Jetstar Cadet Scheme Failing To Produce Safe Pilots?

[Sunfish]

I think it's now official. We are one heart attack away from losing an aircraft because Jetstar "cadets" appear to be incompetent at landing an aircraft. This incident is in addition to the one the ATSB just reported. God knows how many others have been glossed over.

I want two fully trained and demonstrated competent pilots in the cockpit, not just one Captain and a "Learner".


Jetstar cadet scheme under scrutiny
Andrew Heasley
December 15, 2011

AUSTRALIA'S aviation safety watchdog has now put Jetstar under intensified scrutiny for its cadet pilot training scheme after another botched landing attempt.

The latest bungled landing occurred at Cairns airport on a flight from Sydney on November 3, when a cadet pilot selected the wrong flap settings, the airline confirmed.

When the captain, who was flying the Airbus A320, realised his cadet co-pilot had selected the wrong flap setting, he called for the landing to be aborted.


But the cadet compounded his mistake by choosing a wrong flap setting for a second time, upsetting the aerodynamics of the airliner for eight seconds.

Fortunately for all on board, the plane was at 1900 feet and the captain had time to recover the situation.

The Civil Aviation Safety Authority yesterday shifted its vigilance up a notch.

''There is now ongoing monitoring by CASA of the Jetstar cadet scheme to ensure it continues to meet the required standards,'' the agency said.

''If circumstances change, CASA will take appropriate steps to ensure relevant safety standards continue to be met.''

The Age believes substantial effort in the safety authority is now focused on Jetstar's operations, and the agency is prepared to act on the airline if necessary.

Jetstar's chief pilot, Captain Mark Rindfleish, said the crew ''followed standard practice and discontinued an approach into Cairns after detecting incorrect flap settings''. ''Anyone at the controls of a Jetstar aircraft has the qualifications and skills to be there,'' he said.

But the incident has sparked more calls for an urgent investigation of the airline's fast-tracked pilot training scheme.

Independent senator Nick Xenophon, who initiated this year's Senate inquiry on pilot training and airline safety, called on CASA to launch an urgent investigation of the Melbourne and Cairns incidents.

''Two separate incidents just a few months apart would indicate that this needs to be investigated thoroughly,'' he said.

''I've been approached by a number of Jetstar captains that have expressed concerns about the level of training of some of the cadets.

''I'll be moving in the Senate, when Parliament resumes, for the inquiry to reconvene about these more recent incidents, to call CASA, the ATSB [Australian Transport Safety Bureau] and the Qantas group in relation to this.''

The president of the Australian and International Pilots Association, Barry Jackson, said: ''When events occur on a regular basis then there's an issue.

''They grounded Tiger for these sort of things. It seems to me to be continuing events that point to pilot training and inexperience.

''CASA's the one that needs to look seriously at these events.''

Mr Jackson said experienced first officers were baling out of [Jetstar's parent] Qantas to be snapped up by the likes of Emirates and Qatar airlines, at a rate of one resignation every two days, leading to the recruitment of inexperienced pilots.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau was notified but it chose not to investigate the Cairns incident formally, after it was satisfied that cockpit alarms were not triggered and that the plane was still at a safe altitude.

Read more: Jetstar cadet scheme under scrutiny (http://www.theage.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/jetstar-cadet-scheme-under-scrutiny-20111214-1ouyf.html#ixzz1gX9rRLvB)

[KRUSTY 34]

Simple fix.

Implement recommendation #1 from the Senate inquiry, and implement it NOW!

Hello Canberra, your worst nightmare is just around the corner! :}

[The Truckie]

When you are taught by green instructors who themselves were taught by green instructors, you will get students who are missing alot of vital knowledge that can only be taught by someone with the appropriate industry experience.

For a cadet to be taught properly the instructors have to be older guys and girls who come back to instructing after a career of flying around outside the training area. Just the way the Airforce does it.

[Stiff Under Carriage]

Spot on truckie. Spot on.:D:D

[Dark Knight]

Two sides to every story;

Jetstar procedures as to configuration changes and checking thereof by other crew members?

Did; or if not why not?: the pilot flying check/observe the configuration change called for was correctly set at the time of configuration change?

Not a criticism of Jetstar procedures as I do not know them but I do understand cockpit procedures and that from time to time, regardless of crew experience, things break down or do not happen as they should.

Seizing upon such incidents without the full story promoting a cause belittles the promoters destroying the credibiltiy of their cause.

In the `real world' pilots are fed into airline flight decks daily with minmal experience levels (some 250 - 500hours [the same as maintenance is done overseas]) and yes incidients happen but the deserts & oceans of the world are not littered with carbon fibre & aluminium!

[adsyj]

Lets hope a Jetstar Captain does not become incapacitated in flight leaving a very green FO to bring it home.

It really is not working and I believe is grossly unfair on both the Cadet and the Captains.

[Lester Burnham]

What a load of crap Sunfish. This was one incident involving a cadet. The other incident in Darwin involved someone who met all of the requirements of the the FAA imposed hours requirements and should therefore be "safe". Configuration cockups have been going on for many, many years involving pilots with enormous experience. Anyone remember a B146 nearly pancaking on a beach north of Cairns?

I am amazed that professionals who work in the industry jump on these Safety reports to try and prove a point. If anything undermines a Safety Culture wouldn't it be the fear of some disgruntled cock publicising something you self-reported?

In all of this crap there is possibly a bigger point being missed that Dark Knight has mentioned. Surely this is more serious?

[dghob]

Can someone clear something up for me please? The media and people in this thread keep referring to the co-pilot as a cadet. I'm guessing that's because he came through a Jetstar cadet scheme (he apparently had around 1600 hours prior to his 300 on the A320).

Is it fair to the co-pilot (and perhaps Jetstar) to keep calling him a cadet? Or is it a Jetstar cadetship requirement to acquire somewhat more than 300 hours on type before the they can do away with the "cadet" designation? If that's the case then so be it.

It just seems to me that the media are jumping on "cadet" to give punters the impression that the co-pilot was a just-out-of-school kid who had no real idea of what he was doing. He may well have blotted his copy book on this occasion and will have to face the consequences including one would assume a fair degree of embarrassment. But do we really need to humiliate him further by insisting he's a cadet if in fact he's not?

[Feather #3]

dghob, I retired with >20k hours after a 40-year career and was still regarded by some as a cadet. There are a few jokes around about once being something or conducting an action and that name sticks!:eek:

G'day ;)

[Jack Ranga]

The goat ****er?

[dghob]

Hmmm. The mind boggles.

[Dash1]

Had some experience in a previous life flying with cadets from a major airline gaining industry experience in a type much smaller than the A320. The majority operated to a high procedural standard when the conditions were fine but quickly became 'situationally challenged' when faced with adverse wx or approaches requiring additional planning and preparation. As with any supervisory/training role knowing your own limits and how far to let someone else take the aircraft to a point where you can recover a bad picture is the key. This is where I think the training system in Jetstar is letting these Captains down if these cadets are out there requiring supervision above and beyond what would be considered normal in an Experienced RPT two pilot crew. I can sympathize with the extra workload being placed on the Captain in this incident and in fact all the Jetstar Captains who have to operate in this environment. To his credit he did get the aircraft out of a bad position and safely back on the ground. To quote BB during the senate enquiry, 'Our cadets are only flying with our most experienced Captains' Thank f#%k for that. I thought this was RPT not SPI (Single Pilot Interuptions).

[gobbledock]

TICK TOCK TICK TOCK

[Howard Hughes]

It'd be nice if people took pride in passing on their knowledge, rather than belittling the abilities and background of those in the seat next to them.

You didn't become 'the Orcale' all by yourself you know!:rolleyes:

If a Captain keels over in flight I'm fairly sure the aircraft will be landed safely, so long as they remember to ask for the into wind runway.;)

[Flava Saver]

Agreed HH!

However some of these new RH Seater's seem to know it all already, and don't want your 'knowledge'.

Gen Y :ugh:

[Howard Hughes]

Fair point, it is a two way street! The guy/gal sitting next to you does have to want to learn.:ok:

[Capt Claret]

I can't determine whether my observations are objective or not, as I was a youngish F/O and am now an older Captain.

In my younger days, I don't recall myself or my contemporaries being as adverse to hints, and helpful tidbits, as I witness in more modern times. :sad:

[KRUSTY 34]

Worrying times gobbledock.

Have a look over at the Senate inquiry thread.

TICK TOCK indeed.:{

[Tee Emm]

I want two fully trained and demonstrated competent pilots in the cockpit, not just one Captain and a "Learner".

What you want and what you get are entirely two different things. All over the aviation industry nowadays especially in Asia and Europe and the Middle East (and that's just a start) you have a good chance of being flown with one captain flying single handedly but with the "support" of a learner with three bars, big watch and shiny new wings. Watch this space if the captain goes u/s with food poisoning...:eek: Even the captain has a good chance of not being "fully trained and demonstrated competent":(

[A37575]

If a Captain keels over in flight I'm fairly sure the aircraft will be landed safely,

You obviously have never flown in Indonesia where first officer pay-to-fly schemes are rife among even the largest of the many low cost carriers..

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.

[Gligg]

I saw a snippet of 'The Amazing Race' where the competing couples had to land a Learjet sim by following a script telling them when to put out the flaps and gear. They did pretty well considering no flying experience, one or two getting it down safely on the first attempt.
Just goes to show that just about anyone can do the basics. But what happens when its not all going your way? I guess that's when experience pays off.

[Bigboeingboy]

Blind leading the blind. Lets hope these idiots dont take out 180 people!
Well done SLIC.

[angelorange]

There are similarities with LoCo operators in EU:

Clearly we are on the wrong track in terms of Flight Safety, Training pilots and in giving them progressive careers - in the UK/EU at least.

When USA Regulators are demanding more from their pilots in terms of experience (incl. 1500h rules post Colgan crash) in the EU and UK especially it is being lowered more and more. And this model is being exported worldwide.

The reason is cost and shareholder profits are seen as more important than pilot pay or ability:

1. Now many UK carriers are contracting out pilot supply to a few schools who sell them the MPL route to an FO position. These schemes (including approved or integrated cadet schemes) are funded by the applicant. That person's debt (often around EUR100,000 to 150,000) becomes an interest free bank account for the airline.

Terms and conditions of existing pilots are eroded (existing FOs are put on standby while cadets fly so lengthening time to get required hours for command). The 1000s of highly experienced pilots from the Military, GA or even turbo prop airlines cannot get an interview because it is cheaper to hire an MPL student on a short term contract.

2. Self Finded TRs and P2F (pay to fly): To make matters worse, paying for type ratings ( a business expense that airlines can offset against tax) is seen as normal. Here the pilot, not the business, takes on huge debts to fund the airline.

Some LoCo airlines even sell the RH front seat for around EURO 30,000 to give "line training" to wannabee pilots. This means working for them for 100 to 300 bours and then having no job at the end. Even some cadet/MPL/flexycrew schemes have given just 6 months "employment" where the cadet is paid back EURO 1000 a month of their own initial "investment" before having to return to a bar job to pay the bank loans. The treatment by some LoCo airlines of these workers is disgraceful.

3. As aircraft reliability has improved, so pilot professionalism has often taken on a downward spiral. An over reliance on automation has caused flying skills to wither. Almost 1900 deaths in Western jet Airliners over the past decade are down to Loss of Control.

4. Both P2F and Cadet/MPL schemes place greater pressure on existing Captains who often feel like they are flying single crew. P2F hour builders in particular can cause tensions in teh cockpit affecting CRM because the Captains do not agree with these schemes.

The lack of flying experience of cadets/P2F students is a result of being sent onto a B737/A320 sized jet before doing much real flying in Turboprops/Military/GA. In the past BA, Britannia and others sent their fully sponsored cadets to fly smaller machines (eg: MacAlpine HS125 Biz jets) for up to 2 years before flying larger airliners to get them air minded. Now with MPL there is not even a requirement for solo flying. Most cadets do Mutual flying - not true solo work during their short Light Aircraft courses.


The solution? (NB: more ideas most welcome but here are a few to consider):

1. Regulators should limit the number of cadets an airline can recruit each year - 20% of workforce at any one time rather than the current 60% of FOs for one UK LoCo.

2. Airlines should be encouraged to seek out a diverse pilot demographic and encourage junior pilot apprenticeship schemes with each other so that cadets can work on Turboprops/light jets or even instructing with approved schools before joining the main jet fleets.

3. P2F and Self Funded TRs should be banned under Regulator laws. The Airlines should fund training after frozen ATPL/ATP. Pilots should be bonded for 2 to 3 years per TR and all airlines should have a database of bonding agreements within EU/US/Oz to prevent early leavers going after a year without paying something for their training.

4. All pilots should be given Upset recovery training (not just Sim Tests) in real aerobatic aircraft at least once a year.

5. Automation airmanship courses should be introduced on an annual basis by Airbus/Boeing/etc. Note Bombardier already does something (Free to attend!): Safety Standdown: Aviation Safety Seminars and Online Resources | Safety Standdown (http://www.safetystanddown.com/)

[teresa green]

That has basically always been the case Tee Emm, we all had to start some where. But the difference is in the training. Like everything else it has become politically correct, treat people nicely, let them decide how much they want to learn and how quickly. In my training days, it was hurled manuals, accompanied by language that would make a sailor blush, and you became used to being called a stupid pr%ck. In fact when they were pleasant, you wondered what was going on. This of course was from the hard schools, the Skippers that had been Bomber Command pilots, they had short fuses if you stuffed up in anyway, and we learnt quickly and surprisingly efficiently, and if you didn't, you were out. Abhorrent now of course, but it seems to me the middle road has not been met, discipline, lack of "paddock bashing flying" (nothing teaches you better than the aircraft itself), and gives you the basis for that other lost word "Airmanship". It seems to me the standards and safety that were developed over the last eighty years are in danger of being somewhat decimated into the future. The end result will not be pleasant.

[toolish]

There are many, many more incidents involving cadets.
In true Jetstar tradition you will never hear about them.
Jetstar + self regulation is a bad combination but now we have Jetstar + self regulation + cadet:ugh::ugh:

What is the name of that truck driving school

[Sarcs]

angelorange that is an extremely well thought and well summarised post!:D

Where were you when the Senate Inquiry was on....oh I forgot the Eurozone...more's the pity! Could you possibly send your thoughts to Senator X or Senator Heffernan, might help them to see what we in Oz will become....and giving them solutions is also a good thing!:ok:

[Gligg]

Report: Garuda B733 at Malang on Jul 22nd 2011, hard landing

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Dec 14th 2011 11:32Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 14th 2011 11:32Z (The Aviation Herald (http://www.avherald.com))

A Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737-300, registration PK-GGO performing flight GA-292 from Jakarta to Malang (Indonesia) with 108 passengers and 8 crew, performed a VOR approach to Malang's runway 35 visually circling to runway 17, however, the aircraft got too high on the approach and turned in too early on base to runway 17 struggeling to acquire the extended runway and glidepath. The aircraft subsequently touched down hard prompting the tower controller to inquire the possbility of a hard landing with the crew. The aircraft was instructed to stop at the end of runway 17 and hold pending a runway inspection, which revealed some metal debris in the touch down zone of runway 17. The aircraft subsequently was cleared to backtrack the runway to taxi to the apron. No injuries occurred, the aircraft received substantial damage including wrinkles of the left wing, a fractured nose wheel hub and damage to the left engine inlet.

Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC) released their preliminary report reporting, that the training captain (46, ATPL, 14,197 hours total, 5,275 hours on type) was pilot monitoring, trainee first officer #2 (28, CPL, 457 hours total, 457 hours on type) was pilot flying, trainee first officer #1 (33, CPL, 206 hours total, 206 hours on type) was occupying the observer's seat.

Flight GA-292 was number 3 in the arrival sequence to Malang and therefore had been sent into a high level VOR holding for runway 35, active runway was 35.

After the two preceding arrivals had landed, the tower changed the runway to 17 because winds had changed to southerly at 10-15 knots. GA-292 was instructed to leave the VOR holding and commence a VOR let down to runway 35 circling visually to runway 17. After completing the let down the aircraft joined a right downwind for runway 17, turned onto base. When the first officer initiated the turn onto final, the captain assessed that the aircraft was too high for the approach and the turn was too early bringing the aircraft tracking right off the extended center line, and took control of the aircraft. The captain increased rate of descent to acquire the glidepath while at the same time trying to align the aircraft with the extended center line.

