Ryanair, too low on..

[hetfield]

altitude, not fuel.

A Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-DAC performing flight FR-3214 from Manchester,EN (UK) to Memmingen (Germany), was on a visual approach to Memmingen's runway 24 when the crew descended below required minimum height of 1000 feet AGL and initiated a go-around at 450 feet AGL. The aircraft landed safely on their second approach.

In their monthly bulletin Germany's BFU rated the occurrence a serious incident and opened an investigation reporting the minimum safety height was 1000 feet AGL however the aircraft descended to 450 feet AGL before initiating a go-around.Incident: Ryanair B738 at Memmingen on Sep 23rd 2012, descended below minimum safe height (http://avherald.com/h?article=459fa8f6&opt=0)

[FLR-PSA]

Yeah, we got a memo from the boss last week asking us to descend to 450 were possible and press the ‘empty poop tank’ button before landing thus saving on toilet services and reducing turnaround time. Of course, we’ll be charging the farmer a website administration fee to cover the costs of fertilising his crops with prime poop.

[hetfield]

@FLR-PSA

Well, hard times for loco...

BTW, does it also save money to take off without ATC clearence?

Incident: Ryanair B738 at Eindhoven on Oct 18th 2012, took off from wrong intersection and without clearance (http://avherald.com/h?article=459f9d27&opt=0)

[Alycidon]

so it was a visual approach, what minima apply?

not enough information here, but if I need to go round from 10' radio if I want to, I believe I'm allowed to.

why did they go round? landing gate? EGPWS? ATC? loss of visual? who knows?

[FLR-PSA]

@hetfield

Yeah, we got a memo from the boss last week asking us to use as much runway as possible and not to hang around waiting for clearances at quiet airports if no one’s looking and no high-fare airlines are on approach. If Eindhoven complain we’ll just stop going there he said.

[hetfield]

That's great. One should stand up to stop these moneymakers.

[Capn Bloggs]

so it was a visual approach, what minima apply?

not enough information here, but if I need to go round from 10' radio if I want to, I believe I'm allowed to.

why did they go round? landing gate? EGPWS? ATC? loss of visual? who knows?
Have a look at the parameters on the diagram on Avherald. Pretty obvious to any jet pilot, I would have thought, especially if you understand the concept of a stabilised approach.

[b737NGyyc]

These guys were descending at 3200 fpm descending through 1000 AGL at 211 knots with F5, gear down and speed brakes extended.

Hardly a stabilised approach by anyone's standard and it triggered a classic EGPWS Mode 2 warning.

They were less than 20 seconds from ground impact at that point. Pretty scary.

[hetfield]

At 609' RA still 1.740 ROD and 211 kts, jezz....

Obviously the goaround was the right decission.

But why that late?
Pressure NOT TO WASTE fuel?

[ATC Watcher]

They were less than 20 seconds from ground impact at that point. Pretty scary.
Do not know, maybe the guys were in control , we do not have all the facts.

But Going from min 3200 ft/m to plus 3800 in less than 20 sec, plus the noise , might have been a bit "scary" for the pax behind..

Diving and reducing speed at the same time, especially on a 737NG has never been a good combination.:E

[PENKO]

Maybe they were a bit more preoccupied with finding the runway with the help of their ND, than looking outside and seeing the obvious terrain rising. It is quite an acute turn for a visual.

PURE SPECULATION though...

[EDMJ]

As I understand the BFU report

- [Initially cleared for an ILS approach to RWY 06 => incorrect; RWY in use was 06, the crew was cleared for an ILS approach on RWY 24, and..], the crew requested a visual approach to RWY 24 (this would save time in taxying to the gate, enabling them to compensate for their late arrival)
- weather was CAVOK
- the crew had expected radar vectoring for the visual approach but didn't get any
- a tailwind of 20-30 kts on the base leg was experienced

Terrain around Memmingen is relatively flat, in my opinion

[A and C]

Arriving half way down the runway at V2+ 20 is reason for an anti Ryanair witch hunt............... Not a GA from an unstable approach!

[PENKO]

Fact is that pilots are not paying enough attention to the high elevation of some airports. I see it quite often, even in experienced guys, they think they are safe and high at 3000' whereas this may only be 1000' or 1500' AGL in airports like MAD, RAK and in this Memmingen place..leading to rushed and unstable approaches.

[Check Mags On]

When you get a "Terrain! Terrain! Pull up! Pull up!"

The aircraft EGPWS thinks it is 20-30 seconds from projected impact.

[bungeeng]

Do RYR crews have to submit a report if they G/A?

In the end they did go around so at least one of them wasn't completely target fixated.

Not responding to GPWS alerts does in fact also happen to big reputable airlines, they just don't get reported publicly (a big German airline).

[gorter]

Question for EDMJ. How can the crew expect radar vectors for a visual approach? Surely the clue is in the title?

[PENKO]

gorter, radar vectors for a visual are very common in certain parts of Europe. In Bordeaux ATC even offer it 9 out of 10 times if runway 05 is in use. You get positioned by ATC to a certain point whereafter it is up to you to find the runway and land.

[16024]

I am not a RYR apologist (at all), but the guys went around and nobody lost an eye. There's nothing to see here.
Am I the only other person here who has had an approach that didn't go to plan?
AFAIAA, the EU OPS take on stabilised approach is that the company has to have an acceptable (to the authority) set of SOPs setting out the limits. In most companies that means a target of 1000 aal and limit of 500 aal.
Maybe someone can correct me, but it seems that, by stating any go-around below 1000 is worthy of an investigation, the German BFU is stepping outside it's remit, and should mind it's own business.
As I say, I stand to be corrected, but maybe I should plan to go-around from over 1000 feet next time DUS or MUC keeps me high and fast.

[ShyTorque]

a tailwind of 20-30 kts on the base leg was experienced

Surely this would give a tendency to be too high; rather than too low. It would certainly explain why they were heading for touchdown too far down the runway, set up a high ROD in an attempt to compensate then eventually went around from 450ft.

Maybe airline management pressure was a factor, maybe it was only a basic aircrew error, but whatever it was, it's another reason to stick to my personal policy of not flying with this airline.

.

[Bearcat]

This is demotion material where I come from.

A disgraceful display of continue on itis.....

[McBruce]

To a previous poster: GA in RYR is mandatory report below 1000 agl optional above if there's reportable circumstances....

[EDMJ]

Question for EDMJ. How can the crew expect radar vectors for a visual approach? Surely the clue is in the title?

Just quoting from the report, don't ask me... :)

[scotbill]

I'm with 16024. While I detest MoL's management philosophy and would have to be desperate to travel with his airline, show me the commercial pilot who has never misjudged an approach. There seems to a lot of sanctimonious claptrap going on here.
"Let the one without sin cast the first stone!"

[BOAC]

Some (not so) pretty big breaches of airmanship here, with excessive descent rates both below MSA and below 1000' AGL - 1700+ down at 600 radio!!!??. At the 450' radio they were nowhere near the runway either. No doubt some serious goings-on in an office somewhere and I am certain RY will handle this incident properly. I would honestly expect demotion or dismissal for this episode (Vis Bearcat). What was PNF doing? Who was PF? A complete mental abberation?

However, there does appear to be some misinformation on this thread. Shy Torque - even as a rotating palm-tree driver you need to think about your comment 'rather than too low'!

No sign of 20-30kts on 'base leg' - or anywhere, come to that - all within 'limits'.

No sign of an intent to land half-way down the runway either.

Interesting wind plots if accurate, and they may have been experiencing a significant tailwind as they made their way in initially to 06.

As explained elsewhere 'Radar to visual' is by no means unusual.

As for 'sanctimonious claptrap going on here' - yes, we all can screw up approaches, especially visuals. It is when you quit that counts. Are you implying you would have done the same?

[ShyTorque]

BOAC,

However, there does appear to be some misinformation on this thread. Shy Torque - even as a rotating palm-tree driver you need to think about your comment 'rather than too low'!

No sign of 20-30kts on 'base leg' - or anywhere, come to that - all within 'limits'.

I based my comments on post#13 from EDMJ, who presumably has seen an initial report.

[EDMJ]

Have just reread the report and this was how the commander described it (page 68 of the Bulletin, 7th line, beginning with "Im (rechten) Queranflug...") , i.e.:

"On (right) base, which was very short, there was a tailwind component of 20-30 kts".

[BOAC]

Interesting - BFU show 240/21 --->250/20 ie 90 off. Who is right?

Which 'report', EDMJ?

[EDMJ]

The preliminary report in the BFU September 2012 Bulletin (pages 65-75):

http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_030/nn_223968/DE/Publikationen/Bulletins/2012/Bulletin2012-09,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Bulletin2012-09.pdf

In German only.

[shaun ryder]

From what I can see there was no hand flying until AP disconnect at 16:39:37. Why were they flying the aircraft on the automatics when supposedly cleared for the visual approach? Kind of defeats the object of the exercise in my mind. Also this method of flying visuals with the automatics in usually leads to unstabilised and scrappy approaches.

It looks to me like they were coupled to a speed mode viewing the speed vs ROD + configuration in the attached report. This seems to have led to the high rates of descent developing as the drag increased followed by the inevitable GPWS invite to the CP's office. In order to get a handle on the exercise, plan well in advance, get the automatics off, followed shortly after by the FD when cleared for the visual. Not enough hand flying ability, to much reliance on the autopilot and some pretty scary rates of descent close to the ground.

