AF 321 close to stall

[hetfield]

An Air France Airbus A321-200, registration F-GTAN performing flight AF-7633 from Bordeaux to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France), was on final approach to Charles de Gaulle's runway 26L with autopilot and autothrust engaged, when autothrottle disconnected and the speed decayed until the alpha floor protection activated accelerating the engines to takeoff/goaround thrust and disengaging the autopilot. The crew took control, stabilized the aircraft and continued for a safe landing on runway 26R.

The BEA reported in their weekly bulletin of Sep 11th that the autothrust system had disengaged permitting the airspeed to decay to a point where the alpha floor protection activated, disengaged the autopilot and accelerated the engines. The crew took manual control and continued the landing. The BEA is investigating the serious incident.Beside it's not autothrottle on AB it's AThrust, but if true, how come a flag carrier's crew allows a plane to almost stall?

Incident: Air France A321 at Paris on Jul 20th 2012, speed drops to alpha floor on approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=455c3eae&opt=0)

[Checkboard]

20 years ago, a crew on approach to a runway would concentrate on their instruments for the approach, then look out of the window once visual for landing.

These days crew stare vaguely out of the window as the automatics fly the approach, then concentrate fiercely on their instruments once visual and hand flying for the landing ... :hmm:

[Bus Junkie]

AF pilots seem to have a real problem with basic flying skills.
What is their issue?

[RoyHudd]

Speak for yourself Checkboard.

All of us Airbus and Boeing drivers in my outfit do no such thing. And if you are party to such practices, it is your duty to interevene.

[Callsign Kilo]

Beside it's not autothrottle on AB it's AThrust, but if true, how come a flag carrier's crew allows a plane to almost stall?

AF pilots seem to have a real problem with basic flying skills.
What is their issue?

Sacre Bleu, hasn't this been done before?

[fullforward]

"Beside it's not autothrottle on AB it's AThrust, but if true, how come a flag carrier's crew allows a plane to almost stall?"

The same flag carrier that actually stalled an aircraft on mid Atlantic whose crew failed to recognize it for more than 3 minutes, crashing in the water.

[hetfield]

To me, all serious incidents/accidents with AF are either subject of

- lack of discipline
- poor training
- arrogant moral to flying at all

Maybe a combination of it as well......

[fireflybob]

We won't say anything about a certain UK charter airline that nearly stalled whilst on approach to Bournemouth a few years ago then?

[NOLAND3]

Sorry guy's but before you start judging.. Something doesn't quite add up. If the A/THR disconnected itself they would get THR LK flashing on the FMA, thrust would be locked and they would have a repetative chime and a ECAM warning.

[hetfield]

noland3

AF447 had plenty of warnings, most of us know the outcome....

[NOLAND3]

And hetfield, you know that is a completely different situation..

[hetfield]

Yes, but F-GTAN was 2nd to crash.

Thanks to AB and the mighty protections....

[NOLAND3]

Look, I don't wanna get into a shallow A vs B debate nor condemn or defend the crew.

Just saying how it is, if the A/THR disconnect was inadvertent than it is pretty hard to miss. A manual disconnect on the other hand is a simple single chime..

[Callsign Kilo]

We won't say anything about a certain UK charter airline that nearly stalled whilst on approach to Bournemouth a few years ago then?

Fireflybob, the incident which you refer to exposed unexplained and undetected disengagement of the A/T system on the 737. I've had it happen to myself (thankfully detected it - maybe I got lucky - however I had the use of the FMA banged into me from an early stage). Had maintenance carry out a BITE test and a series of observations and nothing resulted. The 737's A/T disengagement annunciating system, as you likely know, is cack and relies heavily on the crew to be monitoring the FMA at all times. I'm not sure about the Bus, however Alpha floor seems to have saved the day. With the BOH incident the aircraft approached the stall, the crew applied TOGA thrust and the resulting pitch power couple stalled the aircraft. I believe this and the unfortunate THY incident at EHAM led to Boeing amending the approach to stall recovery manouvre (unsurprisingly as the one in force at the time made no sense).

[fireflybob]

Fireflybob, the incident which you refer to exposed unexplained and undetected disengagement of the A/T system on the 737. I've had it happen to myself (thankfully detected it - maybe I got lucky - however I had the use of the FMA banged into me from an early stage). Had maintenance carry out a BITE test and a series of observations and nothing resulted. The 737's A/T disengagement annunciating system, as you likely know, is cack and relies heavily on the crew to be monitoring the FMA at all times. I'm not sure about the Bus, however Alpha floor seems to have saved the day. With the BOH incident the aircraft approached the stall, the crew applied TOGA thrust and the resulting pitch power couple stalled the aircraft. I believe this and the unfortunate THY incident at EHAM led to Boeing amending the approach to stall recovery manouvre (unsurprisingly as the one in force at the time made no sense).

Callsign Kilo, I wasn't pointing any fingers and the intention was not to get involved in a systems debate but saying that AF isn't the only operator that has had such incidents. Not saying AF is perfect either!

[hetfield]

Doesn't activation of alpha floor mean a speed loss of about 30%?

Who was flying the plane so slow?

[guclu]

Automation has good and bad sides.

Anyway thanks god it is a BUS this time with the Alpha protection.

Nice video regarding Automation.

Children of Magenta - YouTube

[tchaikovsky]

Kilo, it doesn't matter what type of aircraft or what type of auto throttle/thrust system. As pilots, out primary role in these modern days is to monitor the automatics. Secondary to this is the age old skill of monitoring the instruments. The fact that speed can be allowed to decay so much to the point of stall
is mind boggling. Having said that I wasn't there to witness the event unfold so I cant pass judgement.

During an approach I would say 40% of my attention is on the ASI. Having seen in the sim just how slow a modern jet has to get to actually stall does make me wonder how these events actually occur.

[fireflybob]

Are these incidents not caused partly by the diminution of basic handling skills due to the increased automation and an up and coming generation of pilots who have little or no experience of hand flying jet aircraft?

When I look back to flying the B737-200 in the 1980s or the B707 in the 1970s I recall that it was quite commonplace for approaches from FL 100 or even (shock horror) from top of descent to be hand flown. We would think nothing of hand flying a visual approach or even a circle to land. We did so much of this that we were "hard-wired" for manual flying - consequently flying the correct airspeed (and the PNF shouting "Airspeed" when the trend or instant value wasn't going the right way) was a given.

I am not against use of automation but I believe this is where the root cause of the problem is. I don't blame the individuals - it is the system (or lack of it) that has produced this result. If we want pilots to be competent they have to be in practice at hand flying but given the dumbing down of basic skills the software/techie guys will seek all sorts of solution with extra warning systems I suppose.

[Callsign Kilo]

Fireflybob and Tchaikovsky,

I totally agree with all you have said. This incident appears to be yet another occurrence of over reliance in automation and complacency. It is unsurprising but bares little satisfaction that it has occurred to AF.

Was merely pointing out where the 737 differs from an Airbus. Irregardless of type, the role of the pilot shouldn't change. The accident in Toronto , the accident over the Southern Atlantic and now this shows a reaccurring trend with AF. It's hard to think it is all possible?

[Smudger]

Tchai and Firefly you got it.... on approach in a modern aeroplane.. (AB or B I don't care) speed is all... speed is life .... I fail to see how this situation can arise .. no matter what automation is available the appropriate speed MUST be maintained... do these people have no sense of self preservation... let alone for all the souls down the back ?

[misd-agin]

Hand flying from TOD is like watching a monkey hanging from a tree branch. If you know how to do it it's no big deal.

If the PF can actually fly he's not learning or practicing anything. If he can't fly it's a huge PITA for the PNF/PM.

[fireflybob]

If you know how to do it it's no big deal.

Here endeth the lesson

[A4]

This is truly alarming. As has been said, if the Autothrust fails, the thrust is locked. Of course it may have failed during deceleration/configuration so it probably(?) failed at idle to allow the aircraft to decelarate to AlphaFloor.

WHO WAS FLYING THE AIRCRAFT?!! AVIATE, navigate, communicate. ECAM is secondary - make sure your not going to fall out the sky!!! This scenario however is what Alpha Floor was designed for. It appears to have rescued the crew from basic inattention.........