The aircraft finally touched down in the touch down zone of runway 17 and rolled down to the runway end to do a 180 degrees turn to backtrack the runway to the apron.

While taxiing down the runway the controller inquired about the possibility of a hard landing, which the captain replied to in the positive. The controller therefore instructed the aircraft to hold before taxiing down runway 35 and had the runway inspected. The runway inspection found metal debris in the touch down zone of runway 17.

After about 10 minutes holding the aircraft was cleared to taxi down runway 35 and to the apron, where passengers disembarked normally.

A post flight inspection found wrinkles to the left hand wing, the nose wheel inner hub was fractured and the left engine inlet cowling was damaged.

[Toruk Macto]

How many years will this cadet have to work for this airline at a reduced wage to pay for this.

[JustJoinedToSearch]

trainee first officer #2 (28, CPL, 457 hours total, 457 hours on type) was pilot flying, trainee first officer #1 (33, CPL, 206 hours total, 206 hours on type)

Someone want to explain that one to me?

Are they doing "Straight and level" in a 737?

I can't believe an airline with pilots of that experience are allowed to fly into Australia by CAS.....

Oh wait, yes I can:rolleyes:

[bankrunner]

Are they doing "Straight and level" in a 737?

737 simulator, more likely due to cost. I suspect the first time they end up at the pointy end of a 737 is on a revenue flight :yuk:

[A37575]

In my training days, it was hurled manuals, accompanied by language that would make a sailor blush, and you became used to being called a stupid pr%ck. In fact when they were pleasant, you wondered what was going on. This of course was from the hard schools, the Skippers that had been Bomber Command pilots, they had short fuses if you stuffed up in anyway, and we learnt quickly and surprisingly efficiently,

One sincerely hopes that the sort of screaming skull former RAF pilots who hurl manuals at frightened students has not carried over to your personal methods of instruction. Not all military pilots carry on like that. There are nutters (military and civil trained) in every flying organisation and your experience proves it.

The worst I ever struck in my 737 career was a Boeing instructor pilot from Seattle. Although that was nigh 30 years ago, at a recent reunion we discussed striking a campaign medal for all those pilots who had flown more than 50 hours with that instructor. It was to be called the "Menen Star" after the hotel on Nauru where we drank and lived.
It was also decided to add a "Clasp" to this medal for all pilots who had been grabbed around the throat by this Boeing check captain.

Despite Teresa's Green horrifying experience of having wartime pilots throwing manuals around the cockpit at him, I can assure him that breed of "instructor" has hopefully gone forever - in more ways than one. Keen and enthusiastic students can be destroyed by those idiots. I was lucky because one of my instructors was a former Lancaster bomber pilot with a DFC and a more gentle lovely instructor you be hard to find. Rest in Peace Syd Gooding old chap.

[KRUSTY 34]

phantom menace has nailed it.

The reason, the only reason, Australian airlines employ Cadets is because,

They're... CHEAP!

There end'th the lesson for the investgators. :{

[tolakuma manki]

Australian worker priced himself out of manufacturing industry years ago.
Australian Pilots now pricing himself out of airline industry.
Sure plenty of asian man and chinese man to fly aircraft into Australia at not much money.
Air Nuigini has maintenance in SE Asia, no problem and cheaper than Australian man doing same job.
Maybe you need new type of job.
McDonalds has plenti??

[IsDon]

Australian worker priced himself out of manufacturing industry years ago.
Australian Pilots now pricing himself out of airline industry.
Sure plenty of asian man and chinese man to fly aircraft into Australia at not much money.
Air Nuigini has maintenance in SE Asia, no problem and cheaper than Australian man doing same job.
Maybe you need new type of job.
McDonalds has plenti??

I guess that counts you out Manki. You'll need at least level 4 English. Might work out ok for you in a Chinese laundry. Maybe they need to pay you a few more peanuts.

[27/09]

Australian worker priced himself out of manufacturing industry years ago.
Australian Pilots now pricing himself out of airline industry.
Sure plenty of asian man and chinese man to fly aircraft into Australia at not much money.
Air Nuigini has maintenance in SE Asia, no problem and cheaper than Australian man doing same job.
Maybe you need new type of job.
McDonalds has plenti??

So my friend, what is the answer?

Where are these other jobs or do Australasian's need to get used to the standard of living as enjoyed in SE Asia?

[John Citizen]

Manki man :

In your own words If plenty of asian man and chinese man to fly aircraft into Australia at not much money then I am sure they can do the same in Papua New Guinea too :ouch: or perhaps they fear the astronomous levels of crime and corruption, and don't appeal to the low standard of living :eek:

As you say, if Air Nuigini has maintenance in SE Asia because they are cheaper then using your philosphy, they can get pilots from SE Asia too :ouch:

Maybe you need a new type of Job ?
McDonalds perhaps ? :eek:
Sorry, I just remembered PNG does not have the McDonalds :uhoh:, whilst over 120 other countries do. PNG will probably be the last country in the world to get it, how advanced ? :confused:
Perhaps then Big Rooster for you. :p

[MACH082]

phantom menace has nailed it.

The reason, the only reason, Australian airlines employ Cadets is because,

They're... CHEAP!

There end'th the lesson for the investgators.

You forgot compliant old fella :hmm:

[tolakuma manki]

Sori for upsetting.
You men sure rude people in Australian Industry.
Asian man more polite yet than you.
Maybe you need to learn about corruption in Asia, they are laughing about you.
We people in PNG go to village and garden when no work, no wait for sit down money like Australian.

[KRUSTY 34]

I'm not sure how compliance is an issue MACH082?

If you are suggesting that airlines employ cadets because they are compliant, then I think the bow you are drawing is a tad long.

You're either compliant, or you're not. I would suggest that any pilot (airline especially) that is not, would not be an airline pilot for very long. Cadet or otherwise.

As I said, the only reason Australian airlines employ cadets is because they are cheap. Compliance has nothing to do with it.

Anything else is pure nonsense! Or am I missing something?

[Icarus2001]

Krusty I think you misunderstood his use of the word compliant.

com·pli·ant   /kəmˈplaɪənt/ Show Spelled[kuhm-plahy-uhnt]
adjective
1. complying; obeying, obliging, or yielding, especially in a submissive way: a man with a compliant nature.
2. manufactured or produced in accordance with a specified body of rules (usually used in combination): Energy Star-compliant computers.

I believe that what MACH may have meant is that they are obliging, yielding, submissive perhaps grateful of the job and so easily manipulated. When you are indentured to an employer for many years and vast sums of money it creates a situation where you are likely to do as you are told.

N'est-ce pas?

[-438]

I agree with the line of thinking that Cadets are not an unsafe option for an airline, provided that the systems are in place to ensure all parties (this includes the crew members sitting beside them in the LHS) are trained appropriately.
I also tend to agree with the line of thinking that most LCC's will utilise Cadets as a means of reducing costs. Whether that be by bonding, reduced wages, kickbacks from training organisations etc.
The problem is appropriate training systems and reducing costs in an airline environment rarely coincide.

[The Kelpie]

I also tend to agree with the line of thinking that most LCC's will utilise Cadets as a means of reducing costs.

Currently aided and abetted by the two major unions involved that have both signed off on a 'deal' with management that, whilst a vast improvement on the NZ contracts that made the papers, still falls significantly short of the minimum remuneration required by the Fair Work Act through the Modern Air Pilots Award. There is a view that the 'deal' entered into under the EBA is not consistent with the minimum rate of pay provisions of the FairWork Act and it's transitional provisions legislation.

I have posted previously on this subject and it seems to have conveniently fallen on deaf ears. The point I am making is that if the cost advantage of employing cadets is removed, or reduced substantially then we would see exactly whether management genuinely see the cadets as a better option.

More to Follow

The Kelpie

[Gligg]

Has the pendulum already swung? Even while the battle continues to maintain jobs in Australia and prevent outsourcing to cheaper labour markets, Aussie cadets are being hired on low wages and salary sacrificing their type ratings, while their third world counterparts get flight training and type rating fully funded. Perhaps its just a matter of time before the cheap labour isn't on the outside looking to get in, but on the inside looking to get out!

[KRUSTY 34]

Thanks Icarus2001. I may have "lept" a little too soon. I thought what I believed Mach' was saying was a bit out of character. Sorry MACH082. :uhoh:

Our flight ops management are always banging on about compliance (the regulatory type), and I guess I got a little tunnel visioned!

[teresa green]

A37575, looking back I have nothing but sympathy for those rather energetic Captains, young men, who had lost their youth seeing and having to do things that haunted them for the rest of their lives. We understand now of course they suffered war neurosis, some had been POW'S and their frustrations and probably anger were taken out on the next generation of pilots that need not see any action. Most were brilliant pilots, short fuses yes, but if you tried, and succeeded, they were OK, but did not have the patience to be mucked about. Did I take that with me into C and T, certainly not, but then again the discipline was still there when I was training, I enjoyed it, but hated to have to fail, and one I did not fail, the very next day flew into a mountain in PNG and killed all on board including nuns and a six week old baby. That I will take to my grave. I am told now that some cadets actually question your authority or your teaching ability, I sincerely hope that is simply incorrect, because if it is not, I don't even want to think of the consequences.

[Water Wings]

There is no substitude for experience, you only have watch airliners landing in x wind conditions these days

I wouldn't really use this as a measure for experience. The worst xwind landing I have seen in recent times (my own excluded) would have to be a 767 which resulted in a tail skid strike and go around. We could safely assume there was probably 20,000 hours plus in the front two seats based on the airline concerned. Point is, every one has bad days.

[ohallen]

Understand that everyone has a bad day occasionally and that mostly it works out ok.

As SLF, if you ask me if I want a 20,000 combined crew up front when ****e happens or a Captain second guessing a 250 hour Gen Y, then what do you think the answer will be?

ps and I am happy to pay for it because I only get one chance at this game.

[Joker89]

If you really want to get scared have a read in the wannabe forum. The amount of people paying upwards of 150k for 200hrs and a 737 or 320 rating then expecting a FO job is amazing. When they don't get a job they then go and buy 500 hrs of line training in a third world country in the hope of then being able to get a reasonable job to pay back the debt not realizing their actions have meant those jobs no longer exist.

Where does this sense of entitlement come from. How can guys who hasn't even done 1hr expect to buy their way into a RHS of a jet. How can the regulators think this is safe?

Can only hope that it doesn't go that bad here but jetstar cadet scheme seems only a precursor to pay to fly.

[Tee Emm]

I agree with the line of thinking that Cadets are not an unsafe option for an airline,

Agree - as long as the captain does not become incapacitated requiring the cadet to be all on his own. Then you have a serious situation as most cadets get very little manipulative flying. But then captains never become incapacitated apart from a few here and there.:ok:

[HF3000]

Joker, you're pointing the finger at the wrong people.

The cadets are just taking opportunitities available to them.

Point the finger at the aviation industry management that is setting these poor young folk up and setting the scene for a low experience flight deck and all the dangers that poses to the innocent travelling public.

[JustJoinedToSearch]

Joker, you're pointing the finger at the wrong people.

The cadets are just taking opportunitities available to them.

Point the finger at the aviation industry management that is setting these poor young folk up and setting the scene for a low experience flight deck and all the dangers that poses to the innocent travelling public.

Sorry but can't agree.

A 5 second google search for "jetstar cadet scheme" gives you almost a page full of articles about the problems associated with the the Jestar scheme. Including this thread.

A further 10-15 minutes of research and anyone who is interested will become quite aware of how much debt they will be in and how much onestar will 'own' them. Also they will see countless reports from captains about how much they struggle under pressure (which should be expected) and links to the AF447 crash.

If they still decide to go with the scheme, is that the sort of person you want flying your family around? Someone who has knowingly chosen to reduce their future employment prospects, and chosen to be put into dangerous situations they are not ready for and potentially cost lives.

I certainly don't.

The only other person would be someone who has done absolutely no research into the scheme other than the shiny brochure.

Does that sound like someone that should be in charge, potentially alone, of a 180 seat hunk of metal hurtling through the air at 80% the speed of sound?

Doesn't to me.

[BUGS/BEARINGS/BOXES]

So, what is the 'fix' then? How will airlines be able to mould pilots into having the capabilities, behaviours and competencies that they are looking for?
Your constructive thoughts?

[Sunfish]

Bugs:

How will airlines be able to mould pilots into having the capabilities, behaviours and competencies that they are looking for?

Wrong question; it's what the community is looking for, not the employer.

[Bula]

Cheap airfares while getting there in one piece. The balance, who knows.

[Joker89]

I don't blame the airlines. This is capitalism at work. It is the duty of government and regulators to ensure that passengers are protected. Joe public has no idea if the guy in the LHS has paid his way in. The public assume that the rules are there to keep things safe.

A sucker is born every minute so there will always be a supply of people willing to pay so the airline can exploit this commercial opportunity.

I would not have a problem with the cadet scheme if it were purely to generate pilots and not income. What future can there be for these FO's if the airline is motivated to replace them with a new income source.

[Howard Hughes]

So, what is the 'fix' then? How will airlines be able to mould pilots into having the capabilities, behaviours and competencies that they are looking for?
Spend more money!

As this ethos is contrary to the LCC model, it's probably not going to happen.:(

[fl610]

A hull loss per year is cheaper. - quote fatman 1989 :yuk:

[JustJoinedToSearch]

So, what is the 'fix' then? How will airlines be able to mould pilots into having the capabilities, behaviours and competencies that they are looking for?
Your constructive thoughts?

Well first of all by all reports the 'scheme' cadets (as oppsed to the old QF program) have neither the capability or competency to be what they are meant to be, a back up 'captain' when the situation requires it. All they have is the required behaviour, i.e. "Give us money" and "Fulfil the requirement to have some appropriately documented flesh in the 'other' seat".

As for my constructive thoughts:
Contrary to popular belief there are actually guys in GA who can take their valuable experience and still conform to SOPs etc of the airlines. I'm sure if Virgin opened up recruitment, there would be a hell of a lot of replies, at least some of who would be suitable.

In house training, instead of farming them off to some 3rd party provider where you have little control/input into how they are trained (beyond the standard airline specific things) is almost certainly the best way to go, especially if you insist on using no experience 'cadets' who will likely stuggle.

Proper cadet programs are an excellent source of potential captains. A highly competetive selection process means you are able to get your pick of the bunch. Spending a year or two getting industry experience and then a few years in the back as an SO gaining airline experience without being the first line of defence, means that you end up with a supply of experienced, quailty FO's who have a much better chance of performing under pressure.

The only problem I have with the proper cadet scheme is that they might be lacking in the real, by yourself, command experience that is invaluable (depending on where they do their 'industry experience') which would be a disadvantage.

Safety isn't cheap. Never has been, never will be. Unfortunately Jetstar are the very definition of cheap, and safety really isn't important to them.

Personally I think we are going to go full circle in a few years and after some hull losses 'safe' will become sexy again and people will be willing to pay for it. I would just rather the government pull their finger out and prevent deaths instead of responding to them. But what are the chances of that?

[Falling Leaf]

In safety circles they call it 'blood priority'. Until we have blood on the ground (hull loss), don't expect anything to change - as seen by the response to the Senate Inquiry.

[Gligg]

'Contrary to popular belief there are actually guys in GA who can take their valuable experience and still conform to SOPs etc of the airlines'

You mean like following stable approach criteria?

Me thinks 'popular belief' is nothing more than Jetstar painting GA as hacks to push their cost cutting agenda.

[HF3000]

I agree, I think it will take at least one smoking hole in the ground.

If a cadet F/O with 300 hours creates the hole, and the Captain fails to prevent it due "cognitive overload" from babysitting the cadet, the blame game following that will probably be similar to the Erebus thread.

The Airline will blame the Captain.

The Opposition will blame the government, for failing to respond appropriately to the senate inquiry.

CASA will blame the Airline.

The Government will blame the previous government, or CASA, or the Captain, or global warming, or whatever they can come up with.

The Government, the Airline, and CASA will all come out saying the training was in line with "World's best practice" and quote that it was all in accordance with ICAO accepted guidelines.

But hopefully there would end up a Royal Commission who would maybe go down the line of the USA's 1500 hours ATPL, and the Government, CASA, and airline chiefs may all admit quietly to themselves that these u-beaut jets don't actually fly themselves after all.

