Crash filmed from cockpit

[750XL]

Don't think I've seen this posted anywhere else.

Lucky guys

LiveLeak.com - (Must Watch!!) Plane crash video from inside cockpit

[strake]

Dear God..lucky to get out alive.

As for the reasons, where do you start..?

I'm not sure if the aircraft was "struggling" for height or if it was deliberately being flown low. If the former, well there were plenty of places to put it down, if the later..why?

Whatever the reasons, that is a frightening piece of video.

[FullWings]

That is truly scary.

Judging by the length of the takeoff roll and that they touched down then became airborne again after takeoff, it looks very much like a performance (lack of) related accident. They were barely out of ground effect for much of the 'flight'.

Maybe high density altitude as well, by the look of the vegetation? The ground seems to be subtly rising as they fly into it, as well.

Plenty of opportunity to call it a day while they still had grass underneath. Good that they didn't try any turns, though... :ooh:

[Madbob]

750XL

As you say lucky guys and one I'd not seen before posted on the net. Where and when did it happen?

It looks like an attempt to fly at perhaps over max gross, 4 pob plus, fuel plus cameras etc. on what looked like a warm day by the people just wearing T shirts. Add in perhaps a high density altitude (I don't know the elevation of the strip) and you get a recipe for disaster!!

The strange thing is that none of the occupants said anything into the mic, and there were no expletives or commands such as "brace"! The engine note didn't seem to change either.

The amazing thing is that the pilot didn't try and put it down sooner (before the trees) when the rate of climb was negligable. He was also lucky to avoid a spinning-in and a fire after the crash.

Even without the slow motion, just watching it I experienced a sense of time compression! There is a lesson it this video for us all ......pilots and pax!

MB

[Armchairflyer]

Original description: This is unprecedented footage of a small airplane crash from inside the cockpit from two different views. Miraculously, everyone survived.
The pilot will make a full recovery and the rest of us escaped with superficial injuries and feel very lucky to be alive . This trip was much anticipated and due to our excitement we had our Gopro cameras filming at various times. After flying up into the mountains for a hike in the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness we were planning on flying to a small mountain town for dinner. Due to warming temperatures we had a hard time gaining altitude. After taking off we hit an air pocket that made us rapidly loose altitude, pushing us down into the trees.Lucky escape indeed; this one looks comparable IMHO but there were no survivors :uhoh:. Or does stalling vs. "controlled impact" really make that much of a difference?
Fatal Air Plane Crash (Accidente de avión) from the Cockpit - YouTube

[FullWings]

That puts them in Idaho, where the *bottom* of the valleys are at around 4,500', according to Google Maps. You can see convection off the peaks that would naturally produce a bit of sink between them but "due to warming temperatures we had a hard time gaining altitude" explains most of it.

4-up plus luggage at a density altitude probably 7-8,000+, being propelled by what sounds like a boggo 4-cyl Lyc., probably not leaned out. Ouch! I'm surprised it got into the air at all! Well, I suppose it didn't really...

Edit: It appears to be a Stinson 108 with a 165hp Franklin 6 cyl. That's a BIG ask at that weight and temperature.

[SinkRateSam]

That's a very frightening piece of footage indeed. I don't understand why he didn't put her down immediately when it was evident that performance was insufficient. You could see it wasn't going to end well just looking at pilot's attempts to lift off...

According to NTSB prelim report (link below), the flight was operated near Bruce Meadows Airport (U63). Elevation 6370 ft. (http://www.airnav.com/airport/U63/).

NTSB preliminary report (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20120701X65804&key=1)

EDIT: Maximum temperature on that day, in that region (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/KSNT/2012/6/30/DailyHistory.html) was 28°C recorded. That would put them at over 9000ft density altitude. Owch.

[L'aviateur]

Sometimes the urge to press on overrides logic. It's clear that the aircraft was overweight for the density altitude, it's clear that performance was poor during the take off and there was plenty of opportunities to abort/land.

[jxc]

My Gut feeling watching that was Blair witch doctor something doesn't sit right people to calm !

of course I may be wrong (1st time this year)

[mns1977]

I don't mean to be flippant, but I agree something isn't right with this. The way someone touched that guys face on the ground looks odd.

[CruiseAttitude]

An old FAA training video on density altitude, worth a watch.

Density Altitude - FAA Video - YouTube

[gingernut]

Great film Cruise.....at first I wanted to shout HARRY THE BASTARD but glad to see common sense prevailed:p

[tartare]

Harry was flying an FTDK though...:E

[Pace]

Harry was flying the notorious Doctor Killer :sad:
The other films were horrific as they showed how awful an impact can be with trees and all that hard unforgiving wood.
It highlights the danger of flying low especially at altitude on hot days and areas of sinking air.
In conditions like that with low powered piston singles and low climb ability all you have is potential energy to get out of a sink!
low height above the terrain and minimal potential energy to tap into!
Anyone know of mountain flying courses in Europe? I did some on skis at Meribel France and may go back this winter as that was amazing flying.
Any other notable places :E

Pace

[Armchairflyer]

One person I am aware of who is much into mountain and glacier flying is Hans Fuchs from Switzerland (http://www.gletscherflug.ch/glacierlanding.htm; rest of the webpage is in German). He should certainly be able to give you sound advice (and BTW he is an ex-racing driver, too ;)).

[Madbob]

Just like the trap that Steve Fossett got into in September 2007.....

MB

[The SSK]

The pilot is 70, in case that's relevant.

70-year-old Boise pilot listed in serious condition after plane crash in Valley County | Boise, Garden City, Mountain Home | Idahostatesman.com (http://www.idahostatesman.com/2012/07/02/2176478/38-year-old-boise-pilot-listed.html)

[Pace]

SSK

No relevance whatsoever the only relevance is below

Elevation: 6370 ft. / 1941.6 m (surveyed)

Bruce meadows is a dirt strip the accident time was 1530 so likely above standard temperature.
The aircraft was four up so probably heavy without knowing the fuel state.
It is a horrible state to be in full power (hope he leaned?) almost zero climb struggling to maintain airspeed and avoid increase AOA and drag.
His mistake other than taking off was not putting down earlier but hanging in there on a wing and a prayer till he was over trees :(
They were all very lucky as they could easily have all been killed
One saving grace and credit to him is that at least he kept it flying into the trees! In such a situation it is so easy to stall spin trying to cling onto altitude

Pace

[The500man]

Just watched the FAA video. Harry was having trouble until someone pointed out that he (or his wife) shouldn't have left the whiz-wheel in the car! :ok:

[SpeedbirdXK8]

Totally and utterly avoidable - c***k !

