Article: NTSB: Emirates 777 continued flight after loud bang, messages

[Squawk7777]

source (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/08/31/361475/ntsb-emirates-777-continued-flight-after-loud-bang.html)

By John Croft

The US National Transportation Safety Board revealed in a preliminary report issued 30 August that an Emirates Boeing 777-200ER crew continued a 5h flight from Moscow's Domodedovo airport to Dubai on 5 March after hearing a "loud bang" and receiving several error messages on departure.

Pilots of Flight 132 (A6-EMH) reported the incident after landing at Dubai, according to the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) of the United Arab Emirates, the authority handling the investigation.

"Following the bang a number of status messages were annunciated, these messages occurred over a 16 minute time as per the Boeing AHM (airplane health management) data," the report stated.

Messages indicated a problem with the right Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engine, and included a thrust asymmetry compensation message that is issued when the flight control computer automatically uses rudder input counter the yaw effects of a failed engine.

Four additional messages were received on departure, followed by two AHM messages after landing.

Flightglobal's ACAS database shows that the 14-year-old aircraft is owned by Veling and has Trent 884-17 engines, members of the Trent 800 family. As of 31 June, the aircraft had accumulated 61,581 cycles and 12,945h, according to ACAS.

Inspection of the aircraft in Dubai revealed "a large section" of the right engine's inboard fan duct and thrust reverser were missing, starting at the trailing edge and ripping forward.

Overall, officials estimated that 2.8-3.7m2 (30-40m2) section of engine covering to be missing, along with the primary exhaust nozzle outer skin. The primary nozzle inner skin had been "holed in several locations at the 12 to 1 o'clock position," the report stated.

External to the engine, the one tyre on the main landing gear "was observed to have a large cut to the sideway" of approximately 36cm (14in), officials said. Examination of the aircraft and engine was to continue but the results have not yet been posted.

The report does not discuss what procedures the Emirates crew followed after hearing the bang and receiving the AHM annunciations or whether the aircraft should have been returned to Domodedovo.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

I note it says "status" messages. It could very well be that none of these had an associated abnormal procedure, so the implication in the article that the crew ignored something they shouldn't have is a bit naughty.

Sounds like something happened, the aircraft systems noted it, but it never was determined (by those systems) to be serious enough to post a message requiring crew action. And since the flight completed uneventfully, its hard to argue with that determination.

[Squawk7777]

Sounds like something happened, the aircraft systems noted it, but it never was determined (by those systems) to be serious enough to post a message requiring crew action. And since the flight completed uneventfully, its hard to argue with that determination.

Messages indicated a problem with the right Rolls-Royce Trent 800 engine, and included a thrust asymmetry compensation message that is issued when the flight control computer automatically uses rudder input counter the yaw effects of a failed engine.

What does the QRH procedure say?

[Groaner]

As of 31 June, the aircraft had accumulated 61,581 cycles and 12,945h, according to ACAS.

Average of 13-minute flight time. Or maybe it's block time, in which case DXB is amazingly efficient.

A lot of training flights?:rolleyes: Sim broken?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

What does the QRH procedure say?

If Boeing uses the term "status message" in a manner consistent with us (or is that vice versa) I'd guess "nothing at all" - status messages don't require crew action.

[vapilot2004]

Average of 13-minute flight time. Or maybe it's block time, in which case DXB is amazingly efficient.

A lot of training flights? Sim broken?

61K cycles as quoted is highly suspect. Aside from it being well beyond the base DSO of 40K, that figure is well out of the ball park for a 14 year old long-haul aircraft.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

I think its the FH number that is bogus too.

14 years is 122 640 calendar hours. 12 945 FH implies the plane is being used only 10% of the time. Unless its a hangar queen, that seems impossible.

Bets on it being 61k hours and 13k cycles? That'd be 50% utilization and 2.5 cycles/day which sounds more credible.

[swh]

It would be 61k hours, and 13k cycles, sounds about right for an aircraft that also does short hops around the ME and into Europe.

That works out to be an average utilisation of around 12 hrs a day, which also sounds about right.

[Non Zero]

Since when journalists knows how to assess a 777 Non-Normal situation better than a trained crew!
Status Messages = no actions required and no troubleshooting either. Only maintenance on ground can take care of a Status messages.
Cycles are important, but maintenance in ME is probably one of the best in the world!
This episode won't affect the almost clean T7 record!

[TopBunk]

As of 31 June

What date? That'll be the 1st of July then:ugh:

[grizzled]

According to Aviation Herald, here are some of the status messages received:


...the crew received a number of status messages in the following 16 minutes including: "THRUST ASYM COMP", "ENG EEC1 C1 R", "ENG EEC MODE R", "ENG R EPR BLANKING", "TURB OVHT SNSR ENG R". The flight was continued to Dubai where the aircraft landed safely with a delay of 40 minutes (departure with a delay of 10 minutes). After landing more status message occurred including "FIRE LOOP 1 ENG R" and "OVERHEAT CIRCUIT R1".



You be the judge....

[Wizofoz]

...Gladly.

There is no checklist or remedial action required for status messages. They are for information and maintenance action.

What are you suggesting should have been done? Shutdown an engine in defiance of the Boeing Bulletin specifically recommending against it? Divert when there was no actual non-normal situation?

I'm judging they did exactly as they were supposed to....

[Wizofoz]

Well, I AM a 777 pilot and....

Consider? Certainly. I believe MCC was contacted by SAT PHONE, the situation assesed, and the decision that it was safe to continue made, resulting in a safe landing at destination.

No, the situation was not typical and thus required management, which was done. Are you suggesting anytime ANYTHING unusual happens, a return to origin is required?

Where exactley is anyone (and grizzled, you are doing so by implication) getting the idea that anything other than a professtional job was done?

ETA, for some reason this post keeps appearing before Check Aiormans post, even though it was written in response to it!!

[Check Airman]

I am not typed on the 777, thus cannot (and will not) judge the crew. However, for the experienced 777 crews, even though no action is required for status messages, wouldn't the appearance of multiple messages connected to the engine cause you to consider returning to the airport?

My rationale would be that it wouldn't be the first time a computer system generated seemingly innocuous messages when a more serious problem existed.

Is it typical of the plane to generated multiple status messages during flight?

[Check Airman]

Thanks for that reply.

I'm not saying that any fault requires a return, but I would certainly let the PIC know that I'd have reservations about continuing the flight. If he elected to continue, I'd be paying extra attention to possible en-route alternates just in case.

And to be clear- not saying the crew did not act professionally. I'm just trying to get a deeper understanding of how these situations are dealt with.

[King on a Wing]

Wizofoz,
You sound like a decent EK trainer, who is appropriately rated on the T7, unlike some of the armchair pilots we see here on this forum.
Pray tell me then, what EICAS messages do you get on this airplane between 80kts and 400 ft AGL...??!!
I think the answer to my question should answer your query WRT the lack of eicas msgs and the presence of status msgs only.
Why then was the airplane dragged thru 5 hours of a trip.
Who was trying so desperately trying to get the plane 'back to base'. Which one of the 2 morons on the FD was trying to brown nose him/herself into the managments pants to enable a promotion...
And at what cost.
Last but not least, what was 'managment's' advice on ACARS when the AHM msgs hit home...
All wonderful questions, with dubious answers, I am sure..

[King on a Wing]

Some posts missing.....this one written before post #13.
Still doesn't answer my question.

[euroflyer]

After take off a bang is heard and several status messages (all related to the engine) pop up...
The identification phase surely tells you that the bang is related to the engine as the status messages confirm, so why continue the flight knowing there is something wrong with the engine?!
Maintenance will always want the aircraft back home... its the crew in the end who decide..

[grizzled]

Wizofoz...

Re: (and grizzled, you are doing so by implication)

Huh??? All I did was provide some clarity to the discussion by showing what some of the actual status messages were (at least according to Av Herald). Your response suggests you are a tad sensitive re this particular event. FWIW, I certainly am not hung up on it one way or the other.

When I have something to say (on pprune or elsewhere) I say it. I don't imply. Sheeeesh....

[629bus]

As a RATED Pilot on the 777, any "loud bang" followed by any status msg(s) would have resulted in a return to the departure airfield. Irregular status messages could have been managed and continued to destination, however these coupled with a "loud bang" is just waiting for the swiss cheese model to unfold!

[The Ancient Geek]

The report does not discuss what procedures the Emirates crew followed after hearing the bang and receiving the AHM annunciations or whether the aircraft should have been returned to Domodedovo.


Clearly the the report would have discussed these items if there was any doubt about the crew acting correctly in response to the information available to them.

They did their job and the outcome was a success. There are, however, questions to be answered about the cause of the tyre failure and the resulting damage.

[bvcu]

Some of these responses miss the obvious , the report said a large chunk of reverser fell off , even on our modern hi tech a/c there is no EICAS message for that . The messages that came were probably due to damage to wiring caused by the failure . been quite a few of these failures now , shows the difficulty with composites !

[Squawk7777]

If Boeing uses the term "status message" in a manner consistent with us (or is that vice versa) I'd guess "nothing at all" - status messages don't require crew action.

But they bear a certain relevance, that why they are displayed. "Unusual" status messages could be an indication of more serious messages to come. It is up to the pilot to put two and two together. Just because there is a status message NOT requiring any crew action (for now) is it safe to continue.

For all the armchair theorists/non 777 pilots, please take note what Wizofox says. What he says is absolutely correct. He knows what he is talking about.

What about the 777 pilots and non-777 pilots that disagree? Where's basic airmanship and common sense with regards to safety? Plus, after having seen any type of message about thrust asymmetry (and audible clues) I would have returned. End of story.

[Checkboard]

Engine surge/stall gives a loud audible bang, or series of bangs, temporary loss of thrust an not necessarily any damage. A bang and a status message doesn't necessarily indicate a continuing problem with or damage to the engine.

[SLFguy]

ANTI AB LOBBY: "You guys are relying waay too much on computers and are losing airmanship"

AB LOBBY: "Go away dinosaur"

*BANG*

AB LOBBY: "Computer says all hunky dory - keep going"

[JCviggen]

Who's the AB lobby and whats their relevance to 777's ?

[joojoo]

Firstly, I'm not a commercial pilot.

@Contacted
"A new bulletin relating to Thrust Reverser Inner Wall failure now recommends landing at the nearest suitable airfield.

If this particular flight had this problem (since the bulletin issue) then the crew would not have continued to Dubai."

If that is the case then in this particular case, and with hindsight, you'd have to say that return to airfield would have been a good decision (although maybe for the wrong reasons at the time).