[tobz92_ymen]

any current cadet problems can be attributed to their exposure to ga attitudes and sop's (or lack of) as no real ab-initio cadets who have been trained from 'effects of controls' to operate with professionalism and highest regards for safety are yet to be checked in to line, as the first jetstar group of ab-initio cadets is set to start their a320 endorsements on the 4th of jan at the oxford sims at gatwick. So until these guys are flying, which will not be until late february it is unfair to make generalisations of ALL jetstar cadets

[Mud Skipper]

tobz92,

current cadet problems can be attributed to their exposure to ga attitudes and sop's

You just reinforce the old saying "You don't know what you don't know".
Instructors can teach SoP's and the concepts of safety but only experience and time teaches professionalism and highest regards for safety.
As a professional organization an airline should mentor and teach but they’re not flying schools for green pilots when paying punters are down the back.

I'd hope you are a wind up but guess the 92 is your DoB.
This will end in tears.:ugh:

[KRUSTY 34]

I've said it before, this thing has more legs than a centipede!

The "Cadet" in question was probably an accelerated candidate who would have held a CPL at time of entry, but so will the ab-initio pilots, when they start their line training. Just how deep, and of what quality/benefit the F/O's experience was, prior to joining jetstar, may or may not be a factor. Not easy to quantify as we are all individuals.

The heart of the problem, and something that the vested interests cannot, or will not come to grips with, is the devaluing of the profession. This will lead to people occupying the front seats of Jet airliners who for a range of reasons, probably shouldn't be there. Inexperience will be a factor, but if we're honest with ourselves, we were all inexperienced at one time or another, despite what we thought we knew from our years in GA. Not that many years ago the much coveted RHS of an Australian Jet airliner was the goal. Now we have pilots talking about toughing it out long enough to gain the hours (and the experience) so they can move on to a better job that will at least help them pay the bills, I mean that's comforting!

20 years ago I worked for a GA charter company that expanded into RPT. As the realities of regular public transport started to bite, the purse strings were tightened, and some middle management positions were liquidated. One of the affected managers, a 42 year old CPL holder and grade 3 instructor, who's 1200 hous of experience was gained over 20 years of weekend flying, was offered a position flying the line. I knew him well. He wasn't reckless and he was compliant, but like most mangement types he saw flying for a living as bit of a mugs game. After all, shake a tree and 20 will fall out. the real money was in mangement. The airlines weren't recruiting, our books were full of very experienced applicants, and we were in the middle of a recession. The GM (a PPL holder) also didn't see the value of the profession, but he did throw a lifeline to this bloke as we needed an extra line driver. He met the min requirements (just) and was current (also just). He took a 50% percent pay cut, and away he went. I mean really, how hard can it be?

To cut a long story short, on a dark and stormy night, this bloke got it wrong and flew his aircraft and 6 passengers into the side of a hill whilst attempting a circle to land. The airline folded a week later.

This guy wasn't a D!ckhead. He wasn't a Cowboy, and he certainly didn't set out that day to make his wife a widow, orphan his children, or destroy many other lives, but he never should have been in the front seat of that aircraft. What kept the rest of us alive, and still does for me to this day, was the belief that piloting an aircraft on the day is the most important thing in the World. To treat the profession with anything but the utmost importance and respect is just asking for a disaster.

By attempting to place pilots into the front seat of a Jet airliner at the lowest possible cost, Jetstar are asking for a disaster. The very fact that the regs allow this to happen was previously not an issue. There was never a shortage of applicants, most of whom appreciated the uncompromising nature of the game. Irrespective of what training these candidates recieve, if their heart isn't in it (and it won't be after a short period on min wage and crippling debt) then you are doing nothing less than setting yourself up!

The 1500 hour/ATPL recomendation is a blunt tool. It will not definitively address all the complex issues. It will however put the "Value" of the profession back into perspective. The NTSB and the FAA recognised this after Colgan. Too many people with too many vested interests in this country however have been too clever in their opposition to it. Watch them run for cover when the unthinkable happens. :sad:

[Sarcs]

Spot on Krusty!!:D:D You got in one.:ok:

It is not just airlines that are only prepared to pay for the lowest common denominator. I know of a company that actively promotes low time FOs to Captaincy, while overlooking more experienced FO candidates. Why?? Because they have groomed perfect yes men/women and they only have to pay them two thirds of an experienced Captain's wage!:=

.....the only saving grace with that mob is they don't fly that often!:rolleyes:

[fl610]

Yes well said Krusty. :ok:

[aussie027]

Very well said Krusty.
Being a professional aviator takes a specific, dedicated mindset.
One committed to continual learning and erring on the side of being conservative and humble if you want to remain safe.

Aviation is a very serious business with life and death consequences only seconds away on many occasions on every single flight whether in a glider, Cessna or Boeing.

The "gee whiz, this is awesome" video game mentality of some belongs at home in front of the PC game or XBox, NOT in a real cockpit, especially one with trusting, paying passengers behind it.
There is no freeze or reset button in the real world!!
For those lucky enough to be flying, do so safely.:ok:

[Dark Knight]

The process is already in place; the second officer is redundant with the first officer rapidly following.

Technology has been around for many years, has been refined and is used daily to fly aircraft without crew.

Boeing, Airbus build good aircraft to fit the lowest common denominator with technology increasingly providing the protection, a trend which pax and government will demand. The human element becomes a monitor and with exposure the ability to interfere or take over will continue to reduce.

Acceptable hull loss rates with the associated loss of life will, as it is now, decrease but be considered acceptable, after all this is what insurance is all about, actuarial assessment. Collateral damage if you will.

Whether we like it or not experience becomes a decreasing factor; the economics decree the demise of the flight deck crew; it will take time but this is the way of the future.

[CaptCloudbuster]

Read this then decide if "the human element" reduced to a monitoring role is really the way we should go...



French transcripts from the black box (English underneath transcripts)

English Translations underneath the French transcripts from the black box



For more than two years, the disappearance of Air France Flight 447 over the mid-Atlantic in the early hours of June 1, 2009, remained one of aviation's great mysteries. How could a technologically state-of-the art airliner simply vanish?

With the wreckage and flight-data recorders lost beneath 2 miles of ocean, experts were forced to speculate using the only data available: a cryptic set of communications beamed automatically from the aircraft to the airline's maintenance center in France. As PM found in our cover story about the crash, published two years ago this month, the data implied that the plane had fallen afoul of a technical problem—the icing up of air-speed sensors—which in conjunction with severe weather led to a complex "error chain" that ended in a crash and the loss of 228 lives.

The matter might have rested there, were it not for the remarkable recovery of AF447's black boxes this past April. Upon the analysis of their contents, the French accident investigation authority, the BEA, released a report in July that to a large extent verified the initial suppositions. An even fuller picture emerged with the publication of a book in French entitled Erreurs de Pilotage (volume 5), by pilot and aviation writer Jean-Pierre Otelli, which includes the full transcript of the pilots' conversation.

We now understand that, indeed, AF447 passed into clouds associated with a large system of thunderstorms, its speed sensors became iced over, and the autopilot disengaged. In the ensuing confusion, the pilots lost control of the airplane because they reacted incorrectly to the loss of instrumentation and then seemed unable to comprehend the nature of the problems they had caused. Neither weather nor malfunction doomed AF447, nor a complex chain of error, but a simple but persistent mistake on the part of one of the pilots.

Human judgments, of course, are never made in a vacuum. Pilots are part of a complex system that can either increase or reduce the probability that they will make a mistake. After this accident, the million-dollar question is whether training, instrumentation, and cockpit procedures can be modified all around the world so that no one will ever make this mistake again—or whether the inclusion of the human element will always entail the possibility of a catastrophic outcome. After all, the men who crashed AF447 were three highly trained pilots flying for one of the most prestigious fleets in the world. If they could fly a perfectly good plane into the ocean, then what airline could plausibly say, "Our pilots would never do that"?

Here is a synopsis of what occurred during the course of the doomed airliner's final few minutes.

____

At 1h 36m, the flight enters the outer extremities of a tropical storm system. Unlike other planes' crews flying through the region, AF447's flight crew has not changed the route to avoid the worst of the storms. The outside temperature is much warmer than forecast, preventing the still fuel-heavy aircraft from flying higher to avoid the effects of the weather. Instead, it ploughs into a layer of clouds.

At 1h51m, the cockpit becomes illuminated by a strange electrical phenomenon. The co-pilot in the right-hand seat, an inexperienced 32-year-old named Pierre-Cédric Bonin, asks, "What's that?" The captain, Marc Dubois, a veteran with more than 11,000 hours of flight time, tells him it is St. Elmo's fire, a phenomenon often found with thunderstorms at these latitudes.

At approximately 2 am, the other co-pilot, David Robert, returns to the cockpit after a rest break. At 37, Robert is both older and more experienced than Bonin, with more than double his colleague's total flight hours. The head pilot gets up and gives him the left-hand seat. Despite the gap in seniority and experience, the captain leaves Bonin in charge of the controls.

At 2:02 am, the captain leaves the flight deck to take a nap. Within 15 minutes, everyone aboard the plane will be dead.]

02:03:44 (Bonin) La convergence inter tropicale… voilà, là on est dedans, entre 'Salpu' et 'Tasil.' Et puis, voilà, on est en plein dedans…
The inter-tropical convergence... look, we're in it, between 'Salpu' and 'Tasil.' And then, look, we're right in it...

The intertropical convergence, or ITC, is an area of consistently severe weather near the equator. As is often the case, it has spawned a string of very large thunderstorms, some of which stretch into the stratosphere. Unlike some of the other planes's crews flying in the region this evening, the crew of AF447 has not studied the pattern of storms and requested a divergence around the area of most intense activity. (Salpu and Tasil are two air-traffic-position reporting points.)

02:05:55 (Robert) Oui, on va les appeler derrière... pour leur dire quand même parce que...
Yes, let's call them in the back, to let them know...

Robert pushes the call button.

02:05:59 (flight attendant, heard on the intercom) Oui? Marilyn.
Yes? Marilyn.

02:06:04 (Bonin) Oui, Marilyn, c'est Pierre devant... Dis-moi, dans deux minutes, on devrait attaquer une zone où ça devrait bouger un peu plus que maintenant. Il faudrait vous méfier là.
Yes, Marilyn, it's Pierre up front... Listen, in 2 minutes, we're going to be getting into an area where things are going to be moving around a little bit more than now. You'll want to take care.

02:06:13 (flight attendant) D'accord, on s'assoit alors?
Okay, we should sit down then?

02:06:15 (Bonin) Bon, je pense que ce serait pas mal… tu préviens les copains!
Well, I think that's not a bad idea. Give your friends a heads-up.

02:06:18 (flight attendant) Ouais, OK, j'appelle les autres derrière. Merci beaucoup.
Yeah, okay, I'll tell the others in the back. Thanks a lot.

02:06:19 (Bonin) Mais je te rappelle dès qu'on est sorti de là.
I'll call you back as soon as we're out of it.

02:06:20 (flight attendant) OK.
Okay.

The two copilots discuss the unusually elevated external temperature, which has prevented them from climbing to their desired altitude, and express happiness that they are flying an Airbus 330, which has better performance at altitude than an Airbus 340.

02:06:50 (Bonin) Va pour les anti-ice. C'est toujours ça de pris.
Let's go for the anti-icing system. It's better than nothing.

Because they are flying through clouds, the pilots turn on the anti-icing system to try to keep ice off the flight surfaces; ice reduces the plane's aerodynamic efficiency, weighs it down, and in extreme cases, can cause it to crash.

02:07:00 (Bonin) On est apparemment à la limite de la couche, ça devrait aller.
We seem to be at the end of the cloud layer, it might be okay.

In the meantime Robert has been examining the radar system and has found that it has not been set up in the correct mode. Changing the settings, he scrutinizes the radar map and realizes that they are headed directly toward an area of intense activity.

02:08:03 (Robert) Tu peux éventuellement le tirer un peu à gauche.
You can possibly pull it a little to the left.

02:08:05 (Bonin) Excuse-moi?
Sorry, what?

02:08:07 (Robert) Tu peux éventuellement prendre un peu à gauche. On est d'accord qu'on est en manuel, hein?
You can possibly pull it a little to the left. We're agreed that we're in manual, yeah?

Bonin wordlessly banks the plane to the left. Suddenly, a strange aroma, like an electrical transformer, floods the cockpit, and the temperature suddenly increases. At first, the younger pilot thinks that something is wrong with the air-conditioning system, but Robert assures him that the effect is from the severe weather in the vicinity. Bonin seems ill at ease. Then the sound of slipstream suddenly becomes louder. This, presumably, is due to the accumulation of ice crystals on the exterior of the fuselage. Bonin announces that he is going to reduce the speed of the aircraft, and asks Robert if he should turn on a feature that will prevent the jet engines from flaming out in the event of severe icing.

Just then an alarm sounds for 2.2 seconds, indicating that the autopilot is disconnecting. The cause is the fact that the plane's pitot tubes, externally mounted sensors that determine air speed, have iced over, so the human pilots will now have to fly the plane by hand.

Note, however, that the plane has suffered no mechanical malfunction. Aside from the loss of airspeed indication, everything is working fine. Otelli reports that many airline pilots (and, indeed, he himself) subsequently flew a simulation of the flight from this point and were able to do so without any trouble. But neither Bonin nor Roberts has ever received training in how to deal with an unreliable airspeed indicator at cruise altitude, or in flying the airplane by hand under such conditions.

02:10:06 (Bonin) J'ai les commandes.
I have the controls.

02:10:07 (Robert) D'accord.
Okay.

Perhaps spooked by everything that has unfolded over the past few minutes—the turbulence, the strange electrical phenomena, his colleague's failure to route around the potentially dangerous storm—Bonin reacts irrationally. He pulls back on the side stick to put the airplane into a steep climb, despite having recently discussed the fact that the plane could not safely ascend due to the unusually high external temperature.

Bonin's behavior is difficult for professional aviators to understand. "If he's going straight and level and he's got no airspeed, I don't know why he'd pull back," says Chris Nutter, an airline pilot and flight instructor. "The logical thing to do would be to cross-check"—that is, compare the pilot's airspeed indicator with the co-pilot's and with other instrument readings, such as groundspeed, altitude, engine settings, and rate of climb. In such a situation, "we go through an iterative assessment and evaluation process," Nutter explains, before engaging in any manipulation of the controls. "Apparently that didn't happen."

Almost as soon as Bonin pulls up into a climb, the plane's computer reacts. A warning chime alerts the cockpit to the fact that they are leaving their programmed altitude. Then the stall warning sounds. This is a synthesized human voice that repeatedly calls out, "Stall!" in English, followed by a loud and intentionally annoying sound called a "cricket." A stall is a potentially dangerous situation that can result from flying too slowly. At a critical speed, a wing suddenly becomes much less effective at generating lift, and a plane can plunge precipitously. All pilots are trained to push the controls forward when they're at risk of a stall so the plane will dive and gain speed.

The Airbus's stall alarm is designed to be impossible to ignore. Yet for the duration of the flight, none of the pilots will mention it, or acknowledge the possibility that the plane has indeed stalled—even though the word "Stall!" will blare through the cockpit 75 times. Throughout, Bonin will keep pulling back on the stick, the exact opposite of what he must do to recover from the stall.

02:10:07 (Robert) Qu'est-ce que c'est que ça?
What's this?

02:10:15 (Bonin) On n'a pas une bonne… On n'a pas une bonne annonce de vitesse.
There's no good... there's no good speed indication.

02:10:16 (Robert) On a perdu les, les, les vitesses alors?
We've lost the, the, the speeds, then?

The plane is soon climbing at a blistering rate of 7000 feet per minute. While it is gaining altitude, it is losing speed, until it is crawling along at only 93 knots, a speed more typical of a small Cessna than an airliner. Robert notices Bonin's error and tries to correct him.

02:10:27 (Robert) Faites attention à ta vitesse. Faites attention à ta vitesse.
Pay attention to your speed. Pay attention to your speed.

He is probably referring to the plane's vertical speed. They are still climbing.

02:10:28 (Bonin) OK, OK, je redescends.
Okay, okay, I'm descending.

02:10:30 (Robert) Tu stabilises...
Stabilize…

02:10:31 (Bonin) Ouais.
Yeah.

02:10:31 (Robert) Tu redescends... On est en train de monter selon lui… Selon lui, tu montes, donc tu redescends.
Descend... It says we're going up... It says we're going up, so descend.

02:10:35 (Bonin) D'accord.
Okay.

Thanks to the effects of the anti-icing system, one of the pitot tubes begins to work again. The cockpit displays once again show valid speed information.

02:10:36 (Robert) Redescends!
Descend!

02:10:37 (Bonin) C'est parti, on redescend.
Here we go, we're descending.

