Flight - Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?

[greeners]

Fascinating article in this week's Flight International; "BACK IN CONTROL: The life-or-death importance of mastering upset recovery.”

It leads with a statement that the "Global airline industry faces a decision: whether to take radical and expensive action as a result of lessons learned; or accept crashes such as AF447 happen but are sufficiently rare that a cost-benefit analysis of the investment in further safety improvements does not stack up. If the latter view prevails, it is much the same as saying that another widebody crash with similar causes is acceptable". (my emphasis)

The thought provoking article looks at the "overwhelming evidence that the AF447 crash is only the latest manifestation of a developing phenomenon the industry has watched helplessly for 20 years and done almost nothing about: loss of control in flight (LOC-I)."

The article looks at the recommendations made by the French Accident Investigator, the BEA, as well as considering a variety of factors such as the challenges around the man-machine interface, confusion arising from airspeed readings, and a little on what we refer to as the 'startle factor'. It then goes on to look at the substantial value that can be derived from upset training on aerobatic aircraft like the Extra 300.

It concludes: "There is a general consensus that honing pilot knowledge and skills should best concentrate on 'staying in control', as EASA puts it, rather than recovering when the aircraft has already adapted an extreme attitude. Others demand both. The industry knows pilots are not getting the training they need for flying aircraft in a fast-developing, increasingly intense environment, so the question is: should they train more, or train differently? They cannot stay the same."

What is the most suitable approach, given real world commercial limitations? Is the current training sufficient at your company?

[Loose rivets]

I can only mention again Davis' plea in one of his later editions. I had, still have, the first edition, but in about 2000 one of my FOs showed me his. It really spelled out the need for airlines to go that extra mile and give real handling training.

I was lucky, I did what I wanted to satisfy myself I had a good feel for the aircraft, but I gather I wouldn't get away with it these days.

What is very noteworthy, is that it usually took 500-ish hours of short haul - with numerous empty legs - to really feel at one with the new kit. I can see that could never be paid for in the real world.

[pakeha-boy]

Quote...What is the most suitable approach, given real world commercial limitations? Is the current training sufficient at your company?

Airlines need to cough up the money and spend it on training.....going into a sim session prepared and ready to go,and expected to be at the top of your game,is sometimes not enough.We have debated this before...Airlines have,over the years,cut training times,ventured into areas(current flavour of the month) that really dont need a lot of training,and neglected the issues that are now surfacing,real issues(not that you should dismiss any/all).Two sim sessions/annum(some airlines one)is not enough.

A/C redundancy has created mores issues,than it has sometimes resolved.The pressures of passing sim checks,rather than training in lieu of,I believe has cost us dearly......I believe the way to solve some of these issues is the way in which we instigate and approach sim training sessions,and a "bust" or "Pass" mentality needs to be removed,

[Basil]

No doubt in my mind that aerobatics should be a compulsory part of commercial pilot training and recovery from unusual positions should be practised from time to time in the sim.

[4Greens]

Google on 'ICATEE' which is the International Committee for Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes. Its all there and will be an ICAO requirement eventually.

[takoon]

The current JAA syllabus has only incipient spinning in the zero to hero course.

I think flying schools got scared in the nineties when there was a few unrecoverable spin incidents. It is a real shame that current new F/O's do not experience aeros or fully developed spins.

[Meeb]

When I was a 509 instructor the studes got full blown aeros instruction, indeed a 509 instructor had to have the aeros instructor rating. As with all areas of life these days a dumbing down has occured, JAR no longer requiring aeros is a missed opportunity but perhaps things will go full circle and it will be reinstated in due course. However the article in flight regards airline pilots flying an hour or so in an extra is all rather pointless I feel.

[pax britanica]

As a passenger this gets a little scarier each time there is new thread on ‘skills’. Are new generation flight crew really 'pilots' or aircraft systems monitors is one question that comes to my mind. I know that all newer recruits are not the same but that holds good for any profession-difference being most people’s mistakes do not end in death. Looked at a different way there are many careers where skill or touch of people like skilled toolmakers or machinists have seen the skill factor eroded as they monitor computer controlled devices. They still need some of their traditional skills to assess quality and consistency but after a few eyars often could no longer use their precsion skills to replicate the part. Unless allowed to ‘keep their hand ‘ in pilots must lose handflying skills because that si the way we humans are made-use it or lose it.
I am not seeking to be deliberately provocative because I still sort of have faith but wonder what will happen as the older pilots with more rounded experience retire in greater numbers -again I know this group can sometimes be accused of having insufficient skills in other ways as well.
It seems to me though that all airline pilots at some stage of their career should get some experience of unusual attitudes but is a sudden stall in an Extra really much good if your triple 7 300 suddenly throws a hissy fit at 35000 ft .
It is not easy I know but perhaps a way could be found for people to safely ( I am old enough to remember reading about training accidents as people shut down engines etc) experience the scary combination of unusual attitude and huge mass/momentum.
I had a couple of school friends who went on to become flight crew and one I kept in touch with for some years to the point where he was a 757 Captain but as he put it he had learned a huge amount in his early years hand flying 707s round the Bovingdon hold and similar manoeuvres which gave his generation an experience denied to his successors.
I know money is an issue but perhaps a little pressure needs to be put on managements about how safety first really works. A mischievous friend of mine recently wrote to Easy Jet about their attitude to flight safety and got the usual -safety is our first priority response and the most important issue to our management. He didn’t get any response at all to his follow up which said he appreciated the assurance but if they really meant it why was the board composed solely of accountants and marketing people and none of them had any responsibility for flight operations or safety.

[bubbers44]

I got spin training at 4 hrs so when I soloed shortly after it I was more aware of what could happen at any time while flying no matter how much time you had.

When I became an instructor I taught spin recovery to my students even though it wasn't required until you went for your flight instructors rating.

Being in command of an airliner and never exceeding a 60 degree bank or less and no spin recovery doesn't make sense to me.

I taught an aerobatics course for quite a while and believe it really helps a pilot feel confident in his ability to handle most anything that can upset his aircraft no matter how large it is. Airplanes basically all fly the same whether a biplane or 747. The biplane just does it quicker.

[CDRW]

I fear that greeners first post - his statement in italics will be the way of the future.

In a leading Far Eastern company new cadets with just a few hundred hours total time, doing their B777 conversion are encouraged, if not taught, to engage the ap from sim session one. !!! Autopilot out when on final full flap and nice and stable.

I fear the autopilot is now the master with the "pilots" telling it what to do - which is the normal thing to do - BUT it is becoming our crutch when things are not so normal. Strong crosswind - do an autoland - rainy day, vis down to 1500m do and autoland ( that is even recommended by management) regardless of the state of the ILS! - one engine inop - do an autoland. Loss of control whilst in manual flight - engage the autopilot!

It's a big big problem but it does seem that high profile individuals and organizations recognise this - its just going to take years and years ( if it gets done at all) to move towards getting BACK IN ONTROL

[bubbers44]

Scarey isn't it but it doesn't have to be that way. Basic flying skills should still be the norm and automation should be a way to make flying easier. It is all about money and airline management wants it this way.

In the US the FAA can fix this with mandatory hand flying skills. If you don't have them you can't fly no matter how fast you can type. Do you think the FAA will do it? No. Money runs how the FAA rules.

[sevenstrokeroll]

our airline introduced unusual attitude recovery quite awhile ago...after one of our planes had a rudder hardover and killed everyone

and when we started unusual attidue recovery training, with the exception of turning off the hydraulics to the rudder, it was just like being in a light GA aircraft like when I was a flight instructor.

there are some good words of wisdom from WEBB in "FLY THE WING" and DAvies in "handling the big jets".

we also instituted feet on rudders and hand near yoke below FL180.

and the best way is to avoid gtting upside down in the first place!~

[Capn Bloggs]

the industry has watched helplessly for 20 years and done almost nothing about: loss of control in flight (LOC-I)."
Helplessly? The leaders of industry (pilots and beancounters alike) have actively pursued this policy of automation, actively encouraged of course by certain designers of "aeroplanes"...or is it the other way round? Whatever, there's no helplessness about it.

[Mowgli]

Add to the AF447 A330, the Colgan Air crash at Buffalo, NY and the XL A320 at Perpignan. You don't have to look too far to find evidence that automation is relied on far too much. It's not only about the of erosion of manual flying skills but also recognising and diagnosing the situation the aircraft is in. If pilots were exposed to situations in aerobatic aircraft where they could experience the symptoms of stall, spin and UPs and then execute correct recovery techniques, IMHO they would be able to bring this experience to the fore when confronted with the seemingly incredible circumstance of loss of control in a complex modern airliner. In the cases of the AF447 A330 and the XL A320 , these types have protections to prevent the stall:WHEN THEY ARE FULLY FUNCTIONING. When all the holes line up in James Reason's Swiss cheese accident model (Wikipedia if you haven't heard of it), it is then down to the pilot to prevent the accident. Sadly, these accidents are showing that the pilots are not doing so.

[Fly3]

I have no doubt that some kind of upset training would be extremely beneficial but I repeat what I said in another thread. This is not recommended to be done in a simulator because no data was gathered during test flights to program the simulator to replicate the the aircraft reaction to pilots inputs during major upsets. Hence what happens in the simulator may bear no resemblance to what the actual aircraft does and could lead pilots into learning techniques that do not work in real life.

[bubbers44]

Handling the big jets is my favorite. It explains a lot.

[bubbers44]

The 737 hardover crash with the rudder problem hasn't happened in decades so is probably no longer a threat. I always loved the 737.

[4Greens]

Noone has responded to my post on ICATEE. Please do, as I need some input.

