Paul McCartney near death experience

[herman the crab]

Not sure if I missed this but can't believe there has been no comments on it and the reporting style :)

Paul McCartney and wife two feet from disaster in helicopter drama: Pilot forced into terrifying climb after brushing tree-tops | Mail Online (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2231160/Paul-McCartney-wife-feet-disaster-helicopter-drama-Pilot-forced-terrifying-climb-brushing-tree-tops.html)

HTC

[XV666]

A slightly less dramatic reporting from The Daily Telegraph: (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/9670209/Paul-McCartney-and-wife-2ft-away-from-helicopter-crash.html)

Sir Paul McCartney and his wife Nancy Shevell narrowly avoided disaster after the helicopter they were travelling in almost crashed into trees in the driving rain, according to air traffic reports.
The couple were travelling back from the launch of Sir Paul's daughter Mary's new cookery book in London to their home in London when the incident happened in May.
According to reports released by the Air Accidents Investigations Branch, that monitors air traffic, the helicopter came within "two feet" of crashing into the trees.
The report said that the "commander" of the helicopter became disorientated in bad weather and skimmed the trees while trying to land.
In the end, the unnamed 55-year-old pilot, was forced to abort the landing and instead land at nearby Lydd Airport in Kent.
The near miss was recorded as a "serious incident", which it defines as "involving circumstances indicating that nan accident nearly occurred".
No action will be taken against the charter company Air Harrods, although recommendations have been made over flight safety.
The firm, that is also used by Tony Blair, charges £3,000 an hour for helicopter flights.
Sir Paul, 70, married his 52-year-old third wife Nancy Shevell last year.
His eldest daughter Mary McCartney, has written a cookbook on vegetarian dishes.
His spokesman declined to comment.

Regardless, I'm intrigued at the accuracy of the radalt that reads two feet off the top of a tree :p

[Arm out the window]

Two feet clearance off the trees? He's getting soft, his previous wife only had one foot.

[Hedski]

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S4-2012%20G-WIWI.pdf

[Hughes500]

TQ
If you read the report it says crew 2 !

[Anthony Supplebottom]

can't believe there has been no comments on it

First mentioned a month ago on this thread - http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/491343-fayair.html.

[P6 Driver]

I wouldn't wish ill on anyone but if this particular VIP passenger was to have a scare, would it be possible to give him one that would just persuade him to stop singing?

[stilton]

HELP :eek::eek::eek:

[Torquetalk]

TQ
If you read the report it says crew 2 !


My bad. Post deleted. Thanks JimL & Hughes500.

[helispeediii]

any one been in there at night ? is it lit, only saw pic in paper , didnot look like many escape routes , they all walked away! luck or judgment ?? helispeediii

[Avitor]

I wouldn't wish ill on anyone but if this particular VIP passenger was to have a scare, would it be possible to give him one that would just persuade him to stop singing?

Agreed...and to go home before sundown. :ok:

[76fan]

How on earth can something like this happen, doesn't this operator have some sort of "off-airfield" approach procedure? (like an offshore ARA), ie with a defined approach minima? (eg 200 ft) Or do they just make it up as they go along?

Probably not, and likely yes. The company for which I worked wasn't interested in SOP's for sites such as this, so once one pilot had pushed his luck it was even more difficult for the next pilot to refuse if he considered similar conditions to be unsafe. Commercial pressure and "satisfying the customer" often ranked far above basic flight safety in operations such as these; perhaps nothing has changed since I had to give it up. A Chief Pilot responsible for flight safety but rewarded according to the profit of the commercial operation ....now how can that be done without a conflict, and why is it allowed by the authority?

[helisniper]

Targa top

How on earth can something like this happen, doesn't this operator have some sort of "off-airfield" approach procedure

That's the problem, they clearly did, and it certainly didn't involve abiding to the legal requirements of maintaining VMC below 1000' or even to a vaguely sensible height below that figure! The AAIB report will make spectacular reading, and it will be interesting to see what else comes out. There ought to be plenty of FDR/CVR evidence, although some are saying that this was wiped because the incident wasn't reported as 'promptly' as it could have been!

76 Fan

It was the Ops Director, not the CP. Either way, I don't really see a conflict as its the accountable manager's responsibility to ensure that commercial issues don't reduce flight safety. Then again, with AH's peculiar arrangements, who is the AM?!