Having said that, anyone can have a bad day.

[kick the tires]

Having said that, anyone can have a bad day.

Oh great summation, not!!! Trying using that reasoning to the 180+ lives behind these two numpties!

[RAT 5]

Was this daylight? I hope so, but where was the sun? It's not the first time crews have been caught out by low sun as they turn 180 degrees. But then again, thinking ahead for that is basic airmanship. However, without that factor, and assuming the ILS24 was the last wpt in the Legs page there must have been a lot of VNAV deviation data screaming at them about their predicament. This compensates for the high elevation of the rwy and avoids all the mental gymnastics if Altimeter v Distogo. What does beg the question is why wait so long to correct a bad situation getting worse. It was a bit of a no-hoper a long time before the G/A. An early realisation of that and a quick timely correction is what could have been a better decision. Did they G/A because of the EGPWS or because they were unstable at 500' agl. The fault with the latter is they seem to be in a very scary place at 500' agl. I'd like to know what their interpretation of all the VNAV and raw ILS data was, and what visual clues they had. Ultimately, what it all comes down to is lack of practice, both in Mk.1 eyeball approaches, which RYR decry, and a full understanding of how to use the automatics in ALL phases of flight. If they were descending >3000fpm on autopilot at F5 I wonder where the MCP speed bug was. I hope over the F5 bug. I wonder why they didn't level the a/c on base leg, get it to F40 and then go down. There was still V/S down while trying to slow down, close in. It ain't gonna work, not that close. Drag it up, but that requires having done it or seen it done before. It's not in the robotic trained monkey syllabus. Yes, they went around, but not from the correct point, only height.
To learn from this, for which I hope all RYR pilots do have the opportunity, we need to know much more detail facts, not only about what happened but why.
Remember AA in Cali. The what was easy to follow, it was the CVR that gave an insight into the why.

[Agaricus bisporus]

descending at 3200 fpm descending through 1000 AGL at 211 knots

At 609' RA still 1.740 ROD and 211 kts

610 ft height but 4 miles out and off the centreline?
3200fpm at 1000ft height?

And people are defending them? It beggars belief.

"A superior pilot uses his superior judgement to avoid situations that would require the use of his superior flying skills"

Triple fail there then...

There can be no excuse whatever for passing 1000ft in that manner, none at all. That is the very latest at which a g/a should have been initiated.

Automatics still in? - my guess - seen it - been there - is they were maxed out - possibly with energy management - possibly spatial awareness (which was pretty much absent I venture to suggest) and hand flying was simply beyond their capability. It does not bespeak a crew in their comfort zone. = g/a

The really worrying thing is that they didn't throw this away back on base turn because when they run this through the sim it will be a butt-clencher from 5000ft onwards - The picture at the point of 609' and 1700fpm will be simply terrifying. This is essentially a pilotless aeroplane flying itself into the ground over 10 miles or so.

It certainly illustrates why you don't carry excess speed to lose height close in.

This will no doubt turn into a first-rate training demo of supreme lack of judgement and no doubt the Ryanair trainers will make full use of it in future.

Rat5 has hit the nail too re parachuting in on F40 and fly by numbers training that doesn't allow for airmanship. OH bugger! I've said it again! Sorree.

I'll get my coat.

[bracebrace!]

1000' RA at 210kts with almost 3300fpm rate of decent? Then they continued down to 600'RA at 1700fpm before eventually deciding to throw the approach away? This approach should have been thrown away LONG before their actual go-around. A pat on the back for going around when they did? Bollocks, a black cab with no biscuits for continuing as far as they did. :=

[Microburst2002]

The unforgivable sin of these crew is the over 3,000 fpm sink rate at 1,000 AGL. That is absolutely unacceptable and it shows an extremely poor judgement and attitude on their part.

Unless there was some form of loss of control, automation mismamagment, mishap, etc... Then it is adifferent story. But if they hand flew the visual like that, intentionally, they are surely sending CVs right now because I don't think they are very merciful in RYR.

[Thunderbirdsix]

Here we go again anything to do with Ryanair and ye are off, wonder how many pages will this one go, as I said before the people on this board are totally anti Ryanair, time to give it a break no one was hurt :ugh:

[misterblue]

No, I think this time we are all anti-incompetence.

The RYR bit is irrelevant. There was no chance of getting in, therefore they should have gone around at 1,000ft.

End of.

[ShyTorque]

BOAC, I was trying to understand how they got in that situation. It now seems they didn't even make the runway, so it was worse than I first thought.

I'll still accept an overdue apology, even from a plank wing driver. ;)

[Cagedh]

@ 16024 & scotbill

Did you have a look at this report (http://avherald.com/h?article=459fa8f6&opt=0) from post nr 1?

Those guys were:
-at 450' RA at 4NM from the threshold
-at 420' above RWY elev. at aprox. 4 NM from threshold with a V/S of -1740 fpm and at 211 kts
-at 913' above RWY elev. at aprox. 6NM from threshold with a V/S of -3280 fpm

This is not just an approach that didn't go to plan, as you put it, but a major f@&§up!

Were you sitting in that cockpit? Otherwise I can't believe that anybody is defending these guys.

[Sciolistes]

610 ft height but 4 miles out and off the centreline?
3200fpm at 1000ft height?

And people are defending them? It beggars belief.
There is something strange about those parameters. Gear down, flap five, the NG will not hold 210kts at 3200fpm. Those parameters show that he decelerated from 216kts to 211kts with a stowed speedbrake and an increasing rate of descent peaking at 3200fpm.

Hmmmmm :confused:

[BOAC]

Scio - in all probability the figures were instantaneous (or even 'max' for effect....) and not sustained.

Plank says sorry to rotary man - I read your post as assuming the wind had anything to do with the altitude 'lows'. It didn't really.

TBsix - this event has shocked me and probably quite a few other current and ex pilots. I have always held RY training and supervision in high regard considering the intensity and pressures that the crews operate under, but this (September event) has just blown my mind.

It is interesting seeing the addenda coming into the AvHerald report.

[Microburst2002]

Is there some :8 who can calculate the average sink rate from say, 2,000 AGL till the lowest point?

[Microburst2002]

They kept AP all the way???

2660 fpm average the last 1,000 ft they sank before reaching the lowest point and disconnecting

scaaaary

Was it an automation modes fucup?

[Microburst2002]

Company totally not to blame.

Pilots with extremelly poor judgment and a dangerous attitude that renders them unable to assess risk

Unless it was an automation fuc up. They had AP ON all the way, maybe one was heads down reading a checklist, the other is too fresh, my god but they were at 210 kt what were they thinking about?

Most of us don't even know how 2,700 fpm feel from 1,500 to 500 agl in an airliner. It has to be scary.

CFIT??? They have add a new category, because this was not controlled at alll...

[Bernoulli]

Microburst, you're not really telling us that Ryanair is 'totally not to blame' are you.

Ryanair's corporate culture and practice has nothing to do with it?

C'mon, really?

[fireflybob]

For one reason or another this looks like a loss of situational awareness.

One wonders whether fatigue might be a causal factor.

[Dg800]

...my god but they were at 210 kt what were they thinking about?

They were clearly thinking about making up for some of the delay they had accumulated. There is no leeway with such a short turnaround time, you know.

Witness the fact that they requested the visual approach because it would have put them on the end of the runway closest to the gate (shorter taxi time) and they explicitly questioned ATC about any speed limitations (ATC's response: 250 knots :ok:). Pity that they were then unable to conduct the approach they had explicitly requested. It's all in the BFU report, BTW.

Ciao,

Dg800

[criss]

It always amazes me when you speak about RYR's corporate culture, I have a feeling you are just guessing.

I occasionaly work as TWR controller at an aerodrome where they are the biggest operator. And I'm yet to see an airline where crews are as rigid about SOPS, rules etc as RYR's. Tailwind component too big by just 1kt - they will take the runway that results in 10mins delay. Runway change - they will sit for 8 mins at the h/p for rebriefing, while the other operator would just press a button in the FMC for the new SID and off they go. If they are unhappy with sth, they will stop and you won't make them move until the issue is resolved. The list could go on and on. In fact never seen them in a hurry that would affect their procedures.

[beernice]

Quote
Ryanair's corporate culture and practice has nothing to do with it?
Yeah Bernoulli I am saying Ryanairs culture had nothing to do with it. Going through a landing gate not stabilized gets you demoted if a captain and fired if an FO. The culture is also one of blameless go arounds. If that's not a culture promoting stabilized approaches I don't know what is.
As for leaving the automatics in after being cleared visual approach would be considered industry best practice espically in an area with a lot of VFR traffic like FMM, reduces workload and frees up capacity to look for other traffic.

[DouglasFlyer]

They kept AP all the way???