I'm curious though, if they had decided to return would they have had to fly around burning fuel for maybe 5 hours? Given that the thrust reverser was apparently affected this could be quite significant no? As the flight was presumably not over any huge body of water, maybe calculating your possible diversions and carrying on with vigilance makes quite a lot of sense?

[Non Zero]

MCC monitor real time engine parameters ... continue didn't jeopardize safety ... i'm pretty sure that flight was closely monitor all the way to touch down and beyond!

[lomapaseo]

Any chance that we can disscet the NTSB full report rather than a newspaper's summary of what plays to the public.

I don't have a hangup about status messages alone, but I would be curious about the kind of stuff captured on the DFDR.

[typhoonpilot]

You're all assuming the report of a "loud bang" is accurate. Perhaps there was or perhaps there was not. This exact same failure just occured again last week on a HAM-DXB flight. That crew did not report a "loud bang".

The other thing that seems to be forgotten in this discussion is when the Status message inhibit ends. To refresh some memories or let those who do not fly the B777 understand it is, "cruise or 30 minutes after lift-off, whichever occurs first".

You're all assuming their was a lound bang and then a bunch of messages. Not to be blamed as that is the way the report makes it sound. But was that in fact the case? I highly doubt it.

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Any chance that we can disscet the NTSB full report rather than a newspaper's summary of what plays to the public.

I don't have a hangup about status messages alone, but I would be curious about the kind of stuff captured on the DFDR.

There is no NTSB "Full report", and likely never will be. There's a summary of info on the NTSB website, but NTSB isn't the lead agency.

The NTSB version of the info is here (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20110531X83949&ntsbno=ENG11RA030&akey=1), copied below for convenience:
ENG11RA030

On March 5,2011, the crew of an Emirates Airlines , Fligth 132, a B777-200ER (A6-EMH) reported a load bang on take off from DME upon landing at DXB.

Following the bang a number of Status Messages were annunciated, these messages occurred over a 16 minute time as per the Boeing AHM Data, They were:

THRUST ASYM COMP
ENG EEC C1 R
ENG EEC MODE R
ENG R EPR BLANKING
TURB OVHT SNSR ENG R

Further messages occurred on March 6, 2011 at 0202, as per Boeing AHM Data, They were:

FIRE LOOP 1 ENG R
OVERHEAT CIRCUIT R1

On walk around inspection, found a large section of the INBD Fan Duct
and Thrust Reverser (IPC 78-31-01-05, Item 001) missing, missing material stemmed from the trailing edge at the 9 o'clock position, FWD approximately 5 ft at max dimension and tapering down to approx 2 feet at the 12 and 6 o'clock position, total of between 30 and 40 square feet approx.

It was also observed that the primary exhaust nozzle (IPC 78-11-14-01, Item 35), outer skin, had detached completely and that the inner skin was holed in several locations at the 12 to 1 o'clock position.

The #12 Main wheel was observed to have a large cut to the sideway (approx 14"). No other damage was immediately visible.

Informed by DME station that items believed to be part or all of primary exhaust nozzle were recovered from within the airport perimeter. Investigation is ongoing, TR cowls not yet opened. Inspection of aircraft for secondary damage still to be carried out. Photographs have been take by MLMS EK ENG Line Maint/Group Safety and Quality.

The investigation is under the jurisdiction of the General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) of the United Arab Emirates. Further information pertaining to this accident may be obtained from:

web: Welcome to UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/pages/default.aspx)

This report is for informational purposes only and contains only
information obtained for, or released by, the GCAA.

[Bigmouth]

If the flight had been in the opposite direction, from Dubai to Moscow, would they still have continued?
Would you?

[Wizofoz]

Pray tell me then, what EICAS messages do you get on this airplane between 80kts and 400 ft AGL...??!!

In response to King On A Wing.

The inhibit system means most master cautions are inhibited between 80kts and 400ft. But AFTER 400ft, any conditions that remain detected are then annunciated. I'm no sure what you are getting at. Are you saying that because a non-normal occurred before 400ft, it would not have been annunciated?

Not so-the annunciation would just have been delayed until the end of the inhibit period for that condition. If you are a 777 pilot and not aware of that, may I suggest some remedial study....

Grizzled-my appologies. My colleagues are being unfairly slammed here by some pretty ignorant comments, I accept yours was not one of them.

Bigmouth,
If the flight had been in the opposite direction, from Dubai to Moscow, would they still have continued?
Would you?

Having assessed that the aircraft was safe to continue it would have been a commercial decision from the company.

I've had a similar occurrence. A Black Cockatoo once went through my By-pass duct and took a chunk of the lining with it. Ok. That's happened. The engine is stable, no change in parameters, no thought of a shutdown,what exactly is the jeopardy in continuing?

[golfyankeesierra]

It is not an engine failure; the flight is not ETOPS.
They did not disregard any "land asap" advisory.

This is one of those cases for a Command course and I think those in favour of diverting or continuing will be divided in 50/50.

The crew took the commercial view and with the info we have so far (and from my armchair) I totally agree.

[lomapaseo]

Mad )Flt) Scientist

There is no NTSB "Full report", and likely never will be. There's a summary of info on the NTSB website, but NTSB isn't the lead agency.

The NTSB version of the info is here (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20110531X83949&ntsbno=ENG11RA030&akey=1), copied below for convenience:


Thanks for the factual summary.:ok:

Count me in as one of those that says it's too early to express opinions about the conduct of this flight.

Too bad the NTSB has place themselves on the front page without being able to comment fully to sites like PPrune

[Lyman]

RTB required only after second bang, per Qantas.

[Magplug]

Mmmmm.... Moscow nightstop..... No Thanks :ugh:

[fourgolds]

JooJoo , I think you nailed it , with regards what the manufacturer would have prefered. The bulletin issued as a result of this incident. However the crew were doing what thay were trained to do at the time . Makes one think does'nt it ?

[jackx123]

plenty of moscow night stops as it is in dxb :}

[grizzled]

Wizofoz...

No worries Mate. I too get frustrated at times at pposters who suggest a certain action by a certain crew was not appropriate -- with no evidence to support such a statement. I simply ignore such comments if they are clearly made out of ignorance, but when they appear on a professional thread, or from someone who purports to be a professional, I do wonder...

[cwatters]

the report said a large chunk of reverser fell off

Visible from inside?

[nitpicker330]

Over 4000 hours on the mighty triple seven and I can tell you that if I'd heard a loud bang with yaw then seen lots of status messages related to the same Engine then I most certainly would RTB all things considerered.

For gods sake it's a TWIN.

In my experience with the 777 if the CMC/ACMS told you something was wrong it usually was......unlike the AB. :{

We are not TEST PILOTS people and our Passengers deserve our good judgement and experience and this doesn't include RISK TAKING.

[Enjoy the view]

4000 hours and flying another type "twin Boeing jet", I fully agree with nitpicker330.

Why take any chance? Was commercial pressure a factor? SAT phone with direct connection to Maintenance control and/or flight ops can be helpful, or not.

At the end of the day, it's you the crew sitting up here with your passengers who makes the call.

And yes, I wouldn't mind explaining that in the office later on. Probably easier that trying to justify the other option (possible engine failure 1/2 way through the cruise in the middle of no where).

But hey, no judgment to the crew, I wasn't there. They landed safely after all.

[jumbo1]

Nitpicker, nowhere does it say there was a yaw, just a loud bang. That could come from a bird strike, tyre etc, not necessarily from an engine.
In recent years there have been a few cases of pieces falling off aircraft and none crashed. In many cases it was only discovered after landing at destination.
I wasn't there so cannot judge without all the FACTS.

[nitpicker330]

Generally on the 777 if the TAC failed it was from a stall/surge on one of the Engines confusing the system so it shuts down!! Therefore one could possibly assume that there must have been some sort of Yaw during the "bang" event.

Bangs are NOT normal and one followed by a lot of Status messages should lead one to consider all is not well with your donk!!

[woo hoo]

Generally you are right but the TAC will also disconnect if an engine thrust data is lost. Engine EPR blanking in combination with some of those other status messages just might add up to that situation in which case no yaw.

however in principle I'm with you in that 'if it looks, feels and sounds like a fish.....then it's probably a fish' BUT i was not on the FD

[Jet II]

I would have thought that all the 'experts' on this thread would have been aware that 'THRUST ASYM COMP' means the system has failed - not that it has operated as the reporter at Flight Global seems to think. :ok:

[helen-damnation]

Lots of armchair theorists here.

Has anyone thought about the weather in DME? March can be pretty nasty.

Has anyone considered the option of continuing with enroute diversions available on better/cleaner runways if DME was contaminated?

There are a heap of variables here, and a lot of people who seem quick to jump in and condem.

If you would have done it differently, great. BUT you weren't there, neither was I.

[SMOC]

-400 rated not 777, but looks like C1 EEC right engine failed then C2 struggled with the EPR possibly due to missing ducting, corrupted data I'm outta here resulting in EEC R which means N1 mode? no A/T therfore no TAC? Is there any action required for the left engine in this case? On the -400 with an EEC failed we have to drive all the remaining engines into N1 mode by turning off the EECs.

[sAx_R54]

Speaking purely as an interested observer in all things PPRuNe, if those sitting at the sharp end are unable to agree about actions to be taken when fault advisories are annunciated from a FD, then does this not suggest that there is something wrong with the 'system'? If the end always justifies the means, then it would appear that the pilots made the correct decision, however had the same event(s) a decidedly different outcome, what course would discussions have proceeded along then?

[helen-damnation]

sAx

It would have been much the same. 1 would have done this, 2 would have done that etc, etc.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

sAx, there's more than one way to skin a cat.

[sAx_R54]

...and more than one way of getting it wrong! My main point is that if events can rapidly degenerate to a total loss of control, why take the risk? As I implied, if this had produced a worse outcome, would you have agreed with the pilots decision to continue? What price skinning of the cat then?

[helen-damnation]

My main point is that if events can rapidly degenerate to a total loss of control

Hold on. Who said anything about a loss of control! This was a series of STATUS messages (see previous posts), nothing to do with control OR engine failure.

Did you previously work for the News of the World?

[Squawk7777]

Hold on. Who said anything about a loss of control! This was a series of STATUS messages (see previous posts), nothing to do with control OR engine failure.

But the status messages refer to an abnormal situation, therefore it is prudent to presume that things could deteriorate. It is up to the flight crew to correlate all available information. Based on the limited and incomplete information we have got right now, I won't judge the crew.

[Locked door]

Yes the situation could deteriorate, but only as far as the loss of the use of that engine which is not life threatening. However this engine stayed running and there wasn't any indication that it would do otherwise.

