A breath of fresh air at last. One pilots view of CRM

[Tee Emm]

"Why CRM Changes Nothing".

Flight International published the following letter in the 28 February-5 March issue.

"I am probably going to get murdered for this - but I must do it. Crew resource management (CRM) is a fraud.

I was an airline captain for 28 years, and only during the last five was I forced to spend - once a year - the most useless eight hours of my life. Did CRM change me? No. And did I learn anything? No. And all of my colleagues agree with me. CRM wastes money as well as the time of crews who should be flying instead of listening to some guy saying nothing of interest.

Does anyone really believe that a pilot who is rude, stubborn or prone to cause conflicts in a cockpit is going to modify his attitude because of CRM? And, if he is a captain, is he going to listen more to his first officer - and vice versa? Is the pilot who tends to cower going to become more assertive? No way.

Perhaps CRM will have some effect on five-year olds - but not on normal adults."

Ronald Neves.
............................................................ .............................................

I could not agree more. For this Ppruner, reading that letter was like a breath of fresh air. At last someone has the bottle to put in print, what so many pilots deep down, think is true - but risk getting howled down by the aficionados of CRM. Full marks to the writer and to the editor of Flight International for publishing it:ok:

[Armchairflyer]

If five annual eight-hour lectures/seminars are all this pilot has encountered CRM-wise, his view is not very astonishing IMHO (but not very convincing either).

[parabellum]

As an ex QANTAS pilot once said to me, as we endured day three of a week long course, (albeit in a nice hotel in Penang!), "All CRM does is make stroppy FOs into even more stroppy FOs"!

Truthfully, I think it may encourage a timid FO to speak up and that is good, but I do agree with some of what Mr Neves says also.

[sheppey]

A flying school manager colleague agreed fully with Ronald Neves's CRM letter. but told me his hands were tied by the regulator who has mandated CRM courses for those under their authority. He was being pragmatic when he said the spin-off was that CRM courses bring in much needed money to the flying school and that was the real bottom line. Someone once remarked that CRM was a cottage industry that pulls in millions of $ world wide.

[triple7BR]

My view of this subject is that you cant obviously change the mind of a captain who has been flying as long as 40 years without even knowing what crm could be. But it is possible to doctrinate new pilots into this topic so he will always fly understanding the purpose of the CRM.

[pjac]

I agree with Tee Emm however, the problem is, CRM is required as part of the operator's insurance coverage. Those on the CRM team are obviously in disagreement of any view that the process is useless. Some people are good communicators and some are not and in an aircrew/flight deck situation, the rank of captain-in-command, there will always be the potential of misadventure-by lack of communication, leadership and the failure on each crew member, to identify a problem or failure. Correct and sensible sessions of "LOFT" and similar, exercises, go further to addressing this/rather than CRM.

[parabellum]

possible to doctrinate new pilots


I hate that word "Doctrinate" 777BR, it is our ability to stay flexible that means so much.





CRM is required as part of the operator's insurance coverage


Possibly, but unlikely. I would like to see the insurance agreement between underwriter and clients that stipulates this, maybe for a small operator but not for an airline.

[Armchairflyer]

Is CRM training in airline practice really still restricted to tedious classroom lectures? Just asking because IIRC in an article by Robert Helmreich, this kind of conveying CRM knowledge and skills was associated with the "first stage" of CRM training which was (understandably) disparaged by pilots, while newer teaching methods based on LOFT apparently are not only more informative but considerably more accepted by flight crews.

[A37575]

But it is possible to doctrinate new pilots into this topic

A more accurate description is "Brainwash". :ugh:

[Cheapshoes]

CRM isn't simply about addressing those with borderline personality problems, it is about assisting the rest of us to be as good as we can be in this discipline. We don't train every six months just for the benefit of those who only just meet the minimum standard, it is also for the more able to get even better.

Sounds like your CRM courses aren't being very well prepared/presented, and that's a shame, but it doesn't give cause to denounce the whole enterprise.

BTW I don't teach or manage CRM, and have no axe to grind, but I acknowledge that my interactions with others are sometimes well handled and other times could have been improved. Anyone who doesn't say the same of themselves REALLY needs CRM.

[Dunbar]

One day CRM classes may not be effective but the central tenets of CRM, or effective non technical skills are without doubt a major contribution to flight safety. Things like effective communication, shared SA, open decision making...
Anyone who thinks these things are not of value is misguided. We train these skills in the sim and they work.

[Slasher]

Every bloody CRM module I ever done opened with the bloke
saying "write down the definition of Leadership". Used to just
drive me up the wall to the point where I used to invent the
definition with a skewed sexual theme. Stiff **** if the rabid
PCers didn't like it.

Some bits of CRM I found were useful - the CLEAR rule and in
problem-solving that the entire group is usually stronger than
the individual, but that's about it.

How many real captains need to learn about managing errors
or spend a boring whole afternoon on how to resolve conflicts
with a Purser who's having a period, or a little 200hr arrogant
wonderbrat?

CRM should be taught instead to the CEOs, beancounters and
other execs possessing PhDs and other useless degrees which
in no way gives them any bloody knowledge on how to run an
airline and its employees properly.

Not that it'd do any good.


