Concorde crash: Continental Airlines cleared by France court [Archive]

donnlass

29th Nov 2012, 21:47

There was a spacer missing from the left gear asembly

However, the Observer, citing John Hutchinson, a British Concorde pilot for 15 years, said the lack of a component called "spacer" in the undercarriage was a contributing factor.

When Air France mechanics had taken the undercarriage apart for a service, they reassembled it without the part, which keeps the wheels in the correct alignment. The missing spacer was found on the original part in the workshop

Without the spacer, the aircraft veered on takeoff "like a supermarket trolley with a jammed wheel," claimed the Observer. It was this, not the loss of power, which sent the jet heading to the edge of the runway, and neary into collision with an Air France 747, the same one that the picture of Concorde trailing flames on the runway was taken from.

The firemen claimed that it was the friction caused by the jammed wheel assembly that caused the tyre to burst and not the metal strip and that this caused the airacraft to veer towards the edge of the runway where the metal strip had fallen off.

If the spacer had been fitted then the Concorde would have stayed straight down the centre line and been nowhere near the metal strip.

CONCORDE SST : LATEST NEWS (http://www.concordesst.com/accident/latest.html)

Skipness One Echo

29th Nov 2012, 22:14

Except the gash in the tyre was a match for the metal strip found on the runway.

jcjeant

30th Nov 2012, 03:26

Only goes to show that once the legal profession gets involved in something technical and complex like aviation, the court outcome is a complete lottery depending on who is adjudicating. The verdicts go backwards and forwards like a yo-yo. The only constant is the legal profession collecting huge fees on all sides at each and every stage. I'm sure that, compared to their lawyers' bill, the EUR 1m damages Continental had to pay were chicken feed. Not really .. in France
It's not has been a lottery for at least more than 30 years ...
It's always the same people or organizations who are not guilty .. and I'll let you guess who .. :)
In french ... of course .....
MM7c-07dOxI#!

From a french forum (free translation)

Unlike some who claim that Concorde lack them, there is no lack to those who have been victims because the future operation of the aircraft had not been stopped. This aircraft was a prototype and nothing else. His business career has been marked by dozens of major incidents but have never been the subject of investigations and regulatory reports yet. The bursting of tires are counted by tens and authorities did everything to leave sercice what we now know to have been a flying coffin. On behalf of the prestige of France, unacceptable risk to kill a hundred passengers was taken and of course, things could not end otherwise. To confirm the dangers of matches, just know that under Giscard, a council of ministers had discussed the urgency to ground the plane (after the Washington accident .. a insight for what happen later) is also conducive to the accident.
There is still incompetent technicians Air France, known as unable to provide maintenance to the task. This is clearly demonstrated in the report of Canal+ and it is distressing. How can we forget a spacer on the main gear and be told by counsel for the company that this spacer was useless and that there was therefore no fault while British Concorde experts say the opposite ? Say that even the scheming of ADP on the work immediately after the accident to repair the track used fateful day?
This ruling has cleared Continental if you read between the lines but still basically in the same line opacity that accompanied the device throughout his career, the various responsibilities in the crash are known culprits too, but nothing is said, nothing will be done against them ...
The Concorde was anything but an airliner capable of transporting passengers safely!
Ad usque fidelis !

Landroger

30th Nov 2012, 13:57

I predict something little less than thermonuclear when M2Dude gets to read that final paragraph. :uhoh:

Shaggy Sheep Driver

30th Nov 2012, 14:52

It is quite plainly a wrong statement. If operated correctly, Concorde was probably the safest airliner in the skies. But it was demanding, and it did demand correct techniques, on the flight deck and in the maintenance hangar. BA gave it that.

The court has rightly pointed the finger of blame for Paris back where it belongs.

blind pew

30th Nov 2012, 16:26

Thanks for the Canal + link.
Very interesting and refreshingly brave that they were allowed to produce the documentary.
Along similar but dissimilar lines National Geographic are producing a documentary on Papa India - the Staines disaster which claimed a similar number of victims.
The researcher for Cineflix has been in contact with me but after I sent her my manuscript which contains what I believe really happened it has gone quiet.
Similar in that their were a number of witnesses which should have been called, misinformation, amnesia and a state airline.
Dissimilar as the AAIB investigator distanced himself from the inquiry findings and Cats eyes Cunningham - the test pilot - stated that BEA operated the aircraft incorrectly - and he never knew everything.

jcjeant

30th Nov 2012, 19:50

Excerpts from the judgment
In general
BEA has never issued any other recommendations for the operation of the Concorde as those listed after the accident August 9, 1981 despite consecutive events to bursting of tires and their consequences
The administrative inquiry into the crash of a June 14, 1979 in Washington was conducted in a context of political pressure by the investigator concerned and confirmation by supervisor

The Court considers it unacceptable that this aircraft could maintain its airworthiness certificat without the measures required were not taken at both the tire changes as the protection of its most vulnerable tanks

The Court considers that factors related to the duality of the administrative authorities and builders, poor organization on a French certification and airworthiness followed, power relationships both internally in both French and between countries at political financial and economic concerns attended a followed airworthiness was not the height of the exceptional technology that allowed the project ConcordeExtraits de l'arret de la cour de justice
En général
Le BEA n'a jamais emis aucune autre recommandations durant l'exploitation du Concorde que celles reprises après l'accident du 9 Aout 1981 en dépit des évènements consécutifs aux éclatements de pneumatiques et leurs conséquences
L'enquête administrative relative a l'accident du 14 Juin 1979 a Washington avait été menée dans un contexte de pression politique selon l'enquêteur concerné et confirmation par son chef hiérarchique

La cour considère inacceptable que cet aeronef ait pu conserver son certificat de navigabilité sans que les mesures qui s'imposaient ne fussent prises tant au niveau du changement des pneumatiques que de la protection de ses réservoirs les plus exposés

La cour considère que des facteurs liés a la dualité des autorités administratives et des constructeurs , la mauvaise qualité de l'organisation francaise relative a la certification et au suivit de navigabilité, les rapports de force tant en interne au niveau francais qu'entre les deux pays au niveau politique, ainsi que les préoccupations économiques et finacières réccurentes ont participé a un suivit de navigabilité qui n'a pas été a la hauteur de l'exceptionnelle technologie qui a permis la réalisation du projet Concorde

Lyman

30th Nov 2012, 20:09

I was passing through Reno some years ago when a friend told me Concorde would be taking off. I went to the ObDeck and fell in love. What a thing of beauty. The lines, the attitude, the NOISE.....

She was and always will be an exquisite symbol of how beauty and performance are sometimes living in the same soul.

She was betrayed, horribly, and obscenely, by political idiots and posturing simpletons. Maintenance and operations got lax, and applied to a stunning and challenging platform, the results were inevitable.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

30th Nov 2012, 20:15

Lyman. I was right with you until your last sentence, to which I answer "not on this side of the Channel, mate!" ;)

Lyman

30th Nov 2012, 20:26

My extreme bad, sir...

I was thinking it as I wrote, and forgot to write it.

topoverhaul

30th Nov 2012, 21:08

I'm with Donnlass, the cause of the high drag configuration was as a result of rotating early as the aircraft left the side of the runway due to the drag of the mis aligned gear.. This low speed could have been flown out of with the power available but when the FE shut down number 2, which had been affected by the fuel tank surge, before obtaining any confirmation from another crew member, the fate was sealed. As always an accident only results when lots of small factors line up and allow an undesired outcome to prevail.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

30th Nov 2012, 23:52

The other effect of the FE shutting down no.2 when it was still producing power was to disable the 'green' hysdraulic system (driven from engines 1 & 2; no.1 had already failed). With no 'green' system, the u/c could not be retracted adding greatly to the drag.

The shutting down of no.2 was probably the single worst thing the crew did (would you shut down a power-producing engine with one already out, past V1, and the aeroplane nor yet airbourn but committed?).

That's if you don't count the downwind t/o, overweight, and overfull fuel tanks (so no air gap to be compressed if the tank gets clouted by, say, a bit of burst tyre). That's why the tank ruptured (from inside, by a hydraulic overpressure).

ATC Watcher

1st Dec 2012, 10:01

SSD : I always wondered why he did this. Surely in the Sim emergency situations training one learns particular scenarii and engine fire must have been one of them .
So why , in the real emergency situation, the brain would do something different , and potentially fatal, as you explained here?
Was the Concorde training or drills different that any other 3-crew Type in this situation ?
I doubt it , but do not know.
Has this happenend before on other types ? ( old FEs here may know )
I'd love to understand .

The 2 cases that I can recall where the FEs did similar actions , were the China 747SP over Pacific, and the Aeromexico DC10 over France , but both were following high vibrations, not fire.

dalek

1st Dec 2012, 10:05

For those interested in this subject
THE CONCORDE SERIES OF LECTURES
A Companion Guide by Pete Finlay makes interesting reading.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

1st Dec 2012, 10:11

Where can they be obtained, dalek?

UPP

1st Dec 2012, 17:59

To Lyman:

I used to live in South London, directly under the flightpath. Every now and then a Concorde would come over. The noise could be heard even if you were in your house with the TV on - it would only be at a few thousand feet by then.

In winter it was even better, with the powerful light stabbing into the darkness.

As far as I know, no-one ever complained about the noise; we all just looked up and stared in wonder at this beautiful thing in the air.

I actually built some of the components used, so I suppose I had a sort of proprietorial connection, along with thousands of other people, and it still saddens me to this day that she is no longer around.

Taras B

1st Dec 2012, 18:20

I once worked as a butler for a family who lived in the New Forest near Southampton.

One rainy day, the Concorde flew nearby and I experienced a mild sonic boom. I happened to be standing in the kitchen at the time, preparing tea. The shock wave traveled through the thatch roof of the cottage and struck a lone rose I had placed in a vase a few day's prior. All the flower petals gently fluttered to the ground.

It was a surreal, "Rosebud..."-type moment.

CITIZEN KANE - Rosebud - YouTube

driftdown

1st Dec 2012, 18:38

@ UPP

I used to live near Epsom and for years when home on leave I would be out in the garden watching for Concorde flying overhead around 1700H. Beautiful to watch.

I was driving around the perimeter road one night and thought something had fallen of the car, unknown vibration etc, could not figure out what it was until I saw Concorde rotating all lit up. A stunning, stunning view.

It is shocking that BA did everything right and yet she was grounded without much, seemingly, in the way of protest. Really was the service losing money etc or did other factors (??) come into play?

UPP

1st Dec 2012, 19:03

Not an expert on that subject. All I know is that, as stated above, on this side of the Channel we all did our bit as best as we were able, with PRIDE in the fact that it was Concorde we were working on. Go to any engineering company in the land that worked on her, and you'll get the same answer.

So it didn't happen at that level.

Once BAe withdrew as the manufacturer, that meant Concorde was automatically grounded forever. And the grandstanding from the bearded one, saying that his firm would take over was nauseating, since he knew full well that without a manufacturer future flights were impossible.

Could she have been kept flying? Yes, if she still had a manufacturer. Given the way tech marches forward these days there could even have been a Concorde II developed entirely inside computers, and then eventually realized. But the manufacturer wanted out - even destroying jigs to make sure there couldn't be a reprieve - and there's only ever one reason why a company with shareholders wants to stop doing something; MONEY.

Perhaps someone else can tell you that side of it, I certainly can't.

I'm sure the answer will be to be with recession, not enough people wanting to pay premium to fly like that, etc. To me that's b******s. Every day there are more millionaires in the world than there were the day before, and more money in the world than there was the day before.

But I think that the only way this could be done again is if a seriously rich individual (and there's plenty of people with more money that a small country these days) said 'I love aviation, I love technology, there will be lots of spin-offs to make money from along the way - think NASA -, and then said 'F**k it, lets do this'. It would take the drive and determination of someone like Bill Gates.

Believe me, the engineering companies up and down the land would jump straight to orbit with delight. Not so much for the money, but the idea that they can once again be involved in working out how to make something as special and beautiful as Concorde.

What a thrill it would be to be able to look into the sky when one flies overhead and tell all around you 'we did that'.

Lyman

1st Dec 2012, 19:06

You guys must be so proud, my awe has not lessened with time.

Concorde defies description. A technological marvel, or a work of timeless and artistic sculpture?

To be treated so badly by Air France and the politicians. I cannot believe there is insufficient interest in recommission.

Her roar is for the ages.....

best....

Shaggy Sheep Driver

1st Dec 2012, 19:14

Beardy wanted two things; for the public to believe he was twarted by BA from keeping Concorde flying, and for the fleet to go into retirement with his airline logo on the side rather than BA's. He succeeded in the first, but thankfully failed in the second.

But what a marketing guy! To this day on our Concorde tours almost everyone who has no industry knowledge truly think he could have saved it 'if they'd have let him'.

What a star he is! He didn't have to spend a cent, yet he's gone down in history among the great unwashed as the man who could have kept Concorde flying if it wasn't for nasty old BA thwarting him!

Lyman

1st Dec 2012, 19:24

Rutan. Is there another way to see it?

UPP

1st Dec 2012, 19:27

'To this day on our Concorde tours almost everyone who has no industry knowledge truly think he could have saved it 'if they'd have let him'. '

Absolutely. And I go straight to orbit in a different way whenever anyone mentions that within my hearing, and disabuse them of that notion double quick.

BA really looked after her, treating her like the royalty she was.

Concorde tours? You're involved? It's a weird thing, but I've climbed over several UK Concordes during their flying days, and my mother got one of those Bay of Biscay flights as a present once, but I have never actually stepped inside one. Ridiculous, isn't it?!

I must remedy that one day, because I can't show the family some of the things I did without going into the cockpit, and the other things are in the engines, and not visible.

BEagle

1st Dec 2012, 20:05

I'm still convinced that, had Thatcher still been PM instead of that dreadful little Bliar, both the French president and CEO of Airbus would have been invited over for a stand-up handbagging session at No.10......

Concorde was killed by French arrogance, complacency and incompetence. As was AF447. Any airline whose senior captain turns a gallic shrug to RTOW requirements and announces "Top!" (that stupid French thing) when 5 tonnes outside scheduled performance limits is one with whom I will never fly.

Incidentally, it was well known that Sir Richard Branson once said that the only thing he envied about ba was Concorde. A sentiment I share.

UPP

1st Dec 2012, 20:05

@Lyman

'A technological marvel, or a work of timeless and artistic sculpture?'

Well, obviously the tech side could be vastly improved these days in Concorde II.

But as for the shape, she isn't just a work of timeless and artistic sculpture; she is timeless because the laws of physics don't change. She is the perfect example of form following function, or maths in action, if you will. She is the shape that she is because the laws of physics dictate that shape. Whoever said mathmatics isn't beautiful?!

Concorde II would be more or less that shape (I hope), but with lots of twitchy little control surfaces responding in the blink of an eye to circumstances, and you would feel as if you were in a living, breathing animal!

As for AF, well, I wasn't going to mention that!

@Shaggy
'......and for the fleet to go into retirement with his airline logo on the side rather than BA's.'

Hadn't thought of that. Obviously he had. Glad it didn't happen. If she was going to be retired, at least it should be with the logo of the people who actually looked after her.

@Beagle
I have the honour to deal professionally on a weekly basis with a scientist who had the ear of Mrs T when she was still PM. The scientist made proposals, got a severe grilling from Mrs T (herself a scientist, remember), and when she decided this was good stuff she gave lots of money to the project. And then she was ousted, and all the money vanished.

Yup, politics instead of sense. Mrs T would indeed have given them a handbagging. I'm sure a lot of us would have held her coat.

DaveReidUK

1st Dec 2012, 20:23

Concorde was killed by French arrogance, complacency and incompetence.

Quite so, and the fact that it was never remotely profitable.

beamender99

1st Dec 2012, 20:26

I once worked as a butler for a family who lived in the New Forest, Southampton.

One day, the Concorde flew nearby and I heard a gentle, but firm, sonic boom. Guess what, That was Air France ignoring the rules. Odd that!!!
I was working in Alderney with Aurigny at the airport, and on hearing the sonic boom, and the guys there said that it was common as AF, when travelling down the channel, ignored the rules and went supersonic earlier than they should.

A good friend of mine reported that the boom was also heard in Bracknell..
He was told that the sound in effect bounced of cloud formation thus extending the noise area.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

1st Dec 2012, 20:28

Quite so, and the fact that it was never remotely profitable.

That is not correct. BA made a great deal of money on Concorde ops.

It's true that the aeroplane did not pay for its development, and overall it was not a financial success, but the early costs having been written off it was a very profitable aeroplane. It would have made financial sense to keep in the air making profits.

Operating profits (at least in BA.... who knows about AF?) were a reason to keep it flying, not to ground it.

Wisden Wonder

2nd Dec 2012, 00:40

After 9/11 the passenger figures were low, a lot of top league business people died that day, and they flew Concorde. This had a major effect on the continued operation of the aircraft by British Airways. Reference the metal strip, I was informed that the repair was done in Israel, by a contract company for Continental, so were they responsible for the 'bodge job'? it can only be one of many mistakes that brought Concorde to an early demise, one beautiful aeroplane.

mini

2nd Dec 2012, 00:41

Beags, If Thatcher had been PM back in the 60's Concorde would never have happened.

Concorde was operated by companies that lived in the real world, it was killed by reality.

mini. Offspring of a Concorde design engineer, homestead adorned with pics, once was a BAC brat etc etc.

ATC Watcher

2nd Dec 2012, 06:16

Allow me the French side of the story : * (for the sake or arguments )
I understand the BA side of the story is quite different, but allow me nevertheless: .

Concorde was a project of another era :the goal (for France) was to demonstrate to the world that Europe was as good if not better than the USA in manufacturing airplanes. It was political decision to make it was not an economic one.
Forcing cooperation between States on top technologies to counter North American leadership was another one.
And basically you can say it worked on the long run. We have Airbus now, greatly thanks to the Concorde pioneers.

That is how France saw , and basically still sees the Concorde story. not to make money. never was,as De Gaulle said many times, it was, :" Le Prestige de la France "

Concorde was never a profitable aircraft and could never be , the small number made and the hugely expensive support men and machinery needed to manufacture spares for engines and mainframe was huge and coud only be done as the State was subsidinding and paying for this.
Air France did made money for some time with them, because they did not pay for anything . the aircrfat were fee , the maintenance subsidised, fuel was cheap .Load factors were in the low 50's but nobody cared . Opening lines like crazy Caracas, Dakar, Washington, Teheran,etc.. .
In the end years , fuel was expensive and only remained the US routes : first twice a day, then only a single New york daily. with 13 aircraft and 50 or so crews to do that .
Add a few charters ( 2-3 per month on average ) but that was it .
How can it be profitable ?

After the crash the load factors went down further, price of fuel went up , but also 9/11 hit badly . Technical problems too. Remember the Rudders ?
Many JFK-CDG AF flights were cancelled due tech and pax transfered by 747 instead,with not enough First class seats, poor marketing, poor PR, but that is typical AF .Reliability, delays and cancelations are a problem when you market speed.

If my memory is correct , it was when EADS said they will no longer guarantee the spares , that it sealed the fate of the aircraft . Whether this decision was political or purely EADS , I do not know. But everyone agreed at the time it was time to pull the plug. Including the general public in France . It felt like putting an old dog you loved to sleep. Did not like it, but necessary to avoid further suffereing.

That is in a nutshell how the French side sees the Concorde story.
But still with extreme pride to have build the aircraft ( of course you all know that for the average Frenchman Concorde , like Airbus are French aircraft ;)

pulse1

2nd Dec 2012, 07:46

I understand that the final nail in the French Concorde coffin was the another near disaster after the Paris crash. An AF Concorde made an emergency landing in Halifax with very little fuel. This was after shutting down one engine and then not noticing for too long that they were still losing fuel from that engine:

http://www.pprune.org/jet-blast/82079-af-concorde-unscheduled-landing-halifax.html

Following this, and another few incidents, AF could not take the risk of another Concorde disaster so they decided to ground it, and then went on to have a few disasters with other aircraft e.g AF477, Toronto B777.

I also understand that the French quoted BA £50M a year to maintain the design authority for the aircraft. This happened to exactly match the BA operating profit for Concorde, coincidence?

OPENDOOR

2nd Dec 2012, 12:47

stuckgear

2nd Dec 2012, 13:02

I have always thought Concorde was grounded after 9/11 due to pressure from the US government (remember the first proving flight following the refit turned back mid Atlantic on that day) because a high-jacked Concorde could out fly the US missile defense system.

A short diplomatic exchange along the lines of "ground Concorde and we'll give BA and AF some more routes or else..."

It did not make sense grounding an A/C that had a near perfect safety record and had just had millions spent making it even safer.

I have no evidence to back this up except the general paranoia that existed in the States following 9/11

From my understanding the aircraft was terminated operationally due to the inherent costs in the re-engining program and other modifications.

The fact that the TC was cancelled was nothing to do with costs, safety, or operability, just an assurance that no one else would be able to use one ever again.

stopping using an aircraft doesn't canx the TC, once the TC is canx it can never be flown again (outside of experimental with administrator approval) without undergoing the type certification process and meeting the requirements as set forth by the administering authority at the the time.

ATC Watcher

2nd Dec 2012, 13:57

Soemone just sent me this :
Something at least the French did right : they Powered the static SD :

BAC-Sud Aviation Concorde 213 F-BTSD> Musée de l'Air et de l'Espace - Site officiel (http://www.museeairespace.fr/?id=2959)
.

and for a bit of nostalgia , 1,5 min of demo of a unique feature :
Descente de nez Concorde F-BTSD Sierra Delta> Musée de l'Air et de l'Espace - Site officiel (http://www.museeairespace.fr/c/c/aerospatiale-bae-concorde-sierra-delta-213-f-btsd-air-france/nez/)

Capot

2nd Dec 2012, 15:40

Revenant a nos moutons, I would never claim to be an expert on this subject, but I know several who really are, and none is in any doubt that the start of the chain of events that led to the Paris catastrophe was the mechanics' failure to reassemble the undercarriage properly, ie leaving the spacer on the floor where it was found.

The evidence that the fire started before the SST reached the Continental piece of metal is, in their view, incontravertible.

This will never, ever be admitted in France and there is little point in going on about it. Unless, of course, you are facing a civil suit for very large sums.

Lyman

2nd Dec 2012, 18:35

There is a "Fine", and a civil suit. Who is plaintiff? At some point, the reality of the pre Titanium fire will foreclose further action. Counter suit? Dismissal with prejudice? 'Denial', a national credo for France? Non, non, toujours NONS.....

Sheesh

AlphaZuluRomeo

2nd Dec 2012, 20:13

This low speed could have been flown out of with the power available but when the FE shut down number 2, which had been affected by the fuel tank surge, before obtaining any confirmation from another crew member, the fate was sealed.
The low speed, maybe. But the BEA also estimated the fire intensity would have destroyed "soon enough" the left wing/control surfaces for the aircraft to be doomed anyway.