[Katamarino]

What an irresponsible pilot.

[Armchairflyer]

Without the benefit of hindsight: when exactly would you have aborted the take-off (apart from the sensible option of not even trying)?

The reason I ask is that from the moment the pilot starts the t/o roll, I see no key event that would strongly trigger revising the initial decision to attempt the take-off, just a sense of constant unease. I dare speculate that similar cases of rationalization and escalating commitment could catch some "more responsible" pilots, too.

Uh, very sluggish acceleration -- yes, but it rolls and there's plenty of space ahead. Uh, very reluctant lift-off -- granted, but we are airborne and no obstacles around. Uh, very marginal climb rate -- sure, but flat terrain ahead and we've managed to clear the trees so far.

To be honest, apart from the fact that already owing to a lack of experience with high-altitude operations I would surely have made calculations beforehand and/or tried a solo take-off (which might have made me feel sufficiently apprehensive to not try another one with additional payload), if I put myself in that pilot's position at the moment the initial decision to take off was taken (arguably in the honest belief that it might be a bit close but would turn out well) and without the benefit of hindsight, I couldn't tell whether and especially at which moment I would have aborted the attempt.

[peterh337]

FWIW, ISTM that the impact with the trees happened during a right turn.

Look for the right wingtip dipping just then.

So maybe they were either turning round (slowly) or trying to avoid something.

The plane was clearly grossly short of performance. Not the 1st time that has happened and it won't be the last.

[bluecode]

Agree with armchairpilot, once committed to fly it's hard to back out of it. The sensible option would be crash land on flatter ground when you realise you haven't got the performance but that's hard to commit to. Keeping it going in the hope of gaining both height and airspeed is an easy trap to fall into. You know any attempt at a turn will precipitate a stall/spin.

But really the clues were all there before they even left the ground. It was a hot and high airfield. The aircraft was fully loaded. Any pilot should have sat down and worked it out. Possibly he'd done it before and got away with it. But this time conditions conspired against him.

One thing we pilots do is push limits. Soon what was once scary and on the edge seems normal. The more experienced we are the more confident we are in our abilities. But we forget the aeroplane has a limit and when you find it. It's not pleasant.

I often remind young pilots that the fact that you get away with something ten, twenty or a hundred times doesn't mean you're safe. You only have to crash once. That's why we set limitations.

It may not seem particularly relevant to those of us on this side of the pond. But it can happen just as easily. Consider a fully loaded aircraft, perhaps with a less than optimum engine, a shortish bumpy grass runway with some obstructions on one of our occasional hot days, zero wind. Add in less than perfect pilot technique. As you clear the hedge at the end with the stall warning yelping, you gulp as you eye the powerlines and copse of trees now seeming a lot closer than you previously thought.

Far too easy to get yourself into that situation.

[peterh337]

That plane was more than "fully loaded", relative to the performance and conditions.

A certified plane at MTOW, ISA conditions or appropriately corrected as per the POH, will climb adequately.

IMHO, those people were something like 20% to 30% overloaded, to be just stuck there, not climbing.

Unless flying into rising terrain which they didn't know about before departure (which is also really stupid).

[Genghis the Engineer]

There's a good general rule: half take-off speed by halfway down the runway, and airborne by 2/3 down the runway - or abort.

Given the massive length of that runway (say 2 minutes at an average of about 40 knots = 2000m+, that would have been easily followed and allowed plenty of stopping distance.

And let's face it, if an aeroplane like that isn't airborne by 1300+m of runway anywhere, it's time to stop and re-assess!

I've had a similar sight out of the front, twice that I can recall, in correctly loaded aeroplanes but due to longer than expected grass and the aeroplane just refusing to accelerate past a point. Both times I followed that rule, stopped, and re-assessed. It's not difficult.

G

[dublinpilot]

Without the benefit of hindsight: when exactly would you have aborted the take-off (apart from the sensible option of not even trying)?

The reason I ask is that from the moment the pilot starts the t/o roll, I see no key event that would strongly trigger revising the initial decision to attempt the take-off, just a sense of constant unease. I dare speculate that similar cases of rationalization and escalating commitment could catch some "more responsible" pilots, too.

Uh, very sluggish acceleration -- yes, but it rolls and there's plenty of space ahead. Uh, very reluctant lift-off -- granted, but we are airborne and no obstacles around. Uh, very marginal climb rate -- sure, but flat terrain ahead and we've managed to clear the trees so far.

To be honest, apart from the fact that already owing to a lack of experience with high-altitude operations I would surely have made calculations beforehand and/or tried a solo take-off (which might have made me feel sufficiently apprehensive to not try another one with additional payload), if I put myself in that pilot's position at the moment the initial decision to take off was taken (arguably in the honest belief that it might be a bit close but would turn out well) and without the benefit of hindsight, I couldn't tell whether and especially at which moment I would have aborted the attempt.

I think your questions are good. Even if you would never put yourself into that position in the first place, you can learn far more about yourself and your own potential failings if you try to put yourself into the pilot's mind.

I suspect (but it's only a guess) that nobody seems too scared in the video by the lack of climb, because they had already flown that day (probably to get to that airfield) and know that it was hot/high/heavy and expected the climb performance to be marginal.

What they might have missed could be an increase in tempertature, or down flow of air from the higher ground ahead, or simply turbulence. As they obviously took off upwind, any wind would have been flowing down this side of the higher ground ahead.

Clearly taking off with such marginal performance is wrong, but if you flew into that airport on the same day, it is a big decision to say that we can't fly out, unless we make two or more flights to bring the passengers one by one. It's easy to see how you'd be tempted to try it. Wrong thing to do, but unless you can imagine the mental pressures to fly, it's hard to learn from it.

[gasax]

I tend to side with Armchair here. The Stinson has a great reputation has a load carrier - and at MSA would easily loft the load onboard.

At the sort of density altitude they were at the sluggish takeoff and climb would be expected. So there is no clearcut 'go no-go' event. Once airbourne the climb rate would be expected to be poor. The more experience that you have in this areas the more likely you are to expect the poor performance and to be able to eventually get away.

From the video if this flight had been attempted a earlier or later in the day it would probably have succeeded.

From my own experience I know my old Terrier seemed to suffer disproportionately with high temperatures in terms of takeoff - to the point that on hot days (over 30 C - generally not in this country) I just avoided trying. The Stinson may be a little similar.