Um 16:39:20 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „SINK RATE“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe von 1 319 ft (AGL) bei einer Sinkrate von ca. 3 240 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach rechts von ca. 25 Grad.
At 16:39:20 the EGPWS generated the "SINK RATE" warning. Altitude was 1319 ft AGL / ROD appr. 3240 ft/min /bank right appr. 25°

Um 16:39:37 Uhr wurde der Autopilot deaktiviert.
At 16:39:37 the AP had been switched off

Um 16:39:40 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „CAUTION TERRAIN“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe vom 480 ft AGL bei einer Sinkrate von ca. 500 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach links von ca. 35 Grad.
At 16:39:40 the EGPWS generated the „CAUTION TERRAIN“ warning. The airplane was at a height of 480 ft AGL / ROD appr. 500 ft/min / bank left appr. 35°

Um 16:39:41 Uhr erreichte die B737 ihre geringste Flughöhe von ca. 450 ft AGL.
At 16:39:41 the B737 was at it's lowest height of appr. 450 ft AGL

Um 16:39:42 Uhr generierte das EGPWS die Warnung „TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP“. Das Flugzeug befand sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt in einer Höhe vom 460 ft bei einer Steigrate von 600 ft/min und einer Schräglage nach links von 7 Grad.
At 16:39:42 the EGPWS generated the „TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP“ warning. Airplane was at a height of 460 ft AGL / ROC 600 ft/min / bank left 7°

No - the crew decided to switch off the AP 5 seconds before the EGPWS hard warning.

Looking scary to me...

[EDMJ]

The Avherald report linked to in the first post has been updated to include a dissenting statement from the airline.

[EDMJ]

...avoiding the many small aircraft on a Sunday afternoon...
...the light aircraft traffic is very high (as anyone who has been there on a nice day knows)...

@Lederhosen:

This is turning into a phobia :p Let me know the next time you're going to Memmingen on a nice day, and the wing-waggling Cessna you see will be me popping over from Jesenwang to make an air-to-air photograph of you on the approach :E

[Dg800]

I think it perfectly possible they may have been trying to save time.

Seeing as this is the reason the Captain himself gave for choosing this approach (page 67 of the report), I think making up for lost time was definitely high up in their list of priorities. This is also consistent with their query about any speed restrictions and with their maintaining a somewhat high speed (both vertical and horizontal).

Ciao,

Dg800

[Dg800]

The Avherald report linked to in the first post has been updated to include a dissenting statement from the airline.

Or rather, by an airline's press officer who is not aware of the fact that EGPWS warnings are recorded in the FDR and will therefore later show up in the report. :E :ugh:

[EDMJ]

I would just like to share what is a very real issue.

Fully appreciated; I intensely dislike the German practice of heavy IFR iron mingling it with light VFR traffic in Airspace E. I always give Memmingen a wide berth when in that area.

[misterblue]

"Request an orbit" would have solved it all.

[shaun ryder]

For one reason or another this looks like a loss of situational awareness.

One wonders whether fatigue might be a causal factor.

No, more like pushonitis, continuing on with a botched approach either to save face or because of commercial pressures. Fatigue? Call in sick, take a day off, take radar vectors whatever, no excuse for bad workmanship. It is the responsibilty of the Captain to ensure the safety of his pax and crew, flying fatigued, letting the FO fudge it, forget it.. As for accepting a visual approach and then flying it on the automatics? Well it isn't really is it? You might as well take vectors if you want to increase your capacity. Flying this visual through the MCP just made the situation worse, it was never going to happen. I guess that the handling pilot bottled it and continued bounding in to save face. A go around or vectors should have been called a lot earlier.

Was it 2 Captains or FO/Captain? Who was handling?

[jimjim1]

Incident: Ryanair B738 at Memmingen on Sep 23rd 2012, descended below minimum safe height (http://avherald.com/h?article=459fa8f6&opt=0)
says:-

"rather than the crew preemptying"

What is pre-empty-ing? Is it part of your airline's SOP? :)

[Dg800]

Was it 2 Captains or FO/Captain? Who was handling?

FO/Captain. Captain handling after AP disconnect according to the BFU report.

[Bernoulli]

My point exactly Beernice (@#57). The culture you describe is one of threats. Judging from posts elsewhere on this BB that corporate culture seems prevalent in all that this company do, from the top down.

[criss]

You seem to have some problems in reading the posts.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

"Request an orbit" would have solved it all.

They're not very good at those either.

[RAT 5]

Just a couple of comments:

It seems that RYR are claiming nothing untoward happened as the crew reacted correctly to an unstable approach and made a G/A. Is that economical with the truth; if the OFDM data in AV is correct?
They were High above an ILS GS, and presumably a VNAV profile, then they were Low on the ILS GS and VNAV profile and all without slowing down significantly. This means they descended through the GS. Does this imply the GS was not armed? After all, the A/P was engaged. The a/c went through the LOC from both directions. Therefore if APP was armed the LOC would have been captured allowing GS to be captured.

The statements from RYR seem to claim the AV article was objectionably inaccurate. I would like them to be very specific about what. Rather than trying to deflect attention with various claims, spurious or not, I'd like to hear from them the absolute truth. That way the will really deflection attention and close down this discussion. If OFDM data is correct I, and all RYR pilots, want to learn something from this. Let everyone be open about this event. I always thought the idea of OFDM data was to enhance safety and not witch hunt; to share the data and lessons learnt. Until we see certified accurate data acceptable to RYR & AV & IAA & BFU then speculation will abound.

[Herod]

Could be a medical problem. My last flight was an unstable approach, flown by the FO, but with no comment from me. When I saw the FDR printout I realised that, after thirty-nine years in the business, I'd lost it. The result was a nervous breakdown, medical retirement, and I've not flown since. Stranger things have happened.

[IcePack]

Um they got it wrong. (we all do sometimes) & they went around at 500 ft so whats the problem?:cool:

[BOAC]

One has to hope some of these posters are pulling our plonkers and not actually serious. If they are, I hope they are not responsible for passengers' safety:eek:

[fireflybob]

Fatigue? Call in sick, take a day off, take radar vectors whatever, no excuse for bad workmanship. It is the responsibilty of the Captain to ensure the safety of his pax and crew, flying fatigued, letting the FO fudge it, forget it..

shaun ryder, I did not say fatigue was "the" cause but may be A factor. This was not to meant in any way to make "excuses" for this incident but it is a fact that fatigue can affect judgement as well as skill.

[Phantom Driver]

One has to hope some of these posters are pulling our plonkers and not actually serious. If they are, I hope they are not responsible for passengers' safetyhttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gif

Does make a chap wonder somewhat....
(p.s bet you miss wewol days:ok:)

[hetfield]

We ask that the article be removed from the Aviation Herald website and an apology be issued by the AH for implying that the crew did anything wrong when recovering from this unstable approach incident.

This article is being picked up internationally and is inaccurate.

Please give this your urgent attention and call me to discuss.

Regards
Stephen
Stephen McNamara
Head of Communications
Ryanair Head Office
Dublin AirportAmen..........

[KBPsen]

an apology be issued by the AH for implying that the crew did anything wrong when recovering from this unstable approach incident.Nice attempt at spin there. I don't think anybody has implied that the go around was wrong.

I thought Ryanair couldn't care less about the public's perception but the recent aggressive pursuits seems to indicate they have become a bit sensitive.

[Capn Bloggs]

They were High above an ILS GS, and presumably a VNAV profile, then they were Low on the ILS GS and VNAV profile and all without slowing down significantly. This means they descended through the GS. Does this imply the GS was not armed? After all, the A/P was engaged. The a/c went through the LOC from both directions. Therefore if APP was armed the LOC would have been captured allowing GS to be captured.
Pretty obvious to me they weren't doing an ILS, nor had a LNAV route in the box. It was a Visual Approach via a wide right base, so none of the above (capturing) would be expected.

The lesson I get from this is the problem that can be created by using the automatics to turn visual base, especially when higher-energy. One needs to devote more time "controlling" the beast (looking at VS, speed) than actually looking at the big picture: where am I, do I want to be here; what do I have to do to fix it/give it away. Good learning scenario...

[crispy banana]

Heres what happens when you don't go around:

Air Europa at Lanzarote (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/477311-air-europa-overrun-final-report.html)

Air Nostrum at Barcelona (http://avherald.com/h?article=44272525/0000&opt=0)

:=

[Alexander de Meerkat]

I was berated not too long ago by a PPRuNe mod over a previous post I wrote about Ryanair and safety. I therefore welcome the opportunity to put the record straight. I can only assume this was not in fact dangerous in any way, but a totally normal approach for them. As any Ryanair pilot will tell you, it is entirely normal to have a rate of descent in excess of 3200 ft/min 1000' above the airfield. Indeed, the previous 5 pages of comments are merely tittle tattle from disaffected pilots who were unsuccessful in their attempts to join such an illustrious organisation. There clearly is no cause for concern here, because we are told there is not, and that should be good enough. Clearly there was no breach of SOPs either, just an unfortunate misunderstanding, for which we are all extremely grateful. And mercifully, there is no writing on the wall, because it would be offensive to many to suggest there is. I am both heartened and reassured that all is well and that safety was clearly not an issue at any point.

[camel]

i can see why the PR dept is getting involved..must be worried in case the red top papers get hold of this incident : 'aircraft plunging towards ground' ,'seconds from disaster' ,'pax screaming'....etc etc

[Whip Whitaker]

Meerkat:=

They say sarcasm isn't a desirable trait, I have to disagree this post made my day.

Now I have to go back to the subpoena in US court thread, lets have a drink first.

Cheers
Whip

[Microburst2002]

As for leaving the automatics in after being cleared visual approach would be considered industry best practice espically in an area with a lot of VFR traffic like FMM, reduces workload and frees up capacity to look for other traffic.