02:10:38 (Robert) Doucement!
Gently!

Bonin eases the back pressure on the stick, and the plane gains speed as its climb becomes more shallow. It accelerates to 223 knots. The stall warning falls silent. For a moment, the co-pilots are in control of the airplane.

02:10:41(Bonin) On est en… ouais, on est en "climb."
We're... yeah, we're in a climb.

Yet, still, Bonin does not lower the nose. Recognizing the urgency of the situation, Robert pushes a button to summon the captain.

02:10:49 (Robert) Putain, il est où... euh?
Damn it, where is he?


The plane has climbed to 2512 feet above its initial altitude, and though it is still ascending at a dangerously high rate, it is flying within its acceptable envelope. But for reasons unknown, Bonin once again increases his back pressure on the stick, raising the nose of the plane and bleeding off speed. Again, the stall alarm begins to sound.

Still, the pilots continue to ignore it, and the reason may be that they believe it is impossible for them to stall the airplane. It's not an entirely unreasonable idea: The Airbus is a fly-by-wire plane; the control inputs are not fed directly to the control surfaces, but to a computer, which then in turn commands actuators that move the ailerons, rudder, elevator, and flaps. The vast majority of the time, the computer operates within what's known as normal law, which means that the computer will not enact any control movements that would cause the plane to leave its flight envelope. "You can't stall the airplane in normal law," says Godfrey Camilleri, a flight instructor who teaches Airbus 330 systems to US Airways pilots.

But once the computer lost its airspeed data, it disconnected the autopilot and switched from normal law to "alternate law," a regime with far fewer restrictions on what a pilot can do. "Once you're in alternate law, you can stall the airplane," Camilleri says.

It's quite possible that Bonin had never flown an airplane in alternate law, or understood its lack of restrictions. According to Camilleri, not one of US Airway's 17 Airbus 330s has ever been in alternate law. Therefore, Bonin may have assumed that the stall warning was spurious because he didn't realize that the plane could remove its own restrictions against stalling and, indeed, had done so.

02:10:55 (Robert) Putain!
Damn it!

Another of the pitot tubes begins to function once more. The cockpit's avionics are now all functioning normally. The flight crew has all the information that they need to fly safely, and all the systems are fully functional. The problems that occur from this point forward are entirely due to human error.

02:11:03 (Bonin) Je suis en TOGA, hein?
I'm in TOGA, huh?

Bonin's statement here offers a crucial window onto his reasoning. TOGA is an acronym for Take Off, Go Around. When a plane is taking off or aborting a landing—"going around"—it must gain both speed and altitude as efficiently as possible. At this critical phase of flight, pilots are trained to increase engine speed to the TOGA level and raise the nose to a certain pitch angle.

Clearly, here Bonin is trying to achieve the same effect: He wants to increase speed and to climb away from danger. But he is not at sea level; he is in the far thinner air of 37,500 feet. The engines generate less thrust here, and the wings generate less lift. Raising the nose to a certain angle of pitch does not result in the same angle of climb, but far less. Indeed, it can—and will—result in a descent.

While Bonin's behavior is irrational, it is not inexplicable. Intense psychological stress tends to shut down the part of the brain responsible for innovative, creative thought. Instead, we tend to revert to the familiar and the well-rehearsed. Though pilots are required to practice hand-flying their aircraft during all phases of flight as part of recurrent training, in their daily routine they do most of their hand-flying at low altitude—while taking off, landing, and maneuvering. It's not surprising, then, that amid the frightening disorientation of the thunderstorm, Bonin reverted to flying the plane as if it had been close to the ground, even though this response was totally ill-suited to the situation.

02:11:06 (Robert) Putain, il vient ou il vient pas?
Damn it, is he coming or not?

The plane now reaches its maximum altitude. With engines at full power, the nose pitched upward at an angle of 18 degrees, it moves horizontally for an instant and then begins to sink back toward the ocean.

02:11:21 (Robert) On a pourtant les moteurs! Qu'est-ce qui se passe bordel? Je ne comprends pas ce que se passe.
We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don't understand what's happening.

Unlike the control yokes of a Boeing jetliner, the side sticks on an Airbus are "asynchronous"—that is, they move independently. "If the person in the right seat is pulling back on the joystick, the person in the left seat doesn't feel it," says Dr. David Esser, a professor of aeronautical science at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "Their stick doesn't move just because the other one does, unlike the old-fashioned mechanical systems like you find in small planes, where if you turn one, the [other] one turns the same way." Robert has no idea that, despite their conversation about descending, Bonin has continued to pull back on the side stick.

The men are utterly failing to engage in an important process known as crew resource management, or CRM. They are failing, essentially, to cooperate. It is not clear to either one of them who is responsible for what, and who is doing what. This is a natural result of having two co-pilots flying the plane. "When you have a captain and a first officer in the cockpit, it's clear who's in charge," Nutter explains. "The captain has command authority. He's legally responsible for the safety of the flight. When you put two first officers up front, it changes things. You don't have the sort of traditional discipline imposed on the flight deck when you have a captain."

The vertical speed toward the ocean accelerates. If Bonin were to let go of the controls, the nose would fall and the plane would regain forward speed. But because he is holding the stick all the way back, the nose remains high and the plane has barely enough forward speed for the controls to be effective. As turbulence continues to buffet the plane, it is nearly impossible to keep the wings level.

02:11:32 (Bonin) Putain, j'ai plus le contrôle de l'avion, là! J'ai plus le contrôle de l'avion!
Damn it, I don't have control of the plane, I don't have control of the plane at all!

02:11:37 (Robert) Commandes à gauche!
Left seat taking control!

At last, the more senior of the pilots (and the one who seems to have a somewhat better grasp of the situation) now takes control of the airplane. Unfortunately, he, too, seems unaware of the fact that the plane is now stalled, and pulls back on the stick as well. Although the plane's nose is pitched up, it is descending at a 40-degree angle. The stall warning continues to sound. At any rate, Bonin soon after takes back the controls.

A minute and a half after the crisis began, the captain returns to the cockpit. The stall warning continues to blare.

02:11:43 (Captain) Eh… Qu'est-ce que vous foutez?
What the hell are you doing?

02:11:45 (Bonin) On perd le contrôle de l'avion, là!
We've lost control of the plane!

02:11:47 (Robert) On a totalement perdu le contrôle de l'avion... On comprend rien... On a tout tenté...
We've totally lost control of the plane. We don't understand at all... We've tried everything.

By now the plane has returned to its initial altitude but is falling fast. With its nose pitched 15 degrees up, and a forward speed of 100 knots, it is descending at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute, at an angle of 41.5 degrees. It will maintain this attitude with little variation all the way to the sea. Though the pitot tubes are now fully functional, the forward airspeed is so low—below 60 knots—that the angle-of-attack inputs are no longer accepted as valid, and the stall-warning horn temporarily stops. This may give the pilots the impression that their situation is improving, when in fact it signals just the reverse.

Another of the revelations of Otelli's transcript is that the captain of the flight makes no attempt to physically take control of the airplane. Had Dubois done so, he almost certainly would have understood, as a pilot with many hours flying light airplanes, the insanity of pulling back on the controls while stalled. But instead, he takes a seat behind the other two pilots.

This, experts say, is not so hard to understand. "They were probably experiencing some pretty wild gyrations," Esser says. "In a condition like that, he might not necessarily want to make the situation worse by having one of the crew members actually disengage and stand up. He was probably in a better position to observe and give his commands from the seat behind."

But from his seat, Dubois is unable to infer from the instrument displays in front of him why the plane is behaving as it is. The critical missing piece of information: the fact that someone has been holding the controls all the way back for virtually the entire time. No one has told Dubois, and he hasn't thought to ask.

02:12:14 (Robert) Qu'est-ce que tu en penses? Qu'est-ce que tu en penses? Qu'est-ce qu'il faut faire?
What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?

02:12:15 (Captain) Alors, là, je ne sais pas!
Well, I don't know!

As the stall warning continues to blare, the three pilots discuss the situation with no hint of understanding the nature of their problem. No one mentions the word "stall." As the plane is buffeted by turbulence, the captain urges Bonin to level the wings—advice that does nothing to address their main problem. The men briefly discuss, incredibly, whether they are in fact climbing or descending, before agreeing that they are indeed descending. As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in "dual input" mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. The nose remains high.

02:13:40 (Robert) Remonte... remonte... remonte... remonte...
Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin) Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l'heure!
But I've had the stick back the whole time!

At last, Bonin tells the others the crucial fact whose import he has so grievously failed to understand himself.

02:13:42 (Captain) Non, non, non... Ne remonte pas... non, non.
No, no, no... Don't climb... no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert) Alors descends... Alors, donne-moi les commandes... À moi les commandes!
Descend, then... Give me the controls... Give me the controls!

Bonin yields the controls, and Robert finally puts the nose down. The plane begins to regain speed. But it is still descending at a precipitous angle. As they near 2000 feet, the aircraft's sensors detect the fast-approaching surface and trigger a new alarm. There is no time left to build up speed by pushing the plane's nose forward into a dive. At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his side stick all the way back.

02:14:23 (Robert) Putain, on va taper... C'est pas vrai!
Damn it, we're going to crash... This can't be happening!

02:14:25 (Bonin) Mais qu'est-ce que se passe?
But what's happening?

02:14:27 (Captain) 10 degrès d'assiette...
Ten degrees of pitch...

Exactly 1.4 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder stops.

___

Today the Air France 447 transcripts yield information that may ensure that no airline pilot will ever again make the same mistakes. From now on, every airline pilot will no doubt think immediately of AF447 the instant a stall-warning alarm sounds at cruise altitude. Airlines around the world will change their training programs to enforce habits that might have saved the doomed airliner: paying closer attention to the weather and to what the planes around you are doing; explicitly clarifying who's in charge when two co-pilots are alone in the cockpit; understanding the parameters of alternate law; and practicing hand-flying the airplane during all phases of flight.

But the crash raises the disturbing possibility that aviation may well long be plagued by a subtler menace, one that ironically springs from the never-ending quest to make flying safer. Over the decades, airliners have been built with increasingly automated flight-control functions. These have the potential to remove a great deal of uncertainty and danger from aviation. But they also remove important information from the attention of the flight crew. While the airplane's avionics track crucial parameters such as location, speed, and heading, the human beings can pay attention to something else. But when trouble suddenly springs up and the computer decides that it can no longer cope—on a dark night, perhaps, in turbulence, far from land—the humans might find themselves with a very incomplete notion of what's going on. They'll wonder: What instruments are reliable, and which can't be trusted? What's the most pressing threat? What's going on? Unfortunately, the vast majority of pilots will have little experience in finding the answers.

[Icarus2001]

Whether we like it or not experience becomes a decreasing factor; the economics decree the demise of the flight deck crew; it will take time but this is the way of the future. Whilst I agree that it is technically possible all parties like the thought of someone at the front, where it hits first often, being as interested as the passengers in getting there safely.

Trains move in two dimensions along fixed rails and can stop at ANY time if there is a problem. So why then do we still have train drivers?

Yes there are a handful of driverless trains around the world. Japan, Docklands light rail etc but the large proportion still have drivers. Why?

When all trains operate driverless then you may see more push for aircraft without crew at the front. Even the US UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) still have pilots at the controls. It is just that the controls and pilots are thousands of miles away connected by a data link.

[27/09]

The process is already in place; the second officer is redundant with the first officer rapidly following.

A scary thought and probably true if some managers get their way. Have they thought it through though? Where do they get their single pilot Captains from?

[27/09]

Even the US UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) still have pilots at the controls. It is just that the controls and pilots are thousands of miles away connected by a data link. And they still crash.

Actually I see ATC, especially enroute controllers being automated out of the system well before pilots are made redundant by automation.

[Captain Nomad]

There are so many lessons that can be learned from the Air France accident and I won't attempt to even try and cover them.

It's a heart-rending transcript and one still can't help but wonder if the Airbus control system was somewhat more 'conventional' then the crew would have been able to come to grips with what was going on an aweful lot quicker.

This bit of crucial information that comes too late is one of the saddest quotes in the whole transcript: But I've had the stick back the whole time! It is right up there with But what's happening?

The Captian walking in saying What the hell are you doing? would have been able to SEE what control inputs were being made in a traditional cockpit.

This situation could have been averted in a conventional control cockpit: As the plane approaches 10,000 feet, Robert tries to take back the controls, and pushes forward on the stick, but the plane is in "dual input" mode, and so the system averages his inputs with those of Bonin, who continues to pull back. The nose remains high.


This final death knell would also have been observable: At any rate, without warning his colleagues, Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his side stick all the way back.


Why Airbus, why?! Sometimes I really have a love/hate relationship with modern technology...

[Captain Nomad]

Wow... I'm gobsmacked! :ugh:

Merry Christmas to you too buddy. Enjoy, by the sound of it you'll be a very lucky boy to see a lifetime of them the way you and your mates are going...:=

One final word: you don't know what you don't know. Think about that before accusing people here that THEY know nothing about something.

[waren9]

Disagree Nomad

1. Having the stick back the whole time tells me that the boy hadn't yet learned to how fly. Keeping the stick hard back is not a natural reaction for someone with no FBW time.

2. His offsider had plenty of time during the descent to see where the other stick was. A significant part of 2 pilot flying is making it your job to know what the other guy is up to. Especially when the sticks aren't linked.

2 guys f.'d up deluxe. Shame they took the rest of the plane with them.

"This plane flies like any other". Its true.

[Mud Skipper]

GoMad,

Yep I flew that piece of Sh1t also.

Fact is experience counts, that's why airbus put that red button on the sidestick, "Priority L/R", would have saved the day if a pilot knew what he was doing but then he would probably have flown around the weather in the first place just as other aircraft had.

Merry Christmas

[DirectAnywhere]

Many is the time I've flown to or from SE Asia at night behind say China Southern or Asiana and gone around a buildup just to see their strobes and beacon disappear into the cloud. They've always reappeared on the other side but when you see a properly calibrated radar throw up solid yellows and reds and then see someone fly through it you do tend to wonder what is going on on that flightdeck.

Still, they're cheap. :ugh:

Also, to read that transcript is truly frightening. As a professional pilot I think,'What did they miss, could I have done better?' and try and think on a dark night, in cloud, in a real aeroplane and not a sim WOULD I have been able to do better? I would seriously hope so but these were three well trained and, apart from one of them, experienced pilots but confusion reigned. Something went seriously awry with their training and operation that night.

At the end of the day people remember that first lesson POWER + ATTITUDE = PERFORMANCE.

[psycho joe]

The AF447 accident would be a genuinely very interesting discussion with education potential written all over it. Unfortunately on "PPRUNE-downhere" it's only worthy of being used as a tenuous thread to bolster a mob-mentality, whereby people can combine their hated of jetstar with their pass-time of slagging off cadets.

If anyone with serious A330 time has anything to contribute, particularly with regard to whether it would even be possible to recover a deeply stalled 330, expected alt loss, use of flap etc etc it would be very interesting to know.

Do any such Pilot's still exist on PPRUNE.



Anyway, back to the serious stuff:

Cadets suck.
GA pilots rule, or to put it another way;

Im a GA pilot who feels threatened by Cadets, so I'll jump on PPRUNE and make tenuous claims about how GA time could in any be related to flying a jet. Other GA pilots and Jet spotters will applaud my sound reasoning and obvious command presence, because after all doing something stupid ("scareing yourself") in GA somehow can be morphed into the deluded belief that it is building character and an essential experience to that Jet job, if only the airlines realized that I posess the "right-stuff". Of course it beggars belief that the few actual jet pilots will interject with something rational, but never fear they will be drowned out by the shear awesomeness that is someone pretending to have a friggin clue.

Of course, whilst slagging off cadet's, over whom I reign supreme, the great thing is that I also get to slag off jetstar. Because they suck. But mostly because they are hiring cadets and not me. I despise the airline, although if they call i'll step over my own mother to get into the QANTAS system even if it is jetstar. The great thing is that even people who haven't got a pilots licence of any sort will come here to help me slag off jetstar AND cadets.

But wait, what if we could also gather together the people who hate CASA. Nobody likes CASA so it must be their fault that I'm not being hired by jetstar, the company that I hate (but not really). We could find all manner of people who have run foul of CASA to join us. Of course they're just innocent victims of cadets just like me.

And what about AF447, if I can't blame the cadets then surely I can argue that the aircraft is too complex for their lack of keenly honed GA skills.

Does that about sum it up?