Not sure what you mean about having an "SOP" for "sites like this". Surely the ANO and JAR-OPS are clear enough? Or are you suggesting there should be "company minima"?!!!

[Savoia]

The AAIB report will make spectacular reading ..

You may see the "Special Bulletin" here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/S4-2012%20G-WIWI.pdf).

Tks TRC.


.

[TRC]

You may see for yourself ..

Subject to amendment though..

"This Special Bulletin contains facts which have been determined up to the time of issue. It is published to inform the aviation industry and the public of the general circumstances of accidents and serious incidents and should be regarded as tentative and subject to alteration or correction if additional evidence becomes available."

[76fan]

1. JAR-OPS is after my time.
2. By sites like this, I meant any off airfield site, especially if the aircraft was operated for its owner by company pilots.
3. Chief pilot responsible for flight safety? A direct reply from a Flight Ops Inspector when the question was put to him.

My company didn't have anybody with the grand title of Ops Director. If one person (in my case the Chief Pilot) had responsibility for "getting the job done if at all possible" and "flight safety", surely you can see the conflict of interest? I could give several examples, but not here in public, in print.

I had hoped that things had improved since my day but an occurance such as this would seem, sadly, to show that they have not.

[ShyTorque]

Irrespective of the events leading up to the go-around, I wonder why the number 1 engine/transmission went over the maximum allowed combined torque figure.

My understanding is that the FADEC system should have prevented an overtorque; i.e. the advertised idea is that the pilot pulls the collective and the aircraft should look after its own limits for him. If this didn't happen, why not?

It's a great shame if a pilot makes an honest mistake, the aircraft doesn't work as advertised and so the pilot gets shown the door as the result.

[212man]

My understanding is that the FADEC system should have prevented an overtorque

A few reasons, that I would suggest. One is that the FADEC can only react to reasonably collective rates, and a very large and abrupt pull with always cause a transient overtorque until the FADEC 'gets its act together.' Another reason might be that the torque limiting is 'soft' compared to other parameter limiting, so that in attempting to restrict to 120% one FADEC allowed its engine to rise to 121.5%. I've been told from the horse's mouth that the S92 Tq limiting is not particularly 'hard,' and we can see that in practice during training. A further explanation might be that the FADEC was limiting N1 rather than Tq, and therefore as the Nr decayed (if indeed it did) the torque rose.

[Sir Korsky]

Was blowaway power entered ? 2 crew and 2 pax in a ++ is about as light as it gets. The PF and the PM would have been awoken by the drooping rotor that's for sure. I also believe, but stand to be corrected, that 10 minutes accumulated 2 min power is allowable before a tear down is required.

From the RFM

Blowaway is an escape logic associated with dual engine limiting that removes the takeoff power limiter in certain cases to provide for extraordinary and unforeseen circumstances where increased power beyond the takeoff power limit is required for continued safe operation. Extraordinary turbulence encountered in the final moments of a landing approach to an oil platform or pilot misjudgment of closure rate upon landing to a confined area can serve as operational examples where increased power beyond the limit could be an important contribution.
The blowaway logic can be latched in either of two ways: a slow to moderate rotor decay rate to 100% Nr or an excessive decay rate of 5% per-second or greater occurring at 104% Nr or less. In both cases rotor droop is occurring because more power is being commanded than the engines can deliver at the takeoff power rating, but in the latter one, the logic is applied sooner to counter the faster rate, presumably related to a more urgent situation. Blowaway is reset over a ten second interval that is initiated when Nr is restored and exceeds 106%.
When the logic is tripped, the dual engine takeoff limit is replaced by the 2-Minute single engine N1 limit or 115% torque whichever occurs first or in combination. Although normally both engines will blowaway, one engine may trip in some cases at the 100% Nr point if the droop rate is slow and enough power is realized from it to arrest droop and increase the rotor speed before the other engine trips. Other than in the colder ambients where 115% torque can be achieved at low N1 values, blowaway may be expected to result in 2-Minute N1 usage, and therefore, time added to the cumulative 2-Minute counters.

[Helinut]

Lots of unanswered questions when I read the Special Bulletin. Does anyone know if the AAIB are to do more investigation of the circumstances of the flight (rather than the post-incident download and analysis which is what they seem to have concentrated on so far)?

It would be interesting to know whether the site was lit.

