to todays manuals who read like the fineprint of fishy software agreements.
The main reason, unfortunately, is not improvement of safety, but lawyers of manufacturers, operators and regulators trying to discard any kind of responsibility by shoving everything to the last one in the food chain.

By asking us to adhere strictly to these sops, all other players wash their hands in the black and white printed jungle.
And we all continue to play the game and quite often the scapegoat.

It's like with some religions:
The problem is not the message, it's the interpretation.

[9.G]

The Term SOP is long in the past. It's OM B nowadays and speaking of EU legislation part of the legally binding operations manuals. SOP is a mere recommendation of the manufacturer nothing else. OM A creates a legal framework for operations, something like main law body and is tightened up to the AOC specs. OM B is the executive order if you wish of how to comply with A using a tool such as aircraft. C are aeronautical manuals such as charts. D is training. A clever pilot knows his legal framework and understands the implications of such along with the consequences. On daily basis there's millions of violations all around the world but as long as everything ended well, legal machinery is in hibernation. As soon as the sh&t hits the fan that's when the merciless giant awakens and slaughters the scapegoat without compassion or remorse. Luckily religions aren't part of legislation anymore. :ok:

[LeadSled]

9G
Using an example from the Australian Civil Aviation Act 1988 (S.20A) is not really an example of what I was talking about.

The serious offenses that carry a potential custodial sentence are all in the Act, and are not strict liability offenses.

It is in the CARs/CASRs that you see the over-reach of the use of "strict liability". In much Australia legislation, strict liability is used for minor offenses, in the motoring area such as parking fines or minor breaches of speed limits.

It is the free use of strict liability in aviation regulations, in a way completely at odds with the traditional view that there must be a "mental element" (mens rea) for an offense to be treated as a criminal offense. The maximum penalty under the CAR/CASRs is 50 penalty points, but you still accumulate a criminal record.

Not only is this increasingly not the case, we are now seeing "reverse onus of proof" appearing. Once again, this is contrary to any reasonable interpretation of criminal law principles, "innocent until proven guilty' and the Crown (prosecution) must prove it's case.

Another increasingly disturbing trend, in aviation,(but generally not other Australian law) is for the meaning of "beyond a reasonable doubt" to be watered down to a lower level of proof required -- or put another way, the bar for "beyond a reasonable doubt" has been lowered --- for aviation.

Tootle pip!!

[9.G]

I've been digging a bit and that's what I found out:

CASR Division 13.K.2
Demerit points scheme
13.370 Offences to which demerit points scheme applies (Act s 30DT)
(1) All offences under CAR and CASR that are specified as strict liability offences are prescribed as offences to which Division 3D (Demerit points scheme) of Part III of the Act applies.
(2) The number of points that are incurred in relation to an offence to which that Division applies are as follows:
(a) if the maximum penalty for the offence is 10 penalty units or less — 1 demerit point;
(b) if the maximum penalty for the offence is more than 10 penalty units but less than 26 penalty units — 2 demerit points;
(c) if the maximum penalty for the offence is 26 penalty units or more — 3 demerit points.

It seems to me that Aussies have established a similar point system to traffic violations. Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00363/Html/Volume_1#_Toc327521380)

Strict liability is simply a fact of the violation, without the burden of proof as you already stated. Sample, if you land without clearance there's no need to prove a criminal intent the mere fact is sufficient. That's all it is to it. The fact that the definition of strict liability is contained in the criminal law is the legacy of the common wealth legislation.

I'm not an expert of Ozz criminal law but it seems really odd that one would have a criminal record for a violation labeled as strict liability in down under. Only in case of injuries or fatal outcomes a criminal investigation will be launched by the DA office not CASA. That's when the DA office has to prove mens rea and the burden of proof is upon the DA office. Nobody is gonna be declared guilty till proven otherwise. For the conviction as per criminal law there must be a trial, that's where the principle of reasonable doubt comes in. In any case the plaintiff will use the results of the CASAs investigation to underline the accusations.

That's my take on that.

reference CIVIL AVIATION ACT 1988 (http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/caa1988154/)
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2012C00622/Html/Volume_3#_Toc334537135)

[9.G]

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Infringement Notices/Demerit Points (http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_91187) here's what I was talking bout.
Infringement notices are another enforcement tool. They impose administrative fines and are a cheaper and faster alternative to prosecution for breaches of the regulations.

