Unusual Attitude Recovery Training since AA Flight 587 crash Nov 2001

[Centaurus]

Unusual attitude recovery training in the military is part of basic flying skills. In the airline industry it seems to be taught (if at all) with some trepidation with the usual excuse that simulators are unable to faithfully reproduce the range of control forces that may be experienced.

In November 2001, an American Airlines A300 crashed shortly after take off caused by the first officer over-controlling the rudder pedals following a wake turbulence encounter. The A300 lost its fin and rudder rendering the aircraft uncontrollable.

Since then, despite various well publicised airline training programmes in simulators, unusual attitude crashes have happened occasionally in the Boeing 737 and other types.

In the American Airlines accident it seems the company taught use of the rudder to level the wings in an upset. This may have been a misunderstanding by the then training managers of the correct method to recover from an unusual attitude. At the time of the AA A300 accident it had not encountered an unusual attitude - merely moderate turbulence easily handled.

There has been a plethora of well researched articles on unusual attitude recovery training in simulators and it seems to me each operator has it's own views on the subject and published in company operations manuals.

With such widely differing opinions put forward by manufacturers and interpreted as needed by their customers, I would greatly appreciate if some expert in Pprune could perhaps jot down in these pages a succcint summary of the steps to be taken to recover from an unusual attitude and to what extent can this be done in a typical jet transport flight simulator.

[de facto]

Google airplane upset recovery revision 2 november 2008.boeing and airbus got together and published 443 pages on basics of upset recovery including stalls obviously.
It includes practical sim scenarios.
I would greatly appreciate if some expert in PPRuNe could perhaps jot down in these pages a succcint summary of the steps to be taken to recover from an unusual attitude and to what extent can this be done in a typical jet transport flight simulator.
Sorry i aint an expert and not gonna do your homework:E
Enjoy the reading:ok:

[blind pew]

Centaurus.
The jury is still out as to whether it was pilot induced failure whatever airbus says.
Fortunately never a bus pilot but in my three airlines I was taught to use rudder in combination with aileron.
Rudder limiters suposedly prevented over stressing the fin.
Had a captain accidently apply full rudder pedal in cruise once with no ill effects except to my underpants.

[Oktas8]

Rudder limiting technology does not protect against cycling the rudder. One solitary input, different story. This was one of the key points of the accident in question.

[Clandestino]

The jury is still out as to whether it was pilot induced failure whatever airbus says.What jury? Last time I checked, Airbus was aeroplane manufacturer, not investigating authority. IAW Annex 13, accidents on American soil are investigated by the NTSB, final report (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2004/AAR0404.pdf) was published almost eight years ago.

Fortunately never a bus pilot but in my three airlines I was taught to use rudder in combination with aileron. Me never, just pitch and roll.

Rudder limiters suposedly prevented over stressing the fin.Legacy of AA587 is that nowadays every western built airliner has little note following Va in limitations chapter. It is supposed to deal with this little gem of aeronautical ignorance you have reminded us of.

Rudder limiting technology does not protect against cycling the rudder. One solitary input, different story. This was one of the key points of the accident in question. Unfortunately, AA587 discussion we had was contaminated by the folks who had no concept of either static or dynamic stability but kept on posting their idea that composite fin was too weak, despite being repeatedly warned that NTSB analysis showed it failed well above maximum design overload. I don't mind amateurs on the PPRuNe, some made very useful contributions but I find those who keep spouting their wrong notions and react to attempts to correct them as if it were personal attacks pretty annoying.

In the American Airlines accident it seems the company taught use of the rudder to level the wings in an upset. Let me play a bit of devil's advocate here: what is wrong with teaching to use rudder to level the wings in upset?

[Intruder]

Absolutely NOTHING!

I don't know of a single airplane that cannot be assisted in recovery from an upset with judicious and knowledgeable use of rudder. Maybe if proper rudder use had been TAUGHT to Airbus pilots prior to the AA587 crash, it wouldn't have happened as it did...

[Pugilistic Animus]

IMHO using roll control alone is better in most upsets, the rudder should only be used if there not enough flight control power to assist with lateral control...in a transport airplane rudder should NEVER be used during stall recovery.

