The most unnecessary chute pull ever?

[Pace]

You are right to point out the question of what happens in a deployment in high winds but, of course, those same winds will have a effect on a forced landing as well.

Jonzarno a chute pull in strong winds is the enemy of a chuted aircraft while the friend of a conventional forced landing.

Landing into a 30kt headwind in a forced landing will give a very low forward speed.

Being carried horizonally at 30 kts into a hard object and we all know the damage a 30mph head on crash into a solid object does in a car.

This is really the point I am making! Yes the chute is an amazing leap forward in safety giving another option to the pilot to add to his skills.
Part of those skills are knowing when to pull and when not to pull.

I do NOT agree that people on the ground are safe from a descending aircraft under a chute. Without doubt there will be a fatality caused by a chuted aircraft landing on somebody or causing a multiple road traffic collision.
Then that pilot will have to live with the fact that did he really need to pull?

While an aircraft is gliding down the pilot has full control of where it goes or into what. He also has control of whether he stalls or not! Again it comes back to solid piloting skills and not plane drivers using technology to cover up a lack of those skills chuted he has no control whatsoever.

So for me the chute is a fantastic advance in potential safety and the Cirrus is a dream machine but with that advancement comes potential problem.
Being lured into conditions the pilot is not capable of is one.

I know for a fact that I dont trust piston singles any distance on dark nights.
With the Cirrus I would definately be tempted to fly night cross countries as I know I have a way out.

Pace

[Jonzarno]

I do NOT agree that people on the ground are safe from a descending aircraft under a chute. Without doubt there will be a fatality caused by a chuted aircraft landing on somebody or causing a multiple road traffic collision.
Then that pilot will have to live with the fact that did he really need to pull?

Live with the fact? Yes. And far too many pilots have already died with the fact that they didn't pull when they really, really needed to.

Nothing can be guaranteed in this world except death and taxes and any outcome of any accident is possible in theory. But history to date does demonstrate that pulling is preferable to not pulling.

You are obviously a very experienced pilot and, as I've said before: please feel free to make your own decisions about your own flying, and if you won't listen to me: listen to this 3000 hours in type Cirrus instructor:

pmYT1UssVss

If that isn't enough, watch the interviews in this video:

2pwJjJslvgA

By the way: one of the pilots interviewed is the one you called an "idiot" in your earlier post.....

As I say: you make your own decisions about your flying: what worries me is the potential influence of what you write here on inexperienced pilots who may not be as good or experienced as you.

If one of them dies following your advice, then that's something YOU may have to live with.......

[Pace]

Jonzarno

Very emotive writing ;) But as you say nothing is guaranteed. I would rather pilots made that pull or not to pull based on solid flying skills and not on panic decisions because they are in a situation they should not be in.

Remember most pilots do not have that luxury choice! Engine failure and they are going down.

It is then up to their piloting skills whether they pull off a forced landing.

There is a slight simularity to the second engine in a light twin.

Again the second engine gives you more choices with more choices comes the option to make the wrong choice.

But Jonzarno who is being critical of the Cirrus or the chute? Certainly not me I have sung its praises but with a caveat.
I see pitfalls which you seem blinkered to acknowledge or discuss in what comes over as all in the garden is rosy attitude when its not! As for my comments of an idiot it reffered to pulling the chute because of water in the static system. If that is the case then I would seriously question the judgement of the pilot above. If not and as you claim he had a complete panel failure then Cirrus have a major problem.

Pace

[007helicopter]

I have no idea how many innocent people are killed or seriously injured by GA on the ground?

I suspect incredibly rare, in the last decade no one to date has been injured on the ground due to a CAPS pull and inevitably at some point in the future that will happen but still strikes me as a virtually neglible risk, compared to example driving a car and hitting a pedestrian.

When pulling the Chute in ideal conditions with time on his side the Pilot would endevour to glide to the most open suitable land possible to pull the chute once other avenues are exhausted.

In IMC or other emergencies I guess its more of a Lottery.

Looking at the Cirrus accident rates there has been a surprising and relatively high proportion of Instructors and High Time experienced Pilots that have persihed and there are figures that seem to bear out time on type appears to be more important than total hours. No I can not explain this and do not have the figures to hand.

The strong wind argument is very valid and above an estimated 35 knot ground speed I certainly would now consider a forced landing as being a viable option subject to terrain and other conditions. (and something I did modify my SOP as a result of debating the whole topic on here and COPA)

[Adrian N]

As for my comments of an idiot it reffered to pulling the chute because of water in the static system.

Yes, he should have selected alternate static. He made a mistake.

But picture the scenario. He had taken off in low IMC - 400ft ceiling. Almost as soon as he entered the clouds, the VSI, then the altimeter, and the ASI started giving contradictory indications, and I believe there was also a problem with the attitude indicator (this was a first generation Cirrus with traditional gauges). The pilot was confused, frightened, not sure if he was climbing or descending, and was at low altitude in IMC.

Static blockage followed by an immediate takeoff into IMC is not an easy failure to deal with. To call an 800 hour private pilot an idiot for using his aircraft parachute in such a situation is simplistic. Sure, he made a mistake, but plenty of much more experienced pilots have done the same, and died.

To give just one example, Aeroperu flight 603. A Boeing 757 with a 22,000 hour captain and 8,000 hour first officer. They crashed into the ocean shortly after taking off from Lima, having mis-identified and failed to cope with a blocked static system.

The strong wind argument is very valid and above an estimated 35 knot ground speed I certainly would now consider a forced landing as being a better option subject to terrain.

That's probably a bad idea.

If you have a 35kt wind on the ground, it's likely to be over 50kt at 500ft above the ground. Making an accurate glide approach in those conditions is going to be very difficult, and the chances of getting it wrong are high.

Let's say you're having a really good day and everything goes just perfectly to plan. You flare to land into the wind at 70kt - so a groundspeed of 35kt. You have exactly the same energy to dissipate as the aircraft travelling downwind at 35kt under its parachute. And, of course, the airbag seatbelts in the Cirrus are there to lower the risk of injury in just such a situation.

On the other hand, if something goes a bit wrong - wind shear causes you to land one field short with the nose down as you tried to regain airspeed, or your landing site turned out to be 30 degrees offset from the surface wind direction (which will probably be 30 degrees different from the wind at altitude), or in your fear at trying to pull off a difficult forced landing in a plane which glides as badly as an SR22 you cross the hedge at 90kt not 70kt, or due to the strong wind you misjudge your approach to the landable field.... suddenly the parachute arrival looks infinitely preferable. But it will be too late, and you might become the 59th Cirrus pilot to die in a situation where you could have lived if you'd used the parachute.

[007helicopter]

Adrian all I am saying is it is factor to consider and subject to terrain and many other factors a decision is to be made by the pilot.

Being dragged by a massive parachute would be no fun either and it is for each of us to weigh up what we think the safest option.

Many on COPA would factor in strong winds to their decision making, At what wind speed in general would you consider for yourself it would become a factor to consider a forced landing as opposed to a chute pull with what appear's reasonable terrain below?

[Adrian N]

It would have to be an extremely strong surface wind, in an area with an abundance of suitable landing sites for me to consider not using CAPS.

The Cirrus I fly (SR22 turbo - not mine, unfortunately) has been modified with a 4 blade MT prop. Its glide performance is abysmal, and it would take a combination of skill and luck to glide it to a successful landing. I did some of my FAA CPL training in it, and the required 180º glide approach to a precision landing was extremely difficult even in good conditions. In a forced landing I'd rate the risk of a high energy crash to be very high and would would prefer to take my chances being dragged a bit by the chute on the ground.

[shortstripper]

Sorry but having watched that great advertising video (obviously produced by Cirrus) I'm still not convinced! They keep banging on about the lives saved by the chute, but how many of those sixty something may have survived anyway by either doing a successful forced landing or not flying when they would not have if in a "conventional" aircraft? Like Pace, I don't knock the system as such and would certainly use it if all else failed (I also concede some of those who've died flying Cirri would have survived if they'd used the chute). It's the blinkered "I will survive if I pull the handle" attitude that gives me the shivers! A perfectly nice aeroplane but for one designed from the outset to be so very safe, it doesn't "seem" to have worked? I'm not saying it's unsafe, but it's not the panacea they seem to be trying to portray in that video.

Live with the fact? Yes. And far too many pilots have already died with the fact that they didn't pull when they really, really needed to.

That in response to Pace's point about a pilot living with the fact that they may kill someone on the ground? Ok, nobody wants to die and yes you could kill someone on the ground just as easily in a forced landing or loss of control ... but at least you would know you tried (or die knowing so). You seem to be saying that if you kill someone on the ground having saved yourself that at least you're alive? .... Hmmmm! I hope you didn't mean it quite like that ... It's a nightmare scenario that some poor sod will face one day I am sure. Not their fault of course and I certainly wouldn't think anyone would blame them. Not a good pilot survival outcome to use to make your point though :=

SS

[Adrian N]

how many of those sixty something may have survived anyway

It's now about 90 people. Maybe some of them would have survived. Quite possibly none of them would. In almost all cases it would have needed the pilot to pull off an extremely lucky and skillful forced landing, or to demonstrate superlative handling skills while terrified, right after demonstrating less than superlative skills.

What is indisputable is that more people than have been "saved" by their parachute have died because they didn't use it. 58 Cirrus pilots were sure they could recover a bad situation. They were wrong, and they died. And they took over 60 passengers with them.

[Maoraigh1]

58 Cirrus pilots were sure they could recover a bad situation. They were wrong, and they died. And they took over 60 passengers with them.

That's a horrifyingly high death toll.

[shortstripper]

I'm sure some of the 58 would have died even using the chute :(

It's really not cut and dry one way or the other is it?

I wonder how they compare to other aircraft? To be fair, I don't know what the fatal accident rate per hour of flying is for most aircraft makes??? ... But 118 seems very high for the 6000 or so airframes produced so far? I'd love to know. I might be more convinced if it compared favourably ... Though for an aeroplane designed to be safe I'd hope it would be a lot better.

SS

[Adrian N]

I'm not sure that any of the 58 would have died if they'd used the chute. There have been a number of fatal Cirrus accidents where the parachute couldn't have made a difference - most notably flying into terrain in IMC. But the 58 are the ones which happened in situations where other pilots had pulled the chute, and everyone on board lived.

If you use the parachute high enough - about 400ft in level flight, or 920ft in a spin - and slow enough (demonstrated speed in certifcation was 135kt, but there have been successful deployments at 187kt and only one parachute failure, which occurred at something like 270kt), then you will live.

The Cirrus fatal accident rate was initially slightly worse than the GA average. Recently it has improved significantly - quite probably because more people have been using their parachutes.

The average accident rate, using NTSB data, for GA flying is 1.24 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours of flying. If you limit the selection to personal and business flying (i.e. not flight training), the rate is 2.38 fatal accidents per 100,000 hours. The Cirrus rate is 1.57 over the last 3 years, and 1.07 over the last 12 months. There is lots of data freely available on the COPA website (www.cirruspilots.org).

[Fuji Abound]

That in response to Pace's point about a pilot living with the fact that they may kill someone on the ground?

What a strange idea.

What makes you think you cannot kill someone with a conventional forced landing?

In fact with a conventional forced landing you carry more energy, and are likely to cover more distance. So on the one hand the propensity to cause injury is greater, but, on the other, you might, and I emphasize might, be more selective about your landing site.

I suspect this is just another example of unfounded speculation not supported by any evidence that one landing is any more likely to cause harm to third parties than the other.

[shortstripper]

Fuji Abound ...

Read my post again ... I acknowledge that fact! Cherry pick why don't you??? :ugh:

SS

[shortstripper]

What is it about this subject that makes the "pull the chute" brigade so blinkered to any argument against it???

Nearly all of the posts by pilots who question the wisdom of using the BRS at the slightest hint of trouble have acknowledged that it is a worthwhile safety device. All they do is question its use in certain circumstances and speculate that it may encourage slightly more reckless flying? Those who own or fly BRS equipped aircraft seem to defend the system without question as if it's faultless?

I'm starting to think there's some brainwashing going on somewhere? :p

Oh and yes .... This is one of those late night after wine postings that is a bit tongue in cheek. No doubt the Cirrus brigade will jump on me yet again! :ouch:

SS

[Adrian N]

When you sober up, perhaps try and give a coherent argument against it? In your post at 20:52 UK time you asked how Cirrus accident data compared to other aircraft. I gave you some clear data. Your follow-up makes it clear that I was wasting my time.

[Fuji Abound]

Shortstripper has your earlier post be pruned?

My quote was more intended as a comment on a generally cited belief.

I dont think the cirrus lobby is biased, its more a case that there are so many irrational arguments about the chute, that they spend their time dispelling those but really hoping for a rational debate.

Nothing wrong with a glass of wine or two hope it was good stuff.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Folks, how about actually reading a bit of the thread? .

That's crazy talk :eek:

If people did that they might come across actual facts that get in the way of their preconceived notions :hmm:

[shortstripper]

Shortstripper has your earlier post be pruned?

My quote was more intended as a comment on a generally cited belief.

I dont think the cirrus lobby is biased, its more a case that there are so many irrational arguments about the chute, that they spend their time dispelling those but really hoping for a rational debate.

Nothing wrong with a glass of wine or two hope it was good stuff.

Twas an excellent Burgundy thanks and if you note the time I'm replying to this (just off to work) you'll realise I didn't have tooooo much ;) No my earlier post wasn't "pruned" :suspect: Sorry if I came across a bit spiky but your comment was addressed to my post and didn't appear as a general one.


When you sober up, perhaps try and give a coherent argument against it? In your post at 20:52 UK time you asked how Cirrus accident data compared to other aircraft. I gave you some clear data. Your follow-up makes it clear that I was wasting my time.

I meant against individual aircraft types ... say Piper PA28's, or Beech Bonanzas ect.

SS

[mary meagher]

I get the impression from a number of expert posters that the Cirrus is not a very good glider. (and my long ago experience with a Franklin engine has given me a strong preference for Lycoming!)

If all you power pilots simply shut down your engines and seriously took up gliding you would be much much safer! We seldom fly at night, in poor weather, or IMC.....though we do fly in interesting terraine.

And there is no pressure involved in persuading a reluctant family to come along for the ride...most cross country pilots fly alone!

[Steevo25]

For me, I think the chute is probably the best safety item ever put in an aircraft and I for one would definitely have one if it could be put in my aircraft. I also like the Cirrus aircraft, there are quite a few of them at my airfield.


BUT, there are downsides. First of all I really do feel that having the chute on the aircraft does take away some element of assumed risk. I have seen this with my own eyes down at my airfield with some (and I do say some not all) Cirrus pilots electing to take the chance when others will not even consider going up.


Also, the 'pull the chute at any sign of danger' attitude is fine and probably would save your life in many circumstances. But no one seems to consider the people on the ground. A chute pull (when there may have been a recovery if no chute had been available) may well save the lives of the people in the aircraft, but once the chute has been pulled there is no going back and next to no control. The last chute pull I heard about came down in a garden and a couple of hundred metres from a school.


I think it is very difficult to judge if the chute should have been pulled or not as I wasn't in the aircraft and I may of had a very different opinion if I had of been in there. Unfortunately (or fortunately), it is human nature for life preservation and when under pressure and a life threatening situation, the first reaction is to take away that risk and the chute gives a very good option of doing that.

[Pace]

I think some here take comments as against Cirrus aircraft. It's pilots or the chute and respond in a very defensive manner!
The fact is the Cirrus is the first mass produced aircraft to have a standard BRS and it is without doubt a huge contribution to safety! The idea of reliably lowering the aircraft and it's occupants to the ground is very appealing!
But that fact alone will generate discussion as some of the proposed uses fly I. The face of conventional training.
There are those who promote the chute for any engine failure!
I see that Cirrus do not back this stance as in the FM the procedure stated by Cirrus is to glide to a suitable landing area and to perform a FL!
Only with no suitable landing area do they quote " Consider" the use of the chute ! Yet many promote it's use for any situation where the pilot feels threatened!
We are talking about GA PPL pilots!
Their currency. Ability and experience vary enormously so extra diligence needs to be taken not to attempt trips they would not do in a conventional un chuted aircraft.
Flying in ones limits becomes even more important as well as the decision making of when and where to pull

Pace

[Jonzarno]

BUT, there are downsides. First of all I really do feel that having the chute on the aircraft does take away some element of assumed risk.


There are two aspects to this:

Firstly, there is a chance that a reckless pilot might take a stupid risk because they think the chute protects them from that and I am sure that must have happened and it is wrong.

The way to address that is through training and mentoring and it is covered extensively in the transition training and CPPPs I have been banging on about in previous posts and has been discussed often on COPA.

Secondly, though, there is the reassurance it gives in “normal” operations, especially flying in IMC or at night. I remember doing my night rating in a Robin and wondering what I would really do if the engine failed.

I have never flown any aircraft other than a Cirrus in serious IMC, but I have to say that I wouldn't fancy needing a forced landing either on a dark night or under a 200-400 ft cloud base without knowing I have the chute. Obviously other pilots do fly their non-CAPS aircraft in those conditions, and I don't for a moment blame them for doing so, it's just my personal view.


But no one seems to consider the people on the ground. A chute pull (when there may have been a recovery if no chute had been available) may well save the lives of the people in the aircraft, but once the chute has been pulled there is no going back and next to no control. The last chute pull I heard about came down in a garden and a couple of hundred metres from a school.


