11 miles out @ 530 feet AGL

[hetfield]

An Eastok Avia Airbus A320-200 on behalf of Kyrgyz Airways, registration EX-32002 performing flight EAA-823/N5-823 from Osh (Kyrgyzstan) to Irkutsk (Russia) with 171 people on board, was performing an ILS approach to Irkutsk's runway 30 utilizing the autopilot to intercept the localizer and glideslope. After the autopilot engaged mode "G/S" the aircraft began a descent which was terminated by the crew about 48 seconds later at about 530 feet AGL about 11.5nm short of the runway.Incident: Eastok A320 at Irkutsk on Feb 28th 2012, ILS malfunction leads to premature descent (http://avherald.com/h?article=452d9416&opt=0)

Chilling....

[Check Airman]

Good thing the crew caught the error. I wonder if they were in IMC?

[bubbers44]

Scarey.Hope they survive their career.

[bubbers44]

Had an FO who would have landed in an orchard if I hadn't forced her to level out. Stupid is hard to fix sometimes.

[Swiss Cheese]

Reminds me of the 2011 AAIB safety review report of an A320 [G-MEDA] doing an approach to Addis in IMC....

A British Mediterranean Airbus A-320 aircraft, registration G-MEDA operating as flight number LAJ 6711 on a flight from Alexandria (Bourg-el-Arab), Egypt, to Addis Abeba, Ethiopia, carried out two approaches using the Addis Abeba VHF Omni-Directional Radio Range beacon (ADS VOR) and associated Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). On the second approach the aircraft crossed over a ridge of high ground in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) and came within 56 ft of terrain at a location 5 nm to the northeast of the airport. As the aircraft crossed the ridge the crew, alerted a few seconds earlier by a radio altimeter (RA) height callout, carried out a go-around; at the same time the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) generated a ‘TOO LOW TERRAIN’ aural alert
The investigation determined that the antenna of the ADS VOR had suffered water ingress and was not functioning correctly. The correct maintenance procedures for the ADS VOR/DME and its associated monitoring equipment were not followed.
The aircraft received erroneous information from the ADS VOR which was fed to the flight deck VOR display, the Flight Management System (FMS), the navigation displays and the EGPWS computer with its associated Terrain Awareness Display (TAD). A single common position 1
source error thus adversely affected all these apparently independent navigation/situational awareness systems.
The existing certification standards for the aircraft navigation systems were met but were not sufficient to protect against this problem.

[Microburst2002]

Nothing to do with Addis Abebba or similar incident in Alexandria many years ago.

I would really like to know what was the airplane configuration by the time they realised it was a wrong signal. The report says 48 seconds, but that height is too low for such short time from platform height...

The ILS glideslope signal was obviously working bad, because you can never have a false glideslope below nominal glideslope, as far as I know. I have had such event myself at home base and we disconnected immediately. It was VMC, however.

GPWS will not warn you in such a case if you configure, until EGPWS TFC function is triggered at about 500 agl or less.

In IMC and with some fatigue, and at night, I would like to think that I would be aware of the wrong capture, but I cannot be sure until I have such a situation...

[beardy]

48 seconds is a couple of miles or so, which makes the descent point roughly 13 to 14 miles out, 3 deg glide path makes platform height broadly 4000 feet agl 'ish'. Descent from 4000 to 530 feet in 48 secs! I think even I would have noticed a rather high (!) ROD and overspeed conditions.

Would somebody else like to try juggling the numbers and come up with a rational explanation?

[A4]

So assuming they were at platform of 3-4000' AGL at >11.5d it would take a large ROD to achieve 530'AGL 48seconds after GS* - possibly 2500-3000fpm.

This is similar to the AirInter A320 that hit the mountain on approach to Strasbourg. They were performing a VOR NPA but selected -3300fpm not -3.3°.

It just stresses the importance of checking that the aircraft is descending at a sensible ROD.

As for the comments regarding ILS signal validity (on AvHerald), there is (was) an AIC detailing this. Typically LOC is valid inside 25nm and GP either 10nm or 15nm depending on offset from centreline. Some installations it's more than this due to operational requirements. If you look on a Jepp plate, the vertical profile shows the range the GS signal is valid from - take a look at the ILS for Naples runway 24. You take the LOC from 7000' but the glide is only valid approx 10d - so DON'T arm the approach at BENTO!

A4

You beat me to it Beardy :)

[beardy]

A difference here is that NPAs are normally stabilised (constant speed) and ILSs are decelerated. Go down and slow down ain't pretty when you're hot and high.

[PT6A]

Shows the importance for height checks, distance verses height. Not just for the NPA's but as a cross check to the trusty ILS.

I have seen a few strange captures in my time, luckily I was always awake enough to catch it and takeover manually.

One springs to mind in Canada when the signal was being affected by a snow bank (I think) anyway after capture it caused the GS signal to fluctuate up and down... And of course the autopilot followed it, so it was click click and back to manual!

[BOAC]

because you can never have a false glideslope below nominal glideslope, as far as I know. I have had such event myself at home base - err, say again?