For this to be AF (again) post AF447 is really worrying. No doubt the report will provide the details.

A4

[Gary Brown]

Just worth saying that this is an on-going BEA Inquiry, of which they have released this and only this:

http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/2012/2012.semaine.36.pdf

20/07/2012 AD Paris Charles de Gaulle(95)
0 0 Passage sous la vitesse d'évolution en approche, déclenchement de la protection grande incidence
Vol AD Bordeaux Mérignac (33) - AD Paris Charles de Gaulle (95).

Lors de l'approche, pilote automatique engagé et A/THR déconnectée, l'avion passe en dessous de la vitesse d'évolution. Le pilote automatique se déconnecte à la suite de l'activation de la protection grande incidence ''ALPHA PROT". L'équipage reprend les commandes, réajuste la poussée et atterrit normalement.AGB

[aviofreek]

I find it amazing how every few months you can expect a "problem" with AF... Not going into any particular reasons how or why an incident/accident occured, just when it comes to AF, there's too many of them. Anyone wanna bet on outcome of this particular "incident" if they had flown anything else, insead of dummy-proof airplane?

[Oakape]

This is a modern day phenomena and you are going to see more of it as the years go by.

The manufacturers have convinced the airlines that the automatics are so good on their aircraft that they don't need to spend a fortune on training, so they don't. They have led the airlines to believe that anyone can fly their aircraft, so the airlines employ 'anyone' when they are short of pilots.

Most pilots I have sat beside or behind in recent times have the autopilot in as soon as it is legally allowed after take-off & it doesn't come out until around 200' on final. They can't fly, or are inadequately trained, or are just plain lazy, or perhaps all three.

I have sat in a classroom & heard a TRE state that there are three pilots on the flight deck - the captain, the first officer & the autopilot! I'm sorry, but the autopilot is not a pilot. It is a pilot aid, like an autothrottle or a moving map. But pilots are buying into this philosophy for various reasons.

The best place to find out a pilot's mindset is in the 737 sim during S/E ops. Those that think the autopilot is a pilot & are used to completely handing over the operation to it on an every day basis, tend to get themselves into all sorts of trouble, as they forget they are still responsible for the rudder & the thrust lever on the operating engine. Then they blame the automatics when the aircraft turns against the heading bug, or the speed is too fast or too slow. They don't notice that the control wheel is hard over trying to fly the aircraft straight, or perhaps they just don't understand why it is like that.

It has been said in the past that the pilots of the future will just be systems managers. Perhaps we are already there & the bulk of the personel on the flight deck these days are system managers & not pilots. If this is the case, the problem may be that the systems are just not quite as good as the manufacturers have promised everyone & the systems managers don't have a clue what to do on the rare occasions that things don't work as advertised.

[Bus Junkie]

Two pilots watched a Turkish 737 enter flare mode and crash from 2000 agl. The aircraft doesn't matter. The training and attitude of the pilots does matter.

I think it is about time AF hired some expat DECs and instructors to bring them in line with the 20th century.


Basic Airmanship
Fireflybob and Tchaikovsky,

I totally agree with all you have said. This incident appears to be yet another occurrence of over reliance in automation and complacency. It is unsurprising but bares little satisfaction that it has occurred to AF.

Was merely pointing out where the 737 differs from an Airbus. Irregardless of type, the role of the pilot shouldn't change. The accident in Toronto , the accident over the Southern Atlantic and now this shows a reaccurring trend with AF. It's hard to think it is all possible?

[Sciolistes]

These days crew stare vaguely out of the window as the automatics fly the approach, then concentrate fiercely on their instruments once visual and hand flying for the landing ...
Haha, Chequerboard. That's the best summary of modern flying practise I've reas for...I've read. :ok:

Even found myself doing this, espeially the final sector at 9:00am after an all night duty.

[short-fuel]

With all respect, I think, some of you are wrong on this question.

It's not a problem of skills, or a question of training.

It's a question of behaviour in a cockpit. People rely too much on automation these days, and this is a perfect example of people looking outside the window, chatting, and not looking at the ASI during this crutial phase of flight: Approach and landing.

Unfortunately, I think this will happen more and more in the future.:(
The question is. How can we stop this from happening?

Short-fuel.

[beardy]

short fuel

:rolleyes:sterile cockpit and window blinds

[hetfield]

and not looking at the ASI during this crutial phase of flight: Approach and landing.Not only ASI...

- what attitude am I flying?
- what power setting do I expect?

If the ASI, like in this case, is something around 30% low, the pitch must be about double and the power at idle to follow the glide.

Hello, who is flying that thing?

[Golf-Sierra]

When I look back to flying the B737-200 in the 1980s or the B707 in the 1970s I recall...

Well if we look at the number of crashes there were on approach/landing in the 60s/70s/80s I'm quite sure pilots did loose track of what the plane is doing from time to time - it's just that the outcome was usually very much different.

Unfortunately, I think this will happen more and more in the future.
The question is. How can we stop this from happening?

Protections kicked in when needed. What more do we need?

For this to be AF (again) post AF447 is really worrying.

If this incident occurred on say a BA or Lufthansa flight would the relevant authority even be investigating it?


Golf-Sierra

[J.O.]

Once again I get the feeling that there's more to this story than what's been reported. If the autothrust kicked off on its own, do you not get repeated single chimes to remind you of it the fact that you are in thrust lock?

If on the other hand, the PF pushed the disconnect button and cancelled the caution because they intended to fly the approach with the autothrust off, then this is a completely different scenario.

[Discorde]

From 'How Airliners Fly':



<<Again, will our future pilots be able to fly their aircraft without the assistance of autopilots and computers when necessary if they never get the chance to practise these skills during normal operation? A related factor is that a pilot whose job is merely to watch the aircraft fly itself is unlikely to be as well motivated as one who can get his or her hands on the controls now and then. Designers of future aircraft and airline managers must address the issue of how much and under what conditions pilots should be allowed, or indeed encouraged, to fly manually and without guidance systems. It is likely that compared to a mere aircraft monitor, a skilled, motivated pilot will always make a greater overall contribution to flight safety.>>

[PENKO]

There are known issues with the autothrust in relation with a rad alt failure, in which the autothrust will not maintain speed in approach.

[StormyKnight]

Just putting this out there.....as far as I know its not done for a good reason just I don't know what that is....

On the actual throttle levers is there any indication (coloured leds for example) to show the status of the throttles? Auto/manual/engine failure etc?

Just seems to me that its a bit like driving a car & scanning gauges.....each gauge should have a green light around the whole gauge to indicate the value it is showing is within normal limits, orange if just out & red if seriously out.

On approach or if in an emergency, you just need to do a quick scan for colours, then another for actual values...but as soon as a gauge indicates an issue with a needle pointer, the orange/red surrounding light would point you straight to it...Ah Hello LOOK AT ME!

With the airspeed, the aircraft would know what is normal for approach & show green, if it wasn't normal it would show orange & red if it was close enough to stall to warrant it....

I just think scanning gauges & looking at the physical position of throttle levers is going to continue to be an issue.....
the gauge reads 20 for example, you go ok its ok.....but how often have you done a double take in real life & said, hang on that should be 30 - how did I miss that?

In this case the aircraft should be indicating loudly & strongly that the approach is not normal, something that is active on the last 1000 landings is now turned off that should have sent alarms bells...In addition even if the pilot turns it off, somehow you need to confirm he knows it's off....."Are you sure Y/N?" to avoid accidentally or inadvertently turning something off (or on...)

As I see it these planes are smart enough to fly themselves but they aren't real good at keeping the pilots informed what they are doing.......

Would it be a problem for an automated voice to say
"INFORMATION: Auto throttle disconnected because xxxx" where xxxx is the reason for the disconnection.....The pilot would know instantly its turned off & why the plane thought it needed to turn it off.....

Both bits of information I would have thought very useful for the pilot & they would be delivered in the quickest & most sussinked manner.
Far quicker than reading a message on a screen....

My GPS can tell me I'm speeding, but a plane can't?

What am I missing?

Cheers

[nitpicker330]

Known issue on Boeing and Airbus models.

Effects the A/T systems and can lead to thrust idle.

Plenty of info and training guidance from Airbus and Boeing on the subject.

Next.......