PS - I believe Ron Neve was ex-AN.

[john_tullamarine]

The OP's reference is to a Ron Neves.

There was a Ron Neve in AN with whom I flew on quite a number of occasions on the Mouse and held in very high esteem. I suspect that the latter's view of CRM matters was/is probably a little more balanced than the former's.

As I recall the AN Ron skippered the first AN aircraft into DRW post- Tracey .. which, in turn, possibly means that the OP (who was amongst the first into DRW post-Tracey with another - non-airline - operator) and Ron had a yarn over a beer at the time ...

[Andy24]

As a CRM ground instructor, I feel that some statements need clarification.

CRM isn't simply about addressing those with borderline

Very far from the truth. If your airline is still teaching such things please advise your Human Factors department to update the CRM syllabus as these teachings have been abolished years ago.

Threat & Error management is the order of the day and except for the initial course or OCC really don't see why one should waste time dwelling on subjects like Leadership (unless for an upgrade course) Communication or Fatigue etc etc.

One good module of TEM should suffice as it covers the whole spectrum of CRM. TEM should be supported with good case studies and a healthy class room discussion. My slides usually comprise of a photo or a maximum of 4 words and it's all to the individual. TEM just gives you the right tools for a safe flight and not the tools on how to fly the plane.

Add to the session some LOSA or FDM findings how one has one lively CRM session

[Tee Emm]

Threat & Error management is the order of the day

Talked to a pilot who had undergone a TEM course. Part of the briefing was that lined up for take off in a twin jet he should say: The "Threat" is the runway. The runway is wet. I shall manage the threat by using normal take off thrust -not reduced thrust. The next "Threat" is Cb ahead on radar at 30 miles. I shall manage that threat by selecting the radar to the 80 mile range using 10 degrees tilt up. One airborne I shall further manage the "Threat" by asking you to call ATC for approval to track 10 miles to the left of the weather. Any questions?"

What a load of absolute codswallop. But all this went into the CVR which is just what the operator needed to arse cover. :mad:

[Akali Dal]

T M...that's what I heard from a friend who works at Korean. During an audit flight, he was debriefed by an expat auditor that he did not articulate the " threats " as such, pre-takeoff! The sore point was that earlier during the take off briefing he had pedantically briefed about the weather, the runway surface conditions, higher flap selection, possible full thrust takeoff with V1 reduction if it rained heavily, yada, yada, yada. However since he did not reiterate those considerations during the busy pre-takeoff period, the auditor saw it fit to give him a mild dressing down!

IMHO, this CRM/TEM thingy really helps in empire building for some highly " inadequate " blokes.

[Sciolistes]

IMHO, this CRM/TEM thingy really helps in empire building for some highly " inadequate " blokes.
CRM and TEM are great concepts which we should all endeavor to get to grips with, especially if it doesn't come naturally. But unfortunately I totally agree with the above quote.

These things are management skills, and management skills can only be effectively taught by well trained managers, of which there are very few in any business.

[Slasher]

Well said Tee Emm but don't forget when the 200hr kid is the
threat.

"The landing will entail a 25kt crosswind and 8kt tailwind on a
short wet runway at MLW. For this reason I will take control of
the aircraft at a thousand feet AGL and you will revert to PNF
duties. Any questions?"

"But but.... its MY sector and I want the challenge!"

"You can do all yer bloody challenges with captains who want
to risk losing their job. Besides, what would be your actions if
the spoilers fail to deploy on touchdown?"

"...What?"

"If you did the landing what will you do if the spoilers fail to
deploy on touchdown?"

"Well um....ahh...I guess..."

"Exactly."

[thefodfather]

It sounds like a lot of people are getting the wrong type of training that is then compounded by it being badly applied by management for all the wrong reasons. When done well, by a good instructor, as part of a company wide safety programme that involves everyone from the management down it actually becomes something worth listening to.

One question I always like to know from pilots is how often does their safety department come back to them with feedback after they submit an occurrence report. Bad things happen to good people with the best of intentions, sharing them so others don't fall down the same hole is vital. If the training isn't relevant and applicable to the people being trained, why bother?

[Gulfstreamaviator]

Just for the record what happened next.....


glf

[Herr Piece]

I just attended my annual CRM recurrent training.

I am very happy to say that I learned that the letter 'I' is not part of the word 'TEAM' in the English language:ok:

I find it astonishing that CRMIs are being paid to wheel out the same material year after year.

[Slasher]

In the 1920s Al Capone knew far more about CRM technique
than any latter day one. His style was simple - independent
individual achievement while still part of a team.

His spelling of "TEAM" had "I" in it.

[safetypee]

A significant problem is that there are many views of what CRM is, or is not. Few if any posts in this thread have chosen to define CRM. Thus what has or has not been taught or achieved cannot be judged objectively.
Many examples of CRM training appear to indicate poor subject selection (single focus), weak instruction, or have little follow up; we have yet (in this forum) to hear from the successes in the industry.
Helmreich provides a useful view of what CRM is – “the application of human factors”, although his other contributions have added complexity with ideas on evolution, TEM, etc.