[waren9]

You're closer than you think, Joe.

then surely I can argue that the aircraft is too complex for their lack of keenly honed GA skills.

Atleast GA will teach you to fly.

[tobz92_ymen]

because 2000 hours in a 182 doing meat bombing vfr is really gonna help you in a jet, or at least let you be accepted by the other 'boys' that you've done the hard yards (whether or not is beneficial one bit) unlike those cadets who havent been exposed to dodgy operators and unsafe work practices and had to deal with pumping avgas straight out of the barrels which we all know is essential and a necessary requirement to fly a jet these days

[Flava Saver]

It's not about being "accepted" by the boys. Far from it.

The cadets are very nice guys. 'Most' are fitting in. 'Some' are learning the hard way (Gen Y) not by Skippers, but by the Cabin Crew pulling them into line that it's not all image and Ray Bans. :=

But most are certainly green when it comes to abnormals, be it some ECAMS, Weather, or general airline left of centre stuff that happens, day in, day out.

And guess what? Line FOs that have done 10 yrs or whatever their story is, in GA (dodgy operators or whatever the stereotype is being made), seem to have a sense of maturity to the exposure.

I'm not against cadets one bit. Far from it. But in the back seat, not the right hand seat for the first year or two in an airline in my opinion. The holes are lining up I'm afraid.

[HF3000]

I dare anyone to deny that if the pilot at the controls had even a few hundred hours doing G/A IFR work in a non-Airbus aircraft he would have had sufficient base experience to have reverted to attitude+thrust as soon as he felt the aircraft was out of his control.

Not cadet bashing, but in this incident, the evidence is clear as day.

[AnQrKa]

“Even the US UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) still have pilots at the controls.”

Not anymore.

“This situation could have been averted in a conventional control cockpit:”

This exact accident has happened in several “traditional cockpits” including modern glass jets.

“particularly with regard to whether it would even be possible to recover a deeply stalled 330”

Of course it’s possible. BUT, having pulled close to full back stick for so long, the stab would have crept to full nose up and can take up to ONE MINUTE for it to return to neutral with full forward stick. This is a long time for a confused crew who are getting stall warnings AND overspeed warnings at the same time and are not fully clear as to what problem is affecting them.

This was a totally save able situation BUT its arrogant to take the high moral ground when analyzing from the arm chair. Accidents have occurred at the hands of the most experienced crews. The AF crash unfolded VERY quickly with a failure that has caught more than one experienced Airbus pilot unaware. These guys had more master cautions and warnings and ECAMS being thrown at them in one minute than most of us have had in a 4-hour sim mission.

I am glad it didn’t happen to me in the middle of the night with heavy eyelids.

Incoming………

[wishiwasupthere]

“Even the US UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) still have pilots at the controls.”

Not anymore.

Care to back that up with proof? And not just experimental use of not using a man in the loop, but widespread use. I can guarantee that 99.99% of UAVs flying around the world (certainly in a military sense) aren't doing so completely autonomously.

[KRUSTY 34]

In recent times I've been looking closely at the AF447 thread(s) over in Tech Log. Lots of opinions, enormous amounts of Technical babble, and even some straight shooting no nonsense stuff! CaptainCloudbuster however IMO has succintly captured the essence of this disaster. What a surreal and unbelievable realisation by the Captain at the very end that he has presided over the loss of everything!

As far as the benefits of GA vs Cadet, an interesting point was made by our head of Check and Training when our first cadets were doing their endorsements in the Sim. He said to me, "Krusty, they're bright, they're sharp, they're eager to learn. BUT, I get the impression they don't really believe the thing can crash!"

Now wheather or not that was true for most or all of them I cannot say. I know the head of C&T is not one who is prone to exagerate. Our operation is somewhat more "Grass Roots" than International heavy Jet transport, so I'm reasonably confident that any such impressions by these guys would by now have been dispelled.

It does however highlight the fact that on evidence, perhaps this crew found it difficult to come to grips with that very fact!:sad:

[Keg]

“Even the US UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) still have pilots at the controls.”

Not anymore

Yes, and the Iranians have good evidence on how foolproof that technology is. :rolleyes:

[Dark Knight]

CRA daily operates driverless ore trains and trucks in the Pilbara (and just purchased an additional large number of trucks) apparently driven from within a warehouse in Perth.

Doubtless the have done the studies and accept the inevitable `hull loss' as a deductable business expense.

Recently had a direct entry pilot who had paid for his commercial, ATP plus his A320 rating and 200 hours on type; total around 450 hours. Doing the airline entry simulator sessions (some 15 sessions) in a B737 200/300 sim with manual thrust and little autopilot use it was clearly evident a great lacking in manipulative skills. Particularly so in maintaing the aircraft in trim and flying it; needless to say such things as the SID/Departure went by the board.

The airline he will be as an F/O with operates A320s and I strongly suggest within 6 month any manipulative skills which were refreshed will have disappeared continuing to do so as time passes.

Automatics will be the only thing which will save him in the future assuming they are correctly programmed.

Should they be monitored from the ground and with computer in `real time' monitoring then he may have a long career.

It is no use denying, refusing to accept the concepts of decreasing crew numbers in the flight deck when historically the numbers have continuously reduced and technology is daily in use doing the task.

It may be argued accepting and moving towards this concept would be a safer route to go than manual skills?

The move to MCP tends to supplement this line of thinking where actual aircraft flying skills will increasingly be replaced by simulator time.

[Chimbu chuckles]

CRA daily operates driverless ore trains and trucks in the Pilbara (and just purchased an additional large number of trucks) apparently driven from within a warehouse in Perth.

Doubtless the have done the studies and accept the inevitable `hull loss' as a deductable business expense.

Yeah I can see parallels between a load of coal and 300+ human beings:ugh:

Recently had a direct entry pilot who had paid for his commercial, ATP plus his A320 rating and 200 hours on type; total around 450 hours. Doing the airline entry simulator sessions (some 15 sessions) in a B737 200/300 sim with manual thrust and little autopilot use it was clearly evident a great lacking in manipulative skills. Particularly so in maintaing the aircraft in trim and flying it; needless to say such things as the SID/Departure went by the board.

The airline he will be as an F/O with operates A320s and I strongly suggest within 6 month any manipulative skills which were refreshed will have disappeared continuing to do so as time passes.

Automatics will be the only thing which will save him in the future assuming they are correctly programmed.

Should they be monitored from the ground and with computer in `real time' monitoring then he may have a long career.

How about this for a concept? If he can't demonstrate the required skills in a simulator he doesn't get a career.

It is no use denying, refusing to accept the concepts of decreasing crew numbers in the flight deck when historically the numbers have continuously reduced and technology is daily in use doing the task.

It is worth denying - there will never be less than 2 pilots on the flight deck of a high capacity jet. Its the cheapest thing in the cockpit.

It may be argued accepting and moving towards this concept would be a safer route to go than manual skills?

No it can't - whats unsafe about developing/practicing/maintaining manual skills in a simulator?

The move to MCP tends to supplement this line of thinking where actual aircraft flying skills will increasingly be replaced by simulator time.

Surely you mean actual flying experience rather than skills?

AF447 is not the first or last A330 to suffer this type of failure - its just the first where the pilots crashed the aircraft straight after. It just so happens the two pilots were ex cadets - albeit with 9000hrs between them - and they were unable to fly the aircraft straight and level (ish). No one expected them to fly the aircraft to check ride tolerances just don't haul the side stick full aft and hold it there all the way into the sea. If they sat there with their hands in their laps after hitting the captain call button the aircraft would likely have meandered on until the captain could regain his seat FFS!!

[bankrunner]

Care to back that up with proof? And not just experimental use of not using a man in the loop, but widespread use. I can guarantee that 99.99% of UAVs flying around the world (certainly in a military sense) aren't doing so completely autonomously.

They don't have pilots in the traditional sense, ie someone with with any sort of qualification that would allow them to fly a manned helicopter or aeroplane. They're trained specifically as UAV operators. Unlike pilots of manned aircraft, they also often come from the enlisted ranks.

That said, UAVs in theatre routinely spend a lot of time station keeping autonomously with nobody watching it particularly closely.

[wishiwasupthere]

They don't have pilots in the traditional sense, ie someone with with any sort of qualification that would allow them to fly a manned helicopter or aeroplane. They're trained specifically as UAV operators. Unlike pilots of manned aircraft, they also often come from the enlisted ranks.


Getting a bit off subject, but thats not entirely true. Larger UAVs (think Preds/Reaper and larger) are still flown largely by traditional pilots (I think the USAF has dabbled in using non aircrew officers to fly UAVs, but they still get trained up to at least PPL level). Certainly the Americans, Brits, us and even the Canucks use qualified pilots for there larger UAVs.

Smaller tactical UAVs (from 'backpack' UAVs up to ScanEagle size) are not usually flown by qualified pilots. Australian ScanEagles were flown by artillery corps troops. God help us all!

As far as enlisted ranks vs officers being pilots, well there was no problem doing that during WWII, and even now the US Army uses Warrant Officers as helicopter pilots, but thats a whole other argument thats been done to death over on the Military Forum.

[AnQrKa]

I will expand on my point.

UAV's are more frequently operated by people who have never stepped foot in a cockpit. Call them pilots if you want too.

"there will never be less than 2 pilots on the flight deck of a high capacity jet. Its the cheapest thing in the cockpit."

The pilots are the only cost in the cockpit. Is there anyone else up there earning a salary?

"If they sat there with their hands in their laps after hitting the captain call button the aircraft would likely have meandered on until the captain could regain his seat FFS!!"

Chimbu,

Depending on the precise nature of the failure causing problems with air data information, the bus could be in a situation where the very last thing it would have done is “meander”. I suspect you have never flown the bus? It may have been a situation where simple lack of airspeed was only part of the problem.

[Chimbu chuckles]

We know what the precise nature of the problem was...'unreliable airspeed' is the page header in a Boeing QRH. The stream of data sent to AF via ACARS confirmed what the nature of the non normal was. The aircraft was giving the crew the info they needed but nothing I have seen suggests the two FOs spent any time working through the ECAM warnings - there were two or three dead give aways in that list.

They still had a PFD/ND/Engine instruments (except maybe EPR) and a GPS derived Ground Speed.

Call me picky but what else do you need to fly straight and level?

No never flown a Bus - many of my mates do, some even Check and Train on them - very happy in the 777 thank you very much.

Two well trained pilots are the cheapest thing you can put in a cockpit - compared to the billions that would be wasted certifying, or trying to, a computer to do it.

Humans are fallible yes - that applies equally to computer programmers as it does to pilots. If they have proved nothing else Airbus designers have proved that.

[KRUSTY 34]

I know I keep saying it, but in Australia we have Cadets for one reason and one reason only...

They're CHEAP!

[BombsGone]

And UAVs of all types crash at around 30 times the rate of manned aircraft. Automatics are far from perfect, when they work their great, but when they don't they crash, badly.

[Chimbu chuckles]

c173 while Australia and PNG GA have been the training grounds for a LOT of very successful and highly skilled airline pilots its also supplied quite a few absolute dickheads.

Cadetships supply utter dickheads too.

% wise its probably a wash.

In the old days you could beat the ******** out of most and fail/sack the died in the wool dickheads - now that is against the law.

GA without structure and self discipline is NOT the same as the old 3rd level airline system was years ago - The Kendals/Hazos/Talair/Tillair type companies that supplied a LOT of pilots with LOTS of HIGH quality experience.

Having said that I am sick to death with the mantra of 2000hr meat bombing GA cowboys - that I suspect is MOSTLY propagated by cadets because thats what they are told by HR - 2000hr meat bombing cowboys NEVER got into airlines.

[donpizmeov]

Sorry C173, I think I miss your point. Whats your no come back argument?

Cadets have been happening throughout the world for some time. Its only now that Oz GA pilots are finding that they can no longer buy their type rating and their jet job, because someone else has bought the type rating before them, that it seems to have become a problem. It would seem that the conditions of employment for these cadets was agreed upon by the federation and the Jetstar pilot body, so why should anyone not in this group care? Unless it stops them buying their own way in.
If the quality of the graduated cadet released to line seems be a problem, it would be a problem with the training department for not doing their job correctly. If there is a problem with the ex GA skygod captains flying with graduated cadets, it would once again be a problem with the training department for the quality of its command course.
Where I work at the moment, cadets graduate straight to the right hand seat of the A330 or B777. They are required to pass the same checks to the same standard as none cadet FOs. If they can't, they are either retrained or dismissed. The next flight after they graduate may be over the Bay of Bengal in the middle of the monsoon, or to Moscow in the middle of winter. When they achieve 6000hrs, they are eligible for a command. They complete the same upgrade course to the same standard as everyone else or they don't pass.
This company has been hiring between 500 to 700 pilots a year from many years. At the moment they are taking all the ex ryan air and easy jet ex cadets they can get, as they are very happy with the high standard of the product that is produced. At these companies ex cadet FOs may be offered commands on A320s or B737 with as little as 2500hrs.
The best experience for a future A320/B737 captain is to fly a A320/B737 and to be taught how to operate it correctly. Working for a GA company being paid under award salaries, flying antique aircraft VFR may prepare you for the ever decreasing T&Cs of the aviation industry (see the above about buying type ratings etc), but does little else.
If you go the GA route enjoy the flying and the variety and the special locations. Just because you have done the hard yards does not entitle you anything except more hard yards. The world has moved on. If you go the Cadet route be careful hiring a light aircraft for that weekend fly away, as you will have no idea of how those small aircraft work.

The Don

[AnQrKa]

Chimbu,

Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.

Again, sitting on ones hands in such a situation would not work.

I ask you, why did an experienced crew crash an MD11 recently in NRT. Why did an experienced crew crash a 737 in Jamaica recently?

Are these accidents not debated so much simply because they were not crewed by cadets?

[andrewr]

At the end of the day people remember that first lesson POWER + ATTITUDE = PERFORMANCE

This might be one reason the crew were confused. If I recall correctly most of the way down they had TOGA thrust and about 11 degree nose up attitude. That power + attitude in normal circumstances should presumably result in climb not descent. The problem was the flight path was about 40 degrees downwards and the aircraft was stalled.

I see power + attitude = performance repeated over and over but it is only true in specific circumstances. Those circumstances apply virtually all the time for commercial flying, but AF447 escaped them.

The real equation is power + attitude + AOA + weight = performance (and you could probably add other factors too).

Power + attitude = performance is a good approximation, when flying on the front side of the power curve. Not so good where AF447 found themselves.

Also, IIRC the stall warning was confusing as the AOA was out of range much of the time and the stall warning didn't sound. It only sounded when they input forward stick, the aircraft began to recover and the AOA returned to the "valid" range.

It's easy to say a better pilot would have recovered, but think about what they saw:
- TOGA thrust and 11 degrees nose up attitude
- Instruments say they are descending
- Low airspeed value
- Stall warning sounds when they give forward stick

It sounds confusing to me. How many pilots could really recover the aircraft, on instruments from this situation with no forewarning? How many might decide the pitot/static and stall indications appeared to be unreliable, and fly power + attitude = performance e.g. TOGA thrust & 11 degrees nose up attitude?

[donpizmeov]

c173,

I guess I just can't see why you would suggest Australian pilots are better than any others. I have flown and worked with good pilots from all over the world. I have also flown and worked with some shockers, Australians included. There are lots of Oz pilots around the world because Oz aviation is a ever degenerating sheltered workshop. I am not sure if flying up and down the east coast qualifies anyone as the "worlds best pilots". I think the real world extends far beyond Australia's beautiful shores.

Does the cadet pilot pass the same CPL ATPL exams to the same standard as your normal pilot? Does the cadet pilot have to pass the MCIR to the same standard as your normal pilot? Does the cadet pilot have to pass his type rating course to the same standard as the non cadet? Times are changing mate. Not saying its all good or right, but I don't think the cadet is the problem here.

The Don

[donpizmeov]

Andrewr,

15 nose up and TOGA will work below 10000'. It will not work at FL380. Normal cruise attitude at .82 is around 2.5 degrees up. To increase this to 15 nose up, even with what power TOGA would give up there will never have a happy ending. The 330 has not got the performance to sustain even 10 nose up at an ALT near max or even optimum. To recover an upset at altitude you would need to lower to/or below normal cruise attitude to recover speed.
The big problem with this accident is that situational awareness was lost, and never regained. The unreliable airspeed recall is useful if this happens down low, but ain't gonna work if you use the same numbers up high. Luckily this has been learned from this accident and is being reenforced/taught by a lot of airlines now.