[Clandestino]

AF pilots seem to have a real problem with basic flying skills.
What is their issue? Oh... not much... they just wrecked a widebody a couple of years ago with loss of all aboard. It does tend to concentrate media and internet fora attention on AF incidents.

I am not saying AF doesn't have its problems, I do tend to agree with Hetfield. I'm just saying that malaise is a) not as dangerous or critical as some panicky exclamations of "Today pilots cant fly!" claim b) far, far more widespread than just Air France.
The 737's A/T disengagement annunciating system, as you likely know, is cack and relies heavily on the crew to be monitoring the FMA at all times.If I may suggest alternate procedure: monitor airspeed, if it falls below target, don't waste your time on analyzing "Eh... what is autothrottle doing now?", just disconnect it and set the needed thrust manually. Fly the aeroplane first, troubleshoot second. Feasible?

With the BOH incident the aircraft approached the stall, the crew applied TOGA thrust and the resulting pitch power couple stalled the aircraft. It could be easily avoided... if the crew only remembered to use manual trim or if they flew aeroplane with autotrim...

As pilots, out primary role in these modern days is to monitor the automatics. Hopefully this was sarcasm. Anyone truly believing this knows :mad: about automatics or flying in general.

Pilots are there to control the aeroplane; no more, no less! If they have to use automatics to help them, so be it but not a little bit of responsibility for the flight can be offloaded to a mindless entity, such as autopilot. "Monitoring" doesn't just mean "sit there and watch" but also "do something and do it right when things go wrong".

I don't blame the individuals - it is the system (or lack of it) that has produced this result.I agree but it might turn out we agree for the different reasons.

If we want pilots to be competent they have to be in practice at hand flying.Competent for what? Have a look at all the accidents and major incidents in airline transport for last couple of decades where lack of flying skills featured prominently and you'll be hard pressed to find the single one that goes along the storyline of typical GA VFR into IMC: "He wasn't skilled so he got killed" Almost all include minor distractions that eventually lead to pilots' flying abilities to go to pieces. Flying raw data manual ILS when everything is working fine can increase pilots' confidence in their skills but it only marginally better prepares a pilot for that manual go-around on dark night or to both recognize and admit that he has screwed up badly and abandon the approach for another try. If there is an area that can be seen as lacking, it's mental, not manual skills. There are still far more pilots who handle the crises successfully than those who turn up minor malfunction into major catastrophe.

do these people have no sense of self preservation... Oh yes, they do. Problem is there is nothing to activate their sense of self preservation. They have no idea that flying is inherently dangerous and getting and maintaining the level of safety we have today took a lot of effort on part of everyone involved in air transport.

Another problem is the modern manager, who has been trained from kindergarten that there is rulebook for everything and everything must stick to rulebook. There is no appreciation of how we got our rules written in the first place. There is no recognition or appreciation that the pilots who were in love with flying always acquired knowledge of the air & machinery far, far in excess of what the regulations required of them and many times this saved the day. So the ignoranti put their faith in learning the rulebooks by rote and get nasty surprise when they can remember what chapter 4 page 42 of OM-this-and-that said when tension is high.

WHO WAS FLYING THE AIRCRAFT?!! Seemingly, no one.

AVIATE, navigate, communicate. ECAM is secondary - make sure your not going to fall out the sky!!! Yup. It says a lot about how bad it is if it has to be mentioned at all.

Not going into any particular reasons how or why an incident/accident occured, just when it comes to AF, there's too many of them....reported in the media. Similar effups don't make it further than internal safety publications or AAIB bulletin at the worst and don't get picked up by media.

The manufacturers have convinced the airlines that the automatics are so good on their aircraft that they don't need to spend a fortune on training, so they don't. Possibly yes (heck, I'd say: probably) but if you take a closer look at their manuals, not a single one explicitly says so. Legally, manufacturers are off the hook for this one and I wholeheartedly suggest their manuals should be followed to the letter and not to some (perhaps imagined) spirit of them that suggests that automation can replace pilot skills.

On the actual throttle levers is there any indication (coloured leds for example) to show the status of the throttles? Auto/manual/engine failure etc?We have FMA for this.

I just think scanning gauges & looking at the physical position of throttle levers is going to continue to be an issue.....

Looking at the physical position of the throttle lever is a big issue. It's pretty useless. Those who believe throttle position say something about delivered power have acquired very dangerous habit.

With the airspeed, the aircraft would know what is normal for approach & show green, if it wasn't normal it would show orange & red if it was close enough to stall to warrant it....
We already have something very similar on Airbus since 1988!

In addition even if the pilot turns it off, somehow you need to confirm he knows it's off....."Are you sure Y/N?" to avoid accidentally or inadvertently turning something off (or on...)Sure. And Windows 8. Intentional ATHR disconnect gets ECAM message, you have to press athr discon twice to clear it. Similar with autopilot.

As I see it these planes are smart enough to fly themselves but they aren't real good at keeping the pilots informed what they are doing.......As you see it. See previous entries.

What am I missing?Basic knowledge of how Airbus cockpit looks, let alone how her instruments work.

[hetfield]

Who says AF7633 had defective RA(s) ?

[A37575]

and the PNF shouting "Airspeed" when the trend or instant value wasn't going the right way) was a given.


Why on earth would the support pilot be "shouting"? One would have thought mandated support calls required normal talking style on the flight deck. One does not "shout" V1 or rotate, or 1000 to go and so on?:ok:

[llagonne66]

Well, well, well ... already 44 posts on a thread that has started with a very dubious translation of the BEA report by The Aviation Herald.
BEA :
Incident
20/07/2012 AD Paris Charles de Gaulle(95)
Passage sous la vitesse d'évolution en approche, déclenchement de la protection grande incidence

Vol AD Bordeaux Mérignac (33) - AD Paris Charles de Gaulle (95). Lors de l'approche, pilote automatique engagé et A/THR déconnectée, l'avion passe en dessous de la vitesse
d'évolution. Le pilote automatique se déconnecte à la suite de l'activation de la protection grande incidence ''ALPHA PROT". L'équipage reprend les commandes, réajuste la
poussée et atterrit normalement.
The Aviation Herald :
Incident: Air France A321 at Paris on Jul 20th 2012, speed drops to alpha floor on approach
By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Sep 12th 2012 16:34Z, last updated Wednesday, Sep 12th 2012 16:34Z

An Air France Airbus A321-200, registration F-GTAN performing flight AF-7633 from Bordeaux to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France), was on final approach to Charles de Gaulle's runway 26L with autopilot and autothrust engaged, when autothrust disconnected and the speed decayed until the alpha floor protection activated accelerating the engines to takeoff/goaround thrust and disengaging the autopilot. The crew took control, stabilized the aircraft and continued for a safe landing on runway 26L.

The BEA reported in their weekly bulletin of Sep 11th that the autothrust system had disengaged permitting the airspeed to decay to a point where the alpha floor protection activated, disengaged the autopilot and accelerated the engines. The crew took manual control and continued the landing. The BEA is investigating the serious incident.
So it appears that autothrottle was off "A/THR déconnectée" and has NOT "disengaged" on its own and that it is not considered as a "serious incident" by BEA but just as an incident.

[hetfield]

So it appears that autothrottle was off "A/THR déconnectée" and has "disengaged" on its own and that it is not considered as a "serious incident" by BEA but just as an incident. Indeed, A/THR disconnect is not a serious incident at all.

But a flight crew who allows the speed to drop almost to stall speed causes surely a "serious incident" IMHO.

BTW

AB calls it auto-thrust, not autothrottle.

[fireflybob]

Why on earth would the support pilot be "shouting"? One would have thought mandated support calls required normal talking style on the flight deck. One does not "shout" V1 or rotate, or 1000 to go and so on?

A37575, ok yes wrong choice of word there but am not sure an Airspeed prompt should always be in "normal talking style". There again when humans become maxed out the first sense the brain dumps is hearing so the monitoring pilot might, on certain occasions, have to do some sort of pattern interrupt to draw attention.

[CrazyStuntPilot]

That's why I prefer autothrottles to autothrust. I can see the levers moving.

[Microburst2002]

Ok, so it is the pilots who disconnected the A/THR

no problem, but then you have to mind the shop...