[The500man]

when exactly would you have aborted the take-offAs he tried to climb away from ground effect at about 55 secs into the video it sank back to the ground. I think that was probably the correct time to abort.

It looks like a similar story at 1:25 and 1:50.

[Genghis the Engineer]

If, as it appears, that was a Stinson 108 (the yokes are wrong but the rest looks right), the useable payload is around 800lb. With those 4 who all looked reasonably slim and half tanks, it probably was in weight limits, with full tanks not far over MTOW.

Visually it was hot, and probably high. The Stinson whilst it will carry a lot of load and lands on sixpence, does take quite a lot of runway on a good day to get airborne, so I think that's a pure performance issue, not an overload issue. Personally in the UK I wouldn't try to get airborne from less than 600m of grass in one.

Still an idiot who if he survived, which I of-course hope he did, was clearly needed some substantial aeronautical re-education.

G

[Pilot DAR]

when exactly would you have aborted the take-off

Smug answer: Before you need to!

Seriously, any airplane which is not airborne and climbing away in the 50+ seconds I saw in that video, should be put back on the surface, and stopped to figure out why. (though the reason is not a mystery here). Even the fully loaded heavy jets only use 45 to 50 seconds on the roll.

So, I use time. My all time short time for becoming airborne in the 150 is 9 seconds from application of full power to wheels off, though that was in unusually favourable conditions. I would be very happy with 20 to 30 seconds in anything I fly, longer than that, I'm thinking about aborting.

I aborted a takeoff off a small lake in the amphibian last weekend. I was airborne, but it had taken too long due to a variable crosswind, and downdrafts off the shoreline hills. Could I have made it? Probably, but I don't want you lot speculating about my poor decision making! One more downdraft would have made the difference. I can control the abort, I cannot control the downdrafts.

So I took off the other direction with lots of room to spare.

The pilot in the video displayed poor judgement in my opinion.

[Armchairflyer]

WRT to my "Which clue to hang the abort decision on?" question, IMHO the inputs by Genghis, the 500man, and DAR give good clues (poor pun intended): however flat and benign the surroundings look, if the airplane clearly does not want to leave the ground within reasonable time/distance limits (or settles back), disregard the vast and flat space in front of you and abort.

For me that's a useful and applicable take-away lesson: whenever altitude and temperature suggest that performance will be a critical factor, don't rely on the seemingly flat and forgiving environment to push you towards a safe decision; at the very least make a deliberate internal t/o briefing before pouring on the coal: "If at point x I am are not airborne and climbing, I'll cancel the attempt, no matter how much flat terrain in front of me which might lure me into continuing."

[DeltaV]

There's a good general rule: half take-off speed by halfway down the runway...

I'd say that isn't enough. 70% speed at the halfway mark more like, but one of the problems with what we saw in the clip is, where is the halfway mark? The terrain seemed so endlessly flat.

Pilot DAR's suggestion of timing sounds good in such a situation though here in Britain we're usually more constrained by strip length than anything.

[Akrep]

@ 1:20 into the video I would have made the decision to put it back on the ground. assuming the pilot is familiar with the strip thus knowing that he has about a mile of clear area left before the forrest starts he should have put it back on the ground.

after his first airborn attempt at about 00:50 he bounces back on the ground after loosing ground effect.. and gets airborn the second time. at about 1:20 you can see he pıtches the nose down probably because of loosing speed and when he does he looses altitude in the proces.. he is diving for speed @ maybe 50 to 70 feet of the ground... if you have to do that after already a long take-off roll.. something should click into place that you probably are not going to make it.

over the forrest it´s so clear the moment he starts his bank he is loosing altitude.

[Pace]

On another website I found out some more information. To make it short, the Density Altitude that day of the accident was 8,300 feet. The engine on the aircraft, a Fairchild, was 165 horse power, normally aspirated, in other words, no super-charger or turbocharger. That couple with the fact that he was about three passengers over MGTOW for that day. It is quite surprising they got airborne at all.
Also, they took off in the direction of raising terrain, so coupled with minimal climb rate and the raising ground, well...

Posted by Con Pilot on the biz jet forum

Re looking at the video he made every error of judgement available

Pace

[Big Pistons Forever]

It is always better to be wishing you were in the air after deciding not to takeoff then it is to be in the air wishing you were after the ground after not thinking about the factors that are going to effect the takeoff and subsequent flight........

Even if the pilot was so foolish as to not take into account the many adverse factors effecting his takeoff, during the takeoff roll the aircraft was screaming at him "I can't fly in these conditions". Like an earlier poster said when the aircraft settled back on the ground after refusing to accelerate he still had room to abort the takeoff...but he kept on going :ugh:

This is past just bad decision making, it is actively choosing to be stupid......

[Genghis the Engineer]

I'd say that isn't enough. 70% speed at the halfway mark more like, but one of the problems with what we saw in the clip is, where is the halfway mark? The terrain seemed so endlessly flat.

Pilot DAR's suggestion of timing sounds good in such a situation though here in Britain we're usually more constrained by strip length than anything.

Actually that was a typing error on my part.

What I meant to say was half flying speed by 1/3 down the runway, airborne by 2/3.

My error.

G

[SpeedbirdXK8]

The moment the pilot woke up was the time the flight should have been aborted. The silence in the aircraft is proof all were willing it to take off in their heads rather than listen to the alarm bell and speaking out. I have sat in the back of a AA5A during a flight in 'iffy weather watching the LH seat fly straight towards very grey/black cloud p*ssing rain; frankly had I not said anything the LH seat would have continued. As it was we only just escaped being engulfed by the front. The RH seat was not a pilot (I am) and despite my protest to the contrary the LH seat insisted it would be a treat for none pilot to sit up front during a flight we knew has enroute border line weather. I have never flown with that pilot since. Perhaps I should have stood my ground or stayed on the ground with the old saying ringing in my head. If I hadn't accepted the back would those two people still be alive? It isn't often I chip into "debates" on pprune but on occassion I thought some straight forward comment was necessary.

[Gertrude the Wombat]

despite my protest to the contrary the LH seat insisted it would be a treat for none pilot to sit up front
It has never occurred to me to put anyone other than the person with the best flying ability (even if it was only a few lessons in a Tiger Moth fifty years ago) in the front seat. If there's no flying ability then it's the passenger with most passenger experience in light aircraft (least likely to entangle camera strap round yoke, etc).

[bluecode]

To quote a friend of his on another website. He's apparently an experienced mountain pilot and intends to fly again as soon as he's able. He told me the air just disappeared out from under them...no lift suddenly. He almost aborted because of the lengthy take-off...not uncommon at 6,000 ft, when a gust of wind lifted them up.