[Guru8904]

...in a transport airplane rudder should NEVER be used during stall recovery.

May I know why?

[Pugilistic Animus]

The short answer is that you can induce a spin,...alierons/spoilers on modern airplanes are effective and safe at high AoAs...:)

[safetypee]

Re “what is wrong with teaching to use rudder to level the wings in upset?”

Nothing, except its best used in conjunction with the primary control for roll, and that overly encouraged use of rudder may lead to misuse.

Re “...in a transport airplane rudder should NEVER be used during stall recovery.”

The certification requirements and guidance are not so definitive. There are some reservations and dependency on aircraft type, but rudder is not explicitly prohibited. In practical terms, a line pilot may not be able to distinguish between approach to a stall and actual stall, and similarly the phase of recovery. Thus the general response would be to refer to the flight manual and manufacturer’s advice for 'normal use of the controls' during stall recovery.

CS 25.203 (a) ‘It must be possible to produce and to correct roll and yaw by unreversed use of aileron and rudder controls, up to the time the aeroplane is stalled. No abnormal nose-up pitching may occur. The longitudinal control force must be positive up to and throughout the stall. In addition, it must be possible to promptly prevent stalling and to recover from a stall by normal use of the controls’.

AC25.7C (section 6) ‘The rudder should not be used excessively during the stall entry or recovery. Depending on the specific flight control system design (such as automatic turn coordination), any use of the rudder during stall testing could be considered to be an unusual piloting technique that would not be permitted’.

‘As required by § 25.203(a), normal use of the lateral control must produce (or correct) a roll, and normal use of the directional control must produce (or correct) a yaw in the applied direction up to the point where the airplane is considered stalled. It must be possible to prevent or recover from a stall by normal use of the controls’.

[Intruder]

The trouble with situations such as AA587 is that if a person has never been exposed to such a situation at all, panic is more likely. Hence inappropriate use of full rudder and/or rapid control reversal is also more likely.

However, if judicious use of rudder is TAUGHT and PRACTICED to aid roll during upset recovery, then it is more likely that the recovery technique will be familiar/remembered, and appropriate rudder use is more likely.

While use of rudder may not be REQUIRED, it will often be helpful.

[Pugilistic Animus]

They have, at least in the US...jet upset training, in an L-39 or T-38...and if you have already done some aerobatics they may even let you have a little extra fun...;)...it's not very expensive....I wonder why airlines don't simply send their pilots for real upset training...the best written account of jet upset recovery is in Davies HTBJ...:)

[A37575]

The trouble with situations such as AA587 is that if a person has never been exposed to such a situation at all, panic is more likely

I would have thought that before being accepted into an airline as a first officer the applicant would be an experienced well qualified pilot. he would then have gone through a full course on the aircraft type he will be flying. then line training in the real aircraft. Presumably during his flying career he would have been exposed to varying degrees of turbulence over the several years he has been a pilot. He would have studied for airline pilot examinations and researched accident and incident reports at the company technical library.

With all this background experience why would he suddenly "panic" in moderate turbulence and proceed to bash the rudder pedals from side to side?
Seems to me a question of basic pilot incompetency.

[de facto]

Pilot incompetency in the ranks Of the almighty American Airlines since it was deemed necessary to give a basic class on when to disconnect the automatics...
(children of the magenta line).
I doubt the AA are new 200 hrs CPL guys and yet....

[Pugilistic Animus]

Shhhh...411A's ghost may appear...:}:}:}:ouch:

[blind pew]

The link below gives lists yaw incidents whose possible causes were yaw dampers or the autopilot.
The accident report states that the yaw damper damage on 587 was too severe to determine whether it was serviceable.
Having only once declared a mayday which was due to extreme yaw/roll oscillations caused by a defective yaw damper which was not detectable nor heard of at that time on the heavy jet concerned then I still stick to the possibility that the accident may not have been the fault of the pilot.
Look at the 737 accident history.
http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Publications/pdf_library/A300-corrected%20final.doc