May I remind that, as per the BEA technical report:
- No strip = no accident; even with the tail wind, the (slight, given their calculations) overweight, the missing spacer... etc.
- OTOH, still as per the BEA report, once you include the titanium strip => tyre explosion => fuel leakage => fire into the scenario, then the aircraft is doomed, whatever anyelse. Even if she was not overweight, if the wind was head, if the #2 was kept running, and if the spacer was where it should have been.

And by the way: I'm nevertheless "happy" with the appeal, which seems more "honnest" in assessing responsabilities/faults. Indeed, I think AF/French authorities in general took "too lightly" some issues with the plane (namely: tyres, and the Michelin NZG fitted for the return to flight were an excellent thing). IIRC, the exact same scenario (rolling on the strip) with NZG tyres would not have had such catastrophic outcome.

I disregard the "pre-strip fire" reports, as those reports always were not precise enough to be relevant IMO (unless one wants to "make a story", of course ;)).
Capot, on that very topic, if you have any evidence/documentation (i.e. something more tangible that "every knowledgeable people know..."), I would be more than pleased to take them into account to, if needed, change my mind & be corrected. Indeed, why not try to answer BEA's "denegations", if the "truth" is so easy to demonstrate? (bearing in mind that once again, in my eyes selected testimonies of witnesses are not that conclusive). And I'm no expert either, I just can read & understand ;)

Shaggy Sheep Driver

2nd Dec 2012, 21:01

I, too, have my doubts about the 'fire before the metal strip' theories. Is there any hard evidence for it?

However, I do beleive that the other factors were 'holes in the cheese' and the metal strip was only the final one of those. I'd say 'no overfilled fuel tanks, no accident', as well, even with the tyre disintegration.

jcjeant

2nd Dec 2012, 21:31

I'd say 'no overfilled fuel tanks, no accident', as well, even with the tyre disintegration. Did the fuel tanks were overfilled when the Washington event happens (big leak of fuel .. multiple important holes) :confused:
And why no fire ?
Maybe it can be considered that for Gonesse .. it was some hot post for igniting the fuel (other than engines) .. and this can drive again to a problem with the gear (spacer) ?
Note that this particular plane (Washington event) was considered beyond repair
Ironically the replacement plane was the plane who crashed at Gonesse .... :uhoh:

AlphaZuluRomeo

3rd Dec 2012, 12:21

I, too, have my doubts about the 'fire before the metal strip' theories. Is there any hard evidence for it?
My point exactly. I believe the answer is "none". Keeping an open mind, I stand to be corrected, if need be.

However, I do beleive that the other factors were 'holes in the cheese' and the metal strip was only the final one of those. I'd say 'no overfilled fuel tanks, no accident', as well, even with the tyre disintegration.
Yep, I do agree. What I do not remember is if the #5 tank was overfilled? Or simply filled full as in standart/normal procedure at that phase of flight?
Will have to check... If any knowledgeable people comes around, don't hesitate to press that particular point :)
I notice §1.16.7.3 of the final report saying the #5 & #7 tanks were not used for the taxi, and were then "fully full" during T/O, and that "only" 21Kg of fuel from that #5 tank had been used at the moment of the said tank rupture.
In the same §, it it said the tank was at 94% full from the gate, and still at that value when the event occured. Interesting to note is the longitudinal acceleration effect, that led to the tank being considered as full in the physical sense when it ruptured.

Did the fuel tanks were overfilled when the Washington event happens (big leak of fuel .. multiple important holes) :confused:
And why no fire ?
As said above, I can't comment (at the moment) the overfilling or not of the tanks.
However, BEA said the two events were very different:
- Whashington '79, the tanks were punctured by several little/middle sized pieces, which led to (comparatively to CDG) small leaks (*), which didn't ignited (and weren't able to, given their flow rate)
- Gonesse 2000, the #5 tank was ruptured because of an hydrodynamic effect inside the tank, leading to the ejection of a large piece (320 x 320 mm) of the tank wall, and to a massive leak (**), able to ignite (and stay ignited in the airflow).

(*) "Dégonflement puis déchapage du pneu n° 6, entraînant l’éclatement du pneu n° 5, la destruction de la roue n° 5 et des perforations de petites dimensions des réservoirs 2, 5 et 6."
"La fuite de carburant résultant de toutes les perforations était de 4 kg/s."
Reference: Concorde accident final report, §1.16.4.2.1 "Evénement du 14 juin 1979 à Washington".
(**) estimated by 3 different means in §1.16.8.2: 60kg/s, 20-130kg/s, 60kg/s. Or more than an order of magnitude superior to the Washington leaks flow rate...

dalek

3rd Dec 2012, 12:29

AZR

Air France failed to produce the "Fuel Loading Sheet" and "Aircraft Loading Sheet". Documents that legally should have been retained.
So just how overweight and overfuelled the Aircraft was will remain a matter of speculation.

Lord Bracken

3rd Dec 2012, 12:39

CONF iture

3rd Dec 2012, 16:05

From the AF lawyer with the smile : "That spacer was useless anyway"

Not exactly clear since when designers add useless parts and weight on aircrafts ... ?

Shaggy Sheep Driver

3rd Dec 2012, 16:26

Before the France-trashing gets out of hand, it's worth remembering that France had the UK government over a barrel in the 1960s and stopped the project from being cancelled several times. So without them, there might not have been Concorde at all.

Actually you can thank Julian Amory for that (a Brit politician). He inserted the clause into the contract that committed both sides to meet the costs even they pulled out, because the Brits thought the French would renege. In fact it was Harold Wilson who wanted out!

And again worth remembering the contribution made by Airbus after the accident to get the aircraft back in the air.

It should never have been grounded. At least the BA ones shouldn't have been. They were using an improved tyre and following correct operating techniques.

You might also factor in the fact they wanted to divert engineering resource away from Concorde and towards the A380 which at that point was two years from first flight.

Indeed, so why not stick the price of maintenance up until it becomes unsustainable to keep the bird flying? Especially after AF had ducked out.

jcjeant

3rd Dec 2012, 16:30

From the AF lawyer with the smile : "That spacer was useless anyway"
Not exactly clear since when designers add useless parts and weight on aircrafts ... ? It is to be nicer :)
Concorde is a nice aircraft ....

AlphaZuluRomeo

3rd Dec 2012, 23:41

And again worth remembering the contribution made by Airbus after the accident to get the aircraft back in the air.
It should never have been grounded. At least the BA ones shouldn't have been. They were using an improved tyre and following correct operating techniques.
So, in your mind, a BA Concorde taking off - off course following correct operating techniques - and rolling on the (in)famous titanium strip would have been safe? :confused:
Why? In what way were BA tyres sufficiently improved (??) to be immune to that strip?
I'm aware the water deflector were better secured on BA fleet, but that's not the point. There was no NZG tyre on any Concorde in fleet at the time.
OTOH, BA & AF Concorde had numerous tyres bursts, not only in their first years of exploitation. In fact, from 1990 to the accident, 7 tyres events were recorded for each of the 2 companies.

Overall, AF certainly was more laxist than BA, given the recorded evidences (and others events), and for that the company (and the country) could be blamed.
But that's no sufficient reason to assess that BA Concorde were safer regarding to the danger of such a FOD on the runway.
Hence, while the problem was being worked on, I think grounding both fleets was a correct decision. Once again, I stand to be corrected if need be (keeping in mind that I suffer from a very Cartesian mind). :)

From the AF lawyer with the smile : "That spacer was useless anyway"

Not exactly clear since when designers add useless parts and weight on aircrafts ... ?

Of course the spacer had a raison-d'être. Now, lawyers being lawyers, if the absence of said spacer had no influence on the events, then you can say (being a lawyer, remember) that it was useless.
And what said the technical report about that topic? Let's see:
1.18.2.5 Study of the Beginning of the Flight
In theory, the absence of the spacer could have instigated an asymmetrical trajectory, tyre overheating and slower acceleration than normal. Study of the marks on the runway as well as calculations of the trajectory and acceleration made on the basis of the data from the flight recorders show that this was not the case:
• During the takeoff run, the aircraft would have had a tendency to deviate to the left if the left main landing gear had created abnormally high drag. However, its track was straight before the loss of thrust on engines 1 and 2 and there are no observable right rudder inputs. On the contrary, some slight actions to the left are even noticeable before V1.
• Such abnormally high drag could also have led to an abnormal use of the brakes during taxiing to get to the runway. However, the crew performed the pre-takeoff checklist and, in accordance with this, announced the brake temperature, which was 150°C (the temperature must exceed 220°C for there to be an alarm).
Furthermore, it was the same for the left and right bogies. The temperature of the brakes was therefore not at all abnormal.
• The acceleration recorded by the flight data recorder is 0.268 G, which is the normal value for the Concorde when it is at its maximum weight. Furthermore, 34 seconds after the beginning of the takeoff run, the aircraft had rolled 1,200 metres and reached a speed of 151 kt. At MTOW, and with conditions as on that day, the Concorde must roll 1.150 metres and reach a speed of 150 kt in 33 seconds.
Aircraft performance was thus entirely in accordance with the design values up until the damage to tyre No 2 by the metallic strip. Furthermore, takeoff
performance on the flights that preceded the accident (but after the bogie replacement work) was in accordance with published norms. There is no significant difference compared to takeoff performance on other Concordes.
• Up until the time the aircraft ran over the metallic strip, no remarks or reactions by the crew indicate any abnormal aircraft behaviour.
The first tyre marks noted on the runway after the accident were those of tyre No 2 after it was damaged by the metallic strip. There were no identifiable Concorde tyre marks before this point.
In addition, a change in bogie perpendicularity might have occurred, preventing gear retraction. As shown in paragraph 1.16.10, this did not happen.

In conclusion, nothing in the research undertaken indicates that the absence of the spacer contributed in any way to the accident on 25 July 2000.
.

jcjeant

4th Dec 2012, 00:24

In conclusion, nothing in the research undertaken indicates that the absence of the spacer contributed in any way to the accident on 25 July 2000. BEA is short of words ...
For a complete conclusion about the spacer problem .. this was to be add
"but however demonstrate the incompetence and lax of the Air France technical crew in charge of the Concorde maintenance"
Wonder if the chief of this technical crew (the one with the stamp) remained on the pay list of AF ...

stuckgear

4th Dec 2012, 07:31

Air France failed to produce the "Fuel Loading Sheet" and "Aircraft Loading Sheet". Documents that legally should have been retained.
So just how overweight and overfuelled the Aircraft was will remain a matter of speculation.

if the aircraft was overweight for T/O, it should never have begun its take off roll. ergo, then the metal strip is also irrelevent.

unusual that loading sheets, suddenly failed to be be produced. :suspect:

Shaggy Sheep Driver

4th Dec 2012, 08:51

AZR - no Zero Growth tyre, but an inmproved design over that then still being used by AF. But that's not the real reason I'd say BA was safe. The real reasons I think a BA Concorde running over the strip would have (probably - we can't be sure) have survived is because:

They'd have used an into-wind runway

The undercarriage would not be missing a vital component

It would not have been overweight

Most important of all, the tanks would not have been over-full (with no air gap to compress!)

In the event of engine damage, the FE would not have closed down a power-producing engine at that stage of flight

dalek

4th Dec 2012, 09:23

SSD

It may be different on Concorde but from my Military days the first priority was "fly the aircraft."
The FE should not have attempted to shut down anything until the aircraft was safely clear of the ground.

From my Tornado days. Engine Fire Warning at Rotate.

First action. Throttles (plural) to Combat Power.

AlphaZuluRomeo

4th Dec 2012, 11:40

AZR - no Zero Growth tyre, but an inmproved design over that then still being used by AF. But that's not the real reason I'd say BA was safe.
OK thanks :)

The real reasons I think a BA Concorde running over the strip would have (probably - we can't be sure) have survived is because:

They'd have used an into-wind runway
Granted, that's more than probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.

The undercarriage would not be missing a vital component
As demonstrated above, not vital. Argument dismissed.

It would not have been overweight
Granted, that's probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.

Most important of all, the tanks would not have been over-full (with no air gap to compress!)
I agree that this is the most important of all.
That leaves my question unanswered: what is the "normal" fullness of tank 5 on that phase of flight?
- if less than 94% (estimation of AF accident Concorde) then I'll accept that a BA Concorde (or any not "over-filled" Concorde) would have been safe;
- OTOH, if this tank was meant to be that full on perfectly normal operations, then the argument must be dismissed, and one can only conclude a BA (or any not "over-filled" Concorde) would not have been safe.
My understanding of BEA's final report §1.6.3 is that the "overfill" was in tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4. Not in tank 5.
The same § indicate there was a procedure for overfill, allowing up to 1630 liters. The accident aircraft used "only" 300 liters, less than 20% of the total overfill capacity.

In the event of engine damage, the FE would not have closed down a power-producing engine at that stage of flight
Granted, that's more than probable. But it won't have prevented the crash.

Now, my point is: as soon as the massive leak occured and took fire, the aircraft was doomed. No matter what the crew could do right or wrong (and AF personnal certainly did a number of mistakes on that day/a little before).
Then a BA Concorde rolling on the strip, if subject to the same "tank #5 fullness", would not have been safer than its AF counterpart.
Why? Because of the intensity of the fire, which was quickly destroying the left wing and its flight control surfaces. See chapter 1.12 of the final report, and particularly §1.12.2 (debris between the RWY and the crash site) and §1.12.4.6 (study: structure vs fire).

All that is by no mean an excuse for AF people mistakes (even if, of course, their lawyers will try to push that way), but what is important (IMO) is that the aircraft itself (and not AF aircrafts only) was subject to a high risk from specific FODs.
Such risk was assessed after the crash (new tyres "NZG" + liner in tanks), and I think Concorde was safer after 2003, and that the grounding of both fleets was the correct thing to do (another interim solution would have been to make runway inspection mandatory before each take-off, but I'm not sure it would have been practical?)

Shaggy Sheep Driver

4th Dec 2012, 11:44

It's not different for Concorde. Having spoken to many Concorde FEs, P1s, and P2s, they are increadulous that anyone would shut down an engine during take off, especially after V1 but before a safe rate of climb (or even lift-off in this case!) had been acheived. And even then, maybe they wouldn't depending on other factors!

CONF iture

4th Dec 2012, 14:00

Of course the spacer had a raison-d'être. Now, lawyers being lawyers, if the absence of said spacer had no influence on the events, then you can say (being a lawyer, remember) that it was useless.
Sorry, but his words leave no space to interpretation :
"The spacer appears to have no utility"
I would like to see him arguing with the engineering team who decided to put that spacer in the first place ...

I take note of the technical report quote.
In the meantime, let me quote the following :
The judicial authorities did not allow the AAIB investigators to be systematically involved in the examination of evidence.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

4th Dec 2012, 14:46

AZR - you cannot simply dismiss the downwind takeoff, the overweight, and especially the missing spacer as irrelevant to the crash. They were all factors, and if any one (never mind all) had been absent it might have changed the outcome. Especally the spacer (it wasn't designed by the manufacturer to be there just as added ballast!).

The overfilling of the tanks so that there was insufficient air space to allow some compression and therefore obviate the hydraulic overpressure is a crucial factor.

If the FE had not shut down No.2, they'd therefore have a lot more power and less drag as they'd have got the gear up. That might have enabled them to attempt some sort of landing (Perhaps at Le Bourget) before the wing burned through. Or the fire might have got them first. We'll never know.

Either way the inexplicable FE's action raises questions in one's mind about AF's operation of this complex and demanding airliner.

The post return-to-flight near loss of another Concorde (Halifax NS) and AF's decision shortly after that to ground their fleet reinforces that question.

I am confident, having spoken extensively to BA crews who express similar views to the above, that no such situation existed in that airline.

jcjeant

4th Dec 2012, 16:07

For documentation
Another analyze of the Concorde crash (unfortunately no translation in english)
Crash du Concorde: la loi de Murphy (http://enperspective.pagesperso-orange.fr/concorde.html)

Google translation :rolleyes:
Google*Traduction (http://translate.google.be/translate?sl=fr&tl=en&js=n&prev=_t&hl=fr&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&u=http%3A%2F%2Fenperspective.pagesperso-orange.fr%2Fconcorde.html&act=url)

Lyman

4th Dec 2012, 16:11

The conclusion the authority made in their report exudes a skill in legalese. It is conclusive, and defensive. This is not in the mission statement, and reminds one of the ad hoc release of a memorandum exonerating Airbus from "additional" mechanical issues with 447.

Be that as it may, the photography post crash shows me no aggressive abrasion from the concrete on the Strip. It is unlikely the strip pierced the tire, then encountered no further contact with the runway such that it was not grooved, and beaten up with extensive deformation. It looks rather pristine having survived what is proposed.

As to the spacer, i need to read some metallurgical forensics of both the axle and hub to conclude there was no result from a missing thrust bearing. I would be looking for signs of friction heat, loss of surface metal, etc.

If the lawyer concluded the spacer was redundant, unnecessary, then there would need to be proof of same. Not so sure the fire might not have originated with sparks from the 'H' frame, or Hub..... How is it the tires were recovered intact, were they thrown clear of the fireball?

AlphaZuluRomeo

4th Dec 2012, 17:07

Sorry, but his words leave no space to interpretation
If your read precisely what I wrote, you must have noted that I'm not trying to justify the lawyer's words. In fact, I'm not interested in lawyers fights.
I'm concerned, however, about aviation safety.
One can say (and be right about it): BA was more serious about procedures than AF.
One cannot stretch to the point of saying: BA aircrafts were not at risk.

I take note of the technical report quote.
In the meantime, let me quote the following :
Yep, I know that last quote too. What about the entire chapter? The comment from the BEA about that point is interesting, too:
BEA Comment: after an aircraft accident in France a judicial inquiry, separate from the technical investigation, is usually conducted by one or more examining magistrates. The constraints of this procedure did not, however, prevent the BEA from carrying out a full investigation, in association with its foreign counterparts. The BEA nevertheless regrets the difficulties encountered by the AAIB investigators and their advisers.

AZR - you cannot simply dismiss the downwind takeoff, the overweight, and especially the missing spacer as irrelevant to the crash. They were all factors, and if any one (never mind all) had been absent it might have changed the outcome.
It's not me who dismisses anything. I do no more than quoting the BEA, here. And my reading of the BEA final report is precisely that: those "factors" being absent would not have changed the outcome.
Of course, you can always argue that "we'll never know for sure", and be right about that. But that's not my point.
My point is the strip/tyre interaction alone was enough to put the aircraft at risk. Be it an AF incorrectly operated Concorde or a BA perfectly operated one. Hence the grounding of both fleets was justified (and both countries certifications authorities could be regarded as guilty for not having exiged modifications sooner, if one wants to stretch the point).

May I aslo remind what was the first Preliminary Recommendation following the accident? (my bold)
Consequently, without prejudice to further evidence that may come to light in the course of the investigation, the BEA and the AAIB recommend to the Direction Générale de I'Aviation Civile of France and the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom that:
• the Certificates of Airworthiness for Concorde be suspended until appropriate measures have been taken to guarantee a satisfactory level of safety with regard to the risks associated with the destruction of tyres.
Ref: §4.1 of the final report, reproducing Preliminary Recommendation from earlier interim report.

The overfilling of the tanks so that there was insufficient air space to allow some compression and therefore obviate the hydraulic overpressure is a crucial factor.
I'll say it again: Until proven wrong, I consider that the #5 tank was full (94% = full) but not overfilled as per the BEA report.
What's more is that an overfill procedure existed (was approved, I assume) and F-BTSC was fueled according to that procedure. Once again, if that procedure is deemed wrong, then surely it applies to both countries/companies aircrafts.

I am confident, having spoken extensively to BA crews who express similar views to the above, that no such situation existed in that airline.
I don't share that confidence regarding the specific and very important issue of the #5 tank filling, as written above.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

4th Dec 2012, 18:08

AZR, you seem to saying that 'the BEA report says XYZ, so XYZ was the cause'. I think a few of us on this side of the channel, including perhaps our own AAIB, would't consider that BEA report even good enough to be used as bog paper!

jcjeant

4th Dec 2012, 18:49

Consequently, without prejudice to further evidence that may come to light in the course of the investigation, the BEA and the AAIB recommend to the Direction Générale de I'Aviation Civile of France and the Civil Aviation Authority of the United Kingdom that:
• the Certificates of Airworthiness for Concorde be suspended until appropriate measures have been taken to guarantee a satisfactory level of safety with regard to the risks associated with the destruction of tyres. This is a very good recommendation indeed
Unfortunately, this recommendation would be made already after the Washington incident
This neglect or lax of BEA was paid cash at Gonesse

AlphaZuluRomeo

4th Dec 2012, 21:54

AZR, you seem to saying that 'the BEA report says XYZ, so XYZ was the cause'.
Yep, that's it. Until proven otherwise, of course: Errare humanum est, BEA is composed of human beings (I think). ;)
It's not about blind confidence, it's because the report is the most detailled work about the accident I've come across to, and because its conclusions seem accurate & logical (damn my Cartesian mind, once again).
Now, if you want to convince me that BA's Concorde were safe and should not have been grounded following the 2000 AF accident, there is a simple thing to do: to demonstrate that BA's Concorde never took off with 94% full #5 tank (or that RWYs were inspected/wipped before every such take-off).

I think a few of us on this side of the channel (...) would't consider that BEA report even good enough to be used as bog paper!
I'm aware of that. My problem is when those people - from whatever side of whatever sea/border/planet (we have such people here too) - fail to bring anything consistent (in my eyes) to support their theories. So far, I acknowledge question marks alot, but few (if any) definite/hard evidences answers.

(...) including perhaps our own AAIB (...)
Uh? I'm not aware of the AAIB having such a negative PoV about the whole report. Remarks they made, yes. Some specific points of analysis differed, and were dully noted. But disagreement on the facts or conclusions/recommendations?

BTW, I feel useful to also remind that I'm perfectly OK with your comment here:
The court has rightly pointed the finger of blame for Paris back where it belongs.
Yes indeed. Whatever specific role the (in)famous titanium strip played on this sad day of summer 2000, that should not be an excuse to forget or dismiss AF (french) other faults/mistakes when operating that wonderful aircraft. It feels right that the court - finally - acknowledged that. :)
Nor should OTOH those other - and numerous - faults/mistakes be an excuse to forget or dismiss the inherent risk (which is no more french/AF than british/BA or Kinglon for that matter) of the strip/tyre/tank interaction.

This is a very good recommendation indeed
Unfortunately, this recommendation would be made already after the Washington incident.
This neglect or lax of BEA was paid cash at Gonesse
Even with the intense political pressures at that time, recommendations were made after Washington. And after other occurences, in both AF & BA fleets.
What wasn't "imagined" is the massive leak resulting from the 2000 specific scenario (it was significatively different from the Washington and other incidents, as already said here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/501620-concorde-crash-continental-airlines-cleared-france-court-3.html#post7553552)). Measures were not taken to contervene an unkown risk. Is it a fault? A neglect? Perhaps.
Perhaps it's also a bit "too easy" to say so... afterwards. :rolleyes:

jcjeant

4th Dec 2012, 23:03

Measures were not taken to contervene an unkown riskYou are kidding I suppose ?
Leaks of fuel are unkown risk ?
Fuel is not a combustible ?
Fuel can't burn ?
Check the Concorde design
F.O tanks , gear and engines locations .. and you will understand why the risk was know already when for the first time the Concorde shows his Achilles heel ( tires )
On the many other incidents .. this was a luck factor working
You can't expect this will work fine everytime ...