That ole gust of wind done it!

[Genghis the Engineer]

Ah well there's a whole separate debate brewing there.

I've been asked several times as an instructor to help recalibrate low hour PPLs who keep trying to interfere with another PPL's flying, to the point it's becoming dangerous to have them as a passenger. On the other hand, it is entirely right and valid that a passenger (and don't forget that if you are a passenger, that's what you are, however experienced and qualified) should point out if anything is endangering a flight. The balance is extremely difficult to get right, and this sort of CRM is not routinely taught to PPLs.

G

[sevenstrokeroll]

and not one of you have even considered windshear, downdraft, improper air speed indication

so many things could have contributed to this crash.

how many people saw the interview on CBS in which the pilot stated: it was an airpocket (cringe).?

[Genghis the Engineer]

and not one of you have even considered windshear, downdraft, improper air speed indication

so many things could have contributed to this crash.

how many people saw the interview on CBS in which the pilot stated: it was an airpocket (cringe).?

Not sure I can get CBS over here.

Windshear under a near cloudless sky?

Improper air speed indication? He's got visual attitude and a VSI to use.

Downdraft from where?

Sounds like the pilot is even more in need of recalibration than I thought if he's stupid enough to go defending his poor flying like that.

The sheer length of that take-off run is more than enough clue that he should not have continued with the flight. The near-zero climb gradient for a sustained period only re-inforced that.

G

[DX Wombat]

Is it just my vivid imagination or does the aircraft actually become airborne at 0:50secs but then touch down again twelve seconds later?

[FullWings]

Another issue is the sort of "risk creep" you get having completed a manoeuvre several times without understanding how near to the edge you were if any environmental factors changed for the worse.

If you get used to staggering across the airfield boundary at 20ft, it becomes a sort of benchmark. An extra degree of temperature, less favourable wind, higher weight, dirty prop... The percentage reduction in performance to turn the takeoff into an accident is very small, especially in this case where they had 1,500m (5,000') of strip to get airborne in a piston single. Throw in any vertical airmass movement, even as little as 100-200fpm and you're sunk.

I remember seeing the aftermath of a series of identical training circuits by a low-performance aircraft. They were consistently clearing the boundary hedge by 30ft or so from an 8-900m takeoff run, according to witnesses. On the last takeoff, the wind had shifted imperceptibly, plus an almost invisible fine drizzle had started to fall - the combined effects of slightly damp grass, a tiny bit of moisture on the wing and a knot of tailwind meant they clipped the hedge then crashed and burned. Lucky to survive.

Is it just my vivid imagination or does the aircraft actually become airborne at 0:50secs but then touch down again twelve seconds later?
I'm pretty sure it does then runs along for quite a while before staggering into the air again. I think most of us would have taken that as an ideal time to quit flying and go have a drink somewhere!

[sevenstrokeroll]

genghis the engineer

perhaps you have heard of KTVL or KRNO? You see, I have spent most of my life flying the mountains of California and Nevada, USA.

On a day with with 100 miles visibility, and one tiny cloud in the air at KRNO, I had to use max power to maintain the glideslope. (1986, Metroliner III). And some A&&&&^$^& in a 737 ahead of me had the same problem only he didn't make a PIREP untill after I MADE MY PIREP.

Oh, and teaching mountain checkouts as a CFIIMEI, and seeing how people used thermals to climb and then ending up out of the thermal and not being able to climb?

No, the mountains can be unforgiving. Temperature, density altitude, performance are all part of the equation. But unless your plane has the performance of an F15, you better be ready for anything.


Now, I think the guy was pretty close to max gross and the density altitude was very high, and maybe the old franklin wasn't producing all its power well due to aging valve seals...but mountain flying in the summertime is tough.

Actually we just had a commanche crash at Truckee tahoe airport with a density altitude of 9000'. The pilot thought there might have been engine problems so he rejected takeoff , let off two passengers and went back to try again. Crashed into a hangar and died.

[DX Wombat]

FullWings - thank you, that was just what I was thinking, it was a great big hint which was ignored but should have been taken very seriously.

[SpeedbirdXK8]

Gertrude - that's the reason why I will never fly again with that person and will remain on the ground should I ever have to face the same situation.

Genghis - spot on and I have always said CRM applies for all types of aircraft. CRM is the issue at hand here; not lame excuses by a "pilot" unable to accept the truth.

[FullWings]

To add to what Sevenstrokeroll said about flying in mountainous areas, once convection really gets going, you can get some impressive sinking air without any storms or even clouds. It wouldn't be at all unusual to find an area going down at 1,000fpm plus that might take some time to get out of.

I've flown a fair bit in Nevada and at times the ground appears to be porous if you're in the wrong place! The mountains in Idaho probably behave in much the same manner. The middle of the afternoon is not the ideal time to go aviating in a marginally-performing aircraft...

[Genghis the Engineer]

7SR, I hear what you say, and your mountain experience is certainly greater than mine and to be fair KGCN in summer is probably the highest density altitude I've flown from. I do at last count have 115hrs in Stinson 108s so have a reasonable understanding of the type.

But really it's a generic point - continuation of an incredibly marginal performance take-off, onto a near zero RoC and continuing that over trees where there were absolutely no options.

G

[MattGray]

Here's the problem. :eek:
(http://edge.liveleak.com/80281E/s/s/19/media19/2012/Aug/8/LiveLeak-dot-com-32a86a961230-drawing1.jpg?d5e8cc8eccfb6039332f41f6249e92b06c91b4db65f5e99 818bad392484dd2d3beaf&ec_rate=300)

[Genghis the Engineer]

Interesting point Matt.

That's around the stall most likely given a near zero climb angle.

So the pilot *may* have been nibbling the stall for climb angle, rather than flying about the best climb speed which is relatively high (80mph) on the Stinson. (Checking pilots out on type, I find that most have a distinct tendency to climb too slow - 70mph seems more natural to many but with a flapless take-off and around MTOW stall would be just under that , giving poor stall margins and poor climb rates both. It's also something that pilots can tend to do if they are getting nervous about hitting something in front of them (and that seems a near certainty in this case).

G

[alanda]

Suggest try Megève. See Mountain flying (http://www.europeanmountainpilots.org/en/site-12/mountain-flying.html)

[Pilot DAR]

continuation of an incredibly marginal performance take-off, onto a near zero RoC and continuing that over trees where there were absolutely no options.