Because they still require the criminal standard of evidentiary proof and may require further investigation, they are generally only issued for strict liability offences. Enforcement Manual, Chapter 8 - Infringement Notices - (Administrative Fines)

If a holder of a civil aviation authorisation, served with an infringement notice (AIN), chooses to pay the fine they will incur demerit points but will not be subject to any further criminal proceedings in relation to that offence.

If a recipient of an AIN elects to have the matter dealt with by the court, it will be open to the prosecutor to charge the recipient with other offences arising out of the same matter. If convicted or found guilty, a holder will incur demerit points in relation to each offence.

The Demerit Points Scheme is a system set up under Division 3D of Part III of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and provides a staged approach for dealing with a holder who has multiple, or repeated, breaches of strict liability, regulatory offences. Under the Scheme, demerit points are incurred for such breaches on payment of a fine under an infringement notice or on a conviction or finding of guilty by a court. After a predetermined number of points have been accumulated within a specified period of time, all the holder’s authorisations, of that particular class, must be suspended or cancelled. As the period within which accumulation of demerit points may be counted against the holder is determined by the legislation, this largely removes the scope of CASA’s discretion. Enforcement Manual, Chapter 10 – Demerit Points Scheme :ok:

[autoflight]

Those that advocate routine departures from SOPs are protesting too much. One of our prime directives is to follow SOPs and we should not normally deviate without a safety related reason. Good airmanship will indicate when this will happen and whenever possible, the F/O needs to at least somehow indicate his agreement. Habitual SOP deviation without good reason and without the agreement of the F/O, then Huston, we have a problem!
There may be very minor deviations that are of little consequence. I always wore headset when required by SOP. As F/O, I did not push the captain to do the same. As captain, it soon became obvious to my F/Os that headsets, like other SOPs, were required. I think they liked the idea that SOPs were a routine part of how we operated.
I admit to a couple of habitual infractions, but they were based on airmanship considerations and with F/O agreement. Often I carried more fuel, and on really long taxys, I might have sometimes exceeded the maximum taxy speed for brake temp reasons.

[vilas]

RAT 5
The problem with guidence of wise philosophy is who is wise is not written anywhere, so it is a self assessment. Who would like to think he is a fool? So everybody starts deviating. A culture needs to be built and implmented to respect SOPs. As they say SOPs are written in blood. SOPs are there in every air line but if the culture is to admire rule breakers and not rule followers then thing are waiting to happen.

[captjns]

SOPs and Regulations in a nutshell.

Designed and implemented to protect one's self from their own stupidity.

Think about it.

[RAT 5]

I've flown for a bunch of airlines. One thing became obvious; SOP's were often at the whim of the C.P. and not always for good rhyme or reason. I was staggered when I first joined the airline business how it was possible to reinvent the wheel, redesign the a/c and how so many airlines chose to re-write the manufacturer's instruction book. I couldn't fathom it; perhaps still can't. I've learnt to live with it, sometime in frustration. I've flown for airlines where they claimed the SOP's to be the approved bible and guarantee of safety. Firstly it was quite obvious that the XAA had not read the whole Ops manual: that was impossible. Secondly the eureka new SOP was changed a couple of weeks later as the line pilot feedback was that it didn't work the way the desk jockeys thought it would. It was often a 'told you so' moment. Thus, I am an SOP sceptic, not in the general sense of SOP's, but in that they are not always the best way to achieve a required task. It is also possible to over SOP a company. I am involved in TQ teaching. The students will join a in-depth SOP airline. They are trained robotic monkeys and guaranteed to survive if they do not deviate. I will debate that. A colleague SFI from another airline is shocked. In his airline , e.g. a G/A ifs flown according to FCTM and the approach chart with good airmanship discretion in coordination with ATC depending on Wx & TFC. In our TQ airline the G/A will be flown to absolute completion, by numbers, with no exemption. This is not the real world. Is it the best SOP? Should it be so? Should discretion be taken away fro the crew? ATC ask if you can abbreviate the procedure and you have to refuse or break SOP's. The same was a classic for years: CAT 2/3 LVO's; maintain 160k to 4nm (ATC) but SOP was F40 at G/S capture. So please, the SOP bible is not always the bible it pretends to be.
What SOP's do is cover your backside in case on an incident. This time "I was only following orders," is a defence. But sometimes it go my goat and irritated the dung out of my airmanship instincts. Times have moved on, peacefully, and the conflicts no longer applies; but sometimes having to teach such stuff just because it's their train set is galling.