[grimmrad]

Wasn't there also a plane near stalling right over Paris some years ago, don't remember if it was AF as well...

[Clandestino]

Tarom 310 in 1994, similar to Interflug at Moscow in 1991.

[hetfield]

Yes, but totally different scenario.

In both cases, like some others, a goaround was misshandled. A typical A300/310 issue (have been there, got the t-shirt).

But with AF7633 a flag carrier's crew allowed a speed decay of about 30kts during approach until the automatics slammed in.

[llagonne66]

Totally true, they let the speed decay and that needs to be explained.
And true, the automatisms saved the day by giving control of the A/C back to the pilots who have then reacted correctly.

So maybe A. philosophy is not so bad after all :O

[hetfield]

the automatisms saved the day by giving control of the A/C back to the pilotsNo, the automatics took control with alphafloor protection and saved the day of many souls and maybe AF at all.

[Alex757]

I'm not trying to start Airbus V Boeing here ... but surely ... if the throttles moved (like a boeing) the crew would hold them until 80kts (or is it V1?) and would instantly recognise a power reduction

[llagonne66]

Guess it was some joint effort between the A/C and the crew !

As stated in the BEA report :Following activation of the ALPHA PROT, autopilot disconnected. The crew took control, reajusted thrust and landed normally.

[hetfield]

@illa

I'm not saying the philosophy of the aircraft is wrong with regards to this serious event.

All I want to point out is, a flag carrier's crew goofed it up almost to stall.

Needless to say, in a flight phase where speed is an important issue.

[oxenos]

Boeing/Airbus, Autothrottle/Auto thrust, Alpha floor, Rad Alt etc. etc. are all completely irrelevant.
Microburst has hit the nail on the head - WHO IS WATCHING THE SHOP?
If you are so unaware of what is happening, you are in the wrong job.

[DozyWannabe]

Also, this similiar incident happened at a uk airbus operator sometime last year apparently...

Just to clarify, the post that arrived just prior to yours stated correctly that the Thomsonfly incident at Bournemouth was in fact a B737, not an Airbus.

Are these incidents not caused partly by the diminution of basic handling skills due to the increased automation and an up and coming generation of pilots who have little or no experience of hand flying jet aircraft?

Possibly, but the truth is that everyone has bad days at the office and pilots are no exception.

I am not against use of automation but I believe this is where the root cause of the problem is. I don't blame the individuals - it is the system (or lack of it) that has produced this result.

Remember that it's not just a case of bean-counting - with increasingly crowded skies, more and more airspace is becoming RVSM, which *mandates* use of automation in order to traverse it.

Agreed entirely that there should be more focus on training handflight - especially at altitude, but the fact is that if the industry intends to continue expanding then it's going to become practically impossible to practice handflight on the line.

...given the dumbing down of basic skills the software/techie guys will seek all sorts of solution with extra warning systems I suppose.

I can speak with some authority in saying that the "software/techie guys" only solve the problems they are presented with by a design committee that includes pilots and aeronautical engineers - they don't get to specify their own remit and never have.

[DozyWannabe]

Can't remember one - happy to be corrected though...

[gerago]

Remembered a stick and rudder hero at my previous outfit who decided to fly manually with A/P, A/T off. He flew down to level off at Circuit altitude; unfortunately he forgot he had disconnected the autothrust and totally forgot to manually add thrust. The airspeed dropped to near stall speed before the sleepy eye PM noticed the f**k up, slammed the throttles up and saved the day!

[iceman50]

Crazy stunt pilot

That's why I prefer autothrottles to autothrust. I can see the levers moving. The moving thrust levers did not save the Turkish crew flying into AMS so your argument is flawed, we pilots need to monitor the "SHIP".


It must have been an interesting recovery, although there was no mention of TOGA LOCK.

[noclue]

Having no idea of "airbus laws" can someone briefly explain this "alpha floor" logic that they have??

Out of interest re auto thrust/throttle if a speed significantly lower (initial approach limit down to Vref) than the aircrafts current speed is selected on an approach, will the auto thrust/throttle system automatically reduce power to idle to slow the aircraft?? Or will it be a 'powered deceleration', or am I way off the mark re how this system works??

Cheers.

[hetfield]

Can someone enlighten me, it's long ago that I flew that thing.

When on final approach with alpha floor active, speed should have been somewhere between VaProt & VaMax, right?

I know, alpha floor is an A/THR feature, but to get a picture...

[Bigmouth]

Remembered a stick and rudder hero at my previous outfit who decided to fly manually with A/P, A/T off. He flew down to level off at Circuit altitude; unfortunately he forgot he had disconnected the autothrust and totally forgot to manually add thrust. The airspeed dropped to near stall speed before the sleepy eye PM noticed the f**k up, slammed the throttles up and saved the day!
With your hand on the throttle there is no way you will forget to add (or reduce) thrust. Taking your hand off the throttle while hand flying is a mistake made only by pre-solo student pilots and rank amateurs.

[fingal flyer]

Bigmouth,
Havent read it all and not going to bash any airline but when I trained I was taught to fly airplanes and you are dead right about the trust levers.I had an instructor who used to hit me with the control lock(C152)below 500ft if my hand was not on the throttle because I had a bad habit.To this day I would buy her a drink for all that pain because she taught me a real good habit.THe basics cant be beat even in the new stuff.

[Gretchenfrage]

It's almost like groundhog day!

I wrote last year in the AF447 debate to wait for the next incident.

The worst part of these debates is that the ever same protagonists come up with the same lame an cynical statements:
"no, it has nothing to do with the AB dead stick/lever philosophy, because even the Turkish managed to dump their 737 ..... etc. blah, blah ..."

How can you try to defend a design flop by pointing to morons producing an accident with another design??? With the same argument we can abolish ABS and ESP in modern cars by showing that there are some other morons who were able to crash even highly equipped cars!
Such argumentation is not only puerile, but even cynical.


Try for once to look at the whole issue with the following view:

To my belief controls with feedback represent an additional protection in modern cockpits. Had the SFO in the left seat of AF447 had any feedback on his sidestick, he might have better realised his collegues blackout. Had the pilot of the AF321 in question had a moving throttle (that in this instance would not have moved) he might have realised the off situation earlier.

To conclude my argument:

I know there are two mights in my above statement. But if you look at feedback-controls through the above optic, namely as an additional protection, it makes absolutely no sense to abolish them.

[NOLAND3]

None of you have the full fact's here.. You keep your hand on the thrust levers during approach, A/THR on or off so I would be surprised if this wasn't the case with AF231.

No doubt there was a big screw up here, however I'll say it again.. This machine will damn well tell you if A/THR disconnects without any pilot input, and it will keep telling you until you do something about it.

All this talk about moving throttles, sidestick etc etc is pointless..

I would be interested in knowing what Vapp they we're flying and the GW. Defintely not going to get that info here..

[MPH]

Maybe SOP's, CRM situational awarness and good monitoring might help:oh:

[Craggenmore]

Anyone know what the winds were doing..? Possible energy loss..?

[charliemouse]

I guess it's a good job this situation didn't happen below 500 feet?

Most dangerous phase of flight - T/O and landing. Most critical thing to staying in the air - airspeed. Professional crews with hundreds of lives in their hands keep killing themselves and others (or trying to) because... *insert personal logic here* - im not getting into it I'm "not qualified". You can go round in circles forever - humans make mistakes. If it was 11:45am or 6:45pm AF pilots will maybe have been thinking about something else. I don't think a fix will come from this thread or any other i'm afraid.

Now - how can we blame this issue on MOL? :}

[Clandestino]

Yes, but totally different scenario.

In both cases, like some others, a goaround was misshandled. A typical A300/310 issue (have been there, got the t-shirt).Correct... it was the issue of not realizing the autopilot is on and it doesn't disconnect if force on yoke is applied when on automatic ILS app below certain radalt (this was DGAC required modification in order to certify 300/310 for autoland ops) so folks got aeroplane severely mistrimmed by fighting the autopilot. Chalk one up for autotrim.

It is interesting how folks in the heat of the battle forget to trim manually. IIRC, Karair pitch excursion somewhere around 1989 was stopped at 40° ANU as PF tried to relief the forces and trimmed, thereby kicking the AP out.