IIRC another major European carrier had a very similar event coming out of China. Due to an unexpected increase in fuel burn by one engine they ended up not having enough to return to main base and diverted to somewhere in Europe only to find most of a reverser and all of the 'c' duct were missing on the higher fuel burn engine.

I guess different pilots have different thresholds for diverting but I can tell you that on a four engine boeing I have never diverted for a status message and I would be surprised if my 2 engine colleagues would have in this case. Of course the nature of the route, available diversion airfields enroute and the severity of the failures encountered play a part in the decision making process.

No yaw, no indications of engine vibration or loss of thrust. A shortish flight, with a route over land with good available diversion airfields enroute and no high msa's and a chat with engineering who have access to real time engine data the pilots can't see. I'd have a hard time criticizing the actions of this crew.

[Sciolistes]

Yes the situation could deteriorate, but only as far as the loss of the use of that engine which is not life threatening. However this engine stayed running and there wasn't any indication that it would do otherwise.
Obviously, a selection of messages peripheral to the No. 2 engine means that something potentially very serious is wrong in that area, affecting multiple components. Also, there is no way of determining possible collateral damage. Clearly if a sizable chunk of engne cowling has detached, there is no way of assertaing what else it hit on the way out and probably no way of being certain of the affected phases of flight to help hazzard a guess at what may also have been exposed.

Given the infomation presented thus far, choosing to continue was a very puzzling decision.

[sAx_R54]

Quote: My main point is that if events can rapidly degenerate to a total loss of control

Hold on. Who said anything about a loss of control! This was a series of STATUS messages (see previous posts), nothing to do with control OR engine failure.

Did you previously work for the News of the World?

Nice try, but I 'm sure since your able to be as selective, that a degree of intelligence lurks behind your keyboard. The point highlighted was in reference to the likelihood of another potential outcome. I had (un)reasonably concluded that you might have been able to understand risk. Clearly not in your case! As to your latter point (re:NoW), I was never in possession of the necessary eloquence to ascribe to such a fold.

[helen-damnation]

understand risk

Something we do every day :) The assesment of risk is subjective. As I've said previously, I know what I would have done but that's not relevant. The risk was assessed by the crew on the day using information from various inputs and a decision was made.

I was never in possession of the necessary eloquence to ascribe to such a fold

Me neither. I was going to be a diplomat but failed the :mad: exams :}

[Sciolistes]

The assesment of risk is subjective.
No, it is fact based and thus objective. The response to risk is subjective.

[Wiley]

It seems to me that some incredibly clever men - the engineers and designers at Boeing and Rolls Royce - put an incredibly large number of hours into coming up with a system that would give crews fair warning of a technical situation requiring crew action. Those same smart people, with a commercial product to sell to airlines - airlines with a primary mission of getting passengers to their destinations safely and if possible, without UNNECESSARY delay, came up with a system that advised crews of any degradation to their aircraft's (usually triply redundant) systems that did NOT require crew action.

During my training on the 777, it was stressed that we should not try to outguess the systems - and definitely not act upon any status message. Status messages are just that, STATUS messages, which, translated for those who need translation, means "a syatem (or systems) is (or are) not operating at 100%, but we, the men who designed this aircraft, after many hours of careful consideration and with many, many hours of deliberation - and much, much more information than you, the operating crew (and the Monday morning quarterbacks) can ever hope to have available to you - have come to the conclusion that those systems haven't degraded to the point where crew action is necessary".

If a crew found themselves departing their home port bound for an outport that provided less technical support or spares than the home port did, (or if the problem seemed to indicate that the aircraft might be AOG for as considerable time), it would be entirely reasonable, if, after consultation with maintenance and operations, the crew elected to return to base. In such circumstances, that decision would be primarily commercial, and I can see no problem with that.

Like 99% of others who've posted here, I don't have all the information on this incident, but from the limited information I've seen here, and with 12 years as a captain on the 777 behind me, I can't see that the crew did anything wrong.

[sAx_R54]

Like 99% of others who've posted here, I don't have all the information on this incident, but from the limited information I've seen here, and with 12 years as a captain on the 777 behind me, I can't see that the crew did anything wrong.

I am not technically competent to be able to question the decision making process behind any PF/PNF on any given day, however I do wonder had there been a negative outcome, would the decision to continue have received similar support. Whilst response to such questions are axiomatic, it is difficult to comprehend how interpretation of the same 'system event' reporting degradation in control logic on a modern aircraft, would have some continue and some return.

[CanadaKid]

sAx_R54

Personally, I’ve had a single medical assessment that was interpreted differently by two aviation doctors leading to two diverse assessments. I suppose if more doctors were brought in, there would be even more opinions leading to different outcomes. How can one set of ‘numbers’ lead to different interpretations in an applied science?
In the spirit of education (mine!) as a young pilot I would present various scenarios to the Captain . Invariably, the answer would be “well, that depends ….” What followed was a long discussion on what would encourage the best outcome for my contrived scenario.
Every pilot will accumulate as much information as possible before deciding on a course of action. Unfortunately, most decisions have to be made despite the lack of the information available to those reading about it! The course of action becomes a continuing re-assessment depending on the information as it becomes available. What you’re reading in these threads are the assessments of each individual based on their own experience as bits of information become known.

[Desert Dawg]

I believe that it was a piece of the inner honeycomb structure in the tail cone of the engine that departed the engine, and caused some minor damage to the thrust reversing system.

As has been pointed out by a number of posters in this thread, the status messages were just that - status messages - not warnings or instructions to land the plane immediately, and the crew acted accordingly. Also, MCC were well aware of the situation and monitored the aircraft the whole time to a safe landing.

No-one was in any immediate danger, and the crew, together with MCC did a superb job in handling this minor incident in a professional manner.

Enough said..!

[HPSOV L]

I agree with wizofoz - and I wouldn't be surprised if MCC and the crew had a fair idea of what sort of failure had produced the symtoms.
Off topic slightly (and no implyed criticism); when I used to fly this route there actually weren't many airports between Moscow and Tbilisi that weren't NOTAMed unsuitable for various vague reasons. In fact sometimes the dispatcher issued an ETOPs OFP. Has this changed?

[sAx_R54]

@CanadaKid @Desert Dawg Your final points are well founded. So this tale at least has demonstrated that the end does justify the means, as no harm resulted and all was well.

Therefore considering the points made in the #1 post, the material facts (hopefully not from the NoTW), suggest these in conclusion:

....Inspection of the aircraft in Dubai revealed "a large section" of the right engine's inboard fan duct and thrust reverser were missing, starting at the trailing edge and ripping forward.

Overall, officials estimated that 2.8-3.7m2 (30-40m2) section of engine covering to be missing, along with the primary exhaust nozzle outer skin. The primary nozzle inner skin had been "holed in several locations at the 12 to 1 o'clock position," the report stated.

External to the engine, the one tyre on the main landing gear "was observed to have a large cut to the sideway" of approximately 36cm (14in), officials said.

So had these items been MEL, I wonder how many would be happy to set take-off thrust and race towards the horizon of V1, safeguard in the knowledge that advisory only annunciations would continue after they had climbed above 400ft!

Inspiring safety?? Maybe!!

Thanks to all for your considered comments.

[Squawk7777]

The risk was assessed by the crew on the day using information from various inputs and a decision was made.

The problem with this - in ANY airplane - is that the information available might not reveal the complete picture. Having met Murphy on several occasions, I can tell you that I would have not continued the flight (based on the limited info given).

Other (very delicate) question that comes into mind is does EK put any whatsoever pressure on their crews to bring an aircraft back into base? Having worked for various US and UK companies I have always felt a certain vibe from engineering to bring the plane back to base... :suspect:

[Sciolistes]

I agree with wizofoz - and I wouldn't be surprised if MCC and the crew had a fair idea of what sort of failure had produced the symtoms.
Several status messages on the right engine. Yeah that will be the old 2m squared of engine cowling missing problem, there was a company notam about that couple months ago.

[gleneagles]

Anybody who fully trust MCC's analyses of the real time readings from their onboard maintenace computer probably live in an unreal world!

Read this from another thread :

A few years ago, a colleague of mine had a small fuel leak ( which went undetected by even the sophiscated, high tech real time maintenance monitoring ) decided to go against the company's decision to continue to destination as their maintenance control reckoned the skipper was wrong in assessing a small anomaly as a fuel leak. When he insisted on diverting, they demanded he returned to base. However with the prevailing tailwinds, a 180 degrees return to base entails a 7 hour diversion whereas an enroute diversion would have been only a 2.5 hours; seeing the stupidity of the operations control/maintenance control, he countermanded the company's decision, wrested a grudging approval to divert to a suitable enroute airport where he was proven right that there was indeed an engine fuel leak. Technically, operationally and safety wise, he was vindicated. But the company put him through hell, grounded him for several weeks, trying every trick in the book to trip him during the various enquiries. He maintained technical and professional integrity throughout; he was finally released back on line with " no comment " on the incident. When he enquired further, he was quietly pulled aside and told that in the interest of his future contract ( it was a commuting contract ), he should " let go ". Of course he took the advice under protest. This was taken unkindly and true enough some time later he found himself " failed " a sim check under dubious circumstances. THE MESSAGE WAS CLEAR.



Having said that there was no reason compelling reason for the crew to make an ATB to SVO. However I am confident the crew would have consulted MCC and Dispatch for all the relevant information and would have in their heads plans B, C and D in case something really went wrong. Multiple status messages are real cause for concern but no need for immediate crew action. However the crew had better brush up on their systems information/knowledge to be prepared to deal with highly possible inflight failures associated with those status messages. To just pay little attention them just because no pilot actions were required for status messages would be plain foolish.

[rmiller774]

They heard a loud bang "during takeoff". Pieces from the aircraft were recovered within the airport perimeter showing that they heard the bang before they had traveled 5 miles or 2 minutes. And they can't return to the airport to assess an obvious problem? It would have resulted in only a short delay. But I suspect that they wouldn't have departed again in that same aircraft.

[HPSOV L]

Several status messages on the right engine. Yeah that will be the old 2m squared of engine cowling missing problem, there was a company notam about that couple months ago.

Closer to the truth than you might think! Not that uncommon for bits to come off and damage wiring to (in this case non-critical) components.
When I worked there my experience was that the company was fairly supportive when dealing with events.

[sAx_R54]

Not that uncommon for bits to come off and damage wiring to (in this case non-critical) components.