The original idea – even if this can be identified, together with a sociological approach, now detracts from evolving need (safety and efficiency). Past focus has been on the human/human interface, whereas human factors involve a wide range of activities – SHELL model. The industry must pay more attention to other HF aspects.
How many CRM programs cover the S, H, & E aspects (automation, procedures, weather), or indeed consider the central ‘L’ which governs all interactions – individual human behaviour, thinking, acting, applying what has been (or should have been) considered.

CRM has an important role in safety. However, it is not the cure-all solution as some would promote, it’s just a small but necessary contribution, in combination with perhaps the more effective (efficient / reliable / controllable) inputs from technology and organisational control. Yet the effectiveness of these also depend on human involvement – application of human factors. Thus perhaps everyone requires some training / review of resource management, particularly that of individual performance.

[Armchairflyer]

The current definitions of CRM I am aware of refer to it as smartly using all the human resources available (including cabin crew and maybe even passengers, which possibly could have prevented the Kegworth accident, for instance) for a safe and efficient flight accomplishment. AFAIK it has not much to do with patting the back of cocky FOs or starting lengthy team discussions in situations that require quick response.

Pity that judging from the descriptions of actual CRM training here, it seems that most of its potential is wasted by restricting it to tedious lectures and Dilbert-like management "wisdom".

[PEI_3721]

The ICAO view of CRM; chapter 2 of HF training manual (ICAO training requirements come from Annex 6).
I wonder how many CRM courses follow these guidelines.
ICAO Human FactorsTrng Manual Rev 9_03, Chapt 2 CRM TEM (http://www.scribd.com/doc/87856065/ICAO-Human-FactorsTrng-Manual-Rev-9-03-Chapt-2-CRM-TEM)

An example of a CRM training programme.
CRM (http://www.scribd.com/doc/51887755/CRM)

[pol1whiskey]

so Ronald Neves has deemed CRM as a failure. Fair enough. What Does he suggest as an alternative?

[A37575]

I would go with common sense and intelligence

Can't argue with that:ok:

[Armchairflyer]

Common sense and intelligence go a long way, but unless pilots' common sense and intelligence are fundamentally different, I doubt that it makes them aware offhand of, e.g., the effects of stress on decision making and communication (fostering plan continuation bias, a narrow attention focus and reduction/elimination of communication with the other crew members when in all three instances the opposite would be more helpful).

IMHO, CRM should not be a substitute but an enhancement of "pilot-specific" common sense and intelligence.

[Slasher]

Well a Makeshift Pilot Licence (MPL) holder can possess all the
commonsense and intelligence in the world but he will still be
as useless as tits on a bull whenever it comes to making a life
threatening judgement call.

Its instilled airmanship and a healthy dose of experience that
makes all the difference - we flew 727s, DC9s and F27s very
safely indeed well before CRM was invented.

[Armchairflyer]

Certainly, but the idea is apparently that (individual) airmanship and experience combined with appropriate CRM concepts might make you (whoever "you" are exactly here :)) fly 7[3..8]7s/3[1..8]0s/whatever even more safely.

BTW, the captain of KLM 4805 probably had a lot of instilled airmanship and experience.

[parabellum]

so Ronald Neves has deemed CRM as a failure. Fair enough. What Does he suggest as an alternative?


Whatever it was we used in the seventy years before someone invented, yes I do mean invented, CRM. As others have suggested, intelligence and airmanship seemed to work.

[thefodfather]

Given that the commercial aircraft accident rate in 1970 was just over 11 per million departures compared to less than 1 per million departures today, the statistics suggest that the old reliance on common sense and good airmanship wasn't as good as some people think it was.

And, yes, before someone points out the improvements in technology this is, of course, a major factor as well.

If done properly CRM/ HF should not just be about the illustrious aviators who take to the skies. If it's carried out as part of a proper SMS it is as much about improving the organisation that supports those that fly so that decisions makers, whether in the cockpit or not, are able to make the best choices possible in every situation.

[Genghis the Engineer]

Could you keep quiet and let me do this, please?

A phrase I've been forced to use a few times with instructors who show insufficiently good understanding of CRM that they keep jabbering on whilst somebody else (me!) is trying to do something that requires significant mental effort. Particularly something I've already taken the trouble to study (as I'm sure that TP had).

Some of the best CRM I ever saw happened when I had an EFATO whilst teaching a PPL how to fly an old taildragger. My student handed control to me, I called an emergency and proceeded to turn onto a disused runway. Both my instructor and the tower monitored everything I was doing and ONLY when they judged I needed to know something said it. Both, independently, probably passed me information that saved two lives and the aeroplane, but at the same time both left me with the mental space to make the decisions I neeed, as captain, to do the same.

Well a Makeshift Pilot Licence (MPL) holder can possess all the
commonsense and intelligence in the world but he will still be
as useless as tits on a bull whenever it comes to making a life
threatening judgement call.

Its instilled airmanship and a healthy dose of experience that
makes all the difference - we flew 727s, DC9s and F27s very
safely indeed well before CRM was invented.

The statistics indicate that since CRM's advent something has substantially improved safety. It may have been CRM. It probably was to be fair only part of the solution, since numerous other things were being worked on in the same timescale - such as improved avionics, engine reliability, maintenance procedures, and so-on.