[BOAC]

Anyone check the Notams?

[sevenstrokeroll]

which is why you should check your position on any approach...and why the outermarker and its published crossing altitude is important (or other similiar fix)

and why RADAR usually says: you are five miles from the outer marker/8 miles from the field, maintain XXXX till established, cleared for ILSXX apch.

[Mike-Bracknell]

So much for autoland :)

[BOAC]

Radar?????????????!!! Are you sure it was working?and why the outermarker and its published crossing altitude is important (or other similiar fix) - not much use on this approach! Probably never crossed the OM..

I have a sneaking feeling the ILS was u/s........................not knowing the electric jet I don't know what pitfalls await there.

[lasseb]

I faintly remember an event somewhere in Australia I think.
Here to carrier for the G/S was working, but the modulation was U/S.
That will cause the G/S indicator to always stay dead center regardless of where the plane is in the vertical profile.
The autopilot/autoland then did a to steep descend, that would have caused a crash if the crew had not been alert with height versus distance.
To autoland is not really intended for following a signal that never changes. My guess it it tries to reduce power/pitch down until it "sees" a movement on the G/P. If the G/P stays in center, the plane will continue down.

No idea if this is the case in Irkutsk, but its one explanation.

Btw, in the australian incident the G/P U/S was in notam, and the G/P iden't was suppressed from the carrier... Anyone remenbers to listen for that ;-)

[nike]

Air NZ. APIA. 29 July 2000

http://asasi.org/papers/2002/Air%20NZ%20Erroneous%20Glideslope%20Apia.pdf

[student88]

Quick, somebody copy and paste the METAR!

[PJ2]

BOAC;
Anyone check the Notams?
NOTAMs, especially historical ones, are difficult to track down. The following site is one of the best I've found in checking current and (for terminals I've checked), historical NOTAMs. Keep the URL but replace the last four letters with another ICAO designator.

Metars, TAFs and NOTAMs (http://www.universalweather.com/regusers/publictools/corp_comp/metar_taf_notam.html?icao=uiii)

Another difficult item to track down is historical weather. "OGIMET" has, so far, been of enormous help: Formulario para peticion de mensajes aeronauticos (http://www.ogimet.com/metars.phtml.en) , METAR/TAF Reports section.

"Celebrating TAWS Saves, but lessons still to be learnt (http://legacy.icao.int/fsix/_Library%5CTAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf)" is a good read on EGPWS.

In addition to the CAA report to which nike refers, Air New Zealand has produced a 3-part video series, (Part 1, Part 2, Part 3), on this incident.

sevenstrokeroll[/B], Post #13]which is why you should check your position on any approach...and why the outermarker and its published crossing altitude is important (or other similiar fix)
Absolutely.

So why do these cross-checks sometimes not occur? Rushed? Distracted? Singularly-focussed on a failed glideslope?...

The larger question is, why don't go-arounds occur when things do not seem quite right or when the approach becomes really unstable? There still seems to be a strong desire to continue an approach when all indications are that a go-around is required. Seen it in the data...why is this so?

PJ2

[Beakor]

So 48 sec after GS capture he was at 530ft AGL and 11.5nm from the threshold. If we assume a speed of 160kts and a vertical speed of 800fpm then at GS capture he would have been at 1170ft AGL and 13.7nm from the threshold. I don't know their SOPs obviously but 1200ft at 14 miles would make me decidedly uncomfortable.

[BOAC]

I'm pretty sure the ILS has been at the doctor's recently.

I have the July/10 ILS 30 with a 3.33 GP and an IF 8.7 from the field (and a spot height around 800' above the field) to the left of c/line......:eek:.). There is an OM at 2nm with a 754' ATE min crossing and a platform of 2800' ATE and descent at around 7nm from t/down..

[Microburst2002]

BOAC

I mean I had an event when the G/S was erroneously too low. And that there are not false glideslopes below the nominal one. One thing is an antenna or whatever that is transmitting incorrectly and another is the sidelobes of the beam that produce false glideslopes. These are a 6, 9, 12 deg, etc, if I'm not wrong

[hetfield]

These are a 6, 9, 12 deg, etc, if I'm not wrong They are all way above the nominal 3 degree slope.

If 11.5 NM out and @530 feet they may have catched a slope well below 3 degrees.

Anyone who is in the mood can figure it out....

BTW, sidelobs are not unusual for GS signals.....

[simufly]

This is all about airmanship. That certain quality that cant be assessed or monitored. Call it what you will, hairs on the back of the neck, a third sense that all is not well. Long may it last.

[Huck]

Somebody tell me again about those pilotless aircraft in our future....

[sevenstrokeroll]

BOAC

which is why the plane shouldn't have been that low...wait till the outer marker confirms crossing altitude before you start down below the OM alt

[PJ2]

The problem may not be false glideslopes "below" the 3-deg one but of a failed glideslope, period, in which the indication centers and remains centered regardless of actual position.