[ironbutt57]

the problem with current upset recovery training is the "startle factor" is missing...also the simulator,s inability to produce the negative g- forces that may be encountered

[rogerg]

No doubt in my mind that aerobatics should be a compulsory part of commercial pilot training and recovery from unusual positions should be practised from time to time in the sim.
The MPL includes aerobatics as part of the course. ( in the UK, dont know about elsewhere )

[Capn Bloggs]

the problem with current upset recovery training is the "startle factor" is missing
True, but good exposure to canned UAs will go a long way to reducing reaction time when really startled, as well as greatly assisting the correctness of the subsequent response.

[smileandwaveboys]

I remember doing the rudder hard-over module in easyJet over a decade ago, which was quite a fun session, finding that the aircraft could be fully recovered in 1500' from a 135 deg bank angle and 10 deg nose down in landing configuration; it was very educational. RYR do a lot of upset training, too, though it concentrates mostly on high altitude stalls and not so many severe UAs. Both airlines have done quite a lot of doble-engine failure training, too, well before the bad year of the LHR, Hudson and CIA accidents. It's interesting that two locos that draw heavy criticism for having so many cadets and low hours captains seem to be so well ahead on this element of training.

My perception is that there has been a creeping reduction in the abilities and reactions of new cadet pilots to handle the aircraft and they have become much more computer dependent. Many of these cadets become more proficient with experience, depending on the nature of the individual captains they fly with. I think the SOP and automatics mantras have been pushed to hard, that line experience has already been lost, and that fear cultures (compounded by live FDM) prevent pilots from learning or practicing, even in ideal conditions. I find FOs very reluctant to try self positioning or raw data approaches, even in calm and cavok conditions, and those who are keen say that most captains won't allow it. I think that culture needs to be addressed - practice of basic skills when the circumstances permit should be actively encouraged by industry management.

Personally, I think that an aeros, spinning and severe UA recovery section should be reinstated in the ATPL training. The laws of physics and aerodynamics don't change a great deal between light singles and heavy jets - the differences are mainly just details, but the principles are consistent.

[A37575]

It concludes: "There is a general consensus that honing pilot knowledge and skills should best concentrate on 'staying in control', as EASA puts it, rather than recovering when the aircraft has already adapted an extreme attitude

That attitude is just as useless as saying "I'll teach you how to stay away from the water, rather than teach you how to swim".

[smileandwaveboys]

Yep. Is it too much to ask for both evasion and recovery training? It's unfathomable why airline management seem to think everything has to be an either/or decision.

[A37575]

we also instituted feet on rudders and hand near yoke below FL180.

and the best way is to avoid gtting upside down in the first place!~








It takes a competent pilot less than one second to have his hands and feet on the controls from the pilot monitoring position where hands are usually comfortably on knees. There is simply no need (pun, chaps) to go overboard on such precautions as you state. I hasten to add this is not a personal crack at you- after all company SOP are inviolate if you want to eat:ok: Taken to the extreme using your SOP, you may as well require all pilots to wear Nomax flying suits while piloting as well as wool socks with no holes in the toes and don't forget the bone dome -all just in case you abort at high speed and end up in a ditch. After all, we all practice engine failure/fire as a reason to abort.

In all the Loss of Control accidents that I have read about, the aircraft was in IMC or at night. For whatever initial reason the aircraft got into an unusual attitude it usually boiled down to poor instrument flying ability by crews who could be termed as "automatic monkeys" or more kindly the victims of automatics addiction.

If lack of the pilots basic manual instrument flying competency is accepted as a prime cause of a Loss of Control in jet transports, then it follows their instrument interpretation skills were lacking. Now, while it is accepted that there are limitations to the fidelity of modern flight simulators, as far as I know there are no such limitations on their flight instruments. An artificial horizon (EADI) will still correctly depict a 60 degree angle of bank accomanied by 30 degree pitch up or down and the ASI will correctly depict speed at VMO or stick shaker. The IVSI will correctly show high rates of climb and descent and the altimeter will wind rapidly down in an emergeny descent at high altitude.

I know of at least one fully accredited level Five Boeing 737 FFS that has a selection on the instructor panel that places the aircraft in a 135 degree roll and 30 degrees nose down attitude. By any standard that is an unusual attitude.

Assuming the crew member has a basic pilot's licence, it is a simple matter for a competent simulator instructor to set up an unusual attitude, even fully inverted, and within ten minutes teach a student the basics of recovery on instruments from most of the variants of unusual attitudes. It's all about interpretation of what the flight instruments are telling you. Of course it also assumes basic instrument flying competency; which means holding a current instrument rating.

You don't need a course in light aircraft aerobatics to be able to practice unusual attitudes in a simulator. The problem is almost every simulator session in a jet transport is 90 percent on automatics. What unusual attitudes that are practiced, often sees the ridiculous situation where the victim is told to put his head down and close his eyes while the other bloke winds on lots of bank and says "handing over"

That might have been de rigeur in light trainers with the student under the hood trying to have a furtive peek outside. But heads down eyes closed in an airline simulator? Come off the grass...

Ten minutes per pilot in the simulator on unusual attitude instrument interpretation, and how to recover to level flight, is not going to break an airline budget. Done earlier it could have saved countless lives.

[sevenstrokeroll]

having one's hands and feet near/on the controls below FL180 is really not too much to ask. And One second is a long time when you are about to go out of control. Wearing a Nomex suit is a good idea. Indeed the idea of wool sox and uniforms is a good idea too...if I owned an airline all of my STEWS would wear wool instead of nylons and polyesters...I spoke to one STEW who's nylons caught on fire and burned her legs.

EVEN if my company didn't ORDER us to put our hands near the controls, my hands /feet would be right there.

I would ask that one additional topic might be added, use of assymetric thrust (jockeying throttles) to control a plane in trouble. The easiest way for me to handle a rudder hardover was to use assymetric thrust while getting things sorted out.

It boils down to this...someone coming out of WW2 had more acro and unsusual attitude recovery than someone today.

But we simply need to remind every pilot that an autopilot can go TANGO UNIFORM and the pilot is still expected to FLY THE FRICKING PLANE if airborne.

no, what do I do now?

Hand flying is easier to someone who knows how to do it and practices it regularly.

[MaxReheat]

Spinning and aerobatics should be mandatory in ALL PPL, CPL and MPL courses to a) recognise unusual attitudes (you'd be amazed how many studes can't recognise their attitude from the instruments) b) learn how to recover from them and, most importantly, c) learn how to avoid the situation in the first place. It also does wonders for confidence and basic 'stick and rudder' skills.:D

[Lonewolf_50]

A37575: I'll stay out of "where should your hands be" discussion, as it's already covered, but will otherwise offer up a "yes, what he said" regarding the difference between UA training, instrument scan, and its utility (In Type!) over aerobatics in a different type.

That said, I think all flight training before one can get a PPL ought to include some aerobatics, as a confidence builder and in understanding how to Control The Aircraft.

I admit to a bias, since that is how I was trained as a fledgling going through Navy flight training. I appreciate arguments against.

[fireflybob]

Surely one of the biggest differences between practicing UAs in the Sim as opposed to a real (light) aircraft is the lack of (and/or unreal) physiological sensations in the sim?

For UA training to be effective you also have to add in the physiological sensations. It's all very well being able to interpret the instruments but it's having the experience and discipline to do so when everything else that you feel is telling you something different - hence all LOCs happening when IMC or at night.

[blind pew]

Sevenstrokeroll
Maybe on your side of the pond but not the ww2 ex bomber pilots who "trained" me on my first jet... Our training chief did most of his 1011 course on autopilot and his boss was a firm believer in the tent peg landing philosophy - the ace fleet were grounded with main spar cracks...
Nothing beats aerobatics for spatial awareness and why not use gliders/sailplanes to teach energy management as well, then add "forced" landings for good measure - all were poorly taught in my day.
Add some decent simulator upset exercises....
But it all costs money and needs good flight managers.... Rare as hens teeth.

[wannabe024]

I'd hazard a guess that way more people died per passenger seat flown in the decades gone by than they do now. Accidents happen and they are more widely reported and hence more shocking for exactly that reason.

Hand flying skills may not be what they used to be, but I'd also guess that part of that is down to 'the older I get the better I was' philosophy. I have to be be honest and say that I haven't seen anybody in my 10+ year career who as truly scared me with their hand flying skills.

I'd love to see a comparison over the last 60 years of the number of loss of control situations resulting in deaths in commercial aviation per decade. All factors considered I'd think that commercial aviation is a heck of a lot safer now than it has ever been, especially in the Western world.

I'm sure I'm probably wrong though.

[sevenstrokeroll]

when I got my PPL back in 1975...US recovery was part of the exam.

same for my instrument rating.

didn't see it again except when I taught it to my students.

and didn't see it till after the airplanes augered in with rudder hardovers.

BUT I NEVER FORGOT HOW TO DO IT...it isn't that hard.

as to using gliders to manage energy...well, just flying the plane teaches you that...I've never taken my transport jet out looking for thermals to glean a little bit better fuel consumption number.

the best way to LEARN anything is to learn it and then TEACH IT.

Lindbergh said he learned more about flying by teaching than anything else.