In the Cheltenham pull thread which discussed this particular pull and which was was locked, this topic was covered very extensively. In that pull, the number of people who reported hearing the bang from the rocket, seeing the big parachute as well as watching, and even having time to get out a phone and film, the descent was remarkable.

I would draw the contrast between that and an engine out aircraft without a chute.

Also, remember that a light aircraft hitting at 60 KTS carries about ten times the energy of one landing under CAPS at 17 knots. Yes, in the former case you have an element of control that you don't have under the chute but, as the picture I posted in an earlier reply shows, that's by no means an assurance of a good outcome either.

I would suggest that using what altitude you have to glide away from vulnerable areas and then deploying the chute is almost always going to be the best (or at any rate the least bad!) outcome.


I think it is very difficult to judge if the chute should have been pulled or not as I wasn't in the aircraft and I may of had a very different opinion if I had of been in there. Unfortunately (or fortunately), it is human nature for life preservation and when under pressure and a life threatening situation, the first reaction is to take away that risk and the chute gives a very good option of doing that.


That's quite right and it's why the training tries to integrate the use of CAPS into emergencies handling to ensure that the system is used when needed but also early enough in the incident for it to work properly. It's very much NOT "see a warning light: pull the chute”.

[Fuji Abound]

Pace - you will recall we have been here before in terms of what Cirrus do and dont recommend.

I dont know the official reason but I suspect that Cirrus will "never" recommend using the chute in "all" circumstances because their lawyers have made clear that would not be a good idea. It wouldnt be a good idea because there isnt (or wasnt) the evidence to prove the chute will most likely result in a better outcome and, even if there is that evidence now, it would still be difficult to counter a legal argument that in a particular situation a conventional FL wouldnt have been better - with the prosecuting lawyers knowing that since the pilot had used the chute (and killed himself) no one could prove what would have happened if he hadnt pulled the chute - you get my drift.

I imagine to ever make the use of the chute a SOP would require a program of testing and certifying that the FAA could never approve and even if they did would be so costly as to make it economically nonviable.

So in the real world we are left developing a SOP from real world experience which is what COPA have done. As the evidence accumulates doubtless the recommendations will become more refined and statistically more reliable BUT no one will ever be able to safe the chute offers a guarantee and is ALWAYS the best alternative all that it might be possible to say is that statistically it is the best alternative. That is a very different matter.

So the chute doesnt offer certainty any more than a forced landing offers certainty - the only certainty on offer is an extra engine with enough power to enable the flight to be completed with a pilot competent to fly on just the extra engine while still relying on that engine to keep turning.

[Jonzarno]

Shortstripper


What is it about this subject that makes the "pull the chute" brigade so blinkered to any argument against it???


Blinkered? Pot? Kettle?


Nearly all of the posts by pilots who question the wisdom of using the BRS at the slightest hint of trouble have acknowledged that it is a worthwhile safety device. All they do is question its use in certain circumstances and speculate that it may encourage slightly more reckless flying? Those who own or fly BRS equipped aircraft seem to defend the system without question as if it's faultless?


No, we just try to point out what it can do and correct the misrepresentation of how it should be used that you keep parroting. We justify what we say by presenting evidence of what it has already done.

By contrast, it is interesting that the only time you have actually posted any evidence here, it actually destroyed the argument you were trying to use it to prove. :D


I'm starting to think there's some brainwashing going on somewhere?


Brain washing is really only useful if you have a dirty mind. Even then, it implies you actually have a brain to wash....... :p


Oh and yes .... This is one of those late night after wine postings that is a bit tongue in cheek. No doubt the Cirrus brigade will jump on me yet again!


If your vision is not too blurred, hopefully you will see the bulge in my cheek where my tongue is.....

Cheersh! :zzz: :O

[Lone_Ranger]

Jonzarno:
I have never flown any aircraft other than a Cirrus in serious IMC

One sentence that wholly explains your attitude.
Its common for those with little experience to think they know better than the measured arguements of those who have gone before...teenager syndrome

[Jonzarno]

Lone Ranger

Thank you for your measured, considered and closely reasoned comment.

As I posted earlier in this thread, I fly over 200 hours a year as a GA pilot, have well over 1000 hours PIC IFR time, over 30% of it in actual IMC and have done a considerable amount of training both in aircraft and full motion simulators. I take all aspects of safety very seriously indeed.

I don't see how the fact that I choose to fly a Cirrus should reflect adversely on my attitudes or abilities as a pilot?

As for your comments on "measured arguments": please read all of the posts I have made to this thread, before my last one :) and tell me which of the arguments I have made has been less than measured and not supported by factual evidence even if you don't agree with what I say.

As for being a teenager again: I wish!!

[shortstripper]

Jonzarno

I have the good grace to concede to valid points raised and anybody reading my posts can see that. By contrast it is interesting to note that all you ever do is dissect other peoples posts, take their points out of context to try and make it appear that they have no valid point.

I have never said the CAPS system is a bad thing in itself. I have never said the Cirrus is a bad aircraft. All I have asked is why it has such a poor safety record (or appears to have). That has pretty well been answered before you go off on one again btw. I have conceded to the point that I do not know how it compares to other types (individual comparable types not just other GA) but it does seem to have a high number of fatalities. Again this has been answered to a large extent by the fact that many of the accidents were early on and recent training has addressed many of the issues. I have actually started to appreciate the CAPS system a lot more by some of the things I've read on here. However, I still cannot accept the "I will die unless I pull the chute" argument that seems to come across from people like you. Anybody but a fool would not use a parachute as a last ditch "get out of jail card", but given all that I have read I would still go for a forced landing unless I seriously thought it was unwise.

If you want to carry on picking my posts to bits, you go right ahead, but I'm done.

SS

[mad_jock]

What is serious IMC anyway?

The wx is either ****e or its lovely.

Your either flying IFR with your instrument head on be it IMC or VMC or your flying VFR in VMC.

When you start dicking about trying to take the easy VFR option and then getting caught with your privates hanging out is when your likely to screw it up.

Its a lesson I learned years ago always plan for the worst and 99% of the time it never happens. The 1% you end up in the poo you more than glad for putting the effort in on the planning side.

[Jonzarno]

Jock

Of course you're right, it is either VMC or IMC and you are either flying VFR or IFR, I chose the wrong words to make my point.

If you recall I was talking about risk homeostasis and people taking stupid chances because they have CAPS available.

What I was trying to say was that there are things I'm uncomfortable doing without CAPS as opposed to silly risks I'm prepared to take because I do have it.

One of those things is flying any SEP to minima in IMC because I don't fancy a forced landing in those conditions, although I know that plenty of people do it every day (and I don't criticise them for doing so at all!) and the chances of a failure at the wrong moment are small.

[mad_jock]

What I was trying to say was that there are things I'm uncomfortable doing without CAPS as opposed to silly risks I'm prepared to take because I do have it.

This is the nub of the problem that some of us have that there is a risk shift having it on board.

[Adrian N]

Why do you see it as a problem? I'm not that comfortable flying most single engine aircraft at night, or above fog, or in thick IMC which goes all the way to the ground. I will do it, but CAPS makes it much more comfortable.

There's a risk shift with lots of things, really. I wouldn't want to fly a long distance over water with a single magneto. With 2, I'm happier. Pitot heat and alternate static make me more comfortable to fly in IMC. In-cockpit weather (in the States) makes me more comfortable flying on days when there might be embedded CBs. Etc. etc. CAPS is just another thing which lets you get stress-free use out of an aircraft.

Like Jonzarno, I'm happy to fly a Cirrus in lower IMC conditions than other aircraft. That's not really to do with CAPS - it's more because of the situational awareness that the avionics provide, the autopilot, the flight director, and the benign handling which makes it easy to transition to VMC at minimums and make a nice landing even in very unpleasant weather. I now fly a Mooney, and it is much harder work than the Cirrus - so my personal minimums are higher in it.

Despite the strong opinions that get expressed every time there is a Cirrus accident, there is no evidence in the accident data to suggest that Cirrus pilots are using CAPS to get out of situations that other pilots don't get into. For sure, some of them do stupid things - but sadly so do pilots of any other aircraft.

[Jonzarno]

Jock

The point I was trying to make is that my stance of being uncomfortable to do things that many others do regularly without CAPS is actually a more conservative safety stance than theirs.

I stress again, firstly that I have no problem whatever with their decisions in those circumstances and, secondly, that I don't for a moment advocate using CAPS as an excuse to do something stupid.

[maxred]

Like Jonzarno, I'm happy to fly a Cirrus in lower IMC conditions than other aircraft

This is now going round in circles. You are now actually answering, and confirming, the very points that some are making. Namely the knowledge that a BRS is on board, allows Cirrus flyers to, push the envelope, happy in the knowledge that if it goes wrong, pull the chute.

This, in my view, is fundamentally wrong.

I happen to drive a very fast Mercedes. I got there, by track driving, driving TVR, ie, I have experience. I have not totalled a high performance car yet.

The fact it has dual airbags, does not make me go berserk, and drive at the 215 mph, the car will do. If I did, I would no doubt, kill myself.

Same with the Cirrus issue, sooner or later, and by the looks of it, many have already, people will kill themselves. It appears by your comments, and the plentiful anecdotal evidence, that flying skills are being ignored, eroded, simply because a chute will save the day.

This cannot be right.

[Camargue]

I have been reading all this with interest, lots of valid points over the last few weeks and one thing strikes me.

If I was flying to imc minima, at night, over sea, mountains or some god forsaken part of the world I'd rather have 12 cylinders,(or maybe 8) 4 mags, 2 props and the potential of a nice smooth underside rather than a chute - which may, just when you need it, fail to deploy.

I may well be wrong but a pilot who can afford a Cirrus can afford a twin surely?

[Lone_Ranger]

Jonz... I don't see how the fact that I choose to fly a Cirrus should reflect adversely on my attitudes or abilities as a pilot?

It doesn't, I never stated or implied that.
I made a comment on your attitude, not what aircraft you fly

I think, you don't actually realise how defensive you are of a position that comes from a combination of lack of experience and steadfast belief in a single safety being the only option.

[Adrian N]

Maxred, did you read the sentence after the one you quoted? The one which said that being happy to fly it in worse conditions than other aircraft has nothing to do with the parachute?

[Jonzarno]

Jonz...
Quote:
I don't see how the fact that I choose to fly a Cirrus should reflect adversely on my attitudes or abilities as a pilot?
It doesn't, I never stated or implied that.
I made a comment on your attitude, not what aircraft you fly

I think, you don't actually realise how defensive you are of a position that comes from a combination of lack of experience and steadfast belief in a single safety being the only option.


Thank you for explaining my attitude: I have often wondered what it is. :p

I am quite happy to stand on the experience and detailed knowledge of the CAPS system and it's history and the training associated with its use that I have gained to date, and on the merits of the arguments I have put forward supported as they are by facts, evidence and, as far as I know, pretty much all of the CSIPs who provide training on these aircraft. That's not being defensive, it's being assertive of a position that has strong evidential support in the face of repeated criticism that does not.

If you want to try to refute this by belittling me, rather than providing evidence to counter what I and others have said, I would suggest that is playing the man rather than the ball and I'm fine with that. I recall the same thing happening to Rick Beach in another CAPS related thread and I can't think of better company in which to be abused.

I repeat something I said in an earlier post: I'm not trying to convert the unconvertable here. I'm trying to stop an inexperienced Cirrus pilot from dying with a perfectly good parachute unused behind them because they are influenced by something written on a forum like this.

Thank you for helping me achieve that :ok:

[sdbeach]

Jonz...
I don't see how the fact that I choose to fly a Cirrus should reflect adversely on my attitudes or abilities as a pilot?
It doesn't, I never stated or implied that.
I made a comment on your attitude, not what aircraft you fly

I think, you don't actually realise how defensive you are of a position that comes from a combination of lack of experience and steadfast belief in a single safety being the only option.
Thank you for explaining my attitude: I have often wondered what it is. Jonzarno, interesting excerpt quoted here. And I sense that it reveals the challenge in communicating effectively.

First, note how Lone_Ranger described the attitude of pilots who fly Cirrus aircraft, the position he thinks you are defending -- "a combination of lack of experience," and "belief in a single safety being the only option." Were those your words? Do they apply to one Cirrus pilot? Or most? Or all? Or were those his beliefs from your words?

I recall my psychology courses describing this as a projection -- attributing to others the undesirable qualities that one denies in oneself. It's something that I have recognized and dealt with in my career, so it's become easier for me to see it happen to others.

Folks, I've interacted with Jon and other COPA members who do not lack experience and do not believe in an "only option." So, the explanation by Lone_Ranger does not apply to Jon, IMHO.

Yet, here we are presented with those two items as our beliefs. Wrong.

When presented as a stalking horse, these beliefs belittle the dialog, and makes it easy to pursue an interminable debate.

The reality is that only 1 person has died in a Cirrus fatal accident in the past 6 months (actually, he is missing in the middle of Brazil and presumed to have died). In the same time frame, 13 people have survived when they landed under a Cirrus parachute.

I hope that sometime, the folks posting on this thread about an unnecessary chute pull would talk with those families and ask -- was it unnecessary to have them home for dinner?


Cheers
Rick

[funfly]

So, does the fact that most glider pilots wear parachutes mean that when they are considering landing out all they consider is jumping out and parachuting down?

Does the fact that my car has airbags mean that I drive without any regard to crashing?

Any device that offers an addition to saving life must be considered an advantage.

It is my opinion that those people on here who look upon additional safety devices as only for 'ninnies' or 'non macho' pilots represent the same attitude as those who used to wag their fingers at GPS guidance.

In the event of an emergency, the first consideration of any responsible pilot should be the saving of life using the best options available to him at the time. Having additional options fitted to an aircraft widens his/her choice of options.

[bartonflyer]

I now fly an aircraft with a ballistic parachute recovery system - not a Cirrus but a Flight Design CTLS.
For me, the issue is not so much encouraging me to "stretch the envelope" as under the EASA Permit to Fly the aircraft is limited to daytime, VFR only (even though I have an IR) but giving me confidence that should I conk out (and I'm 63) while say flying with a grandchild, wife, friend or other non-pilot - part of the safety brief will have been - turn the key off & pull the big red handle!

[Pace]

Like Jonzarno, I'm happy to fly a Cirrus in lower IMC conditions than other aircraft. That's not really to do with CAPS - it's more because of the situational awareness that the avionics provide, the autopilot, the flight director, and the benign handling which makes it easy to transition to VMC at minimums and make a nice landing even in very unpleasant weather. I now fly a Mooney, and it is much harder work than the Cirrus - so my personal minimums are higher in it.

Despite the strong opinions that get expressed every time there is a Cirrus accident, there is no evidence in the accident data to suggest that Cirrus pilots are using CAPS to get out of situations that other pilots don't get into. For sure, some of them do stupid things - but sadly so do pilots of any other aircraft.

Adrian

You are inadvertently arguing one of the points that worry me ;)
Your minima on an approach should not be determined by whether you have an all singing and dancing glass cockpit or a conventional steam driven variety!
They should be treated exactly the same regardless with regard to minima.

what you are saying is that in the cirrus you are more confident to descend lower on an approach because of the situational awareness that aircraft gives you while with the conventional Mooney you are less confident and hence won't descend as low on the approach?

That to me says that the aircraft determines your minima not your flying skills fine while the all singing and dancing cockpit sings and dances but not so fine when the singing and dancing stops which take my word technology does let you down big time whether in light singles or even in the jets I fly.

I have had an autopilot and flight director failure in a steam driven Citation and had to hand fly down through a solid 20K of cloud to a 200 foot overcast and minima on RVR into Germany! My minima was the same as had it been a fully working singing and dancing state of the art biz jet. I am nothing special its what is expected for safe IFR flight.

The aircraft should compliment your skills not the other way around :ok: your skills set your minima in an IFR equipped aircraft not your technology

You are confirming the very point that technology is compensating for pilot skills and luring pilots into situations where they would not be comfortable without that technology.
that is a dangerous game! your points above in a very mild way others in a much more serious way and yes in the same way I am sure the BRS does lure pilots into a false sense of security making them fly in conditions they would be wary of in conventional aircraft.

I am no different as I know in my heart when I take up my 50 hrs Cirrus time I will be far more relaxed flying at night knowing I have the BRS than I would be in a conventional light single where I would turn away from a night flight of any distance.

Also as a pilot getting older it is a big comfort to know if the ticker goes bang my passengers have a relatively safe way of getting down :E

Pace

[Adrian N]

You are confirming the very point that technology is compensating for pilot skills and luring pilots into situations where they would not be comfortable without that technology.

No, not really. I'm saying that the Mooney is much harder work, and for a fairly inexperienced instrument pilot like me it makes sense not to plan to fly approaches down to 200ft in it. Slowing down to the very restrictive gear and flap speeds is hard work (and nobody's going to thank me for flying the whole approach at 80kt), there's no autopilot, no electric trim, and there are big trim changes when you add power for a missed approach. Add to that the (manual) retractable gear, cowl flaps and prop rpm control and the workload on a missed approach is much higher than a Cirrus - which has a good digital autopilot, easier speed control and much better avionics.