AlphaZuluRomeo

5th Dec 2012, 00:25

Straw man argument, jcjeant. :ugh:
I would appreciate that you do not stretch what I wrote until the point of putting words in my mouth that aren't mine. Thanks :)

Leaks of fuel are unkown risk ?
Fuel is not a combustible ?
Fuel can't burn ?
Can't planes crash? It's a known risk, after all.
Should we ground them all and drive/sail instead?
Oh, wait, aren't car and boat also prone to accidents, sometimes?

I'm certainly not kidding, simply recalling that the BEA indicates that the leak was so massive in Gonesse that It was unheard of. You may check this by comparing the description of the 2000 accident and the list of previous tyre-related events, also available in the 2000 accident report.

Now, is that to say I think the actions taken after Washington (and other occurences, some of them concerning BA planes) were enough? Of course not: Gonesse sadly proved that. But my judgment is biased here, because I know about Gonesse, as we all do. That's my point: it's a bit easier to say "I was sure about that"... afterwards.

Is that to say that I pretend Concorde's Achilles heel (the tyres, indeed) was unknown? Of course not. Best proof of that is that the solutions implemented between 2000 and 2003 weren't "discovered" after Gonesse: The kevlar liner had been studied years before. The reinforced tyres too (even if NZG technology perhaps wasn't available at the time).

I too, presented with the facts, first ask myself "why wasn't anything done?"
Then I check, and discover that recommendations were made, implemented (and I assume: deemed sufficient, even if history prooved otherwise) on both sides of the Channel, despite the fact that the severity of some (if not many) events had been reduced/hidden at first for "political" reasons.
-> It's wrong to pretend nothing was done (as in so many media reports).
-> It's wrong to pretend only one side of the Channel was at risk in 2000, even given the fact that safety records (accidents & incidents) show that AF was (and sadly surely still is) far more casual, even laxist, about flight safety than BA.

Exemple: Yes, it took AF 15 more years than BA (1981->1996) to stop using retread tyres. No, I'm not satisfied to learn that (among other things). But stopping using them in '96 didn't prevent Gonesse accident 4 years later.

Lyman

5th Dec 2012, 00:49

From BEA

"• During the takeoff run, the aircraft would have had a tendency to deviate to the left if the left main landing gear had created abnormally high drag. However, its track was straight before the loss of thrust on engines 1 and 2 and there are no observable right rudder inputs. On the contrary, some slight (rudder) actions to the left are even noticeable before V1."

If the spacer was responsible for alignment and bearing, its absence would initially create less rolling drag on the left side of the a/c; this would explain the left ruddering on the initial roll..... Seemingly innocuous, this may have set up an uncoordinated ruddering later, after the carriage problem was enhanced by the loss of the tire. Any slewing would have exacerbated the tire damage. Was this addressed? Was there no evidence of axle slop causing shimmy in the tire/hub? Prior to blowout?

Phalanger

5th Dec 2012, 03:32

The question should not be who dropped the titanium, but rather if it was reasonable to expect that the concord would never come in contact with such materials on the runway given their use in aviation, and how the design was built to survive such a contact or procedures to avoid such events occurring.

A critical question seems to be if the aircraft was so susceptible to debris on the runway then why was an inspection not mandated before each movement. This was not the first time material had caused issues for the aircraft, and other factors combined did push it beyond the limits.

To believe that a commonly used metal would not appear on a runway during the life time of the use of this aircraft was a massive assumption. Many aircraft in the past have impacted such objects.

Lyman

5th Dec 2012, 03:38

The strip was not commonly used, it was a scrap piece sculpted to replace a piece of metal with more forgiving wear characteristics. It is extremely important who dropped it, how it came to be affixed to the DC -10, and how its sloppy work as a certified repair was passed, for flight.

Imho.

Phalanger

5th Dec 2012, 03:40

That does not answer if one can assume that a material of that type will never appear on the runway.

Lyman

5th Dec 2012, 03:46

It was attached with rivets, I believe, and sloppily done. The aluminum ordinarily used would almost certainly not have pierced Concorde's tire. A certified part would have performed to an expectation. The pirated Titanium was not suitable.

That leaves everyone involved in its attachment liable for a portion of responsibility in the crash. Regardless when, or even IF, it pierced the tire.

Wrong means wrong, and carelessness and shortcuts never ever pay.

Phalanger

5th Dec 2012, 03:52

Lyman

5th Dec 2012, 03:55

The question is answered. What lacks is a judgment call.

BTW, I am in complete agreement:

"This was not the first time the tyres of the Concorde has damage from impact, nor the first time this type of metal had been found on a runway. It was not unreasonable for them to foresee such an occurrence. It was negilant to operate an aircraft in such a manner knowing it was susceptible to this issue but not take action to avoid it."

jcjeant

5th Dec 2012, 06:30

Hi,

Now, is that to say I think the actions taken after Washington (and other occurences, some of them concerning BA planes) were enough? Of course not: Gonesse sadly proved that. But my judgment is biased here, because I know about Gonesse, as we all do. That's my point: it's a bit easier to say "I was sure about that"... afterwards.Have you seen the state of the Concorde after the Washington incident ?
Photos are available
Check the state of the wing ....
He was so damaged that it was decided not to fix it !
There was no need to know the Gonesse accident to determine what to do immediately
In fact after Washington .. it was made nothing for avoid that the next time it was a gear problem .. the wings (and more important .. the F.O tanks) be pierced
The Washington event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and no fire and no victims (good luck)
The Gonesse event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and fire and victims (bad luck)
Before Gonesse ... Concorde was a lucky plane
Luck is not a safety factor .. and this was "discovered" !!! at Gonesse !
After Gonesse .. they put Kevlar in place
Maybe some have misinterpreted the first part of this Amundsen quote
Victory awaits him,who as everythings in order.
Luck we call it.
Defeats is definitely due for him,who has neglected to take the necessary precautions.
Bad luck we call it.

CliveL

5th Dec 2012, 06:59

Have you seen the state of the Concorde after the Washington incident ?
Photos are available
Check the state of the wing ....
He was so damaged that it was decided not to fix it !

Not true - it (#209) was repaired and flew back to Paris three months later and remained in service until 2003.

AlphaZuluRomeo

5th Dec 2012, 08:46

The question is still not answered. It does not matter if it came from this mistake, an engine defect, another vehicle around the airport, blown into the grounds etc. The designers of the aircraft and the operating procedure for the aircraft must take into account the chance of the occurrence. Materials of this type have been, and will be, found on the runway. The aircraft must be designed to either survive such occurrences or methods implemented to stop them occuring.
100% agreed.

This was not the first time the tyres of the Concorde has damage from impact, nor the first time this type of metal had been found on a runway. It was not unreasonable for them to foresee such an occurrence. It was negilant to operate an aircraft in such a manner knowing it was susceptible to this issue but not take action to avoid it.
Yes.
But as I noticed in my previous posts, "Not taking action to avoid it" is not what occured.
"Not taking action efficient enough about the whole problem" would be a correct/honnest description about what occured.
It's not a judgement. It's facts.

The Washington event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and no fire and no victims (good luck)
The Gonesse event is pierced F.O tank and fuel leak and fire and victims (bad luck)
Good luck/Bad luck: Yes.

Is that all? Are you sure the analysis should stop here? In the next Café du Commerce, maybe.
I for myself feel more confortable with a more torough analysis. And I'm not trying to find "excuses" for AF/French by doing so, whatever you may (seem to) think. It's of no use to try to convince me that AF/French side did wrong, I'm already convinced of that, thank you :)
What about other incidents/accidents from both AF & BA planes, involving tyres events & fuel leakages? Why "only" concentrate on Washington '79? Because it was the first/most impressive? Or because it suits the view that (all) the wrong doings lie on only the east side of some narrow sea? :rolleyes:

"It's not me, it the other". Oh yeah. Sure. (that partly true; but partly only).

Phalanger

5th Dec 2012, 08:57

But as I noticed in my previous posts, "Not taking action to avoid it" is not what occured.
"Not taking action efficient enough about the whole problem" would be a correct/honnest description about what occured.
I understand this view, but I would class it as not taking action to avoid it if it did not rectify the issue. Illusionary solutions are not actions to avoid it.

AlphaZuluRomeo

5th Dec 2012, 09:15

I understand your view, too.
But without hindsight, how can one judge a solution as efficient or illusionary?

Phalanger

5th Dec 2012, 12:39

It would be from the view point of a reasonable person in that situation with those expertise. So if they could reasonable see that something else could be done without an excessive burden, like a runway inspection, lining the tanks, not filling too high then that would be an example. But that's common law examples.

jcjeant

5th Dec 2012, 12:55

not trying to find "excuses" for AF/French by doing soNothing to do with AF or BA
AF will make nothing (as other) if they are not constrained by the demands of regulators
Why "only" concentrate on Washington '79? Because it was the first/most impressive? Or because it suits the view that (all) the wrong doings lie on only the east side of some narrow sea? Because BEA produced a report about this event .. and some recommendations .. but certainly not enough (they don't bother of the wings F.O tanks fragility and exposure)
http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/1979/f-fc790614/pdf/f-fc790614.pdf
BEA - DGAC - and other regulators involved have not enacted binding recommendations
They introduced thus the luck as safety factor
Luck work fine ... for a limited time gap .. you can not always win the lotto
At Gonesse they no longer had the winning numbers
Nevertheless, all were cleared by the justice
Encouragement to continue business as usual

AlphaZuluRomeo

5th Dec 2012, 13:57

Nothing to do with AF or BA
AF will make nothing (as other) if they are not constrained by the demands of regulators
Two points:
1/ I didn't wrote "AF", I wrote "AF/French". That was meant to include the french part of the manufacturer, the french regulator, the french accident board...
2/ Doesn't AF publicly say that flight safety is their highest priority? In the discourse at least, they are concerned, and should therefore self-constrain.

In general, jcjeant, you seem to miss my point(s), therefore making the conversation digress/diverge. I cannot see how to explain it better. Perhaps would it be better if I posted it in french? I can do that (by MP), feel free to ask :)

CONF iture

6th Dec 2012, 18:24

Yep, I know that last quote too. What about the entire chapter?
The entire chapter is eloquent ...

The AAIB was kept away from the evidences
The judicial affected the technical
But the BEA still pretends everything is normal

The French judicial authorities did not allow the AAIB Investigators to examine all items of the wreckage or to participate in component examinations.
The section “AAIB Participation in the Investigation” reflects the concerns with the manner in which the French judicial authorities affected the technical investigation.
The constraints of this procedure did not, however, prevent the BEA from carrying out a full investigation, in association with its foreign counterparts.

AlphaZuluRomeo

6th Dec 2012, 22:13

I agree with your first two points.
Not with your third, for 2 reasons:
- a quote from the BEA: "The BEA nevertheless regrets the difficulties encountered by the AAIB investigators and their advisers." => That doesn't feel like "all is normal" to me.
- two quotes from the AAIB: "Co-operation between the BEA and the AAIB enabled the AAIB to make an effective contribution to the investigation."
"In other areas [than the judicial 'blockade'], whilst the UK Accredited Representative and his Advisors agree with the evidence presented in the BEA report, the comments represent differences in the weighting of the conclusions."

Conclusions?
- The implementation of the French system of "2 parallel inquiries" was (far) too rigourous and inappropriate in 2000. This implementation was in contradition with international agreements. Clearly, that left room for improvment regarding full cooperation with foreign technical teams. Such improvments will show more transparency and consenquently less room for critics/accusations of partiality. (*)
- Now, was the situation so dark, in 2000, that the BEA report should be discarted as incorrect/partial in its entirety? (**) The AAIB didn't go that far, quite the contrary. On some specific points, the view of the AAIB differs from the view of the BEA. Those differences have been dully reported by the BEA. As such, the public has access to those comments (transparency: here at least, it's good), and is able to find that the AAIB agrees with the general scenario, e.g.: "This made it clear that the tank rupture had resulted from the effects of the tyre rupture." and "The evidence presented in the BEA report makes it clear that the fuel release, initiated when Fuel Tank 5 ruptured, had ignited within about 1 second of the rupture."

(*) It is my belief that improvments regarding transparency was notable since then (e.g. AF447). Kudos on that point: lesson was learned.

(**) It is legitimate to ask the question: after all, there certainly was a lot of tentation for some people/organisations to be interested only in covering their a**es, as is always the case in such events.

In short: My position?
- Transparency is the best cure against skepticism.:ok:
- Impartiality is the best course to counter partiality.:ok:

DozyWannabe

8th Dec 2012, 00:10

In short: My position?
- Transparency is the best cure against skepticism.:ok:
- Impartiality is the best course to counter partiality.:ok:

Agree totally (and with the rest of your post)

- a quote from the BEA: "The BEA nevertheless regrets the difficulties encountered by the AAIB investigators and their advisers." => That doesn't feel like "all is normal" to me.

Well, quite! And publishing that remark was about the limit of what they could do. Their remit is strictly defined in terms of technical/human factors accident investigation - neither does it extend to passing public comment on other (e.g. judicial) aspects of the case (unless explicitly asked to do so), nor should it.

- two quotes from the AAIB: "Co-operation between the BEA and the AAIB enabled the AAIB to make an effective contribution to the investigation."
"In other areas [than the judicial 'blockade'], whilst the UK Accredited Representative and his Advisors agree with the evidence presented in the BEA report, the comments represent differences in the weighting of the conclusions."

Again - like the BEA, the AAIB are essentially a branch of the civil service and would have been well aware that their Gallic colleagues' hands were tied on the matter - just as it would have been had the roles been reversed.

HumaidDaPlane

8th Dec 2012, 01:46

Something does not look right, if there was a scrap of titanium regardless of where it came from there should have been a quick runway check as is now a common practice in airport's today if this had been carried out then could it still be possible that the concorde would remain in the skies to day? I don't know about you all but when a fully laden fuel chugging aircraft capable of going-over the speed barrier is taking off on constant acceleration maybe some extra precautions would have helped. Anyway most aircraft incidents start off as small mistakes on the ground.

DozyWannabe

8th Dec 2012, 02:48

Something does not look right, if there was a scrap of titanium regardless of where it came from there should have been a quick runway check as is now a common practice in airport's today

Not after every departure there isn't. Prior to every Concorde depatture might have worked, but still - the systems failure exposed by this accident was not fully understood, and even if it were the application of such a procedure could well have harmed passenger confidence in the type.

if this had been carried out then could it still be possible that the concorde would remain in the skies to day?

Possibly, but definitely not for much longer. The truth is that operating the type was incredibly expensive to start with - and even with BA's operation able to turn a profit, the increase in fuel costs over the last decade combined with the dwindling supply of spare parts would have rendered her obsolete well before the airframes became unserviceable. I admit and accept this reality despite being a huge fan of the aircraft (I watched the last three flights pass over Battersea Park where I was working at the time and felt a lump in my throat and a wrench in my gut as each one passed).

She may have been able to temporarily survive any one of the aftermath of the accident, the rise in oil prices or the slump in executive air travel post 9/11, but there was no way she could survive all three.

DaveReidUK

8th Dec 2012, 09:42

if there was a scrap of titanium regardless of where it came from there should have been a quick runway check as is now a common practice in airport's today

Hmmm. So there should be a runway check if there's debris on the runway ? That doesn't make sense.

jcjeant

8th Dec 2012, 19:05

Hmmm. So there should be a runway check if there's debris on the runway ? That doesn't make sense. The original poster has simply poorly worded his sentence (bad syntax)
If there was a check of the runway before takeoff of the Concorde Titanium piece was discovered
But there was no such inspection .. and there were three options
1 No one piece of Titanium (nothing can happens)
2 Piece of Titanium and tire does not touch (luck)
3 Piece of Titanium and tire passes on (bad luck)
Luck is not a safety factor

HumaidDaPlane

8th Dec 2012, 20:20

I understand that you have picked out an error in my comment thank you for pointing this out as I meant to say that even in regular runway check ups whether Concorde was to take off or be a regional jet the fact that debris on the runway is hazardous in every situation that occurs on a runway and therefore a runway check should have been made.

But the point I am trying to get at is that aircraft safety on the ground is as every bit as important as it is on approach take off cruise etc... The Concorde had been accident free for around 30 years it's a shame that it's only accident had triggered the chain of events leading to the demise of concorde.

CONF iture

8th Dec 2012, 23:30

the AAIB agrees with the general scenario
Based strictly on what they have been given to examine.
But as they were "severely restricted" in their access to the evidences ...

(*) It is my belief that improvments regarding transparency was notable since then (e.g. AF447). Kudos on that point: lesson was learned.
So transparent that the Judge withold data from the proceedings.

Transparency is the best cure against skepticism.
Where is it then ... ?

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2012, 08:51

The original poster has simply poorly worded his sentence (bad syntax)

No, not simply a grammatical error. As the poster has subsequently confirmed, he is suggesting a runway inspection prior to every takeoff:

as I meant to say that even in regular runway check ups whether Concorde was to take off or be a regional jet the fact that debris on the runway is hazardous in every situation that occurs on a runway and therefore a runway check should have been made

No airport could possibly function with a requirement to check the runway between every departure.

jcjeant

9th Dec 2012, 11:15

No airport could possibly function with a requirement to check the runway between every departure. OK I take good notice
So as it is commercially impossible and thus for economic reasons there is a general agreement to allow aircraft taking off even with objects on the runway that could cause a serious accident
From a commercial point of view it is indeed a good point of raisonement .. since the "Concorde case" occurs rarely and therefore it is profitable in terms of insurance costs that could result (in case of "bad luck")
Safety first as usual .. with "luck added"

donnlass

9th Dec 2012, 11:23

Safety first make sure all parts removed from the aircraft e.g spacers are replaced in the right order.

jcjeant

9th Dec 2012, 11:28

Safety first make sure all parts removed from the aircraft e.g spacers are replaced in the right order. Indeed, it is the first link in the chain ..( as other pieces)
A chain has several links .. so let us be sure this no other in bad condition

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2012, 12:46

So as it is commercially impossible and thus for economic reasons there is a general agreement to allow aircraft taking off even with objects on the runway that could cause a serious accident

There are no absolutes where safety is concerned, it is always a trade-off against cost/economics.

It's very easy to look back, with hindsight, and say that a runway inspection after the CO DC-10 would have prevented the accident. While that may very well be true, it ignores the reality of how airports and airlines actually operate.

AlphaZuluRomeo

9th Dec 2012, 14:07

Based strictly on what they have been given to examine.
But as they were "severely restricted" in their access to the evidences ...
If the AAIB inspectors were unable to give an informed conclusion, they would have said they have doubts "about everything", they would not have written they agree with the general scenario, don't you think? ;)

So transparent that the Judge withold data from the proceedings.
What's the relation of that with the problem of "the judicial affected the technical" from Concorde days?
At the risk of repeating myself, I'm interested in aviation safety, not in lawyers fights.

There are no absolutes where safety is concerned, it is always a trade-off against cost/economics.

It's very easy to look back, with hindsight, and say that a runway inspection after the CO DC-10 would have prevented the accident. While that may very well be true, it ignores the reality of how airports and airlines actually operate.
Agreed 100% :D:D:D

dalek

9th Dec 2012, 15:20

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration??

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2012, 16:10

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration??

Assuming that you mean the tyre disintegrating, rather than the entire undercarriage, what do you consider caused that ?

Lyman

9th Dec 2012, 16:13

Did I read in an earlier post the Concorde's tires were not original, but were 'resurfaced'? That is not possible? 'Retreading a tire' is purely financial, and not compatible with rotation speeds. It would seem extremely unwise to fit this aircraft with such a component, given its history of undercarriage and tank issues?

DaveReidUK

9th Dec 2012, 17:28

'Retreading a tire' is purely financial, and not compatible with rotation speeds. It would seem extremely unwise to fit this aircraft with such a component, given its history of undercarriage and tank issues?

That's why it wasn't.

ExSp33db1rd

9th Dec 2012, 18:39

I can't comment on the new/retread issue, I just don't know, but long ago my one time Concorde captain friend told me that there were two makes of tyres used by the airline he worked for ( he doesn't speak French ) and one manufacturers product gave more problems than the other, so each flight he would accompany the flt. eng. on the walk-around, and identify the 'mix' of tyre types.

When he eventually had a tire failure on take off he was able to make a guess based on knowledge of how many, and where, the 'worst' tyres were on that specific flight and which bogey might now have a failed tyre, and was prepared for some possible controllability problem on landing due to a failed tyre on 'that' side, and passed the info. to the emergency services, who positioned themselves accordingly.

Could have been wrong of course, and thankfully there was no problem -but the damage from the flailing and disintegrating rubber had only barely missed vital hydraulic controls, another Japanese 747 or Sioux City DC-10 loss of all hydraulics narrowly averted.

Lyman

9th Dec 2012, 18:54

My search function isn't, and I am quite sure there were tire quality issues prior to Gonesse.....also unsure if related to 'recycled' tires.

"The appeals court's decision clears the way for a separate $19.4-million civil lawsuit being brought by Air France for damage the tragedy caused to its reputation."

I found "chutzpah" but is there a word for "shameless" in French?

merci....pas de quois

DozyWannabe

9th Dec 2012, 19:33

If the AAIB inspectors were unable to give an informed conclusion, they would have said they have doubts "about everything", they would not have written they agree with the general scenario, don't you think? ;)

Indeed! As I read it, the judiciary would not allow the AAIB to view some of the wreckage directly - but they'd have had access to the rest of the wreckage, plus the BEA's photographs and diagrams of the wreckage they were prevented from seeing. If they had concerns about missing anything important (or at least anything that might prevent them doing their job) they would have said so.

jcjeant

9th Dec 2012, 20:53

While that may very well be true, it ignores the reality of how airports and airlines actually operate. Thank's for the info
Now I know that airports and airlines don't operate with max safety possible due to commercial reason
So .. as passenger and knowing this .. it's better to be in your lucky day when you board a aircraft and that your relative check as a preventive for a good lawyer ...

At the risk of repeating myself, I'm interested in aviation safety, not in lawyers fights.
Sometime for aviation safety it's good that justice (with the help of lawyers involved) can remove from the loop some people when found guilty for prevent they make more mistakes .....
Justice can help aviation safety

jcjeant

9th Dec 2012, 21:11

If they had concerns about missing anything important (or at least anything that might prevent them doing their job) they would have said so.
they were "severely restricted" in their access to the evidences ...
How they can know they have missed anything important .. as they were "severely restricted" to acces of evidence ?
How you can know about something visual is important or not .. when you can't seen it yourself ?
Why they can see only photos (courtesy of BEA .... ) .. but not the real thing ?
Experts working (investigate) on photos .. when all material is available somewhere to be examined
Forensic working with photos of a deadman cause restricted to touch the body in the morgue ?
Weird isn't it ?