Yes, that is the key point. The reason for the poor performance is secondary, and if transient, might never be known. But, the decision to continue regardless was bad. Though I do not subscribe to a possibly changing air mass as a causal factor from what I saw here, it could have been. A pilot would not know about air variability, but he sure otta know that the takeoff is abnormal, and that should be enough to cause an abort.

An aircraft which has very marginal performance is not going to suddenly get better unless something changes. Perhaps, a distant possibility is that you started your takeoff on downward moving air, and you're going to fly out of it. But that slim chance is not enough to continue on the hope. Anything else which causes degraded performance (engine controls not set right, too much flaps out etc.) should be fixed after the takeoff is aborted, not during.

I spend a lot of time doing performance climb testing, which involves single engine climbs in twins, and partial power climbs in both types. Once the aircraft is established in a climb, however marginal, it's not going to get better unless something changes. If the pilot is in the correct configuration, wit power set right, and at the correct speed, there's not much for him to change....

As I struggle for 3 minutes in my test climbs to record a climb of 50 feet, I'm reminded about the criticality of doing that off the runway. Leaving ground effect is going to worsen the climb capability. Any turn is going to worsen the climb capability. I wonder which the accident pilot thought was going to change for the good as he pressed on....

[Shorrick Mk2]

When to stop the takeoff? Do the performance calculation per the POH, find out the takeoff distance - define a distance reference point by the runway in your takeoff briefing. If not airborne by that point, stop. Performance is very unlikely to improve even if you ever get airborne...

[Pilot DAR]

Do the performance calculation per the POH

It sounds good in practice, but is not that foolproof in reality. Many aircraft originally designed and approved before 1960 (not when they were actually made) have little or no performance information in the POH (if they even have one).

Last month I did a flight test program on the prototype aircraft which was made in 1967, and type certified to FAR Part 23, and it has no performance information at all in the POH.

Hats off to those pilots who familiarize themselves with performance data before they fly, but the Stinson pilot likely had none whatsoever. However, that is no excuse for very poor decision making!

[Genghis the Engineer]

I agree with DAR; also even if an aeroplane of that vintage has performance data (the Stinson actually has published data - TODR is 1400ft for the 108-2 that I know well) it's for a new aeroplane back then, and anybody with any sense will add at-least 50% to that, and then still regard it with a pinch of salt.

G

[rotornut]

Big news - made the BBC: BBC News - Passengers capture Idaho plane crash on film (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19205395)

[Lone_Ranger]

Fake, or i'll eat my (exceedingly large) hat

[Lone_Ranger]

........................... UAV

[sevenstrokeroll]

now, I haven't flown piston engine planes in about 27 years or so. but I do remember that taking off at a high density altitude sometimes requires the leaning of the mixture to optimize engine performance...I will bow to those who have actually flown this type to verify this. I've watched the video , on tv, again and the red mixture knob is fully forward.

There is something that many mountain flyers don't know...that is: where is the horizon?

most people point the nose up near the top of the mountains, when in reality, the horizon is near the base of the mountains. could our heroes have misjudged pitch, therefore speed and performance?

Look, it is very easy to say: it was too high and too hot to fly. easy enough and possibly true. but let's examine everything and someone out there might learn something.

topics for discussion:

dry microbursts
thermals
engine controls
dust devils

[Genghis the Engineer]

I've not flown the Stinson "hot n'high", but the movement from fully rich to leaning for cruise is very small, and it *may* be leaned for best power. Or the pilot may have failed to do that necessary thing and can adds something else to his idiocy. In any case you can't actually see the mixture control during any part of the take-off roll, only during taxi, so I think that the case is unproven.

G

[Pilot DAR]

could our heroes have misjudged pitch, therefore speed and performance?

Well in maneuvering flight, yes, mountain flying can have many dramatically misleading visual cues. However, on takeoff on a level runway, it's pretty simple to establish your pitch attitude relative to the ground. Its pretty hard to over pitch a taildragger on takeoff, as the initial takeoff action is to lift the tail, thereby reducing pitch. If you cannot get the tail up - something is wrong.

If you don't lift the tail, it's akin to a three point takeoff, which equals a soft field technique in a tricycle, you'll still get airborne, if the plane is able.

Certainly examination of many characteristics broadens thinking, which is great. I've never heard of dry microbursts, so I'll stay clear of comment on those, though I have certainly experienced some [wet] ones from local cloud, and they are scary!

Thermals go up, so entering one of those can only help a climb.

Engine controls can certainly be set non optimally for certain conditions, and perhaps by not leaning the mixture there's a contribution there. It is unfortunate that pilot training has "everything full forward" for full power. Fine at sea level, but deceiving at altitude. I would hope that a pilot used to a high altitude airport would take the appropriate action - it's the sea level pilots who make that mistake once.

As for dust devils, well those I have seen are small, contain a lot of dust, and move horizontally. Not great to fly through, but easily seen and avoided, and really don't affect climb rate for more than a second or so.

I think the poor decision making is the prime factor here...

[sevenstrokeroll]

it distresses me to know that dry microbursts are not common knowledge.

and out here, dust devils are pretty darn big (mountain west USA).

[Pace]

Sevenstrokerol

Sinking air yes that is something you have to be very aware of in mountain flying especially operating near terrain and slopes in low climb rate aircraft.

Twisters are something else and would be confined to a very small area.
While intense and able to break an aircraft the effect time wise would be small,
This was purely an aircraft attempting to take off too hot and too high and too heavy.
The thing didn't want to fly from word go and the pilot foolishly continued to struggle into the air.
After that he continued in the hope that he would climb!
Whether the actual descent into trees was caused by sinking air or rising terrain is not clear!

Blame lies squarely with the pilot and I find it hard to see how he could excuse this one as anything but diabolical pilot skills and decision making.

Btw I hate the misuse of the word HERO!
A Hero is someone who purposely and knowingly exposes themselves to risk to their own well being for the benefit of others not someone who is in a situation trying to save their own bacon with unwilling PAX at the mercy of his skills or in this case lack of skills and judgment.

Pace

[JamesHawks]

Why are people complaining that the mic is picking up there screams and swearing?
Have you ever tried to have a conversation with your headsets off with full power set, what do you think the GoPro mic is going to pick up, the deafening engine or the quiet talking into a headset?

Anyway if you turn the volume up you can hear someone shouting just as they hit.
Think about it as well, the pilot is concentrating on trying to avoid the trees so he won't be talking, the passengers in the front seat and the back seats might not have much experience flying so maybe they think this is a stunt flying low by the experienced pilot in the left seat, with the two passengers in the rear not being able to see the view outside the front as well.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Pace - I think that the word hero was being used sarcastically!