However you make a really valid point. Back in that era people's stick-and-rudder skills were generally superb, so most accidents had a substantial teamwork / comms element, leading to the creation of the CRM concepts - and rightly so. The big concern I have, and MPL exemplifies it, is that in concentrating too much on CRM, we have lost track of the primary importance of excellent handling skills. AF447 seems to show that distressingly well - three pilots who worked very well as a team - but in complete ignorance of what the aeroplane was actually doing.

I am a huge fan of CRM, but not where it throws the baby out with the bathwater by ignoring the utter importance that pilots have got to be able to fly and understand their aeroplane.

G

[Sir Niall Dementia]

I did my first CRM course at the same time as I did my command course with my then employer. One of the line trainers and I came up with the following for the CRMI's

Simplex humanoid confirmation: I'm cold I'll turn up the heating,

Duplex humanoid confirmation: I'm cold, shall we turn up the heating?

Triplex humanoid confirmation: We're cold, get the purser up here and ask if we should turn up the heating.

The CRMI's had orgasms over those!

Sadly these days CRM isn't just a case of the FD crew sorting themselves out, I'm heartily fed up of the CC questioning my decisions. P2 can question all he wants, and I hope he will, he at least has a license and in this company anything from 400-6500 hours, but CC going to the company with minimal knowledge and a lot of supposition really grips me. From CC I want a concise report of something that concerns them, if I have time I will answer their concerns in flight, if not then when we've got rid of the pax.

Luckily I'm our Head of Flight Safety so I get to see the written reports before anyone else, but a scan through some of the old posts on the CC Forum here may raise the eyebrows of quite a few pilots.

SND

[Armchairflyer]

AF447 seems to show that distressingly well - three pilots who worked very well as a team - (...)You really see it that way?

[thefodfather]

Interesting thinking regarding the CC.

CC - "Captain, there are flames coming out of the left engine"

Captain - "Leave me in peace, I'm very busy dealing with a right engine fire"

CC inputs are often valid and experience has sadly shown that ignoring them, especially in high pressure situations, is a mistake that is only identified when its too late.

Involvement from the CC, if managed properly and in the right organisational culture, is only a positive thing. If the CC are going straight to company first, I might be questioning the cultural relationships between the FD and CC as well whether the CC training is preparing them properly for the way your company wishes them to act.

Out of interest, Sir Niall, if you get to read the reports first does that mean you filter out the ones you don't like? Or am I inferring too much from your last sentance.

[Genghis the Engineer]

You really see it that way?
Partly - they seem to have pooled information and communicated well. The FO(s) seem(s) to have deferred to the Captain appropriately.

They just all completely misunderstood what was going on, and as a consequence got everybody killed. It strikes me that the big failings were almost certainly in all of their understanding of the situation and the behaviour of the aeroplane, not their ability to work together.


Who doesn't want their CCM telling them there's ice on the wing that hasn't been cleared as the aeroplane taxis out?

G

[A37575]

CC - "Captain, there are flames coming out of the left engine"

Captain - "Leave me in peace, I'm very busy dealing with a right engine fire"

CC inputs are often valid and experience has sadly shown that ignoring them, especially in high pressure situations, is a mistake that is only identified when its too late.

I think the example quoted is too extreme to be a valid point - although I realise you may be just joking.

The statistics indicate that since CRM's advent something has substantially improved safety. It may have been CRM. It probably was to be fair only part of the solution, since numerous other things were being worked on in the same timescale - such as improved avionics, engine reliability, maintenance procedures, and so-on.

Ghengis thought that CRM has improved flight safety in that there have been fewer accidents since the term was first invented. Could be - although I think technical advances such as EGPWS, improvements in airborne weather radar, reliable and amazingly accurate automation and improvements in ATC have been the real key. I question the suggestion that CRM has played any significant part in reduction of accidents. Personalities in the cockpit rarely change their spots. If they are autocratic - they remain that way all their professional lives - in my experience. Subordinates might speak up more but that is more generational than empowered by CRM lectures.

And another thing. I have yet to see a company policy that lays out exactly how a first officer will take over control from a stubborn press-on-regardless captain when things are really getting out of hand. Few captains will cower in terror if the first officer announces "I have control" when an approach becomes unstable and the captain decides to continue the approach instead of going around.

While company manuals theoretically give authority for the second in command to take over control if the captain ignores the rules, they offer no advice as to the physical acts recommended such as smash the captain over the knuckles with a head set or arm wrestle over the the autothrottles. I do know of one enterprising F/O who grabbed the crash axe and threatened to smite the captain during an IFR descent towards hills below the MSA. That life saving act cost the first officer his future command with that company. Yet all he did was use the one CRM tool at his disposal:ok:

[Armchairflyer]

Partly - they seem to have pooled information and communicated well. The FO(s) seem(s) to have deferred to the Captain appropriately.I beg to differ here; although they did talk a lot, it appears that important "standard" pieces of information were omitted (see avherald excerpt below). Agree that it was not a CRM breakdown that caused or significantly contributed to the crash though.