Apart from a thankfully different outcome at the very end, this incident feels uncomfortably like the G-BYPA AS355 accident back in 2007.

Air Accidents Investigation: AS355F2 Twin Squirrel, G-BYPA (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/november_2008/as355f2_twin_squirrel__g_bypa.cfm)

We still don't seem to be learning from our history.

[ShyTorque]

Sir Korsky,

The quote you gave .... is that from the C++ manual, or the earlier C+? I remember it as the latter (but not flown the old girl for quite some years now). Is the C++ (which I've not flown), with its more powerful 2S1 engines, limited to the same maximum torque figures?

[Sir Korsky]

That was from the c++ rfm. Also, the 10 second transient transmission limitation is 230% for both engines. This would have been exceeded during the excursion.

[Flyting]

Two feet clearance off the trees? He's getting soft, his previous wife only had one foot....
Arm out the Window...
:D:D:D chirp of the year.........and everyone missed it :E

[76fan]

Or perhaps we don't all think amputations are funny.

[Wizzard]

I am not familiar with the S76 FADEC system but I would not like to think that if a pilot demands excessive power from the gearbox to get his aircraft out of "trouble" that the FADEC would over-ride his demand when the manufacturers Tq limits are reached!

In fact the aircraft I flew until quite recently would allow both engines to supply OEI LO power at the same time in just this event; the transmission will get trashed but everybody lives to tell the tale :\

[212man]

In fact the aircraft I flew until quite recently would allow both engines to supply OEI LO power at the same time in just this event; the transmission will get trashed but everybody lives to tell the tale

Which is what appears to have happened here :ok:

[oxo]

Or perhaps we don't all think amputations are funny.

Nah, pull the other one..

[Wizzard]

Or perhaps we don't all think amputations are funny.


I hear that before they got married he went down on one knee :ouch:

[Pittsextra]

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Sikorsky%20S-76C%20G-WIWI%2012-14%20v2.pdf

[[email protected]]

Lucky, lucky chaps who only just got away with it. Another example of CRM breakdown where the co-pilot knew what was wrong but let the experienced captain nearly kill them all.

Safety Recommendation 2014-35
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the regulations that permit a helicopter engaged in public transport operations to descend below MSA for the purpose of landing, when flying in instrument meteorological conditions but not on a published approach procedure. until this oft-abused loophole is closed, there will continue to be CFIT accidents like this one very nearly was:ugh:

[satsuma]

It leapt out at me too.

When interviewed by the AAIB, the co-pilot recalled informing the commander of his concerns that the helicopter was below the safety altitude without sufficient visual references. However, the co-pilot believed that, rather than pressing this point, his better option was to support the commander as effectively as he could, even though he believed that the commander’s actions were flawed.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

[ShyTorque]

Crab, out of interest, how do you, as a SAR pilot, descend from IMC into a situation at an ad-hoc location?

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Crab, out of interest, how do you, as a SAR pilot, descend from IMC into a situation at an ad-hoc location?


While Crab is busy, here's a quick reply: IMC offshore descents are done using the very fine radar to avoid obstacles. Overland, there is no way down from IMC except using an airfield approach aid = maintain COCISS all the way there. Not many lakes or reservoirs in this country are a suitable size and shape to conduct a radar letdown; many years ago I witnessed a RadOp attempting a practice radar letdown over Loch Morlich in VMC which would have gone spectacularly wrong had the aircraft been IMC...

[[email protected]]

Crab, out of interest, how do you, as a SAR pilot, descend from IMC into a situation at an ad-hoc location? Simples - you don't overland descend IMC below MSA unless you are on an approved IAP (and that doesn't include made up GPS letdowns).

Overwater, we have dispensation to descend below MSA using our internal radar (330 degree with a dedicated radar operator and no overflying of contacts below 1000') and AFCS/FPC letdown modes (TD to hover etc).

So, overland (day or night) you either find a hole, get a cloudbreak at or above Safety Alt or use an ILS (or similar) then low level grovel as required. Near the coast - get overwater and let down using radar/FPC then grovel as above.

What we absolutely do not do is descend IMC below Safety Alt over land like these guys did. Someone needs to legislate far more tightly about the act of landing - that is what you are doing from DA/MDA onwards, not from the cruise down to DA/MDA (if you even have one which they didn't). On a non-instrument approach you are not really landing until the last 50' or so - why are you allowed get down to that IMC because your 'eventual intent' is to land?