Psychologically therefore, any and all effort to "maintain the glideslope" (high rate of descent, zero rate of descent, etc) is "rewarded", if the pilot isn't cross-checking the crossing altitudes and the DME as ssr has now twice pointed out. The A320 has a superb ND display which should show the position of everything, like the LOM, the airport and so on.

It is hard to imagine how such data can be ignored or just not seen in favour of following either a lobe or a failed glideslope, but it has happened and will continue to happen unless cross-checks are done. It occurred at Apia, at Irkutsk, and I've seen it, recently, elsewhere.

Astonishing, given detailed map displays and all, but there it is.

[BOAC]

Indeed - yet another 'WHAT??!!! Too many these days.

[bubbers44]

Landing to the south at DFW in an MD80 one day with 1000 and 3 we were cleared for the ILS and the FO started a steep descent exceeding 1,000 FPM. The glide slope was pegged full down and we were in the clouds. Looking at the DME at the runway end and our altitude knew we were not high so told him to level off, the glide slope was wrong. 20 seconds later the glide slope snapped to showing us low.

I advised the tower of what happened and they said we don't have to protect the glide slope if the weather is better than 700 and 2. I said we were coupled so does that mean in the future we should only do the localizer approach since the glide slope can't be trusted? He said an aircraft crossed the ILS protected area because of the adequate weather. We didn't get below 1500 ft but it made me closely monitor what the ILS is telling you and if it is real or not.

[PJ2]

BOAC, re, "Indeed - yet another 'WHAT??!!! Too many these days."

And it's not newbies, magenta-liners, innocents (like Bonin & Shaw, et al) who are doing this.

This is Guam, Busan, Charlotte NC, Smolensk, Crossair...all CFITs due to total absence of "checking six"..."where are we, what's my required altitude and when can I go down further?" It's just three components - slope, distance and height and they MUST agree, from intercept to touchdown.

And not one crew member in any of these accidents called for a go-around until it was too late. Why? Why especially, are First Officers so damn reluctant to speak up? CRM is thirty years old.

[reynoldsno1]

I always thought that beyond 12NM intercepting the GP (not the LOC) was pretty much a no-no - 'tis outside the operating parameters of the installation ... ?

[sevenstrokeroll]

bubbers 44 demonstrated what piloting is all about...always use multiple sources of information to confirm, confirm, confirm.

One time while instructing in a piper turbo arrow (over 30 years ago), a student selected the VOR for an airport instead of the ILS. He didn't identify...but the course indicator was on course and the GS was centered, the flag sticking out of the way. (VMC )

so he started down on glideslope (even though he was not on the ILS). IT was perfect...500 fpm, tracking the VOR like a champ...I took his hood off and said:

you got lucky, otherwise you would be dead...turned up the volume and made sure he knew the difference between the ILS ID and the VOR ID.

[Grum]

A little more than that at 1312 feet and that would be a perfectly normal platform HEIGHT of 400 meters in Russia, but not at 14 miles out.

Glideslopes are often 2.7 degrees there as well. I haven't yet seen the appropriate chart though.

[Microburst2002]

The always on glideslope failure would be much more aparent if flying manually. Any pilot would quickly realise that the G/S is centerede no matter what. With AP, however, it will be more difficult.

[BOAC]

Glideslopes are often 2.7 degrees there as well. I haven't yet seen the appropriate chart though. - read post 21?

[PJ2]

The always on glideslope failure would be much more aparent if flying manually. Any pilot would quickly realise that the G/S is centerede no matter what. With AP, however, it will be more difficult.
I have a counterexample to that theory in actual flight data. Hand-flown, high rate of descent towards....?, to "keep up with the glideslope"; - Blew the FAF alt and the thousand-foot-to-be-stabilized-by altitude and leveled off at about the same altitude as the Irkutsk A320 - a CFIT but for some visibility at 500ft AGL.

The lesson is, 1) it happens, and, 2) you cannot say to whom it will occur.

Everyone one of us who fly knows how to cross-check altitudes and distances while descending, and why. What we all think (and know) what should have happened, does not explain people's behaviour.

Preparation, a thorough approach briefing with a solid knowledge of SOPs and PF/PM duties and situational awareness through a cultured airmanship are significant preventative, error-trapping measures, as demonstrated by the Air New Zealand B767 crew at Apia. But it can happen to anyone.

There is no such thing as a "bad apple". The "other guy" is us, on any one day.

[BOAC]

There is no such thing as a "bad apple". The "other guy" is us, on any one day. - wise words. It always seemed a little 'pansy' to check DME against GP intercept when you just KNEW the GP was going to be 'good', didn't you, and then there was always the OM check, wasn't there............................................

Maybe the airport DME was u/s, GP u/s whatever, but as said, with all the 'kit', including a WTFAI map in front of us..........................???? Would this a/c have TAWS with a complete database? That should have started shouting as they penetrated the terrain floor. Perhaps that is why they went round, although I would have thought the TF was well before 530'ATE at 11 miles?

The dangerous one is a GP fail 'on the slope' - there is a big clue if it is actually u/s earlier - the GP needle is 'centered' from or before LOC intercept.