At 02:10:47Z the thrust levers were moved to about 2/3 of travel resulting in 85% N1. The climb rate reduced to 100 feet/min, the angle of attack reduced to about 3 degrees and the roll is controlled. The first officers now attempt to call the captain back to the cockpit. The BEA analyses that after a quick trim and levelling off as result of PF inputs the trajectory of the aircraft appeared controlled again, however the initial increase in altitude was excessive and should have been pointed out by the PNF. However, none of the pilots called out speeds, vertical speeds, pitch angles or altitude.

At 02:11:37Z the PNF pushes the priority button and provides a large left input in reaction to a high right bank, calling "controls on the left". He almost instantly released the priority button and ceased control inputs again without required calls.

At 02:11:42Z the captain entered the cockpit, just before the stall warning stops, the airplane was at 35800 feet MSL, 9100 feet/min sink rate, airspeeds below 100 KIAS, pitch 12 degrees nose up and engines at 102% N1. Neither first officer provides an account to the captain what is happening.

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Arm chair flyer;

I don't filter any of them, and they are all available for all crew to read they come on a pad with individual numbers printed on them so each one can be traced. All of our CC go on he same CRM courses as the pilots, and so do our ground ops staff. There's a good chance if there is a problem we know at the front, but we need a concise accurate report of what the CC member is seeing, when possible they get to ride on a sim jump seat to see how we handle emergencies at the front (it took me a long time to get that approved, but its been really worthwhile).

Any member of crew can file an air safety report, but I prefer CC to discuss it with the pilots before filing so that it is based on technical fact rather than a supposition, I have read some fairly inaccurate ASRs based on the fact that the crew member thought something was wrong and that the pilots failed to inform her, in one case there was, it was an autopilot runaway and the pilots had their hands too full, just before DA to tell the CC what was happening. They sorted the problem, landed went down the pub and had a laugh about it, the CC filed an ASR believing the FD had mis-handled the aircraft (empty positioning sector). OK they should have told her, but maybe she should have hung around and asked what went on rather than going straight into print. Their MOR and the snag sheet arrived with me at the same time as her ASR, a well done for good flying and a wrist slap for poor CRM went to the pilots, I then had to explain to the CC member with the P1 what it all meant, and I have few enough hours in my day as it is.

I've also known a CC member who called the front during initial climb to report "a buzz and vibration" from her seat nothing showed up up front until after landing the crew found a section of rudder trim tab had broken off as they climbed. Her concerns were very valid and the crew spent a long time analysing things, turned out afterwards the buzz started as the gear retracted and the pilots didn't notice over the noise of the nose gear coming up. According to the P1 her report was as accurate as hell, but the problem left them shaking their heads in tracing it.

I value the CC, but I value accurate reporting as well.

[Genghis the Engineer]

I can see your argument Armchairflyer, but:


At 02:11:42Z the captain entered the cockpit, just before the stall warning stops, the airplane was at 35800 feet MSL, 9100 feet/min sink rate, airspeeds below 100 KIAS, pitch 12 degrees nose up and engines at 102% N1. Neither first officer provides an account to the captain what is happening.

All of that is immediately visible to the Captain when he enters the cockpit and all would have known that.

I accept that a brief to him may have been appropriate, but he had visibility of that and the ability to ask questions. Imperfect CRM let us say. But again, lousy situational awareness.

G

[safetypee]

Genghis, et al; “Neither first officer provides an account” …. … “All of that is immediately visible to the Captain …”.
These issues, as you state, involve awareness, but this is not assured. We must take care not to make assumptions and suffer hindsight bias.
These awareness problems are similar to the descriptions in http://www.pprune.org/safety-crm-qa-emergency-response-planning/478368-monitoring-intervention.html#post7050481

In the instance of AF447 the discrepancy in awareness and reporting could involve;- not seeing, or seeing and not understanding, or understanding but assuming that the other person(s) have seen and/or have the same understanding. Alternatively the behaviour may be influenced by ‘fundamental surprise’ which involves many human factors issues as well as technical knowledge.
Can CRM assist in overcoming these problems, if so, how?
Are these aspects being taught?

[parabellum]

I think that if the captain of AF447 had been able to see the control column, as in a conventional aircraft, he would have had an immediate picture of what was happening, brief or no brief, as it was a vital piece of information appears to have been missing.

[HamFan]

CRM is very important for a very small number of pilots but less necessary for the majority of pilots.

But, like it or not, CRM is as indispensable to airlines as today's plague of green, high-vis vests - insurance requirements without either of which, the costs of operation would be higher and the corporate image would suffer: "Any airline worth the name supplies staff with green vests. And has a CRM program."

With the exception of the purser, CC don't need training in CRM; they need training in "effective communication" because they may have something to say at an important time (eg. Kegworth as someone pointed out) however they have very little to "manage" - with the exception of the purser. Effective communication is an integral part of CRM however the CC tend to see their small exposure to CRM training as the sum total of the concept; hence a grumpy captain who, despite possessing exemplary information-gathering and decision-making skills, just isn't touchy-feely enough to make them coffee in the galley before boarding "...has bad CRM."

Parabellum, your crusty, old Qantas captains will, inevitably, be a relic of the past; the next generation, MPL or otherwise, will be brought up with CRM embedded in their heads and, given similar aeronautical experience to the Rat driver, will be better decision-makers for it.