I disagree.

In a visual with APFD you have to scan instruments as much as without it. But without it you can adjust flight path more accurately and react more promptly in case of a cessna crossing your proyected path or something.

[Capn Bloggs]

You guys are nuts accepting uncontrolled VFRs swanning around in your airspace, especially when you're trying to get the thing on the ground. Jets and bugsmashers don't mix!

[Microburst2002]

The claims by RYR in the Avherald are OK.

But this does not imply that there is no problem if you make unstable approach as long as you go around in time, :=

those excessive and hopless sink rates at such low height are unacceptable and very dangerous. Even if you can go around or even stabilize befor 500 ft.

[Microburst2002]

How is it that they don't have any sponsors, banners and that stuff???

I can't believe it. It is a very popular website!

[BOAC]

RY appear to be wasting their time in the PR department and merely making things worse (not the first time!). Before we all get TOO excited about all this (frightening) event, it is worth remembering it happened on 23/9 and perhaps we should be focusing on the action taken by the airline to ensure it does not happen again? I'm sure any such 'action' is long gone by now.

[B737700]

@ FLR-PSA : very nice way of narrating things ! I much appreciate your sense of humour ..... By the way, do you know whether these pilots are still with Ryr or ... probably fired by HMS "M.O.L." ????

[alicopter]

Ryanair deserves a new name | Carole Cadwalladr | Comment is free | The Observer (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/02/ryanair-needs-a-new-rude-name?INTCMP=SRCH)

with court cases in Marseilles and Spain (and probably somewhere else...) regarding labour laws, and the press (see above) in every european country against them, no surprise they are getting nervous... you even read about them in sailing forums since yachties are using air transport to commute to their craft and never in good terms. Can't be good and I must say, they deserve this bad publicity, even if I feel sorry for the Ryanair employees...

[BroCode]

http://sd.keepcalm-o-matic.co.uk/i/keep-calm-and-go-around-10.png

[alicopter]

Union des navigants de l'aviation civile (Unac) Syndicat national des pilotes de ligne (SNPL) versus Ryanair in Marseille.

It's ok to keep cool and go around when things are hotting up for Ryanir but on top of the questions and concerns for security, bad consummer relations, appalling staff consideration, what are the consequences of this air line's actions regarding labour laws (estimated prejudice to french social security 4,5 millions Euro... in Aix en Provence Court case alone...) in France, Spain, Germany and Italy... You can afford to be cheap if you cheat... without mentioning the crooked competition with airlines that complies and find themselves short of a few bucks...
I am fed up with all these people playing the same game with different rules. Hope Ryanair goes bankrupt SOON.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Bankrupt!!

I respectfully suggest that, multiple accidents aside, Ryanair will be one of the world's last four airlines flying.

Along with Easyjet, Vatican Airways and Air Force One.

[Herod]

Hope they don't go bust. They're the only airline that flies from where I live to where I want to go at a price I can afford. Twenty years ago the cost made it a once-a-year trip, now it's several times. Lots of people here slag off RYR without knowing anything about them ("I would never fly with such an airline"). Yes, this was a bad approach and, yes, it needs sorting, but the actual airline involved is irrelevant. Before anyone asks, I don't work for them, I don't hold shares and I don't like M O'L, but the airline is fine.

[RAT 5]

"Pretty obvious to me they weren't doing an ILS, nor had a LNAV route in the box. It was a Visual Approach via a wide right base, so none of the above (capturing) would be expected."

At the time of the briefing some 150nm before I'm sure an LS would have been discussed and the STAR + ILS inserted in 'the box'. Therefore there would have been a VNAV path in the FMC and its data being displayed at all times on the ND no matter what pages were displayed on the CDU. Surely, even when performing a visual to an ILS the Nav Aids would have beens selected and surely APP armed? The "glide slope" caution must have shouted at them many times. These aids would have been tuned and identified long before they started this manoeuvre. The gate where they entered this roller coaster was a wide base leg. I suspect the captain was blind to the RWY for much of base leg; but he might have had the rwy insight when requesting the visual; one hopes so. However he then flew into a blind spot. I wonder what help was given from RHS about the visual profile. It is still the case that instead of turning in all the data was screaming to turn out for a bit. Once agin all the time hoping to be gained was lost, or worse. As with Cali; it is better to be 5 minutes late than 20 years too early.

[I.R.PIRATE]

At the same time there is talk of a BA flight going around after touchdown in Nice...

What say the populace now?

[BOAC]

I R P - give us the links and we can discuss?

I fail to see why all the attention from RY and others is on how/when the g/a was conducted. Surely if we are to dissect this serious incident it has to be as Rat5 says - what was the ILS displaying and how on earth could they arrive at what appears to be 553'ATE at 4 miles from said threshold going down at 1740fpm AND have the runway in sight? It must have been somewhere near the top of their windscreens and any PAPI/VASIs tinged a trifle red. Again, crew interaction is questionable.

Can we expect RY's PR dept to address this, the more important question? Even if AvHerald got the detail of the g/a wrong (I have not had time to cross-refer the BFU report to AvHerald's) is this not what the travelling public need to know?

[Lord Spandex Masher]

PAPI/VASIs tinged a trifle red.

Or red with a tinge of green...

[doniedarko]

Now it looks like a certain airline has got upset over comments on Avherald and gone legal. If you can't read about it it never happened ....muppets :ugh:.

[DaveReidUK]

At the same time there is talk of a BA flight going around after touchdown in Nice...

What say the populace now?

I would imagine that the populace would say that missed approaches happen for a number of different reasons, many beyond the control of the crew.

Nobody is arguing that a GA of itself necessitates any finger-pointing - go to a large airport like LHR and you will see at least one a day, on average.

So it's all about the circumstances that led to the GA, not just the fact that it happened. Unless you have information on the sequence of events that occurred at Nice, assuming what you have heard is correct, then there's not much point in raising it.

[FLR-PSA]

@ FLR-PSA : very nice way of narrating things ! I much appreciate your sense of humour ..... By the way, do you know whether these pilots are still with Ryr or ... probably fired by HMS "M.O.L." ????

Sometimes a bit of humour is needed in threads like these, it breaks up the endless sh!t slinging and arm chair pilot advice.

Anyway, in answer to your question yes, these 2 pilots are still with the airline. They were invited over to see the boss. The receptionist took €60 off each of them to print out their visitors badge (they forgot to print it at home, idiots) and showed them to the office. As soon as the office door opened they ran to get the best seats because they hadn’t purchased a“priority bollocking”. Each put €3 in his personal vending machine and pressed the “Tea and Biscuits” option. They were congratulated for getting down to 450 and emptying the poo tanks before landing, making up time and opening up a brand new revenue stream. The airline now plan to roll out threatening legal action across the entire network and hope by 2014 to sue over 1,000 IP addresses for defamation. They duly thanked the boss, collected their contract pilot of the month award and deadheaded back to Florence, or Pisa as they call it.

[BOAC]

Most operators require an approach aid it to be selected and displayed (where available) for a visual approach, but not, as you say 'armed'.

[RAT 5]

You are assuming the FD's were switched OFF. I doubt that especially as the A/P was still in CMD, but not control. The pilot was in control of the A/P, but perhaps not the a/c. Are you saying that executing a visual approach onto an ILS (which you will surely capture before the landing gate) it is not a good idea to keep the FD's ON, look through them if necessary and then allow them to capture the approach in the final stages? It is not necessary as the raw data pointers would be visible, but it is not a requirement not use all facilities just because you are making a visual approach.

[wiggy]

why would APP be armed during a visual approach?

I guess it depends on whether you're displaying the Flight Director's or not. If you insist on having the F/D's displayed on a visual approach to an ILS runway then APP is probably the most logical mode for the F/D to be in (i.e. displaying LOC and G/S steering commands).

(edit to add: "RAT" beat me to it)

[Alycidon]

A visual approach "backed up" by ILS raw data might be a very good idea if there is any chance of misidentifying the landing threshold.

You may want to opt for a visual approach in order to reduce track miles or to assist the approach controller if busy even if the intention is to use the ILS.

[Microburst2002]

Yeah, right

It could have been a case of some sort of automation problem or fackup, followed by the real fackup, the two guys heads down trying to sort it out with the airplane sinking at over 2,500 fpm.

that could explain the very low height at that distance from the runway and the high sink rates. I don't understand how a crew seeing what is going on keeps it going until they manage to stop the sink with a buffer of less than 500 ft to terrain.

The GPWS warning, was it conventional or EGPWS?

[shaun ryder]

This is a classic case of poor judgement followed by presonitis. The mere fact that this aeroplane was being flown on the automatics after the pilots accepted a visual approach suggested that they were both out of their depth as soon as they elected to go it alone. They were in no way prepared to accept this clearance. They opted to fly a visual manoeuvre through the autopilot and ended up hanging on to the tail of their aircraft.

This business of taking a visual clearance and then half heartedly flying it with the autopilot or flight director is nonsense. If you haven't the confidence to fly the aircraft with your own hands then take radar vectors.

[stator vane]

obviously did not happen in this case,

but some "preaching" about various transgressions of F/D usage are perhaps personal preferences.

makes perfect sense to me.

of course brain must remain engaged.

several times, i have been able to cut significant distance out of a full procedure by asking for a visual approach and using the A/P to manoeuvre the aircraft to intercept the loc and glide on final approach.

it is not rocket science but again, brain must remained engaged and some distance ahead of the aircraft and situational awareness must be present as well.