[RAT 5]

Sharp upset recovery skills requires current sharp manual handling skills. That topic has been thrashed out on here many times. The current airline philosophy is train pilots to minimum costs; operate to minimum costs. Training for visual approaches costs money; accepting the occasional screw up and G/A costs money. Answer? Better not to do it. Thus the STD line op is automatic. (even that causes screw ups, but that's another thread.) Previously I had learnt visual approaches on the line because that was SOP. Thus the sim tick in the box for upset recovery in the 3 year cycle is rudimentary at best. I've trained in many airlines including the 2 quoted LOCo's. It is rudimentary and tick in the box. If you want to train the scenario properly you spend more time and do it properly. It starts at PPL stage and should continue throughout your career. Close your eyes, induce a sim-preset upset, open eyes and recover. Waste of time. Fly the approach and induce rudder hard-over at 1500' as per real life B737; induce a 25degree nose up at 1200' after an inadvertent real life G/A selection; recover from a rolling stall a la Bergenair B757; these are surprise events that happened, were recoverable, but some died. There are even the asymmetric wing icing roll offs on takeoff that required full rudder to recover. These really happened, not the sim pre-set scenarios. Do it properly or not at all. Indeed that is what all training should be. After 37 years I think there is too much box ticking so as to satisfy the 3 year recurrent training cycle. I tried to introduce the Air Peru blocked static line scenario into the 3 year cycle for flight instruments and unreliable airspeed items. "Would take too long. Not approved." Instead we had a simple pitot block and a no drama demo; not even a landing. Wast of time. Dumbing down.
I watched a Nat Geo construction of the Valujet crash. The closing statement from current NTSB officials was sobering. 8 years earlier the FAA had issued a notice that fire detection & extinguishers should be fitted to cargo holds. The FAA did a cost analysis the matter drifted off the radar. "It took body bags to reignite the issue." That was a closing statement in the program. The Secretary of Transport and Secretary of FAA lost their jobs. I wonder just how serious the various AA's take the issue of basic training that will incur extra cost. There have been too many stall crashes in recent years. Has the response of the AA's been appropriate? Surely us the real jet jockeys should push the desk jockeys into doing their job and insist the job is done properly.
It concerns me that there are captains flying around in jets, and therefore guiding the F/O's, who have only 3000hrs of autopilot time and they are cloning youngsters who have only 500hrs autopilot time. True, you can design out many serious failures; you can build in back up systems; you can reduce the risk of needing an ACE, but one day it will happen and the ACE is not there, and people will ask why not. What have they been learning during all their training?

[blind pew]

There are too many senior transport pilots flying who have just about forgotten how to fly an aeroplane. The only way to put matters right is to give all airline pilots a couple of hours on an appropriate aeroplane, say, once every six months, so that they can practise limited instrument flying and refresh themselves with the confidence...
In comparative terms the cost involved is not large.
... A lot of people pay lip service to the cause of aviation safety, but actually do very little about it; this is one area where some positive advancement can be made.
D.P. Davies first published 1967.

incidentally 7strokes - I had been flying jets for eight years before I learnt constant angle approaches (courtesy of ex Lufthansa Starfighter guys) -having failed miserably doing forced landings (glide approaches) because the guys who taught me didn't know how to teach them whereas glider pilots have to do them all the time. As for glider aerobatics - they are far more difficult to perform than in anything with a motor and the training can be a lot cheaper. Apparently gliding is part of the Air France syllabus :confused:

[Armchairflyer]

My experience regarding "handling the big jets" admittedly consists in having read the book, but to my understanding Davies puts a strong emphasis on stall avoidance (e.g., p. 128 concerning "advice on what to do about stalling, there is only one thing that can be said -- don't!") and the numerous important differences between light piston airplanes and big transport jets. This just makes me wonder whether VFR aerobatic training in a light and extremely agile and responsive aircraft would be one of the most beneficial approaches to LOC scenarios in airline flying.

Similarly, C. Sullenberger himself does not seem to think that it was mainly his glider training and stick & rudder skills in light aircraft which helped him in his successful ditching:Air & Space: Did you flash back on any of your experiences as a glider pilot? Did it feel natural to you?

Sullenberger: Actually not very much after the bird strike felt very natural, but the glide was comfortable. Once we had established our plan, once we knew our only viable option was to land in the river, we knew we could make the landing. But a lot of things yet had to go right.

I get asked that question about my gliding experience a lot, but that was so long ago, and those [gliders] are so different from a modern jet airliner, I think the transfer [of experience] was not large. There are more recent experiences I’ve had that played a greater role.

One of the big differences in flying heavy jets versus flying lighter, smaller aircraft is energy management -- always knowing at any part of the flight what the most desirable flight path is, then trying to attain that in an elegant way with the minimum thrust, so that you never are too high or too low or too fast or too slow. I’ve always paid attention to that, and I think that more than anything else helped me.(Source: A&S Interview: Sully (http://www.airspacemag.com/flight-today/Sullys-Tale.html))

[DownIn3Green]

How about just learning to fly right the first time? Stick, Ball, Rudder...etc...the rest will follow if properly trained while still "in the nest"...

[bubbers44]

Sully's landing in the Hudson is a landing all of us should be able to do. If you don't think you could do it automation was probably the problem.

We all need to remember we are pilots, not computer managers, so always know you can fly as well as the buttons you push can fly. The new generation of pilots don't agree with this and the companies that train them don't but if you can not fly an airplane your computer can't then you shouldn't be a pilot. Autopilots were designed to help you not replace you.

Don't let management let the bottom line control airline safety.

[bubbers44]

Many pilots will agree that the new generation of pilots will not be the quality of what we have now because they lack experience. The new 1500 hr rule might help some. We will see. A pilot shortage will be the first result.

[pakeha-boy]

Quote .........Sully's landing in the Hudson is a landing all of us should be able to do. If you don't think you could do it automation was probably the problem.


so mate.....did that have anything to do with the fact that TOGA was never used...or am I mistaken????

some of us know a little more than you think

[bubbers44]

TOGA doesn't do anything if the engines don't respond do they? Those Canadian Geese can really screw up those engine computers.

[pakeha-boy]

well mate..the FAA and NTSB seemed to disagree.......typical east crap

[bubbers44]

You are the only person on the face of this earth that thinks they wouldn't have applied max power as any normal pilot would have before ditching. The FAA doesn't believe it, just you. Have a nice life.

[Dan Winterland]

Reading 'Handling the big jets' is a start, but no substitute for experience. Simulator upset training has value, but again it's not like being in a real aircraft acheiving more extreme attitudes.

I'm sometimes suprised by the fact that many of my colleagues with tens of thousands of hours have never seen an angle of bank over 90 degrees. Having been bought up on a diet of visual and IF UPs (unusual positions) both as a student and an instructor in the military, my advice to those who haven't tried it is to go out there, find a school with an aerobatic aircraft and go and enjoy yourself for a few hours. You owe it to yourself - amd your passengers! What's more, you will become a better pilot and make yourself just that little bit safer. As a long time Airbus FBW pilot, I'm aware that my skills have been dulled down over the years. I make sure that I stay in touch with real flying by doing a few hours of 'real' upside down style flying each year.

[Tmbstory]

From personal experience, it depends on the time you have to deal with the upset, the more the better!

Manual flying skills are essential. A good pilot should be able to hand fly the aircraft from take-off to maximum cruising altitude and back to landing, to the same degree of accuracy as the Autopilot.

The"feel" of the aircraft in the seconds before the upset may give the pilot flying some information as to the reason why the aircraft has gone out of control.


As long as human flight crews are used in Aviation, manual flying skills should be practiced and kept at the highest order, for the safety of all concerned.

Tmb

[A37575]

Simulator upset training has value, but again it's not like being in a real aircraft acheiving more extreme attitudes.


You have a good point, of course. But the big jet loss of control accidents were caused primarily by poor instrument flying skills and in IMC or at night with no visible horizon. In other words, poor instrument flying got the crew into trouble in the first place and the same lack of instrument flying skills caused their inability to recover from extreme attitudes on instruments in IMC.

Anyone can learn to do daylight VMC aerobatics in a light aircraft certified for aeros but I suggest that very few are in a position or aircraft type to do them on instruments where you cannot peek outside. This is where full flight simulators are better for IMC unusual attitude recovery training on instruments than a light trainer aircraft.

[Machinbird]

Anyone can learn to do daylight VMC aerobatics in a light aircraft certified for aeros but I suggest that very few are in a position or aircraft type to do them on instruments where you cannot peek outside.Use the same aircraft (with an appropriate instrument panel) and do follow-up aero work at night. From experience, that is a big confidence builder, but build up to it and you can be safe. The idea is to expand your comfort zone.

Doing night intercepts over the waters West of Key West, was a challenge. Stars above-lights from the shrimp boats below.

[wings11]

Upset recovery training is important but equally, I think, is to use your situational awareness to avoid getting into a situation in the first place.

(I fly the Airbus, I don't know about the 737) Don't fly above optimum alt on the fmgc, ensure you program it properly in the first place, wind, tropo and OAT - update tropo and OAT enroute and if the optimum decreases as it might sometimes then descend with it.

Slow down promptly when you encouter turb., coming back from say 0.79 to .77 will give you a lot more margin if the tx suddenly worsens. If you expect a significant change in wind in the first few thousand feet of descent or tx has been reported or forecast then slow down a decimal point or two at top of descent and then speed up again once the margin is greater and you are through the questionable layer.

Don't push you luck with CB's - use the bloody wx radar correctly! Years ago, just out of line training I was a very inexperienced FO and trucking back north across croatia etc from a med charter we were imc at FL340 and in continual moderate turb, the a/c (321) was struggling to maintain the speed and we were vunerable to any worsening. Suddenly came out into a clear patch and surprise surprise we were in the middle of a line of thunderstorms, the capt had the wx radar on zero tilt and only showing greens, but we were of course just looking at ice in the tops, he turned it down 2 degrees on my suggestion and low and behold and whole pretty picture of reds and yellows etc. I still feel we were lucky that evening. I have never let a radar sit at zero in the cruise again - and many people leave it like that.