G

[Pace]

G

The word Hero is becoming so misused by the media and press it does need clarification.
Even the very professional and skilled Captain who pulled off the water landing into the Hudson was not technically a Hero.
I could be the most skilled and capable racing driver in the world driving a car up a motorway when I experience a double blow out.
Due to those skills I manage to control the high speed car and safely bring it to rest on the hard shoulder. My passengers are at the mercy of me being able to save us all.
I am also part of this potential accident so NO hero! a very skilled driver maybe?
As the car comes to a stop I jump out and walk to the grass embankment! Getting there I turn around to see my three friends still in the car.
There is a whoosh and all of a sudden the car is engulfed in flames.
I rush back knowing the car could explode, ripping open the doors and pulling my friends out.
NOW I AM A HERO.
I feel the term is used to loosely and awards given for the wrong reasons.
I realize in this context he was being sarcastic but do not like the misuse of the term generally.

Pace

[Gertrude the Wombat]

As the car comes to a stop I jump out and walk to the grass embankment! Getting there I turn around to see my three friends still in the car.
There is a whoosh and all of a sudden the car is engulfed in flames.
I rush back knowing the car could explode, ripping open the doors and pulling my friends out.
NOW I AM A HERO.

No, because you caused the dangerous situation by getting out of the car and wandering off and not making sure your passengers were also safe, as was your responsibility as driver. Had you given them the usual exit briefing you would have done for an aircraft - get out as fast as you can whilst not hurrying and not tripping over your setbelt, then run like hell upwind - there would have been no need for heroism.

[janrein]

Another aspect, having watched the video up-thread, I could not see harnesses being worn by front-seaters.

The Stinson may not have been originally equipped with.

Should be installable afterwards, not?

Might have saved the pilot some of his injuries.

Opinions anyone?

Thanks,

JR

[FullWings]

it distresses me to know that dry microbursts are not common knowledge.
I think that's because they get lumped in with the "wet" kind as a subset of microbursts. The actions on encountering one without warning are the same, after all, only the conditions that breed them and the warning signs that they are around may be different.

The training that I've been exposed to covered all this but overall it is classified as windshear/microburst.

Dust devils - great fun! Just make sure you enter against the rotation at low level. :ouch:

Thermals - don't get me started... :8

[Genghis the Engineer]

janrein - my Stinson has 3-point harnesses in the front seats; the original 1947 manual just says "each seat is equipped with a safety belt" but it's not possible to tell what form that originally took.

So I don't know what was original, but it's certainly possible to fit 3-point harnesses. Ours I'd say are at-least 20 years old.

At risk of stating the blindingly obvious, the airworthiness standards for light aeroplanes for at-least the last 30 years have mandated upper torso restraints in the front seat. That wasn't done for decoration - they're there because they improve safety (crashworthiness if you like).

G

[janrein]

Thank you Genghis

JR

[Pace]

G

You are much more qualified than me in crash worthiness :E

In front of a single engine piston is a bloody great piece of engine held to the airframe by a few tiny tubes and not a lot between that and you.

IE not built like a modern car with deformable structures and power units designed to drop down below the passenger compartment in the event of a head on! Little has changed in airframe design in 60 years.

In fact aircraft are very poorly designed for engineer access or crashes!

The killer is not being restrained by belts other than in light collisions but the fact that a massive piece of engine is likely to join you in the cockpit?? That big block of metal is not human friendly :{

In which case maybe the belt may be a hinderence

In that way twins are much safer as the power units are on the wings?
We consider the wearing of seat belts as we do with a car! In aircraft the benefits of containing you in a protective Cell as in a modern car are not there and as such the benefits of wearing a seat belt questionable

Pace

[Genghis the Engineer]

There are minimum structural strength requirements there, in slightly simplistic terms the occupant and engine must not meet with less than 9g acceleration, whilst smaller point masses such as fire extinguishers need to be retained in at-least 15g.

Is a twin safer in that regard? Probably not to be honest. The engine will stop, or the front of the aeroplane will stop, then the occupants will keep going forward - hopefully being retained if the acceleration is below 9g. To put that in perspective,

But a harness is a good thing, because it does in that initial deceleration generally keep soft pink bodies and sharp and deforming bits of aircraft structure apart from each other (not least the yoke, which probably did much of the damage to this pilot).

What you don't want is anything heavy behind you, so pushers are not necessarily a good idea, nor are fuselage mounted fuel tanks.

Once all the bits have stopped moving, most experience is that there are big enough holes to get out of, and airworthiness standards do require harnesses to be releasable under load.

G

[Pace]

G

Thanks for that ;) Bar room chat I had with some pilot friends concerning the benefits of belts in cars and aircraft so was interested in your expert view!
So really the benefits are more stopping you joining the engine rather than the engine joining you :sad:
As for the column another Cirrus benefit :E

Pace

[englishal]

That is why I like modern composite airframes, ones with 25G cockpits and seats and airbags. These offer much more protection to the occupants than a 1947 thing.

Actually I just read the accident report of the DA40 and RV6 which collided at Shoreham a while back. It is quite a testament to the DA40 airframe that the wing was not really badly damaged after slicing off the tail of the RV6 and the effect of the big hole was just to increase drag slightly.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Ah well, yes, there's another set of safety issues.

The first F117 to crash, most of the fire crew who attended it ended up being medically retired. The results of crushed and worse-still burning composite structure is unpleasantly similar to asbestos.

G

[Pilot DAR]

The Stinson may not have been originally equipped with.

Should be installable afterwards, not?



The Stinsons I am aware of, like the Cessnas and some PIpers of that older vintage used a metal on fabric cam type seatbelt. The stiffer than we see now seatbelt webbing passed through the serrated cam type buckle and was pinched there by the force to remove it.

THe problems were found to be two: In a severe crash with big loads, it could get pinched so tight by resrating forces that the occupant no longer had the strenght to open the buckle. Secondly, if the cam pinched webbing got wet it would swell up and jam worse, again, the occupant could not open it.

In Canada, initiallty for flaotplanes, then soon for all planes, these fabric on metel seatbelts were prohibited. in favour of metel to metal.

Shoulder harnesses can be installed under AC43.13-2B as "specified data", and are vitally wise....

[Halfbaked_Boy]

My word...

I don't have the hours some have on here, but I have enough to self preserve and self criticize, and one of the things I've learnt, that my experience has given me, is to keep my mouth shut regarding the abilities of a fellow pilot who has 'gone down'.