Whilst I am often bored by CRM classes and whilst I believe it is an "industry" living off aviation (which is why they keep inventing new generations of it) and whilst deep down I think the lessons of the bad CRM events "don't apply to me...", I know I am a better decision-maker for my exposure to CRM after 20 years since my first lesson in it. I think it helps me recognise undesirable states of flight and cockpit dynamics also.

Some of it is useful.

in the seventy years before .........CRM....... intelligence and airmanship seemed to work.

Most of the time, yes. And as a result of certain occasions when those qualities weren't enough, CRM was "invented."

It may be of interest that some Fire Departments around the world are embracing CRM training (http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CH8QFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fireengineering.com%2Farticles%2Fprint% 2Fvolume-154%2Fissue-8%2Ffeatures%2Fcrew-resource-management-for-the-fire-service.html&ei=plaMT4KgM-XK0QXtmtnXCQ&usg=AFQjCNG3zGe-8x1z0kwfzuyJE4amyVA0DA&sig2=1om3gBdivsRj_p2rFJZtkA) as a way of enhancing the skills and knowledge already given to their crews and chiefs.

[Dustertoo]

Hmmmm,
My first CRM lesson came at the age of 18 shortly after I enlisted in the US Army. I had a disagreement with a Corpral about some minor point. I was sent to the First Sergeants office later that day to face my punishment. After reporting I was asked if I knew why I was in trouble...I mention I may have been out of line when I had a differeance of opinion with the Corpral. The First Sergeant gives me a long stair and finally says...." No. You told the man to go to hell and he didn't have a smile on his face." I thought that was the craziest thing I ever heard at 18 and as I painted everything not moving and cut more grass then I care to remember for the next 30 days.... those words stayed with me...and a year later I figured it out....now we call it CRM!!!

Today in my late 40's as a Captain on a corporate aircraft I still smile as I remeber my first CRM lesson in the Army...gotta love the simple and direct classes. I suspect some of our peers need a lesson in painting and cutting the grass but the magority of us get it....we play nice with the occasional "go to hell" slipped in...we are all just human.

[Big-Windy]

I'll stick my neck out a bit!

I don't agree that CRM has had its day. I do agree that CRM is organic and should adapt and change according to the changing environment it serves. There's bound to be some lag whilst we find a new direction.

I don't accept that CRM is boring and repetitive, I do agree that many CRMIs need to liven up their act somewhat. Some, a hell of a lot.

We should also bear in mind that our once yearly CRM sessions should be kicked off with the right attitude from attendees. Soul searching, (self) critical and, sure, let's do some moaning and whinging too. It's an opportunity to find out what's wrong and perhaps have a go at putting it right (contentious and idealistic, I know).

We all know that the philosophy behind CRM is to defend ourselves against our own physical and psychological limitations in the hope that we do actually fend off the odd nasty. A noble cause, I'm all behind it!

[framer]

It sounds to me like many of the posters here receive terrible CRM training.
I look forward to my annual refresher because I normally learn something about how my brain works, what my weaknesses and bias´s are etc. I also normally get a pretty good example or case study that shows traps that other crews have fallen into.
Not one of my CRM refreshers over the last three years has been about group hugs and making descions as a team....... sounds like I´ve been lucky.

[Tee Emm]

Not one of my CRM refreshers over the last three years has been about group hugs

Same here. I really miss those group hugs especially after my old dog died.:{

[Sillypeoples]

How do you get a 200 hour pilot on probation, culled to be a buddy, pal, fit in, to question the captain? CRM.

Now that the FAA imposed 1500 hours for new hires...golly gee...I guess CRM is just so past it now.

I think back on all the arguments about this, and in the end, people pushing CRM were just the sort that wanted kids in the cockpit that could barely run the autopilot and believed whatever management told them about safety and what pilots should and shouldn't be. Gosh where are all the CRM advocates now?

Funny how everyone forgot the other reason for CRM...legends in their own mind captains flying into the side of a mountain, having their own FOs not believe the instruments infront of them and too damned scared about losing their jobs to say anything.

I guess the real winners are the CRM trainers who made a buck by pushing paper and showing presentations instead of flying planes. I'm curious what new safety crap they will come up with to make their house payments.

So when will airlines start hiring at the top of the resume pile, instead of the bottom of it?

[Ozgrade3]

If you think CRM is bad, have a look at the TEM syllabus in the Human Factors subject at CPL and ATPL level.

Problem is, young well meaning instructors are adopting the wording found in the text books with gusto. I once sat next to an instructor as he debriefed a student after a nav, 30 mins of multi syllable words. I had not the foggiest idea of what he was talking about. Poor student didnt understand a single word.

[Slasher]

So when will airlines start hiring at the top of the resume pile, instead of the bottom of it?

When these crappy cheap nasty outfits like Ryanscare go out
of business..along with an enforceable ICAO ban on low-cost
operations globally.


Pipe dream I know.

[Young Paul]

I work for a "low cost" airline. Because it employs people with many first languages in about seven countries, it receives a high level of scrutiny from a regulatory authority. It was the first airline to introduce an ATQP programme - that is, a sim exercise which is an alternative to the formulaic OPC and line check which reveals almost nothing about anything.