[bubbers44]

I don't know how they can do this, maybe maintenance, but flying into Burbank one day in VMC conditions the glideslope was perfectly centered. It didn't matter if you were high or low. The ATIS said glide slope was unusable but it didn't help the airliner behind us who got a low altitude alert from tower and said we are right on glide slope. Some days you can't trust anything.

[beardy]

Bubbers44, I'm not sure I understand your confusion. ILS GS on ATIS as unusable and yet you watched it and presumably went low and high deliberately to see how it reacted (with or without a failure indication?), tower said you were on the correct approach path The guy behind you presumably flying in VMC couldn't maintain a constant approach to the runway are you saying that he too was using an unusable GS? Why would either of you want to do what you apparently did? What is it you can't trust the ATIS or the crew?

[His dudeness]

Indeed - yet another 'WHAT??!!! Too many these days.

Like Alitalia 404 in 1990 ?

Like Pan Am 806 in 1974 ? or 812 in the same year ?

EAL 401 in 72 ?


Approach phase accidents
Last updated: 19 July 2012
Statistical information regarding the Approach flight phase. The number of fatal hull-loss accidents and fatalities per year is given. The figures include corporate jet and military transport accidents.

Year Accidents Casualties
2012 4 148
2011 11 230
2010 9 327
2009 8 231
2008 10 208
2007 3 103
2006 4 136
2005 8 114
2004 10 106
2003 9 336
2002 17 589
2001 12 231
2000 12 434
1999 11 127
1998 18 581
1997 16 726
1996 21 540
1995 22 550
1994 17 701
1993 14 215
1992 22 900
1991 13 498
1990 15 417
1989 22 785
1988 30 722
1987 18 402
1986 22 437
1985 11 359
1984 8 134
1983 14 582
1982 9 412
1981 12 187
1980 14 598
1979 22 312
1978 17 546
1977 22 512
1976 16 706
1975 19 625
1974 22 775
1973 28 887
1972 26 1058
1971 18 624
1970 20 305

Given the numbers in 2012 vs. say, 1972, methinks the old eagles had more problems than the newbies....(granted, the equipment has moved on, but...)


There is no such thing as a "bad apple". The "other guy" is us, on any one day. :D

[beardy]

So, is it:
The nut holding the wheel on, or, the nut holding on the wheel?

[aterpster]

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/UIIIILS30.jpg

[Wirbelsturm]

Simple cross check is the rad alt tracker at 2500' agl.

Cross check it against the airfield elevation and you 'should be' about 8 miles on a 3 degree glideslope. Anything else and somethings amiss!

[BOAC]

Cross check it against the airfield elevation and you 'should be' about 8 miles on a 3 degree glideslope. Anything else and somethings amiss! - yes, it would be - you would be above the platform altitude of 4470'..........................:confused:

Maybe another thunk?:)

[bubbers44]

Beards,I didn't say we used the inop GS just were curious why it wasn't flagged but centered. The plane behind us was using it and got low. Atis at Burbank is always difficult to receive to the north because the same freq is used up north and the mountains to the north of there.

[Wirbelsturm]

- yes, it would be - you would be above the platform altitude of 4470'..........................http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/confused.gif

3 degree slope equates, roughly, to 300' per nm which, at 8 miles, would be 2400'. With an airfield elevation of 1688' and a slope at 8 miles of 2400' makes 4088' (QNH) which, unless I'm mistaken, is below the platform of 4470' QNH (2795 QFE if you wish). Obviously this needs to be moderated if there is high ground under the approach. But, that's what we are paid for no?

Where's the 'thunk'?

Also, 500' at 11 DME based on the IRK when you should be at 3300' should be setting massive alarm bells off, G/S Loc or not!

Through adveristy to the stars? :}

[Quietplease]

Maybe this is the wrong thread for the opposite problem. Have a look at LGW webtrack 28 June from about 1003.
Apparently it dawned on ATC when the a/c was at 3 miles 1700ft with a ground speed of 250kts on 08 that the approach was "unstable" and a go around was ordered. The go around was pretty non standard just like the approach.
Would have been well set up for a run in and break or maybe that old ex Stuka pilot I used to fly with in Canada with is still around.
Is there still a 250 below 10,000 speed restriction? It's 20 years since I last had to bother with that, my glider can't manage more than 150kts.

[Check Airman]

Looking at the approach plate in post 42, I can't help but to wonder what's the point of putting the LOM 2nm from the runway.

Isn't is more useful, and more typically placed a or near the FAF?

[Gear Operator]

@ CA

Welcome to Russia! This is a normal setup, normally used for a '2 NDB Appoach'. Keep de needles aligned with eachother and you fly straight to the THR (like in Smolensk). Nowadays Russian airfields get VOR/DME more and more. They don't use it in any procedure except to crosscheck the distance on final. It's also helpful for old FMS systems which use DME updating only to calculate the position. Until roughly 2 years ago there weren't any, so no way you knew your distance to the field and whether or not you captured the correct G/S until coming overhead the OM (exept maybe FMS position which reverted to IRS-only at least 15 mins before due to missing navaids). Add to that the controllers instuction: "Descent to height 850m by QFE 939hPa" and you do the math.