Lastly, use tcas and contrails, particularly in v busy airspace like western Europe to keep track of wake, its easy to do if you put a bit of thought into it. ATC over western europe are pretty good at wake separation but not perfect and I have asked many times for 5 degrees left or right to avoid wake.

If all of that means you take an extra minute or even 5 to destination, so what? I agree that we probably need more upset training but I'd rather we avoided the situations in the first place.

My tuppence for what its worth.

[RetiredBA/BY]

DW: What a really sensible and realistic posting. As a student, and later a QFI/IRE , I had very early exposure in the RAF to UPs (Unusual Positions) UNDER THE HOOD , and of course using only untoppleable instruments (Turn indicator plus pressure instruments) and frankly it was a lesson for life, rather like being taught to swim at an early age.

After a long career on many kinds of aircraft from gliders to heavy jets I sincerely believe that all pilots should have a sound knowledge and be trained in how to regain control of their aircraft, whatever size or type, from ANY recoverable position. After all the principles are much the same whatever the type.*

As well as upsets in large transport aircraft that also includes spin training for PPL courses, and at an early stage of training for professional licences, but with considerable emphasis on early recognition and prompt recovery at the incipient stage, recovery from which often leaves the aircraft in a UP, two birds with one stone !! !

I gather that EASA and the FAA disagree on the latter point !


* Just referred to my copy of Big Jets given to us on day 1 of joining BOAC :

Sort out the speed.
Correct roll angle.
THEN Pull or push to the horizon
exactly what we taught in the RAF for UP recovery !

[CDRW]

wings11 - generally a good post to guys going from big pistons to heavy jets - but I got to say I am not sure your statement " coming back from say 0.79 to .77 will give you a lot more margin if the tx suddenly worsens". That is - at a max - 3 knots IAS - hardly think that gives alot more margin.

[heavy.airbourne]

@CDRW: Think again! 3 KIAS will correspond to 10-15 KTAS, depending primariliy on altitude, and then on some other things. What you are looking for is to fly an (indicated) speed somewhere near the middle of high and low speed buffet.

[Waspy]

It all has to do with money. Once upon a time pilots were picked/sacked/bashed/kicked out/selected/graduated in function of real skills as both airlines and the military did'nt need so many of them. Today virtually anyone with enough cash and time available can become an airline pilot:{. It is not politically correct to say that a candidate/young pilot is below average. The center of interest of many youngsters I see flying is more on the latest version of their FMS than on correctly decrabbing the jet at roundout or using their thrust levers for their initial purpose: power ! Keeping a correct speed as near as possible to the bug is not essential: we have autothrottles or autothrust, handflying ?? Are you crazy ? we have an autopilot and you are supposed to use it to the maximum extent ! Looking outside the window ? half of young pilots are already blind at the age of 20...Can you blame them ? Surely not: they adapt to the system and the system is happy they're not asking questions :ok:
To answer one of the questions of the post: Yes, pilots are becoming airline agents, just the same as ground agents, gate agents....system controlers...but that's an industry desire, not a pilot request if you ask me....:=
It's a personal constant fight to let not my skills erode with time as less and less opportunities exist to keep them :uhoh:

[misd-agin]

pakeha-boy - NTSB said the engines were incapable of producing thrust to maintain flight. Page 81 of the report, page 98/213 of the pdf, Section 2.2.3.2 Engine Core Damage

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2010/aar1003.pdf

[misd-agin]

Old rule - the first guy has to get ridiculed and the second guy gets the credit.

AA CA Warren Vanderburgh developed Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program at American Airlines in 1997. Given a Flight Safety Award in 2000 for his work.

NTSB found AAMP partially at fault for the 2001 AA 587 crash.

Ten years later the circle is coming around once again.

[Capn Bloggs]

@CDRW: Think again! 3 KIAS will correspond to 10-15 KTAS, depending primariliy on altitude,
TAS is never more than double the IAS; most times for airline type aeroplanes below 40k, 70% extra.

[Al Murdoch]

Waspy, glad to see that the answer to any problem posed on PPRuNe remains to kick the young. Must be their fault. No one had irrecoverable upsets in my day. :bored:

[BARKINGMAD]

About a decade ago towards the end of my 73 "classic" sim conversion syllabus, we did some UP recovery training in the "box", owned and run by a major British airline.

Great fun and somewhat informative despite the lack of "g" and dirty laundry factor.

Some time later at another session I asked to use up the spare time at the end of a OPC session by practising UPs and recoveries, same company and simulator.

The answer was a definite NO. The reason was attributed to the complaints from the simulator engineers that our manoeuvres were placing abnormal stresses on the motion hydraulic jacks and structure and cracks were either detected or feared.

Can anyone cast any light on whether this was the real reason this exercise was dropped from the menu?

Re hand flying the real aircraft, my previous (now defunct) airline actually had a statement in the Ops Manual Part A saying "it is unlawful to hand fly above 10,000 feet", probably due to an altitude bust alleged to have occurred to one of the movers and shakers of that company. Other colleagues in that and another airline say it is forbidden to hand fly in RVSM airspace, so I presume I'll just have to eject if the A/P goes phut at cruise altitude?! The MEL is vague regarding u/s A/Ps, the wording seems to revolve around "must be a least one altitude holding capability" (F/Ds?) or similar wooly wording.

I thought the average pilot instrument rating included the requirement to fly S&L to well within RVSM limits, so is management going to accept my diversion on departure from Egypt to Europe due to cruising below RVSM flight levels and running low on fuel as a result? Though me and my oppo in the flight deck are tested as capable of such S&L flight, the written guidance on this issue is alas vague in the companies for whom I have flown, so I would appreciate any constructive input on the topic from those who can quote HARD FACTS please.

So is it any wonder that the pilot community as a whole are suffering from a lack of handling skills, even before the bean-counters via the training empires are pushing automatics for economy reasons? :sad:

[A37575]

Can anyone cast any light on whether this was the real reason this exercise was dropped from the menu?


Don't know about your company's decision but in the full flight simulator we used for UA training, it is obvious the hydraulic jacks take a beating at attitudes well beyond those used in 60 bank angle steep turns - although 45 degrees is OK. Because the G fidelity in terms of G manoeuvres is not available it is common practice to go off-motion for UA recovery practice.

As the purpose is mainly practice at flight instrument scanning IMC when in a UA, then it makes no real difference in the recovery technique whether the simulator is on or off motion.

[4Greens]

We used to do recoveries from unusual attitudes on primary instruments under the hood in the Hunter Trainer. The instructor would hurl the aircraft about and then hand over. As you took over he would press the 'g' suit test switch! Very disorientating.

[BARKINGMAD]

Thank you A37575, as I suspected the sims were being damaged. Fair enough, so we switch the motion off and use it as a fixed base trainer, which would be useful to practise techniques.

I would prefer to use "Speed, bank, pitch" in that order, rather than Mr Boeing's long winded non-recall checklist, whilst recognising the effect of thrust/pitch with underslung engines.

Now I eagerly await from those in the know, the chapter & verse on hand flying, either S&L or climbing/descending, in RVSM airspace. Obviously some unlucky colleagues have had to do this for real as quoted in another posting re a 73NG whose A/Ps went on strike. I'm just keen to find the legal/regulatory position on this one should the kit go u/s down route with all the associated aggro and expense.

As I said, the references available to me and others are at best ambiguous. :confused:

[Capn Bloggs]

I'm just keen to find the legal/regulatory position on this one should the kit go u/s down route with all the associated aggro and expense.
My AIP is quite clear:

39.4.8 Failure of the Autopilot with Height Lock
If the autopilot with height lock fails, the pilot must initiate the following actions sequentially:
a. Maintain CFL.
b. Evaluate the aircraft’s capability to maintain altitude through manual control.
c. Assess the situation regarding possible conflicting traffic.
d. Alert nearby aircraft by turning on all exterior lights and, if not in VHF contact with ATC, broadcastadvice of failure, position, flight level, and intentions on 121.5MHZ.
e. Notify ATC of the failure using the phraseology “NEGATIVE RVSM” (see GEN 3.4 Sub-section 5.5 Item 2.q.) and the intended course of action.

I would prefer to use "Speed, bank, pitch" in that order
The only way to do it. :ok:

[USMCProbe]

Two contracts ago, I had the pleasure to fly with pilots from all over the world. Probably at least 30 countries, if not more. I learned a lot.

Training and "habits" are very standard in the west, including N and S America, and Europe. Even the way most of us flew. Even on the A320, most pilots would take off and hand fly until stabilized at climb speed on an assigned heading, or to a fix. On approach if the wx was bad, or we were busy, we would use the AP a lot, but usually would turn it off between 1-5000' agl if the weather was good.

Most pilots from Asia are taught to use the autopilot to the maximum extent possible. 100' agl on takeoff, AP on. 500' agl on landing. Every single flight. There are a lot of old TRE's on airbuses that still teach this, and to fly "Managed" descents almost exclusively. When they get a vector off the arrival, they have no idea how to calculate and monitor a descent.

I believed Airbus has changed their tune, and recommend hand flying for the past few years.

A lot of airlines in Asia require the use of autothrottles as SOP. Even a few big ones where the flight department is run by expats.

UA training in a sim should be required, but I fully agree that it is not enough. You need some initial training to get the spatial stimulus. AF447 should have never happened.

At the end of the day, the companies are always trying to reduce costs, including training costs. In the US, we had 4 hull losses at regional airlines in the last decade that should never have happened, including one high altitude stall to a crash. The response at the FAA was to require airlines to raise the minimums for FO's to 1500 hours. Great, but in 2014 when that law kicks in, they will soon find that they cannot fill their cockpits.