AlphaZuluRomeo

9th Dec 2012, 21:35

I can't comment on the new/retread issue, I just don't know (...)
ExSp33db1rd, data about the wheels & tyres of F-BTSC are publicly available in the final report §1.6.2.5:
The wheels were manufactured by Dunlop, and the tyres used by Air France were manufactured by Goodyear in the United States. No retread tyres have been used since 1996.

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration??
How do you explain the clean transverse cut about 32 centimetres long in the tyre, then? (*)
How do you explain that black elastomer (whoose spectral analysis showed similar to Concorde's tyre rubber) was found in the rivets holes of the strip? (**)

(*) Final report, §1.12.1.2 (with photo):
the parts [pieces of tyre] found at Slab 152 level (a piece measuring 100 x 33 cm and weighing about 4.5 kg) and that found at Slab 180 level fitted together. Visual inspection revealed a transverse cut about 32 centimetres long.

(**) Final report, §1.16.6.4:
Black marks were noted on the outer side of the strip and black elastomer debris was found jammed in one of the rivets. The spectra of these marks and deposits are similar to the Concorde tyre.

Justice can help aviation safety
Perhaps :) I'm still not interested.

May I also remind you that the BEA was in charge of the technical, not the AAIB? Hence, even with full access, the AAIB would not have conducted its own analysis to "cross-check" everything the BEA would have said. You may show little confidence about the BEA, but AAIB doesn't seem to share the extend of your concern about that. That's enough for me, I must say :)

Lyman

9th Dec 2012, 23:45

Quote:
"the parts [pieces of tyre] found at Slab 152 level (a piece measuring 100 x 33 cm and weighing about 4.5 kg) and that found at Slab 180 level fitted together. Visual inspection revealed a transverse cut about 32 centimetres long."

This is the maddening thing about BEA. The two pieces 'fitted' together means they were lined up manually. It does not mean that they 'fit together'. Nor does it mean the seam was such that these were two adjoining pieces of a larger section. The deficit that separates these two pieces of tyre is the length overall of the Titanium?

But then there is this:

"The spectra of these marks and deposits are similar to the Concorde tyre.".....BEA

Does that mean that the elastomeric deposits were similar also to the Goodyear tyres on the DC-10? Also similar to other Goodyear fod on the runway from neither DC-10 or Concorde? The strip is remarkably clean of deep scratches one would expect from a scraping on concrete beneath a 200 ton aircraft.....

Did the Titanium contact the Concorde's tyres only? Or both the Concorde and the Continental DC-10? Or ONLY the Douglas?

To slash the sidewall of tyre number two is counterintuitive, since it presupposes that the Titanium strip was airborne before hitting the lead tyre. More likely would be that the strip, if airborne, would have contacted a following tyre, having been launched by passage of the lead.

AZR: (thanks)

Quote:
The wheels were manufactured by Dunlop, and the tyres used by Air France were manufactured by Goodyear in the United States. No retread tyres have been used since 1996.

That's nice, but rather optimistic. Looking at the photo of Tyre 2, one notices the complete lack of siping on the tire's carcass. The other tyres have siping. Also, the failed tyre has all the tread scrubbed off to the fabric. This is notable, since it is indicative of a patent failure in a Recapped carcass, where the additive layer of elastomer is vulcanized to the remaining elastomer of the carcass. This precludes an embed in the fabric of the carcass, meaning there is no DualPhase adhesion of the additional material, something that of course makes the re-cycled tyre substandard, and a hazard.

Similarly, there is evidence in the photo of a classic separation of a recap bond on the sidewall. The tyre may indeed be an original manufacture, but the evidence is at least suspicious. Did the spectral analysis eliminate the presence of recap material, which is indeed different from OEM? Did it confirm that the material in the Titanium rivet void matches the sidewall (original) of tyre #2?

A shop that wil leave a critical component of a truck on the shop floor may well refit a retread, in a "pinch".

And a shop that will replace an ablative Aluminum strip with a haphazard Titanium lashup, the same. Neither aircraft was airworthy, by definition.

IMHO....

jcjeant

10th Dec 2012, 00:05

but AAIB doesn't seem to share the extend of your concern about thatWell the report is full of AAIB negative comments ...
Concerned .. but must express a diplomatic manner given the constraints of political relations between countries (not forget that the BEA is a french governement body)
It's to note that the AAIB complain (between other things) about the fact that they could see the metal strip for a very short time only .. ie .. they could not make any serious analysis of the (most important) element that ( from BEA report) triggered the accident
But "maybe" they had the right to examine at long .. other scrap metal .. etc ...
Weird ins't it ?

Did the Titanium contact the Concorde's tyres only? Or both the Concorde and the Continental DC-10? Or ONLY the Douglas?
To note that between the Continental DC-10 and the Concorde .. another plane had taking off ...

AlphaZuluRomeo

10th Dec 2012, 10:36

This is the maddening thing about BEA. The two pieces 'fitted' together means they were lined up manually. It does not mean that they 'fit together'.
Really? You did look at the picture included in the report (as shown by another part of your post). I cannot then understand how you came to your conclusion that "It does not mean that they 'fit together'". :confused:
They fit. I see that on the pic.

Does that mean that the elastomeric deposits were similar also to the Goodyear tyres on the DC-10? Also similar to other Goodyear fod on the runway from neither DC-10 or Concorde?
Lost from the DC-10 right hand engine, I cannot imagine how the strip would have made contact with any tyre of the same DC-10. Geometry. Speed. That sort of things.

About the 747 (only aircraft on the RWY between the DC-10 and Concorde), I don't know if the spectra would have been same as Concorde or not.
What I do know, however, is that no tyre problem was reported on that aircraft.
What I do imagine is that Continental would have seeked to prove it was not Concorde rubber on the strip. I'm not aware they did that (nor try to). Are you?

To slash the sidewall of tyre number two is counterintuitive, since it presupposes that the Titanium strip was airborne before hitting the lead tyre.
Huh? Where does that come from? The transverse cut is on the tread of the tyre. The strip was not magically airborne. The tyre from wheel #2 (i.e. front right tyre of the left hand main landing gear) rolled on the strip, and was cut.
See also §1.16.5 "Tyre destruction Mechanism" with experimentations conducted (pictures provided, there too).

Looking at the photo of Tyre 2, one notices the complete lack of siping on the tire's carcass.
I fail to notice that. Quite the contrary, in fact. Tyre 2 was not new (37 cycles old). But it doesn't show a complete lack of siping either. Comparing to picture 4, page 25, or pictures 48, 49 and 50, pages 99 & 102 makes me say: "it looks normal, from the siping PoV". :)

A shop that wil leave a critical component of a truck on the shop floor may well refit a retread, in a "pinch".
Yeah, sure. What does that hypothesis imply? Nothing much: simply falsificate the papers about that tyre (date of purchase, date of installation on the plane), hide the invoices/workshop who did the retreading, and make false GoodYear invoices for new tyres. :=
Big bad Frenchies, huh? :E
Take care, in case AF or GoodYear decide a recent irish exemple is to be followed ;)

But "maybe" they had the right to examine at long .. other scrap metal .. etc ...
Weird ins't it ?
What's weird? Are you implying the BEA lied, and made falsificated material proofs? How is that even possible with the strip under the (too strict, we already covered that) control of the judicial that the AAIB, and you, and me did regret?
If you're going that way, well it's your choice. May I then adress to you the same piece of advice I just gave to Lyman? :)

dalek

10th Dec 2012, 12:30

Dave Reid
Four days prior to the accident the left hand undercarriage bogie was removed for maintenance. When it was refitted a spacer was left out.
The initial accident report took great pains to say the missing spacer had absolutely no relevance to the crash.
Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.

pulse1

10th Dec 2012, 13:24

Most of the information I have on this came from a series of lectures given by an ex Concorde Flight Engineer ( perhaps he is already taking part in this discussion). According to him, one of the factors which made the possible misalignment of the bogie more critical was the ridge across the runway as it passed from the sterile runway onto the main runway. If this is true, presumably being over weight and down wind, encouraged the pilots to use this part of the runway or maybe they would have done this anyway.

DaveReidUK

10th Dec 2012, 13:55

Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.

There is indeed disagreement. But that's rather different from your original assertion:

The strip of metal probably played no part in the accident. It is more likely that the damage was caused by the undercarriage disintegration

Where is the evidence for your "probably" and "more likely" ?

AlphaZuluRomeo

10th Dec 2012, 13:56

Hi Dalek,

The initial accident report took great pains to say the missing spacer had absolutely no relevance to the crash.
It was the final report, not an initial one. Agreed that it "took great pains" (or made a detailled analysis, as I would have written it) about that point.

Other experts disagree and say that the missing spacer led directly to the tyre failure.
I've seen disagreements on that point too, and I cannot imagine the spacer having "no use at all": why was is there in the first place, then? ;)
But, do you have a link/ref to something substantial about that?
So far, I'm "only" aware of:
- general public intented TV broadcasts, with most "experts" being not so experts in fact, and some real experts having no time to really explain their points;
- polemic blogs, usually animated/promoted by people well known to have an agenda (against AF most of the time, or against other french organisations such as DGAC, BEA...).

I'm looking for an honest and documented analysis about that point, by an expert (not only in name). Without it, we have no ground to refute the final report saying, after a detailled/pusblished analysis, that the absence of the spacer didn't change the trajectory of the plane nor the state of its tyres on july 25, 2000 (or on flights that preceded the accident (but after the bogie replacement work).

[edit] Thanks, pulse1, wrote my post before reading yours. That's a start :) Were there docs published after those lectures?
And I think I see who you're talking about. ;)

chrisN

10th Dec 2012, 17:51

Shortly after the Concorde crash, there were various photographs published on websites, possibly somewhere in a thread on here, one of which showed crescent-shaped tyre marks allegedly on the runway, allegedly caused by a squittering bogie (like a supermarket trolley with a bad castor wheel). Was that indeed linked to the Concorde, or positively eliminated from any involvement?

Does anybody have a link to the picture and various comments at the time?

jcjeant

10th Dec 2012, 22:56

chrisN
I guess this is this ?
Does anybody have a link to the picture and various comments at the time?
Was Continental Responsible For the Concorde Crash? « Heritage Concorde (http://heritageconcorde.com/facts/was-continental-responsible-for-the-concorde-crash)

chrisN

11th Dec 2012, 03:00

What I had in mind was referred to in post 33 at:
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/2946-concorde-uk-observer-article-2.html .

"The photographs of the tarmac clearly show that after the tyre deflated, the gear was oscillating either side of centre, which was, in my opinion, caused by the missing spacer and the (now) unbalanced bogie. I really cannot think of any other explanation as to why an aircraft with one engine out should be in danger of leaving the runway."

But the actual picture I have seen is not visible there, and embedded links no longer work.

Machinbird

11th Dec 2012, 04:59

Chris
The site in jcjeant's link is very slow in delivering information. I dd see the picture of the tire marks leading to the runway light this evening.

AlphaZuluRomeo

11th Dec 2012, 08:40

Machinbird, the pics in jcjeant's link are the same provided by the BEA in its final report.

jcjeant, thanks for the link, I read it yesterday night :)
I still fail to be convinded, I must say. I'm at work, will explain in details later, but mostly it is because the parts presenting "alternative" theories (relative to the official one from the BEA) seem incantatory rather than based on facts (the facts themselves, included as reported by the BEA, being sometimes - and when it matters - contradictory with said theories, whatever their logic & value).

Lyman

11th Dec 2012, 12:39

If one kowtows to the popular opinion, one would never question. Any alternate theory involves countering accepted (though perhaps questionable) conclusions.

The French treat an accident scene as a crime scene. Fine. Well then, was the Metal strip photographed in situ? What is the genesis of the convenient hook shape that allowed the strip to present in the vertical to the oncoming Goodyear? How did the offensive element migrate well left of the center line to intercept a tyre that was already left of said line? And that strip having originated on the right side of the donor aircraft? What of the telltale rubber deposits well in front of the spilled fuel? Why a triple when dual represented a preferred skid?

The last three years of my construction career was spent in working with French principals. There is a cultural flavor to the stubborn and precipitous need the French had for assigning "Blame" prior to any extensive forensics. It is obsessive, almost precognitive, and unnerving to associates.

More synthetic rubber comments to follow.

LondonPax

11th Dec 2012, 13:21

Is there some way of seeing G-BOAF at Filton from the public road?

Heritage Concorde (http://heritageconcorde.com/concorde-today/workin-progress-3/concorde-passenger-toilets/work3/uk-concordes-closed-to-the-public) saysthat it can be viewed from a road name “Concorde Way” which is located at the rear of the Cribbs Cause Way Shopping Centre. From Google Maps it looks looks like it's close to a road but not sure if it's a public road:

Concorde Way, Bristol BS2, United Kingdom - Google Maps (http://bit.ly/SO8J4h)

I remember going to see Concorde testing at Filton when I was a kid. Would love to go back and see her now, even from a distance.

AlphaZuluRomeo

11th Dec 2012, 23:56

Any alternate theory involves countering accepted (though perhaps questionable) conclusions.
Certainly! :D
Let's not extend that to the point of countering established facts, will we please? Because if facts don't matter, then we're not being serious about aviation safety, we're being serious about personnal beliefs. ;)

Let's try, once again:

Questionable conclusions from the BEA report:
A1- the titanium strip was the only & direct root cause for the sequence of events that led to the crash;
A2- the missing spacer had no influence to the crash;
A3- the too early #2 engine shut-down had no influence;
A4- the too early rotation (as per references speeds) had no influence to the crash;
A5- the overweight had no influence to the crash;
A6- the rearwind had no influence to the crash;

All those conclusions are indeed questionable, and may be seen as aimed to protect AF from liability, indeed (at last: they had this effect).

Questionable conclusions from third parties:
B1a- the titanium strip had no influence to the crash;
(or)
B1b- the titanium strip cannot be seen as the only root cause of the crash;
B2- the missing spacer had an influence, and was a causal factor of the crash;
B3- the too early #2 engine shut-down had a direct influence to the crash;
B4- the fuel tanks were overfilled and that had an influence to the crash;

Those are questionable because they contradict the report (hence they must be fact-checked), and because they may be seen as aimed to protect a third party (namely: Continental) from liability.

Now, all those have already been discussed numerous times.
Allow me to make a résumé (in french in the text ;)) of my point, without being going to far sidetracked into other (interesting nonetheless) discussions.

Scenario:
B1a is rejected: All evidences show indeed that the #2 tyre blow up when rolling on the strip. BEA, AAIB, judicial and every informed/serious third party analysists are OK with that established fact.
As a first consequence, a major fuel leak occured. B4 is rejected because the overfilling of the tanks (as per procedures) concerned the tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4, but not the tank 5 which suffered the leak. This tank was not overfilled, it was filled.
As a second consequence, a fire started (because of an electric arc or because of reheat: there is a disagreement on the cause). Let's stick to the established fact that the fire was present, as BEA, AAIB, judicial and every informed/serious third party analysists are OK with that (not counting anyone able to look at a picture).
The extent of the fire had in turn two main consequences:
Loss of thrust on engines 1 & 2. It is unclear if the #2 would have produced any significant thrust if it had not been shut down too early, but B3 cannot be ruled out with certainty: Perhaps the #2 engine would have been able to generate useful thrust.
Significant damages to the left wing and left control surfaces of the aircraft. Those damages were increasing with the time. They was no way to stop them from increasing, unless being able to extinct the fire (which was not possible).
Those damages ultimately led - in conjonction with the too low thrust - to the loss of control of the aircraft and to its crash.

Analysis:
Now, my point is that even with the hypothesis of enough thrust being available (i.e. #2 engine not shut down and physically able to produce significant thrust despite the fire, which is far from certain and certainly not an established fact), the thing is the fire damages to the aircraft itself would have been "enough" to make the aircraft uncontrollable => loss of control => crash.
What would maybe have changed is the exact time (hence location) of the LOC, therefore the plane would have crashed elsewhere than at "La Patte d'Oie" of Gonesse. But il would have crashed anyway.
In this way, A2, B2, A5, A6 are irrelevant, whatever their reality or their importance about what they show about AF (non)adherence to procedures.

And if we were to stretch things a bit more? What if the plane had been able to reach & land - not crash, land - at Le Bourget, that was not so far away? Then I think there would have been (massive/total) casualties anyway because of weight, speed, some brake power lost (damages to the U/C), and fire engulfing the plane when it would have stopped.

Hence I don't think it would have been able to "make it" in any way once it had rolled on the strip.
A1 surely is a bit of a stretch, and aimed to protect AF, but it seems the court finally saw better and didn't forget to blame AF too. That's good. A1 is wrong.
B1b is most certainly true: the inherent fragility of Concorde to blown tyres/fuel/electrics interactions was known since a long time. With hindsight, it is now an established fact that the corrective actions that were undertaken since '79 were too feeble to protect the aircraft from that risk.

Conclusion, part 1: All parties involved in the operation and certification of Concorde (in France and UK at last, and perhaps we should add the NTSB/FAA too because of the location of Washington) can be seen as sharing (to some degree it is) the responsibility of letting Concorde fly to its fateful fate in July 2000. I'm not a lawyer, I won't try to assess the sharing of that global responsability, except to say - before being crucified - than I agree that the share/responsability of AF seems greater than the share/responsability of BA.
Conclusion, part 2: As I wrote earlier that, if a BA aircraft had rolled on the strip, it would also crashed too (even with the equation better operated=able to stay airborne longer, there is no equivalent to Le Bourget near Heathrow, I believe?).

Lyman

12th Dec 2012, 01:09

Hi AZR, and thankyou for your well reasoned posts.

Here..

"Conclusion, part 2: As I wrote earlier that, if a BA aircraft had rolled on the strip, it would also crashed too (even with the equation better operated=able to stay airborne longer, there is no equivalent to Le Bourget near Heathrow, I believe?)."

I am not so sure....at all.

You neglect one important thing. With an intact and complete undercarriage, the BA Concorde would most likely not have adventured into the weeds, wiped out a light, and caused a long tail wind driven roll to urge the Captain to rotate immediately. Captain may have rejected the TO, though that is a stretch. Had he done so, he would have decelerated straight ahead, on tarmac, with likely an overrun. Off runway, and directionally challenged, the French Captain had to launch, or face disintegration on dirt. Because he was lacking a standoff spacer.

With an intact axle, at #2 tyre rupture, the forward truck would have maintained separation of tyres 1 and 2, allowing a smooth recovery of track. On BTSC, the #2 wheel migrated left the full 16 centimeters, towards the wheel of #1. Without the spacer, the ruptured tyre would certainly drift on the axle, nothing stopping it. This would have completely altered the carriage geometry, creating an intense out of balance condition, and enormous side loads on the tyres, pulling the a/c to the left.

I say the BA Concorde survives, though perhaps not without fatalities, had there been a similar fire.

AlphaZuluRomeo

12th Dec 2012, 09:49

Hi Lyman,

I didn't neglect anything: See my "analysis" paragraph where A2 & B2 (i.e. the missing spacer, hence the not complete U/C) are quoted. Regarding the "intact" U/C... well, one tyre blown by the strip, it's no more intact.
My point is that rolling on the strip was enough to start the leak & fire.
And the fire itself was enough to crash the plane.

The drift to the weeds, the wiped out light, and the early rotation (whatever their cause(s)) are irrelevant, here, as they would have no influence on the fire and its structural consequences:
Fire => Serious & quickly worsening damages to wing & surfaces => aircraft uncontrollable => loss of control before it had time to land anywhere => crash inevitable.
Even on a perfectly balanced airplane, taking off straight on the centerline (which a BA Concorde would not be, because part if not most/all of the drift to the left was due to loss of thrust following engine surges/FoD ingestion, spacer or not spacer - see my MP).

-----

Now, you imagine an RTO.
First, I don't think an RTO after V1 is likely to have occured at BA. :ooh:
Not without hindsight, as it would have been a violation of procedures := (that even AF didn't do ;))

But what if it did occur? BEA did the maths, for the CDG runway, I suppose the conclusions would have been roughly equivalent @ LHR or elsewhere:

§1.16.13.4 Consequences of Aborting the Takeoff
Two simulations of a possible acceleration-stop were performed, one based on the aircraft’s speed when the rotation was commenced (that is to say in fact the first moment when the crew could have been warned by unusual sensations), at 183 kt, the other at 196 kt, when the FE said what can be understood as “stop”.

The simulations were conducted with the following hypotheses:
• braking on seven wheels, to take into account the destruction of tyre No 2,
• braking torque available at nominal value until the maximum energy indicated in the Flight Manual (70 MJ), increased by 10%,
• use of thrust reversers on engines 1, 3 and 4.

With this set of hypotheses, it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.

The sole difference I can see re: a BA Concorde would be thrust reversers, on 4 engines and not 3. It remains unclear if the #2 (or the #1 for that matter) would have been able to produce any significant thrust (reversed or not) particularly in a decceleration phase (more hot gases injested). Even if we imagine all 4 reversers OK, the aircraft would still overrun at significant speed (even if less than calculated by the BEA above), and the conclusion still stands: overrun + massive fire = catastrophic results.

Shaggy Sheep Driver

12th Dec 2012, 10:07

According to (many) BA FEs I've spoken to, it's extremely unlikely the tanks would have been overfilled on any BA departure, therefore there'd be some air space above the fuel to get compressed and absorb the hydraulic shock of the base of the tank being clouted by a piece of tyre, therefore no torrent of fuel pouring out the bottom of the wing, therefore a controllable 'incident' at worst, rather than a total disaster.

And that's ignoring the other AF factors (spacer, downwind, overweight, no.2, etc).

Not conclusive of course, but it is food for thought.

AlphaZuluRomeo

12th Dec 2012, 10:11

Once again:
As a first consequence, a major fuel leak occured. B4 is rejected because the overfilling of the tanks (as per procedures) concerned the tanks 1, 2, 3 and 4, but not the tank 5 which suffered the leak. This tank was not overfilled, it was filled.

I think it was not uncommon for BA to fill (not overfill) the #5 tank.

If you have data which suggest/prove otherwise, please feel free to share them :)

Lyman

12th Dec 2012, 13:45

Bonjour AZR...

Given that the accident crash has been discussed at such length, it is predictable that complete agreement will be elusive. Impasse is not unfriendly, or need not be.

* "Between leaving the maintenance hangar and the fateful flight of July 25 the Concorde flew two round trip flights to New York and back.* In that time after each gear retraction the right hand shear bush began to slide down into the gap left by the missing spacer.* By the day of the accident the shear bush had moved a full seven inches out of alignment to the point where the two washers were almost touching.* The movement of the shear bush allowed the beam and wheels to wobble up to three degrees in any direction."

.......From "Heritage CONCORDE"

So therefore.....

The accident takeoff was the fifth since return to service. At Rotate speeds approaching 300 miles per hour, the stresses are formidable, so.....