I should clarify, before anyone points it out, that I am no longer either a. military or b. a SAR boy;) Yes I am slowly letting go:ok:

[ShyTorque]

Crab, (I had heard...it's a small world, innit, good luck in the future).

However, to further the discussion,


Quote:
Safety Recommendation 2014-35
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the regulations that permit a helicopter engaged in public transport operations to descend below MSA for the purpose of landing, when flying in instrument meteorological conditions but not on a published approach procedure.


I'd suggest that it's used because it's always been allowed by the regulations, not an "abused loophole", which I'd suggest are your own words, not from the report or from the CAA.

Second point for possible discussion: Why is 1,000 feet above the nearest obstacle within 5 nms the "sacred figure" used for MSA?

[[email protected]]

Thanks Shy:ok:

Yes the 'abused loophole' terminology is just my take on lax legislation/regulation but it takes a certain (high-risk) mentality to deliberately descend IMC below something that is a guaranteed safe altitude when you have little idea what is beneath or ahead of you. Some people seem determined to worship the God of GPS (as they are with satnav in their cars) without really thinking through what they are trying to achieve and what they are risking if it goes wrong.

An emergency letdown due to malfunction, icing etc is a completely different thing but then the risk of not going down is outweighed by the risk of staying up.

With fare-paying pax on board, what excuse was there for not going straight to their planned alternate when it was clear that they could not replicate the first arrival as they were solid IMC at MSA?

As for the 1000' - it takes into account inaccurate flying by allowing a safety margin, all manner of altimeter errors, any likely obstructions and has the advantage of being a nice round figure to work to. Can't really see any reason to change it.

[ShyTorque]

As for the 1000' - it takes into account inaccurate flying by allowing a safety margin, all manner of altimeter errors, any likely obstructions and has the advantage of being a nice round figure to work to. Can't really see any reason to change it.

I would put forward that the 1,000 feet was mandated when navigation aids were far less accurate and so "navigational awareness" errors were far greater than in today's IFR equipped aircraft. And likely to be flown on RPS, rather than a local QNH.

It seems to me that this incident would have been prevented if a stable approach had been flown, with a timely go-around at a pre-planned MDA, rather than an attempt to press on into unsuitable conditions. Thankfully the crew learned the lesson without further penalty. I know they do read this forum and they are only too aware they obviously pushed things too far. We've all learned our limits... few professional pilots would come out of the wash totally whiter than white - even those now running the authority.

If aircraft are to be prohibited from ever descending below the arbitrary "safe 1,000 feet above and not one foot below", the manufacturers are totally wasting their time developing better and far more capable systems than we have been used to in our relatively archaic military helicopters. The technology is already out there; the "modern" military are years behind, mainly because of budgetary and procurement time limitations.

[satsuma]

they are only too aware they obviously pushed things too far

If they had thought that at the time you would think they would have put in an air safety report or an MOR. :hmm:

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

[rotorspeed]

Shy

Agree entirely that the 1000 ft above anything within 5 miles rule for MSA is a definition from a bygone age and quite inappropriate now. A modern IFR equiped helicopter is sure to have at least one GPS with RAIM and frankly I would trust the accuracy of this more even than a pressure altimeter - I've had failures of these and unlike the RAIM GPS there can be no warning indications. But it's not just believing the GPS - it's often very easy to verify it's accuracy to say at least a mile by cross referencing with a radar fix and VOR/DME position, particularly at Peasmarsh with the LYD next door.

I'd guess the MSA at this Peasmarsh site might be 1300ft QNH - a quite ridiculously high MDA for this site. MSA is fine and very appropriate for knowing your safe cruise altitude en route, when you're not focussed on a specific location, but it would be very and unnecessarily restrictive to IFR helicopter operations doing let downs where there is no published approach.

And let's be clear, this incident had nothing to do with the crew believing there were somewhere they were not - their GPS was accurate and they were where they thought they were, horizontally at least. It happened because they tried to fly visually without adequate references and lost orientation. Agree with Shy again what they should have done is not tried to cling on to vague visual reference at night, but after the initial approach down to a height of 300ft failed, simply gone around and climbed straight ahead back into IMC. And then gone to Lydd.