So while I'm sure I could fly an approach to minimums in the Mooney, it's something I would only do if I really had to. I'd be more likely to plan a flight to somewhere with better weather or to stay on the ground. In a Cirrus I've done it quite often - and while it's a serious business which needs a lot of concentration, it's much easier than the Mooney.

On the broader topic, I don't agree that pilots shouldn't use new technology to do things that they wouldn't be comfortable or competent to try with old technology. The world has moved on. Most new aircraft come with glass cockpits, WAAS GPS and digital autopilots which let suitably trained pilots get great utility out of GA aircraft. The GA industry needs a critical mass of pilots if it is remain economically viable. If we limit access to those who are good enough to fly NDB approaches on a partial panel of steam gauges, or other things which are similarly irrelevant to flying a modern GA aircraft, people won't do it; a large part of the industry will die, and the airports that serve it will close.

[Pace]

Adrian

Again what you are saying is it's ok for pilots to use technology to cover up their lack of skills ?
Very dangerous attitude to take as yes the technology makes life easy for all of us but it has a habit of letting you down at the worst moment!
I have been in this for long enough to tell you don't trust anything.

I have never said pilots should not use modern technology lucky you if you have an all singing and dancing machine BUT you have to be able to handle things when you loose that technology and not use the technology to cover up holes in flying ability especially IFR/IMC

I am sure you are a very competent guy but whatever limits you use in a steam driven 30 year old aircraft should be the same limits as you use in a 1 year old Gizmo machine.
If your going lower in the Gizmo machine then you are using (not you) technology to cover flying ability

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

Personally I will not fly single pilot IFR without and operating two axis autopilot and at least a portable GPS with a moving map display.

The autopilot lets me keep the big picture without having to mind the airplane every second and the GPS gives me accurate real time situational awareness.

The last time I flew an NDB approach in for real IMC conditions without some sort of GPS to provide final approach track guidance was 1994.:ok: I teach for the IFR rating so I can certainly fly a stand alone NDB airway/hold/approach, but you have got to be barking mad to think that I would actually go and do that for real, when better technology exists.

Bottom line for pilots have been properly trained and work at fully understanding the electronic magic and maintaining their skills modern technology makes flying easier, better and most importantly safer.

[Pace]

Bottom line for pilots have been properly trained and work at fully understanding the electronic magic and maintaining their skills modern technology makes flying easier, better and most importantly safer.

BP

I totally agree but are you endorsing Adrian having two sets of minima one for a Mooney and one for a Cirrus?
Of course we set off with an autopilot I did in a steam driven Citation to Germany with 20000 feet of icing clouds a 200 foot overcast and RVR on minima with a STAR to fly. The autopilot packed in as did the FD WHAT DO YOU DO THEN? Do you say well if the autopilot was working I would come down to 200 feet but now its not I will miss at 500 because I am not capable of holding it all together hand flown down to 200 without an autopilot? :ugh:

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

Single pilot in a high performance airplane and the autopilot fails I would go someplace that had better weather. If I had to fly a mins approach I would tell ATC that I wanted vectors to final and a long gate.

[bartonflyer]

Single pilot in a high performance airplane and the autopilot fails I would go someplace that had better weather. If I had to fly a mins approach I would tell ATC that I wanted vectors to final and a long gate.

Or just pull the chute ......;)

[mm_flynn]

Adrian


I have had an autopilot and flight director failure in a steam driven Citation and had to hand fly down through a solid 20K of cloud to a 200 foot overcast and minima on RVR into Germany! My minima was the same as had it been a fully working singing and dancing state of the art biz jet. I am nothing special its what is expected for safe IFR flight.


Pace,

I am surprised you said the above. I thought that ILS minimums were determined partially be equipment. Certainly in my single crew aircraft, my legal minimums are lower when the autopilot is working than when it is not working (550 RVR with coupled autopilot 800 without). If I was in the US my minimums with enhanced vision would be lower than without. Additionally with two separate heading, attitude,airspeed, altitude, VSI systems, radar altimeter, flight director, coupled autopilot and windshield wipers I could (if qualified) go to cat II min, but without I can not.

So there are lots of examples where the regulator has determined aircraft equipment determines the minimum, pilot qualification alone is not sufficient. In this context it seems perfectly reasonable for a pilot to choose more conservative minimums in a less well equipped aircraft. And in fact outside cirrus arguments many people argue this. Such as singles should use a more conservative takeoff minimum (not fly at night, over large expanses of water, etc) and they should use twins if they want to do such activities - a clear case of increasing risk exposure with equipment.

I don't fly a BRS equipped aircraft, but the facts would suggest a higher survival rate for cirrus pilots who use the chute than twin pilots for the case of an inflight engine failure*. As such, it doesn't seem inherently stupid to view the BRS system as similar to a second engine with respect to mitigating the risk of an enroute or approach engine failure in IMC or over hostile terrain (but potentially less effective risk mitigation over remote terrain)

* on the basis there is a reasonable body of examples of twin operators who have not managed an engine out and I am not aware of a single Cirrus fatality (or bystander injury) from a chute pull following an engine failure (there are of course cirrus injuries and probably fatalities from EFATO incidents where the chute could not be pulled - but that is an intrinsic risk or a Single)

[Pace]

BPF

Or you might hand fly the STAR and approach because its good real practice
and because you have the confidence and ability to do it accurately :ok:
then the technology comes into its own to reduce your workload but always to compliment your skills as a pilot not to cover up a lack of those skills.



MM

Single pilot is different but that is in the equipment carried for the aircraft be certified as single pilot. The minima you use does not legally change if that autopilot packs up enroute.
i am sure in your sim work you will use the same minima for a hand flown procedure as you will for a coupled procedure.

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

So pace while you where hand bombing the airplane in the bumps while programming the STAR and talking to ATC what would you have done if the master caution light had illuminated ?

Just because I can do something, and yes I could hand fly the scenario you described to a safe landing, doesn't necessarily mean it is a good idea.....

Part of being a good pilot is managing risk. I had a friend who talked a lot like you, until he splattered himself all over a mountain side when his ego wrote a cheque his ability could not cash.......

[mm_flynn]

Pace,

I am 99.9% sure that the single pilot RVR limit is an absolute limit at the time you are executing the approach. So if the AP packs up enroute and at the FAF the tower says RVR 700, you are in the same position as you would be if the AP is working and the tower says RVR 450 (I.e. 100 metres less than legal minimum and illegal to continue to approach in both cases). So yes, without doubt, I personally would not continue.

You are of course correct when I am practicing I do it to system minimums (and sometimes consciously below just in case one day I have a really serious emergency shortage of options). However, I am a chicken and have a choice of where I fly so in a minimally equipped IFR aircraft with no backup systems, I would be a lot more cautious of the mission profile than in a well equipped aircraft with plenty of redundancy.

[Pace]

BPF

Yes and i have 7 friends who have all lost their lives to aviation some of them far better pilots than I. i just have an overworked guardian angel!

But this is not ego trumpet blowing as you suggest as you will know as well as I that in a sim yes you will get multiple failures and be expected to handle them.

you also know that hard IFR/IMC is not a playground and you are trained to expect the worst and to be able to handle the worst.

If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language

Pace

I have never said that you know it. However you seem to be proud of the fact that you flew that jet in circumstances where any further malfunction would have put you in a very ugly situation. Personally I think you were foolish.

Having the ability to control the airplane at the limits means you are a good airplane driver, having the judgement to manage a situation so that you never have to use those skills means you are a good pilot.....

[Adrian N]

are saying is it's ok for pilots to use technology to cover up their lack of skills

No. I think that is how you're choosing to interpret what I'm saying, but it's not what I'm saying at all. I'm saying that in the absence of technology that makes flying easier and safer, it's best not to plan to fly to the limits. I don't say that you shouldn't be able to do it if you have to, but the risks of making a mistake when flying an approach to 200ft with steam gauges and no autopilot are considerably higher than when you have a coupled autopilot and a 12 inch PFD.

So I am very relaxed about giving myself some extra margin when flying a 1966 Mooney; I'm not trying to prove that I'm the world's best pilot, and I'd rather land at my alternate than go missed at 200ft in IMC, or - depending on the weather - break out at 200ft and try do a nice landing in rough conditions. I'm equally relaxed at flying a missed approach from minimums in a Cirrus, or landing well after a last-minute transition from IMC to VMC. If that is covering up for my lack of basic skills, then so be it.

And, anyway, which skills might be lacking? Obviously everyone needs to be able to hand fly in IMC - but beyond that, what? Partial panel? It's a very different concept in a Cirrus compared to steam gauges; if the "gizmos" fail you are left with a mechanical attitude indicator, ASI, altimeter and compass, so you either find VFR conditions, or you end up using the parachute. Or perhaps the skills to use old-style navaids? The Cirrus I fly in the States has no DME and no ADF, so obviously the skill to use them fades. (The Mooney does have an ADF, but only to keep bureaucrats happy. I'd have to be masochistic or stupid to use it to fly an approach.)

As I said earlier, I think the world has moved on. Beyond the basic ability to control the aircraft in IMC, the skill that matters most in IFR in an aircraft like a Cirrus is a thorough understanding of the technology - the failure modes, the flight director and autopilot. But a lot of the skills that were essential for flying with steam gauges are not relevant.

[Pace]

However you seem to be proud of the fact that you flew that jet in circumstances where any further malfunction would have put you in a very ugly situation. Personally I think you were foolish.

BPF

Why would I be proud of the fact! It is what any competent IFR pilot should be able to do and is tested to do.
I can assure you I have a lot more demanding experiences than hand flying an ILS :ugh: As for being foolish thats your opinion and you are unaware of the circumstances! The point I was making is you cannot trust pilot aids as they have a habit of letting you down!

What if you missed and diverted to another airfield? In 20000 feet of solid cloud with a fair bit of icing and still had another failure? What if your diversion airfield was 400 overcast is that more manageable than 200 overcast?

for me there is no difference hand flying to 200 feet as to 400 feet its whether you are visual at minima to make a landing. If not you miss and then go somewhere else. you are talking absolute rubbish which is unusual for you.

But a lot of the skills that were essential for flying with steam gauges are not relevant.

Adrian good luck to you for I sincerely hope you will not be in for a rude awakening and become yet another Cirrus chute pull statistic.

Pace

[Adrian N]

If I pull the chute because I can't fly a partial panel approach, or can't fly a DME or NDB procedure without cheating and using the GPS, I'll send you the insurance cheque! :)

[Pace]

:) good thats what I wanted to hear ;) send the cheque to BPF he needs it more than me :ok:

pace

[Fuji Abound]

I think the difference is that few (any?) RV-8s come equipped with autopilots, glass cockpits and ballistic parachutes as standard, whereas the Cirrus does.That is not the point.

The point is there are many high performance aircraft (in terms of speed, not avionics) and some of these aircraft can only be legally flown in VMC.

Which demonstrates that in both practical and legal terms we have no problem as a community flying high performance aircraft in VMC any more or less than we accept lower performance aircraft may be flown in VMC.

From my experience flying a Cirrus and many other aircraft there is no reason at all why the aircraft cannot be safely operated by a pilot restricted to VMC any more than any other aircraft of similar or lesser performance. I would go further and say there is nothing about a Cirrus which makes it more likely to find yourself in IMC than for any other aircraft type subject as always to the pilot have received adequate training on type.

Quite simply I believe it is just wrong to suggest its the aircraft fault when an involuntary incursion into IMC occurs, there is no more or less reason why a VFR pilot cant operate a Cirrus, than an RV8 than a Warrior.

Having flown with many pilots who are new to higher performance aircraft the "problem" they always have to conquer is the additional speed with which the scenery passes. The often reported nonsense that the Cirrus is difficult to hand fly and that the pilot requires and intimate knowledge of the avionics and autopilot is just that. It is a delight to hand fly for hours on end, and once you are accustom to a glass display the information is more intuitively presented and the pilot requires to interact very little with the avionics.

[Fuji Abound]

If you are saying that I am wrong in suggesting that pilots are on top of hand flying IFR and that technology should not be used to make up for a lack of skills then we are talking a different language

Pace

Well I would say you are wrong. :)

I would like to see a lot of IFR pilots fly a difficult approach with partial panel. Yes, of course they should be able to do so, but how many can honestly say they could?

In reality, in the GA world even IFR pilots are on the whole not flying enough and are not in the SIM enough (or at all) to make these procedures second nature.

The technology comes to the rescue, and hopefully it comes to the rescue to the extent that difficult approaches, with multiple failures dont occur, but in reality, I would suggest they are really dangerous and the evidence is many pilots will really struggle if and when they happen. Even high time GA pilots that are current and flying IFR a lot end up killing themselves. Single pilot IFR in a typical light single is one of the hardest things we do, arguably much harder than operating in a multi crew environment with all the bells and whistles.

With an eye to the response likely I repeat I am not suggesting that in an ideal world every pilot should be on top of their hand flying, but I am suggesting safety is about recognising the reality of the real world, not how we would wish that world behaves.

[Pace]

Fuji

Reading some of the defensive responses makes me feel that some think I am attacking the Cirrus and its BRS system.

I am not in the slightest and consider it to be the biggest safety enhancement in GA.

The idea that if all goes pear shaped with either yourself or the aircraft and rather than ending up as a hole in the ground the complete aircraft and its occupants can be safely lowered to the ground has to be a major advancement in potential safety.

The argument is not about the concept or the aircraft or the technology but its about when to use it ? and the dangers of having such a life saving option available actually drawing pilots into situations where they cannot cope and end up having to use the BRS.

Technology is great but I can only go by my own experience of a lot of hard IFR in a multitude of piston twins, jets and ferry work to warn others of the dangers of relying on technology to compensate for their own lack of instrument flying ability!
Loose the technology and you are left with yourself, your own instincts ,ability, spatial awareness and ability to pick up your game to what is required. Sit there like a frozen Cod and the chute is your only option.

So please do not misunderstand what I am saying.

When the manufacturer(Cirrus) will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use if all other conventional options are not available and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to using it if you sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.

The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.

I also accept that in light GA PPL flying there will be a huge variation in pilot ability, currency and experience hence even more important that pilots guard against the BRS luring them into conditions where they cannot cope and end up having to use the chute for reasons which could have been avoided by more concentration on basic instrument flying skills and not on how to press buttons.

Pace

[mm_flynn]

Fuji,

I do think there is a bit if a pattern of some low experience pilots thinking that all of magic on the plane will let them fly through conditions they are not qualified for. Note this is not a comment on the airplane but on a limit set of pilots.

Ps happy to move this to any new thread - but I do think it is important to understand the human factors behind something like this accident

[sdbeach]

Pace, let me quote a couple of your statements:
Reading some of the defensive responses makes me feel that some think I am attacking the Cirrus and its BRS system.Read on . . .
When the manufacturer will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to a sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.

The chute pull records would indicate that many could have been avoided by basic training and pilot skills.
Seems your choice of words mis-states, and for effect attacks, both Cirrus and COPA positions on the use of the parachute.

"Simple stating consider its use"?

The POH, as well as several other Cirrus training documents, emphasize the use of the Cirrus parachute for loss of control situations and avoiding landings where safety is not assured. For spins, it says this: "Because the SR22 has not been certified for spin recovery, the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) must be deployed if the airplane departs controlled flight. Refer to Section 3 – Emergency Procedures, Inadvertent Spiral/Spin Entry." For inadvertent spiral dive, it says "In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not assured, immediately deploy CAPS. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment information." For forced landings, it says "If flight conditions or terrain does not permit a safe landing, CAPS deployment may be required. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment scenarios and landing considerations."

Seems more thoughtful than simple, and more emphatic than consider.

"Advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to a sneeze"?

Rhetorical flourish? Setting up a stalking horse? Or your interpretation for an attack that diminishes substantial effort?

Check the investigation reports for "sneeze" and you won't find it. Check COPA safety presentations for "sneeze" and you won't find it.

What you will find is the estimation that 120 people have died in scenarios similar to survivable parachute pulls. VFR-in-IMC. Mechanical failures. Avionics failures. Avoiding off-airport landings. How can we get into the minds of Cirrus pilots that they need to think differently in emergencies, since they have an option of abandoning recovery and pulling the parachute handle?

For the record, in the past 6 months, Cirrus pilots have had 1 fatal accident and 7 survivable parachute deployments:

Brazil -- pilot presumed dead in the interior since no aircraft has been found (1 fatality)
Brazil -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of engine power (3 survivors)
West Virginia, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after engine failed to respond to go-around power (1 survivor)
France -- pilot avoided off-airport landing at night after loss of engine power (2 survivors)
Idaho, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing during emergency descent following catastrophic engine failure (2 survivors)
Colorado, US -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in mountains during icing encounter (1 survivor)
Mexico -- pilot avoided off-airport landing in desert after loss of engine power (1 survivor)
Australia -- pilot avoided off-airport landing after loss of control (3 survivors)

No sneezes. 15 survivors.

Some situations could have been avoided by training and better judgment. COPA sees over 400 of COPA pilots (about 13% of our membership) attending recurrent training, over 500 attending decision-making seminars, and about 1,500 credits issued for the FAA Wings program. The Cirrus training network has expanded and the messages delivered more consistently. All this in a general aviation context that does not require more than a flight review every 24 months.

However, one consideration of thoughtful people is that the penalty for poor aeronautical decisions should not be death.