For pilots, it is our responsibility to maintain our own basic handling skills. When I flew long haul on 767 and 777's a lot of us would take off and hand fly to final cruising altitude, as we only got a few legs a month. We had to take the opportunity we had. Can't go all the way now because of RVSM (AP required).

[mary meagher]

The young Kennedy, not qualified in IMC, unable to interpret his instruments, dove into the sea off Martha's Vinyard. The rare accidents attributable to loss of control in major public transport aircraft take place at night or in IMC, possibly because the ASI is unreliable, or the pilot, startled, takes inappropriate action on the controls. Or the pilot is unable to understand what the instruments are telling him.

Training on the simulator in full motion is so hard on the hydraulics that the engineers would rather shut the function down. Managing a big jet with all that inertia is not really as easy as speed/bank/pitch in a smaller craft. How can new pilots be given the right training so that even when startled, they don't pull instead of push.....

[4Greens]

Please, all readers, check out the ICATEE website. Just Google it. When ICAO approve it, it will solve most of the problems raised on this topic.

[mary meagher]

4Greens, can you pm me please? I've read the ICATEE prospectus and have a few questions....

Mary

[blind pew]

I posted the reference to Handling the Big jets circa 1967 because it was as relevant then as it is now. I flew the Trident with trainers who used the autopilot as much as possible and auto throttle was mandatory except with an engine failure when it was not allowed to be used as uncertified.
Our chief instructor had a reputation which was enhanced during his 1011 transition as he used the autopilot as much as possible. Basically the guy who wrote the manual either couldn't fly or was frightened of flying manually.
Until you educate or change those at the top it will still be talked about in another 45 years....fortunately I won't be about to say I told you so.

[4Greens]

Mary,

Please contact ICATEE direct. It is possible via the website.

Glad to find somone who is interested in a positive training outcome.

[bubbers44]

JFK jr did in fact crash because of spacial disorientation. He screwed up and we all know it.

[viking767]

For pilots, it is our responsibility to maintain our own basic handling skills. When I flew long haul on 767 and 777's a lot of us would take off and hand fly to final cruising altitude, as we only got a few legs a month. We had to take the opportunity we had. Can't go all the way now because of RVSM (AP required).




Actually, I believe in RVSM AP is only required to be engaged during cruise flight.

[bubbers44]

Why any airline would require autopilot being on during 98 % of the flight only says their pilots can't fly without it. I flew with three airlines and none required it to be on at all. I guess I am lucky to be retired now and not have to deal with it. 95% of my flying is with an airline that has not hired in 10 years so don't have to worry about it yet. Yes, I know about the new separation rules.

[Centaurus]

For pilots, it is our responsibility to maintain our own basic handling skills. When I flew long haul on 767 and 777's a lot of us would take off and hand fly to final cruising altitude, as we only got a few legs a month. We had to take the opportunity we had

Much depends not only on the specific policy in the company operations manual but also the captains personal enthusiasm for hand flying. If a company mandates automatics from liftoff to touch down, there is nothing you can do about it unless you want to risk your job.

It was 52 years ago when David Davies wrote his book "Handling the Big Jets" yet it remains arguably one of the most readable books on airmanship for airline pilots ever written. One memorable paragraph in the book that has always struck a chord with this reader, is where Davies wrote: "Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly jaded, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can best be met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a self-productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilot's task."

D.P Davies added: "Finally, do not be lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and the approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice in raw ILS, particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches"

When that was written the automatics were not nearly as sophisticated as they are now. But his words of advice still stand the test of time. Although some companies require their crews to engage the automatic pilot soon after take off and leave them engaged until short final, not every chief pilot feels that is really necessary. Some leave the automatics decision to the captain; in other words, flexibility is encouraged. That enlightened attitude is unfortunately quite rare nowadays.

The problem being, the more brain-washed into automatics some pilots may become, the less confident they have in their own ability to hand fly without the crutch of the flight director or other goodies. This leads to what we now know as automatics addiction or automatics dependency - just what David Davies warned against. I suspect that was happening in his day as well - hence his words of caution. The inevitable downhill slide occurs causing some captains to rationalise their own lack of handling confidence by also discouraging their young enthusiastic first officers against practicing hand flying in general. Soon the first officers lose their manual flying confidence.. One day they become captains and the inevitable vicious circle starts again Which is now the current situation in airlines large and small around the world.

I believe if pilots were actively encouraged through company SOP to practice their hand flying skills on instruments within commonsense parameters, the bogey of Loss of Control accidents would reduce over time. That said, there will be rare events requiring superb handling skills and this is why the vital importance of training in the simulator for unusual attitude recoveries will always remain.

D.B. Davies sage advice should be framed and displayed in every crew room..

[Yankee Whisky]

I believe, and practiced, getting to know your aircraft in good and bad situations, leading to confidence building trust in the recoverability of any unusual attitudes it instills in pilots....is of paramount importance in
piloting aircraft (or driving cars in adverse conditions etc):ok:

I am afraid that automisation has lulled the aviation community in a sense of submission to leave it to the computers to handle the flying. No wonder that some pilots don't even qualify to fly a Tiger Moth (well, that is...) !

[bubbers44]

We aren't the same breed of pilots that flew the DC3 and 707 types. It is sad but that is where we are at with the new pilots. I don't think we can change this because management looks at the bottom line.

[bubbers44]

Management doesn't care if you can recover from an upset because the computer doesn't have that input. Air France lost an Airbus a couple of years ago because of two pilots that couldn't fly without automation. They still don't care.

[NARVAL]

Quote:
"Air France lost an Airbus a couple of years ago because of two pilots that couldn't fly without automation. They still don't care."
May I try to differ from that statement (respectfully, I understand your anger, and share it, too): they do care, but they do not know how to solve the training issue.I have read this thread and I share most of the thoughts expressed...although I do not like to play the old warrior, I come from a generation that was trained at things which would scare the young modern pilots to death...flying aerobatics at very low altitude and at night (training in the french navy 1969) training at aerobatics under the hood with needle and ball ,the speed, and nothing else etc...But even if you are at ease with unusual attitudes, even if your experience enables you to stay cool when suddenly wake turbulence you should have avoided sends you at 80° bank on final approach...you have to keep in mind the fact that you no longer fly the solid, simple aircrafts we knew. All the things I have read in this thread seem to imply that when you act on the yoke, or sidestick, the plane will respond. Take the Air France A330, and its crash, since you speak of that company. I will certainly not reopen the thread here, all has been said elsewhere. Let us not even think of "they did not do this, or that"...let us just look at what they did, right or wrong, and the result on the flight controls:
they did not trim the aircraft...it trimmed itself UP to the very end of the THS capabilities, silently. When the pilot (time 02H12'35'') decides to use forward stick, not long I admit, and then neutral stick...the elevator goes from 30° up to 20° up and stays there! Seeking for an accelaration, and not responding directly to the stick command. It is all very well to ask for aerobatic training, but you will not win aerobatic competitions in a plane which keep the elevator up when you push the stick forward. Let us face it, on our new planes, you must avoid dire situations, because once really out of the normal operating envelope, your piloting skills may not be enough. the Perpignan pilot was experienced and competent, but he never could get in phase with his aircraft...

[RAT 5]

In the 80's B732 we flew to the most major & minor airfields: those with all the aids, those with almost nothing; no radar, no DME, perhaps only an NDB & VASI. If really necessary an NDB let down on time and altitude, but usually it was a day time visual. This was the most common into small Greek islands. If you were lucky the larger ones had an ILS. However, on a clear day a visual was the norm; even into LGW, LTN, MAN etc. The a/c had only 1 DME as a range aid. The whole descent had all been done on 1 DME from FL350 and if you spooled up before 1500' you bought the beers. I'm not hankering for the good old days; it was hard work, but satisfying. A visual was the norm using Mk.1 eyeball and knowledgeable control of the parameters necessary to make it work. One of my last airlines, there've been a few, dissuaded against visuals. If necessary it could not be flown shorter than 4nm and a VNAV LNAV route had to be constructed to 4nm to aid the profile. Good god! Every medical you have your eyes tested; every 6 months you have your skills tested. You pass and then you are not allowed to use them. No wonder there are some out there who can not do the basics and do not know how to in any case. Shame on such a philosophy. It was all about saving money due to avoiding G/A's. So when the poo hits the propellor the crew will be hard pushed to sort it out. Trained robotic button pushing monkeys; not pilots. True pilots can do both in their sleep. Even the button pushing is done as per rigid SOP's rather than understanding exactly what is going on and allowing you to chose the best method for the job in hand: even down to what CDU page you have for every phase of flight. Good God almighty. Pontious would turn in his grave never mind Ernest K. G. I fear the pendulum has swung fully to one side. What will take it to swing back to a more sensible centre? sadly too many smoking holes. Every time I watch Air Crash investigation I cringe and wonder how many times something similar has 'nearly' happened. I do not suggest we all fly like Bush Pilots or Flying Alaska jockies, but we should be able to do the basics. There are some things about flying a jet which are basic principles and don't change from a cherokee. We learnt it on the job. It was the norm. Now the HOT says there is not enough simulator time to teach these skills. Ouch! I fear not enough out there can do those; and whose fault is that? CAA's or the airline?
I do not believe flying manually at constant power and speed upto FL XYZ is keeping manual flying skills honed. It is the idle descent to a CDA LDA to a visual or visual to ILS/VOR/NDB finals manually flying through flap extension while keeping on profile that will keep your skills honed. You need to manage speed, power, attitude and configuration to a LDA/CDA. It is that which is discouraged for commercial reasons. A sad day. The saddest thing is if you want to enjoy flying don't become an airline pilot.