This was an incident essentially about loss of control in IIMC, not from the initial let down. They probably descended too low on that, but that phase didn't cause the incident - which was clearly very close to being Haughey style catastrophic.

Crab - do you still really think IMC let downs should never be below MSA in IFR helicopters? I guess if you have rarely operated in such a way you have little experience to draw on.

Of course what we really want is much faster and simpler CAA approvals of submitted formal IMC let down procedures.

[the beater]

This was an incident essentially about loss of control in IIMC, not from the initial let down. They probably descended too low on that, but that phase didn't cause the incident - which was clearly very close to being Haughey style catastrophic

Are you serious?
The fact that they only descended without hitting anything being down to luck was ok?

[ShyTorque]

The fact that they only descended without hitting anything being down to luck was ok?

You wouldn't be able to qualify that because it's not true.

[Pittsextra]

I'm a little confused re some of the comments. Isn't it the case that the plan was to make a decision at 500ft.. Which didn't happen and ultimately ended 20ft off the top of some trees?? So therefore my maths see that a 10000hour pilot with a 5000 hours co-pilot flying a reasonably sophisticated machine used up 480ft... Now 1000ft doesn't seem that OTT.

In the end you could make the 1000ft, zero but all you are doing is giving those that will take the piss more rope to hang themselves?

[Fareastdriver]

In the Solomons we had a GPS approach for nearly everywhere, but only down to what could be described as a non-precision DA. The GPS kit, as approved by CASA, the Oz CAA, was modified and there were certain checks before you carried out an approach. These included position error and satellite reliability, ie there had to be four satellites in view for all of the projected approach time. The HSI would also indicate full deflection at 1/4 mile error when selected to the GPS approach function.

It used to work. On one approach you were flying directly at a mountain much higher than you and then turning on to the approach track at one mile to go to a CFIT.

[ShyTorque]

Isn't it the case that the plan was to make a decision at 500ft.. Which didn't happen

That was probably the crux of the matter.

My point being, there is nothing magic about the figure of 1,000 feet. The initial descent from 1,000 feet was probably the safest part of the approach.

[Woolf]

Crab - do you still really think IMC let downs should never be below MSA in IFR helicopters?

No they shouldn't, unless there is a published procedure. Surely this and other threads like it show why this is a good idea. As others have said where do you draw the line?

I appreciate that the reluctance of the CAA in relation to GPS approaches is frustrating and progress in other countries shows that this can be done properly and safely. But the practice of making up your own approach is not working very well. There is always someone who pushes just that little bit too far.

Shy: I agree 1000' is an arbitrary number and maybe with today's technological advances this could be lower (even though as Crab has pointed out this doesn't always just relate to knowing your position accurately, it also takes into account pilot errors, turbulence, altimeter errors etc...). The main point however is that there must be a clear limit, whatever that number is.

[212man]

Isn't it the case that the plan was to make a decision at 500ft.. Which didn't happen and ultimately ended 20ft off the top of some trees??

It was 2ft not 20ft!

[ShyTorque]

The main point however is that there must be a clear limit, whatever that number is.

There lies the problem. It's difficult to prescribe a "one size fits all" solution, as is often the case in aviation, bearing in mind that different modern aircraft have very different capabilities. The capabilities of recent civilian aircraft far surpasses what the military have at their disposal.

As I wrote before, if a 1,000' limit is mandated across the board, there would be little point in any further research and development for the purpose of making aircraft safer and more capable with respect to poor weather operations.

Again, I'd maintain that this wasn't actually the root cause of this incident.

[Hedski]

Same self administered let downs onshore were responsible for the eventual demise of the pilot of G-CRST. Corporate no rules flights get away with a lot due to no real control or checking. People of ShyTorques experience can do it with proper skill set and tools but there's also those who push it too far. The pilots in this instance were experienced but there was then the lack of CRM, no MCC as far as I am aware.

[Pittsextra]

i agree you could argue a differnt number than 1000ft and actually if you are of the mindset to break a rule then frankly does it matter anyway?

What is a worry is that here is another multi thousand hour professional pilot nearly going the way of other recent multi thousand hour professional pilots with some shocking airmanship, worse the co pilot said nothing in the early stages and became paralysed with fear and still said nothing. It then takes over 2 years for this nonsense to become widely known and reported.

That isn't an industry in my opinion that is keen to really change that's one that really believes it won't happen to them.