And before you get to amped up about avoiding off-airport landings, please be advised that Adrian researched this. He looked at the last 100 fatal accidents in each of Bonanza and Mooney aircraft, both comparable high-performance single-engine piston aircraft to the Cirrus fleet. He found about 20% of the fatal accidents in each type happened during off-airport landings. Good things to avoid, eh?

So, yes, Pace. I think your choice of rhetoric does attack those who have contributed to this significant reduction in Cirrus fatalities -- 1 in the past 6 months. Less than 1.00 fatal accidents in 100,000 flying hours in the past 12 months.

Cheers
Rick
-----
COPA Aviation Safety Chair

[Pace]

SDBeach

If the chute pull record is now so positively established is it not about time that Cirrus add the recommendations to the POH and officialise its use?

Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on.
I will also add that I am taking 50 hrs in a Cirrus starting late june! Hardly likely if I was against the aircraft or its concept.

I am also open to persuasion on where and when to use the chute so forgive my slight journalistic interrogation postings on when the chute should be pulled.:E

Pace

[sdbeach]

Pace, I see you edited the paragraph that I quoted. So let me address your edited thought:
When the manufacturer(Cirrus) will not condone the use of the chute simply stating consider its use if all other conventional options are not available and a second body are advising the use of the BRS for any engine failure almost even down to using it if you sneeze then its natural that when to pull will be discussed as there is NO official guidance.
I wonder what "condone" means to you? Have you read the Cirrus materials? Are you relying upon memory or other sources?

In my reply, I quoted several statements from the manufacturer (Cirrus) in their regulatory document, rev A10 of the Cirrus SR22 Pilot Operating Handbook.

Do you agree that those statements go beyond your criticism? Would you now change your position?

There is lots of official guidance. For all Cirrus pilots. From Cirrus. From COPA. From CSIPs. Even officially from insurance underwriters. One went so far as to say "Pull! I would rather keep you as a customer than deal with your estate!" Underwriters give discounts for participation in the safety programs conducted by the "second body," COPA. And members of that organization show up in accidents much less frequently than you would expect if all Cirrus pilots were the same. Participation has its privileges.

Pace, if you stay on the issue of training and decision-making, then we can have a productive dialog. When you stray over the line into mis-stating positions and denigrating the complexity of decisions to deploy a whole-airframe parachute, then your misstatements and rhetorical flourishes deserve attention.


If the chute pull record is now so positively established is it not about time that Cirrus add the recommendations to the POH and officialise its use.

Surely to stick with their previous stance given the favourable BRS evidence is itself now negligent!
Passing the buck to COPA really is not on
Good grief! Did you read what Cirrus has put into it's recommendations?

And do you have any idea of the way plaintiff's attorneys use your logic of negligence to sue Cirrus? "Ah, members of the jury, you see, Cirrus now admits that the pilot should have pulled the parachute and my client followed their earlier guidance, so now Cirrus should be held liable for damages because my client died without using the parachute."

In my opinion, Cirrus has taken a courageous step in strengthening the guidance for pilots on the use of the parachute. But even those steps seem to trigger your attack that it is "now negligent."

The phrase "No good deed goes unpunished" comes to mind. ;)

Cheers
Rick

[Pace]

SDBeach

I am not up to date on what Cirrus have recently added to the POH in regards to advice on use of the BRS.

i was aware of a previous clip regarding engine failure which advised gliding to a suitable landing site and performing a standard FL and ONLY to CONSIDER the BRS if no suitable landing site was available.

The recommendations from many here is to use the chute for every engine failure as standard practice regardless of being over built up areas or otherwise.
Sadly one day a Cirrus will pull over built up areas rather than gliding clear and will cause a multiple road collision or injury/death to someone on the ground.

If Cirrus have now changed their policy regarding engine failure then please post the new recommendations.

Also consider an engine failure is more likely to happen soon after takeoff when the engine is most stressed has consideration been made regarding pulling at below recommended safe chute altitudes.

finally what are COPA and Cirrus recommendations in strong wind conditions? We all know the damage caused to a car in a 30mph crash into a solid object a car has far better crash protection than an aircraft with a large lump of engine in front of the pilots.

what is the COPA attitude regarding a descending aircraft moving not just vertically but horizontally at 30 to 40 KTS?

Surely that 30 to 40 KTS would suit an in control FL into wind better than under a chute?

Again its not to much to ask for official guidance or is it? These are valid points!!!

Pace

[sdbeach]

Again its not to much to ask for official guidance or is it? These are valid points and a head in the sand attitude is not acceptable
Are you kidding me? "Head in the sand"? Another attack . . .

And did you acknowledge that I quoted three paragraphs of guidance from the Cirrus SR22 POH?


Cheers
Rick

[Pace]

OK

Have removed the H in the S bit ;)

if you stay on the issue of training and decision-making, then we can have a productive dialog.

I think all my questions regarding engine failure fit the above ?

For forced landings, it says "If flight conditions or terrain does not permit a safe landing, CAPS deployment may be required. Refer to Section 10, Safety Information, for CAPS deployment scenarios and landing considerations."

seems very like the previous extraction I saw from the FM do you have section10? but still very different from the advice posted here to use the CAPS for literally any engine failure

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

I think it is time to put a fork into this thread, it is done like dinner.......

[Pace]

Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.

CAA conclusion and why these discussions are not a waste of time as BPF appears to think

Pace

[007helicopter]

I think it is time to put a fork into this thread, it is done like dinner.......

I sincerely hope not, seems like a lot of good debate, everybody is free to participate or ignore.

[Pace]

Having flown with many pilots who are new to higher performance aircraft the "problem" they always have to conquer is the additional speed with which the scenery passes. The often reported nonsense that the Cirrus is difficult to hand fly and that the pilot requires and intimate knowledge of the avionics and autopilot is just that. It is a delight to hand fly for hours on end, and once you are accustom to a glass display the information is more intuitively presented and the pilot requires to interact very little with the avionics

Fuji

I timed the roll rate on an SR22 and it had the same roll rate as a Firefly which is an aerobatic machine.
A delight to fly but I could see it would be quite easy for an inexperienced pilot to over bank especially without visual reference.

but this does beg the question does the Cirrus with all the technology pilot aids and BRS lure pilots into situations they cannot handle?

it also emphasises the fact that those systems should compliment flying skills and not cover up a lack of those skills

Pace

[sdbeach]

Pace asked:
does the Cirrus with all the technology pilot aids and BRS lure pilots into situations they cannot handle?
I'm certain that some Cirrus pilots are lured into situations they cannot handle. But not many.

The number of Cirrus fatal accidents with low-time pilots (pilots with less than 200 hours total time) numbers only 5 out of 104 fatal accidents in 5,600 aircraft:

Park Falls, WI, USA -- during transition training with instructor impacted a river short of the runway, likely wind shear during a simulated engine out

Manhattan, NY, USA -- during a flightseeing tour of the East River with instructor, failed to maneuver in airspace only delimited by purple lines on a chart

Front Royal, VA, USA -- during a night departure when pilot took off on a runway noted as N/A for night operations, then got a terrain alert and overcontrolled the airplane

Cherbourg, France -- loss of control during night flight to Jersey

English Channel -- this accident, loss of control during maneuvering in reported fog and low ceilings mid-channel

So, some, but not many.

In two of them, there were instructors in the right seat. In the other three, one wonders what scenarios were used by their instructors to impart good understanding of their envelope of experience.

Certainly, the Cirrus standardized instructor pilot program (CSIP) emphasizes scenarios to promote better understanding of what pilots might be tempted to do on their own. Cirrus and COPA are both sensitive to and active about the lure of technology to pilots during transition and ab initio training.


Cheers
Rick

[Pace]

Rick ;)

I know when i start flying a Cirrus I will be lured into flying at night in one

Something I am not comfortable doing in a conventional piston single! i never do anything in aviation without an " OUT" night flying gives me no outs in a conventional aircraft if the engine goes bang.
The BRS would soooo :E I would be LURED by that wicked woman :)

Pace

[Fuji Abound]

Pace seriously what cirrus have to say about the use of the chute is a diversion. You know the legal constraints and that is why they go so far and no further.

I agree with you i would fly a cirrus at night, not because of the chute, but because the risk of an engine failure is so very small. For entirely irrational reasons i still dont feel comfortable but the chute just tips the balance. Probably ten years ago i wouldnt have wanted the chute. So thats reasonable scope for a personal judgement call. It is not so much the chute lures you into something you wouldnt do, more it massages your irrationality for ignoring statistics you imagine you dont like.

[sdbeach]

Pace asked several insightful questions about the doctrine being taught about the use of the Cirrus parachute. Here’s a stream of consciousness from my perspective.
The recommendations from many here is to use the chute for every engine failure as standard practice regardless of being over built up areas or otherwise.
Sadly one day a Cirrus will pull over built up areas rather than gliding clear and will cause a multiple road collision or injury/death to someone on the ground.
Actually, the doctrine recommends the use of the CAPS parachute in preference to an off-airport landing whenever a landing on a runway is not assured. (Recall that Adrian researched this for Bonanza and Mooney accidents and found about 20% of their most recent 100 fatal accidents were off-airport landings.)

As for a CAPS pull over built-up areas, been there, done that — no significant bad outcomes to date. Note: past results do not guarantee future performance — but it is interesting to review.

Indianapolis, Indiana, USA — passenger deployed parachute (late, just 4 seconds prior to impact) and plane crashed into a retention pond in the midst of a residential neighborhood. People witnessed the parachute opening but not fully opened. No injuries to anyone on ground.

Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA — pilot deployed the parachute in IMC while disoriented and not trusting that the autopilot LVL button would regain level flight given the low altitude available. Plane landed in a residential neighborhood on a street after breaking tree limbs and with the wingtip striking a parked cargo truck. No injuries to pilot or ground personnel. No damage to truck.

Birmingham, Alabama, USA — pilot deployed parachute after disorientation on approach in IMC; plane landed in a downtown open field (how did it find the only open space in town, eh?!), right across from a gentleman’s club. No injuries to people on the ground.

Danbury, Connecticut, USA — pilot deployed at night over urban area 3 miles from airport and plane draped parachute over power lines. No injuries to people on ground. In fact, law enforcement officials told news media that people aboard plane were a bit shocked, just like typical accidents they investigate. That is, no big deal.

Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, UK — pilot deployed over urban area. At least three people made video recordings of the descent, which indicates that people on the ground notice a parachute pull. Plane clipped tall trees and landed in a garden. No injuries to people on the ground.

Buckhannon, West Virginia, USA — pilot deployed over suburban area and plane came down on top of a pickup truck on the road below. Officially, the local law enforcement considered it a traffic accident! Neither the pilot nor truck driver were injured.

Lawson, NSW, Australia — plane descended under canopy over small town in Blue Mountain region west of Sydney. At least two people recorded the descent on video and at least one other photographed the plane under canopy. People on the ground notice. Plane landed in front yard of a residence, broke tree branches, draped the parachute over power lines. No one on the ground was injured, although they posted a sign on a nearby tree: “Lawson Airport Now Open”

Think about the energy of a vertical descent under canopy. At 17 knots under parachute, compare to gliding clear and hitting something at near stall speed of 60 knots or glide speed of 88 knots. How much less energy is there to contend with under canopy? At least 1/12 the energy of a stall or 1/26 the energy of a glide and 1/112 of a spiral dive!

BTW, there has never been a post-impact fire after a descent under canopy (notwithstanding the fiery mid-air collision at Boulder that deployed the parachute by impact forces).

Consequently, we share these results to awaken people to the actual history of successful landings under canopy.

Pace also asked:
Also consider an engine failure is more likely to happen soon after takeoff when the engine is most stressed has consideration been made regarding pulling at below recommended safe chute altitudes.

Doctrine for use of Cirrus parachute on departure now includes a structured departure briefing:
- runway heading
- field elevation
- 500’ AGL altitude as MSL for “CAPS and FLAPS” call out
- 2000’ AGL altitude as MSL for troubleshooting
- hard-deck altitude at which pilot will deploy CAPS before descending without runway landing assured

For loss of power events on departure, first recommendation is to abort the takeoff — better to overrun the runway at 30 knots than impact the ground at 90 knots.

Next, below 500’ AGL, pilots plan to land straight ahead.

At 500’ AGL, pilots call out CAPS and FLAPS, meaning that CAPS is viable at this altitude above the ground if deployed immediately without further hesitation (or expect a loss of altitude below which CAPS may not be viable)

At 2000’ AGL, pilots now have sufficient altitude to troubleshoot the situation and determine the best course of action. However, the hard-deck altitude provides a threshold for action, below which the pilot will not descend without deploying CAPS, unless landing on a runway is assured.


Finallly, Pace asked about deploying CAPS under strong wind conditions:
finally what are COPA and Cirrus recommendations in strong wind conditions? We all know the damage caused to a car in a 30mph crash into a solid object a car has far better crash protection than an aircraft with a large lump of engine in front of the pilots.

what is the COPA attitude regarding a descending aircraft moving not just vertically but horizontally at 30 to 40 KTS?

Surely that 30 to 40 KTS would suit an in control FL into wind better than under a chute?

Tough call, for which guidance necessarily involves pilot judgement of the situation.

As for the crunch of a Cirrus at 30 knots intro something solid, recall that the ergonomics were designed to handle this situation. Seats are certified for 26G horizontal impact. Restraints are four-point seat belts. Airbags are equipped on many Cirrus aircraft. Side yoke removes the frontal impact of a steering wheel or yoke, that often impales the front-seat people. Seats are equipped with crush zones for vertical impacts. The cockpit structure involves carbon fibre and very strong cage pillars. Several Cirrus have run off the runways at 30+ knots and people survived.

Interestingly, at least four Cirrus have landed under canopy in strong winds, between 25 and 40 knots. Once people exited the airplane, the parachute reinflated and the aircraft flipped over. At least one involved a dangerous situation, which was captured on video, where the empty plane was dragged by the parachute over a frozen field until the parachute hung up on a power line. No one was injured in those accidents, either on the ground or aboard the aircraft.

As for a better outcome in a forced landing in strong winds conditions, that depends upon the skill of the pilot under duress. Most of us hope to be that skillful, but many of us realize that do not practice that, have not formed a habit of doing that, and would not trust we could successfully execute that. Also, it takes a bit of skill to maneuver into the winds at the surface that are often different than the winds aloft.

When flying a Cirrus with a parachute recovery device, we have the option of not executing a forced landing. In other aircraft, no such choice.

So, the training doctrine on the use of CAPS seeks to emphasize that the pilot must make their own determination of when they will pull the red handle.

Fortunately, recent outcomes are favorable — in the past 12 months, 8 fatal accidents and 11 CAPS deployments with 15 fatalities and 21 survivors. And the trend is accelerating — fewer fatalities and more survivors — in the past 6 months, 1 fatal accident and 7 CAPS deployments with 1 fatality and 13 survivors.

Good. But we are not done yet.


Cheers
Rick

[Pace]

Rick

You raise some interesting points regarding the base level for a chute pull.
A climbing aircraft maybe climbing at 700fpm and abruptly loosing an engine would still have some upward momentum when the chute is pulled.

I would imagine this would have an effect on the chute being successful at a lower than base level as there would be less deceleration for the chute to counteract over a pull with an aircraft descending at maybe 700 fpm?

Probably further research could establish better guidelines.

Maybe now we can get to some sensible discussion :ok:

Pace

[sdbeach]

You raise some interesting points regarding the base level for a chute pull.
A climbing aircraft maybe climbing at 700fpm and abruptly loosing an engine would still have some upward momentum when the chute is pulled.

I would imagine this would have an effect on the chute being successful at a lower than base level as there would be less deceleration for the chute to counteract over a pull with an aircraft descending at maybe 700 fpm?

Probably further research could establish better guidelines.

Indeed, you point out an advantage of a climb attitude for deploying the Cirrus parachute -- upward momentum.

Except, experience with pilots in Cirrus simulators proves otherwise. Despite hiring the simulator to experience emergency procedures, despite thorough briefings with the simulator instructor, despite knowing they will be challenged by an engine-failure-on-takeoff scenario -- they don't pull!

Seems that until a Cirrus pilot forms a habit, they experience tunnel vision, panic, or freeze.

One sim instructor goes so far as to note "That I only have to kill them once!"

In retrospect, the combination of reviewing CAPS survivable scenarios with a briefing for departure on every flight gets into the minds of Cirrus pilots -- and they do things differently afterwards. The briefing includes establishing altitudes as well as the call-out for "CAPS and FLAPS" and an action to grasp the CAPS handle at 500' AGL. That helps build muscle memory and a habit to consider CAPS in an emergency.

Once you get into a Cirrus cockpit, have a great Cirrus day!

Cheers
Rick

[Fuji Abound]

The handle is a bit like aeros.

Watch the average pilots head during climb out - its focused straight ahead or on the instruments. Some aeros training gets the head naturally moving around the cockpit watching in this case for traffic at one of the most critical times.

Once learnt it isnt quickly forgotten but it takes some learning in the same way as calls that a safe 180 is an option if executed immediately or a chute deployment is an option.

[Madbob]

Without wanting to take this tread off course - does anyone know where a Cirrus pilot has actually pulled off a successful forced landing and deliberately opted NOT to pull the 'chute?

My view is that CAPS is like an ejection seat. Just as when I was learning to fly in the RAF we had ejections seats in Jet Provosts and Hawks BUT we were still taught how to do forced landings.