It is my belief the problematic landing gear issue was at the very least contributory, definitely not "irrelevant".

re the "Transverse Cut". I would be looking for evidence of Zinc Chromate from the strip's painted (primered) surface, and remnants of Red Applicating mastic.

The site of deposition? The "cut" area of the tyre tread separating the two recovered oval pieces of tire tread surface. Evidence of elastomer (tyre material) was identified on the Titanium strip itself, there is no reason that the tyre remnants would be free of applied materials from the metal shard.

I am sure it is in the report, and my cursory review missed it. For me, evidence of Red Mastic and paint primer on the tyre pieces would be absolutely conclusive of rupture due to Continental's shoddy shop work on the DC-10.

merci beaucoup

DozyWannabe

12th Dec 2012, 16:28

It's generally accepted by all parties that the deviation from centreline was caused by the sheer amount of thrust asymmetry caused by the starboard engines functioning normally with reheat and the port engines being impeded/damaged by the fuel fire. The missing spacer may have had an effect, but even if correctly fitted it is *extremely* unlikely to have changed the outcome beyond losing control at a marginally higher altitude.

Such a gain in altitude might have altered the location of the crash, but the controls would still have been destroyed by the fire (the existence of which is irrelevant to the spacer) at the same rate - there's simply no way they could have made Le Bourget and landed safely with that kind of damage.

AlphaZuluRomeo

12th Dec 2012, 17:04

Given that the accident crash has been discussed at such length, it is predictable that complete agreement will be elusive. Impasse is not unfriendly, or need not be.
Oh, but I've no problem with that. :)
Indeed, we differ on the spacer. Neither of us has conclusive evidences, and both scenarii are possible/sensible. I hope not to give the impression of being unfriendly here. :)

at the very least contributory, definitely not "irrelevant"
I can also agree with that. Not a problem.
I didn't say it's irrelevant per se. I said it's irrelevant in the scenario I presented (and which is by no means a personal one).
I notice you "forgot" to answer about that scenario. Too bad, it was the only point I really stressed. Should I take it that you agree with me here, then? :)

there is no reason that the tyre remnants would be free of applied materials from the metal shard
Well, I disagree, and I could think of a number of reasons. Relative hardness of materials involved, for example. ;)
If you have no counter-proof, you may "just" admit it, say "I don't know" (*) instead of asking for a complementary proof that we know doesn't exist.
As you said yourself, impasse is not unfriendly, or need not be. :)
OTOH, trying to "noyer le poisson" could be seen as unfriendly. ;)

(*) I tried to do that at lenght earlier in the topic, and I'm not hurt for having done that.

Lyman

12th Dec 2012, 21:31

Hi AZR

negative on the Poissons, Monsieur...

Ici.....

Quote:
"there is no reason that the tyre remnants would be free of applied materials from the metal shard"

Well, I disagree, and I could think of a number of reasons. Relative hardness of materials involved, for example.

if My interest was required to be objective I would not stop once I had found elastomer on and in the Titanium strip. I would continue and seek to find deposition of Alkyd and epoxy mastic on the rubber pieces. Did BEA? (it is exceedingly unlikely Titanium would be found on the rubber :) ). But NOT impossible, since remnants of grinding might be bound in the primer, or mastic!

"If you have no counter-proof, you may "just" admit it, say "I don't know" (*) instead of asking for a complementary proof that we know doesn't exist."

I missed this, does this mean you believe no proof one way or the other exists?
Do you think they sought such evidence?

1. They must have, if only to cement further their theory of "transverse cut".

2. They did not report the results of their Gas chromatography/electro phoresis?

3. They did report, and I missed it?

4. There was no such deposition?

5. If none, they missed a chance to cement Continental's 'guilt'?

6. If foreign material was identified, and not reported, they are incompetent?

I have no bias here, my enjoyment is in the discussion, especially with a bright and patient person such as you :D

AlphaZuluRomeo

12th Dec 2012, 21:51

Hi

When I cut meat with a knife, I think findind bits or traces (juice) of meat on the knife is proof enough that the knife was used. Especially when there is no other meat in the neighborhood that could have been cut by this knife, and when I learn that the bits/traces found on the knife were analysed, and found consistant with the two parts of meat in my plate.
I don't have to find bits of knife on the meat to be convinced.
In fact, finding bits of knife (or knife's coating) on my meat would worry me. :p

I have no bias here, my enjoyment is in the discussion, especially with a bright and patient person such as you :D
Thanks for saying that, Sir :)

Lyman

12th Dec 2012, 23:27

AZR...

My friend, your 'knife' is coated with chemicals that are made from petroleum, and the meat is made from naturally occurring proteins, and fats. That there could be commingling is a virtual certainty.

The rubber in the tire is a product of organic chemistry, the mastic is composed of basic chemicals found in the same lab, and the paint alkyd resin. If the Titanium 'knife' has been ground at the bench, it may have donated ground Titanium to the applied paint.

There was elastomeric debris covering the runway, that is the nature of runways.

BEA said only that the elastomer on the Titanium was consistent with Goodyear rubber, not that it was proof that the Titanium had entered the carcass of BTSC's tyre. With possible proof available, the forensics are untried and the result is insufficent, unsatisfactory.

I think a test should have been done, rather than being so easily satisfied that Titanium from CAL sliced the tyre.

It suggests satisfaction at a low threshold, that a preconceived theory was proved by the presence of material that is found all over the runway, as well as in the GoodYear #2.

Were the tyre remnants rubber only, or complete through and through sections of the tyre to include fabric?

See you next time?

Lyman

12th Dec 2012, 23:51

Hi Dozy....

You write...

It's generally accepted by all parties that the deviation from centreline was caused by the sheer amount of thrust asymmetry caused by the starboard engines functioning normally with reheat and the port engines being impeded/damaged by the fuel fire.

By what mechanism were the port engines impeded, or damaged, by fire?

DozyWannabe

12th Dec 2012, 23:54

BEA said only that the elastomer on the Titanium was consistent with Goodyear rubber, not that it was proof that the Titanium had entered the carcass of BTSC's tyre. With possible proof available, the forensics are untried and the result is insufficent, unsatisfactory.

But that's the limit of forensic science right now. Just as it is in criminal murder trials, the furthest the evidence can be taken is that the "wounds" are consistent with having been caused by the object in question (unless a portion broke away inside the "wound" and can be physically matched up). Further speculative conclusions may be drawn, but they will not be legally admissible as evidence.

I think a test should have been done, rather than being so easily satisfied that Titanium from CAL sliced the tyre.

Several tests *were* done as part of the investigation and the results from every test supported the conclusion.

It suggests satisfaction at a low threshold, that a preconceived theory was proved by the presence of material that is found all over the runway, as well as in the GoodYear #2.

Not true. In accident investigation the theories are derived from the evidence, not the other way around. The BEA applied due diligence in trying to prove or disprove the sequence of events that led to the evidence with which they were confronted.

I remember reporting of this case very well, and it was at least weeks following the accident before the possible role of the titanium strip was publicised. As usual the press published a lot of incorrect information in the rush for an exclusive story - one of the most repeated was the allegation that there was a 747 with then-President Chirac on board nearby. I still see this repeated in articles today but it was never true.

Were the tyre remnants rubber only, or complete through and through sections of the tyre to include fabric?

The latter. They simulated the wheel and tyre behaviour with and without the missing spacer and the loads were never sufficient to precipitate catastrophic failure of the tyre.

The outcome of this legal process simply stated (correctly in my opinion, as criminal law and accident investigation should not mix except in significant extenuating circumstances) that Continental should not be held *criminally* liable for the unorthodox repair of the titanium strip - it does not alter the facts of the case itself.

By what mechanism were the port engines impeded, or damaged, by fire?

The fire heated the air in front of the intakes to a temperature that was outside the normal operating range. This caused both engines to surge during the take-off roll, from which engine one eventually (briefly - once airborne) recovered, but engine two did not.

Lyman

13th Dec 2012, 00:26

Makes sense......

May I rule out convection? So radiative. Were starboard engines affected? I would think so. By what amount?

You are defending French rules of evidence, above. Manslaughter demands "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the USA. Had I been the Titanium gearhead charged, I would have wanted all procedures exhausted.qa

The procedures I discuss above are not new. GC has geen around for decades, all that is required is a solution of tyre, and the 'unknowns'.

DozyWannabe

13th Dec 2012, 00:41

May I rule out convection? So radiative. Were starboard engines affected? I would think so. By what amount?

No, the starboard engines were not affected because the fire was well away from the intakes of those engines. Convection causes heated gases to travel upwards and sink as they cool. In the case of the port engines, hot gases from the fire were being sucked straight into the intakes - no time for the convective process to be established.

You are defending French rules of evidence, above. Manslaughter demands "beyond a reasonable doubt" in the USA. Had I been the Titanium gearhead charged, I would have wanted all procedures exhausted.qa

I am doing no such thing - I've stated several times that I believe the continental legal process following aviation accidents to be counter-productive in many ways. Criminal procedure on the continent differs from that of the US and the UK in that the supposition is of guilt, and that guilt must be disproven rather the other way around.

There's no doubt in this case that the mechanic overstepped his bounds and performed a repair job that he didn't fully understand - even though he probably thought he was doing no harm (see also the mechanic who used the wrong window bolts leading to separation and decompression on BA5390). I don't believe criminal negligence is an appropriate description of what he did - the issue was and is far more complex.

The procedures I discuss above are not new. GC has geen around for decades, all that is required is a solution of tyre, and the 'unknowns'

In this case there was no need - the tyre remnants were reassembled and the initiating point of damage was conclusively proven to be consistent with the titanium strip. They ran theoretical and physical reconstructions over and over again and the results of those experiments proved (beyond reasonable doubt) that the failure of the tyre was initiated due to contact with the titanium strip. No other failure mode matched either the debris pattern as was found on the runway, or the velocities required to breach the fuel tank.

jcjeant

13th Dec 2012, 01:22

I remember reporting of this case very well, and it was at least weeks following the accident before the possible role of the titanium strip was publicised. As usual the press published a lot of incorrect information in the rush for an exclusive story - one of the most repeated was the allegation that there was a 747 with then-President Chirac on board nearby. I still see this repeated in articles today but it was never true.All newspaper articles confirm that Jacques Chirac was aboard the plane with his wife
He was back from Japan (G7 meeting)
Centre de Documentation G8 (http://g7.sciencespo-lyon.fr/spip.php?article192)
If you have a press article release or any other document that proves otherwise (contradicted by Jacques Chirac .. etc. ..) they are welcome
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/108920-crash-concorde-almost-killed-chirac.html
Eléments d (http://proces-concorde.blogs.la-croix.com/elements-d%E2%80%99audience/2010/03/02/)
Crash Concorde 'almost killed Chirac' | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-202037/Crash-Concorde-killed-Chirac.html)
Le Figaro - France : Concorde*: Continental Airlines joue son va-tout (http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2010/03/05/01016-20100305ARTFIG00008-concorde-continental-airlines-joue-son-va-tout-.php)
| The Sun |News (http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/157864/.html)
Chirac a assisté au crash en direct - Libération (http://www.liberation.fr/evenement/0101340502-chirac-a-assiste-au-crash-en-direct)
CONCORDE: Anatomy Of A Disaster [Archive] - David Icke's Official Forums (http://www.davidicke.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-60477.html)
Concorde : enqute sur un incroyable crash - L'EXPRESS (http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/fait-divers/concorde-enquete-sur-un-incroyable-crash_642198.html)

DozyWannabe

13th Dec 2012, 01:31

@jcj:

All those articles used the same source, which turned out to be incorrect.

See here (from #219 for the next couple of pages):
http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/435870-french-concorde-crash-11.html

The only AF 747 in the vicinity was vacating runway 26L and M. Chirac was categorically *not* on board. It makes for a juicy, emotive story though - which is probably why it was repeated so much without proper verification.

[EDIT : Friendly word of advice - it's not advisable to link to the David Icke forums if you want your point to be taken seriously. Unless of course you subscribe to the theory that most if not all world leaders are in fact shape-shifting lizard aliens intent on enslaving the planet! ]

jcjeant

13th Dec 2012, 01:45

DozyWanabee
http://www.pprune.org/6111388-post205.html
As an aside, while French officials did and do sometimes travel on AF charters, the usual mode of travel in Chirac's day was a government-owned A310.
A310 (official aircraft) for go and return from Japan ?
Poor Chirac ...... :)
Joke ?
I'm waiting a denial of the presence of Chirac aboard the 747 .... from a independent source
So far I find nothing ....

DozyWannabe

13th Dec 2012, 01:52

Why should he deny it? He was all over the international press within hours of the event - do you think that if he were an eyewitness or somehow directly connected that he would not have mentioned or confirmed it?

Aside from the fact that I know there was only one source for the claim, other things that make me suspicious include the fact that the reports do not agree on the airline the supposed 747 belonged to (some say AF, others JAL), as well as the fact that none agree on how close F-BTSC came to the supposed 747. As I said before - variations on the story include F-BTSC passing within 7m, 70m or 7 yards(!) of the alleged Chirac 747, the alleged 747 itself either on the runway and exiting, at a holding point or *actually crossing the runway across F-BTSC's path*. Some even have Chirac himself "looking on in horror" as the flaming Concorde passed by.

tonytales

13th Dec 2012, 02:53

This is my first post on this topic. To establish myself, I put in over fifty years in aircraft maintenance in positions from mechanic to vice president and I managed Quality Control as well.

The controversy over whether the missing spacer contributed to the accident is impossible to settle. It does show a shocking lack of adherence to process and poor quality control at Air France. Work of this nature in the USA is mandated as a "Required Inspection" which is a warning sign to the Inspector. I believe the British used a “Double Inspection” to ensure compliance. What failed here is not fully explained. I might also add, I found the cavalier attitude toward an overweight takeoff and in a downwind direction disturbing. The corporate safety culture apparently failed all around.

The titanium repair spacer from the DC-10 engine was apparently not installed in accordance with the Structural Repair Manual (SRM). Continental also is at fault for shoddy work.

All these aside, the bigger issue is the failure of the relevant regulatory agencies and the manufacturer to prevent the chain of events caused by a tire failure. As an example, early on in the B727 history there were some tire failures that punctured the composite material tank access plates on the bottom of the wing in the gear area. I seem to remember Boeing Service Bulletins and an Airworthiness Directive mandating their replacement with metal tank access plates to prevent puncture. Every time we purchased a used B727 we had to check to see the AD was complied with to get the aircraft on our certificate.

After Concorde suffered a major tank rupture at Dulles, what regulatory action was taken? Apparently there were tire improvements. But tire failures continued. Every single tire failure was a roll of the dice as to where the shrapnel would go. It took the CDG crash to finally come up with some measure of protection which I believe was lining the tank bottom with Mylar fabric material. It took all those years from Dulles to CDG to drive the point home that the aircraft was vulnerable to a simple tire failure.

Lord knows I have seen many tire failures. Early on it was a B720 that wiped most of the hydraulics off the strut, a B747 that damaged the horizontal stabilizer (the mechanics on duty never thought to look back there until I told them to take a peek). I have seen landing gear doors badly damaged, etc, all of these from failed tires that threw pieces or chunks or even entire recaps but they didn't bring the aircraft down.

The real cause of the crash was the failure of the regulators and the manufacturer to take definitive corrective action to prevent a repeat of the Dulles tank rupture. If it was impossible to do so, then the aircraft certificate of airworthiness should have been pulled. The Concorde was a magnificent flying machine but it had a fatal Achilles Heel. They had adequate warning at Dulles, they should have taken action.

B Fraser

13th Dec 2012, 07:35

A now retired member of the Concorde flight crew told me that the engine problems were down to one engine (can't recall which one) ingesting runway lighting debris and the adjacent engine ingesting neat fuel which was interpreted as a second failure on the flight deck. The ingress of fuel into the engine was a transient condition and full power would have been available after it had sorted itself out. Once both engines had been rolled back, Concorde was then on the back of the drag curve. Had power been maintained and the ruptured tank had fully drained, there may have been a better chance of a survivable outcome but it's a purely academic discussion.

The flame front could not advance faster than the airflow so it begs the question what ignited the fuel ? It was thought that damage in the wheel well caused electrical arcing which by some means of a disrupted airflow in that area, ignited the fuel. The reheats are thought not to have been the source due to the airflow speed being greater than the speed of flame front advancement.

Either way, it was a very dark day in aviation and has revealed once again the consequences of lax attitudes to process.

jaja

13th Dec 2012, 07:55

Very well said B Fraser :

".....and has revealed once again the consequences of lax attitudes to process."

Some times all the holes in the Swiss cheese line up, and an accident is the result.

As professionals, we most do our utmost to keep these holes out of alignment.

B Fraser

13th Dec 2012, 09:00

As a fare paying passenger, I ask that the holes are found and filled in.

AlphaZuluRomeo

13th Dec 2012, 09:00

Hi Lyman,

I've quoted a number of sources, established facts and so on.
I'm convinced of the role of the strip. So is the BEA, the AAIB, and a number of other detailed analysis.

You have doubts? Fair enough, you're entitled to that. :)

But I you want me (or anyone) to share those doubts, you don't need to ask for "more proof".
You need to demonstrate, first, that what we consider as proof is not good enough. And you need to do that with more than "just" your doubts and convictions, because you're "fighting" material evidences.

That's not easy. And by the way, I'm perfectly happy with you having doubts about the strip. I'm not a lawyer, I don't think PPRuNe is a court either.
I suggest we put that point at rest until your doubts are backed by either hard evidence, of a logical demonstration able to counter all of the evidences/conclusions of the final report.

Now, the matter in discussion when you joined this thread, the point I was trying to make is this one:
BA Concorde was not more immune to tyres events leading to damage to the wing/tanks/electric that AF Concorde. Basically, they were the same aircraft, even if operating procedures differed (in definition or in the quality of their execution).
Therefore, it was the right decision to ground both fleets until the tyres were replaced by NZG ones (resistant to blow-up IIRC) and a kevlar liner fitted inside the fuel tanks.

Even if you think BTSC didn't roll on the strip (or have doubts about it), you surely agree with the above? I mean, the strip was one FOD, there was no way to ensure that never such an aggressive FOD will find its way to Concorde's tyres, with the potential catastrophic consequences we're all aware of since july 2000 (or since '79 or any other tyre incident since, depending your view).

Had power been maintained and the ruptured tank had fully drained, there may have been a better chance of a survivable outcome but it's a purely academic discussion.
Calculations were made about that (and other theories) here (http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Diplom/sieker.pdf) if you're interested.
Short answer is: the tank would not have fully drained before the aircraft was rendered uncontrollable by fire damage to the wing & elevons.

Lyman

13th Dec 2012, 17:30

AZR

"Even if you think BTSC didn't roll on the strip (or have doubts about it), you surely agree with the above? I mean, the strip was one FOD, there was no way to ensure that never such an aggressive FOD will find its way to Concorde's tyres, with the potential catastrophic consequences we're all aware of since july 2000 (or since '79 or any other tyre incident since, depending your view)."

There are several ways to see this, my preference is to agree with you.....

Any patent vulnerability to disaster requires mitigation, in a sane and honest way. My perspective is that the Concorde was especially vulnerable to tyre issues. Likewise, as a unique design, she had other vulnerabilities exclusive to her mission. Air France purposely avoided their most basic responsibilities. Evidence? Continuing with the use of recycled tyres well past the first disintegration of the installed problem......

stuckgear broaches what I expect is the nucleus of the discussion.

BTSC was overweight......substantially

She was without a required part in her left bogie....unconscionable

Regardless, she pushed back, and initiated a Take Off on the 'wrong' runway.

What follows in the take off is the genesis of a spirited discussion, and Legal action.

All of it MOOT......

Characteristically, partisans focus on the irrelevant and inconsequential, in a practiced way, to distract and confuse the course of Aviation as it relates to duty of care, fundamental safety, and honestly derived profit.

The Court has decided the evidence is not sufficient for criminal retribution, as regards the errant metal shard.

Works perfectly well for me.......

Tip of hat to you, sir...... :ok:

stuckgear

13th Dec 2012, 19:00

stuckgear broaches what I expect is the nucleus of the discussion.

BTSC was overweight......substantially

She was without a required part in her left bogie....unconscionable

indeed. at least someone gets the nucleus of the point i was 'subtly' making to see if anyone picked it up..

[sarcasm mode/on] is the spacer an MEL item [sarcasm mode /off]

to which point is an aircraft released for service with a component missing?

is that acceptable in terms of the certificating authority or under the design approval to which the aircraft was certificated ?

how does it stand with an aircraft taking off outside of its take off weight in terms of the certification data.

either way was the aircraft outside of the design approval under which it was certificated ?

it should never have been released for service for public transport operation and should not have been rolling for take off in public transport operation (or even for experimental purposes).

arguing about the coulda/woulda/shoulda is like a discussion of why a drunk driver ran off the road. he should not have been behind the wheel.

the aircraft should not have been on the runway for a commercial operation. As both B fraser points out along with tonytales (welcome to first post land) the operational situation was less than lax and we find ourselves, yet again, looking at wreckage of an aircraft where regulations and SOP's were treated contemptibly, such regulations and SOP's that have been designed to prevent the situation occurring and in many cases implemented to prevent the repeat of a past accident.

DozyWannabe

13th Dec 2012, 19:06

BA Concorde was not more immune to tyres events leading to damage to the wing/tanks/electric that AF Concorde. Basically, they were the same aircraft, even if operating procedures differed (in definition or in the quality of their execution).

As I recall, the BA airframes had an extra piece of equipment fitted to the main gear bogies to deflect debris in the event of a tyre failure. They also used a different brand and model of tyre. This is not to say that these differences would necessarily have had an effect on the outcome, but that the differences were quite substantial.

My perspective is that the Concorde was especially vulnerable to tyre issues.

Not particularly. The gear as a whole had to cope with higher levels of stress and wear compared to subsonic airliners of similar vintage (as you say) - but it is the question of the vintage that is key. A lot has been learned about systems safety in airliner design since the mid-late '60s, but Concorde was designed and certified before these lessons were adopted.

Tyre vulnerabilities aside, the fact that the tyre failed is only a relatively small piece of the puzzle as a whole. The tyre failure itself was triggered in a somewhat unusual way - FOD from a piece of debris substantially larger than what would usually be encountered, causing the tyre to disintegrate in much larger sections than would normally be the case. The size of these fragments caused much more substantial damage to the parts of the airframe they struck than would normally be expected from a tyre burst, including rupture of the fuel tank skin and in all likelihood severing of electrical cabling which is generally agreed to be the ignition source of the leaking fuel.

Any one of these factors alone would not place the aircraft in immediate danger, but this particular combination of factors did.

Any airliner that stores fuel in the wings (read : practically all of them) is going to be vulnerable if the lightweight outer skin is damaged - for another example see B732 KT-28M at Manchester in 1985 . In that case the skin was holed when a combustor can was ejected from the P&W JT8D engine - a model known to be susceptible to that particular failure mode but was not considered unsafe because of it.

BTSC was overweight......substantially

Outside of recommended parameters, but not to the extent of being unsafe.