[[email protected]]

The capabilities of recent civilian aircraft far surpasses what the military have at their disposal. yet people keep spanking them in all over the place - why is that???

Published and cleared GPS approach with a proper MDA- no problem.

Made up approaches just for convenience - an absolute killer - how long can you be lucky doing those??

[tistisnot]

It would appear somewhere between 5000 and 9999+ hours?

[ShyTorque]

A couple of points need reinforcing here. Firstly, despite what Pitts seems to think, it is not presently illegal to descend below 1,000 feet in these circumstances, see the reference to it by the AAIB in their report.

Again, I maintain that descending below 1,000 feet wasn't the root cause of this incident.

Those calling for a total ban on doing so are making a knee jerk reaction, possibly out of ignorance about how the helicopter industry works. Such a ban would be draconian and unnecessary.

Crab, having left the military, you may need to broaden your horizons a little and step down from your lofty perch! Having been in the SAR role myself, amongst others after my military time, I can say with the benefit of hindsight that the onshore corporate market is at times equally, if not more demanding of the individual. It requires extremely high standards at all times.

It's unlikely ever to be the case that an individual customer would wish for there to be a 'published approach' to his own back garden per se, but properly thought out IMC let downs can be carried out in a perfectly safe manner (and it happens, make no mistake; the most modern helicopters in civilian use are extremely good at doing them almost by themselves) but it needs to be done in the proper way with prior planning and in a disciplined way. For example, with an agreed MDA and with a proper missed approach procedure, as you say.

To the holier than thou, I'd say that like most things in life, it's important to find a balance. A balance between keeping the industry safe and stopping it in its tracks.

[Thomas coupling]

Shytorque is absolutely bang on here.
Before droning on about IMC let downs the fact remains that one of Britain's (dare I say, the world's) crown jewels is alive and kicking today by sheer and pure LUCK. He knows it and everyone here - reading this knows it. Predominently two very very experienced pilots (like the one who flew into a crane in London last year and like the three exceptionally experienced (one being a CAA examiner) S76 drivers in Ireland several years ago) made catastrophic decisions which took them beyond their capabilities - due I would suggest (in these three cases) to believing their capabilities were above the demand on the day.
We have to thank the Authorities (in whichever country) for doing the dirty work here. It is they - who have to look at each and every scenario and implement Black and white rules to deter "experts" from pushing the limits. But as is sometimes the case - practitioners choose to ignore these rules and occasionally pay the price.
In my previous life, I have witnessed two 'royal flights' visiting a temporary LZ in well below minimum weather limits using their own onboard GPS processes. One of the LZ's was at the base of a 1500' rock outcrop along the coast and the AS355 shot an approach from seaward towards the LZ in complete IMC with a c/b of 100'. :ugh: In the Irish accident, two very experienced Captains flying a private S76 had a CAA examiner onboard experimenting with a GPS approach to the private landing site. They flew straight into the hills doing it.
We ALL know this goes on out there and there are many many advocates who defend this process - but until the real experts (CAA) are happy - this domain will continue to collect victims.
Thank God our country treasure lives to sing another day :D:D

[[email protected]]

Again, I maintain that descending below 1,000 feet wasn't the root cause of this incident. quite right shy, it wasn't - it was descending below 1000' IMC without an sensible plan other than 'suck it and see' and then compounding the error by trying to fly VMC without sufficient references.

If there is nothing wrong with the corporate ethos, how did 2 such experienced pilots nearly kill themselves and their passengers?

It requires extremely high standards at all times.] and not those demonstrated here then - what are the lower time pilots doing if these are the really good guys?

I am quite aware of what goes on in the corporate world and no doubt the 'loophole' will remain to allow people to keep earning a living from flying helicopters.

BUT, we must accept that we will continue to have such incidents as this, and the ones TC mentions, plus countless other CFITs and near CFITs whilst home-grown approaches with no obstacle clearance planes, no MAP, no DA/MDA are considered an acceptable way of providing public transport.

[Pittsextra]

I don't think many comments here have much to do with knee jerk anything. 1000ft first got mentioned by Shy in this context..

Second point for possible discussion: Why is 1,000 feet above the nearest obstacle within 5 nms the "sacred figure" used for MSA?

So having prompted discussion why moan about it when it does?? I don't think I said anything about things legal or otherwise did I??