The frequency of bits coming off may be one thing, the potential for a rapidly degenerating condition may be another. It is clear from reading many of the threads in this Forum SpainAir Madrid, AF447, BA038, AA Kingston JA, Fedex Tokyo,that there are many unknowns and fewer known unknowns for even the most experienced and competent of pilots. Many of the 'nervous chattel' seated towards the rear of the composite/alloy matrix tube are not aware of this and instead think a system operated and managed through several dependencies e.g. ATC, Re-fueling, Maintenance, Engineering design and construction, cargo handling, weather forecasting and not least the peak of the ice-berg, those who release the parking brakes, would do nothing but apply the precautionary principle, where there is the remotest doubt about any unknown.

From my analysis which is restricted by cursory knowledge of aviation, rapid degeneration can give a pilot(s) an extremely narrow window in which to make the correct decision and execute a recovery plan. Thread drifting slightly to illustrate this point (see T-Tail deep stall - Deep Stall (http://www.rbogash.com/Safety/deep_stall.html)), the pilots had less than 2mins to act upon the information they were receiving and make the correct decision. Sadly, they were unable to so by the time the CVR stopped recording.

So for the avoidance of any doubt, the packed sardine like 'chattel' in the rear, would rather not be used as flying guinea pigs and would prefer a firm 'decline' from the twin peaks in front, where there is any doubt in data emitted from these highly contiguous systems. Whilst this is easy for me to say in the anonymity of the PPRuNe Forum, I recognise that those that have a passion for flying heavy metal would like to remain employed and not have to succumb to the wrath of their managers. However they (you) should not be afraid to stand by that which you believe is correct on whatever day you choose to exercise such judgment. The 'chattle' in the back will appreciate it as they will have survived to join the contiguous aviation system on another day and more importantly so will your family, who will be spared the rhetorical management line, of what a great servant to aviation you had been.

Apologies to those who think I have spent in excess of my $0.02c.

[slowto280]

Browsed briefly through thread - didn't see any link to picture(s).

Are there any out there? :confused:

[Basil]

Of course he took the advice under protest. This was taken unkindly and true enough some time later he found himself " failed " a sim check under dubious circumstances. THE MESSAGE WAS CLEAR.
Which is a good reason to work in the West and belong to a strong union.

[lomapaseo]

You don't stop on a dark one lane road at night for every noise you hear in your car.

Decision making involves assessment and balancing of risks.

Armchair quarterbacking may be fun but it has no validity

[Nick 1]

Once upon the pilots use to contact engineering with satcom ,
now maybe , same machinery, is used by management to contact pilots.

[sAx_R54]

Armchair quarterbacking may be fun but it has no validity

Premier league would be a more appropriate analogy than NFL from these shores, so maybe midfield maestro!

No pilot would have accepted the plane for flight dispatch in the same condition that it landed. And no pilot aware that the status annunciation related to a 3.7m2 piece of missing aircraft would have continued the flight. So if that is correct, the question remains as whether safety was compromised to satisfy the bean counting champions of Smithsonian economics.

[Wizofoz]

Sax,

I disagree.

Yes a chunk of reverse duct had fallen off.

But the aircraft was airborne, and at some point was going to have to descend and land. That descent and landing were not going to be any more risky in Dubai than in Moscow.

Therefore, the only saftey related question was, was it any less safe to cruise for five hours before making the inevitable descent and landing?

The damage was done, parameters were stable, and there was no sign that the situation was deteriorating. What is it you envisage might have happened in cruise that might have led to an unsafe outcome, bearing in mind the aircraft had numerous diverion options en-route HAD anything gotten worse?

[Enjoy the view]

bearing in mind the aircraft had numerous diverion options en-route

Which ones are the diversion options/ alternates on this route? Is the route going through Kazakhstan, or Iran, others?

[Wizofoz]

Down through Azerbajan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE.

Non-Etops, so never more than 420NM from an Adequate, though in this case, never more than 45 minutes from a company designated Alternate.

[sAx_R54]

I disagree....

I hear your point, but how do you rationalise this? No MEL list would have included such damage, so the plane would have been deemed unsafe to depart in the post landing condition, right? But the same damage inflicted whilst air borne is deemed safe enough for a 5-hour journey, right again?? Therein lies my difficulty to comprehend how you and your fellow professionals are able to see equivalence in this contra-indication.

[Wizofoz]

Of course you wouldn't depart with it.

But, once it has happened, you are stuck with it.

You haven't answered my question- If it isn't going to get any worse, why is it safer to land immediatley than to carry it to a convienient base?

You also can't dispatch with only one RAD ALT- would you land ASAP on some marginal wilderness strip if THAT happened in flight?

Once dispatched, the MEL does not apply, and it is up to us to make the best decision we can with the info available.

[Lord Spandex Masher]

sAx, the MEL only refers to pre-departure. I think that was covered earlier in this thread.

The ECL/QRH is what matters after departure, ie. pushback.

For example, on the Embraer that I used to fly the APU shut itself down during push back, inbetween engine starts, due to an overspeed.

The MEL states that the APU must be secured prior to departure, CBs pulled etc..

The ECL states that the APU must be turned off, that's it.

See the subtle difference?

Not that that example is relevant to this discussion but the use of MEL and the ECL/QRH is.

[sAx_R54]

...You haven't answered my question- ...

I am unable to answer your question, but I wonder if you are able to answer my conditional preposition? If all the factors remained the same and outcome followed had caused harm, would you have supported the decision to continue the flight?

[redsnail]

Having being involved with an incident at a Moscow airport (UUWW), I'd rather continue to Dubai. (Mayday situation is different of course)

Regardless of the MEL, the aircraft would have been grounded for a minimum of 3 days while the Russian authorities "dealt" with the situation.

[Wizofoz]

I DON'T support or reject the decision itself, but am willing to try and provide reasons why it was made.

Simply put, if you cannot provide a reason why continuing was less safe, how is the question even relevent? If they had RETURNED and crashed, would that have made THAT a bad decision?

I UNDERSTAND that the crew did it's best given the information at hand, and don't imagine I could have done a better job, no matter which way I went, under the circumstances.

And yes, I would have supported the crews doing its' best, even if the outcome had not been so good. There have been MANY incidents where the crew acted in good faith, only to have a bad outcome.

We learn from these, and no doubt will do so from this incident.

[sAx_R54]

I DON'T support or reject the decision itself...

I accept that as a reasonable response and I respect you for it. I have read countless of Accident Reports and scenarios which have lead to disaster, where cause and effect have been intrinsically linked (swiss cheese model using your vernacular). Now I am no aviation specialist and I do not possess a crystal ball, but time and time again, past incidents receiving the benefit of PPRuNe inquisition alongside the transcription from CVR's/FDR's have shown pilots trapped by outcomes determined by fate.

Whilst the T7 is ETOPs compliant and thus able to fly 3.5hrs on a single engine, if resulting damage had subsequently progressed a single engine shutdown (damaged fan blade, increasing engine vibration, etc) and there was deteriorating weather condition at all reasonable alternates, attempting to balance asymmetry with strong windshear (swiss cheese), may well have occasioned the matters where a collective wisdom could be applied when the CVR stops recording.

Lets face it, more serviceable aircraft have sadly been caught out without any advisory status warning of less than 100% systems performance.

[Wizofoz]

Whilst the T7 is ETOPs compliant and thus able to fly 3.5hrs on a single engine, if resulting damage had subsequently progressed a single engine shutdown (damaged fan blade, increasing engine vibration, etc) and there was deteriorating weather condition at all reasonable alternates, attempting to balance asymmetry with strong windshear (swiss cheese), may well have occasioned the matters where a collective wisdom could be applied when the CVR stops recording.




...And the presence of such factors would have been considered in the decision making process. The idea is to assess ALL relevent data ON THE DAY- not what might happen in some fantasy situation.

If the above is your main objection to the continue decision, and forcast weather was fine'n'dandy en-route (as it usually is) would that temper your critisism?

[sAx_R54]

...not what might happen in some fantasy situation...

You don't need to look too far in this Forum to see the Reality that fantasy might try to ignore. My criticism is not the the pilots per se, but of the industry as a whole. Emirates may have a policy called get the baby home unless both engines are on fire, for all I know, so no blame attributable to the pilots. The real fantasy is that the traveling public do not understand that determination of the risks, does not principally take them into consideration.

[HPSOV L]

Emirates may have a policy called get the baby home unless both engines are on fire, for all I know

While there are plenty of things I could complain about EK. commercial pressure to complete a flight in the face of any inflight contingency, is not an area I ever had any concerns about.
Sometimes these aviation discussions turn into a cockfight about who can take the most conservative (and therefore most professional so the argument goes) appearance.
Wizofoz; I take my hat off to your ability to organize logical argument out of the white noise of Pprune.
Most posters are firm disciples of philosopher Schopenhauer's satirical "38 Ways to Win an Argument":rolleyes:

[Enjoy the view]

Down through Azerbajan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE.

Non-Etops, so never more than 420NM from an Adequate, though in this case, never more than 45 minutes from a company designated Alternate.

I think that Uzbekistan is not exactly on this route (quite offset to the East), but it doesn't matter too much...

However EK doesn't seem to serve many destinations between Moscow and Tehran along the route (possibly Larnaca a bit more to the West?), so that would mean quite a large territory to cover before reaching a suitable commercial station capable to meet the tech aircraft and assist with passengers and so on... It wouldn't look "too good" to justify why half way down route, due to an engine failure, the aircraft had to land somewhere remote....?

What's the company policy in that regard?

[sAx_R54]

..Most posters are firm disciples of philosopher Schopenhauer's satirical "38 Ways ...

Cyber blog tennis can be a pointless exercise for sure. The parallel threads (nee worlds) of AF447 (pg 40-->) and the US Airways Captain are succinct descriptions of the view I would champion. On this thread however lets take the view that the certainty of safe outcome was never less than 100%.

If I am Schopenhauer's disciple, then it is pure serendipity as I know not of such philosophy.

[HPSOV L]

Not aimed at you sax - your points are constructive and well argued.
PS: Worth googling that Schopenhauer reference - you'll get a good laugh out of it.

[Wizofoz]

What's the company policy in that regard?

An engine shutdown is Land At Nearest Suitable Airport and commercial considerations are specifically NOT to be part of that assesment.

If that had happened (and similar things have in the past) it would be a case of "Well, we tried!!".

HPSOV TA!:O

Look up Brian Dunnings "in Fact" series on "Logical Fallicies"- You'll find they are a staple of many PPRUNE posters!

[Fubaar]

your points are constructive and well argued.I couldn't disagree more. The guy has a point of view set in stone and won't hear any argument to the contrary, even from very experienced captains on the type. As someone (more than one) has said before me, status messages are just that - status messages that a lot of very clever engineers and test pilots decided should inform the crew of a degradation in aircraft systems that were not important enough to require crew action.