So much for this digression.

but surely ... if the throttles moved (like a boeing) the crew would hold them until 80kts (or is it V1?) and would instantly recognise a power reduction No. Old red herring that keeps returning. You can even find YouTube videos of old pilots spouting this, only proving how lucky they were never to have engine control failure during their careers, for surely, smart they weren't.

There was also an airbus case I believe. Very probably there was, however I wouldn't believe anything without proper reference. Maybe it is just me.

Remembered a stick and rudder hero at my previous outfit who decided to fly manually with A/P, A/T off.Manual flight with autothrottle/autothrust active is strictly prohibited at my outfit so no confusion about it being on/off. I think it's a good thing.

Having no idea of "airbus laws" can someone briefly explain this "alpha floor logic that they have??Alpha floor is generic term for automatic high power command when AoA gets way too high. Even 737 NG have it and on them it's called...."Alpha floor".

Taking your hand off the throttle while hand flying is a mistake made only by pre-solo student pilots and rank amateurs.
Blasé aerosexual jetpilots too.

It's almost like groundhog day! Sure it is, since some folks building their theories of advanced flight control architecture, found them on spectacular misunderstanding of basic flying principles and are unable to take subtle hints their notions are so at odds with reality, they only have some limited entertainment use. As explicitly pointing them they are somewhat clueless would go against RoE, I guess we have to live with it.

no, it has nothing to do with the AB dead stick/lever philosophy, because even the Turkish managed to dump their 737 ..... etc. blah, blah ..It wasn't just Turkish. There are thousands of Airbi landed uneventfully every day, as there are hundreds of pilots throughout the history neglecting to monitor their airspeed. Nothing to do with flight instruments or flight controls architecture.

How can you try to defend a design flop by pointing to morons producing an accident with another design??? What flop? What morons? In real world, airliners are stil flown by human beings and, unlike machines, they tend not to perform equally every time. Just because a pilot makes "stupid" mistake it doesn't qualify anyone, especially not some participant in anonymous internet discussion, to label him as "moron". Overall performance is a pointer of how one might act when thinks go pear shaped, not guarantee. Clueless pilot might get lucky and fly throughout career without scratching his aeroplane and knowledgeable and competent pilot can be faced with task far beyond his capabilities early in his career. Of course, all Joe Public sees is smoking hole and wants to blame anyone for that. Easy if pilots are foreign. Even easier if Airbus is involved as all the false stereotypes about computers surface.

With the same argument we can abolish ABS and ESP in modern cars by showing that there are some other morons who were able to crash even highly equipped cars!Nope. If pitch feedback is comparable to ABS/ESP, then Airbus is waaaay beyond it, nothing like we have in the cars yet.

Such argumentation is not only puerile, but even cynical.Argumentation you have presented is straw man. Argumentation Airbus needs not control feedback to be safe might be even sarcastically delivered, yet it's true.

To my belief controls with feedback represent an additional protection in modern cockpits.Yes they do, but they have synthetic feedback to prevent pilots from ripping their wings off or killing their passengers (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19990914-2) Synthetic pitch feel is not designed to be speed cue, its use as such is incidental and unapproved and anyway, there were numerous incidents and accidents where unusual feel or displacement of controls provided no cue for hapless crews. Airbus has G protection to deal with overstress risk. Loss of it puts it in config similar to loss of pitch feel on "conventional" aeroplane. A bit more difficult but definitively manageable even for the subpar pilot.

But if you look at feedback-controls through the above optic, namely as an additional protection, it makes absolutely no sense to abolish them. Of course. Problem is that this proposed optic is largely based on total misunderstanding how manual instrument flying works in real life. Pilots sets pitch and power, trims out, checks for performance. If it isn't what is expected, pitch and power are adjusted, forces trimmed out, performance checked. So on and so forth until rollout. Control position is just demand, not delivery and every clue about aeroplane behaviour is taken through visual channel. That's why those officially tasked with recognizing whether the design is airworthy have certified A318-A380 even if it has no synthetic feedback or moving thrust levers.

[jcjeant]

unlike machines, they tend not to perform equally every time
Just a reminder ....
Machines can have also malfunction .. and so no to perform equally every time
Put all his trust in a machine is a mistake .. as has been often shown

[mike-wsm]

Speaking as a retired software/techie guy I would recommend that the PF should always be in the loop, receiving inputs and producing outputs. Mere monitoring does not keep him fully aware and he will not be in a sufficient state to take over.

[Starbear]

For those who asked: With A/T engaged actual IAS will not reduce below Vls (Vref) regardless of speed selected but if A/T off/disengaged (still serviceable) and levers at idle IAS will reduce below Vls but upon reaching the speed equivalent to alpha prot range, TOGA thrust will be applied regardless of thrust lever position or A/T status (except if u/s) A/P will disengage Alpha Floor annunciated and if on G/S, aircraft will climb away in Alpha Prot speed range. Pilot action will be to lower nose accelerate and recover. A/T will annunciate TOGA LOCK until further action on levers by pilot.

[woodja51]

OEB Already mentioned affects Airbus and Boeing , possibly the issue with rad alt 1 going to zero and causing speed decay ( flaremode) when coupled to an ILS will lead to a rapid drop in speed until alfa floor kicks in.

If they were in manual thrust or disenaged a/Thrust then toga lock would appear until throttles moved , or the throttles would have to be manually moved to cause the speed decay...

If the automatics ie rad alt was the problem , then the automatics caused the problem ....which then fixed the problem...? Sort of ironic really.

As far a pilots flying 'hotas ' totally agree, BUT maybe , just maybe the manufacturers ( both) should FIX THE FRIKKIN PROBLEM not just write nice bulletins OEBs etc for crew to remember in this less paper AKA more paper cockpit they inflict on us.

AIrbus lost a jet and test pilots due to engine thrust reduction on one side after takeoff some years ago as the aircraft transitioned via ALT* at lowish level where it is not speed protected. T

his is a nice little note or caution in the FCOM... Prob should be a WARNING but the lawyers got hold of it - dont want to alarm the punters!! .

Alternatively they could have FIXED it before someone gets the chance to test it for real with a eng prob. after takeoff with hi ROC and low ALT level offs.

. IMHO Airbus and Boeing both run by lawyers and accountants ... Bring back decent engineering not paper mache coverups and then blame pilots when they dont pick it up.

[eightmileshigh]

Soon, very soon we will rid ourselves of these pesky pilots with their ridiculous salary and benefit demands and refusal to work 20 hour shifts. All flights will be controlled from ground stations located in various third world countries staffed by low cost x-box players.


Signed …

The accounting department.

:cool:

[hetfield]

@woodja51 (http://www.pprune.org/members/136195-woodja51)

wtf are you talking about?

Two pros of a flag carrier ignored a speed decay of about 30kts during approach.

That's it.

[fullforward]

Hetfield,

I am too fed up with this empty bull****ting, endless bla bla bla trying to explain the unexplanable.
Unfortunately, as I wrote here regarding the idiot that slammed a perfectly flyable aircraft into a montain in Indonesia (Sukoi), for each Capt Sully 1,000 morons are born.
No more political correctness! Just facts and actions. One thing is an unnavoidable disaster, other is to screw up with people's lives by irresponsible training, poor evaluation system combined with criminal negligence and lack of basic airmanship.

[ATC Watcher]

fullforward :
the idiot that slammed a perfectly flyable aircraft into a montain in Indonesia (Sukoi), for each Capt Sully 1,000 morons are born.

I wonder how the (Suhkoi) Russian Capt in question would have done with 2 engines out above the Hudson, and what Sully would have done in a badly planned demo flight in Indonesia ? 2 totally different situations where "luck" also played a role.
So I would be careful before giving idiots/morons adjectives.

[exeng]

and what Sully would have done in a badly planned demo flight in Indonesia

I suspect Capt. Sully would hae been very unlikely to have accepted a very badly planned demo flight in the first place.

In flying planning is everything - that is what we do. I also doubt that Capt. Sully would have started a planned flight and then decided on a whim to to change the plan at the last minute - although I am not suggesting for one minute that this happened on the Sukhoi disaster.

[White Knight]

I suspect Capt. Sully would hae been very unlikely to have accepted a very badly planned demo flight in the first place.