If all we had been taught was to "pull the handle" many aircraft would have been lost un-necessarily and many were saved by successfully being landed dead-stick and this was sometimes done in IMC/night - we needed a 600 foot cloud base to give it a go. There was even a procedure to dead-stick aircraft such as the Harrier and the Hunter just as I think there still is for the F16, which like the others mentioned is also a single-engine jet.

I'm not saying that having a CAPS option is bad, all I would like to see is perhaps some discretion first. Clearly if over mountains or water there's no contest but if a forced landing was an option I'd start the profile and only take CAPS if it was clear that my forced landing was not going to work, at say CAPS AGL minima plus 250 feet.

MB

[sunside]

Yes, there is an SR20 in France that was successfully landed in a field by a low-time pilot after the engine had quit due to corrosion in the fuel system, which had probably developed during a few months where the aircraft had not been flown. Here is the incident report (only in French):

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2011/f-nc111203/pdf/f-nc111203.pdf

"Conséquences: Aucune" means: No consequences, the aircraft flies again.

[Jonzarno]

Madbob

There have been a number of forced landings in Cirrus aircraft, some more successful than others. Here is an example of one that went fairly well.

WPR13LA011 (http://www.ntsb.gov/AviationQuery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20121015X75934&key=1)

The problem, of course, lies in the ones that didn't work out quite so well......

[Pace]

Jonzarno

The problem there and this is not pointed at chuted or unchuted aircraft is a complete lack of practice which in a single piston should priority for practising regulary .

Pilots should practice FLs as well as instinctively looking for landing areas in the takeoff and even in the cruise but apart from in a checkout few bother.

Its the same with multi engine pilots they fly single engine stuff under test but then never bother until the next examination.

So my guess is that a failure to pull off a successful forced landing is more than likely to be a lack of practice which again comes back to keeping handling skills honed

Pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

I wouldn't argue with that at all.

I always try to brief land ahead options in the event of an EFATO but one thing that often strikes me is how many runways don't really have one.

There's one particular runway I often use that goes right over a city with no real alternative for a Cirrus driver to either getting back down on the runway straight ahead and hoping you don't hit the hedge too hard or pulling if you are above 500 ft.

When I have practised forced landings from the cruise (yes I actually do although, as you say, probably not often enough, and despite my opinion about the use of CAPS!) it has often struck me how little I can really see in a field 500 feet below me. Of course some fields are better than others for that but it's still hard to be sure nothing nasty awaits down there.

And therein lies the answer to your point about reasons for unsuccessful FLs. There are reasons that relate to the skill of the pilot, and there you are right about the need to keep the skills sharp; but there are also reasons relating to unseen objects and obstacles that you don't know about until it's too late.

In light of that, I have to say, at the risk of unleashing another storm of outrage, if I didn't have a nailed on landing on a runway, I'd still pull.

But on your main point, the need to keep basic flying skills current, I agree entirely.

[thing]

I always try to brief land ahead options in the event of an EFATO but one thing that often strikes me is how many runways don't really have one.

That's one that bothers me, especially after the Barton accident. Now if I'm going somewhere I either work out the runway in use from wind or if it's multiple runways I ask before I take off. I then go to 'View on map' from Skydemon and check out the Google image. If it looks like a crap departure (or even arrival) with no outs I don't go. I'm not happy being at full power and 200' above an urban connurbation.

Thinking about that, don't some departures therefore break the glide clear rule? Or does that fall under the 'unless landing or taking off' rule?

[mad_jock]

yep it does thing.

Some airports are criminal with the amount of risk exposure they place SEP pilots under with their VFR approach routings.

And they get in a major strop when you tell them to go and poke it your not doing it.

LBA once tried to get me to extend down wind and orbit over the city in a SEP bloody madness. But everyone else accepts it so by showing good PIC skills your perceived to be a stroppy stupid pilot.

[007helicopter]

your perceived to be a stroppy stupid pilot.

Good grief MJ - Surely Not?:)

[mad_jock]

yep which is why prats getting themselves into stupid situations and then pulling a handle to save themselves has a knock on effect for us all.

[Fuji Abound]

Dunno might stop AT putting pilots in such situations in the first place, they probably think everyone is capable of gliding clear until they come down vertically.

[Pace]

LBA once tried to get me to extend down wind and orbit over the city in a SEP bloody madness.

But a city is usually pretty big so select the area you are going to do your orbit thing over. Ie if there is a river running through it orbit where you know you can put down in the river or a railway line or whatever!

Keep a content situational awareness of the wind direction, Look for open fields and above all keep the thing flying. Why should there ever be an excuse to stall, spin in or fly into a house? It is you who have done the above no one else.

Gliding down you have complete control. the space shuttle can glide in from space! If you fly into a brick wall its you who have done so.
Be constantly aware and don't fixate on landing at one point. If its not looking good go 45 degrees left or right and take one of the other areas you as a constantly aware pilot will have marked with you eagle eyes.

If I had such a failure over a City i would glide clear. If not possible or no landing site was available yes pull the chute because you have no choice.With a gliding aircraft you are in control pull the chute and you are no longer in control.

Come down into someones back garden on top of the pram with a baby in it and you live with that.

Not so bad if you know you had no choice but not so easy to live with if you know you could have glided to a better place or used your superior skills to do something else.

Above all keep your skills honed so you are in control even if that control means you elect to pull the chute.

Sit there like a Frozen lump of jelly a passenger to events then ???
Flying skills flying skills you are a pilot not an aeroplane driver good at pushing buttons but nothing else.

No one tells you to stall to spin or to fly into a brick wall its all in your control.

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

Way more engine failures in the Cirrus, and every other GA airplane, were directly caused by the pilot than were situations where the engine actually failed with no warning and/or where the pilot was helpless to prevent the loss of power.

Flight training, and this forum, IMO spend way too much time on being the hero pilot after the engine failure instead of concentrating on the mundane, unsexy details that prevent the engine failing in the first place......

[mad_jock]

down town leeds and Bradford is huge.

I couldn't see anywhere to go even a park.

And I would also glide clear Pace because I always keep an escape option.

[Pace]

MJ

One of my jets operates out of Leeds :E always windy
Some airports ban single engine aircraft for those very reasons

Totally off topic but a comment to BPF the word Hero is grossly misused.

IMO spend way too much time on being the hero pilot after the engine failure

A Hero is someone who puts their wellbeing physically or mentally at threat on behalf of others.
I could be a fantastic race car driver when all four tyres blow at high speed on the motorway. Because of my superior skills as a driver I control the car and bring it to a stop on the hard shoulder.
I am an unwilling part of the event saving my own and others through those skills.
i am not a HERO.
i jump out of the car and run up the embankment only to turn around and see the car enveloped in flames. I run back and rip the doors open dragging my passengers out of the car and risking myself in the process. i am now a HERO ;)

To me the Captain of the Hudson river ditching was not a Hero although he was described as such.
He was a very professional and capable pilot who pulled off a superb water ditching but he was
an unwilling part of the event i.e. he had that ditching whether he was alone in the aircraft or with 200 PAX in the back.
Had he stayed in a sinking aircraft getting everyone out at that point he is a Hero

just a word used to readily by the media and me being pedantic over its common use

Pace

[mm_flynn]

Gliding down you have complete control. the space shuttle can glide in from space! If you fly into a brick wall its you who have done so.
Be constantly aware and don't fixate on landing at one point. If its not looking good go 45 degrees left or right and take one of the other areas you as a constantly aware pilot will have marked with you eagle eyes.

If I had such a failure over a City i would glide clear. If not possible or no landing site was available yes pull the chute because you have no choice.With a gliding aircraft you are in control pull the chute and you are no longer in control.

Come down into someones back garden on top of the pram with a baby in it and you live with that.

Pace,

You seem to have a remarkably large faith in your gliding and an unreasonable concern about parachuting. I say this on the basis of the relatively signficiant track record of property damage and personal injury caused by aircraft coming down after a powerplant failure or loss of control and the negligable incidents of injury or material damage from chute deployments over built up (or rural) areas in similar circumstances.

I can certainly agree that an attiude of 'I'll just pull the chute if it feel like too much' would be wrong, but I believe the facts are very clear that your odds of injurying/killing yourself and people on the ground are negligable in a chute pull compared to a forced landing.

In fact, I believe there is a specific case in the US, where a Cirrus with an engine failure elected to glide to a (nearly) empty beach rather than pull a chute. Unfortunately the beach jogger didn't get out of the way and the pilot didn't perfectly control his glide to avoid and the jogger - who was struck and killed by the gliding aircraft.

[Pace]

We are discussing this topic and do not want to personalise this by whether I would pull off a FL or not. I am just as bad as anyone else in not practising these things until a check ride ;)

It may well be that long term a fairly standard procedure maybe to use the chute for the majority of engine failures as statistics could point that way but I wonder how much those statistics are clouded by the fact that we do not practice FLs enough or in my case with twins practice engine failures enough ?

Again looking at the chute pull statistics many could have been avoided by basic piloting skills and there is a worry with all the technology available that pilots are forgetting those skills and relying more on technology to make up for a lack of those skills. A dangerous principal to follow.

But hey I am not promoting myself as some sort of SkyGod who is well on top of everything but arguing a point.
I have had a fair amount of experience and done a fair amount of stupid things in the course of getting that experience which luckily I have to date got away with others may not be so lucky.

Pace

[Adrian N]

Again looking at the chute pull statistics many could have been avoided by basic piloting skills and there is a worry with all the technology available that pilots are forgetting those skills and relying more on technology to make up for a lack of those skills. A dangerous principal to follow.

Very true that many chute pulls could have been avoided. But I don't think it's true that technology is causing pilots to forget basic flying skills. Pick any GA aircraft type and read through accident reports for it, and you will find many examples of accidents caused by poor skills and - more often - appalling judgement. A lot of accidents are caused by pilots with poor skills flying into situations which require a high level of skill to fly back out of; when they can't, they die.

[Pace]

A lot of accidents are caused by pilots with poor skills flying into situations which require a high level of skill to fly back out of; when they can't, they die.

that appears to be the reason behind the tragic channel Cirrus crash which has caused the CAA to look at high technology aircraft fitted with BRS?
my very concern that we need to guard against the technology and BRS Luring us into situations we are not equipped to handle without that technology , pilot aids and comfort of the BRS

From the accident report

Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.


Pace

[007helicopter]

With both the Cirrus English Channel Cirrus fatal's it appears both were low time, both not instrument rated, both flying in IFR conditions, both lost control and perished.

With or without a chute these conditions seem a common killer in GA and I am not sure to what degree the chute Lures pilots or is a factor but it can not be ruled out.

What is clear that neither of these Pilots had the thought or mindset to recognize that they had lost control and use the one thing that could probably have given them a chance of survival (assuming they had a Dingy and suitable survival kit on board)

In the SIM from personal experience when overloaded and even in a dire situation the chute did not even enter my mind, this is also proven with many other Pilots and I hope a valuable learning point. Many Pilots have died with a perfectly good intact BRS Chute.

My SOP over water would be to use the Chute rather than attempt to land with a fixed under carriage.

[Jonzarno]

Pace

In answer to your last two posts:

Firstly, I think that 007Helicopter has it right in his last post.

Some further thoughts:


A lot of accidents are caused by pilots with poor skills flying into situations which require a high level of skill to fly back out of; when they can't, they die.


I think we agree that proper training and currency is the best way to avoid a pilot error accident. The sad fact, however, is that even the best trained and current pilots can occasionally make a potentially fatal error.

In the GA world, you only have to look at the two examples I posted earlier in this thread of the instructor in a DA 20 who died with his student in a failed forced landing, and Manfred Stolle, who was also a good and experienced pilot, who died trying to stretch a glide in his Cirrus. Both would almost certainly have been saved by BRS.

Sadly, there are seemingly endless others. And of course there are also plenty of examples of how the pros can get it wrong as well such as AF 447 and the recent Asiana landing accident.

To illustrate further the contrasting consequences of a mistake, let's look briefly at two similar recent GA accidents: the Gloucestershire CAPS pull and the twin that crashed in Jersey the report on which has just been published.

In both cases, the pilot made a mistake on an instrument approach. In one case the pilot had CAPS available and chose to use it. In the other, CAPS wasn't available, even if the potential window for its use was small, and both the pilot and his innocent passenger died.

Of course neither accident should have happened: after all, if you're an instrument rated pilot you should be able to fly these approaches safely consistently. But in both these cases something happened to make the pilot get it wrong. One died along with his passenger and the other lived. And these are by no means isolated examples of an accident type that has happened far too often across the entire GA fleet.



that [Risk homeostasis] appears to be the reason behind the tragic channel Cirrus crash which has caused the CAA to look at high technology aircraft fitted with BRS?


You may well be right about the circumstances of this accident, personally I think you probably are within the context set out by 007H in his post.

I just wish we were talking about a sheepish pilot pulled out of the Channel after a CAPS pull, rather than the tragic fatal outcome that actually happened. I also do not believe that this attitude is representative of most GA pilots whether they fly TAAs or not. It also begs the question as to whether he'd still have done the flight in a non-BRS aircraft. After all, he didn't actually use the chute (although there is evidence to suggest it deployed on impact).


my very concern that we need to guard against the technology and BRS Luring us into situations we are not equipped to handle without that technology , pilot aids and comfort of the BRS


I agree. Hence the need for proper transition and emergencies handling training of which the appropriate use of the BRS is an important part.

That said, did the technology and BRS "lure" the pilot of the twin that I quoted into his unsuccessful approach? Well he didn't have BRS and he knew his autopilot wasn't working before he took off, so I doubt it. Perhaps he was a little too bold? Who knows? But he wouldn't have been the first. Either way, I wish he'd had BRS available and used it!


Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.


As they rightly should. The correct operation and use of these systems is a major contributor to safety. Hence, again, the need for proper training on which I think we are agreed.


By the way: when you do your 50 Cirrus hours, are you planning to get any training from an experienced CSIP? Have you thought about going to the CPPP I recommended earlier in this thread? I'd recommend both highly!

[Pace]

As they rightly should. The correct operation and use of these systems is a major contributor to safety. Hence, again, the need for proper training on which I think we are agreed.

Jonzarno

We are as one on your comments above :ok:

Pace

[Chuck Ellsworth]

We could make it safer for tail wheel pilots that lose directional control on the runway by having a drag chute to deploy.

[Big Pistons Forever]

MJ

One of my jets operates out of Leeds :E always windy
Some airports ban single engine aircraft for those very reasons

Totally off topic but a comment to BPF the word Hero is grossly misused.

A Hero is someone who puts their wellbeing physically or mentally at threat on behalf of others.
I could be a fantastic race car driver when all four tyres blow at high speed on the motorway. Because of my superior skills as a driver I control the car and bring it to a stop on the hard shoulder.
I am an unwilling part of the event saving my own and others through those skills.
i am not a HERO.
i jump out of the car and run up the embankment only to turn around and see the car enveloped in flames. I run back and rip the doors open dragging my passengers out of the car and risking myself in the process. i am now a HERO ;)

To me the Captain of the Hudson river ditching was not a Hero although he was described as such.
He was a very professional and capable pilot who pulled off a superb water ditching but he was
an unwilling part of the event i.e. he had that ditching whether he was alone in the aircraft or with 200 PAX in the back.
Had he stayed in a sinking aircraft getting everyone out at that point he is a Hero

just a word used to readily by the media and me being pedantic over its common use

Pace

Pace


I think you have misunderstood my point. I think a lot of pilots secretly would be very pleased to be one of "those" pilots. The guy who was climbing out after takeoff and BAM the engine explodes, the windshield is covered in oil but our "hero" pilot coolly bends the aircraft around and executes a flawless landing into the postage stamp field, stepping out of the undamaged aircraft to the applause of the amazed onlookers.......

The reality is, unfortunately a lot more messy with many tragic outcomes that demonstrate just how difficult this scenario really is.

IMO flight training feeds this fantasy with all the emphasis on executing the forced approach and hardly any on avoiding having the engine fail in the first place by avoiding the pilot caused reasons that cause 80 % of the engine failures in certified SEP airplanes.

I believe this is largely why there is such a visceral dislike of the Cirrus parachute and the oft stated covert and overt commentary that paints someone that uses the parachute as being a lesser pilot.

Nothing about this line of argument means that attaining and maintaining skills appropriate to the aircraft is not as important as ever. What is different is that a new technology, the CAPs, has created opportunities to deal with the engine failure scenario and other airborne emergencies in a new way. With an understanding of its capabilities and limitations comes a way to make flying safer.

I think that is a good thing

Finally saying Sully is not a genuine hero says a lot more about you than Sully.......

[mary meagher]

Sully WAS a hero all right.

Not for using all his experience, training, and capability of the aircraft to bring about a happy arrival.

No, in my book he became a hero when he went back into the aircraft WHEN IT WAS IN A SINKING CONDITION to make absolutely sure that all his passengers had been saved.

Unlike some ship captains lately in the news.