[BOAC]

Where's the 'thunk'? - look at the chart?

[Gear Operator]

Further research learns that IRK VOR came online only recently, namely 06MAR2012, the incident took place 28FEB2012...

XYA2501
GG ENHBZEZN ENZZNESI
061009 UUUUYNYX
(A0617/12 NOTAMN
Q) UIII/QNMXX/IV/BO/AE/000/999/5215N10426E025
A) UIII
B) 1203061000 C) PERM
E) COORD OF IRKUTSK VORDME IRK 112.3 MHZ ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
521602N 1042341E.
REF AIP ENR 4.1.1-2, AD 2.1 UIII-8, 55, 69, 71, 87/88, 97/98,
99/100, 101/102.)

[Check Airman]

Gear Operator,

Very interesting. Never heard of a 2 NDB approach. Certainly is interesting.

Not sure about your other info about the VOR just entering service. The plate shows an effective date of 16 Dec 2011. Perhaps the NOTAM was for a slight change in the coordinates?

[Wirbelsturm]

sloping ground ounder the arrival. Whats the problem. Monitor your height above the terrain with the rad alt and cross refer it to the chart to ensure that the glideslope is giving you correct information.

Basic airmanship.

The ground appears to be 2500' under the IAF thus I would expect to be at 1900' AGL on the rad alt with the 2500' check coming in before the IAF and the descent point. Then I would brief falling terrain toward the airfield. Glasgow 05 has it, Gatwick has it, Salzburg circling is a wonder and Innsbruk is great fun. Seems like a total lack of SA to me.

All briefable items.

[BOAC]

There was a VOR approach to R30 using the IRK VOR/DME on 29 Jul 2010. Notam may reflect a new installation?

[Gear Operator]

Maybe its only a change in coordinates, in that case disregard my last posting please. I never flew to UIII, but to many other Russian places where VOR's were installed recently. The usual sequence is that such a NOTAM is issued some time before it's incorporated in the procedures/charts, that was the reason for my assumption.

[BOAC]

GO - the Jepp 2010 chart does confirm a move to the east for the VOR in that notam.

[EatMyShorts!]

Don't miss the fact that the glideslope is setup at an angle of 3.33 degrees instead of our standard 3.00 degrees! So, BOAC, I realize you have some deficiencies in mathematics: 330 ft/NM * 8.7NM = roughly 2900ft difference in altitude. Add the THR elevation and you get to about 4600ft. Easy, isn't it? Maybe you should go back to the books to review basic IFR procedures and how to check the profile of an approach...

[Gear Operator]

EMS:

I would suggest to read BOAC's posts again and maybe consider to rephrase your last offensive post.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

As stated:

Just line up the needles and its as good as a LOC......

The old Russian system, and it worked very very well.

Twice in Moscow actually made the 2 NDB approach, its very very precise.

Also the +/-2nm position for the Inner Marker, is traditional....missed approach point, as well as a VRP...in olde worlde flying.

Does the reference to 8nm, refer to the VOR/DME and not distance to threashold, (as per plate)..

A few years ago, when conducting an approach here, a beautiful clean night thank goodness, we descended to join the procedure, and at 4000ft +/- there was a fantastic temperature inversion, the AT logic could not cope with a dramatic change in temperate, and just went to idle......


glf

[BOAC]

Wirbel - aeons ago on PPR we had a discussion on the merits of a 'surveyed' RadAlt figure printed on a chart as a check - I still think it would be a positive advance in safety, but I don't think it happened.

Poor old eatmyshorts is so busy chewing he/she has failed to notice that GS intercept at 8.7 is 4470' or that is is not 8.7 from threshold - ah well!:ugh:

[Wirbelsturm]

BOAC, I couldn't agree more, the Radalt provides another layer of SA that is often missed. It is only useful if it is adequately briefed beforehand. I seem to remember that many high energy approaches stem from those approaches flown over high ground descending to the runway. (ILS 19L+R into Oslo?)

Sadly, in this case, the obvious SA cues were missed. There are those who have done it and those that are going to!

[aterpster]

For you radar altimeter fans, the surface below the IF is approximately 2,300' and at the FAF about 2,000.

[FlightPathOBN]

Just curious, but at the IF, the box should have a min 1000'ROC...and if considered mountainous, a 2000' ROC

Were they getting prox warnings?

[aterpster]

FlightPathOBN:

Just curious, but at the IF, the box should have a min 1000'ROC...and if considered mountainous, a 2000' ROC

What box?

In any case, Jeppesen charts don't show obstacle clearance. The parenthetical altitudes are height above the charted runway elevation of 1,675, msl.

I can only speak to TERPs, but initial approach segments in designated mountainous areas (DMAs) require a minimum of 1,000 feet of ROC, not 2,000. Feeder routes and airways in DMAs generally require a minimum ROC of 2,000.

The initial approach segments are governed by the STAR charts for UIII, which state "MEA under radar control."