It's fantastic to speculate about possibilities, that's how we get the mind working and learning, but come on, a bit of respect for a pilot who has been involved in a very traumatic experience, one which we have no solid knowledge about what caused it.

All we can do is theorize, so let's wait until the report before we question the pilot's personal skills/safety?

[Biggles78]

All we can do is theorize, so let's wait until the report before we question the pilot's personal skills/safety?
The NTSB prelim report stated he was a Commercial Pilot. With that in mind his personal skills should have been sufficient. If they weren't then he should have reverted to a PPL.

First job I flew skydivers out of a shortish paddock with longer then desired grass and trees at the end (one way takeoff). It had a windsock and after pacing the length, worked out the speed I need to be at as I passed the windsock. Reject decision made even before the preflight. I had a massive 300 hours with an exceptional 25 on type. Was I being cautious due to inexperience and would I do the same now with several thousand bug smasher hours or would I become complacent as it appears (speculation) in this case?

It will be interesting to see the experience of the crash test dummy.

[Pilot DAR]

All we can do is theorize, so let's wait until the report before we question the pilot's personal skills/safety

Well... When the theorizing is based only upon speculating about the unknown causal factors in an accident, I would agree, and try to behave accordingly,

This accident, however affords us the ability to watch the event in real time, and overlay our own decision making and thresholds on what we see. Okay, perhaps they were being chased by hundreds of horseback Taliban, or the passengers were all critical care medics who were caring for an unseen injured child... but other than that I saw a takeoff attempt which was continued beyond reason and safety. I remain critical of the decision making which caused that accident, and I don't see any mitigating factors to justify it....

I have no knowledge of the accident report, but I speculate that it will/does say something like: "The pilot continued the takeoff attempt when the aircraft's performance was not adequate for the conditions".

[Genghis the Engineer]

I think that where everybody lived, and is walking and talking, it does move the goalposts a bit. There is no particular need to respect the dead or the feelings of surviving relatives - and those involved have the right and ability to come and defend their actions should they wish.

There's a similar discussion going on on the Stinson owners group at the moment; more technical and type specific (and with many contributors who are used to flying Stinsons hot'n'high), but not a lot more sympathetic.

G

[Big Pistons Forever]

The issue with respect to shoulder belts has been settled for awhile. The NTSB, FAA, TC, CAA, etc etc all have universally recognized the worth of shoulder belts. Without one even a relatively mild crashes will cause the person to bend around the lap belt slamming their face into the knobs and bolts sticking out of the instrument panel. Use of shoulder belts has greatly reduced head and facial injuries in crashes.

The good news is that you see many examples of very bad accidents with the wings and tail ripped off but the cabin area still basically intact. In addition the usual situation during a crash is that the engine mount will rip away from the firewall and fold under the aircraft or to one side. The ones where it goes into the cabin usually involve hitting the ground at a very steep nose down attitude and are almost invariably fatal.

The bottom line from my POV is any pilot that does not wear fitted shoulder belts is a fool and I will not personally fly an aircraft that is not fitted with shoulder belts .

[englishal]

one which we have no solid knowledge about what caused it.
Actually I think we can be pretty sure what caused it. Going into hot and high mountain airports with a fully loaded plane which is under powered is a recepie for disaster.

Someone I know checked out a couple of experienced UK airline pilots on a Archer III. Next day three turned up with their luggage to go flying and in chatting he found out that they were planning to fly to Big Bear in the mountains. 30C and 6700' elevation. No you're not he said.....

[Genghis the Engineer]

Just an observation based upon a couple of posts here.

I've been nearly killed once by a recently retired commercial pilot:15,000 hrs and it turned out had forgotten most of the airmanship he had presumably once known about operating single engine piston aeroplanes.

Holding a commercial licence and having been flying for a lot of years (as, being 70, this chap presumably had) does not necessarily indicate that somebody knows how to safely operate a small aeroplane with a whirly thing on the front.

G

[150commuter]

I suspect the final NTSB report may not shed much more light on this accident but perhaps Leslie Gropp the pilot may be prepared to share his reflections on the incident once any legal stuff has been settled
I'd be interested to know how much experience he's had of operating from high elevation airfields. My impression was that he was local so maybe quite a lot.
I've only taken off from high elevation fields (two up in 172s in Arizona) a couple of times and they were lower than this one but I do remember the apparently excessive length of take off roll so that may not have been such an obvious warning as it seems.

Whatever really caused this accident speculating about it does provide useful reminders for us all and the outcome seems to have been almost as fortunate as in the G-ARCC TriPacer accident at Popham in 2006 .

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I did a fly/fly holiday in Colorado once and went mountain flying with a guy called Bruce Hulley from Denver Front Range. Before I was allowed to solo I spent a lot of time (at his insistence) going through the POH for the aircraft I hired, Even having passed all the perf exams required in the UK ATPL syllabus I had never really looked at the degraded performance hot/high brings, I had just never encountered such severe limitations before, A 182 at Leadville was down to around two thirds tanks, two up in August, the book said slightly more, but the Hulley factor said less, I'm glad it did, I found myself using a lot of half forgotten gliding skills to get high enough for the Independence Pass that afternoon.

For my own aeroplane, which has a very basic POH and not a great deal of performance I work on two thirds of take off speed by the time I'm halfway own the runway. or stop and think again.

SND

[bluecode]

I suspect the final NTSB report may not shed much more light on this accident but perhaps Leslie Gropp the pilot may be prepared to share his reflections on the incident once any legal stuff has been settled
A friend of his, defending him on another forum said. 'It was a bit late in the Day, it had gotten hot too quickly, he nearly aborted when a gust of air lifted them, he felt once up that he was committed.'

If I was him I'd ask my friend not to be so helpful. In all seriousness, in the same situation. I would have to put my hands up and say. 'I screwed up'.

In any case there's a lesson to be learned for all us. First you can be caught out no matter how experienced you are. But also more importantly don't allow anyone to post footage of your crash on the internet. :O

[Pace]

I knew one pilot who crashed a helicopter hospitalising his passengers landed two twins gear up crashed a single twice requiring two props and shock loading engine strips!
Even then it was never his fault!
Those are the most dangerous idiots around!
The ones who put their hands up and appreciate their fault are open to learning from the experience.
Sadly a lot fit category one

Pace

[peterh337]

There are some amazing crash videos put up online.

A recent famous one is a TB20 gear up landing, where the warning horn is going off the whole time (well it does stop on ground contact :) ) and one person who speaks the language translated some of the poorly audible dialogue as the pilots believing it was an overspeed warning horn.