[Pace]

BPF you and I seem to cross swords all the time now with jibes at me over any thing and everything but what the heck if it makes you feel good :ok:
A Hero pilot is not one who pulls off a great landing because he has an engine failure! That is a guy who is in a situation whether he likes it or not and uses his skills and a certain amount of luck get him out of it!
A hero is someone who risks their own physical and mental well being for others purposely putting themselves at risk in that process!
As Mary said if Sully stayed on board insuring everyone was out if the aircraft then that act was an act of heroism!
Ditching the aircraft successfully was an act of professionalism and skill not in itself an act of heroism!
BPF if you cannot see that I do not know what to say just carry on with your willy waving gripes at me if it makes you feel good as that says more to me about you

Pace

[Mach Jump]

I think that if we take the emotional/obsessive aspects out of this discussion and just examine all the views, we find that none of them are mutually exclusive.

I used to fly aircraft with ejection seats. Over the years they have saved many lives, but killed quite a few too.

I see BRS in the same light. It's a fantastic safety system, and I'd love to have one in every aircraft I fly.

There will be some whose lives are saved by it's operation, from otherwise impossible situations.

But:

There will always be some who will use the system prematurely/ unnecessarliiy, when there was a better solution.

There will always be some who will operate the aircraft in a way they wouldn't risk without BRS.

There will always be some who don't know how, or fail to operate the system in time, and die in the wreckage.

There will always be some who are injured or killed by accidental/inadvertent operation.

There will always be some bystanders who are injured or killed as a result of the system being operated.

The way to maximise the first and minimise the rest is by EDUCATION.

Knowlege of the system, it's operation, and limitations. Also, prior consideration of possible scenarios, and consequences of it's operation, are what will minimise the risk/benifit ratio of systems such as this.


MJ:ok:

Ps. I also think that aircraft should be certified to operate, without limitations or modifications, both with, and without the system being operational.

MJ

[Chuck Ellsworth]

BPF you and I seem to cross swords all the time now with jibes at me over any thing and everything but what the heck if it makes you feel good

Pace.......maybe it could be because in 80% of your posts you failed to check that you were not going to annoy him with opinions that do not meet his level of experience as a aviation expert? :E

Therefore your communication failures were self caused? :E

[Jonzarno]

Way more engine failures in the Cirrus, and every other GA airplane, were directly caused by the pilot than were situations where the engine actually failed with no warning and/or where the pilot was helpless to prevent the loss of power.

Flight training, and this forum, IMO spend way too much time on being the hero pilot after the engine failure instead of concentrating on the mundane, unsexy details that prevent the engine failing in the first place......


Whilst I can't argue with the basic sentiment of this, I would be interested to know a bit more detail on how these failures are being caused. Improper mixture control leading to detonation / pre-ignition or failure to add oil suggest themselves but, although I know of one or two examples, I don't recall reading about many of these.

However, I am aware of a number of maintenance induced failures and would have thought that is probably a bigger problem.

Here is an index to a number of articles by Mike Busch, some of which are relevant to this. They are all well worth reading:

https://www.savvymx.com/index.php/resources/articles

And here is a link to Mike's free webinars which are also well worth watching.

https://www.savvymx.com/index.php/resources/webinar

I appreciate that going through all of this takes quite a long time, but they really are very informative.

I hope this is useful!

[Big Pistons Forever]

Pace

I went back and read some of my earlier posts and you are right, my phraseology made some of the posts veer into a personal challenge, rather than challenging the content of the discussion. So for that I apologize.

I will however stand by my comment about Sully. I firmly believe that what he did could not be duplicated by most airline pilots flying today. I highly recommend you go back and listen to the CVR tape and watch a animation of the event. How Sully and his Copilot dealt with a desperate situation unfolding in a very short time frame, is amazing.

I think there is easy for a reflective negativity to infect internet correspondence. I think it is entirely appropriate to call him a hero and to imply that he was just doing his job, utilizing his training and there was nothing truly special here, has a whiff of hubris that grated.....

Anyway thanks for pulling me up short. You were right and I will be more careful in the future.

Cheers

BPF

[Jonzarno]

MJ

Thanks for posting this :ok:: here are a few, I hope equally constructive, thoughts:


There will be some whose lives are saved by it's operation, from otherwise impossible situations.

But:

There will always be some who will use the system prematurely/ unnecessarliiy, when there was a better solution.



Possibly, but better too early than too late!


There will always be some who will operate the aircraft in a way they wouldn't risk without BRS.


Yes, this is undoubtedly a risk. It is best addressed through training and peer influence from organisations like COPA


There will always be some who don't know how, or fail to operate the system in time, and die in the wreckage.


Yes, this has been and remains a major challenge. We seem to be making progress with this, but there's still a long way to go.


There will always be some who are injured or killed by accidental/inadvertent operation.


This is very unlikely. It requires something like a 60 lbs pull to deploy the chute: pilots are taught to "do a chin up" on the handle. The only case that comes close to fitting this scenario is the unsurvivable midair collision that caused an involuntary deployment.


There will always be some bystanders who are injured or killed as a result of the system being operated.


Whilst you can't say it will never happen, it never has so far, and those bystanders will always have both audible and (almost always) visual warning of the deployment. Contrast that with an engine out aircraft gliding in silently at three or four times the speed.


The way to maximise the first and minimise the rest is by EDUCATION.


Yes, yes, yes!


Knowlege of the system, it's operation, and limitations. Also, prior consideration of possible scenarios, and consequences of it's operation, are what will minimise the risk/benifit ratio of systems such as this.


Again: absolutely right. The emergencies training I did in the full motion simulator was a real eye opener and I'd recommend any Cirrus pilot that can to do that. If you can't do that, talk at length about this to, and fly with, an experienced CSIP!


Ps. I also think that aircraft should be certified to operate, without limitations or modifications, both with, and without the system being operational.


I agree, but it's unlikely to happen on cost grounds as well as because it's not in Cirrus Design's interest to spend the money to achieve that.

[Mach Jump]

... but it's unlikely to happen on cost grounds as well as because it's not in Cirrus Design's interest to spend the money to achieve that.

In that case I would want to know what compromises they have made elswhere in the design which render the aircraft too dangerous to fly without it.


MJ:ok:

[Adrian N]

I would want to know what compromises they have made elswhere in the design which render the aircraft too dangerous to fly without it.

None.

It is an integral part of the aircraft which couldn't be removed without making significant design changes; if you take the parachute pack and rocket out, the CG moves a long way forward. And then the FAA and EASA require it to be operational because they certified it as the means of recovering from a spin in a Cirrus. They could have demanded a full spin test program - but they both agreed with Cirrus that using the parachute was a better way to recover from a spin with minimum loss of height - 920ft lost in a 1 turn spin with a parachute recovery, and typically between 1,200-1,800ft lost in a 1 turn spin with a normal aerodynamic recovery.

[Mach Jump]

Ps. I also think that aircraft should be certified to operate, without limitations or modifications, both with, and without the system being operational.

...which couldn't be removed without making significant design changes...

I wasn't considering complete removal of the system, only flying with the system inoperative.

...but they both agreed with Cirrus that using the parachute was a better way to recover from a spin with minimum loss of height - 920ft lost in a 1 turn spin with a parachute recovery, and typically between 1,200-1,800ft lost in a 1 turn spin with a normal aerodynamic recovery.

This comparison would only stand up if the end result of a 'chute pull' was the same as a successful aerodynamic recovery, which it clearly isn't.

It seems to me that a compromise has been made here.


MJ:ok:

[Adrian N]

Well, the certifying authorities have said that it has to be operational because they believe that it offers the best protection to the occupants in the event of a spin. Cirrus also believe this - so why would they spend a lot of money re-certifying the aircraft to a lower safety standard?

I see it as analagous to a stick pusher. A Pilatus PC12 has one of those. It adds weight and complexity, and it is there because the manufacturer and the regulators agreed that it offered the best protection for the occupants. You're not allowed to fly a PC12 if it is inoperative. It's not that Pilatus have cut corners and the PC12 is too dangerous to fly without the pusher - it's just the way they designed their aircraft to meet the certification standards.

[mad_jock]

It's not that Pilatus have cut corners and the PC12 is too dangerous to fly without the pusher

Yes it is, it either means that the elevator doesn't have enough authority to recover in the stall due to aerodynamic effects eg super stall.

Or it displays stall behaviour which the average competent pilot wouldn't be able to recover from.

If the plane doesn't need it they don't fit it.

With that much torque on the front from the turboprop I imagine if the wings are stalled and you fire wall it the hull is going to start turning the opposite direction and the rudder won't be enough to stop the yaw.

[Mach Jump]

I see it as analagous to a stick pusher..

No it isn't. The end result of a stick push is the same as a successful stall recovery. The aircraft flies home and lands safely in both cases.

The certification authorities have allowed a compromise in the need for spin recovery testing by making a serviceable BRS a requirement.

Yes it is, it either means that the elevator doesn't have enough authority to recover in the stall due to aerodynamic effects eg super stall

Exactly.

I'm not going to get into an argument here though. We all have our views, and I accept that we are just not going to agree on this.


MJ:ok:

[Pace]

I went back and read some of my earlier posts and you are right, my phraseology made some of the posts veer into a personal challenge, rather than challenging the content of the discussion. So for that I apologize.

BPF

My apologies to you too :ok: I have said this before my posting style is designed to encourage passion in these discussions so sometimes colourful sometimes challenging sometimes stupid :ok:but I can usually waken a dying thread :{ So I can only expect some of the responses I get :E

regarding the Hero i was being pedantic in the use of the word and purist in its meaning as the Press /media have watered down the true meaning and appear to attach that word to anyone who has been in anything threatening.

As for the Captain of the Hudson water landing he was not just doing his job but showed extreme skills and ability in pulling something off which as you say most in the sim could not replicate. That still does not truly describe the word HERO.
i was being pedantic and in no way trying to take away from the amazing skills displayed by the Captain in landing that aircraft and saving so many lives in doing so.

Pace

[Adrian N]

Yes it is, it either means that the elevator doesn't have enough authority to recover in the stall due to aerodynamic effects eg super stall.

I bow before your aircraft certification expertise! You must have a lot of experience to make such a decisive statement. Maybe they did just design an aircraft with dangerous handling, despite years of experience building aerobatic military training aircraft.

But, just maybe, they thought that a stick pusher would be the best way to keep pilots and passengers safe in the PC12? Maybe they took deliberate design decisions, like giving it a T tail so that it's easier to drive up to the cargo door, because they were using technology to avoid any risk of a deep stall? Maybe they thought it would be pointless to fly the full spin test matrix (hundreds of spins in different configurations of CG, fuel balance, flap settings, power settings, etc.) in an aircraft the size and weight of a PC12, risking their test pilots' lives, when the risk of spinning could be eliminated with a stick pusher? And the accident record would seem to suggest that they didn't do a bad job.

The certification authorities have allowed a compromise in the need for spin recovery testing by making a serviceable BRS a requirement.

Just as they have allowed a compromise in the need for stall / spin avoidance in a PC12 by making a serviceable stick pusher a requirement. Pretty much every other single engine aircraft has had to do hundreds of stalls and spins; the pusher allows a PC12 to demonstrate an equivalent level of safety by using technology - exactly the same idea as a Cirrus with BRS.

[mm_flynn]

Whilst I can't argue with the basic sentiment of this, I would be interested to know a bit more detail on how these failures are being caused. Improper mixture control leading to detonation / pre-ignition or failure to add oil suggest themselves but, although I know of one or two examples, I don't recall reading about many of these.

However, I am aware of a number of maintenance induced failures and would have thought that is probably a bigger problem.

Remember forced landing due to 'Engine Failure' just means the engine was unable to maintain power, not that it actually fell apart. So the first and second most common pilot induced engine failures must be either running out of fuel or mismanaging the fuel selectors to run the engine out of fuel.
Third is probably failure to apply carb heat when needed.

Other common ones would be running the boost pump and getting a rich cut, not checking the fuel for water, pulling the mixture rather than the throttle, leaving the primer unlocked, etc. None of these actually break the engine, just result in no/low power.

There are some more subtle ones, like taking off knowing (or not having checked) that the mixture is too lean to generate full power, both mags are not working, knowing oil consumption has dramatically increased, etc.

[Pace]

I have had 3 engine failures

One pilot enduced just after I had got my PPL force landed into field SEP. perfect touchdown in field PAX panicked and crawled onto wing with me holding his jumper.
Plane crossed field with no one at controls. By time I got back to controls after letting him go and took out hedge. Cut off tree stump in hedge demolished wing.

One Seneca 4 3 rocker shafts sheared just after takeoff discovered incorrect torque at manufacture 30% PWR available till 800 feet then shut down as vibration impossible

One Seneca five /spurious rough engine with engine cuts then complete failure.
Nearly new aircraft Piper literally replaced everything in the fuel system to eliminate the problem.
Engine completely stopped in IMC just out of Weston.so 2 out of 3 not pilot enduced

Pace

[mad_jock]

I bow before your aircraft certification expertise! You must have a lot of experience to make such a decisive statement

err no its in the ATPL syllabus and also it was in a selective course during my engineering degree.

From memory the original 747 design didn't have one because it was in limits during test flying. Then when they stretched it with further models it wasn't so they had to fit it.

The reason why the Pc12 has it is the huge torque delivered by the prop/engine and it wouldn't be controllable with max torque and stalled wings.

So its a completely different kettle of fish, you will die if you stall a PC12 and put max torque on before unstalling the wings.

Cirrus they couldn't be bothered finding out and used the BRS as and excuse not to test. In all likely hood you would be able to recover normally its just nobody knows. Well they more than likely do but nobody will admit to it.

[India Four Two]

m_j,

The Cirrus was spun as part of its evaluation prior to EASA certification.

Quite benign characteristics as I recall. I remember thinking I would certainly have a crack at recovering, if high enough, before pulling the red handle.

I've got the report somewhere. I'll dig out the reference.

[Pace]

looking at the aircraft configuration there is no reason apparent why it should not recover from a spin. Aircraft which flat spin usually make do with a drag chute the BRS is a bit overkill ;)
And I cannot see any reason why this would flat spin

pace

[Adrian N]

The reason why the Pc12 has it is the huge torque delivered by the prop/engine and it wouldn't be controllable with max torque and stalled wings.

If that were the case, other single engine turboprops would require a stick pusher. There's nothing special about the PC12. The certification requirement (in the US it's 14CFR Part 23.201(f)(5)(iii) - don't know the EASA ref.) says that a turboprop aircraft only needs to demonstrate a power on stall at "thrust necessary to maintain level flight at 1.5 VS1 (where VS1 corresponds to the stalling speed with flaps in the approach position, the landing gear retracted, and maximum landing weight)", and in those conditions there must be no more than 15 degrees of roll or yaw (up to 25 degrees allowed above 25,000ft).

A PC12 doesn't need a whole lot of torque to fly at 1.5 VS1, and there's a high likelihood that it could meet that certification test requirement - just as aircraft like the Meridian or TBM do. And at the worst some aerodynamic fixes could be applied to make it meet the requirement - much more easily and cheaply than installing and certifying a stick pusher. The Piper Meridian or Socata TBM don't have stick pushers, but if you apply maximum torque at the stall there is no guarantee that they wouldn't roll on their backs, as it's not something that they needed to demonstrate to achieve certification.

Cirrus they couldn't be bothered finding out and used the BRS as and excuse not to test.

I'm afraid that's just wrong. It would have been way simpler and cheaper for Cirrus to do a full spin test program than to certify the parachute. It is not an add-on to cover up poor handling or design - no matter how much some Cirrus detractors would like it to be.

In all likely hood you would be able to recover normally its just nobody knows. Well they more than likely do but nobody will admit to it.

As India Four Two says, it was spun for EASA certification. At least 60 spins, which always recovered within the parameters required for part 23 certification. The outcome of the testing was that EASA agreed with Cirrus and the FAA that using the parachute was the safest way to recover from a spin with minimum loss of altitude.

[mad_jock]

I don't have a clue what nasty's go on to require it. But there must be something for them to loose the payload of the hydralic actuator and lines.

Well technically you don't recover. You go from one completely stalled state of the wings to another.

[India Four Two]

Spin testing:

http://www.peter2000.co.uk/aviation/misc/3-105960-Cirrusstall-spinreport.pdf

[Pace]

India Four

Interesting write up showing there is nothing wrong with the Cirrus SR20 spin behaviour :ok:

Also interesting that the testing was carried out on the SR20 not 22.
I have had low experience in both the SR20 and 22 but of the two found the lower powered SR20 had a more balanced feel to the aircraft rather than the 22.
Maybe someone with experience on both can confirm?

More interesting was the recommendation to use the BRS for recovery from a spin citing poor pilot ability and lack of knowledge in spin recovery.
Yet again coming back to a lack of training and poor handling skills in modern pilots regarding spin recovery.

Nothing much wrong with the Cirrus but a lot with the pilots and the training regime.
Again not Cirrus pilots but an emphasis on the training which is turning out avoidance pilots without handling skills.

now I await the flack :E

Pace

[007helicopter]

More interesting was the recommendation to use the BRS for recovery from a spin citing poor pilot ability and lack of knowledge in spin recovery.
Yet again coming back to a lack of training and poor handling skills in modern pilots regarding spin recovery.

OK, I will bite

a) Spin recovery is not now taught and never will be for PPL training so how could I (or others) be expected to recover from a spin.

b) Why the hell would a competetent Pilot in control of the aircraft get into a spin? if he has let it go that far and out of control I would suggest the last thing I would rely on is him to get out of it competently.

So lack of knowledge I agree, I have never been taught to recover from a spin. I do not have this knowledge or skill.