Its not illegal to drive you car into a wall at 70mph - you don't because you might have a personal rule that it would be dumb thing to do. etc etc.

Neither is it holier than thou, because it doesn't affect some of us one way other the other. Discussion is merely that and left there. What I do find curious is how a same old drum gets beaten, same old chippy comments, same old digs and yet as crab so accurately put it "people keep spanking them all over the place"..

So why is that? Why when some people ask a question its a discussion point, others its holier than thou??

[212man]

In the Irish accident, two very experienced Captains flying a private S76 had a CAA examiner onboard experimenting with a GPS approach to the private landing site. They flew straight into the hills doing it

Slight semantics, but the CAA Examiner was not onboard - it was he who initiated the search action, as the aircraft was not there to meet him in Aldergrove the next morning.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

212 man;


You're right. The CAA Inspector wasn't on board, a freelance IRE (Spotty Muldoon) was on board, in the P2 seat, the operation's chief pilot was in the back. In the Irish AAIB report the final words on the CVR were Spotty saying "Gentlemen, I'm really not happy about this" followed by an AVAD 100' warning that was cut short by the impact.


The next morning when the house keeper went to check the pilots' beds she found they hadn't been slept in, at that point the search started.


The let down they were using had been created by the crew, who allowed the aircraft deliberately off track that night to compensate for wind and earlier high ground.


JJ Smith hit the mountains very close to the Haughey Air crash site.


SND

[Curtis E Carr]

Why is 1,000 feet above the nearest obstacle within 5 nms the "sacred figure" used for MSA?

I guess that it might stem from the wording of Rule 33 (1) of the Rules of the Air Regulations (notwithstanding Rule 33 (1)(a)).

JJ Smith ......

Should that not be AJ Smith?

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Curtis;


Comes from typin two fist and not reeding it rite.


SND

[ShyTorque]

Pitts, If the cap fits.....my comment was a general one, reading through the tone of some of the posts here, which as usual, as soon as reports are published, seems to be to cast a bunch of scorn upon the crew involved. If people are going to do so, and some always will, because they lurk often anonymously in the sidelines just waiting to do so, at least they should do so from a properly informed point of view, rather than from an incorrect understanding of the rules.

Curtis,
Yes, thanks, I fully expected someone to say that - the great majority of pilots know the regulation. My question was with regard to the basis for the figure of 1,000 ft being decided upon by the authority in the first place. I think Crab more or less covered that already, but yes, (a) obviously did apply.

[Sir George Cayley]

Looking to the future the advent of point in space procedures at private helipads may be one way to reduce risks?

SGC

[Two's in]

It's a very old Chestnut, but if you haven't figured out that accidents are no respecters of "experience" by now, you probably shouldn't be in a cockpit. Competence and training may save you on the day, but historically (especially recently) a wealth of flying hours alone doesn't often change the outcome.

[Thomas coupling]

http://www.aaiu.ie/sites/default/files/upload/general/4719-0.PDF

Spotty Mulhern 1996. He was a CAA IRE. Old colleague of mine. 18 years ago to the day as it happens. His wife successfully sued the H.P. for half a million, 8 years later.

[ShyTorque]

Looking to the future the advent of point in space procedures at private helipads may be one way to reduce risks?

SGC

Precisely. Coupled with a missed approach procedure and a backup plan!

A thoroughly sound operator may complete the task less often than an unsafe one simply because fewer risks are being taken.

Unfortunately, the average customer doesn't know the difference and in general the average customer doesn't want to hear about the possibility of a go around and a backup plan, such as a diversion to an alternative followed by a road journey, because of the personal inconvenience it is likely to cause them.

As I've been saying for many years, the most difficult thing about the corporate job is knowing when to say no!

[misterbonkers]

A few years a go we were flying elton John to gleneagles and the weather wasn't great but our reliable man on the ground who provided lighting etc was keeping us updated at the weather appeared ok. We briefed on one attempt but made two as on the first go around the site became visual so we made a second attempt which was then unsuccessful. So we returned to Edinburgh. This was in the early hours of the morning and in the time we'd just 'wasted' they could have driven instead. Sir Elton got out of the cab and said nothing but another of his passengers was pretty upset with us (to say the least)!