[Desert Dawg]

Geesh..!! The amount of crap spewed out in this thread regarding a minor incident just boggles the mind...! Hashing this issue to death is becoming a laughable matter...

Guys - get over it...! It's done.. over.. Finished.

Pax, crew and plane are all safe. MCC and engineering have fixed the issues. Life moves on.

[Dani]

There are two arguments hidden in this discussion:

One is the decision the crew made. There are always different points of views in such cases. We can safely argue that most pilots wouldn't return inflight based solely on status messages. All options have to be weighted, inclusive the weather and traffic situation in Moscow.

The other point is the system itself. For me it's amazing that you can loose such a big portion of an engine without loosing thrust, or even having no warnings. They lost basically most of their duct wall and outer cowling, still there is no sign of it in the cockpit? Eighter 777 are wonderfull aircraft... - or the opposite. Wouldn't there be a massive deterioriation of aerodynamics inside the fan duct? I can hardly believe that all this honeycomb material went through the fan or through the outside without causing damage on the engine itself.

And if you loose a whole chunk of your reverser, doesn't that trigger any warning on the flight deck? I'm really astonished.

How big is the increase in fuel flow? No temperature deviation?

And on a 5 hours flight over sparsely populated area, wouldn't there be time to stand up from your "armchair" and have a look on your troubled engine? I guess the feedback to maintenance would be very much different than based on status messages, and so would be the answer from MCC.

So, all in all, I tend to be in the group of "there was something wrong" in this incident. But more information would be necessary to get a definite picture.

[sAx_R54]

...The guy has a point of view set in stone and won't hear any argument to the contrary, even from very experienced captains on the type...

My point of view is set in 'passenger' not in stone! I believe that this thread was started by a T7 pilot and he/she amongst others similarly on this thread would have conducted an immediate return. Other T7 pilots (you?) would have elected to continue. This strikes me as a sort of aviation arrogance, where risk can freely be moved from contained to unknown, as the industry knows what type of risk passengers would like to experience on any given day. And if there is a greater economic need to reduce the cost profile of operation, then passengers have to join in regardless of their view. It may well be argued that is exactly what we purchase when we buy a ticket, but the disembarking passengers in Bahrain might disagree on seeing site of the damage to the aircraft.

If you are an experienced pilot of type, then for sure it might be great to convey your aviation macho-ism to fellow colleagues over a pint, as how you danced on the rudder pedals in a manner which Fred Astaire would have delighted, following failure of thrust asymmetry compensation, as you counteracted increasing yaw and balanced the plane on the precipice of controllability, after engine shut-down! Boys own story, fantastic stuff! But we passengers may not have enjoyed it as much.

I don't possess your insight, but for those times when luck and skill run out, we have threads that run over 200 pages of what pilots should done to prevent the situation.

[fft100]

Fuubar wrote

"As someone (more than one) has said before me, status messages are just that - status messages that a lot of very clever engineers and test pilots decided should inform the crew of a degradation in aircraft systems that were not important enough to require crew action. "

I admire your confidence in computer systems. However, unfortunately, they can only give messages (status, warning or other) for something they know about. Therefore, if there are no sensors, gauges or other inputs to monitor then they cannot tell you about it. I would guess that the cowling was not connected to any sensor, so the computer was not able to pass on the info that it was not all there.

Pilots can only make decisions based on the info they have, but it is not wise to assume that all the info is available. Computers are 'smarter' than they used to be, but i am not sure it is wise to rely completely on them. I used to write software for banks. They are not infallible. They are not God. People should use them with care.

[charlies angel]

sax

Dont make it so complicated and black and white.

I'm a taxi driver on the motorway with a passenger and I get an oil level low warning and I decide to to carry on to the next service station. On checking it is noted that I do in fact need a litre of oil. No drama.

A colleague of mine has the same warning the next day but decides to pull over onto the hard shoulder and call out the AA for a tow to the service station.He also needs a litre of oil. No drama.


Who out of our taxi driving chums is the most/least correct?
Same end result? Totally different decisions were made?

What is the perceived danger to the passenger? Is it the same for each scenario?

Now both scenarios could have had a different result.
What if the first taxi had blown its engine?
What if the advisory was false?
Maybe the AA van breaks down towing our friend!?

So many imponderables.

Command decisions are a healthy mixture of technical knowledge,experience,commercial awareness,team input and many more imponderables.

We use the grey matter because most scenarios are not completely black and white;)

[sAx_R54]

..I'm a taxi driver on the motorway ..

Your a taxi driver, you get a warning light indicating low oil pressure, you hear a bang and knocking noise (big end bearing?), you continue onto motorway anyway, struggling to maintain comfortable cruising speed the engine seizes, you are in the fastlane and desperately try to make the hard-shoulder, the klaxon of the HGV sounds in you ear as you thank your blessings that you are not at 36,000ft!

[Desert Dawg]

@sax

Get over yourself man....!! Really....

What a troll....

[rh200]

I'm a taxi driver on the motorway with a passenger and I get an oil level low warning and I decide to to carry on to the next service station. On checking it is noted that I do in fact need a litre of oil. No drama.

A colleague of mine has the same warning the next day but decides to pull over onto the hard shoulder and call out the AA for a tow to the service station.He also needs a litre of oil. No drama.




At the risk of being a smart arse and since you asked.

Having been a person who was responsable for dealing with the results of such decisions, but on much larger equipment, I can say the second driver made the correct initial decision.

Why, because there where two possible occurances, one the warning system was faulty, two the system was indeed low on oil. If it was indeed low on oil then there are two main possibilities, one it had systematicaly got lower over a long period, or oil is drastically being lost for some reason, like a lost sump plug.

A engine under high load can be damaged in a very short time, even if the oil pressure light comes on and you get it shutdown. Hence the correct course of action is pull over, verify you still have adequate oil with the dipstick and then continue on to where you want to deal with it. :)

The first driver made a guess, that unless he had other information was just that.

p.s this is not meant to reflect on the actions of this crew.

[woo hoo]

I know it's difficult for some in our community to accept but i think sAX's outside comments looking in are refreshing and a worthwhile insight into who pays our wages might be thinking...and so eloquent :ok:

[badgerh]

Wizofoz said:

You also can't dispatch with only one RAD ALT- would you land ASAP on some marginal wilderness strip if THAT happened in flight?

Turkish did :\

How nice to see good argument well presented, thanks Wizofoz!

[sAx_R54]

@woo hoo

A while ago I was on my way to MKJP to present a paper to a professional institute. Ironically enough it was a T7 departing from LGW. 20mins before touchdown the plane encountered heavy turbulence and dropped like I've never experienced before or since. Thankfully we did go on to make a perfectly safe landing.

In the baggage hall at arrivals the Captain and FO were standing right next to me, so I took the opportunity to ask what had happened. The Captain ignored a request for conversation (surname Dawg perhaps!), but the FO explained it had been a little wild and that the command to FA's to immediately seat was because they were unsure if someone had been hurt, or how long the turbulence on descent would last. It was incredulous to me how anyone could take that experience as routine. His final anecdote was that flying was extremely safe and encouraged me to read an aviation blog to get a better look behind the 'scenes', hence PPRuNe ever since.

Reviewing a number of PPRuNe threads has not actually made me feel anymore comfortable when I fly and it is the type of mis-placed arrogance demonstrated by some here, that is a disservice to the aims of a true safety culture. Periods of enlightenment cease when we take ourselves more important than we ought, so my apologies again to all if this appears to be the hallmark of a troll, but at approx 6 posts/pa I am remarkably ill-equipped to lay any claim to even a modicum of success in that direction.

[lomapaseo]

Sax

Arrogance?

It's fine to come on here and ask questions, but when when the answers rebuff your preconceived opinions and you continue with the same opinion what do you expect.

[MTOW]

Seconded, lomapaseo.

sAx, maybe five times out of ten departing Heathrow, an aircraft will be instructed by ATC to stop climb at around 5,000' because of conflicting traffic. This involves a major reduction in power, which, (the sudden loss of engine noise), quite a few passengers perceive to be a major emergency. (I had the wife of a colleague, [who you'd think would know better] assure me that "The engines failed!!!!")

Although it's absolutely no big deal, I accepted that for many pax, it was - (a bit like the turbulence that so affected you and the FO quite correctly told you it wasn't). So, if things were looking busy (when aren't they at Heathrow?), I got into the habit, if time permitted, of telling my passengers to expect the reduction in power when I made the 'cabin crew take your seats' call immediately before takeoff, usually finishing with the comment that since I'd warned them, it probably wouldn't happen today.

It's not arrogance that people responding to your REPETITIVE posts are displaying. They're just trying to tell you something you should by now, (by page 6!!!,) appreciate - passenger aeroplanes quite often fly, (I'd go so far as to say on a daily basis) with bits and pieces missing or not working. Airlines have a very comprehensive document called a Minimum Equipment List that, before departure, a crew and the engineers may refer to to see if those very clever men and women who built the aeroplane consider it is safe to set out without.

After the aeroplane has moved, that list is no longer the decider. On a 777, in most (but obviously not all) cases, it's a wonderful little screen that comes up with all manner of messages called the EICAS, and on the Airbus, the ECAM.

I've suffered (I use that word quite accurately!) a major lightning strike immediately after takeoff and I can assure you, the bang we felt when it hit the aircraft (both me and the passengers!) right under the FO's windshield was major, I'd go so far as to say extreme. (It felt like we'd hit a solid object.)

I assumed our radar and radios at the very least would have been fried. However, a check of all systems - and a check of the STATUS page - assured me everything was still functioning. However, using your (apparently unchangeable) logic, I should have dumped fuel (as the Moscow crew would have had to) and returned to land immediately, "because you never know..."

[Yankee Whisky]

This could have been a disastrous ending. Ignoring engine "bang" followed by multiple messages "advising" the crew could have resulted in
any kind of engine disintegration either in the air, or when reversing thrust on touchdown. Consider secondary damages also.
Not being a 777 driver, I nevertheles would have thought it prudent to
land the aircraft ASAP and assess the damage. Better safe than sorry ,even if it costs the airline some money !
By admission of learned crew members, they would not have departed with the aircraft with the engine in the condition it turned out to be.
Enough said.

[RobertS975]

Maybe I am way off here, but this incident/episode kind of reminds me of the the BA 747 that shut down an engine out of LAX and then attempted to continue to LHR on the remaining 3 engines.

My quick opinion is that at least the BA crew knew what their deficit was, one engine out of 4. This crew really did not know what their actual issues were.