The Don

[bingo doubt]

Andrewr - finally someone with a clue

It's a thread drift but I'll continue...

I'm going to wager that very few besides those piloting the military types have experienced flying (and recovering) a jet in the high alpha regime.

For their various sins some get around in the 1:1 thrust ratio types, and routinely exploit the high AOA spectrum, recognising full well that while yanking on 30+ alpha provides instantaneous turn rate, it also comes with the penalty of energy bleed rate. We're talking lots of knots per second wiped off the dial. No problem if it's planned, all it requires is an extended period of stick forward back into single digit alpha and we're accelerating (and flying in the classical sense) again, but not before significant altitude is lost.

Not a problem for someone who routinely flies in this regime, but who really see this type of flying ever?

I don't think it's too long a bow to draw to assume the AF guys had never experienced high AOA flight. Why would they? Airliners don't go there, right?

POWER + ATTITUDE does not always = PERFORMANCE

[Tankengine]

Power + attitude = performance only when not stalled!

It should have been more obvious to them that they were stalled, full forward stick PLUS forward manual trim was required as the autotrim probably wound in full back stabiliser.

Not enough pilots see effective stall training in any aircraft.:ugh:

By that I mean NOT immediately recovering but holding in full backstick for some time and then reducing AoA to recover and feeling/seeing the results.

Too many instructors are scared of stalls/spins.:=

The junior F/O who kept pulling backstick was a huge part of this crash!

Airbus would have shown dual imput at times but not having a visual que for the other pilots as to the fact he was holding in full backstick was also a huge factor.:ooh:

[PLovett]

I understand that QF A330 drivers have been briefed by Airbus as to the AF447 crash following the recovery of the "black" boxes. What I have been told (second-hand) is that the problem was the iced pitot tubes were sending corrupt information to the computers. This in turn prevented the computers in protecting the aircraft from going into a stall.

When the autopilot disconnected in the turbulence the aircraft started to lose height. The crew followed their trained procedure by setting the throttles and holding back stick. However as the computers were receiving corrupt information as to speed they did not protect the aircraft and the aircraft stalled and remained stalled because of the back pressure on the side-stick.

Now we can argue all we like about how we would have recognised that the aircraft was stalled and we would have lowered the nose etc etc. But lets place ourselves in that cockpit; its a dark and stormy night, we are fatigued as it is a flight on the back-side of the clock and the aircraft is not responding in the way it should to what we have been trained to do. A test pilot may have thought something along the lines of......"well that's not working, let's try something else"......but an airline crew stepping outside of SOPs' and training?

Airline economics will continue to see cadets being trained in Australia. The problem for the industry is to see that the lowest cost training model, as evidenced by Jetstar, does not become the standard.

For those who believe that pilots will only discuss at length incidents or crashes involving cadets I suggest that you get out of the DG&P site and visit Rumours & News where they will find crashes and incidents of all kinds dissected at length.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Bus SOPs say when heavy and high and suffering an unreliable airspeed non normal pull full aft side stick and set TOGA?

Sorry I just don't accept that.

So the pilots were not following SOPS?

It doesn't take a Test Pilot to NOT stall in the first place.

We've all done 'unreliable airspeed' in the sim both before and after AF447 - hands up who buried the stick in their gut and held it there? Yes it can be a work out but come on - if your basic manual flying skills are sound its not THAT hard.

Chimbu,

Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.

Boeing can give overspeed and stall warning simultaneously too - only difference is they don't unilaterally pitch up.

That is just another charming little 'design feature' of the Bus only a PHd could dream up.

You haven't seen, and won't see, me bash cadets in this thread...or any other.

[Joker89]

Are high altitude stall recoveries not part of initial and recurrent training on the A330. Why in alternate law was there no stick pusher stall protection.
You would think that in this scenario, with loss of airspeed indications, Is when you would need it most.

Back on topic. GA guys flying single pilot turbo props IFR have the toughest jobs in industry surely they have what's needed to be the back up captain.

[psycho joe]

Bus SOPs say when heavy and high and suffering an unreliable airspeed non normal pull full aft side stick and set TOGA?



No they don't, but the SOP's do call for full backstick for EGPWS and up to full backstick and nearly 18 deg nose up for windshear in normal law.

I can't help but wonder if Bonin was simply subconciously reverting to a muscle memmory type response or similar.

the A330 design really can't be blamed here it acted beautifully. It got confused so it handed all controll back to the humans just as you would want it to. It even remained stable enough in a deep stall for the wings to stay levelled. Unfortunately the humans didn't follow the published attitude/thrust settings for an airspeed unreliable, they didn't seem to realize that they were in alt law, they didn't seem to realize that stall stall is a function of alpha vanes and not AIS so they WERE stalling.

[waren9]

Joker89, depending on level of degredation low speed stabilty protection is available in alternate law.

[Sue Ridgepipe]

do you agree australia has some/most of the best pilots in the world? i don't think many disagree with that...

c173 you seem to belong to that rather large group of arrogant Australians who believe that no one else kows how to fly an aeroplane. I guess that kinda limits your options when you go on holidays.

[Oxidant]

do you agree australia has some/most of the best pilots in the world? i don't think many disagree with that

You might find a few (thousands) that would.............

c173 you seem to belong to that rather large group of arrogant Australians who believe that no one else kows how to fly an aeroplane

Rings a bell...........

and what makes you think they are not

Point proven................:rolleyes:

[PLovett]

chuckles, I think you misunderstood me as have several other posters here.

Firstly, the crew followed SOPs' (and training) by applying full back stick and throttle to regain the height from the upset caused by the autopilot disconnection. It would have worked but for the problem caused by the iced pitot tubes of which they were not aware therefore their actions caused the aircraft to stall. What the crew needed to do was to not follow their training (and SOPs') and lower the nose.

Secondly, the crew were not aware of the corrupted information coming from the pitot tubes. If they had been aware of the problem they may have approached the whole issue differently depending on their training.

The basic point was that the aircraft was not doing what it says on the box. All the fancy software that is designed to protect the aircraft was not working because of a problem of which the crew were unaware, and it would appear, their training was not sufficient to cover an alternative approach to the problem.

[Tankengine]

Plovett,


BS!:ugh:

No SOP for full backstick at high altitude.:=

The crew and aircraft combination killed them,

IF the Captain had been in his seat then things probably would have been different.:hmm:

Well trained and experienced pilots [of any nationality] should have sorted this out instead of holding backstick into the sea!:ugh:

[Captain Dart]

These people advocating 'full back stick' in a jet transport at high altitude are a real worry...who are they flying for ? :eek:

[Gligg]

There seems to be a distinct lack of the KISS principle at play... I have had the Airspeed on an EFIS go screwy. Seeing I wasn't smart enough to analyse all the permutations and combinations of what the computer may or may not be doing, I held a straight and level attitude on the AH and checked I had cruise power set (as per my initial IFR training in a rickety old Seminole) Seemed to work out ok...

[FlareArmed]

IMHO the key to having a safe operation with cadets is the quality of the Captains. The RAAF have had low-time pilots (with varying ability) in the RHS of transport aircraft for years, but there is a high level of formal supervision compared to airlines through the process of flight authorisation (getting an "auth"). This means that the Flight Commander (or "autho") will considers who flies with who on what mission in what conditions.

For example, a Flight Commander worth his salt would not pair a green co-pilot with a below-average Captain to carry out a demanding task. A squadron is small enough to manage that but the problem with an airline is, once a low-time pilot is qualified as an FO, they are paired with any Captain. We all know that amongst airline Captains, there is a diverse range of ability from barely-competent to walk-on-water. An airline Fleet Manager is hardly going to look at todays flight to a demanding destination, check the weather, and decide that Captain Bloggs and FO Newbie is the wrong crew for the conditions. That won't work in a cookie-cutter world.

IMHO, cadets need to be paired with highly-competent "old bolds" for an extended period. That means their line-training period should be more like 1000-1500 hours with an above-average Captain that maintains a reasonably steep gradient to keep the operation safe while bloggs learns the ropes.

BTW, 2 degrees nose-down and idle keeps you out of a lot of trouble in a high-level UA – keep it simple.

[Dark Knight]

Yeah I can see parallels between a load of coal and 300+ human beings

From a management point of view 40,000 tonne of coal, 200 freight cars plus 3 or 4 locos, several kilometres of track with associated bridges, culverts, signalling equipment, etc probably equals one aircraft hull loss, 300 lives and associated peripheral damage. All actuarially accounted and insured.
If he can't demonstrate the required skills in a simulator he doesn't get a career

He had previously demonstrated sufficient skills to get a job as a F/O with a carrier (one you or I would not fly with!) to get his 200 hours A320 time and with a lot of instructor work progressed to a stage of demonstrating sufficient skill to progress to the next stage. The next stage was back to A320 (and I am not knocking Airbus) where within 6 months I suggest any manipulative skills which were refreshed will have disappeared continuing to do so as time passes. Exposure and experience may help but the future is reliance upon more and more automatics with SOPs developed around this concept.

whats unsafe about developing/practicing/maintaining manual skills in a simulator?
Not a thing however, does it replace actual experience? Supplement real time experience yes but it only forms a very small part of the overall operation and I suggest if anything the AF A330 demonstrates where it can all go pear shaped rapidly.
Stall Recovery? Wings Level, Nose Down, Max Power; Recover Airspeed, Attitude & Altitude

there will never be less than 2 pilots on the flight deck of a high capacity jet. It’s the cheapest thing in the cockpit


Management do not see pilots as being the cheapest thing on the flight deck regardless of what we may like to think and the cost of creating a pilot via a cadetship if the airline is paying for it is a considerable outlay; of course where management have created a situation where the pilot is dumb enough to pay for this then management’s cost is significantly reduced. Compared to automatics I would argue long term and with continued development and reliability the long term cost advantages of automatics is considerable.

Reference the 2 pilots in the cockpit I refer to the daily use of UAVs (and regardless of the unsubstantiated statement; `And UAVs of all types crash at around 30 times the rate of manned aircraft’) the evidence suggest to the contrary.

The increasing use and reliability of automatics/technology
CRA unmanned trucks & trains increasing
Passengers daily step off an aircraft onto an unmanned bus or train to transport them to the next destination without knowledge or a thought about who or what is driving the thing.
The high SPEED trains throughout the world (350 passengers plus) have only ONE driver being largely automated, computer monitored.
People, we, accept technology reasonably readily; when we check in we have little qualms about seat assignment via the internet, check in at the automated kiosk & use the baggage drop all eliminating the `counter jumpers’. At the supermarket, Coles & Woolworths, and Bunnings we increasingly use the automated self checkout eliminating the `checkout chicks’.


That is, people do and will accept change.


I do not necessarily agree or like the way it is going but this however, it is the way of the world and it has been ever thus since the beginning and certainly throughout my career DC3s to A380/B747 800, UAVs, etc.


Perhaps, instead of clinging to outmoded philosophies of minimum 1500 hours, etc we need to review our thinking to adjust to the future technologies.

[psycho joe]

BTW, 2 degrees nose-down and idle keeps you out of a lot of trouble in a high-level UA – keep it simple

This is an argument for dedicated cadetships. This action might work on some aircraft, but applied to an A330 it would yield some spectacular results.

This wasn't a situation whereby there was no procedure so the crew had to make one up by relying on their GA knowledge of light aircraft.

[Sunfish]

The trouble, Dark Night, is that when terrestrial automated transport experiences a fault, it fails gracefully and stops on the road. Even a ship can often anchor.

Aircraft don't have that characteristic when they fail.

Furthermore, there is the little question of authority and responsibility in the event of an accident.

I would prefer that a knowledgeable person, who is going to die along with the passengers if anything goes wrong, supervises the despatch and conduct of the flight. I prefer this because of the phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility will preclude a court attaching blame to criminally negligent individuals associated with the despatch of said aircraft.

In risk-taking literature, diffusion of responsibility occurs when individual members of a group feel less personal responsibility for potential failure in the pursuit of risky options than if acting alone.


Diffusion of responsibility - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffusion_of_responsibility)

I suppose we could solve that problem by fitting the engineers, despatchers and operations managers of said unmanned flights with explosive collars that would be automatically triggered by the aircrafts demise.

[KRUSTY 34]

Dark Knight. I'm afraid you (and quite a few others) still don't get it. Will 1500 hours and an ATPL ensure a candidate is better equipped for their initial airline seat than a 200 hour Cadet trained from the ground up? Who knows! That argument has been done to death, and will continue to be debated for as long as we have those varying streams of entry.

The main issue is the pure evil of the Jetstar Cadet Scam. It is in existence for one reason and one reason only. To drive down wages and conditions. Anything else is just a diversion. The creation of cheaper pilots will lead to one inexorable conclusion, disaffected and distracted pilots. The FAA has recognized this and have mandated a system to put value back into the profession. Something that Jetstar management are unwilling to accept, and we all know what Jetstar (and QF) want, they usually get.

If Cadetships are so superior, why doesn't the operator foot the bill? After all, at Qantas "Safety is our number one priority"! Instead the candidate is mired in debt and subjected to subsistence wages on
graduation? That's a recipe for disaster! That's the argument. Anything else is just smoke and mirrors. :rolleyes:

[Gnadenburg]

If the quality of the graduated cadet released to line seems be a problem, it would be a problem with the training department for not doing their job correctly. If there is a problem with the ex GA skygod captains flying with graduated cadets, it would once again be a problem with the training department for the quality of its command course.

Where I work at the moment, cadets graduate straight to the right hand seat of the A330 or B777. They are required to pass the same checks to the same standard as none cadet FOs. If they can't, they are either retrained or dismissed. The next flight after they graduate may be over the Bay of Bengal in the middle of the monsoon, or to Moscow in the middle of winter. When they achieve 6000hrs, they are eligible for a command. They complete the same upgrade course to the same standard as everyone else or they don't pass.
This company has been hiring between 500 to 700 pilots a year from many years. At the moment they are taking all the ex ryan air and easy jet ex cadets they can get, as they are very happy with the high standard of the product that is produced. At these companies ex cadet FOs may be offered commands on A320s or B737 with as little as 2500hrs.

The best experience for a future A320/B737 captain is to fly a A320/B737 and to be taught how to operate it correctly. Working for a GA company being paid under award salaries, flying antique aircraft VFR may prepare you for the ever decreasing T&Cs of the aviation industry (see the above about buying type ratings etc), but does little else.
If you go the GA route enjoy the flying and the variety and the special locations. Just because you have done the hard yards does not entitle you anything except more hard yards. The world has moved on. If you go the Cadet route be careful hiring a light aircraft for that weekend fly away, as you will have no idea of how those small aircraft work.

The Don

I disagree with your post for a number of reasons. I have experience with cadets in the Middle East and in Asia.

The Middle East was comical at the entry level where the scheme was based on nationalism and wasta. What was interesting, was the end product, which I did have experience with. That is, a cadet who was promoted to Captain.

The knowledge/experience gaps would probably have been addressed with flying experience outside of the airline. I have seen this at both airlines with absurd decisions that would not be expected from pilots with a solid base- for example, both airlines I worked for have seen cadet captains fly an airliner after an engine failure well beyond the first suitable airport.

It is politically naive in my experience to expect a training department not to be powerfully influenced by management! Cadet programs are industrial weapons, they drive conditions lower as they try to take experience out of the equation, and the end product I have seen is in no way near the standard you would expect of a First Officer in an airline which sees safety as a priority. What I am seeing now in Asia, is serious incidents as Captains are overloaded in managing the inexperience of the RHS.

I have cadets sitting next to me with operational limitations such as 10KT X-W and 5KM viz. That gives should give you an idea as to the other gaps in their knowledge base.

[Gnadenburg]

Under certain situations involving loss of airspeed and/or ADR problems along with flight control law degradation, the A320/330/340 etc can be providing the pilot with false overspeed warnings AS WELL AS stall warnings. In such a situation, the overspeed protections may become active providing the pilot with a nose up bias that requires constant forward pressure until the failure is resolved or the affected ADR is switched off. I know of several very experienced pilots that have been tripped up in the sim with failures such as these.

AnQrKA

We know that the overspeed warning can be erroneous. What about about the stall warning on Airbus? Coming off the ELAC and based on alpha, do you view it as genuine in all circumstances?

[FlareArmed]

This action might work on some aircraft, but applied to an A330 it would yield some spectacular results.

psycho joe: I'm interested in the spectacular results that 2º ND and idle thrust would yield in an A330. The aim is – in the face of conflicting/confusing information – to get the aircraft stable after recovering from a UA. Idle is a known power, and 2º ND is a reasonable attitude (to not stall and not overspeed) while you trouble-shoot the problem.