[BOAC]

Just curious, but at the IF, the box should have a min 1000'ROC...and if considered mountainous, a 2000' ROC
- yes, we are puzzled there! Where do you see 'boxes'?

[EatMyShorts!]

What's the point? I am as courteous with our special-friend "BOAC", as he was with "Wirbelsturm". Yes, I missed the fact, that the VOR/DME is slightly past the threshold, so DME 8.7 is in fact 7.7 NM from the runway - not a big difference! 8 * 330 = 2640ft + 1670ft = 4310ft. That is pretty close and good enough for a rough cross-check. I was hoping that you are doing that as well for each and every approach in IMC!

[FlightPathOBN]

Well..the box would be the FMC, I really think that the question, did it give prox warnings should have been a clue...

You are killing me here... The required obstacle clearance is 1000 feet in non-mountainous terrain and 2000 feet in designated mountainous areas.
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afs/afs400/afs420/policies_guidance/memo_TILS/media/Clarification_8260.3B_Para1750d_signed.pdf
http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/SC-17.jpg

The box, okay the FMC, has the segment ROC programmed in...its min segment altitudes...

what do you think the prox warnings are based on?

There is the foundation of the regulations, and the flight management systems on the aircraft.
There is also the precipitous terrain prediction within the FMC that must be accounted for in the procedure design, perhaps that is for another day...

[aterpster]

FlightPathOBN:

You are killing me here... The required obstacle clearance is 1000 feet in non-mountainous terrain and 2000 feet in designated mountainous areas.

You are showing en route low-altitude airway criteria. I thought we were speaking of the segments of an instrument approach procedure.

[FlightPathOBN]

These are the segments of an approach procedure...
final approach ROC tapers from 200 min to 500' ROC at the FAF, Correct?
Havent you ever wondered in the calculations what sets the location of the FAF?
Its when the ROC taper hits 500' for the next segment...NOW you know.
Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?

Now try to explain, the precipitous terrain algorithm...

[bubbers44]

True statement. Research before posting.

[bubbers44]

I was responding to the 1,000 vs 2,000 post by a.

[aterpster]

FBO:

Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?

Correct as to intermediates. Not correct as to initial approach segments.

[BOAC]

In any case, I can only assume FPOBN thinks this was an RNAV procedure and not an ILS?

[aterpster]

BOAC:

In any case, I can only assume FPOBN thinks this was an RNAV procedure and not an ILS?

The intermediate and initial approach segments of all approaches have the same obstacle clearance, whether ILS, VOR, RNAV, or other.

The STARs and ILS at UIII are in the RNAV database and can be flown with LNAV except for the final approach segment.

The STARs at UIII take the place of the initial approach segments for the ILSes.

[BOAC]

Yes, but why do we appear to think they would be using any vertical profile in 'the box' - might they not just be 'flying' it, and thus a million 'segments' would be irrelevant? The only JEPP plates I have, 2010, do not even have a whiff of any RNAV waypoints. Does the Dec 11 set have?

Discussion of RNAV 'criteria' is all well and good if relevant. What about an approach NOT using the 'box'? Do we know? What then? Good old 'airmanship', eh?

[PJ2]

BOAC;

Just checked - no, there are no RNAV charts for UIII in the Dec/11 charts. There is the note that LOC-Only approaches are NOT AUTHORIZED for 12/30, though the restriction likely doesn't apply in this incident.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Discussion of RNAV 'criteria' is all well and good if relevant. What about an approach NOT using the 'box'? Do we know? What then? Good old 'airmanship', eh?

There are no RNAV procedures per se for the airport.

The ILS IAP in question (Runway 30) can be flown using LNAV from the en route environment, through the applicable STAR, to the FAF, at which point the ILS must be used. "New airmanship" requires RNAV (LNAV) be used in this manner with a modern AB or Boeing.

I would load all the charts if this forum software made such easy like other fora.

[BOAC]

Thanks, PJ - as expected. So, a ballroom full of FMC 'ROC's would not have made any difference. We can surmise
a) They set up a home made RNAV 'approach' and it went drastically wrong
b) They screwed up a simple ILS for inexplicable reasons (was it actually 's'?)
c) There was a malfunction which caused the a/c to dive towards the ground

Aterpster - 'New airmanship' - no such thing, I'm afraid. Flying still requires 'old airmanship' not to be forgotten in the starry-eyed gaze at the magentas, whilst, of course, using the facilities to the best advantage.:ugh:

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Aterpster - 'New airmanship' - no such thing, I'm afraid. Flying still requires 'old airmanship' not to be forgotten in the starry-eyed gaze at the magentas, whilst, of course, using the facilities to the best advantage.

Thus, why I put it in quotes. I wouldn't be surprised that both you and I started in this business about the same time.

There are, as you know, too many new airmen who know very little about airmanship.

[PJ2]

aterpster, BOAC;

Re "the new airmanship" - it's why I wrote this (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/489774-af-447-thread-no-9-a-32.html#post7306229) only-slightly-off-topic comment in the AF447 Thread #9.