[westhawk]

When and if we become aware of just what the crew knew and exactly when they knew it, then perhaps some of the above conclusions will be vindicated and some will be repudiated. Until then, my own opinion as to the propriety of this crew's actions under the conditions specific to this occurrence will remain open to revision pending the receipt of additional facts.

I just fail to see the logic in either condemning or supporting what was done without knowing what facts were available to the crew at the time of the occurrence or at any time during the flight thereafter.

[Desert Dawg]

I Third Lomapaseo's comments....

Well said Loma :ok:

[sAx_R54]

MTOW It's not arrogance that people responding to your REPETITIVE posts are displaying

It's not what sAx says that is important, it is what your colleagues say that is. This thread was started by someone I presume to be rated on type. He/she amongst other pilots in this thread are of the view that they wouldn't. Yourself and others alike feel that all possibilities had been considered, and that all eventualities were foreseeable. But as you rightly imply, 'chattle' don't possess your oversight on the FD and perhaps would rather have lined up and taken their chances with those who wouldn't. It is pure fallacy to suggest that all knew that all would be well, as I have read your contributions on many other threads, where what is known is accurately dissected in minutiae in the last few seconds before impact. The arrogance is to be dismissive of this truth, when immediately surrounded by other threads that continue a cyclical review.

My perspective of the aviation industry's safety culture, is my reality of the aviation industry's safety culture! Your perspective and hence your reality, may actually have been helped if you had digested the views of your learned peers from page 1!

[myradios]

I'll 'fourth' Lomapaseo's comments. :ok:

[Andu]

Jeezz, he doesn't give up, does he?

"Fifth(ed)".

[helen-damnation]

the views of your learned peers from page 1

Except that it doesn't matter how learned you are. Unless you were there on the day, anything else is speculation and a bunch of armchair lawyers, experienced or not, are simply postulating and theorising based on their own flying (or not) experience.

and

I don't possess your insight Precisely :ugh:

You want a safe flight, believe it or not, so do we! If it all goes belly up, I intend to get home to my wife and kids so I'll do what I've been trained to do to make that happen. That means you're coming along too. Even if the problem has a specific procedure to deal with it, the hard fought and gleaned experience of the crew is used to gather info, assess and decide on an appropriate response. We don't have the option to pull over and dip the oil! We do however, have people to read a realtime data download for things we can't see. All part of the decision process.

You're entitled to your view, but please don't expect it to detemine mine :=

Move on folks, there's nothing else to see here .......

[poorjohn]

There are a lot of ways to get killed in a transport aircraft, usually extremely well mitigated by well-designed, well-manufactured, well-maintained machines flown by two or more extremely well-trained highly-competent professionals who can co-operatively handle the situation when something does go wrong.

As "slf" (amusingly insulting, imo) I would not choose to fly behind those among you who've developed arrogance as part of your life-style. If you enjoy smarting off at someone expressing an opinion you disagree with here, I don't trust you to not treat your colleage in the other seat any better.

John

[golfyankeesierra]

The real problem here is that the non-pilots think they were flying a crippled aircraft back to homebase just to save some bucks (or be in time for dinner).

Reread the earlier posts about status-messages. They mean really nothing: 99 out of 100 times they are cleared after landing with one push on a button in the onboard maintenance computer.
A status message in not an indication of a problem or a failure.
A status message isn't even presented directly to the pilots; it has to be manually called up on a special page in a secondary display.

Now the load bang is something else.
It is usually associated with stall and that can be destructive.
We have however several cockpit indications (vibration and EGT would be my direct focus), and as long as they remain normal you just keep on trucking'.
BTW the aircraft will automatically downlink engine data at certain trigger values and also most probably the pilots will have discussed the engine health with homebase maintenance as they have access to enormous amounts of engine data which can also be downlinked on request.
That is standard for any technical issue; via satcom anytime, anywhere.
It is not like 20 years ago that you are on your own on the other side of the globe; there has been progress and we have instant access to advise by specialists, be it f.i. operational, medical, security or in this case technical.

Anyway, we are not an arrogant bunch of cowboys.
We use our experience, airmanship and good judgement to make cooperative decisions in situations like this.
You'll gather that experience when flying day in, day out for years like we do, not by reading a pilots forum (not meant to be arrogant).

[golfyankeesierra]

Maybe I am way off here, but this incident/episode kind of reminds me of the the BA 747 that shut down an engine out of LAX and then attempted to continue to LHR on the remaining 3 engines.

My quick opinion is that at least the BA crew knew what their deficit was, one engine out of 4. This crew really did not know what their actual issues were.
Not even close: the whole issue is they before continuing the flight to destination the crew must be satisfied that they can stay clear of obstacles when (if) the next (second) engine failure occurs. Which is "critical" in the case of crossing the Rockies (and Greenland).

BTW the BA crew had an actual failure, this crew NOT.

[bvcu]

Think to put some of this in simple terms a reasonably sized chunk of FAIRING inside the exhaust area broke away. If one looks at a very simple example look at the A320 series engines and compare the CFM 56 nacelle and the IAE V2500 one is very short and one is long . The engines are a similar size. So the loss of some of the nacelle doesnt have a major effect on the physical operation in this area. I'M sure if the crew had sight of the damage they wouldnt have carried on but , the damage was not visible so the only choice is to go with what you can see , a good set of engine parameters and a few status messages.

[poorjohn]

golfyankeesierra: Anyway, we are not an arrogant bunch of cowboys.
We use our experience, airmanship and good judgement to make cooperative decisions in situations like this.
Apologies to the majority who don't deserve the 'arrogant' paint-brush. I probably should have specifically acknowledged that my comment was intended to describe a small minority.

But I hold to my view that those few are not my favorite drivers because 'arrogance' and 'cooperative decisions' are sometimes tragically at odds, as anyone with a keen memory of accidents will be hard-pressed to deny.

In my own defense, although I've never flown anything bigger than a twin Commander, I've been a obsessed fan of flying machines since a relative who ran an FBO gave me a ride in a Navion, probably some 60 years ago. Since then I've had ample opportunity to see things from your side, minus the pilot in the other seat, spare engines, FBW electronics, or a friendly dispatcher or maintence tech on the line. And I am, probably insignificant to the discussion, a physicist and 'rocket scientist', by virtue of work on Apollo.

And, btw, I did develop an enormous respect for the many in your profession who contributed such vast amounts of knowledge to the AF447 threads - the likes of PJ2 and dozens of others far outshine the few at the other end of the scale.

[rob_ginger]

During my training on the 777, it was stressed that we should not try to outguess the systems - and definitely not act upon any status message. Status messages are just that, STATUS messages, which, translated for those who need translation, means "a syatem (or systems) is (or are) not operating at 100%, but we, the men who designed this aircraft, after many hours of careful consideration and with many, many hours of deliberation - and much, much more information than you, the operating crew (and the Monday morning quarterbacks) can ever hope to have available to you - have come to the conclusion that those systems haven't degraded to the point where crew action is necessary".

Sorry, but I can't let this pass. I have to agree with sax_r54's comments about what I would expect an aircrew to do in the circumstances as reported, i.e. *loud* bang, followed later by STATUS messages.

I would agree that if you JUST had some status messages you would be "alert but not alarmed". However, the loud bang makes a world of difference. I think it's a little cute to take the two in isolation. I'm a graduate electrical engineer, and if a comparable situation occurred in my line of work I wouldn't hesitate to shut down plant/stop production/whatever until the cause of the noise had been established.

Like sax_r54 I'm pretty disappointed at the apparent attitude of some posters on this forum, who seem to be saying that it's OK to ignore a loud bang AND some subsequent status messages. Here's another SLF who doesn't like that attitude.

If the circumstances were indeed different in this particular case then that's another matter, but my comments on the event as reported here stand.

[golfyankeesierra]

From Boeing FCOM (744, not 777):
Status Messages

Status messages indicate equipment faults requiring MEL reference for dispatch.
They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.

FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.

Still don't get it?

[SLF3]

A bit late, but the taxi analogy does not work, unless it is a twin engine taxi.

[sAx_R54]

Maybe the cyclical nature of this thread should now be locked by the MOD's, in deference to the more important news items on the rest of the Forum. To sqwk7777 and 629bus I stand behind your views and hope that on any given roll of the dice, that you would be the pilots at the sharp end, using superior judgement in order to avoid having to demonstrate your superior skill. All other times our trust will be in the hands of fault tolerance, triple-redundancy and prayer.

[lomapaseo]

opinions, opinions opinions

anonymous posters from all walks of life interested in aviation.

commenting on news.

Nothing unexpected about that except the name of this forum doesn't match the overall quality of the message to the reader.

What we need is a sticky thread to capture the discussion messages to these news clips

What Would You Have Done ..... if

[Dont Hang Up]

They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.

FYI The concept of Status message (AFAIK) was introduced with the B747-400.
As I said before the status messages aren't even displayed to the pilots (directly).
There is only a blue Cue indicating the presence after which the STS info can be called up.
With the introduction of the B744 the cue could be displayed right after take-off, causing some inadvertent inflight returns because the old school classic 747 pilots thought they were actual failures (like several posters here).
Boeing responded with inhibiting the STS cue until 30 minutes after T/O.

Still don't get it?


I think I do get it. But I also understand the cause of some perplexed head scratching on this thread. The content of these mere status messages seems to go beyond what may be deemed 'of minor academic interest'.

Thrust asymmetry? Overheat and Fire sensor problems? All after a loud bang? That sounds like a big deal.

I defer to those that understand these things properly but I understand the confusion.

[Sciolistes]

They are nice to know but have NOTHING to do with inflight failures and have NO effect on decision making.
Nice to know? Sometimes you have to use some common sense and see the bigger picture. A group of status messages relatively co-located in an a single engine nacelle makes it pretty bloody obvious something is highly unusual and unquantifiable has happened. Something that takes out several components simultaneously is not likely to be trivial and is possibly quite dangerous with unknown damage to annunciated areas of the aircraft.

When you add the audible 'bang' into the picture, the situation seem pretty clearer still!

The decision to continue is what they chose. On the face of it, it I does seem a very strange decision. What they took into consideration is unknown by all of us and one can only assume they made the correct decision at the time and under the circumstances. However, that does not detract from the obvious gravity of the situation.

[Lookleft]

As one poster put it with sat phones and data link the crew have access to a lot of information on which to base a decision. I doubt the crew would have continued if they thought that they had a crippled aircraft.