FD's, A/T's, A/P's, LOC's and G/S's can be useful tools but pilot must be smarter than the tools he or she is using.

[Whip Whitaker]

If you haven't the confidence to fly the aircraft with your own hands then
take radar vectors


I would say you are probably in the wrong profession.

We could merge a lot of threads that have at the core the same problem, basic handling skills. Is it really that hard to look out the window and plan accordingly?

I wish 411A could be here to get involved...

[Herod]

pilot must be smarter than the tools he or she is using. Should be written in stone over the door of every training school and pilot's crewroom.

[RAT 5]

First lesson in any Jet TQ course. " the best computer on the a/c is between your ears."

Considering the requirements for anyone to be on a jet TQ course I find it amazing how many need a Japanese brain to do the most trivial of calculations. Sad. Tragic, unacceptable.

Signed: an old grump.

[Prober]

"If you haven't the confidence to fly the aircraft with your own hands then take radar vectors."
Maybe if you lack this particular confidence, you should be sitting in an office somewhere, pontificating about other people's deficiencies - which seems to be a fairly common happening, especially on this forum!:ugh:
Prober

[shaun ryder]

several times, i have been able to cut significant distance out of a full procedure by asking for a visual approach and using the A/P to manoeuvre the aircraft to intercept the loc and glide on final approach.

But why? The reason we request visual approaches is so that we can hand fly the aircraft down to the runway isn't it?

Maybe if you lack this particular confidence, you should be sitting in an office somewhere, pontificating about other people's deficiencies:=

Thanks for the concern, but I enjoy keeping my hand in. I do despair though at the number of FO's and Captains, who get maxed out at the prospect of hand flying an approach without any form of automation to back them up. Often citing their desire not to exceed any of the company parameters, give me a break...The truth is, some of these guys lack the confidence to operate the equipment without the aid of the autopilot.

Pontification over!

[Lord Spandex Masher]

But why? The reason we request visual approaches is so that we can hand fly the aircraft down to the runway isn't it?


No, it's so you can make an approach visually for economic and expeditious reasons.

You can also hand fly under vectors, on a procedure and on an instrument approach (can't you?!). All of which ultimately end up at the runway.

It matters not which kind of approach you are undertaking you may hand fly or not.

[shaun ryder]

Not quite. Being vectored by a controller on to a runway, is not the same as positioning the aircraft yourself for a landing, takes a bit more thought on the pilots part you might find. God forbid, you might have to think about pitch and power? Hand flying under vectors? Not the same, usually with the FD being driven by the NHP, just following a flight director I think, not worthy of a medal.

Are we not discussing the fact that this was a botched visual approach flown on the autopilot? Splitting hairs about how to position on to an ILS to save fuel and time is not the issue.

My question was simply why request a visual if you are not going to hand fly it.

[Bearcat]

I'm saddened Racedo is hiding under his plinth re this thread.

[Capn Bloggs]

Shaun, you need to get out into the world a little more. Where I operate, visual approaches are flown with all the automatics in, day in day out, saving hundreds of grand a year in fuel and flight time. Sometimes with LNAV and VNAV, sometimes in VS.

It's no big deal at all, and for the reasons stated they are quite appropriate, including cutting short an ILS. Using the autos reduce workload at lats initially while you work out what you are doing.

That said, and as I said before, you do need to keep on top of the aeroplane. The automatics will lead you astray eventually, and that is what seems to have happened here. For the critics of those who "need" the automation, they are generally a product of their company's operating philosophy or indeed rules, so it's not solely their fault that they can't or won't fly with less than full automation. The trick, of course, is to know we to use what.

Quotes of the thread:
FD's, A/T's, A/P's, LOC's and G/S's can be useful tools but pilot must be smarter than the tools he or she is using.

the best computer on the a/c is between your ears.

:D :ok:

[deptrai]

If this had involved Swaziland Airlink, the pride of the kingdom, I think this thread would have been a bit shorter. Ryanair certainly attracts it's fair share of scrutiny. RYRs LoCo approach (no pun intended) to business, their loud-mouth CEO, and now also their seemingly agressive legal stance all make sure people will continue to talk about them, and scrutinize everything they do (Disclaimer: I have never flown with ryanair, but I would not hesitate to do so if I had to. I'm not a RYR "hater", I have no reason to doubt their professionalism as an airline, and I believe their safety management system is appropriate)

So let me add to the noise.


BFU report.

16:39:20 EGPWS "Sink Rate" - which was 3240 ft/min at 1319 ft above ground. Bank angle 25° to starboard.
16:39:37 AP was deactivated
16:39:40 EGPWS "Caution Terrain" - sink rate is now 500 ft/min, at 480 ft. Bank angle 35° port.
16:39:41 450 ft, lowest height above ground reached
16:39:42 EGPWS "TERRAIN, TERRAIN, PULL UP" at 460 ft, 600 ft/min rate of climb, bank angle 7° port

http://s11.postimage.org/uu2pdrf8z/bfu_RYR.jpg (http://postimage.org/image/w94a2hgbz/full/)
images (http://postimage.org/)

BFU's account of what the PIC said: (my translation)

Takeoff in Manchester had been delayed 25-30 min, so flight crew decided to land on rwy 24 because of the shorter taxi distance. They prepared for ILS approach to rwy 24. They also spoke about a possible visual approach, in case anything wouldn't go according to plan. They were then cleared for a procedure approach (sic). PIC wasn't prepared for that. RYR documents indicated one could expect radar vectors, and he had always been given radar vectors on previous approaches. After the airport was in sight, they decided on a visual approach, and were given clearance. They descended at a high sink rate and speed of approximately 250 kts to 4000 ft.

[I'll translate the rest of the PICs account later if anyone wants]

[Lord Spandex Masher]

Not quite. Being vectored by a controller on to a runway, is not the same as positioning the aircraft yourself for a landing, takes a bit more thought on the pilots part you might find. God forbid, you might have to think about pitch and power? Hand flying under vectors? Not the same, usually with the FD being driven by the NHP, just following a flight director I think, not worthy of a medal.

My question was simply why request a visual if you are not going to hand fly it.

Isn't it? Gee I didn't realise! You think you deserve a medal if you hand fly a visual approach?

I answered your question Shaun. A visual approach saves track miles and, therefore, time and money. You can hand fly them or not it doesn't matter.

Why don't you try this next time. When you're getting vectors turn the FD off and hand fly. God forbid you might have to think about pitch and power and complying with heading, altitude and speed instructions all at the same time. Takes a bit more thought than simply flying a visual approach, you might find.

[BOAC]

Short of fuel....? - who are you suggesting was "Short of fuel....?"

Be careful how you answer and back it up with facts or you may well be getting a 'letter'.

[VinRouge]

What was the landing fuel on the jet during the time of the go around in comparison with the legal minimum Iaw ops1?

Who authorised this fuel at dispatch?

What will be done to ensure that this event doesn't happen again?

[deptrai]

let's not get paranoid about "letters" :suspect:

I think Hetfield was simply asking a question, as indicated by the question mark. Avherald wrote "The crew advised they had only 5 minutes of holding fuel and requested estimates for the holding time, then advised they would need to divert to Bratislava [...] FR-8414 was vectored towards Bratislava [...] Climbing through FL110 flight FR-8414 requested priority, was told the airport [Budapest] would be open for them".

[shaun ryder]

Why don't you try this next time. When you're getting vectors turn the FD off and hand fly. God forbid you might have to think about pitch and power and complying with heading, altitude and speed instructions all at the same time. Takes a bit more thought than simply flying a visual approach, you might find.

Some might say thats putting your balls on the chopping block Mr Spandex.

I get you, but unfortunately some ops manuals state this practise is not permitted until you are cleared for a visual approach (no descent restriction, to avoid confusion). So raw data under radar control might not be such a good idea after all.

[BOAC]

let's not get paranoid about "letters" - yes.let's? Hetfield's thinly disguised 'hint' they were 'short of fuel' is exactly what all this kerfuffle is about.

Let us be quite clear.

There is no indication from what we know that the fuel situation was incorrect IAW EUOPS.

I suspect none of us take 'extra fuel' to Budapest in case the tower bursts into flames.

It looks to me like a well-handled unusual situation totally unworthy of anything other than a ''telling of the tale'. No hints. No trolling. Simples?

[VinRouge]

How about a little extra fuel to handle an unforeseen problem at destination, ie icing system failure or gear snag?

[criss]

Shaun, what you say makes no sense. Being cleared for a visual approach doesnt kraj you're no longer under (radar) control.

[BOAC]

How about a little extra fuel to handle an unforeseen problem at destination, ie icing system failure or gear snag - of course, if your company and conscience allow. How many 'icing' and 'gear' problems do you anticipate - at least one on each sector? What particular 'icing' failure have you in mind and how much fuel will you allow? Are you aware that Boeing on the Classic used to advise a MINIMUM fuel state of 3800kg total for some gear malfunctions. Are you planning on arriving everywhere at GS intercept with that 'in case'? Do you risk getting out of bed in the morning?:ugh:

[VinRouge]

Boac, I don't see any problem with having enough fuel to shoot at least 2 approaches at destination, then divert, hold, then land with A safe minimum. The extra approach can be used for multiple events, not only a missed approach. Fuel = thinking time, especially when things don't go to plan.