[ABX]

Another recent one:
Video: Light plane caught in power line (http://video.news.com.au/2267016064/Light-plane-caught-in-power-line?area=endslate2)

Seems like an unfortunate spot to have overhead power lines.

Ps. If a mod knows how to embed the video here, please have at it!

[AdamFrisch]

On the topic of shoulder harnesses: Most early aircraft, including my own, do not have them. Guess what - you're not legal to put them in either without an STC or a 337 field approval, which is no easy task to get unless you're willing to spend serious money. You can't change anything in relation to your seats, no matter how bad they might be. For many aircraft, no such 337 precedence exists and not STC is available. It is illegal to add them.

A crystal clear example of how certification procedures and protocol can actually reduce safety.

[peterh337]

The problem with adding seat belts is that it is (obviously) a structural mod. The attachment points need to be suitably robust, and most planes don't have "structure" up there.

A 337 is a Major Alteration approval form. If you wanted to do a major structural mod on an N-reg you would likely need a DER to generate some analysis and produce an 8110-3. This is likely to cost you at least 4 figures.

I was once quoted $10k for a DER package for a relatively trivial avionics installation (probably about 2 days' work for the DER) which could have been done (and was done) for nothing by getting an FSDO to approve the 337 for the installation beforehand. But major structural mods to the airframe are a different thing and the FAA is very picky about those.

[Genghis the Engineer]

More to the point, you need an engineer behind the mod who is capable of understanding all the issues and ensuring that all the regs are complied with in fitting it.

It isn't, as Peter ably illustrates, a trivial task.

Which doesn't mean that you shouldn't do it !

G

[Big Pistons Forever]

Adam

In Canada the regulator has recognized the safety value of installing shoulder belts in older aircraft and has allowed a mechanic to install with out an STC by using their own judgement on the most effective way to anchor them to a primary aircraft structure. I am surprised the FAA does not have a similar dispensation.

[AdamFrisch]

I would argue that even the most unsafe installation of a shoulder harness is better than not having one, so I can not agree with this view. It should be allowed without paperwork and costly certification across the board.

[Pace]

Adam

I would imagine that the biggest problem with fitting non tested and properly designed in fitments like a Harness is liability!
Any belt rather than no belt is not quite true! An attachment coming away could itself cause serious injury or a pilot being unable to release himself because of a non approved installation and being burnt to death for that reason.
Who gets sued? Who is prepared to place themselves into a situation of being sued with such an instillation?
Hence I can imagine some authorities would take differing views?

Pace

[peterh337]

You obviously cannot just screw a shoulder harness attachment point to a roof made of 1.5mm aluminium...

[Genghis the Engineer]

You obviously cannot just screw a shoulder harness attachment point to a roof made of 1.5mm aluminium...


I'm not sure it's that obvious to everybody. Nor is the importance of correct shoulder harness geometry.... Air Accidents Investigation: Whittaker 500444 (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/august_1999/whittaker_500444.cfm)

With regard to the pilot's harness, the diagrams in Figure 1 to 3 illustrate the recommended
geometry of harness installation, including the turn angles of the shoulder straps over the seat
occupant's shoulder. The intent of this is to provide a pre-existing rearward acting restraint force on
the upper torso, whenever the straps are normally tensioned prior to flight, thus minimising the
relative forward movement of the occupant with respect to the airframe in the event of a sudden
deceleration of the aircraft. Such forward movement can otherwise result in increased shock
loading to the occupant as the slack in the straps is taken up when they suddenly become taut.
The report of the consulting pathologist who performed the autopsy concluded that the cause of
death (which would have been virtually instantaneous) was injury to the brain associated with a
broken neck, although he determined that other injuries would also probably have rendered this
accident non-survivable. A photograph taken of the pilot seated in the aircraft with his harness
fastened immediately before the accident flight indicated that there was no change in the angle of
the straps over his shoulders. This was later confirmed by tests carried out on the re-assembled
wreckage. Thus in the accident no initial restraint of the upper torso would have been provided
upon impact of the aircraft, which would have allowed the pilot's upper body to rotate forward
about the lap strap. In this circumstance it was considered likely that the pilot's head had struck part
of the airframe and had been effectively forced back relative to his shoulders before the straps had
tightened against this forward rotation

G

[Big Pistons Forever]

A less then perfect shoulder harness will always be better then no shoulder harness.

Adam

Frankly if I was in your shoes I would just talk to your A and P and tell him you want shoulder belts fitted in a way that seems reasonable to him , cash up front, no log book entries, not for attribution and if anybody asks you just say "oh those shoulder belts were on the aircraft when I bought it".

A pilot at my local airport wound up off the end of the runway in an elderly C 172 with no shoulder harnesses. He suffered terrible facial and skull injuries from when his head hit the instrument panel after he jackknifed around the lap belt. If he had shoulder harnesses he probably would have walked away sore but unharmed.

[Pace]

BPF

I have no doubts that Harnesses fitted by a competent engineer who knows what he is doing will work correctly or he will not fit them.
Having come into flying from car racing I know only too well how important the fixings are, the angles that they are located and a whole myriad of design details which have to be complied with for the belts to work as they are designed too.
The main problem is getting retrofits into an aircraft not designed for belts! Some maybe good candidates for a retrofit others almost impossible.
Then the next problem will be getting approval so yes you are probably correct in getting an engineer to unofficially fit the things.
Whether an airbag could be used for those aircraft where belts are not suitable???

Pace

[IFMU]

There are many STC shoulder harnesses available out there. Our club C140 has Wag Aero harnesses:
Wag-Aero Online Store - August 2012 (http://store.wagaero.com/index.php)

Also available for Cessnas are the Hooker harnesses:
STC Kits | Aviation | Hooker Harness (http://www.hookerharness.com/aviationstckits.php)

Another club I am in just put them in our piper arrow. I was the ringleader that got them installed in the arrow, we used the BAS ones:
B.A.S., Inc. - Aircraft Safety Equipment and Accessories (http://www.basinc-aeromod.com/)

The Friendly Aviation Association has put out some verbiage which would seem to make it easier to get harnesses put in either as a field approval or a minor alteration, especially for an old airplane like the star of the show:
http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/gen_av/harness_kits/media/shoulderpolicy.pdf

I don't know if any of this is helpful overseas. I do know that I would rather have a shoulder harness than not, even if I was unsure of the engineering behind it. Anything that takes some of the crash energy and disspates it through your chest and collarbones rather than your head has got to be better.

-- IFMU