The next morning we flew them on another leg. Rather amusingly Elton John turned up at the aircraft and had clearly reflected on the night before - he apologised sincerely for his hairdressers manner the night before and we explained how we understood and had their best interests at heart. His hairdresser arrived in a seperate car and got out, head ashamably down, said nothing and got into the cab - he was somewhat more friendlier and grateful when we arrived at the next destination!

[Sir Korsky]

Back to the principal subject here. PM is an avid helicopter enthusiast and still regularly entrusts his own and family's safety to helicopter pilots all over the world. He appreciates the time we save him between relaxing and the next gig. Thanks for sticking with us Paul and we appreciate your business. :D

[Ed Thrust IV]

Sir Korsky, surely the principle subject here is that 1 second later and the Radalt would have read -1 ft and Paul would not be able to relax before his next gig or any other - just a thought.

[Bravo73]

Sir Korsky, surely the principle subject here is that 1 second later and the Radalt would have read -1 ft

Nope, that's not the 'principal subject'. Unless you happen to be a Daily Wail journalist. :rolleyes:

[algarvebookbaby1]

Sorry to be a complete numpty, but I am new on here and abbreviations mean little. What is the HP.

[satsuma]

Handling pilot. That one's for free. The rest you have to work out for yourself!

[Thomas coupling]

What he means is: DYOR, OK? QED. :ok:

[algarvebookbaby1]

Thanks for that. I did work out the rest for myself just stuck on that one!!!:8

[HOGE]

HP is the sauce North Sea pilots expect to find on their bacon butties..

[EESDL]

Report states that Radalt's accuracy was +/- 2'
Gulp

[John Eacott]

I see that this was picked up by the Daily Express last week, with the usual shock and horror headline: Sir Paul McCartney was just 'INCHES from death' in helicopter near miss (http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/553813/Sir-Paul-McCartney-helicopter-crash-2012)

BEATLES legend Sir Paul McCartney was INCHES from death after the helicopter he was flying in almost crashed into a line of trees, a report found.

The 72-year-old rock and roll legend and his wife Nancy Shevell were in the aircraft when the pilot attempted to land at Sir Paul's country estate in East Sussex.

However, bad weather conditions affected the trip and an air accident report found that the aviator missed TWO urgent warnings when trying to land.

The poor weather forced the pilot of the Sikorsky S-76C chopper to abandon his first landing attempt.

But instead of following protocol and heading to a place with better conditions, the navigator tried for a second time to land and almost hit a line of trees because he could not see them, the report found.

During the second attempt, Sir Paul was just TWO feet from danger when the pilot, flying on instruments, almost crashed into the lining of trees before finally touching down on the helipad.

A report published by the Department of Transport's Air Accidents Investigation Branch found the 55-year-old pilot, who has more than 10,250 hours of flying experience, missed two urgent warnings that the aircraft was too close to the ground.

The report concluded: "The descent from above the minimum safe altitude was conducted in reduced visibility and low cloud conditions into an area with limited visual references.

"The helicopter was therefore brought close to terrain in an environment in which situational awareness could become degraded easily."

The bizarre incident happened when Sir Paul and his wife were flying from Battersea Heliport to their Peasmarsh estate on May 3, 2012.

When approached by reporters at the time of the incident, Sir Paul declined to comment on the flight.

The air safety authority have called for a Civil Aviation Authority review of helicopter regulations governing how low a pilot can fly while relying on instruments.

http://cdn.images.express.co.uk/img/dynamic/1/590x/secondary/paul-mccartney-flight-245643.jpg

[ShyTorque]

But instead of following protocol and heading to a place with better conditions, the navigator tried for a second time to land and almost hit a line of trees because he could not see them, the report found.

Lessons to be learned:
1). Never let a blind navigator fly the aircraft.

[farsouth]

:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D:D

[Exo.]

The "Air Safety Authority"...?

Wonder what it would be like if we let paper reporters write the actual accident reports.

On the topic of the Irish incident, wasn't the handling pilot the PF? I suspect I'm getting confused between who sued whom. Still, that makes suitably sobering reading (the report, not the suing part).

[212man]

...wasn't the handling pilot the PF?

They generally are...:confused:

[Exo.]

Indeed, I must be confused then. Coupling's message implies that the wife of the PF successfully sued the PF?

[212man]

Coupling's message implies that the wife of the PF successfully sued the PF?

Pilot's widow awarded £500,000 by High Court - RTÉ News (http://www.rte.ie/news/2002/1023/31209-compensation/)