What the heck has sully got to do with AF? Stop kissing his arse!

They're a dangerous airline. THREE hull losses since 2001!

[hetfield]

PLEASE...

come back to that particular AF issue.

[gerago]

With your hand on the throttle there is no way you will forget to add (or reduce) thrust. Taking your hand off the throttle while hand flying is a mistake made only by pre-solo student pilots and rank amateurs.

That skydeity apparently forgot that he had disconnected the autothrust and expected the engines to spool up! He was looking out visually for the runway, manipulated the side-stick but not the throttles. Mental fog, possibly.

[camel]

This is very scary to say the least ... gimme a firefly bob up front please anytime ..against one of the new breed of p2f boy wonders...its reasonable to expect that the whole crew can actually fly the aircraft without an autopilot eh? or maybe not ...:=

[whatthefuh]

The real problem is the current malaise of pilots' over-reliance on the automatics coupled with some carriers' refusal to allow their pilots to practice their manual flying skills - (at a suitable time and place of course.) Automation has become so good and reliable on all modern types that we naturally expect it to work all the time.

Pilots no longer scan the way they needed to while hand-flying and I've found it very informative to cover the engine instruments during an auto-approach and ask the other guy what the thrust setting was. 90% of the F/Os didn't know, which frightened the life out of me. Try it some day for yourself - you may be horrified too.

It's all in that excellent video about the children of the magenta line. It all works so well 99% of the time that we'd better really know our automatics when it all goes pear-shaped - regardless of whether it's an A or B a/c. Unfortunately, from 20 years of TRE experience, I've found that most pilots don't know it. Then add in the surprise factor and it can all go badly wrong in a very short time.

[A318-111]

Hetfield,

Could you have a look to the Avherald incident description ?

My suggest is only to avoid non-sens comments in this topic.

[hetfield]

My suggest is only to avoid non-sens comments in this topic.

So why don't you delete your post?

[A-3TWENTY]

Air France is like korean air in the 90`s. Almost everyear they crash an airplane and have some incidents.

Better if they started recruiting koreans to improve their safety record.

[Skyerr]

Conclusions yet to be done, if you know all the circumstances of the event.:=

[macdo]

WHATTHEFUH is spot on and the training depts. of most Western Airlines also know it. Slowly we find more bits and pieces being added to LPC/OPC's which point to line pilots being found to have poor basic flying skills as well as only scant grasp of the autoflight system. We have recently had stall recovery, manual handling details, Unreliable speed drills, mishandled landings heavily covered, and you can sense from the briefings that the attitude is 'we want to make sure you know the basics'. Unfortunately, the elephant in the room is the massive growth in the number of inexperienced Captains and very inexperienced FO's being rostered together. Everyone knows its only a matter of time before one of the LoCos has a serious loss attributable to crew experience but seem curiously unwilling to address the problem for fear of offending those few who are getting hugely rich in the background.

[jester42]

I thought that the post by Gretchenfrage was of value. Knowing what input the other Pilot is making without asking them, would be a design feature.

However, Clandestino spent a long time dissecting that post and added;

''Alpha floor is generic term for automatic high power command when AoA gets way too high. Even 737 NG have it and on them it's called...Alpha floor''

I must have the old version of the handbook then! ;)

Clando, do your self a favour and please reread the post and try to understand it. :ok:

[hetfield]

In the meanwhile there is an update on avherald.

AF7633 was recovered by alpha prot not alpha floor.


Incident: Air France A321 at Paris on Jul 20th 2012, speed drops to alpha prot on approach (http://avherald.com/h?article=455c3eae&opt=0)

[A318-111]

In the meanwhile there is an update on avherald.

AF7633 was recovered by alpha prot not alpha floor.

:D:D:D

This is why I did not delete my post...:rolleyes:

[hetfield]

A318

And your message is?

No matter if alpha floor or alpha prot, like you know there are only a few knots difference.

Anyhow this flight was about 30kts slow on final approach.

[oxenos]

" Everyone knows its only a matter of time before one of the LoCos has a serious loss attributable to crew experience."

macdo, what has this to do with LoCo?

Is AF a LoCo?

Were the AF crew inexperienced?

To go back 4 or 5 pages, this got as bad as it did because of lack of awareness, which is just as likely to be caused by complacency and over reliance on automatics as on lack of experience.

[safetypee]

Re generic alpha prot. #64, #73,
AFAIK the generic mechanism is to control alpha with elevator (pitch command); the application of power is normally via trigger to a fixed thrust setting.
The difference between a fixed power setting and control is important as there may be systems / situations where additional power is not available.

[jcjeant]

That skydeity apparently forgot that he had disconnected the autothrust and expected the engines to spool up! He was looking out visually for the runway, manipulated the side-stick but not the throttles. Mental fog, possibly.
Is that the landing checklist was conducted by the PNF ??
The item autothrust is included in this list
So the PF must know !

[Lonewolf_50]

Anyhow this flight was about 30kts slow on final approach.

Odd, I used to chastise my flight students when, on final approach during an instrument approach procedure, they were unable to keep their speed within + / - five knots of the briefed approach speed.

I would presume that professional pilots have slightly tighter standards, given how very important a stabilized approach is. Granted, on a gusty windy day, or with a lot of turb, you may get some variations that you don't normally get, but among professionals the pride of how darned well one flies the approach was once a given.

So the guy not flying in this case, on final, was doing the flying pilot what favors by not singing out "five knots slow" ... and upon not hearing "correcting" ... where then the standard follow up to the first alert that the plane is off of profile ... to make sure the man flying is in the game?

Automatics, all well and good, but if the aircraft is not flying the approach to spec, the pilot must. One needs to be mentally in the game. HAL may get a stray voltage, or a spurious input, or even a spurious human input, and then it's yours!

I don't think I've said anything new here, but I do worry that what I discuss above about pride in precision may no longer be a foundational assumption.

Or maybe I am wrong.

On the bright side, the last few commercial flights I was on were pretty smoothely flown. This includes one where the flight deck crew initiated a go around because they were not happy with the aircraft on the ground encroaching to close to the runway.

Was that HAL, or were the pilots flying the aircraft?

It also includes a crew for American Eagle who were on final into DFW but waved off due to, as they explained over the PA system to us after they were established and getting sequenced in for our approach, that they had been put into an interval that was not sufficient. I got the impression that someone had cut in front of them, or was being sqeezed in, but as I wsan't in the cockpit, I am not quite sure what was the actual situation.

There are still good crews out there, and thanks for that. :ok:

[jcjeant]

Was that HAL, or were the pilots flying the aircraft?

Here it seems that none of both was flying the aircraft :)

[DozyWannabe]

HAL may get a stray voltage, or a spurious input, or even a spurious human input, and then it's yours!

Not true. This is why the ELACs, SECs and FACs are duplicated with functional redundancy across all six units. HAL is a *bad* analogy because it implies a centralised decision-making apparatus, when in fact it is distributed and redundant.

This includes one where the flight deck crew initiated a go around because they were not happy with the aircraft on the ground encroaching to close to the runway.

Was that HAL, or were the pilots flying the aircraft?

Could have been either. If autopilot and autothrust are engaged and the FMC is properly set up, a TOGA command will cause it to fly the escape/go-around procedure automatically. If the approach is manual the pilots can either do it off their own back or follow the FD.

[jcjeant]

Could have been either. If autopilot and autothrust are engaged and the FMC is properly set up, a TOGA command will cause it to fly the escape/go-around procedure automatically. If the approach is manual the pilots can either do it off their own back or follow the FD. In the case discussed .. it was not one .. or other
It was an approach mode "hybrid"
Part controlled by automation ... and other (autothrust) controlled ?? manually ...
A mixture of genres that was dangerous in this case
So .. not recommended

And I emphasize again :
Is that the landing checklist was conducted by the PNF ??
The item autothrust is included in this list
If yes (I hope that AF pilots comply checklists!) the PF must know !

[Lonewolf_50]

Dozy, I don't care that you wish to nitpick the analogy. I am keenly aware that AFCS and AP systems have depth and range of features. I actually spent some years of my life flying. As noted early in this thread, one of the robotic features kicked in to remedy a well out of standards deviation. That is the core of my point, and it is my position that the maintaining of a professional level of standards is a HUMAN not ROBOTIC responsibility and task. It shall not be delegated.