[4Greens]

Agree entirely with the previous post. As an old fogey with military and airline experience, I have consistenly argued for a guarded switch that when activated turns the machine back into a real aircraft that flies normally.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Never mind 'Handling the Big Jets', the problems seem to be at a more basic level. A more suitable bit of bedtime reading, despite its dated graphics, is that classic, 'Stick & Rudder'. Understand what Langewiesche says and all will be well.

[misd-agin]

unusual attitudes in a fighter/trainer capable of high G operations, with an ejection seat, is light years apart from doing unusual attitudes in an airliner.

I wish each airliner required or offered acrobatic training. Learning to control your fear level is a huge positive from acro training.

[RetiredBA/BY]

Well, actually they are not THAT different, in fact quite similar. Earlier, I quoted DP Davies advice on recovering from an upset is fundamentally the same as taught in jet trainers and fighters in the RAF:

Deal with speed and trend.
Use aileron to roll wings level.
Pitch to nearest (up or down) horizon.
Stay off the rudder !

We did it, under the hood, with turn indicator and pressure instruments only because the AH could/would topple. I guess the modern ADIs are untopplable so recovery should be straightforward with modern equipment

I still remember that training both as student and instructor as clear as day and I passionately believe that ALL pilots should have the training and knowledge to recover from ANY recoverable upset.

I would also argue that a pilot trained to recover from upsets is more likely to be able to avoid them in the first place. !!



and 4 greens isn't it actually TWO switches, AP and AT disconnect !

[4Greens]

Ref previous post. Switch removes all auto systems. You then fly attitude, wings level, power setting that you know about and call for a cup of tea.

[Green Guard]

Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?

it is ( I am sorry to say) very stupid question.
The answer is Yeeeeeees

[misd-agin]

We disagree. Fighters roll at up to 720 degrees per second. Even roll reversal does not cause the a/c to lurch. If you make roll inputs in large airliners and change the rate of roll or worse reverse direction you shake the entire a/c. I call it 'the widebody lurch'.

Pull back - trees get smaller? Sure. Push forward trees get bigger? Sure. Yes they're similar but at the same time there's significant differences. And the procedures to recover are the same. But given a choice I'd take an upset in a fighter anyday over an airliner. Why? What's the last defense in a fighter with altitude below them? Let go. Actually a regular biannual training event years ago. It's not a good idea an airliner.

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Pull back - trees get smaller? Sure. Push forward trees get bigger? Sure.

What these so called 'pilots' seem not to have understood is the third part of that little saying. "Keep pulling back, trees get bigger again".

[Waspy]

The fact you did'nt experience any unrecoverable upset doesn't mean you'll be able to cope with it when it happens. I was a fighter in another life. I thought it would never happen to me until it did. If the surprise effect can be so huge for an experienced fighter, flying half of the time upside down and at high G's, tell me what today's airline pilots (with very limited training in that area) will do...? Besides, you din't read all the words of my post. I wrote:You can't blame the youngsters.

[4Greens]

For the last time, check out ICATEE on google. All the training requirements are covered and hopefully will be ICAO doctrine in the not too distant future.

[Linktrained]

In 1950 when being trained on the Link D2 it was possible to have the whole operation either with or without " Rough Air". ( Whether this could have different settings - has been forgotten.) We started with "Calm Air" and learned to fly on instruments and stalling and how to recover from a spin. Then "Rough Air" was used for most or all of my training. As a new pilot I felt that it was unlikely that I would spend the rest of my instrument flying time just under calm conditions. ( I was right !)
Thanks to the random nature of the "Rough Air" one learned to maintain ones flight path with greater accuracy. ( "Calm Air" was easier - but not as useful as a lesson.) Later, hand flying alternate hours with the Captain, when it was " my hour" to hand fly a York, sometimes we flew into an unseen/ unsuspected Cb. The randomness of the Link meant that surprise or shock of sudden turbulence even when accompanied by lightening strikes, St. Elmos Fire and squeals of static were just additional effects.
(165 Kts. IAS or about 180 kts. TAS and just below 10,000ft. I assume that a higher TAS would have meant that we would hit each cell harder.)
( Radar was not fitted for a further ten years, for me. Then it had become a "No Go Item". And I could radar map read - at night, too!)
LT

[Mac the Knife]

"Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training"

From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.

It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.

:bored:

[A37575]

"Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training"

From the comments it seems that there are almost insuperable barriers to this.

It would probably be easier/cheaper to make the automation better.


I understand from a colleague working for Boeing in the simulator business, this is precisely how Boeing has designed the 787. Idiot proof and the planning assumption is that incompetent pilots will crew the aircraft.

[bubbers44]

So the future is to lower the standards of airmen so incompetent pilots will not be unemployed using automation as a fix?

Now rerun the Hudson USAIR double engine failure in your minds and visualize the deep hole in the ground. That is what automation and lowering standards will do to our aviation future. Do we want the public to know this is where we are headed for if regulations are made to allow this to happen?

[Shaggy Sheep Driver]

Problem is, unless you empoy only pilots like Sully with lots of real stick and rudder time in all sorts of circumstances (and where would you find them these days?) who could pull off a 'Hudson', the alternative is automatic aeroplanes with much better and more clever automatics.

A few hours of 'hands on' in a transport jet sim every few weeks won't do it. You need 'background'.

[greeners]

SSD, interesting point. 'Background' as you suggest will absolutely help and is not an option in the commercial environment. Some would argue that three to five days of well structured upset recovery training in the classroom and in aerobatic aeroplanes as a starting point and maybe a day or two of recurrency training every year (six months? two years?) may not guarantee a save on the scale of Sully's ditching but will absolutely put the pilot in a far better position to ensure that his or her IAs are the very best ones possible.

There has been an interesting parallel debate on one of the LinkedIn groups (Aviation Professionals) where the REAL costs of a hull loss are touched upon, not just from a financial and legal liability perspective but from the actual reputational hit; one commented that you would have to take into account the cost of the accident AND the safety overspend factor, and suggested that for a western European airline, the cost of AF447 would, in ALARP terms, come in well above $1000 million dollars. It is difficult to see how this level of training cost could be exceeded even with the discounted cash flow analysis. And yes, I fully acknowledge that some will view that perspective as sitting at an extreme end of the spectrum. But is it, really?

For me this thread has been fascinating, not just to see the various views (mostly pro-upset training, although a huge variation in what people believe to be suitable or appropriate), but also in the mostly polarised opinions with little apparent swing room. I have already stated my own pro-upset training bias, both from background (RAF, GA safety and aeros FI) and from business, as my company now delivers this kind of training for pilots of larger aeroplanes. Fortunately for us, and probably for some passengers who could well end up better off as a result of this kind of training, a number of Heads of Flight Ops feel that getting this training definitely IS worthwhile.

I met with the fleet manager of a small Business Jet operation today where he expressed huge concern that many of his pilots had rarely been beyond 45 degrees of bank and he had a genuine concern that he was not confident that if a genuine upset was encountered that it would be handled in a way that most likely delivered a safe outcome. The ICATEE suggestion that only new pilots should receive Upset training in real aerobatic aircraft (notwithstanding 4greens support for this mission I've seen nothing that will make any suggested change in training requirements mandatory) is absolutely - in my already declared to be biased view - a great step in the right direction. Real progress is good, but many will still feel that it is nothing like enough.

[bubbers44]

SSD we all know they won't spend the money so we know where we are going.

[bubbers44]

Sully won't save the next one because automation can't. Read his book. It is great. I hope most of us could have done what he did. We don't get to practice ditching so expect we could do what the manual says. He had to do it with no training. He did everything right.

[thermostat]

pakeha-boy. You hit it on the head. Well said. Too much emphasis on flight testing rather than on training. I don't see how aerobatic training would have helped the crew of AF447. You don't take a passenger jet which is at 35000 ft (close to coffin corner) and put it through an area of bad weather. I've said many times before, if they had flown around the bad weather, they would be alive today. Also, if they had released the sidestick (taken their hands off the thing) the aircraft may have recovered on it's own. This was a stupid accident that should never have happened in my opinion. The attitude that we should know how to recover from an upset is only one side of the story. I prefer the side that says, let's fly the 'plane so as NOT to have an upset.
My experience in sim "training" on the Airbus was not good. It was a "get you" attitude rather than "let's see how we can make this a better pilot". One should leave the sim exercise feeling good, that you have practised/mastered a particular problem, accomplished something. That is not happening.
T

[A37575]

Why not -assuming of course you are talking about practice ditching in the simulator:ok:

In fact it should be part of type rating training as every aircraft is different. The Boeing 737 FCTM and QRH give very good advice on the ditching procedure. But it takes good instrument flying skills especially if carried out in IMC/night. That is because any excess variation from the recommended airspeed and rate of descent will effect the body attitude. There is an optimum body attitude at impact and attitudes lower than that even momentarily could cause the aircraft to dive under at impact. Pilots proficient at raw data manual flying will quickly get the hang of the careful instrument scanning and thrust handling required to maintain a steady state rate of descent and nose attitude in the last few hundred feet. Remember there may not be accurate QNH available.

On the other hand simulator experience has revealed that pilots wedded to automatics and out of current manual instrument flying practice, usually "crash" several times into the water rather than maintain correct flying attitude, airspeed and optimum rate of descent. It is a worthwhile exercise in the simulator which doesn't take too much time.

If it is obvious this writer is somewhat biased in his thoughts on practicing ditching in the simulator, it is because in another life he spent a few thousand hours flying wartime designed four engine maritime reconnaissance aircraft over the oceans, night and day at low level.