Lack of training and poor handling skills, complete and utter BS

Cirrus they couldn't be bothered finding out and used the BRS as and excuse not to test. In all likely hood you would be able to recover normally its just nobody knows. Well they more than likely do but nobody will admit to it.

I think fully explained above and more old wives tails

[Pace]

So lack of knowledge I agree, I have never been taught to recover from a spin. I do not have this knowledge or skill.

I would thoroughly recommend any pilot investing in some aerobatic training with a competent instructor.
The anti spin brigade cite spins being low level but many are loss of control at high level.
I also ask how do you identify between a spin and spiral dive?
we have had pilots who are scared of even stalling because of the big bad bogey man that lies beyond of what they have experienced who have written their concerns in these threads.

nothing to do with Cirrus or Cirrus pilots but a change to avoidance flying! Sadly avoidance while being the first line of attack does not always work.

Yes regarding the Cirrus the BRS is probably the way forward and safest way to recover the aircraft

pace

[mad_jock]

Spinning is taught but its optional in the ppl. Most of mine opted to do it in a tommy.

Just another excuse for poor skill levels from incompetent pilots.

If you know you have a hole in your skill set get it bloody sorted, don't presume a handle is going to fix it. 200 quid and one afternoon will get it done. About the same amount as you waste in fuel lugging a brs around for 100 hours.

[thing]

If you know you have a hole in your skill set get it bloody sorted

Stop beating around the bush mate and tell it like it is...:)

I get a mag from the CAA and this month's has an article about chute pulls. Interesting stuff and pictures to look at.

[Adrian N]

Sure, pilots should learn how to recover from a spin. It's fun. However:

don't presume a handle is going to fix it.

Well, actually yes it is. The manufacturer, the FAA, EASA, and the certifying authorities in every other country where the Cirrus is approved all agree that the best way to recover from a spin with minimum loss of altitude is to pull the handle.

If you spend some time reading fatal accident reports for other aircraft, you come across case after case where pilots spun to the ground. They should have been able to recover, but as was pointed out above, if a pilot is bad enough to get into an accidental spin it's asking a lot for them suddenly to be good enough to recover from it. The penalty for being an incompetent pilot doesn't have to be death.

About the same amount as you waste in fuel lugging a brs around for 100 hours.

Is it really your considered opinion that "lugging a BRS around" is just a waste of fuel?

[India Four Two]

I have had low experience in both the SR20 and 22 but of the two found the lower powered SR20 had a more balanced feel to the aircraft rather than the 22.Pace,

That's an interesting observation. I've only had one flight in an SR 22 and I found it a delight to fly manually. Bearing in mind that the object of my flight was to see how the automation worked, I did two takeoffs, two landings and a go-around from an ILS, with no prior upper-airwork and had absolutely no difficulties.

What exactly do you mean by "a more balanced feel"?

Why the hell would a competetent Pilot in control of the aircraft get into a spin?007, the short answer is "easily". I'll preface my slightly longer answer, by stating that I like spinning. I've done hundreds of spins in Chipmunks and in gliders and quite a few spins in an assortment of other aircraft, mainly Citabrias and C172s.

I've done spins and recoveries on partial panel in C172s and I've taught spinning in gliders, where some of my heavier students rapidly learnt the difference between a spin and a spiral dive, if they didn't hold the stick back on the stop.:=

So, concerning your competent pilot, I can envisage a situation where a pilot routinely flies in IMC, relying on the autopilot and then has an autopilot failure in cloud. If he has not routinely practiced manual flying on instruments, I can see him easily losing control. Admittedly, it would be more likely a spiral dive than a spin, but the result would be the same, unless he came out of cloud or had the red handle in a Cirrus.

Concerning the spin testing, it's interesting to note that three of the four cases were only tested at forward CG. I find that somewhat surprising.

[007helicopter]

So, concerning your competent pilot, I can envisage a situation where a pilot routinely flies in IMC, relying on the autopilot and then has an autopilot failure in cloud. If he has not routinely practiced manual flying on instruments, I can see him easily losing control. Admittedly, it would be more likely a spiral dive than a spin, but the result would be the same, unless he came out of cloud or had the red handle in a Cirrus.


I think the problem I have with this is "if he can not routinely fly in IMC with an auto pilot failure then that is the problem" and renders the pilot incompetent, his ability to recover from a spin is not even going to come into the equation as I would suggest very unlikely he will not recover.

I stand by my SOP and if I am in a spin for whatever reason (my lack of training, incompetency, mechanical or avionics failure) I will be pulling the chute.

I do not know the facts but I am not aware of any Cirrus Pilots that claim to inadvertently got into a spin and recovered, I know of a few that did not recover and I know about a few who pulled the chute and survived.

[mad_jock]

Is it really your considered opinion that "lugging a BRS around" is just a waste of fuel?

For me yes in a SEP.

The only situation I would want it and I haven't been trained to deal with is an in flight structural failure.

And the chances of that are so low on a youngish certified aircraft its a risk I am willing to take.

Apart from that give me the additional payload please.

And in flight failure of the magenta line will kill commercial pilots never mind ppl's and its something the industry is looking to solve.

[007helicopter]

And in flight failure of the magenta line will kill commercial pilots never mind ppl's and its something the industry is looking to solve.

What with a back up dual ipad's ? :E

Back to the spinning and avoiding it and if in it recovering, surely the pilot had to do many wrong things to get in that position, fly to slow (and not recognise it) stall the wing (and not recognise it and recover) so the chances if this is inadvertent of recovery is in my opinion very low.

A spin is an Aerobatic exercise that I personally believe has little value in time and money well spent for flying high performance GA aircraft. (Although I would like to do it some time for the experience only)

Stall and Spin accidents in GA are very often fatal and often at circuit altitude where recovery technique and the chute are useless so avoidance training is the key

[Pace]

007H

The problem with avoidance is that you have to identify what is happening to avoid it.
It is easy in an armchair position to say this should happen or that should happen very different on a dark night in poor visibility when a pilot is trying to locate a runway and his full concentration is outside the aircraft peering through the mist and rain while scared because the visual references are not adding up.

It is so easy to get slow, see something and over bank! Suddenly the pilot wakes up with a stall and huge wing drop. What good is avoidance then?

Or the pilot in IMC high level again distracted and scared because he has wondered into a storm cell? Suddenly he looses control enters a spin which he has no idea if he is in a spin or a spiral dive. Uses incorrect recovery methods probably for the wrong situation and breaks the plane.

YES YES YES avoidance is priority number UNO but its not enough. There are far too many silly avoidable accidents now which indicate aircraft drivers relying on fancy systems rather than Pilots with skills.

You only have to look through the Cirrus chute pull statistics and you think to yourself WHY WHY WHY? needless, stupid incidences which caused the knee jerk chute pull reaction.

Yes as in many walks of life people have to be protected from themselves and thank God for the chute as many have said its better they live than die but some come across as mountain walkers setting off in winter wearing a T shirt and shorts and wandering why they get into a mess.

The systems and BRS should compliment solid handling skills and experience not make up for a lack of those skills and experience.
I am sure the majority of pilots are serious people who put a lot into honing those skills and many do through organisations like COPA but then there is that minority who frankly I would not send my worst enemy up with never mind a loved one.

Pace

[Adrian N]

The only situation I would want it and I haven't been trained to deal with is an in flight structural failure.

That reminded me of a Cirrus crash in Florida. Here's what the NTSB said:

Although the airplane was equipped with an airframe parachute, an acquaintance of the pilot reported that the pilot would only use it in the event of a structural issue that rendered the airplane uncontrollable. Otherwise, if it were controllable, the pilot intended to hand-fly the airplane to landing. If the pilot had deployed the airframe parachute, he may have increased the likelihood of a successful emergency landing.

The pilot had 3,000 hours, and obviously thought that he had been trained and could deal with a forced landing in a flat grass field. On the day, he couldn't. He died, as did his wife. Their niece, who was in the back seat, was injured.

How about medical incapacitation? Catastrophic engine failure over rough terrain? Unexpected severe icing? Mid-air collision? I've had a lot of training too, but none of it has given me the secret to surviving those scenarios. And as for the more mundane forced landings, remember the statistic that was discussed earlier in the thread: around 20% of the fatalities in other high-performance singles (Mooneys and Bonanazas) occurred while attempting a forced landing - either due to unsuitable terrain or loss of control while manoeuvring to a landing site. That's a lot of dead people, and lots of them were far more skilled and experienced than me. Using BRS may not be as macho as pulling off a brilliant forced landing, but it does give you a much higher likelihood of living to fly another day.

You only have to look through the Cirrus chute pull statistics and you think to yourself WHY WHY WHY? needless, stupid incidences which caused the knee jerk chute pull reaction.

One could argue that the reaction hasn't been sufficiently "knee jerk", because more people have died in Cirrus accidents that would have been survivable if the chute had been pulled than have survived after using it.

Sure, people take dumb decisions and get themselves into difficulties. But if you spend some time reading the details of the Cirrus chute pulls, not a lot of them are the result of "needless stupid incidences". Some, maybe, once one has the benefit of hindsight, but at least the pilots lived. Lots of other pilots die needlessly and stupidly, and lots of Cirrus pilots have when simply pulling a handle would have saved them.

[Pace]

Adrian

what are we arguing here! How wonderful an escape route the chute is? NO that point is taken.

So what are you arguing that pilots do not need to have good handling capability any more because as long as they can drive the plane not fly it they can pull a chute?

from my point I am arguing that the chute and yes systems should compliment a pilots honed skills and experience and not be used as a get out of jail for free card.

You will always get the highly experienced pilot who messed up and on reflection may have been better pulling the chute but I am sure that works the other way around?

Is it possible that a fast spinning or spiral dive aircraft might tangle up in the chute? putting the aircraft in a no win situation?

YES a pilot has to make a quick judgement of whether to use the chute or not but I would rather that was based on experience and pilot capability than an " Its ok I can press on in this weather because if i cannot handle it i have the chute

Problem here is we are all going around in circle and I suspect are not really that far apart

pace

[India Four Two]

Although I would like to do it some time for the experience only

007,
I strongly urge you to try it. Not only for the experience (which can be fun), but also to become comfortable with seeing your aircraft in an unusual attitude and knowing what to do about it. :ok:

It could save your life one day.


Pace,
I think you are right. We are all not that far apart.

[Adrian N]

what are we arguing here!

We're not arguing. We're discussing! :)

I disagree with the assertions that the Cirrus chute pull statistics are filled with pilots who have made really stupid decisions followed by a "knee jerk" reaction to pull the chute. Most of the Cirrus chute pulls are not the result of pilots recklessly setting off into conditions that were beyond their abilities. A few might fall into that category, but really not many. Just under half of them have followed some sort of mechanical failure, where the pilot didn't want to risk a forced landing - a really good decision in the vast majority of cases. And just under half involved some sort of loss of control, usually in IMC, sometimes following unexpectedly severe icing. Some of those were the result of really bad decision making, but quite a few weren't.

I also think it is wrong to suggest that too many Cirrus pilots think "I can press on in this weather because if i cannot handle it i have the chute". Some of them might think "if I have an engine failure in this weather, the chute will let me survive where otherwise I would die", but I think that's different. I can't find any evidence to suggest that the parachute is used as a "get out of jail" card in the way you suggest. Yes, some pilots have used it having flown into really bad weather, but some pilots just overestimate their abilities, or underestimate the weather, or don't bother checking it - whatever aircraft they are flying. Once again, read through the Mooney or Bonanza accident reports and you will find staggering examples of pilots setting off into level 5 thunderstorms or severe icing or other conditions which they had no hope of surviving

Is it possible that a fast spinning or spiral dive aircraft might tangle up in the chute? putting the aircraft in a no win situation?

Cirrus test pilots spent months pulling the chute from every kind of attitude they could get the aircraft into, and didn't manage to tangle the aircraft up in it. It has been used in spins and spiral dives, and even at 34kt while inverted - which is about the best way I can think of of trying to get tangled. So I guess the answer to your question is "no".

[Pace]

The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions, and the pilot intended to fly an instrument landing system approach. Review of non-volatile memory data revealed that the autopilot approach mode was armed as the airplane intercepted the localizer course and was descending toward 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). At that time, the autopilot was selected to vertical speed (VS) mode with the altitude armed rather than selected to the altitude mode, which is one of the criteria for automatically arming the glideslope (GS) mode later in the approach. About 1 minute later, the autopilot automatically cancelled the VS mode and switched to altitude mode as the airplane reached 2,600 feet msl. However, at that time the airplane was above the glideslope by 53 percent needle deflection. The autopilot will not automatically arm the GS mode unless, in addition to the altitude mode being selected, the airplane is more than 10 percent needle deflection below the glideslope. As a result, the airplane remained above the glideslope until the autopilot was disconnected about 1 minute later. The pilot then attempted to hand-fly a missed approach; however, he was unable to maintain the heading or altitude assigned by air traffic control. He subsequently lost control of the airplane during a turn and elected to deploy the airplane's parachute system. The airplane came to rest in a vacant lot.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's failure to maintain airplane control during a missed approach in instrument meteorological conditions. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's overreliance on the autopilot system and his inability to hand-fly the airplane once the autopilot was disconnected.

The above is just one example I can cut and paste here there are many more equally ridiculous CAP pulls! What the heck was this guy doing IMC with as the NTS Board stated reliance on systems and inability to hand fly without the autopilot? I can show you many more examples.

The recent channel crash with a recommendation by the CAA to look at highly automated aircraft with CAPS would indicate that there is a problem with these pilots flying out of their depth and being lured by the systems and CAPS into situations they cannot handle

Safety action
As a result of discussions arising from this accident and others, the CAA is
considering enhancing publicity to the GA community concerning the operation
of light aircraft equipped with advanced avionic and ballistic recovery systems.


to just defend and say everything in the garden is rosy is frankly sticking ones head in the sand even the CAA are identifying a problem which needs addressing!
I fully accept we are talking about a small minority and most Cirrus pilots are well trained and extremely competent pilots but as with anything positive there are negatives too.

Pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

This pilot clearly got behind the aircraft and screwed up flying the missed approach: no argument there. Chances are, though, that he had flown missed approaches before under training conditions and got it wrong under the pressure of having to do it for real.

One way of trying to address this is to do emergencies training in a full motion simulator but even that won't recreate the pressure of having to do it for real.

Whilst I agree with you that training which properly incorporates CAPS into emergencies handling is vital, calling this pull "ridiculous" is, well, ridiculous.

The mistake had already been made when the pilot decided to pull. If he hadn't pulled he would have died. Whatever went before, the final decision to pull was a good one.

With respect: this isn't the first time in this thread that you have used this kind of confrontational and emotive language. You're obviously a very experienced pilot, but, if I may say so, you don't help the valid points you make by spoiling them in this way.

Incidentally: as I asked earlier, when you do the 50 Cirrus hours you talked about earlier, do you plan to do proper training with an experienced CSIP and / or go to the CPPP I suggested? I really do recommend it no matter how experienced you are.

[Pace]

Whilst I agree with you that training which properly incorporates CAPS into emergencies handling is vital, calling this pull "ridiculous" is, well, ridiculous.

The mistake had already been made when the pilot decided to pull. If he hadn't pulled he would have died. Whatever went before, the final decision to pull was a good one.

If as the safety board indicated the pilot relied on autopilots and was incapable of hand flying then the ridiculous was not referring to pulling the CAPS but to being there in the first place and I don't change my stance on ridiculous! ! Thank God he had a CAPS to pull. The CAA have also noted a problem in their conclusions on the accident over the channel.

Pace

[Chuck Ellsworth]

With respect: this isn't the first time in this thread that you have used this kind of confrontational and emotive language. You're obviously a very experienced pilot, but, if I may say so, you don't help the valid points you make by spoiling them in this way.

For sure we don't want to hurt any feelings here.

So maybe I can help settle this safety feature that seems to generate so much disagreement here.

They should rename the chute feature and call it " The Darwin Solution".

[Jonzarno]

Pace

There are lots of examples of pilots dying after screwing up an instrument approach ranging from this one through to the Cork Airport crash involving an ATPL on a commercial flight. This one lived.

Any thoughts on the question I asked?

[Pace]

Any thoughts on the question I asked?

If you are saying that the aircraft has unique handling characteristics which need mastering then the answer would be yes. if not NO! I have had to many sets of keys thrown at me in the past and told to get on with it :ok:

If you are saying I need to thoroughly learn the Cirrus perspective glass then Yes but I hope that is on the ground and not wasting money in the air? And no I never rely on or trust autopilots or systems and am happy hand flying approaches and missed as any ATP should be.

So maybe :E

Pace

[Jonzarno]

I have had to many sets of keys thrown at me in the past and told to get on with it


Yeeesss...... Famous last words?


If you are saying I need to thoroughly learn the Cirrus perspective glass then Yes but I hope that is on the ground and not wasting money in the air?


An interesting "perspective". Having so strongly, and rightly, advocated training for other Cirrus pilots, I thought you might find it useful yourself, especially the part that covers CAPS use. But you obviously don't need that.

Enjoy your Cirrus flying!

[Adrian N]

What the heck was this guy doing IMC with as the NTS Board stated reliance on systems and inability to hand fly without the autopilot?