I have had to carry out 2 precautionary shutdowns due to engine anti ice problems and an alternate gear extension before.These times, the extra approach fuel was useful to fully brief the crew and go through the drills slow time.

Do the major civvie carriers track individual fleet fuel discrepancy? Our best to worst accounts for 5% of cruise fuel.

[BEagle]

VinRouge, if the weather / likely traffic situation at destination merits additonal fuel over and above normal contingency then fine - that's up to the captain to decide.

The legal fuel to the alternate includes a go-around, climb, cruise and descent, to arrive overhead the alternate with 30 min holding fuel plus fuel for the approach.

My concern would be whether an assumed climb/cruise/descent profile was actually overly optimistic, in the case of bad weather and certain Mediterranean air traffickers.... For example, a certain manufacturer's table only allows for a visual approach at the alternate for absolute minimum legal fuel planning. If you're going to cut it that fine, then corrections for cruise level, ISA deviation, wind component and planned landing weight must be included in the diversion calculations.

The reported BUD event is a little confusing. It seems that the crew arrived with more fuel than the legal minimum, then commenced a diversion to their alternate after the tower suffered its fire. But after the crew had commenced their diversion, ATC seems perhaps to have misunderstood and offered them an immediate visual at BUD, thinking that the crew was in a critical situation? Which they clearly were not. Nevertheless, deciding to abandon a diversion and to return for an immediate visual takes some pretty rapid thinking.....

[VinRouge]

Not the most experienced skipper, but once I have decided to div, I div. it gets too confusing otherwise and fuel is usually pretty critical too. I am not sure I would be keen to return to an airfield whilst the tower is on fire.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

My concern would be whether the climb/cruise/descent profile was actually overly optimistic

Until they got a more up to date planning doodah one of my previous airlines div fuel was based on a straight line. We always took some extra.

Agree about the BUD thing, doesn't appear to be any pressing need to land at a closed airport without a tower.

[DownIn3Green]

I'm not going to bother reading thru this whole thread..."Hetfield" says it all...the guy who doesn't understand "no flap landing" profiles obvivously doesn't understand the defination of a visual approach, verses a "stabilised" approach...(from another thread for which I critisied him...however now I think I understand where he is coming from...)

Trying to interject his long learned and age old wisdom (which in my opinion is very valuable and a lost art nowadays) should be something all of you young guys should take note of... I don't really understand the problem here...

If 1,000 AGL is the minimum safe altitude, how could you ever land if even one tiny little cog in the wheel was out of the mix?

That's why we are Captains, a title that didn't come with a training course and a few years experience back in Hetfield's day...(Nor mine, may I add) and doesn't come with an instruction book. A Captain will never find all of the answers to any given situation in a Flight Manual...

Basic principals of flight always dictate the flight of the airframe...I think what Hetfield is saying and I fully agree with is: How you as a Captain apply basic aerodynamics to your aircraft in any given situation is not taught in any school, it is only learned after years of watching and picking the best of every "Greybeard" you fly with and learn why some other Captains scared the hell out of you...

That's my rant...I know a few Ryanair Captains, one of which was an Instructror with me in the mid 1980's....I've never ridden on Ryanair, but I wouldn't hesitate to do so if they were going my way...

Hetfield...I hope you realize I'm agreeing with you...sort of...DI3G

[RAT 5]

"Agree about the BUD thing, doesn't appear to be any pressing need to land at a closed airport without a tower."

Is BUD not a base? Was this a BUD a/c with a BUD crew? Could this explain the gethomeitis? If the a/c was then grounded by the closed airport I'm sure RYR have enough spare machinery around the network to sort it out. After all, if there were return pax they would have to bussed to Bratislava anyway.

It reminds me of an incident with me, after closure curfew. It was 20mins after the airport closed, and usually the tower and services were shutdown. This night, for some reason, ATC was there. They cleared me to land and confirmed fire cover was there. Ops was open. I had fuel to hold for a while so I asked OPs if the airfield was open. They replied that it was officially closed. I said ATC would let me land, but please call mission control for their permission. We didn't want to start a war with the locals. End result is we diverted. I wonder if in this case they had the time to get an answer from their mission control. We're always told Ops has the big picture. Surely, it's not a bad idea to pass the buck sometimes.

[Agaricus bisporus]

Budapest diversion.

A classic opportunity for "order, counter-order, disorder".

imho its a poor decision to go back on a decision to divert. Once you've made a decision and committed, carry it through. It's tempting, I know, but. As it happens the result was completely benign but what if...what if...?

Looks awfully like more press-on-itis to me.

And it would be interesting to see if the scenario described above re cleared to land but field not open applied here too - I'll store that little gem away for BUD arrivals in future.

[BEagle]

imho its a poor decision to go back on a decision to divert. Once you've made a decision and committed, carry it through. It's tempting, I know, but. As it happens the result was completely benign but what if...what if...?

That's what I was always taught. Many years ago, I was on a precision approach in minimum conditions and didn't see the RW at minima; as I started the go-around to my alternate, the other crew member said he could see the RW. It was very probable that I could easily have got in on a subsequent approach, but that would have meant landing below briefed minimum diversion fuel. It didn't help that the only available aerodrome was quite distant and that the aircraft configuration was such that an extra fuel burn penalty had raised the minimum fuel requirement. Of course you can't win - the diversion was no problem but I was hauled over the coals when I got back.....because others had landed successfully. :(

But in this Budapest case, things were probably rather different. For example, it might have been a wise move to have understated the actual spare fuel in the first place? But once the offer of a priority approach to a clear runway with no traffic ahead in CAVOK conditions was given, a quick recalc by an experienced crew might have identified that they could still make a visual approach and land with minimum legal diversion fuel, especially given that they probably hadn't used any contingency at that point.

It would be interesting to know whether they were still south of Budapest when climbing through FL110. They also had the weather and runway directions in their favour; to be honest, to me it sounds like a pretty slick decision from a quick thinking crew.

[txl]

Reading headlines like "Ryanair plane barely avoids crash", I can understand why the company's PR and legal depts are in full panic mode. Getting press like this is surely damaging their reputation (or what little is left thereof). They need to do damage control, but putting pressure on the messenger is always a bad move.

From my experience as a journalist, it's quiet common for corporations to have their legal depts bully smaller news outlets or blogs into obedience (bark at the big dogs for a change, you cowards). On a side note, a true PR professional would never allow something like this to happen. This will fire back at you -- it always does.

I'm not an expert in aviation, but the incident as described by BFU sounds pretty serious. So instead of bullying the media, Ryanair should investigate what internal procedures lead to a crew trying to make up for lost time by an impromptu change of plans that nearly went south.

[racedo]

I'm not an expert in aviation, but the incident as described by BFU sounds pretty serious. So instead of bullying the media, Ryanair should investigate what internal procedures lead to a crew trying to make up for lost time by an impromptu change of plans that nearly went south.

Are you really that nieve ?

Do you think that Ryanair haven't already run that scenario through numerous times to find what occured. In addition gone through their SOPs with crew to find those which were transgressed and why ?

Ryanair reported incident within 12 hours to IAA and kept the data to ensure all could be investigated.

Or perhaps you are another one believing in the story where no facts are checked.

[txl]

Are you really that nieve ?

Actually, I tend to believe I'm not – or at I least I hope so.

I am aware that Ryanair is surely doing everything to investigate the issue. So let me rephrase: Instead of bullying the media, they should concentrate on the investigation and drawing conclusions from that.

As "Enjoy the view" pointed out, there is some evidence (not only from this incident, and surely not only regarding Ryanair), circumstantial as it might be, that points to a corporate culture that might be problematic.

Like I said, I'm not an airline professional, and I'm not trying to blame Ryanair here, cause I don't know enough about the business. But it ticks me off when a company's legal department harasses a news outlet for reporting accurately – and here's where I have some expertise – what an official report says.

[criss]

Name the evidence.

[Dg800]

Okay,

now we know the reason "unexpected high tailwind."

It's a well known fact in aviation that a high tailwind in turn causes an excessive sink rate, right? :mad: :ugh:

[BOAC]

Actually chaps, we knew this in post #1, since AvHerald quoted the pilots there. Anything new?

[late-joiner]

now picked up by the Daily Mail
Ryanair plane carrying 141 passengers from Manchester nearly crashed over Germany after pilots tried new manoeuvre to make up lost time | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2245767/Ryanair-plane-carrying-141-passengers-Manchester-nearly-crashed-Germany-pilots-tried-new-manoeuvre-make-lost-time.html)

[BOAC]

now picked up by the Daily Mail - that's a relief - now we can expect some accurate and un-sensational reporting - including a picture of the wrong aircraft.................................................... ....:ugh:

[PH-Chucky]

According to the German newsmedium "Spiegel" Ryanair gave a statement about the incident stating that the crew experienced tailwind and that they performed a go-around according the text book.

I must say Ryanair is completely correct about this....

But then again they 'missed' some important information.... Because this unesteblished-high-energy-low-pass was the problem, not the tailwind. They might have performed a text-book go-around, but that was AFTER they screwed up this approach....

And if Ryanair is really concerned about 'safety', then stop MOL saying things about seatbelts and co-pilots.....