We carried flame-floats, which when activated in contact with the water, would burn brightly for several minutes. On long range maritime reconnaissance flights, crews would take up pre-planned ditching positions in the aircraft while we practiced laying our own flare-path with flame-floats in the water and made approaches with go-arounds conducted at 200 feet. Squadron pilots were thus well versed in ditching techiques in terms of airspeed, rate of descent and nose attitude.

I must say I didn't envy the crew members sitting in their ditching stations as they couldn't see outside. No doubt each prayed fervently the pilots knew what they were doing because no one wanted to get wet feet 500 miles out to sea.

[misd-agin]

Who could replicate what Sully did? He realized he couldn't reach TEB. LGA was a stretch and an immediate decision had to be made. The river was the largest open space available. He choose it.

If anything he ran out of airspeed too soon. They impacted at 750' FPM with no flare(AOA limited).

The Airbus FBW would not allow him to stall the a/c prior to water impact. The threat of stalling a non-FBW a/c prior to impact exists. Old saying - 'it's alwyas better to fly to the scene of the crash then to crash at the scene of the crash'.

Who could replicate what Sully did? He says the answer is many.

He's a great spokesman for the profession.

[bburks]

I have not had the pleasure of reading PPRUNE for a time, but am quite pleased to view this thread. I have been working on Upset and LOC-I issues for the past four years, and prior to that, on simulator fidelity issues. I am currently a line Captain flying 737's, and served about ten years as a Check-Airman. I am happy to see a few posts identifying ICATEE (International Committee for Aviation Training in the Extended Envelope), as I have been working on this committee since the summer of 2009 (a sad irony was that the first day of our first meeting was the day we lost AF 447).

I have greatly benefitted from the previous posts, as it confirms many of the assumptions we have arrived at in ICATEE. By the way, there are many other excellent working groups globally working on Upset and Stall issues (two FAA ARC's, EASA, ICAO, AIAA, SAE, etc.), and there is tremendous consensus between the groups, giving us confidence that we can identify a solution to eliminating or at least reducing LOC-I in the future.

If I may, I would like to summarize the important lessons we have learned from our activities in ICATEE. Our mission is to eliminate/reduce LOC-I through enhanced UPRT. Our method was to conduct a thorough review of the accident/incident literature, and then to seek training solutions. As much as possible, we focused on identifying the existing global training infrastructure that could contribute to enhanced UPRT. Our approach is a long-term approach; we will not be able to "fix" the current deficit in UPRT knowledge and skills of existing airline pilots overnight, but we can begin moving the needle towards more robust knowledge and skill development. And we can certainly better equip future airline pilots entering the inventory. Much of what we need to repair is in eliminating negative training, emphasizing academics, using simulators appropriately, and then providing some realistic exposure to the real g-environment and psychological/physiological benefits of training upsets/stall in real aircraft.

Examples of negative training; the practical test standards (FAA) that emphasized "minimum loss of altitude" for approach to stall and stall training (now removed with new AC from FAA, but still wrongly emphasized at some airlines and operators. Regardless, we have suffered from years of this negative training that will have to be "trained-out" by proper emphasis on immediately reducing AOA).

In-appropriate use of simulators. A FFS is very accurate in the normal flight envelope, as the aero model is based on actual flight test data. FFS lack this model beyond the normal envelope. ICATEE has worked with OEM's, NASA, etc. to derive "non-normal envelope data" to produce a more accurate and capable upset model. Flight test data does require an OEM to produce approach to stall and limited stall data, but it is derived from a very benign entry, wings-level, 1-g with 1 knot per second or so deceleration up to the stall. However, most "real-world" in-advertant stalls are dynamic. We need the capability to provide an "enhanced" aero-model in the FFS, and we are close to producing that.

For now however, FFS should only be used in accordance with their accuracy; for now that should be in approach to stall training, and not full aerodynamic stall training. If pilots and instructors attempt to perform "real stall training" in simulators now, it will likely not be accurate. For example, most (if not all) swept-wing jet transport FFS will replicate a full aerodynamic stall very much like an approach to stall; the jet (FFS) will be controllable around the pitch and roll axis. This "benign" behavior will give the wrong training impression to pilots on the criticality of full aerodynamic stall; a much different condition that an "approach to stall". In the future, we will need to adopt the improved type-specific aero-models and begin providing more "accurate" aerodynamic stall training to airline pilots (precisely because of the large difference in performance of an aircraft in aerodynamic stall vs. approach to stall).

End Part One

[bburks]

Almost ALL of the folks I have had the pleasure of working with in airline training management are fine people with great integrity. For the most part, they provide excellent training, and there is no question on their "desire" to provide the best training. Other examples of negative training in UPRT are due to a lack of knowledge on the training capabilities of the training infrastructure.

The American Airlines Advanced Manuevers Program is a great example of this. It was never their intent than to provide other than world-class quality training. Indeed, we will never know if one of the benefits of this training was in one or several aircraft accident "saves". So I am not here to impugn the developers of this training program. However, we have learned from AA 587, and how limitations in academic understanding, and the practical demonstration of maneuvers in a simulator can have negative consequences.

In-appropriate use of rudder was a finding in this accident. A simulators ability to accurately portray "yaw or side-load heave" as produced by aggressive rudder input is very limited. If the simulator WAS accurate in this motion cueing capability, the sim response to that aggressive input would have been so violent and direct (like the actual aircraft) that you would never have to explain to the pilots why that input was in-appropriate. However, if we combine the lack of realistic g-cueing capabilities in a FFS (particularly those departing the normal flight envelope), and compound this problem with a lack of realistic feedback tools to the pilots and instructors; then we exacerbate the problem. In current FFS, the lack of useful feedback tools can actually REWARD in-appropriate flight control inputs. Using rudder as a roll strategy is VERY effective, however it can produce very negative consequences such as aircraft structural limits being exceeded. ICATEE has identified the necessity of providing enhanced feedback capability to instructors and pilots as a primary need (flight control inputs, flight displays, VN diagram, alpha/beta plots, etc.). The good news is that this is not a formidable technical or cost issue.

This brings up the next challenge; better instructor UPRT training and standardization. In ten years of working as a Check-Airman, I was never given any explicit training in how to teach and evaluate Upsets and Stalls, and certainly in how to use simulators appropriately (and I would consider the bulk of my instructor training and standardization efforts provided by my company as excellent! This seems to be an issue predominately with Upset/Stall training).

Unfortunately, in reviewing our surveys to airlines and operators, this appears to be the norm in the global industry. Many of you may have performed "free-play" with the simulator, expecting that it's accuracy was excellent in all attitudes and maneuvers. Because of this wrongly held notion, too many instructors will provide their own "upset techniques" and a lack of airline training management appreciation on FFS limitations, and the need to ensure UPRT standardization becomes problematic.

One other quick example. Several posters here have identified pre-set maneuvers in simulators in providing upset scenarios. At my airline, we selected one of these maneuvers for our recurrent training cycle in the B-737NG. This was to be a high altitude, heavy weight upset, designed as a TCAS wake encounter that pitched the aircraft up to 20 degrees, and then began an aggressive roll through 130 degrees. So far so good. This was selected from a preset feature on the simulator instructor panel, and the maneuver began!

As the pilot flying, I identified the pitch and roll, cross-checked flight deck instruments, and then initiated a recovery by turning off the A/P and A/T. I provided measure nose down elevator, and as roll began, provided measured aileron input (measured in that flight control inputs were not abrupt, but initiated in respect to the lack of aero-damping at altitude). Imaging my surprise as I reached FULL aileron input that the roll had not reversed, nor even slowed the rolling rate! The jet continued to roll just as quickly past 130 degrees with full aileron input! The next thing I remembered was the instructor yelling at me to feed in rudder!

ICATEE work has made me aware that more damage is incurred during high altitude upsets by pilots inputting improper or overly aggressive flight control inputs. So this selected maneuver needed to be investigated. What we found is a simple and prevalent condition in most level D simulators in use. It is what we can call the "wash-out" effect. When an upset maneuver was pre-selected, the simulator went into an "aerodynamic freeze" whereby no flight control inputs provided by pilots would be honored or recognized by the simulator, until the preselect parameters were achieved (could be 2-6 seconds or so). The net effect of this training exercise was to "teach" our airline pilots that in the event of an high altitude upset, that they would need to take aggressive flight controls inputs. Worse training than if we had done nothing at all!

End of Part Two

[RetiredF4]

@ bburks

very interesting, keep it coming!

[mary meagher]

bburks, thank you for your excellent summary... having read part one and part two, I hope for more.

You make the point that training on simulators may elicit over-reaction and agressive imput that make a situation worse. This being due to the limitations inherent in the simulator.

When teaching stall recovery in a glider, it is often sufficient to simply let go of the controls! and the trimmed glider will recover and respond normally to control imputs. When the student does an overexcited recovery from a spin, the bunt that results gives an interesting view of the landscape, and if the straps are not tightly done up, the negative g can be quite entertaining as well. Although this is dealing with stalls and recovery from unusual attitudes in its simplest form, the feedback is authentic....and instant. I once had the privilege of stalling a "BA111" at Cranebank, long ago, and it never felt quite real.

[bburks]

These are just several examples to make the point that industry, and instructor pilots, need to clearly understand the training objectives, and in how to accurately and effectively utilize simulators and ALL training infrastructure to ensure accurate transfer of training.