Like Jonzarno said, he screwed up. From the report submitted by the pilot (http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F54000-54499%2F54146%2F514123.pdf) he had 1950 hours and an instrument rating, with good currency. He was also a flight instructor. It is simplistic just to say he was unable to hand fly in IMC. He may have been a hopeless pilot using the autopilot to cover his incompetence, and relying on the parachute to get him out of trouble. But it's unlikely that he got the qualifications he had without knowing how to fly reasonably.

For comparison, there was a Mooney accident where the pilot lost control flying a missed approach in IMC. Quite similar, but for the fact that the pilot died. The pilot was a CFI, CFII, and a current military B1B pilot who, according to the accident report, 'had received an “exceptionally qualified” rating on last military mission and instrument flight review'. Even really good pilots screw up sometimes.

As for the channel accident, the very inexperienced pilot effectively flew VFR into IMC over water - as hundreds of other pilots have done over the years. The evidence suggests that he was anything but gung-ho about setting off into poor weather, and if he'd just been relying on the automation he would have carried on relying on it and returned to VMC at the French coast. If he had used his parachute when he lost control, he might not have died.

[Pace]

Jonzarno

I would never take any aircraft i was not totally comfortable with in any conditions I flew it in if that means a COPA course so be it.

Adrian obviously both the NTSB and CAA have got it wrong in their conclusions ? Maybe write to them correcting their mistaken conclusions.

All in the garden is Rosy so really I should drop out of this thread

Pace

[Adrian N]

The NTSB concluded that on the day of this accident the pilot relied too much on his autopilot and messed up the missed approach badly when trying to hand fly it. They didn't conclude that he was just an incompetent who shouldn't have been flying in IMC, and nor did they do any investigation into that. Their "probable cause" conclusions are notoriously summarised, and the reality is often a lot more nuanced than their black and white assertions imply. (Read Peter Garrison's "Aftermath" column in Flying magazine for a monthly example of that.)

Similarly the AAIB report didn't conclude that the pilot had been lured out of his depth by his avionics and the comfort blanket of his parachute. They didn't find a cause. They speculated it was probably VFR into IMC, that he probably disconnected the autopilot causing him to lose control, but that medical incapacitation couldn't be excluded. The fact that there's a safety recommendation (an ambigulous one - "enhancing publicity" to the GA community concerning operation of aircraft with BRS might mean reminding them to use it as soon as they lose control) doesn't imply they share your view that there is a general problem with incompetent pilots relying on technology and parachutes in their Cirruses.

[Chuck Ellsworth]

From the report submitted by the pilot he had 1950 hours and an instrument rating, with good currency. He was also a flight instructor.

Which means it is possible he may have never hand flown inside a cloud in his whole career.

There is a big difference between the make believe world of IFR flight instruction and actually hand flying in IMC.

Actually some of them might be better off putting on a hood as soon as they get in cloud and then maybe there would not be the stress of knowing they were IMC for real?

[mad_jock]

Aye Adrian the rest of us can work out that he was an idiot that shouldn't have been on the stick in the conditions.

personally I am over 6k hours with the majority of them inside sodding clouds and with over 30 knts wind on the ground I might add.

[Adrian N]

I'm humbled. :)

Perhaps when I'm that good, I'll be able to make instant judgements based on partial information. Until then, there are shades of grey.

See ya.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Re spins and the Cirrus

This is the report from a Crash in Canada

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A10W0155 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2010/a10w0155/a10w0155.asp)

The airplane spun in and killed 3. Of note is that at the time of impact the rotation had stopped and the aircraft was pitching up. However when the aircraft departed from controlled flight the aircraft was well within the CAPs envelope for a successful deployment.

It would seem to me that if the pilot had followed the POH procedure and pulled the big red handle it is highly likely there would be 3 less dead people and the aircraft might have even flown again.....

[Big Pistons Forever]

They should rename the chute feature and call it " The Darwin Solution".


I think the 70 or so people who are still alive because the CAP's was used might disagree.......

I see the Chuck and Clunk forum (Aka the Canada forum) isn't getting any posts. I wonder why that is ? So I guess you decided to "add" :rolleyes: to this forum :hmm:

Funny how pretty much every post you make seems to involve putting other pilots down, while usually blowing your own horn........

Too bad because you have a lot of experience to offer, but sharing that experience would mean actually engaging in a dialogue rather than just expecting fawning admiration and completely uncritical agreement.....

[Jonzarno]

I think the 70 or so people who are still alive because the CAP's was used might disagree.......

On the contrary, BPF: I think they might well agree. After all they remain part of the gene pool!

Of course those involved in fatal accidents and who might have lived if they, or the pilot flying them, had pulled are no longer able to express an opinion.

[Jonzarno]

personally I am over 6k hours with the majority of them inside sodding clouds and with over 30 knts wind on the ground I might add.


Luxury!! We used to have to deice wings wi' us tongues, take off in earthquake, fly through hurricane and land on aircraft carrier in 40 foot seas at night. Aye, them were t’days! :p ;)

[Genghis the Engineer]

Re spins and the Cirrus

This is the report from a Crash in Canada

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A10W0155 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2010/a10w0155/a10w0155.asp)

The airplane spun in and killed 3. Of note is that at the time of impact the rotation had stopped and the aircraft was pitching up. However when the aircraft departed from controlled flight the aircraft was well within the CAPs envelope for a successful deployment.

It would seem to me that if the pilot had followed the POH procedure and pulled the big red handle it is highly likely there would be 3 less dead people and the aircraft might have even flown again.....

It would also seem, to me, that had the pilot kept AoA below alpha-crit, and/or the aeroplane had sufficiently benign stalling characteristics with no tendency to spin, that there would be nothing to discuss.

The issues, to me, concerning survival of a spin from circuit height, are all about why the aeroplane was spinning in the first place - everything after that is to a fair extent, detail.

G

[Jonzarno]

GTE

The stall characteristics are extremely benign. I've stalled mine many times in training and it really isn't a big deal at all.

Here is a quote from Cirrus on the wing design:


Cirrus chose, in the very earliest stages of designing the SR20 to take on the challenge: to minimize the risks associated with inadvertently stalling an airplane. The approach chosen was to employ wing technology developed by NASA reducing the potential for spin entry after an inadvertent stall. The most visible aspect is the discontinuous leading edge dividing the wing into distinct parts.

The outboard section of the Cirrus wing flies with a lower angle of attack than the inboard section. When the inboard section, which produces much of the lift, stalls the outboard section, where the ailerons are, is still flying. The result is that a stalled Cirrus airplane can be controlled intuitively using aileron.


For what it's worth, Cirrus is not the only manufacturer to adopt this design.

[Pace]

Jonzarno

Really I don't know what we are all arguing about certainly not the quality of the Cirrus or it's systems which are mind boggling for such a small single!
Certainly not the CAPS which is proving a must for SEP aircraft! My own position has moved considerably from the original discussions on when I would use it!
So what is my argument?
It's not directly about the aircraft or it's systems or the CAPS but about the fact that with all positives come negatives!
The negatives I believe is the fact that having a CAPS which is proving so reliable will coax pilots into flying out if their ability zone ! I know for a fact that any distance at night in a SEP is unnactable for me because I never fly without an out! Black night and there are no outs if the engine quits!
With the CAPS there is an out so I would fly a Cirrus at night!
I am sure the same happens with pilots who are not up to speed on IMC /IFR flying! They have an out in the form if the CAPS!
So for me there are two areas to be guarded against !
The CAPS having to be used because SOME pilots fly out of their ability/ experience levels and get in a mess! There appears to be evidence of that !
Secondly the systems compensating for or allowing pilots to get rusty or lazy with their hand flying ability!
Even in the jets I fly on maintenance movements below RVSM We hand fly all the way as it's good for the soul

I have absolutely NO doubts that there is a FEEL GOOD factor we need to guard against and a lazy flying factor created by the very systems and CAPS which is there to protect us

This is all getting to personal too entrenched

Pace

[Jonzarno]

Pace

I don't disagree with any of that! :ok:

[Genghis the Engineer]

GTE

The stall characteristics are extremely benign. I've stalled mine many times in training and it really isn't a big deal at all.

Here is a quote from Cirrus on the wing design:



For what it's worth, Cirrus is not the only manufacturer to adopt this design.

So why did the LOC happen then? Most common light aeroplanes would not have behaved like that? (Although some - the C150 and PA38 come to mind, would. )

G

[mad_jock]

They will have come from the lift the wing with the rudder school of slow flight.

I might add this ability to bite with incorrect technique of the Tommy's is one reason why they produce better pilots.

[Jonzarno]

GTE

Good question! I don't know. But he was high enough for CAPS to have saved him and his passengers.

Jock

It's possible, although that generation of Cirrus has a bugee interconnect between rudder and aileron.

[Big Pistons Forever]

It would also seem, to me, that had the pilot kept AoA below alpha-crit, and/or the aeroplane had sufficiently benign stalling characteristics with no tendency to spin, that there would be nothing to discuss.

The issues, to me, concerning survival of a spin from circuit height, are all about why the aeroplane was spinning in the first place - everything after that is to a fair extent, detail.

G

Absolutely, but this to me is the black and white question that keeps on coming back. Should the penalty for being stupid be death ?

It is likely that had the Canadian pilot been in any other high performance SEP and had demonstrated a similar lack of skill the result would have been the same, he would not have been able to regain control before he hit the ground.
A fact that is amply demonstrated by the accident record.

The Cirrus is unique because it offers an additional option when things go bad. It is highly likely that if this pilot had followed the Cirrus POH and pulled the chute when he lost control all would have lived. I am personally Ok with that scenario.

The Elephant in this discussion however is Risk Homeostasis. Does knowing you have the chute mean you will take risks that you otherwise would not ? Pace seems to very convinced that this is the case, others including myself are less sure but it is of course a tough issue to prove either way.

However I think that this idea of warped risk appreciation IMO only really applies when we look at bad weather accidents, loss of control in IMC etc.

I can't really believe someone is going to say " I am going to make really slow uncoordinated turns low to the ground because I have the CAPs".

The initiating event for this accident, as I think is universally agreed, was an unacceptable lack of skill. In a perfect world every pilot would strive to attain and maintain adequate skill levels, in the real world however some pilots may think their skills are up to the job, but find out they are not, or an otherwise good pilot has a massive brain fart and does something silly.

Again in both of those cases using the chute is not something to be celebrated but the fact that lives got saved is the important thing.

[mad_jock]

I have a spring interconnect as well on the work machine.

Waste of bloody weight and a pain in the backside.

Quite funny though when someone from the pick the wing up with the rudder school of flying try's it when the yaw damper is in. One lad managed to rip his thigh muscle doing that.

[charliegolf]

There's too many pages to check, but I bet if the guy had gone for a landing and died/killed his pax, the alter arguments would have flown freely. When an air force sprogg, I had no choice but to train with a bunch of Paras (first 2 weeks and 2 jumps) on their jump course at Brize. I regard the training as excellent, and highly professional. When the day came to jump, they reiterated what they had said over and over again those 2 weeks:

"You are in control of this parachute. If you don't like what you are seeing, pull the reserve- NO-ONE will ever condemn you for pulling your reserve".

Funny how that bit stuck. In this case, everyone is alive, and everyone's insurance went up 10p a year (except the pilot's).

CG

[Pace]

BPF

If I stuck explosives on every corner of your car and asked you to drive through a busy city knowing one mistake and your dead I am sure you would proceed with far more caution than without the explosives attached!
In the same way the Chute would give me that extra out for night flying so that extra level of security!
The guy who is feeling under the weather in a conventional aircraft would cancel an important trip! He may worry about becoming ill at 10000 feet miles from any airport with only him capable of flying!
In the Cirrus the chute would give him an out that extra level of comfort that in the very unlikely event that he did become ill to the point of passing out he has an out which would not be there in a conventional aircraft!
The pilot undertaking and IMC trip which is pushing his boundaries would equally give that pilot an out if it all became to uncomfortable for him to manage!
So in that sense pilots will be lured into conditions and situations which in a conventional aircraft they would avoid!
This is not pointing at Cirrus pilots being a seperate breed! They are the same as other pilots but I have no doubt that having a reliable chute will encourage them to fly out of their own limits!
We are talking about a small minority! The majority are dedicated to their flying and take it very seriously!
When I talk about sticking ones head in the sand it's ignoring this factor or pretending it does not exist!
It is a Cirrus factor which pilots should be aware of and guard against as used correctly and responsibly the chute is a major advancement in flight safety

Pace

[007helicopter]

Chute pull today, all walked away uninjured, no idea of circumstances.

Small plane crashes near Burlington Mall | Local News - WCVB Home (http://www.wcvb.com/news/small-plane-crashes-near-burlington-mall/26440712#!XxrKZ)

[maxred]

On final to land apparently...run out of fuel perhaps?

Here's the audio

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kbed/KBED-Jun-11-2014-1730Z.mp3

[007helicopter]

Good find on the Audio sounds like was a rental or instructional flight from East Coast Aero.

[maxred]

Looks like a good job all round. The Citabria pilot did a sterling job in awareness and ensuring the first attenders were getting directed to the scene.

I mentioned fuel, because whilst engines can fail anywhere, any time, it seemed a bit strange to fail on final. Just a thought..

We can await the report

[Wesue4u]

Perhaps looking down on a perfect field at 1000 ft, doesn't reveal an imperfect field at touchdown time. Perhaps the perfect field contains fox holes, or rabbit holes, or gopher holes just waiting for a nose wheel to step in and flip the plane.
But of course, you'll never see those imperfections at 1000 ft.

Or perhaps descending to a furrowed dirt field at 16 knots makes more sense that approaching it at 60 or 70 kts. Which I ask you produces more energy to dissipate?

Geez, every well trained military pilot knows to pull the chute; and does.

When the engine gives up and can't be restarted, it's time to give up the plane and let the insurance company pay for it . . . that is unless your machismo gets in the way and you have something to prove.

It would only be a fool who would pass up on a viable safety option, in favor of proving how skilled he is at making power out landings on a dirt field.

[mad_jock]

here we go another evangelistic chute puller..

The argument per say is not about the safety aspects of the chute is more about idiots putting themselves into situations that they should never been in which then leads to them pulling the chute when the situation gets the better of them. Either by bad luck or being talent limited.

[funfly]

I get the impression that PACE is the sort of person who drives a car without wearing the seat belt so that he/she will drive safer.

[Pilot DAR]

I opine that the (new)age old argument of to pull or not to pull, or rather, does an airframe even need a parachute, will never be won - there are persuasive arguments on both sides.

Though, I always remember wise advice about returning to earth: Chances of survival are inversely proportionate to angle of arrival.

With that, I tend toward a preference of arriving to earth with forward flying speed, and near zero vertical speed, rather than vertical speed, which I cannot arrest nor control. But, that's me. If I had been trained in military aircraft, which I suspect are characteristically incapable of a practical forced landing, and taught the benefits and decisions associated with ejecting, I might see it differently.

[mad_jock]

well funny enough the single engine mil aircraft pilots are still taught and practise PFL's and there are quite a few of them that have done a dead stick as well.

[Pilot DAR]

Ah, well outside my realm of experience. Though, I have heard that the Canadian single propeller trainers, the CT-156 Harvard II, which I would think could be forced landed, is "ejected from" if things go bad. As I say, not my area of expertise.

I'm limited to aircraft which can (and are expected to be) force landed. I've succeeded four times at that (which is an average of once per 1750 piloting hours, so I'm not too worried!). I was required to wear a 'chute when I flew jumpers, but I never imagined using it!

[mad_jock]

The accident in finland with a jump plane recently the pilot had to use it.

[Piper.Classique]

Oh well, an interesting first post. On a long dead thread. I landed in a field last week, fwiw. But of course I cheated, I used a glider. And one could say that if I had been a better pilot I would have completed my task rather than returning home with the glider in its box. However, the field I chose at a thousand feet was just fine at zero feet. I once again used my parachute as an imperfect cushion. Also it is useful when parking the glider in the field to put on the wing.
And I can use the glider again next weekend.

[this is my username]

I used to fly balloons, now I teach in steerable aircraft with engines.

One of the constant surprises is the inability of many students to make any sort of assessment of a field surface based on its colour and texture - they have no idea whether the green field is rough grass, smooth grass, wheat or oilseed rape. It's not a skill you can easily teach in the course of a PPL. I have the benefit of a couple of decades of studying fields from the air to fall back on.

[Pilot DAR]

I have never flown a parachute equipped aircraft, but I've flown lots of faster types (Cardinals, 206's, Piper Arrows, Bellanca Vikings and some Mooney) in which I'd be thinking pretty carefully about the choice of field. But that would be for the risk of damage during a forced landing, rather than my perception of the certainty of it after an airframe 'chute was deployed. I will always try to make the best of what I have to work with, and get it to the ground so it is reusable. in 7000+ hours, and a number of in flight emergencies, I have never for a moment thought to abandon an aircraft in flight, I don't know why I would start thinking that way now, even if new technology enabled it.

Old dog, I guess.....

[VORTIME]

The big risk among older pilots is that their behaviour is programmed and can no longer be modified. In effect, it means new technology will bite or save younger pilots but a status quo remains for the older generation.

[Pilot DAR]

it means new technology will bite or save younger pilots but a status quo remains for the older generation.

Yup, for all the G1000 equipped aircraft I have flown, I have no recollection of reading airspeed or altitude info from the scrolling bars, it's those round standby instruments I see first....