[Sober Lark]

Ryanair have a very positive risk profile in part created by a zero loss history.

Reports in the media about the airline contemplating charging a Euro to go to the loo is light hearted and funny and gives free publicity but reports that cast doubt over safety can damage the bottom line and need to be managed very carefully.

The other danger to the airline is that at renewal of insurance such incidents could influence an underwriters perception of the risk being presented and the airline will need to demonstrate clearly and convincingly why they deserve a good deal.

[BOAC]

It must be annoying for all those undoubted professional pilots and trainers in Ryanair to see the company bring this on itself.

How does it go? "When you are in a hole, stop digging"?

[cwatters]

Got to love the Daily Mail..

At one point, the plane was just 450ft (150m) above the ground while dropping at a rate of 500ft/sec....

[racedo]

Ryanair have a very positive risk profile in part created by a zero loss history.

There was a airframe lost at Ciampino...............skilled pilots ensured that was all.

[Facelookbovvered]

I recall that an ERJ145 had a similar high energy approach into HAJ some years back that resulted in a text book go around and landing, both pilots took a hike, from what I've read these guys should have broken off the approach much much earlier, i don't think its anything to do with FR culture, they got it wrong plain and simple and should be supported by the company, perhaps with some re training, they won't do it again thats for sure:cool:

[Sober Lark]

No claim on that one Racedo. I heard Alfred Hitchcock footed the bill.

[RetiredF4]

PH-Chucky
They might have performed a text-book go-around, but that was AFTER they screwed up this approach....

Are there go arounds (at any airline) except ATC and WX caused ones, which have no beforehand screw up as cause?

I go with BOAC on that one.

[7s2000]

Ryanair plane carrying 141 passengers from Manchester 'nearly crashed over Germany after pilots altered landing approach to make up lost time' | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2245767/Ryanair-plane-carrying-141-passengers-Manchester-nearly-crashed-Germany-pilots-altered-landing-approach-make-lost-time.html) It said one pilot was 30 years old (I assume he's the captain) and the co-pilot was 29. Just wonder is it normal to (be able to) be captain at 30 years old on a B737 or is it just Ryanair?

[VinRouge]

I was the captain of a 4 engine wide body at 30, what's the problem with age? Surely needs to be about competence, training and experience?

[westhawk]

what's the problem with age?

Allot of people just have the perception that age somehow implies maturity and all the positive attributes that go along with it. But given that we're discussing pilots, that's certainly open to debate! :)

Plenty of pilots have had to work their way up through the lower ranks of aviation and never even got an interview before thirty and so are somewhat envious as well. The question of whether this career ladder climbing exercise really does any good toward that building of knowledge experience and proficiency is usually asked by the ones who took a shorter and more direct route to the left seat though isn't it?

So I wouldn't put too much stock in people questioning the age of a captain. It's just that most people concern themselves more with their own perspective than that of others. Way of the world...

[Dg800]

Are there go arounds (at any airline) except ATC and WX caused ones, which have no beforehand screw up as cause?

The real issue is not the go around and when it was initiated, that's just a smokescreen FR is trying to use. The real issue is screwing up the approach to the point of being 500 ft short of a CFIT. :=

[fireflybob]

I believe the youngest pilot to be promoted to Captain at Ryanair was circa 25 years old.

No reason why not - they have passed all the checks/training and have the requisite experience.

Also plenty of other operators with "young" Captains.

[hec7or]

I'm pretty sure Thomson had a B737 captain aged 24, splendid bloke he is too!
I don't think age and competence are related. Competence can be aquired with experience, but not every pilot benefits, I've flown with plenty of 50 somethings who haven't the faintest idea what they are doing.

[deltahotel]

Australian test cricket selection criteria - 'if they're good enough, they're old enough'.

[7s2000]

Guys, I was only "wondering" if it is normal practice to be promoted captain at that age regardless of the airline, surely there are many very competent pilots out there below the age of 30s, with 5000+ PIC hours etc. Thank you for the inputs :8

[Bearcat]

Foreign Reports -Irish Registered / Operated Aircraft | AAIU.ie (http://www.aaiu.ie/node/401)

[Bengerman]

i don't think its anything to do with FR culture

The Pilot in Command (PIC) stated take-off in Manchester had been delayed by
about 25 - 30 minutes. During the flight the crew decided to land on runway 24 at
Memmingen Airport. The PIC stated the reason was the short taxiways to the apron
after landing on runway 24. Were the landing to take place on runway 06 the airplane
would have to taxi to the end of the runway and then turn back. The aim was to make
good on some of the time lost in Manchester.

No time pressure then?

[fireflybob]

In principle nothing wrong with any Captain saving time and fuel for his Company - indeed it is part of a professional pilots remit.

[deptrai]

I think it's entirely legitimate to ask intelligent questions about how human factors are affected by short turnaround times.

Very short turnaround times are a comparatively new way of operating an airline. From a "conservative" safety standpoint, anything radically new must be assumed to be potentially unsafe until proven otherwise.

What is NOT ok, in my humble opinion, is to make blanket assumptions and sweeping generalizations regarding safety based on a single incident (and it's even less helpful when such assumptions are intermingled with a general animosity towards everything Ryanair). Memmingen wasn't the first, and probably won't be the last such incident in Ryanairs history either. It's human to make mistakes. Cork 2006 ( Serious Incident: B737-800, EI-DCT, Cork Airport, 4 June 2006: Report No 2007-002 | AAIU.ie (http://www.aaiu.ie/node/198) ) comes to my mind, and some other similar incidents.

Ryanair landed safely 3.34 million times between 1992 and 2011, without a single fatal accident. That's a good safety record. And a lot of flights. Unsurprisingly, there will be some ("serious") incidents, like Memmingen and Cork.

Ryanair has all the FOQA data, in near real-time, and I trust they use it for all it's worth.

[Capn Bloggs]

nothing wrong with any Captain saving time and fuel for his Company - indeed it is part of a professional pilots remit.
That's correct.

[20milesout]

From the BFU interim report (http://www.bfu-web.de/cln_030/nn_1198882/EN/Publications/Interim__Reports/IR2012/I1__Report__12__EX002__B737__Memmingen,templateId=raw,proper ty=publicationFile.pdf/I1_Report_12_EX002_B737_Memmingen.pdf):

"...the airplane was in about 5,400 ft AMSL with a heading of about 117°.
Then the crew initiated a right-hand turn using the autopilot and continued the descent. An altitude of 2,096 ft AMSL had been pre-selected..."

Memmingen airport altitude is about 2070 ft. Were they trying a visual autoland then :confused:

[BOAC]

Confusion, I think. I don't think even on an Irish 737 you can 'select' 2096' and that sounds like threshold elevation in the FMS to me.

(Trusting it is R24, of course.............:eek:)

[BOAC]

it will allow a 'selected' altitude of 2096 on the MCP.- ta OK - didn't know that.Which A/P is that? How does the MCP 'knob' (NB not the co....:)) know when to click in 100's and when to click in single ft?

[doubleu-anker]

One needs to be extremely careful before going visual, in marginal conditions, or any conditions. If there is the slightest doubt, dont do it. Forget about MOL breathing down you neck, as they will soon get rid of you if you screw up.

Think of your passengers safety!!

"Why did you do that Captain?? You fault Captain", and that is true. It just aint worth it.

[BOAC]

One needs to be extremely careful before........ flying, actually? A visual in those weather conditions should have been a walk in the park for a competent pilot. If one were to get lost in the park, then you abandon the walk. There appeared to be a total lack of the oft quoted 'situation awareness' and energy management there.

In reality, these 'swapping to the other runway' tricks to save taxy time don't save much unless you opt for the straight-in runway and open cans of worms if you are quite unprepared for the change.

[JW411]

Purely as a passing comment, I was a training captain on 4-engine aircraft just after my 25th birthday.

[A4]

@JW411

Show off! :ok: :p:p

[TDK mk2]

de Havilland Heron was it, JW411?!

[737Jock]

I was a fleet admiral in the US navy at 21...

Seriously guys get of the age thing, we all know that it has more to do with being in the right place at the right time then anything else.

In terms of suitability for command I trust more in the likes of Ryanair and easyJet as they upgrade people based on merit and ability instead of looking at who's next on the seniority list like most legacy carriers. People who don't make the grade simply don't get command. Not at 25 not at 50 not at 60. People who do make the grade and are lucky enough to be there at the right time do get command.

Simple.

[RAT 5]

Having been through the LoCo experience, and speaking to friends still there, IMHO the root cause is that many airlines do not train even discourage visual approaches. Thus, on a daily basis it is not practiced and therefore not demonstrated. The result is that those who used to do it as the norm lose practice, and those who would like to try it are guessing in the dark. Then, occasionally, someone thinks this is the day and moment to give it a go, and it becomes a can of worms. Quickly you are on a slippery slope, think you can recover it and finally, hopefully, decide it won't work. The consequence is the FlT OPs dept decide that the attempt to save time & fuel achieves the opposite and so they discourage visuals more forcibly. The spiral is less practice, less demonstration and less competence. Thus piloting skills diminish, and this discussion, here, goes round & round, as per many previous threads. I leave you to decide where the root cause is. But once again the solution alludes the community. Pilots want to pilot, airline management want safety and cost saving. Allowing pilots to fly rather than operate can sometimes conflict with their philosophy. More training and encouragement of piloting skills needs resources and as the focus is profit it never happens.