I do have to question though some of the assertions that just because its a STATUS msge then all is well. The 777 QRH is a very thin document compared to a lot of other Boeing QRHs. Thats due to most abnormals consisting of STATUS msges that don'e require any crew action. My understanding of the reason for this is that Boeing tried to make the 777 that automated even with non-normals that no crew action was required. As an example of this the 777 did not have an unreliable airspeed checklist because the FT-ADIRU was considered so good that in the event of a single failure of an accelerometer or gyro then the "box" would take care of the problem without the crew having to do any switching. After the MAS 777 incident in 2005, Boeing have now put an Unreliable Airspeed checklist into the 777 QRH.

[FirstStep]

First, not a T7, just a B744. A lot of similarities though..

It is easy to "second guess" or Armchair Quarterback the decisions of others. Comfy in the confines of our snug room, out of the stress of being in the "pointy end". So, although I wasn't there. I am going to subject you to my thoughts on the matter ( lucky you ).:)

First, as was pointed out ( often ), the crew does not act on Status messages, as per Boeing. Only Warnings or Cautions ( and maybe non < carroted advisories ). I understand Boeings logic, and the necessity of delaying even their presence on the lower EICAS screen. However, they are there. They are information, a tool to be used by the crew in understanding the state of the aircraft. I mean, if we were not meant to view them, wouldn't Boeing, in their infinate wisdom, not even display them until after we were to land?. A single Status message is of limited concern, nesessating only the time it takes me to enter it into the MX log. Multiple messages, all concerning a "system", are another story. Common sense would tell me that something is wrong with the system. In this case the system is the engine. This information, comming on the heels of a loud "Bang" would further inspire me to conclude that all is not well with the engine. Aren't we ( as fellow PIC's ), obligated to use our system knowledge?. There are times when the checklist says, "land at the nearest suitable airport". But, do we really need to wait for a catastrophic event, and the cascading EICAS warnings to take the "safest" course of action?.
There are instances of having multiple deferred items ( all legally deferred ), where the PIC has the right to refuse to take the aircraft, if he feels that the combined effects of those multiple deferred items pose a safety hazard. Again, it's judgement. We have an obligation to ensure the safety of the flight, regardless of the financial of operational implications.
Years ago, I had an ADC fail. The jet didn't know the ADC failed ( no EICAS ), but it sure poured out a lot of EICAS messages related to the outputs of the erroneous ADC. We had to use out system knowledge, or our "common sense" to deduce the cause of our erroneous messages. My point is, although Boeing designed a great airplane, the notification system in place ( EICAS ), can't be relied on to tell the whole story. Sure, act on the EICAS according to your AFM. But, do you believe you will get accurate EICAS messages ( or in this case ANY EICAS massages ) when catastrophic events destroy wires, sensors, or when pieces go missing?.
So, as a commander ( and semi-professional armchair quaterback ), deducing that all is not well with one of my two engines, and being responsible for the lives of all on board, would take the safest course of action by putting the plane back on the ground.
Wait, there's more.....

As far as "calling" the Company is concerned. I've had instances where those on the other end didn't know ****. You may even say there were times we were led down the wrong path. There is often a different set of priorities exhibited by those on the other end. Coersion is not beyond them. So, when safety is concerned, I have learned to make my decision, then call the company to tell them what MY decision is. Of course, operational issues are a different matter.:ok:

I've witnessed enough on PPRUNE to know there will be those that disagree with a lot of what I said, yet, I have the utmost confidence that all will be perfect gentlemen in their responces and will not stoop to criticism or remarks that will hurt my feelings.:O

[sAx_R54]

@FirstStep.

Yours is an analysis that I can comprehend. Ultimately an investigation will be the final arbiter of the known facts. One fact that does seem clear at this stage, is that neither EICAS, the real time engine monitoring back at base nor the pilots, were aware of the large section of fan duct and thrust reverser that was missing. It would be interesting to hear the thoughts of the EK pilots, juxtaposed between what they understood whilst in the air and what they finally saw when positioned on the ramp.

[Enjoy the view]

Well said FirstStep..... all common sense.....

Considerations:
Loud bang <-> twin engine
Multiple status messages <-> computer unreliability/ faults
Company decision making <-> crew decision making

-> Land the thing, discuss after.

[Yaw String]

Known ,extremely infrequent occurrence with RR engine.
Problem with the T/R inner wall lining due long term exposure to elevated temperatures.
Typically occurs during takeoff or shortly after rotation. Loud bang or jolt and EICAS messages + increased fuel flow on affected engine.

Service bulletins 777-78-0071 and 777-75A0002 deals.
Release of parts of engine primary nozzle,aft cowl and portions of the inner wall can lead to minor airplane damage to tires,stab,flaperons,wing control surfaces and wing lower surface.
Continued flight after the T/R failure increases the risk of continued parts liberation from the affected engine....Flight crews should be aware of fuel management given the potential increased fuel consumption resulting from the T/R failure. Thrust reverser should not be selected on subsequent landing if damage is suspected.

A turnback would be understandable, given the prudent nature of most crews, but it is a crew decision, taken in conjunction with maintenance control.:ok:

[zzz]

First Step,

Well said.

What no one seems to have mentioned in the last seven pages is, were the crew confident that they would be able to achieve go-around thrust on the damaged engine. If I'd been in the same situation, given the same info then I would have been very unsure. If you can't get go around power then you have to treat the situation as single engine (even with the damaged engine running) and therefore on a twin engined aircraft land at the nearest suitable airport.

[helen-damnation]

Two issues here:

a load bang on take off

It happened on take off so the engine was at high thrust and it DIDN'T fail. No reason so far to assume it wouldn't provide high thrust.

were the crew confident that they would be able to achieve go-around thrust on the damaged engine

A bang by itself doesn't mean a damaged engine. The Status messages that followed would have indicated that there may be a problem, but co-ordination with engineering, lack of pax reports, ground reports etc AND a NORMALLY functioning engine (parameters/thrust response) could reasonably be deduced by the crew as a continue decision.

Surely this thread has died a slow death by now :bored:

[Squawk7777]

A bang by itself doesn't mean a damaged engine. The Status messages that followed would have indicated that there may be a problem, but co-ordination with engineering, lack of pax reports, ground reports etc AND a NORMALLY functioning engine (parameters/thrust response) could reasonably be deduced by the crew as a continue decision.

A bang itself doesn't mean that it is safe to continue. Just because engineering says it is safe to continue, doesn't mean it is safe to continue. The fact that the engine is running fine right now, doesn't mean it will be running smoothly in 30 mins. It appears to me that some pilots are just too much by the book, forget to think and put themselves and their pax into unnecessary risk.

Look at the picture of the damaged engine, was it safe to continue?

[helen-damnation]

Engineering don't tell you it's safe to continue, they will tell you what the data they have says.

The engine may not run smoothly in 30 mins.. and the sun may not rise in the East.

Pilots don't have internal photos to look at in the air.

unnecessary risk Landed safely after the crew made a decision.

GET OVER IT.

Now have the final say and then lets get on with our lives :ugh:

[MTOW]

Well, I think there's a whole bunch of you who should offer... no, DEMAND that Emirates take you on as (obviously highly paid) consultants - the lot of you - to advise Emirates' obviously hapless, totally inexperienced crews on how they SHOULD operate their aircraft.

Then again, you could all probably save yourselves the journey to Dubai, as, from the posts I've read here, your collective advice would seem to be, in every case where everything isn't 101% hunky dory: "Land immediately!!!! Just... in... case."

[zzz]

Helen,

So you have a loud bang on take off, various engine related status messages and the local ATC unit report engine debris on the runway and your are happy you are going to achieve GA thrust. Amazing foresight.

[helen-damnation]

Informed by DME station that items believed to be part or all of primary exhaust nozzle were recovered from within the airport perimeter. Investigation is ongoing, TR cowls not yet opened.

ATC did not report debris on the runway. The inference from the report quote is that it was discovered later.

I have no doubt the crew would have responded differently if there was a report of debris shortly after T/O.

Amazing indeed!

[Squawk7777]

ATC did not report debris on the runway.

It doesn't really matter what ATC reported. What really matters after looking at the engine is that it was not a wise decision to continue.

Speaking of engineering and data, they can never see the big picture just by looking at their data on their screen. Do you need engineering now to make the decision for you? I have been in two incidents where engineering had no indication whatsoever, but I used my common sense. If I would have been too much by the book, I probably wouldn't be typing this right now!

Landed safely after the crew made a decision.

maybe Fortuna was with them this time. To continue into a 5 hour flight is not safety conscious!

[lomapaseo]

Squawk7777

It doesn't really matter what ATC reported. What really matters after looking at the engine is that it was not a wise decision to continue.



Great hindsight, but absolutely of no relevance to pilot discision making.

If the decision was wrong enough to significantly affected safety of flight, than it's up to the manufacturer to provide, sound, sight and action cues to the pilots while flying, rather than leaving them to be critized by hindsight after the plane has safely landed.

[Wizofoz]

Squawk,

If you think the decision was bad, you must think it may have led to a bad outcome.

What do you think was the worst that could have happened, and why do you think it?

[fdr]

having had a stall on the B777 big engine at TOC on a short regional non ETOPS flight, and then been through the decision making process of evaluating the safety and operational aspects IAW warm fuzzy CRM processes.... I can say that for the operator I was with the following position resulted in flight:

1. I was aware that the engine had stalled, but had returned to normal operations immediately.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.

so what....

The crew get the info they get, and make a decision, either in the absence of other info, or not. The additional information may or may not be beneficial, ie pathological management behaviour does not mix well with decision making.

The big twins fly nicely on one engine, and the conditions on the day very much determine what the crews position may be in respect to safety. Acceptable safety is a moving target, and notwithstanding the rather odd position of FAR 91.07 and 91.13, where applicable, and where applied to a minor event of an engine on a type certified for CAT III single engine landings.... I would suspect that the EK crew made a determination that they were relatively happy with at the time. Tomorrow, their decision may be different, or not; it is conditional on the circumstances.

Be aware that the engine manufacturers spent a fair bit of effort trying to stop crews of the big twins shutting down engines just for the sake of competing a checklist. This is not something I agree with, I think that a checklist is reasonable to follow until the expected outcome diverges from reality, or a greater and contradicting safety risk exists.

In the example case I offer, the company was less conservative in their evaluation than I was, but both positions were based on safety of flight and operational considerations...