I also had a sim evaluation with another big low cost airline. Although I have many issues with that airline, none of them relate to what I saw of the quality of training, although I accept this was limited.

The bottom line with CRM is that it hasn't completely changed the world. The human factor in flight safety is the biggest issue, and whereas other issues (technical, weather) were diminishing in their impact on flight safety, the human factor wasn't. However, there are plenty of airline pilots who still believe that their role is fundamentally flying aeroplanes, rather than managing a complex situation of which the aeroplane is only one component. The fact that, in a far less authoritarian society, the rest of the crew want to regard the captain as a team captain rather than a deity they regard as a nuisance, and something they aren't fundamentally competent to handle, retreating instead to their old stereotypes.

For myself, I enjoy the relationship that I have with crew on most days out. The crew rarely raise silly issues with me, but I know that if the working environment is relaxed and open, then if a matter for concern comes up, I am likely to be told about it rather than have the crew worrying about the drongo in the left hand seat. Accidents and incidents are uncommon these days, and the human factor may not be a large component. I hope that my attitude makes it less likely to be a component when the chips are down for me. I can't guarantee that, but it doesn't stop me from trying to implement on a formal basis what seems to be best practice.

[Sillypeoples]

So if human factors is the big reason why CRM was implemented...why not put two ten thousand hour pilots in the cockpit? Certainly no high time FO is going to let the idiot in the left seat fly him into a mountain.

Oh, that's right...there is a pilot shortage....

[Slasher]

why not put two ten thousand hour pilots in the cockpit?

At around 16,000 hrs I had a 9,000hr ex-Herk skipper once in
the RHS. He'd been on the 320 squirter for two years as a FO.
That was a total of 24,000 hours in the cockpit.

..CRM comes naturally in that situation without all those rules
meant to accommodate the kids - we were too experienced to
let the other guy do something dumb while at the same time
too old to bullsh!t each other.

[piratepete]

Slasher, im sure you are right in your instance about the 24000 hours on board, however in my 38 years (ive been flying jets for 33 years), ive been in many many situations where ive had very similar high hours in the FD and CRM issues have been a big problem for my airplane caused by the "experienced" trouble-maker in the other seat.A lot of this is caused by either ego problems over there, point scoring etc, or competition with me, and on many occasions just sheer incompetence.Ive seen it all.
Now im an instructor I tend to get better co-operation, but now and again the point-scoring issue crops up and im experienced enough to see this for what it is.
In reality CRM is really about covering each other and catching mistakes before they bite you (TEM).It is not a licence to be a ******** to the Captain.This, in my case anyway means a withdrawal of the "priviledge" of sectors from the other guy, they usually get the message and adjust their behaviour accordingly.
Its a cliche of course, but a FO being allowed to fly is a priviledge and not a right.I like the description of CRM from an older guy years ago as "ABC" (ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIOUR in the COCKPIT) Pete.

[FatBoySim]

Exhibit A M'lud

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Airbus%20A319-111%20G-EZFI%2005-12.pdf

[piratepete]

FATBOY.
Thats an interesting incident with a lot of lessons in it on how NOT to do things.Quite a few mistakes in communication there, and lucky there werent any serious injuries.However with respect to CRM etc, what is the point you are making apart from what appears to be a situation lacking in some respects with regard to SOPs and following FCTM procedures?......

[Slasher]

I've never had any problem with a highly experienced FO Mr
Pete. It starts in the crew room - I indicate how appreciative
I am that I have a real pilot to fly with for a change...iso of a
200hr wonderkid (a true sentiment!) and we are both gonna
have a highly enjoyable day today. :) Basically I ensure that
he understands I anyway regard our power-distance as zero.

During the onboard predeparture briefing I emphasise, since
he was a captain himself, how much I'd value his input in any
emerg event, and in any case we look after each other's butt
and watch each other's six. This puts anyone at ease and I've
never experienced any point-scoring or one-upmanship as a
result.

[Sillypeoples]

Well I have had to deal with attitude in the cockpit. I think much of it is the 'white scarf' mentality, or the 'mentor' mentality, or the 'I'm here, I must be good enough' mentality that more then a few pilots have. More then a few have something to prove in the cockpit and they don't have a problem pushing it either at the captain, at the FO, or at a cocaptain.

While a cockpit can be so toxic as to be a serious safety hazard...increases workload tremendously, changes focus and priority...this is really a problem for the people that have never really done anything in aviation...haven't really 'been there and done that'...more they just showed up...now feel they need to wax expert on the subject.

If a guy has some thing to prove in the cockpit...just turn off the auto pilot, give him one needed to navigate with..and say 'show me'...that ends the argument. Every sim instructor knows this, every pilot who's been flying pre A/P and GPS knows this....

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Slasher/Piratepete;

While I've only once experienced problems with a high hour FO who thought he knew it all, (recent mil retiree of high mil rank, who didn't want to be line trained by some ****e civvy trained upstart, his actual words) I have found that the very experienced cockpit can land themselves in potential trouble due to being too comfortable with each other. Due to the way we work here captains can often fly together and in that case I now prefer to fly P2, that way I can behave as a co and keep a cockpit gradient in place. Its made slightly harder by the fact that I'm also management, but that can be overcome by some crew room banter before we start the day.