Having someone or something other than oneself do one's thinking and one's work in place of one, results in losing one's ability to do such thinking and such work. The discussion and the many solutions posited to counter such effects begins at a point after one has accepted someone or something else's notion of what to do and why. The discussion thus becomes lost in details of this or that untoward single outcome, be it a medical, aviation, nuclear, architectural or economical "accident" as in the structural failures leading up to October, 2008.

Some say, Technology-'R'-Us, rather than the other way around. That doesn't mean we eschew such brilliant technical developments; without even any debate we know our technologies make life longer, better and safer, and those are values our society holds.

The enchantment, mainly on the part of owners/managers but not line crews, with the subtstantial benefits of computer automation is justified primarily through economical metrics especially in financially-challenging times, with vague notions of "safety" bringing up the hindmost. Automation was an economic solution, not an operational one.

But the effect of not doing something for a long period of time (physically or mentally) is that of losing one's edge, one's way of thinking and and one's habits.

That has long since become a vicious circle because the traditional goals of "standards, training and checking", the ones that a host of old guys from this and other professions who know "old airmanship", (and "old medicine", "old engineering", etc), have shifted towards skills and thinking in operating automation itself, and not the old-fashioned skills required in actually operating the system, (or machine, etc).

Knowing one's altitude and distance while on an approach is a basic skill which has been marginalized by FMS systems and CRT displays. I recall flying a DC9 in a fleet that had only one DME because the company was too cheap to put in the second DME on the F/O's side. One ALWAYS knew where one was on the approach because it took work and a solid engagement with the airplane and its constantly-changing situation to do so.

Was it less safe? Of course it was, compared to present capabilities and displays. So why do we see crews today continue an ILS approach with all the information available to them including an accurate, detailed, scaled map display showing exactly where the airport is, the FAF is and even the required crossing altitudes for the FAF, etc?

Ninety-nine percent of the time it isn't a problem and a successful if not transparent shift in thinking has taken place and one just carries on. But where accidents occur, the question can't be answered in traditional ways. Recognition that a fundamental shift in cognitive behaviour is required to work and perform successfully in highly-technical systems is needed first, before solutions, primarily for training and checking, emerge.

PJ2

[FlightPathOBN]

Sorry, but it is a 1000' ROC on initial segment, 2000' ROC if mountainous...
(note the MSA is 4700, indicating a 2000'ROC)

From the instrument procedures handbook...

here is that turn illustrated...

http://operationsbasednavigation.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/SC-20.jpg

[aterpster]

FlightPathOBN:

You're mixing PANS-OPS and TERPS. The MSA at UIII is PANS-OPS.

The illustration you show is a DME ARC from TERPs with 1,000 feet of ROC, because it is an initial approach segment. Nothing is stated about Designated Mountainous Areas.

You obviously don't work with U.S. TERPs or you would know that initial approach segments are a minimum of 1,000 feet ROC; DMA or not.

Feeder routes are de facto airways with a minimum ROC of 1,000; 2,000 in DMAs.

MSAs are always 1,000 feet im the U.S., because they are not operational altitudes.

[FlightPathOBN]

FBO:

Quote:
Intermediate segments are 500' ROC, and Initial segments are 1000' ROC unless mountainous, then 2000' ROC...
Correct?
Correct as to intermediates. Not correct as to initial approach segments.

you said this...

[aterpster]

FlightPathOBN:

Go look at Page 1 of the 8260-9 for Dillon, Montana, RNAV 35. This airport is in the Western DMA. Note the feeder ROC is 2000, the initial segment ROC is 1000. This is the same for everu 8260-9 for IAPs in the DMAs of the U.S.

https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/procedures/application/index.cfm?event=directory&directory=2006090116222601006-DLN&type=acifp&nasrId=DLN

[FlightPathOBN]

Are you high???!

I have stated all along that initial segment ROC's are 1000, and 2000 if mountainous...

you disagreed...

the MSA calculations for PansOps is the same as TERPS..

back to the point.....

why didnt the aircraft get a prox warning, when it was 540 ASBL and on initial?

[autoflight]

In approach configuration, the GPWS announcement could be as simple as "too low flap".

[safetypee]

FP OBN, are you assuming EGPWS. Isn’t more likely that this airframe had T2CAS ?

[aterpster]

FlightPathOBN:

I have stated all along that initial segment ROC's are 1000, and 2000 if mountainous...

you disagreed...

OF course, I disagreed. Here is the FAA worksheet for KDLN RNAV 35. The ROCs shown are standard for a mountainous area: (Or, did the FAA design and complete their work record incorrectly?)

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/KDLNRNAV358260-9.jpg

[scrubba]

I think FlightpathOBN is mistaking the source of ground prox warning as coming from the FMC :=, rather than from the purposely independent (E)GPWS :ok:.

There also seems to be a miscommunication :uhoh: about required obstacle clearances for enroute feeder routes in DMAs (2000') and initial approach segments (1000' anywhere).

[BOAC]

rather than from the purposely independent (E)GPWS Indeed, scrubba, but I fear that the 'independence' is being progressively blurred as systems like T2CAS and TAWS or any terrain mapping system become commonplace, deriving information as they do from the FMC.