HAL is a metaphor for letting the robot, of whatever complexity or advanced design, be in charge.

You are reaching here, and not making yourself look any sharper.

[Gretchenfrage]

Lonewolf, save your breath.

It's as if these guys repeat the never ending " ..... resistance is futile ..... ", but in the end common sense prevailed, at least in fiction.

Let time heal their wounds, I'm inclined to say, but I start doubting common sense. Like even fiction is less cynical than the truth.

Maybe because in fiction no one pays the lobbyists ..... :cool:

[DozyWannabe]

Dozy, I don't care that you wish to nitpick the analogy.

That's a little harsh in my book. It's not a case of "nitpicking", it's a case of promoting understanding of how the systems are intended to work as I was taught. If I get something wrong through lack of specific knowledge or lack of line piloting experience, I'm happy to respect that input, put my hands up and apologise. But if people stay stuck in their own mental trench based on an opinion that doesn't reflect reality, then we'll always just keep going round in circles.

I am keenly aware that AFCS and AP systems have depth and range of features.

This isn't about depth and range of features though, it's about the ethos behind the systems design - which seems to have been significantly lost in translation, hence all the rubbish about beancounters and intent to sideline pilots, and as such bothers me greatly.

That is the core of my point, and it is my position that the maintaining of a professional level of standards is a HUMAN not ROBOTIC responsibility and task. It shall not be delegated.

And the systems were designed with that in mind. The alpha prot and alpha floor features were designed to fulfil two primary requirements. Firstly to allow the pilot to make aggressive control inputs in an emergency while keeping the airframe stresses within safe limits, and secondly to provide one last line of defence when things turn CATFU'd

HAL is a metaphor for letting the robot, of whatever complexity or advanced design, be in charge.

But that's not the case - the pilots are always in charge of the systems. Autopilot and autothrust can be disconnected just as they can in any other type. If a pilot or pilots come over time to rely on the automation too much, that's not a type-specific issue, it's an industry-wide one.

[Lonewolf_50]

But if people stay stuck in their own mental trench based on an opinion that doesn't reflect reality, then we'll always just keep going round in circles.
Do me a favor, Doze. Remember which person you are having which argument with. I do not appreciate being tarred with someone else's brush.

HAL isn't just an employee of Airbus.

Capisce?

[DozyWannabe]

That part was for general consumption - not directed at you personally. The point is that if people want to write what I'm saying off then that's fine - but I'll still happily respect the input of anyone - even those who drive me mad - because I'm always trying to learn something.

HAL isn't an employee of anyone or anything - he/it is a fictitious construct based on an extrapolation of technology that was state-of-the-art in the '60s (i.e. large mainframes). That way of doing things was on the road to becoming obsolete by the end of the '70s. Artificial Intelligence has not caught up to Clarke's vision, because it became apparent that the problem was far more complex than anyone realised at the time. However, the advent of processing and volatile storage on silicon meant that the level of redundancy and systems bandwidth available on microtechnology leapfrogged 2001's estimate by quite some way.

While we're on the subject of respect, as a software guy and systems engineer I find references to HAL regarding modern FMS/FMC and FBW technology about as upsetting as you'd find me assuming that all pilots were akin to a combination of Captain Queeg and Captain Demerest - and throwing that assertion into the mix every few posts.

[Lonewolf_50]

Get that microchip off of your shoulder, boy.

[steamchicken]

OK, so in the AF447 thread HAL is the enemy because, er, he didn't take control, as the rules said. In this thread, HAL did, as the rules said, and it's his fault.

And your last point is meant to be an argument, apparently.

[Lonewolf_50]

Sorry, poultry man,
1) you don't get it, and
2) no, you are wrong in your attempt at a summary.

Try reading what I have posted in this thread, to include the following statement. It's only a few posts up, but I guess that's too much work for you.
I am keenly aware that AFCS and AP systems have depth and range of features. I actually spent some years of my life flying. As noted early in this thread, one of the robotic features kicked in to remedy a well out of standards deviation. That is the core of my point, and it is my position that the maintaining of a professional level of standards is a HUMAN not ROBOTIC responsibility and task. It shall not be delegated.

There is probably a class at your local college on how to improve your reading comprehension. Suggest you enroll.

[DozyWannabe]

Get that microchip off of your shoulder, boy.

Seriously, why so combative? Have I somehow been discourteous to you in a way of which I am currently unaware? Sparring with CONF iture and Lyman/bearfoil, I will occasionally unleash a little sarcasm in jest because otherwise the conversation would be downright depressing - but I don't think I've deliberately said anything to you that could be considered a slight...

Regarding your post #111, where you and I diverge is that you seem to consider the existence of the technology itself to be the reason for the apparent decline in handflying and problem-solving skills. The manufacturers have little say in how their customers apply that technology to training - all they can provide is guidance on how their product is operated. The technology in and of itself is nothing more than a tool. It was not intended to sideline or replace the human pilot, it was intended to assist them.

If the airlines have decided to use technological advances as an excuse to cut back on training costs to the extent that safety has been affected, then the onus is on them to correct it. If the industry wants to continue to expand to the point where automation is mandatory in certain types of airspace, then they must increase hands-on training for when the fit hits the shan to make up for it. If a plurality of pilots feel that the technology has been misused by the airlines in such a fashion, then they should band together and do something about it instead of railing against what is, at the end of the day, nothing more than an inanimate object.

[jcjeant]

If the airlines have decided to use technological advances as an excuse to cut back on training costs to the extent that safety has been affected, then the onus is on them to correct itIs that the airlines or the regulators who set the trainings required (mandatory) and the rules for apply them ?
Who decide ? .. airlines or regulators
No laws for training ? .. just curious :)

[DozyWannabe]

The regulators specify general minimum standards, but they're just that - minimum standards.

[haughtney1]

The manufacturers have little say in how their customers apply that technology to training - all they can provide is guidance on how their product is operated. The technology in and of itself is nothing more than a tool. It was not intended to sideline or replace the human pilot, it was intended to assist them.

Spoken like a true Techy guy Dozy, manufacturers have an ENORMOUS amount of influence with respect to regulators and operators.

If the airlines have decided to use technological advances as an excuse to cut back on training costs to the extent that safety has been affected, then the onus is on them to correct it. If the industry wants to continue to expand to the point where automation is mandatory in certain types of airspace, then they must increase hands-on training for when the fit hits the shan to make up for it. If a plurality of pilots feel that the technology has been misused by the airlines in such a fashion, then they should band together and do something about it.

Again Dozy, easy to say, and rather nieve.
Firstly, airlines have been sold a concept that more automated and envelope protected aircraft are inherently safer, which based on past experience is statistically correct, the trouble is it has created a raft of other issues, some of which include a continual erosion of piloting skills and organisationally a loss of respect in the profession as well as a new set of complex unforseen failure modes that overly clever designers and systems engineers never even contemplated.....after all the technology is so advanced and aeroplanes can fly themselves don't they?
You can inform us as eloquently as you like regarding the logic and inherent redundancies built into a system..but the fact remains that aviation is still the cruel mistress when things go wrong....just as it was recently where on a final vector to the ILS at our destination with the A/P engaged we flew through a localised area of turbulence that was powerful enough to roll the aircraft to 30 AOB and disconnect the A/P....pilot intervention prevented any further roll deviation and a departure towards the terrain 2000ft below us.

[jcjeant]

The regulators specify general minimum standards, but they're just that - minimum standards.
So that's what I figured ... regulators are to criticize if there is a lack of training
Their responsibility is total
If you want a better workout .. regulators can only regulate and impose
Suggests that airlines will invest in training for pleasure more than has rules and laws is a sweet dream :)

[Lyman]

Isn't "close to Stall" where this filly plays her top cards?

[Lonewolf_50]

"where you and I diverge is that you seem to consider the existence of the technology itself to be the reason for the apparent decline in handflying and problem-solving skills"

Dozy, are you talkin' to me, or the fifteen or so posters whom you joust with on a regular basis?

What you say there is blatantly false.
Not.
Even.
Close.

Try not to attribute to me that which you have made up in your own imagination.

I'll try to be a bit less snarky.

Deal?