She was without a required part in her left bogie....unconscionable

A little strong, perhaps. The omission was definitely careless bordering on negligent, but ultimately the majority agree that said omission had negligible effect on the outcome.

Regardless, she pushed back, and initiated a Take Off on the 'wrong' runway.

Which had been done safely many thousands of times before.

No-one has ever argued that AF were beyond reproach regarding this incident - maintenance SNAFUs on the part of both AF and CO combined with tragic results. (@stuckgear - would you say that's a reasonable and fair assessment?)

Characteristically, partisans focus on the irrelevant and inconsequential, in a practiced way, to distract and confuse the course of Aviation as it relates to duty of care, fundamental safety, and honestly derived profit.

Thus far the thread has been relatively free of "partisan" bickering, and long may it continue.

The Court has decided the evidence is not sufficient for criminal retribution, as regards the errant metal shard.

A welcome decision as far as I'm concerned (because I believe criminal law and aviation accident investigation don't mix), but that decision does not alter the previously accepted sequence of events or the mistakes that led to them.

jcjeant

13th Dec 2012, 21:18

DozyWanabee
Which had been done safely many thousands of times before.
Some being drunk drive their car many time with no problems
Luck factor at play
Outside of recommended parameters, but not to the extent of being unsafe.
Some drive their car who is overweight with no problems
Luck factor at play
but ultimately the majority agree that said omission had negligible effect on the outcome.
Luck factor at play
That's confirm the nickname of Air France (Air Chance)
A welcome decision as far as I'm concerned (because I believe criminal law and aviation accident investigation don't mix), but that decision does not alter the previously accepted sequence of events or the mistakes that led to them. I guess you are the same about other public transport .. as the train .. the bus .. underground .. etc.
Or do you consider that it is only for air transport that accident investigation and criminal law don't mix
How determine who must pay reparation to the victims or relatives?
Do you know another system ?

DozyWannabe

13th Dec 2012, 23:17

Some being drunk drive their car many time with no problems
Luck factor at play

Some drive their car who is overweight with no problems
Luck factor at play

Luck factor at play
That's confirm the nickname of Air France (Air Chance)

I don't understand what point you're trying to make here. I haven't seen anyone on this thread either state or imply that AF didn't have some 'splainin' to do regarding these factors.

I find the comparisons you're making above a touch inaccurate and more than a little unnecessarily emotive. F-BTSC was approximately 1t overweight at threshold - Concorde takeoffs with reheat will burn well over that surprisingly quickly. Combined with the fuel lost through the leak the upshot was that despite this and the other factors the crew had slight but positive climb established at a shade under half the runway's length - well under the distance normally used. Even though it made no ultimate difference to the outcome such performance is remarkable and demonstrates not only that the aircraft could exceed SOP parameters due to exceptional design, but also that those parameters were deliberately very conservative.

I guess you are the same about other public transport .. as the train .. the bus .. underground .. etc.

Of course! Criminal proceedings should only enter the mix if there is evidence of criminal activity. If a bus/train/lorry driver crashes but they have done no wrong in a criminal sense then they should not be prosecuted - if they were, say, over the prescribed alcohol limit then you prosecute them for that - not for the crash itself.

How determine who must pay reparation to the victims or relatives?
Do you know another system ?

Civil law.

AlphaZuluRomeo

13th Dec 2012, 23:24

As I recall, the BA airframes had an extra piece of equipment fitted to the main gear bogies to deflect debris in the event of a tyre failure. They also used a different brand and model of tyre. This is not to say that these differences would necessarily have had an effect on the outcome, but that the differences were quite substantial.

From memory, there was indeed a cable (?) fitted to the water deflectors on BA fleet, aimed to retain parts of a broken deflector to fly their own way (to a fuel tank, for example).
IIRC that followed incident involving tyres => broken deflectors on BA fleet, and was related to an optionnal A/D.
I can't remember anything else (but I didn't check for it).
Incident statistics tend to show that neither brand of tyres was immune. In that way, I would not have qualified as "quite substantial" the differences between the fleets, but that's a matter of semantics, nothing more. :)

That's confirm the nickname of Air France (Air Chance)
Hi jcjeant,

Dozy just wrote that "No-one has ever argued that AF were beyond reproach".
Would you please consider avoiding to take any chance to drag this thread towards "partisan" (or "partisan"-looking) bickering?
I agree that thus far it has been relatively free of that, and hope too that i may continue as that for long :)
Thanks!

roulishollandais

14th Dec 2012, 00:01

Certification of Concorde concerned Aerospatiale which had been solved in EADS since the 9 (to confirm) july 2000. In his General Documentation published at that date you find NOT A SINGLE WORD ABOUT CONCORDE :: EADS no more wanted to listen about Concorde (ALL THE OTHER activities and aircrafts and helicopters were described) .

This general document was mandatory to come on the market to allow potential financiers to evaluate the risks tooken by the new Company... Domlnlque Strauss-Kahn prepared EADS.

After the crash effectively EADS has been responsible for Concorde!!!!!

DozyWannabe

14th Dec 2012, 00:12

As I understood it, EADS's remit regarding Concorde extended only to parts supply at that point. The remaining airworthy airframes were owned and maintained exclusively by BA and AF.

jcjeant

14th Dec 2012, 10:43

Criminal proceedings should only enter the mix if there is evidence of criminal activity
Civil lawWhen there are people dying .. it is very rare that a judge decides that the case be tried before a civil court
Most often (and for obvious reasons.: duress of penalties .. etc) the case will be tried in criminal court
If the parties suspected of crime are innocent they risk nothing either in civil or criminal court
If the parties are guilty penalties will be stronger when tried before a criminal court than civil court
Penalties for crime are also part of moral reparation for the victims or relatives

BEagle

14th Dec 2012, 15:56

Quote:
BTSC was overweight......substantially

Outside of recommended parameters, but not to the extent of being unsafe.

Incorrect. The aircraft was over its structural weight limit, but, more importantly, it was well over RTOW. Quite why the crew didn't review the RTOW I can only put down to Gallic regulatory indifference....

There are 3 European airlines with whom I will not fly. 2 because of their behaviour of their management and 1 because of safety concerns as it has had too many accidents in recent years for my taste.....

Lyman

14th Dec 2012, 16:14

Quote:

"BTSC was overweight......substantially" My statement, (LYMAN)

"Outside of recommended parameters, but not to the extent of being unsafe."
.....Statement by DOZY WANNABE

Please know i noticed DOZY'S error... But decided not to respond; we have a history, and sometimes responses unleash pages of argument.

BEagle.....

I am not adept at research and post editing. Would you consider posting the reference that concluded BTSC was effectively six tons over legal MTOW?

Many thanks.

stuckgear

14th Dec 2012, 16:28

here you go lyman..
CONCORDE ACCIDENT : ACCIDENT REPORTS (http://www.concordesst.com/accident/report.html)

aircraft data: CONCORDE SST : Accident Report (http://www.concordesst.com/accident/englishreport/6.html)

and here: F-BTSC Preliminary Report (http://www.bea-fr.org/docspa/2000/f-sc000725pa/htm/f-sc000725pa.htm)

scroll down to 6.5..

The Operating Manual provides the maximum structural weights:

- for taxiing 186 880 kg
- at takeoff 185 070 kg

CliveL

14th Dec 2012, 17:39

The aircraft was over its structural weight limit, but, more importantly, it was well over RTOW. Quite why the crew didn't review the RTOW I can only put down to Gallic regulatory indifference....In the interests of accuracy, the final accident report section 1.6.6 states that the "maximum performance" weight calculated for the conditions of the day was 186.7 tonnes; maximum structural taxi weight 186.88 tonnes and the maximum structural take-off weight 185.07 tonnes.The actual TOW was estimated at being between 186.25 tonnes and 185.76 tonnes depending on how passenger weights were calculated.

So the aircraft was between 1,180 and 700 kg over the structural MTOW (0.4~ 0.6%) but under the RTOW for the day. It was never six tonnes over the legal limit.

DozyWannabe

14th Dec 2012, 17:43

Thanks Clive,

I remember that coming out of a discussion some time ago. Am I correct in surmising that while a shade outside the MTOW numbers it was not significantly unsafe to do so?

jcjeant

14th Dec 2012, 18:25

In the interests of accuracy, the final accident report section 1.6.6 states that the "maximum performance" weight calculated for the conditions of the day was 186.7 tonnes; maximum structural taxi weight 186.88 tonnes and the maximum structural take-off weight 185.07 tonnes.The actual TOW was estimated at being between 186.25 tonnes and 185.76 tonnes depending on how passenger weights were calculated.So the aircraft was between 1,180 and 700 kg over the structural MTOW (0.4~ 0.6%) but under the RTOW for the day. It was never six tonnes over the legal limit. It was never six tonnes over the legal limit
On the same page of the french final report I read :
Pour un vent arrière de huit noeuds, la masse au décollage est réduite a 180 300 kg en raison d'une limitation vitesse pneumatique. For eight knots tailwind, the takeoff weight is reduced to 180,300 kg due to a limitation speed tire.
Math:
185.76 - 180.30 = ?

stuckgear

14th Dec 2012, 18:44

So the aircraft was between 1,180 and 700 kg over the structural MTOW (0.4~ 0.6%) but under the RTOW for the day. It was never six tonnes over the legal limit.

if its 1kg outside of the structural weight as defined by the certificating authority, as defined by the type certificate approval, it is outside of certification. period.

DozyWannabe

14th Dec 2012, 19:05

if its 1kg outside of the structural weight as defined by the certificating authority, as defined by the type certificate approval, it is outside of certification. period.

No-one's arguing against that - it was outside (albeit marginally) the MTOW numbers, an oversight for which AF should be (and IIRC were) censured. This does not alter the fact that it was within RTOW and therefore not materially unsafe - borne out by the fact that they achieved positive climb well short of the usual takeoff distance.

Neither does it alter the fact that the damage to the airframe which eventually brought it down was caused by the tyre explosion which was in turn caused by the presence of the strip on the runway. I'm still at a loss trying to understand the intent of these posts.

CliveL

14th Dec 2012, 19:12

Math:
185.76 - 180.30 = ? 5.46 tonnes, which even with rounding up is less than 6 tonnes :D

But if we are being picky, we should include:

For all of these values, the influence of an increase in weight of one ton was examined and found to be negligible.
For a tailwind of 8 kt, the takeoff weight is reduced to 183,300 kilograms due to a tyre speed limitation.
statements which are not on the same page. :rolleyes: Also the actual tail wind at brake release was between 3 and 4 kts. But I grant you that the tailwind prediction may have led to the early rotation.

jcjeant

14th Dec 2012, 19:50

No-one's arguing against that - it was outside (albeit marginally) the MTOW numbers
I'm still at a loss trying to understand the intent of these posts. That's mean , legal matter that this aircraft was no authorized to take off
If the rules were respected (or I ask .. why make rules ?) .. never this aircraft had take off .. never tire will meet any FOD (metat strip or even a buldozer) on the runway
From memory it was also a problem (papers) with the medical certificate of the captain
If a bridge is broken (and it's warnings and barriers) and a car falls in the hole .. of course the hole is the reason why the car falls and driver killed
But in first place .. the driver had not respected the warning (the rule)
Many legal matters were not respected this day and allowed the fatal meeting with the metal strip ..

DozyWannabe

14th Dec 2012, 20:57

That's mean , legal matter that this aircraft was no authorized to take off

No, departure clearance from the tower is final in a legal sense IIRC
.
If the rules were respected (or I ask .. why make rules ?) .. never this aircraft had take off .. never tire will meet any FOD (metat strip or even a buldozer) on the runway

As I said before, Concorde was a thirsty jet - if the weight error had been picked up they may have waited at the threshold for the excess fuel to burn off - a matter of a few minutes at most, and it wasn't a busy day.

From memory it was also a problem (papers) with the medical certificate of the captain

From the report:

The Captain and the Flight Engineer possessed the requisite qualifications and certificates to undertake the flight. In application of a clause in the FCL 1 regulations on the length of validity of medical certificates, subsequently modified, the First Officer’s licence was not valid after 18 July 2000.

A procedural oversight certainly, but not one that impacted safe operation of the flight.

If a bridge is broken (and it's warnings and barriers) and a car falls in the hole .. of course the hole is the reason why the car falls and driver killed
But in first place .. the driver had not respected the warning (the rule)

Not really a valid analogy. If the procedural errors had been caught at an earlier stage it would have been unlikely to result in the cancellation of the flight - indeed it would have more than likely departed at a similar time and in the same manner as it did on the day.

Many legal matters were not respected this day and allowed the fatal meeting with the metal strip ..

A bridge too far, mon ami. Going back to our earlier discussion, the reason why I believe criminal law to be unsuited to blanket application with aviation accidents is that it is too blunt an instrument for that purpose.

[The tragic debacle following the G-AWNO "Penta Hotel" incident is but one factor in why I believe this so strongly...]

There's no question that mistakes were made by AF that day - but those mistakes had no material influence on the sequence of events, by which I mean that even if they had been corrected prior to pushback, the contact with the titanium strip and subsequent events would still have resulted in the same outcome. Similarly, if the damage caused by the tyre burst had been less catastrophic and they'd been able to make it to Le Bourget it would not alter the fact that the tyre burst was precipitated by the shoddy repair that left the strip on the runway.

This applies to other incidents too - for example if, in 1977, PA1736 had successfully cleared the Los Rodeos runway before Capt. van Zanten of KLM4805 began his take-off roll it would not have absolved Capt. van Zanten of taking off without clearance.

In summary, one cannot apply breaches of protocol selectively - every single one must be accounted for and hopefully remedied.

BEagle

14th Dec 2012, 21:55

In the interests of accuracy, the final accident report section 1.6.6 states that the "maximum performance" weight calculated for the conditions of the day was 186.7 tonnes; maximum structural taxi weight 186.88 tonnes and the maximum structural take-off weight 185.07 tonnes.The actual TOW was estimated at being between 186.25 tonnes and 185.76 tonnes depending on how passenger weights were calculated.

186.7 might have been the RTOW for the planned conditions, but emphatically not for the actual conditions.... Given the tailwind component, the crew should have recalculated RTOW and taken the reciprocal runway, rather than giving a Gallic shrug of the shoulders, announcing <<Top!>> and risking it.....

The aircraft was outside both structural MTOW and the more limiting RTOW at the brakes-off point of the take-off roll. Such cavalier attitudes to scheduled performance requirements do not inspire much confidence in the operations of the airline in question.

DozyWannabe

14th Dec 2012, 22:13

jcjeant

14th Dec 2012, 23:47

@BEagle - no-one is disputing that errors, some of which were significant, were made by AF (and the F-BTSC crew) on the day. As a contributor I have a deep and abiding respect for, could you explain the reasoning behind continued stress on this already accepted point?Well .. not all points were stressed by the BEA
The BEA in the recommendations also don't stress about some irregularities attributable to Air France
It makes recommendations about baggage .. tire .. means for recording data .. administrative documents .. and also a note on maintenance
Nothing about the fact of downwind take off .. weight unfulfilled .. etc.
It's very interesting to read some of the answers (in court) of the chief of the BEA (At those day Mr Louis Arslanian)
Unfortunately all those "minutes" are in french and I have not find a english translation so far
http://procesconcorde.fenvac.org/?m=20100202 (http://procesconcorde.fenvac.org/?m=20100302)

DozyWannabe

15th Dec 2012, 00:01

Nothing about the fact of downwind take off .. weight unfulfilled .. etc.

This excess fuel did not attract any comment from the Captain, apart from his remark that they were going to take off at the aircraft’s structural limits. Equally, the controller’s announcement of a tailwind did not lead to the slightest comment from the crew, which is, as we have seen, surprising.

Taking into account the fuel not consumed during taxiing, the aircraft’s takeoff weight in fact exceeded the maximum weight by about one ton.

Seems pretty clearly covered to me (and I found these paragraphs in under 30 seconds with the "Find" function)...

Lyman

15th Dec 2012, 00:46

In the eyes of at least one august body, the accepted myth has undergone game change.

This was a complex and data filled conclusion, this original theory, that Continental was exclusively responsible, criminally for BTSC's demise.

The balance has been lost, the equilibrium disturbed, so a new look at the available data is well worth a chat.

Who would instead claim there is nothing new to assess, traditional importances to be re-evaluated, and conclusions to rock?

No stronger proof against truth, save an unwillingness to encounter discomfort in its pursuit....

Comfort the afflicted.....but afflict the comfortable...

Sheesh

DozyWannabe

15th Dec 2012, 01:29

This was a complex and data filled conclusion, this original theory, that Continental was exclusively responsible, criminally for BTSC's demise.

An inaccurate surmise. Based on the evidence presented, one French judge determined that despite the acknowledged errors on AF's part (some of which were serious, though none of which had any significant effect on the accident sequence), the maintenance error on the CO DC-10 *did* directly contribute to the accident sequence and as such the judge determined that CO were guilty of negligence.

This thread was initiated because that judicial decision was overturned by a different judge* - nothing more than that. The conclusions and report of the investigation (neither of which apportioned responsibility) still stand.

[* - A feature of the judicial process is that different judges can and will draw different conclusions when presented with the same or similar evidence depending on their interpretation of legal statute.]

jcjeant

15th Dec 2012, 03:11

Seems pretty clearly covered to me (and I found these paragraphs in under 30 seconds with the "Find" function)... Yes .. this is in the chapter "Established facts"
My remark was about the chapter "Recommendations"
The BEA in the recommendations also don't stress about some irregularities attributable to Air FranceThis is a lax of the pilots concerning weight .. wind .. etc ..
Note that the lax of AF pilots is another time noted in the BEA final report of the AF447
But again .. in the recommendations .. nothing clearly said about the "AF culture" (or lax) who seems to be in many AF accidents a common factor

DozyWannabe

15th Dec 2012, 03:27

@jcj:

In "Recommendations":

The technical investigation brought to light various malfunctions relating to the operation of the aircraft, for example the use of non-updated flight preparation data, the absence of archiving of certain documents or incomplete baggage management. Equally, omitting the left bogie spacer was a consequence of non-respect of established procedures and of the
failure to use the appropriate tool. Consequently, the BEA recommends that:

the DGAC undertake an audit of Concorde operational and maintenance conditions within Air France.

With all due respect, I recommend you take some time to read the document you claim is missing information before making those claims public, because it can do nothing but harm your argument if your supposition is incorrect.

jcjeant

15th Dec 2012, 03:33

I don't feel harmed ... I'm armoured ... reason that I dare post on forums ... :8

DozyWannabe

15th Dec 2012, 03:45

"Dare" has nothing to do with it (because anyone can post here) - the fact is that you have made several claims regarding the BEA report which are demonstrably untrue.

Taking this on a whimsical tangent, if this discussion were being held in a court of law you'd be risking a perjury charge. Why do so when all it takes to verify the content of the report is to read it?

stuckgear

15th Dec 2012, 07:28

If the procedural errors had been caught at an earlier stage it would have been unlikely to result in the cancellation of the flight - indeed it would have more than likely departed at a similar time and in the same manner as it did on the day.

irrelevant.

coulda/woulda/shoulda...

the incident occured to *that* aircraft at *that* time, under *those* specific circumstances.

what's your agenda here DW?

roulishollandais

15th Dec 2012, 07:52

Dozy,
The rhetoric of a Court is not the same than a web forum rhetoric. Here we try to "think " together in a team work and brainstorming method. In the world village we need to write the progression of elaborating a more acurate doctrine.

BEagle

15th Dec 2012, 08:20

DozyWannabe, do you actually understand the mandatory requirements of aircraft scheduled performance?

Do you understand the effect of OAT and W/V on RTOW?

A commercial air transport aircraft such as Concorde may not commence the take-off run if ATOW > MTOW or RTOW, whichever is the lesser.

However, at no point in the 14 seconds between receiving take-off clearance and commencing the take-off roll did any of the crew comment on the need to review their take-off performance figures.

stuckgear

15th Dec 2012, 08:31

the TC (type Certificate)

[...]

A type certificate, is awarded by aviation regulating bodies to aerospace manufacturers after it has been established that the particular design of a civil aircraft, engine, or propeller has fulfilled the regulating bodies' current prevailing airworthiness requirements for the safe conduct of flights under all normally conceivable conditions (military types are usually exempted). Aircraft produced under a type certified design are issued a standard airworthiness certificate.

A type certificate (TC) is a design approval issued by the civil aviation authority (CAA) of a given country (such as the US FAA and EU EASA) when the applicant demonstrates that a product complies with the applicable regulations. The TC normally includes the type design, the operating limitations, the type certificate data sheet (TCDS), the applicable regulations, and other conditions or limitations prescribed by the CAA. The TC is the foundation for other approvals, including production and airworthiness approvals. TC's are normally issued for airframes, engines and propellers.

An "airworthiness certificate" is only issued to an aircraft that is properly registered and was found to conform its TCDS and be in a condition for safe operations. The airworthiness certificate is valid and the aircraft may be operated as long as it is maintained in accordance with the rules issued by the CAA

my bold and underline.

are you getting the point yet, as you dont seem to understand the very basics.. as "[you are] still at a loss trying to understand the intent of these posts. "

Outside the limitations as set forth by the TC, invalidates the TC and the Airwothiness Cert.. the aircraft may still be capable of performing if it is 1kg over weight, that is irrelevent, it invalidates the TC and subsequently the Airworthiness Cert.; Same if it has parts missing that are part of the design as approved.

AlphaZuluRomeo

15th Dec 2012, 09:09

186.7 might have been the RTOW for the planned conditions, but emphatically not for the actual conditions.... Given the tailwind component, the crew should have recalculated RTOW and taken the reciprocal runway, rather than giving a Gallic shrug of the shoulders, announcing <<Top!>> and risking it.....
Always in the interest of accuracy, the actual wind was not blowing at 8kt as announced by the TWR, but much less (Reference: Meteo Data, IIRC quoted in the final report, I think the word was "negligible" or something like that).
The crew might have been aware of that, "simply" by looking at the windsock.;)
Or it could have been they didn't care ("cavalier attitude")?
But then, why an early and slow rotation, which seemed aimed to bring relief to the U/C, being close/a little over the limit?:rolleyes:

Seems some of the last posts on this page are more and more about being "against" a certain member, whom I think makes valuable contributions. I therefore regret that, much. :hmm: Would it not be more useful to discuss the matter at hand without using a tone aimed (IMO) to harm? :=

stuckgear

15th Dec 2012, 09:17

Seems some of the last posts on this page are more and more about being "against" a certain member, whom I think makes valuable contributions. I therefore regret that, much. http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/yeees.gif Would it not be more useful to discuss the matter at hand without using a tone aimed (IMO) to harm? :=

i've posted nothing that i wouldn't say to dozy face to face in a pub, over mutually shared bag of pork scratchings.

SLFinAZ

15th Dec 2012, 17:29

I've stayed out of this rehash....

In the end I have a relatively simple question.

At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident.

AF maintenance was demonstrably unprofessional.

AF operations was demonstrably unprofessional.