Industry training focusses on recovery from an upset, but it's not good at follow-up when conflicting information is still present. This is where power + attitude = performance is useful. It's drummed into every military pilot until their ears burn – for good reason

[Gnadenburg]

Industry training focusses on recovery from an upset, but it's not good at follow-up when conflicting information is still present. This is where power + attitude = performance is useful. It's drummed into every military pilot until their ears burn – for good reason

A great danger with some quarters of civilian aviation is to look toward the military as a beacon in training standards that can be applied to the civilian world. It is even a greater mistake to assume a military pilot is well equipped to handle incidents just because he is from a military background.

The first generation of upset training I did with Airbus/Boeing came about due poor civilian and inappropriate military experience in dealing with airliners in an upset. That is, many civilian pilots have never been upside down in an aircraft and Boeing was concerned with the possible recovery techniques of an ex-fighter pilot in a jet airliner- rudder use from memory. And the RAAF has had a sadly spectacular history in this area.

Back to your first line, I recall in Ansett training when unreliable airspeed was not an Airbus recall, their philosophy of building a pilot up from raw data and power and attitude knowledge, to introductions of the evolving levels of automation. By accident, it was probably an excellent way to train on the new and evolving glass cockpit concepts. High altitude handling came from experience with the 727. I recall doing high altitude upsets in the SIM and never needing to drop the nose into the brown.

[psycho joe]

psycho joe: I'm interested in the spectacular results that 2º ND and idle thrust would yield in an A330. The aim is – in the face of conflicting/confusing information – to get the aircraft stable after recovering from a UA. Idle is a known power, and 2º ND is a reasonable attitude (to not stall and not overspeed) while you trouble-shoot the problem.



Sorry but you're wrong. A stable, thrust idle descent in an A330 (depending of course on wt and alt and spd, but lets say heavy and high, and going from M.8something then reducing to green dot) would be 1.0 to 2.5 deg NOSE UP at idle thrust. To go 2.0 - 2.5 NOSE DOWN as you have suggested would guarantee an overspeed and a massive sink rate. This is a problem with preconceived ideas carried over from other aircraft types.

My theory (re AF447) is that Bonin went from sitting in the dark, probably tired, probably bored, to suddenly getting an overspeed warning. This would at least explain why his initial reaction (though incorrect) might have been to pull back on the stick, in order to avoid an overspeed. As already suggested, an overspeed warning might have also drowned out the STALL STALL warning, which is based on AOA and not airspeed.

[Dark Knight]

From a management point of view 40,000 tonne of coal, 200 freight cars plus 3 or 4 locos, several kilometres of track with associated bridges, culverts, signalling equipment, etc probably equals one aircraft hull loss, 300 lives and associated peripheral damage. All actuarially accounted and insured.
`

when terrestrial automated transport experiences a fault, it fails gracefully and stops on the road

Not necessarily and the resultant `hull’ loss can be extremely spectacular in all cases however; refer above to my comment in italics and underlined.

Krusty, I get it alright and have done for many a year; you succinctly lay it out here:

`The main issue is the pure evil of the Jetstar Cadet Scam. It is in existence for one reason and one reason only. To drive down wages and conditions. Anything else is just a diversion. The creation of cheaper pilots will lead to one inexorable conclusion, disaffected and distracted pilots.'

It goes far deeper than this; we all know how this came about; whether we will all admit it or not is another question; pilots have no one to blame but themselves.

It is just not the Jetstar cadets but the total pilot wage and T&Cs throughout the world and I would not rely upon the supposed `The FAA has recognized this and have mandated a system to put value back into the profession’ as a partial or full fix for this’.

Ask my fellow pilot friends in the US who, after retirement saw their pension funds obliterated or destroyed by their former employer; American Airlines being the current airline using Chapter 11 to screw their employees.

Putting one’s faith or trust in a politician in this country at present will yield little though possibly a little more than reliance upon the disgraceful apology of the organisation loosely know as our Industry Regulator.

My point was industry will use technology to reduce the crew resource cost which should be recognised resolving the problem.

The argument is pilot wages, T&Cs and `everything else is smoke and mirrors’; until pilots again stand up to this, divided they will continue to fail.

[teresa green]

A 300 hr cadet belongs in the jump seat, given flying time, and serve their apprenticeship as we all did. They do NOT belong in the RH seat, unless supervised by a competent F/O and Skipper, and I for one say if there is a hull loss due to this maniacal decision, I hope the company go up on manslaughter charges, but of course they won't. They will go to extreme lengths to blame the flight crew, and /or the engineers, they will look into their personal lives, they will leave no stone unturned, before they take any responsibility. Seriously, you blokes have to get together and insist on a competent F/O, it IS your ship, your life, your job, your right, your profession, and if you keep on accepting some kid with bum fluff on his face, in the RH seat rather than in the jump seat, because it is now becoming company policy, then you have to look at yourselves as well. Sorry, in our day we would have said (and did) not going anywhere until you give me a competent F/O, happy to have the kid in the jump seat, but that is it. If you don't move on it, they will keep going ahead with it. Time to get some union action, before there is a disaster none of us want to even think about.

[waren9]

Well said TG, except that

Those old enough, that can remember those days are too busy looking after their out of seniority management palm greasing jobs for mates jobs to do so and also actively discourage....

The rest who are too green to know any better.

[Sarcs]

Well said TG, couldn't agree more.:D:D You Jet* Captains grow some cohunas!

As gobbledock would put it...tick tock!

[ohallen]

Thank you TG for the usual wisdom.

There is also an issue with Senators X's activities in the Senate hearings in that each and every politician has been put on notice about what is happening. While they may succumb to the Rat charm at the moment, there is not one of them that can state they were not warned in the event of the smoking hole which none of us want or even contemplate occurring.

Therefore while the Execs may duck and weave around the legal system, each and every pollie who did nothing will be fair game for the media if it happens.

Senator Albanese should have a fun time while he explains his dismissal of the findings, although based on current polls he and many of his friends may have bought enough time to avoid being held accountable when they get booted out or into opposition.

[FlareArmed]

Fair enough psycho joe: I haven't flown that particular Airbus, which sounds more nose-high, but the principle is to get it into a known safe part of the envelope using power and attitude. If 0º is the normal descent attitude, that's something an A330 pilot will know. The point is, have an easy to recall power and attitude that will keep you safe for a few minutes while you sort out the mess.

Gnadenburg: One part of the original Boeing/Airbus jet upset training was to de-train military pilots operating large transport aircraft. You are spot-on: the rudder was the issue; the rudder was used a lot in a small military jet, but in an airliner, it's for engine failures and crosswinds – but mostly a footrest.

Standards of training needs to be seen in context. RAAF pilots' course aims to turn out the next bunch of fighter pilots; not the next FO for an A330. However, the general airmanship, discipline and the dedication to high-levels of professional knowledge (in context), needed to pass the course, will hold a pilot in good stead in any role.

I have been trained in: GA; airlines; RAAF and OEMs (4 times) – the RAAF won hands-down for quality of training; Ansett was also very good; OEM training was appalling; GA was poor compared to the others, but that was in the 70s.

And the RAAF has had a sadly spectacular history in this area.

The RAAF multi-engine world included a VMCA demonstration in the multi-engine syllabus. Everyone considered it practicing bleeding but it went unchallenged until the loss of the B707. I think it came out in a 4 corners report, but there were a few other near-losses. The military, in general, have a philosophy of training pilots in the extremes of the flight envelope, but applying that mentality to transport category aircraft went too far.

[Algie]

I haven't seen a detailed analysis but my guess would be that there are just as many appalling accidents involving high-time pilots with excellent pedigrees in the front seats as there are low time "culprits". American, Air France, Fedex Qantas, Southwest etc etc-all have had accidents involving handling skills, situation awareness, CRM or systems knowledge. Qantas and BA both managed to nearly end up with big jets involved in fuel starvation despite having fuel in the tanks!

The key point is the training and checking environment, and the wider airline culture that operates in. If the world aviation industry is to grow at much better than 1-2% per year then some carriers (and all the jobs that go with them) will be growing at a rate that means they will want to rely on cadets to fuel their expansion.

It may be outside of the experience base of some who comment, but properly managed with excellent training, mentoring and follow-up, cadet schemes can and do work well. Clearly you don't want bare minimum capability in the LHS with cadets flying their first jet-and no serious airline would contemplate that.

Motivation for the introduction of cadet schemes is another thing. Greed by management is not the worst thing, if, and only if, the Chief Pilot and the head of the 217 regime do their job and fearlessly so. Quality SOPS, independent check pilots, good union involvement in safety committees and pilot welfare, good safety and QA programmes, a genuine "just culture" backed with a strong seniority system that guarantees independence for decision makers, quality and un-rushed LOFT, recurrent and PC sessions that really add value in cockpit management and handling skills, remedial training programmes and finally-nothing in training, rostering, fatigue management, endorsement etc that could be described as "minimal".

And those who have been around a while in many environments can put their hand on their hearts as one and attest that in the longer term, doing it properly saves money, not costs money.

If that's not the case then we can all see where the rot has started.

But please, no more of the emotive "who do you want flying on that dark and stormy night".... stuff, it just might be two high time drivers who both agree they're doing a great job right up to the end.

[Jack Ranga]

From someone who doesn't know much about cadets, the history of such past schemes etc, it's pretty clear that this one isn't working. Add to it that this one is all about conditions of employment and saving the airline money rather than putting the appropriate experience up front, you would think that the regulator would be very concerned?

How does Jetstar continue to get away with these incidents when Tiger and Ansett were shut down over their incidents?

There's something very smelly about all of this. You used to be able to get on a jet airliner in this country with FULL confidence that you had the best available in the two front seats.

Now you have to make an active choice about what risks you take when choosing an airline to fly in this country. I've got enough info to make that choice, the flying public do not.

[Artificial Horizon]

Jeeze it must be hard work for some of you guys being such skygods who are so firm in their belief that they would have saved the day on the Air France flight if they were there as 'australians' are the best pilots in the world (now that quote did make me laugh). Surely all that any of us can hope for is that if such an unfortunate mix of circumstances should ever occur to us on a dark stormy night somewhere that through a mix of good airmanship, good flying skills and a huge dose of GOOD LUCK that we may survive. To expect that you can do better is asking for trouble.

[Popgun]

This is what a quality cadet program looks like:

Quality SOPS, independent check pilots, good union involvement in safety committees and pilot welfare, good safety and QA programmes, a genuine "just culture" backed with a strong seniority system that guarantees independence for decision makers, quality and un-rushed LOFT, recurrent and PC sessions that really add value in cockpit management and handling skills, remedial training programmes and finally-nothing in training, rostering, fatigue management, endorsement etc that could be described as "minimal".

Unfortunately it is nowhere to be seen at Jetstar.

The holes in the swiss cheese slices continue to move towards alignment.

PG

PS. CASA - You are shamefully disrespecting the public safety you are entrusted with :=

[Jack Ranga]

Surely all that any of us can hope for is that if such an unfortunate mix of circumstances should ever occur to us on a dark stormy night somewhere that through a mix of good airmanship, good flying skills and a huge dose of GOOD LUCK that we may survive. To expect that you can do better is asking for trouble.

After reading the accident report and the transcript, I think airmanship and good flying skills are the actions that are being questioned from this crew?

And I hope the blokes and girls up the front of any aircraft that I fly in aren't relying on a huge dose of GOOD LUCK to make it through any abnormal situation they may 'find' themselves in.

[Artificial Horizon]

But this is what I am saying, we all have to acknowledge that sometimes good luck does play a big part in surviving these things. The A320 into the Hudson without doubt showed great airmanship and flying skills, it also though had a hell of a lot of luck involved, the river was calm, there were ferries near by, the birds struck at a height that allowed them to clear the Brooklyn bridge by not more than 100ft. The LHR 777, good airmanship and good flying skills + a huge amount of good luck that they happened to be on the ONLY runway at LHR that had a significant undershoot area. The list could continue, no matter what you may think luck does play a part in these things, or call it fate, good fortune, what ever. I just find it a bit strange when people sit back and are so quick to criticize our fellow airman who 'undoubtedly' mishandled a situation, but what would YOU do, how do we know until we experience these things, read Chuck Yeagers autobiography, he is without doubt one of the best test pilots to every fly and he states several times during the book that he is only still here through a good dose of good fortune and airman who he considered to be his equal or superior are no longer here because there luck ran out.

Surely all the Air France episode shows is that even 'experienced' pilots can mishandle an aircraft straight to an accident, the American Airlines Airbus that lost it's tail was mishandled by a very experienced crew, as was the BMI 737 into East Midlands, a very experienced crew shut the wrong engine down, as was the Air NZ / German A320 where a highly experienced crew stalled the thing into the sea.

What I find more dangerous than these potential cadets is the arrogance of some pilots who feel that because they have had the good fortune to have had a mainly incident free career they consider themselves to be highly experienced and therefore impervious to 'screwing up'

[Jack Ranga]

OK, fair enough, but if you don't put yourself into those situations in the first place you wont have to rely on good luck. Sullenbergers situation was a little (a lot) different to the Air France jobby.

[Gligg]

The main thing now is to learn from it, so that it will never be repeated.

[Dark Knight]

http://i779.photobucket.com/albums/yy73/robofq/FlyforFood.jpg

[Gnadenburg]

Gnadenburg: One part of the original Boeing/Airbus jet upset training was to de-train military pilots operating large transport aircraft. You are spot-on: the rudder was the issue; the rudder was used a lot in a small military jet, but in an airliner, it's for engine failures and crosswinds – but mostly a footrest.

Standards of training needs to be seen in context. RAAF pilots' course aims to turn out the next bunch of fighter pilots; not the next FO for an A330. However, the general airmanship, discipline and the dedication to high-levels of professional knowledge (in context), needed to pass the course, will hold a pilot in good stead in any role.

I have been trained in: GA; airlines; RAAF and OEMs (4 times) – the RAAF won hands-down for quality of training; Ansett was also very good; OEM training was appalling; GA was poor compared to the others, but that was in the 70s.

Quote:
And the RAAF has had a sadly spectacular history in this area.
The RAAF multi-engine world included a VMCA demonstration in the multi-engine syllabus. Everyone considered it practicing bleeding but it went unchallenged until the loss of the B707. I think it came out in a 4 corners report, but there were a few other near-losses. The military, in general, have a philosophy of training pilots in the extremes of the flight envelope, but applying that mentality to transport category aircraft went too far.


Military training has become a dangerous argument in favor of cadet schemes and it is often espoused by ex-military people.

Yes, Western military training is an excellent preparation for the airlines. It is essential it is coupled with piloting attitudes devoid of red flags. The quality of training can never be replicated in the civilian world due cost and risk. There's a documentary I watched on F18 training for Canadians where their trainees cooked an engine during an in-flight re-light demo and one candidate damaged an aircraft on landing with aircraft carrier design limitations! That was in one episode!

Military experience from non-Western ideologies produces some of the worst airline pilots imaginable. It can couple cultural faults with cockiness- Korean Air Force for example.

Military training should be respected and seen for what it is. Its limitations and sometimes inappropriateness needs to be considered. Sadly, piloting standards in the civilian airline world have declined so rapidly due low cost carriers and cadet schemes, that military training is now way above the mark and the transitional issues to the civilian world are seemingly ignored.

Leaders from within our industry use military training as an argument in favor of cadet schemes. This is a foolish argument when the driver for the cadet schemes is cost.

[Joker89]

I think it's totally wrong that people can buy their way into a job. How can the airline be putting the best people there, cadet or otherwise, if they are selling the seat. Pay to fly schemes should be banned. Jet star cadetship is not much better.

[Gnadenburg]

Cadet schemes are now totally cost driven. It is such a powerful factor that training departments are putting under-done pilots on the line due management pressures.

The real risk will be the generational mesh- when cadets are junior captains flying with fresh cadets. Technology and tombstone based training will address the risk; but will there be gaping holes in piloting skills and knowledge base?

[Algie]

Gnadenburg

From what I understand the ROK Air Force fighter pilots are excellent and fearless at that job, being fighter pilots. Unfortunately that skill set (as Stephen Coonts said "Balls the size of grapefruit and brains the size of a pea" doesn't translate well into the airline cockpit. The complete mission focus, lack of need for CRM, passenger comfort, storm avoidance, "delay until ready", "safety first" etc etc needs to be refocused into the world of airlines. For many years Korean fighter pilots didn't get that focus translation when they joined KAL or Asiana. Now as far as is possible within any airline, they do. Or at least that need is recognised.