These failures are not black or white, they enter the region of grey where the decisions are conditional on many additional factors, most of which are not provided in the rumour network's quarterbacking.

ease up on the stoning

[Fargoo]

1. I was aware that the engine had stalled, but had returned to normal operations immediately.
2. visual inspection of the engine front and rear indicated no damage.
3. as the flight was an out and back operation, and the nearest spare engine was at point of departure, I recommended that an RTP would be best outcome form an engineering perspective.
4. The engine parameters were identifiable and both recorded the stall, and the return to normal operations.
5. Company ops requested proceed to destination.
6. I had no safety of fight concerns with proceeding and did so.
7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.
8. On departure, with a full derate, the EGT went to limit. The rest of the operation was normal.
9. on arrrival at base, the engine was found to be junk. No parameters were identifiable on the AIMS as significantly changed in flight, but the engine went directly to shop and needed a full overhaul.

Very surprised a deferred boroscope was allowed after a stall in flight. Some engine manufacturers are more lax than others with their requirements though. What engine type was this?

[Gretchenfrage]

I am somewhat surprised.

There you have a 380 with an audible explosion, a very visible hole in the wing, one engine in shambles, two othesr no longer respond, no fuel dumping possible, the CG slowly running aft out of limits. The crew did an extensive assessment, worked on 52 ECAMs, and continued to fly the deadly wounded beast for another 2 1/2 hours to do the never ending ECAMs and ......... come out as heroes, lauded for their professionalism.

Then you have a T7 with an audible bang, no visible damage, only status messages, the engine running and responding smoothly. The crew did an extensive assessment and decided to continue for about 4 hours, to land successfully and .......... the crew gets mostly bashed for not doing a quickie back.

Both decisions may be defendable or questionable, but, believe me, I 'd rather be SLF on the EK flight than on the Qantas one!

[FirstStep]

I apologise if my previous post left the impression that I felt the EK crew did somethong "wrong".
I consider these forums to be great for "news" ( always taken with a grain of salt or two ), as well as an almost graduate course in CRM. Where else can you get such insight into decision making ( good and bad ), on current events. Inflight smoke/fires, engine damage, loss of instrumentation, runway overruns. These are all events we have faced, or might face in our occupation. Tomorrow maybe?. "What would I do?'. I often don't even have to ask myself that question, as my mind seems to automatically begin that "process" of putting myself into the situation. And suprise-suprise, how the event parameters seem to unfold and change more often than a "married woman" as more people in the know seem to chime in.
Someone asked if, after "seeing" the damage after landing, would the EK crew have still felt they made the "right" decision.... Good question. It's often pointed out by some that "if a safe landing is made", then it was obviously the right decision. I have issues with that rationale.
I once has a two loud stalls in sucession on climb out. Did a "Sever Eng damage" checklist, as opposed to "Surge-Eng Stall". Dumped fuel, landed. Then I proceeded to "sweat" my decision. Should I have just tried "throttling back, ect", and maybe continued to destination?. ( Luxury of 4 engines :) ). Boroscope revealed a trashed engine. I give thanks to the powers that be for the damage. What I'm trying to say, is that we are often "shaped" by events in our past, both good and bad. If no damage was found, I would most likely have been "called into the office", ect. Then maybe I might make a different decision if the same events were to unfold again.
With the grace of hindsight, and being in the comfy of my room, not under stress or duress, in reference to the EK crew continuing..... I stated "I" would have landed. Too many people take that as a condemnation of the EK crew for continuing. Sort of misses the value of discussing these events in my humble opinion.

[500N]

Gretchenfrage

Didn't the pilot of the Qantas A380 say why he couldn't land ?

From memory, I thought it was they needed to burn fuel off to get the weight down so that they could still pull up before the end of the runway.

Contacted
"With EK, Qantas (and the like), passengers should have great confidence.
They have a high calibre of pilots."

That's why I prefer to fly Qantas, at least you know you have a crew with some experience and as has been shown, can handle major emergencies when they occur.

[stilton]

There is a major difference.


The QF A380 still had three operating engines !

[Gretchenfrage]

From memory, I thought it was they needed to burn fuel off to get the weight down so that they could still pull up before the end of the runway.

You want to pull up with one donkey exploded and two others running, but not responding to commands?? Good luck!

That's the difference to the EK case:

Both engines were running normally and thus promised a normal approach and eventual pull up. Therefore the decision to continue is quite acceptable.

The 380 was definitely not in a normal state, so a rapid emergency landing was, at least to my belief, indicated. If you can take off balanced on a runway, you will always be able to put the same aircraft down for an emergency landing.
-- V1 cut and remaining distance at MTOW vs. banging the dying animal right on the 300m mark and then give it all the brakes, revs you still have --

[Halton Brat]

A B747/777 engineer's viewpoint:

1. Loud bang on take off.

2. Multiple status messages (the jet is trying to tell you something here).

3. External integrity of twin-engined aircraft unknown.

If I am on board this flight, I would like to land asap please.

In my 40yrs in this business, I have seen major bits departing airframes/engines. If you are lucky, they will miss the Horizontal Stab which is following close behind you; maybe not..........

Not long ago, I was doing a post-flight inspection on a JT9-70 powered B747 Classic. I noticed something different about the #4 engine; the entire Exhaust Nozzle had gone, broken away at the Turbine rear face flange. This is a 'kin big bit on a -70 motor. Lucky it was the #4, & not the #3, for Horiz Stab reasons.

Why do we not have effective external camera coverage on aircraft? I can festoon my motorcycle & even my crash hat with dinky little cameras; what is the problem......at least the crew would have more info to work with.

Rant off.

[fdr]

7. On arrival at destination the engine was bore scoped and found normal, and the return flight was conducted.

Fargoo: there was no deferral, the borescope was done on arrival at the destination, ie landing at end of the sector.

The type provides a message in the AIMS maintenance pages on detection of the "Engine Stall".

Curiously, the engineering in this case was telling me that there was no problem of note whilst in flight, without being aware that the crew had reviewed the AIMS maintenance pages onboard and were quite aware that the maintenance dept were not telling the whole truth. Nevertheless, the issue is what constitutes a safety fo flight condition vs one of inconvenience to engineering... sort of like the Columbia decision making process in the background after the foam strike; Linda Ham: "so this is a scheduling issue..., not safety of flight...". Making a black and white, concrete resolution of "action in the event of..." neglects the environment that aircraft are operated in.

Legally, there is a background issue, that there are no maintenance approvals anywhere in the world I am aware of to conduct maintenance actions in flight, and from the manufacturers, the data monitoring of systems provided to ground engineering is not certified for the purposes of intervention in approved procedures. Might seem a small thing, but when the management gets to the point of getting crews to disregard checklists such as cargo fires etc... in flight then there is a bit of a problem. Where "CRM principles" and company decision making devolves to the extent that everything needs to go through the engineering dept before actioning, then everything between the covers of the QRH becomes negotiable.

Decision making under conditions of uncertainty makes the job interesting. The wash up does not always add much to the future quality of decision making, I suspect that management frequently reinforce bad habits in their response to events. A substantial percentage of management personnel are not trained in risk management, CRM or associated aspects of how their interaction with operations may affect adversely outcomes. Forums such as this have the luxury to opine without responsibility about the decisions made by crew post event, and with the benefit of knowing the outcome of the actual event. The rest of the operators out there every day deal with out of family events that have no specific checklist that covers all the procedures required to be followed. I for one would prefer to generally arrive at an acceptable course of actions that minimises the impact to the operation, rather then refine a response by employing limited resources to the problem at hand, which interferes with the normal operations (EA401, UAL173 like... even arguably AS261).

aviate
navigate
communicate

checklist.... complete
problem resolved? Y/N
Y...... have coffee
N...... apply adequate effort to result in a safe and adequate outcome.

or whatever else floats your boat, after all, as is often stated post event, by management: "...thats what you get paid the big bucks for.." With the heady race to the bottom, the reference to big bucks is probably false advertising now... :)

Operational safety is the outcome of signals that are effectively stochastic in nature, and quite often the result of unknown interactions of factors. Hollnagel's resonance theory gives a perspective of the non linearity of systems. Bottom line is that almost all events are unique in their nature, (but may have similarities to prior events). The target of acceptable safety is effectively a moving target, as are the risks to operational safety. The general unwashed crews around the world actually do a fairly credible job in balancing the issues, even if the customers fuelling the race to the bottom complain about far too many runway overruns, LOC etc. Checklists will invariably deal with generic issues and will frequently leave the PIC with a requirement to determine appropriate course of actions and the disposition of the aircraft. Please refrain from throwing stones.

[ARNSpoty]

Average of 13-minute flight time. Or maybe it's block time, in which case DXB is amazingly efficient.

A lot of training flights? Sim broken?

all of the above:}

[Prober]

First time I experienced a loud bang (from somewhere under my seat) my military flight commander told me not to eat onions for breakfast! More seriously, STATUS messages are just that (qv) and the reason why they are inhibited for 30 mins is so that too hasty a judgement is not reached. Two things here must be considered. One – airmanship, two – I was there and you weren’t (not on this particular incident).

[oxide]

Any idea of an EK incident of a similar nature on 22 Sept. Sister in law was on a MCT-DXB flight, not sure a/c type (she told me it was big). Heard a bang on approach resulting in some sort of dust/smoke in economy. She was seated by the wing but did not look out. Greeted by emergency services on landing.

Any idea what this could have been?

[SuperT]

It might be worth mentioning that the bypass duct is the airframe not the engine. The engine hours are irrelevant, it is the the duct life that counts. The bypass duct is also supplied by Boeing not Rolls-Royce

[NigelOnDraft]

Since this thread seems to decaying, maybe inject something back into it :hmm: A similar BA problem AAIB Report Link (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Boeing%20777-236,%20G-YMMP%2010-11.pdf)

The messages, actions and decisions of the crew all discussed. I'm not trawling through this thread to see the similarities / differences to the EK situation, but I am sure others will :rolleyes:

Just for sake of doubt, I can see little I would comment on, apart from one action raised my eyebrows a little. Will keep to myself for now ;)

[lomapaseo]

Just for sake of doubt, I can see little I would comment on, apart from one action raised my eyebrows a little. Will keep to myself for now

Of course this comment caused me to read the whole report trying to find this "one action" :E

The report appeared to confirm my suspicions of the symptoms as reported.

I recall several other similar events over the years of jet service where the turbine exhaust duct hardware has gone missing at takeoff but other than performance issues with the engine wasn't detected until subsequent landing.

These new glass cockpits do provide a lot more information but even with consultation with the home base tech guys don't make the decisions of go-no-go obvious for you.

[Shaka Zulu]

That's because law and accountability are funny things...

[bvcu]

interesting AAIB report , crew accessing MAT in flight ?

[shortfinals]

Crew clearly didn't want themselves, the pax or the aircraft holed up in Moscow for a few days!