[blind pew]

Fully agree rat 5.
The downward spiral will only stop when the authorities properly police the industry, insure minimum appropriate standards for all and not just nod their mates policies through.

[BOAC]

Perhaps we should press for visual approaches to an airfield to render that field CatC??:)

[Ringi]

737jock

To put your trust back on a level playing field with legacy carriers. Seniority systems don't guarantee command when you are next on the list. Assessments/checks etc must still be passed. All your seniority does is guarantee you are next in line for the opportunity to attempt the process.

[bubbers44]

I agree, seniority allows you to have a chance to upgrade to captain if able. You don't have the buddy system doing it.

[JW411]

TDK:

No, not the DH Heron. (I always wanted to fly the Heron). Actually, it was the HS660 Argosy.

[fireflybob]

Professional pilots should be able to fly a proficient visual approach with confidence just as they should be able to hand fly at altitude.

If they (or some of them) can't then it's the "system" (or lack of it) that's at fault.

Just to qualify (and I know for many this will be teaching grandma to suck eggs) when flying a visual approach all available aids should be monitored/utilized/crosschecked in order to confirm that things are going as planned.

A visual approach (or part of it) may be flown manually but for me such an approach implies switching off the automatics and the flight director and therefore hand flying. If the workload is that high that you don't feel happy to hand fly a visual then maybe you shouldn't be doing it in the first place.

When I flew for the operator in question the Ops Manual specified that when executing a visual maximum use would be made of AFDS etc hence the use of same in this instance (not saying I agree with said instruction!).

Recall watching one FO fly a "visual" - he programmed all the points for the circuit into the FMC and I then watched him fly the whole circuit on instruments with the Flight Director! I remarked that, in my opinion, this was not a visual approach!

It's a sad day when many professional pilots are now barely competent and/or confident to fly a visual approach.

[bubbers44]

ffb, I agree. A visual approach is like parking your car in your driveway. Very easy and we all can do it every day. Relying on automation or a flight director to land an airplane doesn't make any sense.

Landing at some airport we had not ever seen on the east coast of the Dominican Republic one night on a charter in a B727 as a new captain I checked all notams, called dispatch to confirm all navaids and tower operations were normal. My FO and FE were new on probation. They faxed us charts for the approaches. I did everything I could because I could see problems coming up.

Three miles out in the clouds I called approach and said, verify we are cleared for the VOR approach. They said negative, the VOR is OTS, you are cleared for the NDB approach to R26. We quickly set up the NDB for 26 as we approach overhead our supposedly vfr airport still in the clouds, execute the NDB approach breaking out in our procedure turn at about 1200 ft and see the runway with the VASI saying we are too high so descend but realize quickly we are not high, the VASI is wrong so level out and make the approach visually using eyeballs for approach angle over the water in a black hole approach.

We landed fine but then we found out non of the computers at the airport worked so had to copy our return flight plan and take off data over the telephone. After takeoff I heard our company flight from New York coming in so warned them about everything that was broke at the airport.

[Alexander de Meerkat]

I agree with both 737Jock and some of the other contributors. Like many of us in the industry, I have friends at many UK and European airlines - including Ryanair. There is no doubt in my mind that Ryanair management exercise a higher-than-normal level of intervention with its pilots. For example, there is overt pressure to take minimum fuel. That pressure comes in the form of the Captain having to justify the most basic airmanship decisions to his manager afterwards. I stand by my view that such practices are fundamentally opposed to the spirit of flight safety. In my opinion, over a period of time it wears down the Captain's willingness to make decisions that are necessary by always forcing him to consider the potential retribution and subsequent hassle from his manager. That in itself does not, however, mean that Ryanair is intrinsically unsafe - it does mean they have removed a layer of safety from the operation that other airlines have not.

Moving on to the issue of promotion - I think that the major low-cost carriers (Ryanair and easyJet) have a pretty robust command selection processes. The time to command at easyJet is destined to double in years to come as the expansion process of the past grinds to a halt. I imagine that would be the same at Ryanair. It also has to be said that the legacy carriers also have a robust system. I agree with those that say the seniority system just gets you to the starting gate - it does not prevent the selection system removing an unsuitable candidate regardless of their place on the seniority list. You still have to pass the course. In reality easyJet operate a command seniority system these days - the only real difference is that you cannot get on that seniority list until you have the hours for command. That would strike me as a sensible safeguard. Sure, there are imperfections in that system, but there are anywhere. The alternative is very unattractive - that management pilots and their mates decide who is suitable and who is not. Before you know it managers's favourites, their pals, their wives tennis partners' husbands, 'good chaps', 'exceptional' ex-military candidates and so forth all get promoted ahead of the regular good guy who has worked hard all his days but has failed to catch the Chief Pilot's eye. Therefore a robust and transparent seniority system needs to be in place that ensure that once a particular pilot has reached the standard for command he gets on the course in the correct order, and not at the whim of some manager.

[BOAC]

I can see your point in para 1, but I see no harm in having to 'justify' an extra fuel uplift with a PLOG entry - the decider will be what (if any) excessive 'punitive' action is taken on these decisions. As I have posted before, I 'grew up' in airline ops with some Captains taking "1 tonne over PLOG for good measure" on both CAVOK and CATIII days - no logic at all. If such a system makes crews THINK about why they need extra, I am happy with that. You can view it as 'pressure' or 'guidance' depending on the ethos. Going back to the BUD 'incident' discussed elsewhere, with a 2 runway airport, CAVOK forecast and under 6 hour flight, why is 'extra' over PLOG needed as some have suggested? Very nice to have, but........................

[Lord Spandex Masher]

no logic at all.

Wasn't the logic that fuel cost bugger all back when things were black and white?

[BOAC]

So I take it you agree with 'needing' the same excess regardless of weather? Educate me on the logic if you would.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

No not at all. Just suggesting that 'they' took the same amount of gas regardless of weather because it costs very little to carry it.

That was 'their' logic, I didn't agree with it.

[RAT 5]

A slight expansion of the thread away, from RYR in particular, and back to the old cherry of manual competence. In the old Cathy at Kai Tak I thought a visual approach was part of the command pass/fail criteria. IMHO any competent captain applicant, who would have to prove that, should be able to have an a/c at 5000', 220kts, 10nm out at 90 degrees to the RWY in severe CAVOK, i.e. visual, wind calm. They should then be able to make a visual CDA/LDA onto either rwy; their choice. Overhead left circuit or turn immediate right for left downwind on the other rwy. PAPI's as the only aid, or perhaps not. i.e.. a MK.1 eyeball approach hand flown. That's what was necessary in some Greek islands in 80's, and indeed any European airport which might have had only an NDB or VOR aid. Nothing's changed in the expected competence of a pilot, but it's no longer tested. It wasn't tested then, it was norm on the line. The only test was if you spooled up before 1500' or levelled off with power on you bought the crew beers. It focused the mind. Being competent at pushing the buttons is also a required skill, bit it should/must not be at the expense of the basic foundations of aviating. I still think we are the last insurance policy for the pax and they expect us to be able to control the situation when 'windows 95' decides to take a holiday. Equally they expect us to avoid falling into self-dug holes, but when we do, to climb out quickly.

[Capn Bloggs]

Well said, Alex. 10/10.

[BOAC]

That is a different topic. The point of my post was about getting people to THINK about the logic. There was NO LOGIC in the example I quoted, was there? It still costs no extra in relative fuel cost terms to carry extra but why do it if it is not needed? There are still people around who will add on 'a few hundred' (or more) for good measure without thinking why. They are the ones causing this problem.

[BOAC]

Rat - a fine summary of the world as it is and how it should be.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

I agree with you and I'm not defending the 'carry extra just 'cos' lot.

I'm only suggesting that they thought they'd take extra because they thought it didn't matter if they did. That was their logic, logical or not.

[BOAC]

they thought they'd take extra because they thought it didn't matter if they did. - absolutely, and I suspect 'they' still do. Hence perhaps the need for scrutiny - and education?

[2UP]

"Life on the Line" (#205) makes a depressing reading ....
Minor correction: there are presently no airports in Poland equipped with ILS Cat3. EPWA still has only Cat2 ILS.

[Prober]

Yes – sounds like a fairly normal stressful few days. However, there is an antidote. You are the Captain. I well remember my transition from the right to the left seat and I was lucky. It happened at the time when most of the Captains were still the old wartime breed (doesn’t matter whether they were the winners or the losers). They told me that almost everyone will lean on you to do this, do that, change your mind, do what they want. I won’t repeat their exact words, but they all added up to F...O... with plenty of dramatics to bolster the whole scenario. Wonderful to behold.
This stood me in very good stead going frequently to Moscow in the days when their ATC tried to tell you what to do when confronted with major thunderstorms or almost every other problem. I always did what I wanted, not what they demanded. When delayed by security, I always told them to ring Crew Control and tell them why the flight would not go on time. When leaned on by despatchers not to take so much fuel, I told them to fly the aeroplane and I will let Crew Control know.
A military background helped. When you are entrusted with authority and learn to use it properly, gnats nipping your ankles might be a slight distraction, but that is all they are and they really add up to nothing. Be your own man!

[Bearcat]

I think this thread has been trampled to death ........any chance a mod if they exist can call a wrap here?