Apart from 'lost' or some misguided 'dive and drive' approach, does anyone have any idea why they descended before the FAF? The '530' AGL reported puts them at around 2800-3000' QNH at 11.5nm

[PJ2]

BOAC;
Apart from 'lost' or some misguided 'dive and drive' approach, does anyone have any idea why they descended before the FAF?
Yes. I provided three separate posts, (here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/490907-11-miles-out-530-feet-agl.html#post7304550), here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/490907-11-miles-out-530-feet-agl-2.html#post7304862) and here (http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/490907-11-miles-out-530-feet-agl-2.html#post7305444)) on ideas why they descended before the FAF and provided links to two EGPWS documents. I said that I had recently seen this occur once again and gave the reason why it occurred, (glidepath failed to the centered-position - crew followed it). ;)

TAWS (EGPWS) and, I assume T2CAS, have Premature Descent Alerting (PDA) if the aircraft is in the landing configuration but descends below a nominal, internally-generated 3deg glidepath. Inside 12nm, a "Too Low Terrain" warning would not occur until 400ft RA.

http://batcave1.smugmug.com/photos/i-hDbQ6Bs/0/M/i-hDbQ6Bs-M.jpg

[BOAC]

Yes, I saw those, but it is the gross discard of the fact that they probably had been looking at a centred GP for a while, and probably had only just rolled out on the LOC I cannot understand. That's where I need the 'theories'.

Incidentally, I wonder if the ANZ crew were 'senior' management? The video showed a fairly relaxed company attitude to the poor approach preparation (described as thorough) and misunderstanding of 'unmonitored'. I would like, as I said earlier, to have seen the NOTAMS for UIII that day too. The first warning flag for the ANZ crew should have been the ILS NOTAM, and a firm DME/GP descent point briefed. Again, the ANZ video casually 'slips' in the fact that no GP intercept crosscheck was made - makes you wonder! Was it even briefed?

Are we really at that low a level of skills?

[fantom]

Are we really at that low a level of skills?

How many times have you met a self-sponsored crew for a type rating course and sighed in dispair?

Not everyone has proper training, as you very well know. What is going on the the ME and Asia, I don't like to think about.

[BOAC]

Agreed, but rather worryingly I was thinking of ANZ................................

[BOAC]

Late descent, poor approach briefing, casual attitude, complacency, non-stabilized rushed approach, poor-to-non-existent CRM, poor monitoring by the PM, some or all of which may have contributing to non-existent altitude awareness, ignoring the information available on the PFD and esp. the ND, and a descent which blew through the FAF altitude. - probably all those indeed. quite a liturgy.

How does it go? "Learn from others' mistakes before you die from yours"?

[PJ2]

BOAC;
That's where I need the 'theories'.
Again, like aspects of AF447, I don't think it's complex or complicated.

Having flown the A320 and the A330 for many years, I can't, for example, accept many of the criticisms of the airplane, (meaning, in the case of AF447, up to the point of stall the A330 was not an elusive, inscrutable, opague machine which would have hid things from knowledgeable and disciplined pilots, (but may have for this crew)). So with what I think are rare exceptions, (the ATR-72 aileron reversal...the CRJ hard-wing icing issue), I don't think the design of today's airliners are significant contributors to accidents.

On theories regarding why the early descent?

Late descent from cruise altitude (leading to rushing on the approach), poor approach briefing, casual attitude, complacency, non-stabilized rushed approach, poor-to-non-existent CRM, poor monitoring by the PM, poor command leadership in managing threats and errors, etc, etc., some or all of which may have contributed to the obviously non-existent altitude awareness, ignoring the information available on the PFD and esp. the ND, and an early descent.

In the one I'm familiar with, even the fact that when the airplane was leveled off and the glideslope remained centered didn't clue them in that it had failed. Why?

I am not a scientist, psychologist, MD so although I have some ideas, I don't know the actual cognitive sources or processes which make such absence of awareness possible.

All I know is that the overt signs of such losses of awareness are in the list above and, like dozens of other early descents without awareness, almost resulted in another CFIT.

Further, both of us know that everyone who flies is a candidate for the same mistake so believing one is too good to fail or that these kinds of serious incidents happen to others "but I'll never do something that stupid", are big danger signals.

Oddly, we read this and "know" it, but don't truly know this until something serious happens to us which has no serious outcome; all of a sudden, "we", "us"...we are fallible and that is the magic turning point in every aviator's life when but for (fill in the blank), "I" would be dead now. Some can imagine it and learn early before the airplane teaches one, but some pilots just have to pee on the electric fence.

Any pilot-training program that doesn't contemplate these things in terms of addressing them is not doing the job.

Edit: Yes, a huge and needless liturgy!

[contractor25]

what happened to the very basic 5 x groundspeed is rate of decent in feet?

It gives a crude figure, it would have certainly made this crew realise quicker that something was not right.

[BOAC]

c25 - remember we do not know where they started their descent on the 3.3 GP?