AF PIC was demonstrably unprofessional.

AF flight engineer was demonstrably unprofessional.

You can argue that in reviewing this event in totality that AF demonstrated such a complete lack of professionalism in every aspect of it's operations that an accident of this type was unavoidable at some point regardless of the specific triggering event.

When you further recognize that specific sworn testimony from the fire fighters on hand does raise a level of doubt regarding the root cause and actual moment the fire started. Given that these individuals are specifically trained in observation and were in place specifically in case of this type of event I am amazed how easily there observations are dismissed by some.

In the end AF seems to have developed such significant cultural issues that its actual standard of performance much more closely resembles that of a 3rd world flag carrier then that of a "1st world" nation...

Lyman

15th Dec 2012, 17:56

SLF

"At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident."

Generally, after the fact, and often not even then.

People who work in association with eachother (vendor, regulator) develop a camaraderie that often trumps duty, and integrity. It doesn't take much in a "complex operating environment".

Why did EASA relax inspections on the TRENT 700 prior to QF32? How did Thales remain on the 330? "Judgment calls" occasionally lay on the lax side of decisionmaking. Unfortunately, in many accidents, the fact that "regulation" is seen as "interpretive" results in the need to polish turds...after the fact

You ask the important question, Sedona.

Nick Thomas

16th Dec 2012, 01:00

"At what point does a demonstrated lack of professionalism in a complex operating environment override any other relevant components of the accident."
Never as the reason for the accident was the DC10 strip on the runway,see the posts of AlphaZuluRomeo and DozyWannabe who both clearly explain how without that piece of metal the accident wouldn't have happened.
That doesn't mean that a "demonstrated lack of professionalism" if proved shouldn't be addressed.
The difference of opinion highlighted in many of the previous post is in my view caused by trying to prove that "a demonstrated lack of professionalism" trumps the DC10 strip on the runway.

SLFinAZ

16th Dec 2012, 03:16

Again,

We have sworn testimony from a professional firefighting crew specifically trained to deal with potential issues specific to the Concorde...after all that's why they were there:) who state (and this is multiple individuals) that the fire appeared to start prior to the estimated point of impact with the titanium strip.

Given both the training and specific reason they were present they meet the criteria for expert witnesses. This casts a measure of doubt on the debris being the actual cause of the fire.

Now lets go beyond that and look at other variables. While the asymmetrical engine thrust undoubtedly caused a significant portion of the drift the missing spacer has significant potential to add to that drift...potentially causing the impact with lighting etc...

While computer projections project that regardless of flight crew actions the wing/control elements would have burned through...we do not know if proper action by the FE would have allowed continued flight until that point and what the margin of error for the projection is. Regardless of it being 1% or .0000001% the FE's actions are what doomed the plane at that moment. The actual crash occurred when/where it did because of his inappropriate conduct.

The reality is that no one truly objective can say with certainty that the titanium strip caused the fire or that if the flight engineer acted correctly the plane had zero chance for a controlled crash landing that would have allowed for some survivors.

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 04:26

Was Continental Responsible For the Concorde Crash? « Heritage Concorde (http://heritageconcorde.com/facts/was-continental-responsible-for-the-concorde-crash)

I note in the photo of the skid marks leading to the frangible RW light fixture a pronounced linear oscillation by number three tyre..... (the shimmy)

At two hundred mph, that might have been snubbed by the missing thrust washer/spacer? Its production of drag could not have helped the attempt to regain the centerline?

From "Heritage Concorde"

"By the day of the accident the shear bush had moved a full seven inches out of alignment to the point where the two washers were almost touching."

bille1319

16th Dec 2012, 05:07

It's surprising that she stayed in service as long she did. Even with the fuel tank revamping and anti collision avoidance system installations it was evident she was way too long in the tooth. Hardly a week went by that I did not hear Speedbird 1 or 2 calling up Shanwick or Gander on HF ssb for lower flight levels as the air intake doors had problems. The passenger cabin was hardly more comfortable than that of a Dash 8 but the prestige and service was unrivalled and just listening on T2 spectators roof at Heathrow to the Olympus engine whine on taxying or the roar on take-off from R27 after she jumped the long queue will never be surpassed or seen again.:hmm:

mm43

16th Dec 2012, 06:05

Her resurrection is nigh!

No it ain't mates, she died and is dead!

But how and why she died will live on forever, and though I admire the cut and thrust of the PPRuNe contributors, I feel that the subject has died, and all that should have or not have been done by those in all forms of control can be argued until the cows come home (in whatever Grassy Valley), the outcome has already been determined by the justice (injustice?) system.

We can no more make a "silk purse" from a "sow's ear" than could the actors of the day replay and correct their final act(s) from their graves. R.I.P.

Capn Bloggs

16th Dec 2012, 07:11

"sow's ear"
The Concorde a Sow's Ear? Wash ya mouth out with pork fat! :p

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 10:41

Hi SLFinAZ,

I agree that we got (with my comments in [brackets]):
- sworn testimonies by highly respectable & trained people, [that I never saw quoted in extenso (if you have a reference, I'm interested), except for one ATC who said IIRC (TV show) he was not looking towards Concorde when she began her T/O roll];
- sworn testimonies by certainly also respectable people, [but not trained in any way, for exemple the foreman seen in the TV parallel inquiries];
- all those people were situated, at the time of the accident, relatively far from the aircraft [making it difficult to jaudge distances];
- the "step" on the runway that could have played a role "before the strip" [but I can't remember any evidence or even precise/factual hypothesis about that].

Now, on the "other side", we also got:
- no single hard evidence of fire (or any other arising problem) before the blown tyre/fuel leak event;
- no satisfying scenario able to explain where/why a fire would have been present before the strip/tyre/leak event (not even the missing spacer, see quote below);
- evidence (damaged concrete) of the tyre blowning up at the time when & place where the final report said it occured;
- evidences of the fuel leak beginning at the time when & place where the final report said it occured;
- evidences of this fuel leak taking fire shorlty afterwards;
- correlation of all those with the FDR traces;
- correlation of all those with the CVR recordings;
- correlation between those events and the TWR ATC message "Concorde, vous avez des flammes derrière vous".

The lack of precision of eyewitnesses is relatively common, if we're to believe what professionals experienced in working with witnesses say on the topic.
My conclusion is, then, that without meaning the slightest disrespect to sworn and/or professional witnesses, their testimonies must be somehow incorrect/not enough precise.

Quote from B. Sieker (op. cit. in my #160): The report makes a point of recording that there was no sign of abnormality in the taxying and takeoff run up to the point of tyre destruction. There was no shimmy, no deviation from track, the brake temperatures were equal RHS and LHS, and the longitudinal acceleration was consistent with the TO mass and ambient conditions. Let us accept that ensemble as evidence that any bogie misalignment due to the missing spacer became a potential problem only after the destruction of the tyre.

jcjeant

16th Dec 2012, 11:05

I agree that we got (with my comments in [brackets]):
- sworn testimonies by highly respectable & trained people, [that I never saw quoted in extenso (if you have a reference, I'm interested), except for one ATC who said IIRC (TV show) he was not looking towards Concorde when she began her T/O roll];
- sworn testimonies by certainly also respectable people, [but not trained in any way, for exemple the foreman seen in the TV parallel inquiries];
- all those people were situated, at the time of the accident, relatively far from the aircraft [making it difficult to jaudge distances];
- the "step" on the runway that could have played a role "before the strip" [but I can't remember any evidence or even precise/factual hypothesis about that].I think you can have some answers to your questions about references in the minutes of the trial:
2 « février « 2010 « Procès du crash du CONCORDE (http://procesconcorde.fenvac.org/?m=20100202)

dalek

16th Dec 2012, 11:23

SLF

Retrospective knowledge is wonderful. We now know that once the exploding tyre or titanium strip had caused a fire on that scale, a controlled crash landing was impossible.

It is unlikely that the crew knew this until the final couple of seconds before impact.

Carrying out an emergency drill (engine shutdown) before the aircraft is at safe height and speed smacks of poor airmanship. Or at least it was on any of the aircraft I have been on.

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 12:01

Thanks jcjeant, but there is "only" Me METZNER PoV there.
I see no testimonies. Should I look at other pages? I will try to find something better suited on that blog, but it may require some time.

As a lawyer in court, Me METZNER had a clear and open agenda.
I've no problem with that, but I'm not interested in discussing his PoV, nor am I ready to take it into account for an analysis :)

EDIT
- sworn testimonies by highly respectable & trained people, [that I never saw quoted in extenso (if you have a reference, I'm interested)
Disregard, my bad and so on (about the bold part) the testimonies are "simply" available in the Appendix 6 of the BEA final report. Will re-read that.

SLFinAZ

16th Dec 2012, 13:19

dalek you know no such thing. We can certainly agree that the catastrophic nature of the event made any type of controlled crash landing highly improbable. Can you tell me with 100% absolute certainty that a flight deck crew of aviators the caliber of Alfred Haynes and Dennis Fitch might not have accomplished a miracle?

We need to look no farther then the annals of any nations military aviation to find incidents of planes and/or people surviving catastrophic damage. The sad truth is that while events doomed the air-frame the specific cause of the crash was flight crew error.

How is it OK to argue that without the titanium strip none of the other deficiencies really matter yet dismiss the actual cause of the crash (FE's incorrect response). I'll use UA 232 as my argument. Had a less qualified flight crew destabilized the aircraft resulting in a high altitude loss of control and crash...many of you would be arguing the design flaws of the DC-10 as the root cause and dismissing the upset...since the plane was clearly doomed.

Yet more people lived then died that day. At the end of the day it's not really over till the aviator can no longer aviate. In this case the weakest link on the flight deck removed any opportunity for survival at a time when the plane was still capable of controlled flight.

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 14:18

With respect, I would like to invite interested people to view the photograph in the Heritage link.

The shimmy is obvious. the trail of rubber has a cycle roughly the circumference of the tyres, and an excursion from center of close to one foot. That suggests the out of balance condition of the right side of the portside bogie contributed to the skid.

That means the ruptured tyre is contributory. Also note the dark scrub of the #2 tyre in roughly the same cycle as the bogie's oscillatory condition... That suggests the tyre was essentially still on the wheel, with the ruptured deficit causing severe drag.

A bogie with a blowout will not shimmy like that. Period. Can we surmise the bogie stated to shimmy at brakes release? Yes, I would say, yes.

Now, given the state of the bogie's wobble, I can suggest that as speed increased, it worsened. The vibration would have reached substantial effect in the cockpit (imo), and now we come to #2 engine cut.

Did FE have evidence to cut the engine? Of course. What was the nature of the evidence to hand to cause FE to take such a remarkable action? Temps? Tower? (ATC) "..derriere vous...."

I submit that FE associated the extreme portside bogie vibration with engine failure....

At 120 mph, the bogie would wobble seven times (right, left) EACH SECOND.

I estimate the weight of the bogie at approximately 2000 pounds.

I urge all objective people to see the photographic image, and decide if they can see the scalloped trail of rubber left by the 1 and 3 tyres.

At the runway light, the a/c was travelling closer to 250mph.

SLFinAZ

16th Dec 2012, 15:41

In many ways the damage sustained by Concorde F-BVFC in the June, 1979 incident at Dulles was probably as severe if not worse than that sustained by sister ship F-BTSC on that fateful flight in July of 2000.

Probably (IMO) the most telling comment based entirely on factual observation vs informed speculation.

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 15:46

If the image I reference is not fake, I submit the out of line track of the tyres is a matter concluded by factual observation.

with all due respect....

SLF

Yes, I see that, I thought you were addressing my point re: shimmy.

Add to your (below) comment...

The dispatcher was also made aware of a technical issue with the new aircraft, F-BTSC, when his computer indicated that the thrust reverser on the number two engine was inoperative due to an issue with the secondary nozzle.* The aircraft could be safely operated in this condition but the issue would reduce the aircraft’s maximum operating weight by 2.5%.

That is roughly 5000 pounds. For performance, did the aircrew subtract that from maximum allowable TOW?

I completely agree: that the tyre burst is indisputable, its mechanism of failure is less important than the history of similar events, and the utter lack of mitigation that followed Dulles. The complete disregard for safety given the dozens of incidents is inexcusable. In that context, the Titanium strip takes on a more subtle role, that of scapegoat....

SLFinAZ

16th Dec 2012, 16:14

Lyman, we are discussing different issues. My point is that regardless of the cause of the tyre failure the damage incurred in the two incidents is similar and the Dulles incident actually had potentially greater damage to the air frame...

Further....

While the condition experienced was highly unusual and not something for which any crew had been trained to deal with the crew failed to follow one of the most basic responsibilities of a pilot. No matter what happens, no matter how many alarm bells or warning are going off, your chief responsibility is to fly the airplane. An engine fire can be dealt with, but only after a stable climbout has been achieved. By shutting the #2 engine down the crew eliminated any available margin that might have kept the aircraft in the air long enough to reach Le Bourget.

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 17:27

After reviewing the 3 firemen testimonies (and a waiting captain's), I note 2 things:

First, even if the 3 firemen were in the same room, they don't give the same exact same location/timing for the events.
Example: event "blake smoke like a tyre exploding" at around S6 or S5 for two of the firemen, while the third didn't see the black smoke, but only the beginning of the fire, around S5, with first a small flame at the rear of the engine (different from the reheat), then the big flame everybody saw later.

Nevertheless, they were close enough (not like the foreman I remembered from a TV show) and their descriptions are precise enough to come to the conclusion that it seems the "black smoke" event took place at or shortly before the "first apparent trace of destroyed tyre" located between W7 and W6 on the appendix12.
Indeed "around S5" and "shortly after W7" are close enough - or were, in 2000, now the taxiway have different names.

Also noteworthy is the confusion in some TV shows when they said that witnesses had said the fire had begun a long distance (wasn't 1 km quoted?) before the strip. Yep. That is before where the strip was finally found. Not before where the strip probably was when Concorde rolled over it. I really have no difficulty to imagine the strip being swept along the trajectory of the aircraft, as its 200 tons rolled over it... but it seems that notion eludes some people anyway.

Second, many people said the BEA just "disregarded" the testimonies of the firemen. Not so, as seen above.
And quite not, when we read in extenso the appendix6. We understand then that the fact that the BEA was so keen to say the fire may have begun at the rear of the engines (by opposition to the second theory of the ignition in the U/C bay, which is the only one the AAIB considers valid) is somehow directly related to the testimonies of the firemen, which were trusted (as they should be) regarding the sequence of events (first this, then that: we human are good for that; not so when it came to precisely locate (in the space or time) this or that).

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 17:39

AZR

BTSC took off with an inop Thrust reverser on #2. It was legal, but reduced her max op weight by 2.5%.

It is not possible to know what FE was acting on, but if #2 was problematic, even in his thought only.......

Something triggered his desperate attempt to cage the #2 engine.

What do you make of the "black smoke" re: the "tyre burst"?

I would associate black smoke with unburned (neat) fuel out the nozzle?

Nick Thomas

16th Dec 2012, 18:02

"Can you tell me with 100% absolute certainty that a flight deck crew of aviators the caliber of Alfred Haynes and Dennis Fitch might not have accomplished a miracle?

We need to look no farther then the annals of any nations military aviation to find incidents of planes and/or people surviving catastrophic damage. The sad truth is that while events doomed the air-frame the specific cause of the crash was flight crew error.

How is it OK to argue that without the titanium strip none of the other deficiencies really matter yet dismiss the actual cause of the crash (FE's incorrect response). I'll use UA 232 as my argument. Had a less qualified flight crew destabilized the aircraft resulting in a high altitude loss of control and crash...many of you would be arguing the design flaws of the DC-10 as the root cause and dismissing the upset...since the plane was clearly doomed."

SLFinAZ the UA 232 is a red herring as it's no way comparable with this incident.
Firstly it happened at altitude and secondly they had an extra qualified pilot travelling on the flight. So the time they had to deal with the problem was considerably greater than the Concorde crew. That in no way takes away from the skill and expertise of the UA 232 crew. Yes the design flaws of the DC10 were the root cause of that incident.
To blame the late FE for the crash is simplistic and flawed and to expect any flight crew to be able to perform "miracles" is preposterous.
If you read my earlier post I clearly state that whilst the other deficiencies had no direct bearing on the crash, it does not mean that action should not be taken to correct them. The crash would have happened with or without the deficiencies.
Can I tell you with 100% certainty that the UA 232 crew would not have saved the day. They are human so I doubt that they can perform "miracles". The best people to answer that question would be the UA 232 crew. In fact this line of argument is better suited to the pub as it resembles the typical pub discussion comparing sporting teams of different eras, whilst fun it has no value in this case.

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 18:05

BTSC took off with an inop Thrust reverser on #2. It was legal, but reduced her max op weight by 2.5%.
No, the reverser motor (cause of inop) was replaced before departure, by request of the crew after the plane change (BTSC was the reserve aircraft for that day).

What do you make of the "black smoke" re: the "tyre burst"?

I would associate black smoke with unburned (neat) fuel out the nozzle?
No, the testimonies (in french) are pretty clear. Black (puff of) smoke, located at/near the U/C, not at/near the nozzle.
Shortly after that, fire begun with a small flame at first (said the firefighters). Then, the big flame we all saw with, then, black smoke (yes again), this time from uncomplete burn of the leaked kerozen. But there is no confusion possible for a french reader.

SLFinAZ

16th Dec 2012, 18:22

Again I'm sorry but your comment is completely incorrect. Under no circumstances is it appropriate to shut down the #2 engine below 400 ft regardless of circumstances. UA 232 is in no way a red herring but an indication of what is possible under extreme circumstances.

The shut down of #2 engine directly contributed to the specific circumstances of the crash. Had the engine been left on in accordance with specific SOPs that clearly state that no engine (even if on fire) is to be shut down below 400 ft a different specific outcome would have emerged.

This does not mean a different final outcome but we'll never know, what we do know with 100% certainty is that the FE's flawed decision robbed the captain of any chance to successfully control the "landing".

This seems to go back to the numerous 447 threads that all go beyond a basic lack of airmanship. At the end of the day that plane crashed entirely due to a lack of basic piloting skills. Neither individual was even remotely qualified to be in the pointy end of a commercial airliner.

jcjeant

16th Dec 2012, 19:06

I really have no difficulty to imagine the strip being swept along the trajectory of the aircraft, as its 200 tons rolled over it... but it seems that notion eludes some people anyway.Yes I have really difficulty to imagine the strip being swept along the trajectory (over such a large distance) of the aircraft ...
It is a concept that escapes me completely .. seems some"magic" at work there .. :)

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 19:49

The shut down of #2 engine directly contributed to the specific circumstances of the crash. Had the engine been left on in accordance with specific SOPs that clearly state that no engine (even if on fire) is to be shut down below 400 ft a different specific outcome would have emerged.

This does not mean a different final outcome but we'll never know
Agreed until there... :)

what we do know with 100% certainty is that the FE's flawed decision robbed the captain of any chance to successfully control the "landing".
... but I agree no more here:
- as per SOPs, the #2 engine would have most certainly been shut down once in flight & above 400ft;
- hence any landing attempt would have been on 3 engines "only", which is abnormal but certainly not "without a chance".

Yes I have really difficulty to imagine the strip being swept along the trajectory (over such a large distance) of the aircraft ...
It is a concept that escapes me completely .. seems some"magic" at work there .. :)
What is the definition of "such a large distance" for you?
I'm fond of Harry Potter, but not so fond of magic regarding aviation safety.

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 20:26

If the Titanium had slashed and punctured cross tread, it is quite possible it stayed with the carcass for a time. Evidence of the transverse slash is shown in the runway photo I reference from Heritage Concorde. If that is the case, that the black deposit is from the cut, then we know that piece of tyre was retained at least up to that point. I think the fuel stain is prior to the loss of directional control to left. Thus suggesting the tyre rupture was not initially responsible for the off runway excursion, imho.

Once the two "flaps" of tread parted, the Titanium obviously was released.

Why would a tyre rupture cause such extreme yaw? I do not think that it did.

Nick Thomas

16th Dec 2012, 21:51

SLFinAz I still stand by comment that the UA 232 flight is a Red Herring. I do agree with you when you say the engine should have not been shut down below 400ft, but because something shouldn't be done doesn't automatically mean that it must be the primary cause of the accident. For you to convince me that you view is worthy of consideration you will have to refute the findings of the BEA.
There are many theories being put forward in this thread and for them to have any credence they must be backed up by verifiable facts. Quoting Heritage Concorde, newspapers or other forums do not pass that test. You can belive what you want but that does not entitle you to overlook the vast body of evidence that has been tested by a far more rigorous body than this forum. Nor does trying to claim that the accident investigation is trying to hid the truth. In fact to be blunt this thread reads very like all others where people claim that there is a conspiracy in place.

Lyman

16th Dec 2012, 22:36

Nick Thomas

Would you consider viewing the runway photography of the skid marks and making a comment?

I see evidence of oscillatory movement about the bogie's horizontal plane.

For me, with some experience in vehicular investigation, the marks show a distinct wobble, such that a rate and distance of displacement can be readily discerned. Given the expected ground speed of the bogie, a cycles per second can be ascertained.

There is also evidence of tread crush, the siping width varies in concert with this cyclical action. This is indicative of side loading, or "scrub".

Will you please comment? Thanks.

I know the pic is from other than BEA, but it is intriguing, and I believe it is genuine.

Nick Thomas

16th Dec 2012, 23:24

Hi Lyman
I am not an accident investigator so am unable to draw conclusions from those photographs. From reading this thread I know you think they are important and that is your right so to do. My view is that there are two opposing views represented on this thread. One in it many guises doesn't accept the BAE report and will spare no effort in promoting their theories. The other (of which am a member) take the view that out of the available information present, the BAE report is the most useful in understanding what happened.

Where I do agree with those who don't accept the report or parts of it, is that the many other failures brought to the fore after this sad crash should be addressed but that doesn't mean that they actually caused the crash. In other words am of the view that even if all these points had been addressed before the incident the crash would have still occurred with the same awful outcome.

From previous conversations with you on this forum(when you were know as Bearfoil) I respect that you are trying to establish the truth. My path towards getting a better understanding of this tragic event is a different one to yours and therefore for me looking at the photographs you mention, will be of little value, as I am not expert enough to draw conclusions from them. The other reason am disinclined to view them is that it would mean that in order to be fair I should carefully study all the other evidence presented here that questions the report.