[petitb]

Having read six pages of expert comment on near stalls due to Auto Thrust/Throttle failure, please tell me gentlemen, what does a captain do with his right hand when flying an approach/landing on any Airbus?. Just askin!.

[hetfield]

what does a captain do with his right hand when flying an approach/landing on any Airbus?Well, it depends..., in my outfit it was

- A300/310 keep right hand on thrust levers/throttles (!?), even flying with A/THR
- A320/340 hold your coffee, because SOP wants you to fly with A/THR on, even flying manually. But this has changed many times, yes, after incidents/accidents.

[DozyWannabe]

"where you and I diverge is that you seem to consider the existence of the technology itself to be the reason for the apparent decline in handflying and problem-solving skills"

Dozy, are you talkin' to me, or the fifteen or so posters whom you joust with on a regular basis?

What you say there is blatantly false.
Not.
Even.
Close.

To be fair, I included the qualifier "seem to" very deliberately for that very reason. Also because I wasn't 100% sure, but that was the vibe I was picking up from your posts. That way I hoped to make clear that you were more than welcome to set me straight if I was wrong.

Deal?

Done and done. :ok:

Spoken like a true Techy guy Dozy, manufacturers have an ENORMOUS amount of influence with respect to regulators and operators.

I disagree. This is commercial aviation. Certainly since the end of the '60s, no manufacturer has built an airframe solely on the basis of their own wishlist, because developing and selling a product no-one wants to buy would be commercial suicide.

For the last 3 to 4 decades, manufacturers have developed products by polling customers at every level (meaning management, finance, crew and maintenance) to find out what the priorities should be for the next-generation product. So - breaking down your next section:

Firstly, airlines have been sold a concept that more automated and envelope protected aircraft are inherently safer, which based on past experience is statistically correct...

Let's start by separating automation from envelope protection and FBW, because they're completely different concepts.

With automation the improvements in reliability and safety come from the fact that machines, whether electromechanical or electronic, tend to be better at doing mundane, repetitive tasks than humans. From the earliest wing-levellers through the alt/hdg hold autopilots to the modern FMS-driven systems it is primarily this technology that has encroached on hand-flying practice while on the line - and as you say, statistically every generation of the technology has led to improvements. The INS- and radio-driven analogue units that preceded the digital ones were the first to effectively allow autoflight from wheels-up to top of descent, or even autolanding (which was developed primarily by us limeys because of the operational problems caused by the infamous pea-soupers at Heathrow). The move to digital didn't really alter this practice as far as I've read and it was certainly never intended to be used as a way of de-skilling pilots (though I'm sure it was probably perceived that way in some quarters even decades ago).

Digital FBW and envelope protection is a newer concept in civil aviation, although it's been on the line now for 24 years (36 years if you count analogue FBW as used by Concorde). There's been a lot of rubbish talked about it, largely through lazy or intentionally inflammatory journalism.

Digital flight control in general provides a cost saving via weight reduction (which pleases the management and accountants) and reduces points of mechanical failure (intended to please pilots and crew) by simplifying mechanical implementation through fewer moving parts (hopefully making maintenance easier).

Envelope protection is a side benefit of digital control - particularly with regard to airliner operation and like FBW it is a very misunderstood beast. The press liked to play up the aspect in which it can help cover pilots if they have a bad day at the office, but the other primary benefit - equally important if not more so - is that when the systems are functioning (i.e. well over 99.9% of the time), it can allow a pilot to make emergency manoeuvres without having to worry about overstressing and damaging the airframe. The press tend to ignore that aspect because it has less chance of generating controversy of the kind which sells newspapers.

the trouble is it has created a raft of other issues, some of which include a continual erosion of piloting skills...

Then surely the onus is on the airlines to counter that problem, and on pilot unions and regulators to make the airlines do it.

and organisationally a loss of respect in the profession

What you're talking about there is not restricted to pilots - it is the advent and primacy of managerialism in every aspect of business. Search PJ2's posts for some very eloquent analysis of the problem.

as well as a new set of complex unforseen failure modes that overly clever designers and systems engineers never even contemplated...

The systems (FBW and envelope protection in particular) were specified with pilot input, and none of the systems features were implemented without sign-off from pilot engineers. The idea that the digital systems were cooked up in a closed room by techies and beancounters simply isn't true.

And while grumbling about clever-dick techies may be cathartic, I can assure you that they, like you, are front-line staff and as such, just as subject to the capricious whims of management and markets as airline crew.

Most technology-related accidents have tended to be INS/FMS/autopilot related rather than flight control issues. In engineering terms, the failure modes of digital FBW systems are actually relatively simple in nature because they were designed in such a way as to be an interconnected set of very simple systems which, as a whole, can perform complex tasks. Even then, what the systems are doing is not especially "clever" or "complex". As for "unforeseen", the recent example of AF447 stemmed from a blockage of all 3 pitot tubes - which was not merely unforeseen by the designers and aero/systems engineers, but also by the pilot engineers. Preceding hull-losses stemming from loss of air data had only one or (exceptionally rarely) two pitot tubes blocked at once.

...after all the technology is so advanced and aeroplanes can fly themselves don't they?

Another press-originated fallacy. Don't get me wrong, some industry characters did suffer foot-in-mouth syndrome, but what was printed for general consumption (i.e. outside aviation specialist publications) was shorn of a lot of important context and therefore misconstrued.

I think it's very important to understand that in Airbus's case, the training cost savings to the airlines from going to digital FBW technology were primarily related to having all models in the range from the short-haul narrowbodies to the long-haul widebodies having an almost-identical flight deck layout and feel - i.e. conversion training would be cheaper. *Never* was it suggested that the technology was so good that airlines should feel free to cut back on existing pilot training.

As an aside, the first time I heard that phrase was in the movie Airport 1975 in reference to the Classic 747, which featured no digital technology at all.

the fact remains that aviation is still the cruel mistress when things go wrong...

As far as I'm aware there have been no hull-loss accidents related to the failure of a FBW system in the 24 years they've been flying commercially.

just as it was recently where on a final vector to the ILS at our destination with the A/P engaged we flew through a localised area of turbulence that was powerful enough to roll the aircraft to 30 AOB and disconnect the A/P....pilot intervention prevented any further roll deviation and a departure towards the terrain 2000ft below us.

Well done (and I mean that sincerely). I don't see how it would have been any different on a previous generation airliner though. I'd be interested to know what type it happened on.

[Apologies for the essay everyone!]

[RetiredF4]

DozyWannabe

[Apologies for the essay everyone!]

No apologies needed, that was a good one Dozy. :D

hmmmmmm... and that from me.....:confused:

[bille1319]

AF have acknowledged “malfunctions” with Pitot tubes on A320s. Do you think one could be on the list of culprits?

[Lone_Ranger]

Why?, a pitot tube is such a simple device and preventing them freezing (about the only thing that stops them functioning once in flight), is equally straightforward. Its fully developed, known technology, they simply shouldnt be a cause of problems. all the crap they plug into them, well thats a different matter

[Lone_Ranger]

Dozy, you said.....


"As far as I'm aware there have been no hull-loss accidents related to the failure of a FBW system in the 24 years they've been flying commercially"

Failure, perhaps not, but I think we can all remember one instance of a " functional FBW system playing a large part in downing an airworthy aircraft...
they aint perfect things

[DozyWannabe]

Failure, perhaps not, but I think we can all remember one instance of a " functional FBW system playing a large part in downing an airworthy aircraft...
they aint perfect things

I'm not sure what you're referring to - could you enlighten me?

I don't think anyone's saying any system is perfect...

[jcjeant]

"As far as I'm aware there have been no hull-loss accidents related to the failure of a FBW system in the 24 years they've been flying commercially"24 years is a lot of time and many hours of service :)
DW
I don't think anyone's saying any system is perfect... Well after 24 years of non events in the FBW backyard .. this mean (I understand .. you mean) .. perfect .. no ?
Or you mean .. we must waiting ... 24 years more and maybe a failure causing a hull-loss for say it's not perfect ..... :confused:

[DozyWannabe]

Well after 24 years of non events in the FBW backyard .. this mean (I understand .. you mean) .. perfect .. no ?

No! All it proves is that the system is no worse than any other. Every system has its quirks.