I imagine any airline that took on fighter pilots without transition training into the airline culture would get into trouble.

Algie

[theheadmaster]

I would take a Western fighter pilot without transition training over a cadet (without any real training at all) next to me in the flight deck any day, more-so if there is a serious emergency to be dealt with. The very skills that make a pilot a good fighter pilot also make them a good airline pilot: the ability to think under pressure, able to think in four dimensions, able to adapt quickly to a changing environment, ability to coordinate crew members (that may not necessarily be in the same aircraft), and good stick and rudder skills.

The real stand out examples in my career of airline pilots with poor CRM, mission focus, poor decision making skills, poor airmanship, and lack of customer focus were not fighter pilots. To put that in perspective though, and to recognise that 'no organisation has a monopoly on F-wits', one of the most stand out poor pilots I know eventually made it to be the CO of the RAAF VIP squadron in the early 90s :rolleyes:

[PPRuNeUser0198]

BA have been operating a cadet scheme since the 60's and there is no regional flying to build up "experience" in the UK.

Their cadets go into the RHS of a jet straight away and they don't seem to be having any issues...

Isn't this the same?

[Sarcs]

Here's a bit more fuel for the debate from planetalking:

AF447 disaster will dog air safety arguments in 2012 | Plane Talking (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2011/12/27/pilot-skills-safety-regulation-big-issues-for-2012/)

[Algie]

And I do remember, though I don't have it in front of me right now, that in my 2nd Edition of "Handling the Big Jets" which I received 40 years back, the author Davies of the UK CAA advocated airlines using small jet trainers (presumably of the Macchi/Hawk/Gnat variety) to keep airline pilots up with their basic "edge of envelope" handling skills. I do know that Alitalia had 4 MB-326D trainers presumably for that purpose in the 60s and 70s.

Davies probably knew more about basic and advanced handling techniques and issues than anyone before or since. Yet his advice has never been taken on. And who ignored it? Almost by definition, people who knew less than him!! Heavy jet simulators simply cannot, at the "edges" replicate exactly what happens. In Australia a targeted recurrent (6 monthly) training programme could be outsourced (to a special RAAF PC-9 training squadron or BAE or similar) at probably $15,000 a year for 2 X 1 day ground school then 2 X 2hr sessions in a PC-9 simulator then 2 X 2hr session in the aircraft. That might cost Qantas/Jetstar say $35 million a year but what a bang for the buck that would give this whole sorry issue!! Probably pay for itself in reduced insurance premiums.

A wistful thought maybe......but much of my career was defined by issues covered in "Handling the Big Jets", either because they were ignored, or because they worked.....and its not too late to get something right.

Algie

[redsnail]

T-vasis Yes, it's true BA have been offering a cadet scheme off and on since the 60s. They still recruit pilots from a variety of back grounds too.
BA used to send their cadets to fly turboprops and other regional aircraft to get some more experience. Also, their cadet schemes of old were a different animal to their new cadet scheme which they have just been interviewing for.

Europe as flown by the airlines is a fairly easy place to fly versus Australia. (Nearly 100% Radar environment, SIDS, STARS, ILSs)

I don't know how the Jetstar scheme works WRT being released on the line and what airports/approaches they can go to.

The old scheme BA would pay for the cadet's training. I believe it had a pretty high wash out rate (versus other full time schemes). The cadet would pay for it with a lower income for a few years post training.

[Artificial Horizon]

I think Redsnail has hit the nail on the head, flying almost anywhere else in the world is a very relaxed easy environment compared to Australia. Australia is a true 3rd world country when it comes to ATC, NAV Facilities, Procedures etc. The worst thing about it is that the ozzie authorities are too busy patting themselves on the back about knowing how to do things properly whilst the rest of the world has its head in the sand to notice just how crap and quite frankly dangerous the Australian environment has become.

This does put an increased expectation on the Cadet pilot, one thing I noticed when doing my first round of line training in Oz was that you spend 99% of the time focussing on complicated procedures like f**ken CTA steps and CTAF's that you don't have time to just concentrate on flying the aircraft. I can honestly say that after flying A320's all over the world for almost 10 years before returning to Oz that after my line training I felt like I had become a worse pilot because the training was so confused and all over the place. Thankfully I had the ability just to chew up and spit out some of the rubbish that I was being fed, unfortunately for the cadets they don't have this option. Lets put this in perspective, my first airline in the UK had the grand total of 10 sectors + 2 sectors for test as your line training allowance as a new pilot on the jet fleet coming from turboprops, the line training from start to finish took 5 days. At the end 99% of the trainees pass without incident. Cadets were afforded the luxury of 20-30 sectors or approx 2 weeks and once again 99% of people passed. This is just not possible in Oz and there perhaps needs to be some recognition that Australia is not the place for cadet schemes.

[Gnadenburg]

I doubt flying an Airbus around Australia is too hard.

But I do doubt if a low cost carrier such as Jetstar puts the effort into their cadet scheme to the extent that BA does. Or Qantas.

In reference to SID and STARS and wallowing around on them at 250kts. This is what I refer to as the "green line". Due lack of training, if you take a cadet off the green line they are lost. Where I am, Cadets are not competent in visual approaches or raw data flying ( especially self-positioning onto an approach ).

These are bread and butter skills. OK, you can create SOPS that don't don't require or have a need for these type of skills and consequently, make your operation less efficient. But industry wide, a lack of any experience with these type of skills lends toward the disaster. And we are seeing that with the recently realized pilot loss of control phenomenon. Yet, Airbus has had a problem for some time in this area with a supposedly simple handling aircraft. Three crashes on Go Around and I would imagine many, many close calls.

[Gnadenburg]

I would take a Western fighter pilot without transition training over a cadet (without any real training at all) next to me in the flight deck any day, more-so if there is a serious emergency to be dealt with. The very skills that make a pilot a good fighter pilot also make them a good airline pilot: the ability to think under pressure, able to think in four dimensions, able to adapt quickly to a changing environment, ability to coordinate crew members (that may not necessarily be in the same aircraft), and good stick and rudder skills.

The real stand out examples in my career of airline pilots with poor CRM, mission focus, poor decision making skills, poor airmanship, and lack of customer focus were not fighter pilots. To put that in perspective though, and to recognise that 'no organisation has a monopoly on F-wits', one of the most stand out poor pilots I know eventually made it to be the CO of the RAAF VIP squadron in the early 90s

Gnadenburg

From what I understand the ROK Air Force fighter pilots are excellent and fearless at that job, being fighter pilots. Unfortunately that skill set (as Stephen Coonts said "Balls the size of grapefruit and brains the size of a pea" doesn't translate well into the airline cockpit. The complete mission focus, lack of need for CRM, passenger comfort, storm avoidance, "delay until ready", "safety first" etc etc needs to be refocused into the world of airlines. For many years Korean fighter pilots didn't get that focus translation when they joined KAL or Asiana. Now as far as is possible within any airline, they do. Or at least that need is recognised.

I imagine any airline that took on fighter pilots without transition training into the airline culture would get into trouble.

Algie



Gents,

I don't want to move away from the topic by discussing the merits of military training. My concern is the convenience where industry leaders are comparing military training with commercially driven cadet schemes.

They are justifying a training program dangerously pushing the minimums to drive a commercial benefit versus an incredibly expensive military flight training program. This view needs to be smashed.


Algie

My experience with non-Western military pilots has been eye opening. Egyptian and Bulgarian ex-MIG drivers topping the incompetence charts equally. Why did we ever fear the Red Army? Koreans I have heard the issues second hand.

[Artificial Horizon]

Exactly right, in Europe and the States it is very very unlikely that in the normal course of things you will have to deviate from the green line. This means that the new pilot has time to 'think' about the aircraft and what it is doing. I am still unsure how much training value is involved in a Melbourne - Launceston sector where you end up with a cross between a DME/GPS and Visual arrival off the back of a 25 minute sector where you haven't even had the change to brief. Airbus went a long way to make flying the aircraft simple but when you then throw in stupid SOP's like 250kts by 5000 and 210kts by 3000 you start confusing the situation. I would argue that the airbus was not designed to be flown in Airspace where descents are interrupted by wacko CTA steps that mean instead of flying it like a jet transport aircraft should be flown you have to dirty up just to achieve an unrealistic profile whilst achieving unrealistic speeds. The question perhaps that should be asked is why are these high performance aircraft mixing it with GA at non-controlled sh*t pot little airports whilst trying to fly the thing like a big 172.

[neville_nobody]

I doubt flying an Airbus around Australia is too hard.

Yeah there are a few Jetstar Captains who came from overseas saying that only to realise that because of all the associated BS involved in flying around Australia that it can be quite stressful. In one descent you can cop a speed up slow down (trashing your profile) a clearance to descend that takes you out of controlled airspace, and then have your STAR cancelled track direct to a 3 mile final for a visual approach.

I think the issue is that if the Captain has to worry about all of the above and then additionally has to keep a very keen eye on the FO due to lack of experience major things can be missed due to overload.

Additional to all that there are some control zones that don't even fit into a jet profile!

[teresa green]

Whilst I have had both RAAF and GA pilots next to me on unlimited occasions as F/O's and both have performed as one would expect, some of us senior blokes used to get a bit testy with some ex RAAF blokes who were the "ace of the base". Yes, they knew it all, yes, we were lucky to have them, yes, if it were not for this damn nbrs thing they would have been or should have been the CP by now, in fact a few were downright a pain in the arse. Yes they could fly, and were good to have around, but then so were so many GA blokes who had come thru the school of hard knocks. It all boils down to the bloke/girl themselves, give me the steady, cool, unpretentious one every time, but NEVER a 300 hr cadet, who belongs on the jump seat, for quite some time yet.

[hewlett]

Off topic a little but thought I would share. Walked into the cockpit of an SQ 744 or 777 (can't recall which) with a 2man crew some time back. Skipper was an expat(aussie) and FO a very green looking singaporean(assumed). I got to listen to the very professional and impressive to me at least pre flt briefing, until, at the end the skipper said if we have any problems at all just sit there and don't touch a thing, I will do everything. Rattled me a bit to think what would happen if the skipper swallowed a chicken bone or developed chest pain. Am I right in guessing this idea of inexperience in the cockpit has been around some time and oz is only now catching up on "worlds best practice"?

[Jack Ranga]

The question perhaps that should be asked is why are these high performance aircraft mixing it with GA at non-controlled sh*t pot little airports whilst trying to fly the thing like a big 172.

Because mate, you operate in Australia, worlds best practice in Aviation :ok:

Just ask CASA, ASA & Qantas. They, between them, know it all.

[Joker89]

There is no simple solution. I draw your attention to Turkish airlines 738 flight 1951 which stalled on approach into amsterdam. Captain pilot not flying ex military with 5000 hrs on F4's. FO 4000hr pilot flying conducting line training. Safety pilot in the jump seat.

ATS went into retard mode due to faulty rad alt on captains side. No one noticed till stick shaker that speed was ref - 40.

Who's at fault. FO? The captain as pilot monitoring or safety dude for saying or seeing nothing. There's no insurance against incompetence.

[Angle of Attack]

AH
I'm hearing you but full back stick from cruise to crash (apart from a brief reprieve) does not inspire confidence, it shows complete lack of basic flying skills.
I will judge this incident in hindsight and I will say they were totally incompetant, ffs its pretty obvious mate..

[mattyj]

That OzSync character can't be a real pilot..far too reasoned and sensible ..surely no place for the likes of him or her in aviation!!

[Centaurus]

I imagine any airline that took on fighter pilots without transition training into the airline culture would get into trouble.

Airline culture? You mean slaved to the automatics and shiver in their shoes if the flight director falls over?

Any pilot be he ex military, ex floatplane, ex night freight, ex corporate or ex RFDS, undergoes a type rating course on the airliner he will fly. That course includes the principles of CRM. Included on that type rating course are numerous briefings. In other words the course is an integral part of the so called `transition training` into the airline culture. Where is the problem that you imagine specifically with former fighter pilots? It certainly did not exist in my experience.

In the small Central Pacific airline I was privileged to join many years ago, most pilots were ex military including several of the senior captains who were former fighter pilots or jet bomber pilots. One had flown F4 Phantoms from aircraft carriers during the Vietnam war while one was a helicopter pilot in the same war. Another had flown the F111, as well as the Phantom. Two were former Mirage and Sabre pilots that were in aerobatic teams. One had even flown P51 Mustangs. The airline had an excellent flight safety record while operating into black hole approaches without ILS in Pacific atolls.

[Sunfish]

AH:

The question perhaps that should be asked is why are these high performance aircraft mixing it with GA at non-controlled sh*t pot little airports whilst trying to fly the thing like a big 172.

Because the effing Government has sold every airport they can and isn't building any new ones.

[ejectx3]

"Airline culture? You mean slaved to the automatics and shiver in their shoes if the flight director falls over? "

Puhleeeeeze.

*rest of story edited due to asshats*

[Jetstarpilot]

I hope you put in a report for not adhearing to SOPs!:=

Where are all the Jetstar bashers now that one of the skygods has admitted not being perfect:ugh:

[ejectx3]

:rolleyes:

[Gnadenburg]

Quote:
I doubt flying an Airbus around Australia is too hard.
Yeah there are a few Jetstar Captains who came from overseas saying that only to realise that because of all the associated BS involved in flying around Australia that it can be quite stressful. In one descent you can cop a speed up slow down (trashing your profile) a clearance to descend that takes you out of controlled airspace, and then have your STAR cancelled track direct to a 3 mile final for a visual approach.

I think the issue is that if the Captain has to worry about all of the above and then additionally has to keep a very keen eye on the FO due to lack of experience major things can be missed due to overload.

Additional to all that there are some control zones that don't even fit into a jet profile!



It was much harder in the days without STARS. Sydney for instance. And when I started flying in Australia the hardest thing was managing higher speed profiles with CTA steps. Airbus VNAV was useless until the advent of STARS and even then because of the speed you were expected to fly at domestically, it never worked. Those who couldn't help themselves would cheat the box in a number of creative ways.

Oh, and then QF started flying internally. The TAA and Ansett standard jet profiles went out the window.

Australia can't be too hard a place to fly. STARS, speed restrictions etc. The pilots from abroad who you indicate are struggling must have never flown there before, come from Europe or widebody backgrounds?

[ejectx3]

Takeoff with f/d off. Notice, rotate to 15 degrees, press toga, f/d appears...problem solved. It's hardly the end of the world. And a minor oversight, not stupid. My point being that it's an aid not essential, and relying on f/d or anything other than basic attitude flying is fraught with danger. Looking through the f/d is in fact a very sensible thing to do rather than follow it blindly. The very point we are discussing.

[Trent 972]

From Boeing Aeromagazine (http://boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/aero_04/textonly/tr01txt.html)
...the flight director (FD) is designed to provide accurate pitch guidance only after the airplane is airborne, nominally passing through 35 ft (10.7 m). With the proper rotation rate, the airplane reaches 35 ft with the desired pitch attitude of about 15 deg and a speed of V2 + 10 (V2 + 15 on some models).
Sounds to me like ejectx3 managed the situation as one would expect.
(What we need now is for Jetstarpilot to improve on the spelling errors that are far too common in his/her posts). ...adhearing???? bwahaha
signed
Dyslexic Skydog

[Gnadenburg]

In the small Central Pacific airline I was privileged to join many years ago, most pilots were ex military including several of the senior captains who were former fighter pilots or jet bomber pilots. One had flown F4 Phantoms from aircraft carriers during the Vietnam war while one was a helicopter pilot in the same war. Another had flown the F111, as well as the Phantom. Two were former Mirage and Sabre pilots that were in aerobatic teams. One had even flown P51 Mustangs. The airline had an excellent flight safety record while operating into black hole approaches without ILS in Pacific atolls.

Was the Axeman of Apia a fighter pilot? :}

[clear3]

So, i guess all the problems will go away now that Jet*NZ is advertising for Skippers and fo's through a certain agency. The ad reads "why work in China when.......

The axeman hahahah...i know the guy in the left seat was ex US navy/boeing test pilot!!!

[Centaurus]

Was the Axeman of Apia a fighter pilot?

Got it in one.. And he had an axe to grind with old Joe Z the captain..:)

[Oxidant]

The ad reads "why work in China when.......

you can be paid half the money for working in NZ........