In science when something new is postulated it normally undergoes a peer review and if that is favourable it is then included in the body of scientific knowledge. Of course over time this theory will again be tested and if then found wanting the body of scientific knowledge will be revised to accept this new development. Why do I mention this. Well for my understanding of this incident to be increased or changed, then the BAE report will have to be challenged by another body of similar standing. As I have said earlier I am not an expert in this field and I therefore have to trust those who are considered to be so. I presume that other people posting here will not agree with my last point but may I suggest that in questioning the report you must have considerable confidence in your ability to understand third hand a very complex accident

AlphaZuluRomeo

16th Dec 2012, 23:55

I know the pic is from other than BEA, but it is intriguing, and I believe it is genuine.
No Lyman, I'm sorry but this pic is from page 64 of the final report; there are other pics from the runway in pages before and after that. ;)
All those pics show places where Concorde was after the destruction of the tyre from wheel #2. Hence I fail to see where you're heading to? :confused:

As previously quoted:
Quote from B. Sieker (op. cit. in my #160): The report makes a point of recording that there was no sign of abnormality in the taxying and takeoff run up to the point of tyre destruction. There was no shimmy, no deviation from track, the brake temperatures were equal RHS and LHS, and the longitudinal acceleration was consistent with the TO mass and ambient conditions. Let us accept that ensemble as evidence that any bogie misalignment due to the missing spacer became a potential problem only after the destruction of the tyre.

I would also take this opportunity to say that I fully agree with Nick Thomas' excellent last two posts #222 & #224 just above. :D
Well said, Sir, and tip of the hat to you. :ok:

Lyman

17th Dec 2012, 00:19

Nick Thomas, AZR...

Thanks to you both. Your input is most helpful.

Briefly, I conclude the bogie is rotating about its horizontal plane as a result of a missing stand-off spacer. I do so because the tires are tracking irregularly in a plane which would ordinarily not be active.

Yes the marks were deposited after the rupture. The artifact that describes the shape of the tread cut suggests the tire was still reasonably intact at the site of the strip's insult.

If this contravenes BEA material, I think it worthy of mention..

So there we are.

A very enlightening discussion, and again, thank you.

Cheers :ok:

AlphaZuluRomeo

17th Dec 2012, 12:33

Hi Lyman,

The artifact that describes the shape of the tread cut suggests the tire was still reasonably intact at the site of the strip's insult.
I'm sorry, I don't understand this :confused:

If this contravenes BEA material, I think it worthy of mention..
Sure! If, it would :)
But I don't think this contravenes BEA conclusions. As for the material (=the picture ??), as previously stated it is from BEA.

philip2412

17th Dec 2012, 13:56

Hello AZR,

pls allowe me one question,would the concorde have hit the strip if the spacer had been in place ?

Thank you

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 14:34

pls allowe me one question,would the concorde have hit the strip if the spacer had been in place ?

All other things being the same, yes it would have.

From what I've read regarding accident investigation, if physical evidence and eyewitness evidence diverge, then it is standard procedure to consider the physical evidence as more reliable, as eyewitness evidence has been proven to be one of the less reliable sources - dependent as it is on human perception and psychology.

The missing spacer is unlikely to have altered trajectory prior to contact with the metal strip, it would simply have had a very marginal effect on acceleration (and possibly a barely-perceptible level of vibration) given the sheer amount of thrust-to-weight involved.

At the risk of re-stating the obvious, no amount of errors on AF's part (of which there were undoubtedly several) would be sufficient to negate the errors made by CO. Mistakes made by both organisations must be combined and considered as a whole (and indeed the BEA report always reflected this).

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 15:02

Lyman

Briefly, I conclude the bogie is rotating about its horizontal plane as a result of a missing stand-off spacer.

As you requested, I looked at that picture very carefully, and yes, there is evidence of a shimmy-like oscillation in that part of the track. However, I also looked at the other pictures in the BEA report (which is the source of the Heritage picture) and I could not see any evidence of similar oscillations when the aircraft was on the tarmac.

So I have some questions for you ..

I am no expert on shimmy, but I do know that it depends on a critical relationship of feedback between tyre forces and gear structure. The tyre force/slip characteristics would change substantially when the gear moved from tarmac to grass, so why are you sure that shimmy was present throughout all the TO? The BEA certainly didn't think so. Could shimmy be present only in the grass-bound part of the roll?

By the time the FE called the #2 engine failure and fire warning and then shut down #2 the aircraft had been airborne for several seconds. There would have been no shimmy once airborne, so why do you think it such an important factor in his decision to shut down #2? Why would it trump the engine failure and fire warnings? [The debate as to whether he should have shut down at that time is another matter]

At the time when the aircraft passed over that region (97611.5 on the BEA datum) it was at about 203 kts and had an AoA of 9 deg. One second later it lifted off, still at 203 kts but with an AoA of 11 deg. At the time we are discussing then about 80% of the weight was being carried by the wing so only 10% was on the LH gear. Since any forces transmitted to the airframe must depend on ground reaction and slip why do you think that the gear had a important effect at this point?

Shimmy, as I understand it, is a cyclical rotation of the wheels about the main leg. Again at the time we are talking about, the aircraft sideslip was 3 deg. Allowing for +/- 3 deg oscillation because of the missing spacer that would mean the wheels oscillating between zero and 6 deg would it not? Why would the time they were at less than 3 deg not offset the time they were at more? Or in other words, why should shimmy change the average force?

I notice that in your argument you do not mention the sideforce generated by the tyres. Have you any reason to neglect that contribution? I would think it a bigger effect than the drag and what is more it would have been acting behind the CG and giving a moment to restore the aircraft towards the centreline.

Lyman

17th Dec 2012, 15:34

CliveL

I am most grateful for your response. To start...

"I notice that in your argument you do not mention the sideforce generated by the tyres. Have you any reason to neglect that contribution? I would think it a bigger effect than the drag and what is more it would have been acting behind the CG and giving a moment to restore the aircraft towards the centreline."

Let us begin with brake release. First off, a skidding tyre has less authority to affect direction. If skidding from the start, the left bogie is having less effect on direction than the right. That means the a/c will tend right, and may explain the Captain's initial left ruddering. (with four healthy engines))

For the record, I would suggest that as a whole, asymmetrical thrust had far more to do with track than tyres. If the left bogie had one tyre out of line, the bogie as an entirety would have less authority for directional control than the right bogie. Notice the tire marks on the picture showing roll prior to kero stain?
Only the left side?

This is suggestive of misalignment of left bogie. Notice also the straight track. This suggests that the misalignment is well managed. After the tank rupture, and fire, the bogie has less to do with track than thrust inequalities, imo.

You make a good point re: weight on wheels at the runway light image. The skid marks are light, narrow, and show the wing carries the a/c here. They also show more emphatically the stresses on the tyres from the outset. Free of most weight, they shimmy and wobble more readily.

I am interested in discussing the rest of your post. I'll leave at this point for you to respond if you wish.

Again, thank you

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 15:37

Another very important factor to bear in mind is that unlike with most powered ground transportation, where the motive power of the engine is transmitted to the ground *through* the wheels and tyres, an aircraft's thrust is independent of the wheels, which serve only to maintain heading and not to transmit propulsion mechanically (at least in a direct sense). An unbalanced wheel on a drive axle will therefore have a considerably greater effect on ability to control direction than a similar imbalance on a non-driven axle.

The lateral trajectory of the aircraft shows no abnormal signs of instability prior to contact with the metal strip, so it can therefore be concluded that the guidance of the correctly-fitted wheels along with the force of the forward thrust were more than capable of overriding any instability that the wheel with the missing spacer might have caused.

It is also therefore reasonable to conclude that the veer to the left coinciding with the strip contact was at least largely caused by a combination of the forces involved in loss of the tyre, loss of thrust from the port engines due to hot gases and the loss of grip caused subsequent to the tyre's destruction.

Another thing to bear in mind with the eyewitness testimony is the simple difference in perception that can be caused by the difference in speed of light vs. speed of sound. In general eyewitness testimony will tend to report perception of fire or visible evidence of explosion before any audible abnormality, and this is generally regarded to be because of the speed of light vs. sound perception. The firemen in this case may well have seen the fire before they heard anything abnormal with the takeoff (such as unusual engine noise or even the sound of a tyre failure) for this very reason.

Lord Bracken

17th Dec 2012, 15:55

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 15:59

Let us begin with brake release. First off, a skidding tyre has less authority to affect direction. If skidding from the start, the left bogie is having less effect on direction than the right. That means the a/c will tend right, and may explain the Captain's initial left ruddering. (with four healthy engines))

I guess I should have specified that I meant conditions after the tyre was demolished. The BEA report (18.2.3.3) deals with the situation before that and all the evidence presented there says that the missing spacer and consequent freedom of bogie to yaw had no effect on the trajectory in that phase. I know no better.

For the record, I would suggest that as a whole, asymmetrical thrust had far more to do with track than tyres.

I'm wholly with you there :ok:

Chris Scott

17th Dec 2012, 16:04

Quote from CliveL:
"By the time the FE called the #2 engine failure and fire warning and then shut down #2 the aircraft had been airborne for several seconds. There would have been no shimmy once airborne, so why do you think it such an important factor in his decision to shut down #2?"

I think Lyman is arguing that violent vibration caused by main-wheel shimmy may have influenced the F/E's decision to shut down engine #2, even though the a/c was still getting airborne. While the root cause of any shimmy would be removed once the wheels left the ground, my experience suggests significant vibration might continue until the auto-brakes have stopped wheel rotation. I don't know what criterion is required on Concorde for autobrake, but it's likely to be near the start of an active gear-retraction sequence. In this case, as we all know, gear-door damage led to the selection of gear UP being refused or aborted by the retraction system at some stage in the sequence. Perhaps you or others can comment.

Having said that, I'm not aware of any evidence to support Bearfoil's intuition.

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 16:06

Concorde engines didn't all spool up at the same speed (3 + 1 iirc) so this was normal.

Indeed - this was discussed in detail on the old thread here:

You call 3-2-1 Now, start your stopwatch, pre-set to countdown from 58 seconds, and slam the throttles fully forward till they hit the stops. Four RR Olympus engines start to spool up to full power and four reheats kick in, together producing 156,000 lbs of thrust, but at a total fuel flow of 27,000 US gallons per hour. A touch of left rudder initially to keep straight, as the #4 engine limiter is limiting the engine to 88% until 60 kts when it will release it to full power.

And some further detail on startup at pushback here:

The trick was to get as many hydraulic systems online ASAP during engine start/pushback, and that's where the sequence was defined. Now my tired/worn out/time-expired brain recollects that number TWO engine was started first, this gave us GREEN and YELLOW systems, followed by number THREE engine, which now gave us BLUE system. Once these engines were successfully started the 2 air start trucks (oh for that darned APU) could be disconnected and preliminary system checks, including full and free flying controls, could be carried out. After push-back the outboard engines were started by using adjacent engine cross-bleed (as BRIT312 quite correctly stated years ago, there was no 'cross the ship' cross-bleed duct), the remaining system checks would be carried out.

Something I recall from the time I was reading these discussions was that during critical phases the FE would have been watching the engine instrumentation like a hawk, and given that the takeoff run was proceeding relatively normally prior to strip contact it would be far more likely that abnormalities in that instrumentation would have been the trigger for engine shutdown rather than a split-second increase in vibration. All evidence suggests that the crew thought they were dealing with an engine fire and had little time (or inclination) to determine its cause in the short time between strip contact and impact.

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 16:12

Dozy

the wheel with the missing spacer

That's a trap I fell into also - it wasn't a wheel with a missing spacer it was the bogie pivot, so all four wheels on that bogie were affected.

But let me draw your attention to the comment in the BEA report (18.2.3.3 again)

A displacement in the horizontal plane is, on the other hand, abnormal. It requires predominance of horizontal loads over vertical loads, which is not the case during the takeoff phase.

This is (presumably) the reason why the pre-burst trajectory was not affected.
Easy to see that if vertical loads on the bearing predominate the 'slack' will be taken up by the axle moving to the top of the female part not to the rear which would produce a yaw.

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 16:14

Concorde engines didn't all spool up at the same speed (3 + 1 iirc) so this was normal.

That was indeed so, but #4 was spooled up with the others at 60 kts and the left rudder input from the FDR trace was at 100 kts - no obvious reason for it either.

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 16:19

Hi Chris,

Nice to see you back again :)

While the root cause of any shimmy would be removed once the wheels left the ground, my experience suggests significant vibration might continue until the auto-brakes have stopped wheel rotation.

I'll buy that! (at least as a contributory cause). I don't know of course, but I wouldn't bet against auto-brake being NBG along with a lot of other functions.

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 16:21

Cheers for that Clive - interesting stuff!

That was indeed so, but #4 was spooled up with the others at 60 kts and the left rudder input from the FDR trace was at 100 kts - no obvious reason for it either.

Us engineers are pre-disposed to be concerned with "why" in that situation, however is it not likely to be the case that a line pilot would simply correct as necessary and worry about the "why" once airborne? After all, the possibility exists that it may simply be an unexpected lateral gust...

Regarding Chris's very salient point, I have to ponder just how significant such vibration would be compared to that which might be expected from a damaged engine as suggested by the warning systems. To my mind this is reinforced considerably by the fact that a trained Concorde flight crew would be acutely aware of just how critical engine problems are during that phase of flight and prioritised that problem almost instantly.

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 16:39

After all, the possibility exists that it may simply be an unexpected lateral gust...

There was damn all wind in any direction ....

I have to ponder just how significant such vibration would be compared to that which might be expected from a damaged engine as suggested by the warning systems.

But engine 2 had no real internal damage - in fact the BEA report says specifically that the internal state was not such as would cause surge. Equally there is no mention of any engine failures that might give rise to a genuine fire warning from flames inside the nacelle.

Lyman

17th Dec 2012, 16:47

Howdy Chris, CliveL

Quote:
A displacement in the horizontal plane is, on the other hand, abnormal. It requires predominance of horizontal loads over vertical loads, which is not the case during the takeoff phase.

My guess is there was vibration as the vertical loads lessened, and not by much, until the bogie wobbled to its limit. In the crush of alarms, and confusion, the FE may have associated this extreme vibration with an immediate need to cage the engine that may be causing it. I merely suggest that pulling an engine at rotation is not done, so the conditions were likely extreme, and needed some action. I believe FE believed he was doing the right thing...

The spacer was NOT inconsequential. It may have played a direct part in crashing the aircraft so quickly after take off. The cause of the disaster was fire. Dozens of opportunities for this result were on record. Blown out fuel tanks, disintegrating tyres, loss of wing skin and hydraulics. BTSC (all Concordes) were susceptible.

That the authority allowed the operator to get off claiming it was FOD is contemptible. The aircraft was vulnerable to spontaneous tyre rupture for goodness sake. A fluke piece of metal?

There will be FOD. Easier in the long run to hold operator to account in the long run, Than bend over backwards to protect the responsibles from owning up.

Does BEA address the shimmy? I do. I do not blame shimmy, nor Titane. I blame EASA for letting things slide. The stage is ever full of scapegoats, but lacks responsibility and integrity, all too often.

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 16:49

There was damn all wind in any direction ....

We know that - he couldn't be certain...

But engine 2 had no real internal damage - in fact the BEA report says specifically that the internal state was not such as would cause surge. Equally there is no mention of any engine failures that might give rise to a genuine fire warning from flames inside the nacelle.

Again, we know that with the benefit of hindsight and rigorous analysis, but the FE was confronted with alarms and indications consistent with fire (the fire alarm and gong sounded at 14:43:22.8) and likely damage. The surges were presumably triggered by the presence of hot gases in the vicinity of the intakes - but the FE didn't have the luxury of definitive evidence that we do. The startle effect would have been sufficient to cause a lapse in procedure on his part, but given the circumstances that would be entirely understandable.

@Lyman - the aircraft's tyre issues were not "spontaneous" in nature - at least some were precipitated by other problems (in one case the brakes locked on the takeoff roll). Not all incidents (in particular the first at Dulles EDIT - incorrect, see below) were investigated for the cause of the tyre failure.

Note that I'm not saying your theory is impossible, simply that given the fact we know the FE was confronted by critical warning indications it is more likely he was responding to those.

CliveL

17th Dec 2012, 16:55

Dozy,

My point was simply that there was nothing in #2 engine failure to produce continued vibrations.

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 17:01

My point was simply that there was nothing in #2 engine failure to produce continued vibrations.

Acknowledged and understood. My point (which does not contradict yours) is equally simple - that the crew had no way of knowing that at the time, and as such would have assumed a worst-case scenario to cover all possibilities. :)

@Lyman (below) - that's an assumption. The evidence we have of tyre failures causing subsequent damage to Concorde suggest that in the cases where root cause was investigated, there were mechanical factors leading to failure of the tyre. The other incidents were never investigated to that level - there has never been a documented case of a Concorde tyre incident where there was no plausible explanation for the tyre failure (and thus no evidence to suggest tyres failed "spontaneously").

Lyman

17th Dec 2012, 17:01

Dozy

Please read every word, I said the a/c was VULNERABLE to spontaneous rupture.

As to the rest, I like your take on the FE's predicament.

Point being, I think it took something we may not be seeing for him to counter best practice.

DozyWannabe

17th Dec 2012, 17:34

Correction:

I have been reliably informed that the cause of the Dulles tyre failure was investigated and determined to be an underinflation of the neighbouring tyre to that which failed - the (arguably inadequate with hindsight) fix was a mechanical device which detected mismatched tyre inflation.

This does not alter the extent of my research indicating that there was no attempt to determine the preceding cause of a tyre failure on Concorde which could not be explained.

Addendum:

The spacer was NOT inconsequential. It may have played a direct part in crashing the aircraft so quickly after take off.

As stated earlier, the required time periods for the damaged fuel tank to drain, the potential additional altitude had #2 not been shut down and, crucially, the time taken for the fire to irreparably destroy the controls were thoroughly calculated. There was no way for the aircraft to have reached Le Bourget before control was lost.

That the authority allowed the operator to get off claiming it was FOD is contemptible.

The report documents thoroughly the shortcomings of all parties involved and simply lists them, with no implicit or explicit guidance as to relative importance - the initial decision to prosecute CO was judicial - neither regulatory nor investigative.

Does BEA address the shimmy?

Yes (as Clive twice stated, check section 18.2.3.3).

Pay close attention to Clive correcting me a short while ago:

That's a trap I fell into also - it wasn't a wheel with a missing spacer it was the bogie pivot, so all four wheels on that bogie were affected.

Any shimmy or instability would therefore have affected all four tyres to some extent, but it was only the tyre that contacted the metal strip which failed.

AlphaZuluRomeo

17th Dec 2012, 18:07

Hello AZR,

pls allowe me one question,would the concorde have hit the strip if the spacer had been in place ?

Thank you

Hi philip2412,

As stated by DW, all other things being the same, yes I think it would have, based on all material available.

Let us begin with brake release. First off, a skidding tyre has less authority to affect direction. If skidding from the start, the left bogie is having less effect on direction than the right. That means the a/c will tend right, and may explain the Captain's initial left ruddering. (with four healthy engines))
If skidding from the start, tyres marks would be notably "unusual" from the start. Such a thing never was not reported... and certainly would have, if it was present.
And I strongly disagree with "That means the a/c will tend right": Indeed, if skidding from the start, the left side of the aircraft would have been more draggy than the right side. Not the opposite. :=

My guess is there was vibration as the vertical loads lessened, and not by much, until the bogie wobbled to its limit. In the crush of alarms, and confusion, the FE may have associated this extreme vibration with an immediate need to cage the engine that may be causing it. I merely suggest that pulling an engine at rotation is not done, so the conditions were likely extreme, and needed some action. I believe FE believed he was doing the right thing...
Wouldn't such an important vibration level be:
- recorded on the FDR;
- likely commented by the crew (on the CVR)?
AFAIK, no report of important vibrations on the CVR. Didn't check FDR traces, but I suggest it is to be done before pushing further your hypothesis, Lyman.
And I'm sure the FE believed he was doing the right thing, but that's not the point.

The spacer was NOT inconsequential.
You don't know that. We are discussing this right now, and so far no hard indication has been found of its consequentiality, but BEA report strongly suggests it had none (and explains why, and describes the tests done to arrive to that conclusion).

The aircraft was vulnerable to spontaneous tyre rupture for goodness sake. A fluke piece of metal?
Ahem, first, "not FOD related tyre ruptures" would be a notably more accurate description IMO. ;)
Identified causes of such tyre ruptures were adressed, if my memory serves, in the Washington'79 report, or since then.

Nick Thomas

17th Dec 2012, 19:01

Hi Lyman
You have spent a great amount of time discussing the missing spacer and the possible consequences of it's absence. It may be helpful if you could collect all your thoughts together in one post. I think in doing so, it can be taken for granted that you think the missing spacer is of importance, so for clarity sake it may be wise not to repeat your detailed analysis of that absence, but instead concentrate on it's relevance to the final outcome.

jcjeant

17th Dec 2012, 19:26

The jargon of BEA
Concorde trial 2 March 2010
Me RAPPAPORT

Ce qui est développé est que le risque incendie était imprévisible donc en sa qualité de patron du BEA, M. ARSLANIAN a une connaissance approfondie, c’est pourquoi je veux lui demander si avant 2000 ce risque avait été envisagé.

M. ARSLANIAN

Il est difficile de répondre à la question sans la reformuler. Au cours de l’enquête nous avons remarqué un incendie très spécifique. Auparavant, notamment en 1979, il y a eu une apparition de flamme qui s’éteint tout de suite. Je ne peux répondre qu’en tant qu’enquêteur. Mon opinion est faite même si je ne crois pas en avoir fait part dans ma présentation. J’ai dit qu’il fallait un certain nombre de condition pour obtenir la flamme, que l’on trouvait dans cette énorme fuite très spécifique à l’accident.

Me RAPPAPORT

Il n’a pas été répondu à ma question. Est-ce qu’avant 2000 un incendie quelconque avait été envisagé ?

M. ARSLANIAN

Je réponds de la façon dont je parle. Le BEA travaille sur des évènements. IL n’y a jamais eu d’incendie sur le Concorde avant 2000. La certification ne peut pas se faire sans prendre en compte ce genre de risque. Mais ce n’est pas à moi de répondre sur ce point. Nous ne faisons pas de spéculations. Tous ce que je remarque c’est qu’à l’étude des évènements, nous n’avons pas relevé de risque incendie.

Me RAPPAPORT

M. ARSLANIAN n’a pas répondu

LA PRESIDENTE

Il y a répondu

Me RAPPAPORT

A sa façon.

I RAPPAPORT (lawyer)

What is developed is that the risk of fire was so unpredictable in his capacity as head of the BEA, Mr. ARSLANIAN has extensive knowledge, which is why I want to ask if this risk before 2000 was considered.

Mr. ARSLANIAN (BEA director)

It is difficult to answer the question without reformulation. During the investigation we noticed a very specific fire. Before, including in 1979, there was an appearance of flame is extinguished immediately. I can not answer that as an investigator. My mind is made even if I do not think I have expressed in my presentation. I said he had a number of conditions for the flame, which was in this huge leak very specific accident.

I RAPPAPORT

It was not answered my question. Does anyone before 2000 fire had been considered?

Mr. ARSLANIAN

I answer the way I speak. BEA working on events. THERE has never been a fire on the Concorde before 2000. Certification can not be made without taking into account this kind of risk. But it is not for me to answer on this point. We do not speculate. All that I see is that the study of events, we found no fire risk.

I RAPPAPORT

Mr. ARSLANIAN did not respond

THE PRESIDENT (of the court)

He responded

I RAPPAPORT

In his own way.