Other gains can be made in simply HOW we train in the simulator. Many have expressed here how most simulator training is just rote unusual attitude training. First, we cannot assume that when an airline hires a new pilot that they have the requisite knowledge of aerodynamics in all flight regimes (high and low) or the handling characteristics of their aircraft (ICATEE recommendations are to enhance the academic requirements at both the licensing level and the airline/operator level, which should produce more knowledgeable pilots in the future). There is still a need for what we call "maneuvers-based training (MOFT), but it should be broken down to basic levels on the initial type specific training in the FFS. The pilots should be introduced to the basic manual handling characteristics of their aircraft, with an emphasis on the information available on their flight displays, and how it relates to energy management and trends. Handling should be related to a practical demonstration of aircraft performance, and how it is related to the basic aerodynamic principals involved. And then this demonstration should be repeated to show the tremendous difference related to high altitude flight. For the AF 447 pilots, they likely never hand flew at high altitude, nor in the simulator environment, let alone in degraded flight protection modes.

As an aside, you may have noticed that the industry verbiage is changing from Upset Recovery Training (URT) to Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT). This is based on our analysis that the best gain in risk reduction in LOC-I is to deploy a dual strategy of emphasizing both Prevention and Recovery. Prevention is leveraged by enhanced aerodynamic academics and appropriate use of simulators. The goal is that through improved pilot knowledge and awareness of their specific threat environments, pilots will undertake risk avoidance strategies, or at the least recognize increasing risk threats and take early action before an actual "recovery" is required.

I will address the benefits of "on-aircraft" training later, but our research has indicated that pilots need the exposure to "real aircraft" g-maneuvering to acquire the actual recovery skills required to recover from Upsets. However, those pilots who do complete some form of "on-aircraft" UPRT not only benefit from greatly enhanced recovery skills, but also show tremendous gains in appreciating and utilizing the benefits of using prevention strategies in their line flying activities for avoiding and preventing upsets.

Going back to MOFT or maneuvers-based training, the FFS are excellent for baseline training of this sort. And as "recovery skills" can at times be counter intuitive (" I need to "push" to recovery when my nose is low or I am inverted?"), they will need to be re-visited in recurrent training at appropriate intervals. But industry will need to evolve from better and more thorough MOFT, to more realistic scenario based training, or LOFT if you will. MOFT can be rote, and is usually delivered to one pilot at a time to build up essential pilot competencies. But it needs to evolve to a context in replicating how upsets will be experienced on the line; as a surprise, and in the shared crew responsibility requiring effective CRM, hence LOFT style UPRT training.

LOFT should be used by an airline or training provider to evaluate how effective their flight crews are in upset prevention, by tasking flight crews on their effectiveness in employing avoidance strategies, and then in monitoring aircraft performance and taking effective action before an aircraft departs the normal flight envelope (any upset by definition starts within the normal envelope. Most but not all upset/stall scenarios can be prevented by flight crews employing early monitoring or prevention strategies).

MOFT will continue to be required however, as these skills are perishable and do need re-visiting at appropriate intervals. So the near future will likely see a combination of on-going MOFT and LOFT.

End Part three

[Bus Junkie]

It is simple, just hire expats to fly the air france flights until their pilots complete basic flight training, which includes recognition and recovery from a stall. This after all is not rocket science.

[4Greens]

In a follow up to 'BBurks' excellent posts, just Google on 'ICATEE' to read all about the upset recovery training. Its all there.

[alf5071h]

Bryan, 4Greens, et al, whilst ICATEE is a laudable effort, it is only one contribution amongst many required to address the ‘LOC problem’. It is a much needed bottom up initiative which could, or has had some impact, but the approach via ICAO (who only recommend) is likely to slow any timely effectiveness. Even then action depends on national authorities for rule making, operators to train, and individuals to learn, remember and respond.
The addition of ‘prevention’ in the ICATEE strategy perhaps acknowledges the scope of the problem and that LOC recovery is subsequent to identification and avoidance of hazardous situations.

There are varied and wide ranging views of ‘the problem’. In some incidents the crew created the LOC, or it involved weaknesses in the man-machine interface, and other (most) accidents involved the failure to understand the situation. Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required.

Systems thinking and problem solving can be complicated, but with a generic (abstract) view, some key aspects can be identified.
Fundamental human behaviour isn’t changing, or the difficulty in shaping it. However, the world social and professional climate is changing, and this may (adversely) affect the human.
Automation will always have weaknesses; design and training can help, but these have variable effectiveness. Redesign may take years; but specifics like stall warning and aircraft trim might warrant urgent action.
Training depends on memory and understanding, and ultimately on the human to assess a situation, to recall actions, and then act.
All of the activities in these areas require some remedial action; the key question is which are the more important, which will be effective, which can be afforded, etc. This requires overall co-ordination, at least at national authority level. However, I suspect that this will become fragmented – design / certification, training, checking / licencing, etc, such that at the operator level any effectiveness might be ‘lost’ within the generally ‘over documented’ regulations or ‘jump through the hoop’ cultures.

The above might be a sceptical view – subject to many biases, particularly hindsight, but I wonder if LOC recovery training (based on historical accidents and hindsight) is really what the industry requires to maintain future safety.
My bet is on avoidance; training and improved technology to aid awareness, and provision of additional situational safety margins to help protect humans from themselves. Priority technical changes would include stall warning and the need for auto-trim / trim follow-up systems to provide the crew with appropriate cues for aircraft control.
In a rapidly changing commercial environment, we may not see (or need) much training specifically relating to recent high profile LOC accidents.

[bubbers44]

Sully saved the day because he did not use automation. He did not touch down at 750 fpm as one post indicated because the video shows he was flared into a normal touchdown at less then 20 fpm. I hope we all could do this but he did.

Unfortunately automatic airplanes make pilots dependant upon automation as SOP's by a lot of airlines require using it. When I was flying you could fly with automation or without unless it was a Cat 2 or lower approach.

[A37575]

Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required


I am staggered at the amount of bumpf written on the subject of unusual attitude recoveries. Christ Almighty - we learned this stuff on Tiger Moths years ago. And that was real limited panel recoveries with no ADI. The whole problem in the first place is surely unassailable evidence that almost every jet transport accident put down to loss of control in IMC were caused primarily by the pilots piss-poor hand flying instrument flying ability. They were the product of our age - automatic monkeys.

Having got themselves for whatever reason into an unusual attitude in IMC, the evidence showed they had no idea how to recover on instruments; and even if they could understand what the flight instruments were telling them, they did not have the basic instrument flying skills to get out of trouble.

What a shocking indictment on the airline and simulator provider training systems that have permiited this state of affairs to continue. It will get worse as the new breed of MPL cadets hit the RH seat to with no hands on basic instrument flying skills.

The time is well overdue for State regulators to use their authority and demand airline operators face up to the fact that LOC accidents will continue to occur periodically, unless steps are taken to re-inforce more meaningful raw data IMC hands on flying in simulators and during appropriate times in line flying.

[JammedStab]

For the benefit of those of us not experts on unusual attitude recovery, I found this interesting.....

"The second benefit of unloading the wing is that the aircraft’s roll rate improves dramatically. You will lose less altitude when recovering an inverted, nose-low airplane by pushing to near 0 g, rolling crisply to right-side up, and then pulling to level flight. This holds true even when you are significantly nose low. Where a typical business jet can take 5 sec. or more to roll upright with 1 g or more on the wing, the roll can be completed in 1 or 2 sec. when closer to 0 g."

[silvertate]

Should airline pilots have more/better/different upset recovery training?

it is ( I am sorry to say) very stupid question.
The answer is Yeeeeeees


The other question is: 'should pilots have more hands on manual flying experience.'

But when I put that to xxxxx airline, the answer was an emphatic NO. In fact, I was treated like a Neanderthal for even raising the question. And that, I have to say, is the cause of the problem that the industry now faces. But I don't suppose these managers will ever apologise for thier error - managers never do.

[Naali]

Just joining in to read,but thank You greeners to take this issue for conversation. Maybe some of us with mil-background have much to tell. I just read the first page of this all,so don.t shoot me. Staying in the sky,is an issue here.

[Naali]

Reading more,bburks gives also much to to think about. Thanks,both of You. We had aerobatics,about six hours at basic,and then some more at the next course. And getting to basics,it was one of the most important training in my career. Though the nausea at first,i learned a kind of like,being it alone, trying this and that. So with many different mishandlings it gave me some confidence of understanding how a wing behaves. I would suggest that training to anyone who wants to fly. But for sure,pro,s who fly a supercritical wing these days,are sometimes , not even aware of how it behaves at the altitude. If You stall it there,you may never get the airflow back. so it will inevitably be pancaking till You hit something. That,s why i still like hydraulics more than elec,tricks. They give me at least some back-ups because we know they are vulnerable to saying goodbye. Electrics at any control,-be it wing icing or any state of the airplane,are not really giving the info what You can understand. Just data of different sources. Maybe an imaginary Person could handle all that. Airplanes should not be designed for those who build and sell them.

[Naali]

For a bit of lightness for this issue. My first spin was with our Course Main Instructor,-or however anyone would like to call him,he did not care. In first lesson with climbing to 5 thousand feet with very lax and tired Cessna, He had told me almost all he had,making maths and curves to the frozen window as we climbed,with his finger. so with Him,i had no time to think anything else than just to observe what is happening. He -hahaa talked me over from all my fears. "see,you can stop the spin in any direction you want to,it,s only about timing" -This flies,whenever few basic things are taken into account. It will not fly,if You try to extend it,s boundaries beyond it,s abilities. So be wary of thinking," i know." So i am very much an advocate for training of just unusual situations,first visual,and then really mixing You with differing indications with the plane You fly. Accidents do not happen with normal operations,so some extremes may be better tried with sims. ps.Accidents are those,where no one had the idea that this could happen.