Tomorrow I'm off on a trip with a guy who has been a friend and colleague for 22 years, we trust each other implicitly, but he knows full well that when we report he'll have to sign for it on the grounds that if I f'*&# up as P2 its' all his fault as he signs the tech log.

Today I'm with a young guy with 700 hours, most of the sectors will be his as there is some good learning available, but its' my name in the book and my job if it goes wrong, he will get my normal crew room brief "If you think I'm wrong, shout out immediately as there may not be time later, but please don't be offended if I correct you." I've used that brief for years and never found a problem as a result.

[Centaurus]

but please don't be offended if I correct you." I've used that brief for years and never found a problem as a result.


Of course you have never found a problem as a result. Because, as you said earlier, you are "management":ok:

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Centaurs;

Sadly I have to work with Francis Frogbound and VH of this community, our ops dept dread crewing us together, as we've known each other for years, we're the only managers in this co with licenses, and we have an overwhelming ability to cause chaos wherever we go! According to our ops manager the collective noun for a group of pilot managers is a mayhem.
I feel desperately sorry for a new P2 who gets stuck with a management pilot, and I've always tried to follow the example of the chief pilot of the first airline I ever worked for, make them laugh and they'll start to relax, be as good as you possibly can in the cockpit and they'll respect your abilities as a pilot, as for the rest of it, I'm human like them and if I'm wrong I'd rather hear it from them than end up explaining myself to the police/AAIB/CAA/company/whoever.
What we often forget as we get older/more experienced is that the new guys arrive with new knowledge. The schools now teach a lot of stuff we weren't taught. Some of it we find out from other places, but there is a hell of a lot of freshly imbibed theory, if not much actual hands on time in the young heads next to us. I've always wanted CRM to be a two way transfer of knowledge rather than a group hug session, but I guess I'm possibly on a loser. But I still get a real joy out of sitting on an aircraft jumpseat, or in the back of a sim watching a crew really gel and work together, they may never have worked together before, but suddenly familiarity with SOPs and the environment they are in makes them click and the team work you see is mighty impressive.
I said in an earlier post that as a company we try to get our CC in the sim to watch what goes on, a thorough brief of what they are going to see and a chat with the (often sweaty and tired) crew afterwards gives them a confidence in the pilots that I think very few CC get.

As for being a management pilot, it was that or redundancy at the time, and I've never managed to get out of it, :ugh:

[Emoclew]

SND,
As a fairly senior Capt, I think that's an excellent summary.
Personally I am always minded of a study of aircraft accidents v pilot rank/experience which showed that after 10,000 hours, the "extra" experience did not make the Capt. any safer.

[Centaurus]

I've always tried to follow the example of the chief pilot of the first airline I ever worked for, make them laugh and they'll start to relax, be as good as you possibly can in the cockpit and they'll respect your abilities as a pilot

I was only joking, really:ok:

[Sir Niall Dementia]

Centaurus;

Yeah I know; bad start to the day, sorry for getting serious:ok:

[Slasher]

after 10,000 hours, the "extra" experience did not make the Capt. any safer.

Ran my logbook back to the 10000hr point and compared my
level then to now - I'm probably just a little more safer but a
hell of a lot more bloody cautious, due in main from learning
of the major screwups of others in the past few years.


the fact that I'm also management

No one is gonna be crazy enough to give you any backchat if
they value their jobs ND - its all just a big act in front of you
anyway. I was talking as a ordinary line jock who has to face
people every day who will stow their acting talents since I do
not have any egg on my hat (during the rare times I wear it).

There was a time as a 737 examiner the kids would shut up if
they knew what was good for 'em. That was great....but what
pissed me off was the act everyone else bunged on. It wasn't
till I gave up the position that everyone inside - and outside -
the cockpit became real again.

[Slasher]

Some examples I recall WRT above (737)

While holding Examiner's position -
Me - "That gives ah....133kts."
FO - "Captain I think it might be 131 kt but I'll recheck my
calculation to make sure."

After resigning from Examiner's position -
FO: "That's 131 kt Slash, ya dumb sh!t."

While holding.... -
Me - "Jesus I clanged that on!"
FO - "I noted a gust of wind on touchdown captain. It could
happen to anyone."

After resigning... -
FO - Oh did you? Lemme pull the nosewheel out of my @rse
and I'll do the After Crashdown (checklist)!"

While holding... (during training flt) -
Me - "Flare lad....Flare!....FLARE for fuc....FLARE!!!"
150hr cadet - "I apologise for the firm landing sir. Was it due
to that strong 5kt crosswind?"

After resigning... -
Me - "Ahem....I have control bucko."
200hr FO - "Why???? It is MY landing I'M the PF...I'M..."
Me - "Shutup and get your grubby mits off the column."

[john_tullamarine]

Slash, old son .. you encapsulate the facts succinctly .. as always.

[Denti]

after 10,000 hours, the "extra" experience did not make the Capt. any safer.

I just wonder, what about those 10.000 to 15.000 hour FOs? Usual experience for an upgrade here is around that mark somewhere.