737 reported down in Canada

[Jazz Hands]

First Air 737 reported down in Canada, operating out of Yellowknife. Unconfirmed.

[kbrockman]

Plane From Yellowknife To Resolute Bay Crashes In Far North (http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2011/08/20/plane-from-yellowknife-crash-north_n_932183.html?just_reloaded=1)
A First Air flight has crashed near Resolute Bay, Nunavut in Canada's far North.

The plane, which departed from Yellowknife and was apparently headed to Resolute, crashed early Saturday afternoon.

A source said the 737 was carrying 15 passengers plus crew members.

Transport Minister Denis Lebel's spokeswoman Vanessa Schneider could not confirm the number of people affected.
"No firm details yet," she wrote in an email.

[alph2z]

A 737 passenger jet crashed Saturday near Resolute Bay, Nunavut, in Canada's High Arctic, killing 12 people and injuring three others on board.

Nunavut RCMP have confirmed First Air charter flight 6560 was travelling from Yellowknife to Resolute Bay with 15 people on board, including four crew members, the CBC's Patricia Bell reported from Iqaluit.

The RCMP said in a release it "was made aware of the possibility of some survivors." A flight list was not immediately available.

The Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre in CFB Trenton says helicopters and medical personnel are now at the site.

Hundreds of military personnel are currently in the area for Operation Nanook. But the co-ordination centre says that the incident was not a part of a simulation exercise planned for the military operation.

Prime Minister Stephen Harper is scheduled to travel to Resolute Bay on Monday for his annual trip to the Arctic.

Plane crash near Resolute Bay kills 12 - North - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/08/20/north-air-crash.html)

[westhawk]

From Canadian Forces website (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/feature-vedette/2011/08/nanook11/index-eng.asp)



Operation NANOOK 11 is a two part operation.
Part one:


A sovereignty and presence patrolling operation
Conducted from 4 to 20 August, 2011 on Cornwallis Island and at sea in Davis Strait, Baffin Bay and Lancaster Sound
Includes the participation of our international partners from the United States and Denmark

Part two:


A Canadian whole-of-government exercise
Includes a simulated major air disaster conducted in the vicinity of Resolute Bay, NU
Includes a simulated maritime emergency exercise conducted in the Strathcona Sound, NU area of northern Baffin Island


Operation NANOOK 11 will involve more than 1100 participants from the Canadian Forces Navy, Army, Air and Special Forces. In addition, over 100 personnel from other participating countries will take part.
Edited following the above post. The coincidence is ironic, but hopefully helpful to any survivors.

[wingview]

Crash: First Air B732 near Resolute Bay on Aug 20th 2011, impacted terrain (http://avherald.com/h?article=4419c56e&opt=0)

[Jazz Hands]

The simulated disaster, I believe, is an unfortunate coincidence.

[pigboat]

One of the posters on here (http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?f=54&t=75997) seems to have quoted someone who was in Resolute when the accident happened.

[downnorth]

It is a very sad day here in Yellowknife.

I'm sure I have seen these folks while passing on the ramp maybe even said hello. It is a small/tight aviation community here in Yellowknife and in Canada's Arctic.

A photo of the accident posted by a member of avcanada.ca

http://p.twimg.com/AXUGmY0CMAAPmQb.jpg

[RobertS975]

Nunavut town reeling after plane crash kills 12 - The Globe and Mail (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/nunavut-plane-crash-kills-12-near-resolute-bay/article2136238/)


Aircraft registration reportedly C-GNWN msn# 21067 in service initially with Wien Air Alaska in 8/1975.

[Aldente]

Too early to say, but my thoughts for what it's worth.

The airfield has an ILS on RW 35 but the wind was from the south at 10 knots or more. The runway is just over 1900 m long.

Crash position was to the south east of the airport.

This suggests to me an ILS approach to RW 35 (with a tailwind), followed by breaking right for a left hand downwind pattern to land on RW17. The left hand pattern would have favoured the circle to land being flown from the left hand seat which is what one would expect when flying in challenging conditions.

Don't know what the circling minimums for Resolute Bay are, but the cloud base at the time was pretty low......

[BoyFly]

My condolences to all those families.




TAF CYRB 210538Z 2106/2206 VRB03KT 1/2SM -DZ FG VV001 TEMPO 2106/2113
2SM BR SCT001 OVC006 FM211300 VRB03KT P6SM SCT005 OVC015 TEMPO
2113/2118 2SM BR BKN005 OVC015 FM211800 11010KT P6SM SCT015 BKN030
TEMPO 2118/2203 4SM -DZ BR BKN015 OVC030 BECMG 2201/2203 11015G25KT
FM220300 11015G25KT P6SM SCT004 BKN015 OVC030 TEMPO 2203/2206 2SM -DZ
BR OVC006 PROB30 2203/2206 1/2SM FG OVC002 RMK NXT FCST BY 211200Z=


SPECI CYRB 210710Z 31003KT 5/8SM BR OVC002 RMK FG3ST5=
SPECI CYRB 210710Z CCA 31003KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 RMK FG3ST5=
METAR CYRB 210700Z 31003KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC002 04/04 A2998 RMK ST8
SLP159=
SPECI CYRB 210612Z 29002KT 4SM -DZ BR OVC002 RMK ST8 VIS W 15=
METAR CYRB 210600Z 00000KT 1/2SM R35/5500FT -DZ FG VV001 04/04 A2997
RMK FG8 SLP155=
SPECI CYRB 210528Z 26003KT 1/2SM R35/4500FT -DZ FG VV001 RMK FG8=
SPECI CYRB 210517Z 00000KT 1/2SM R35/4500FT -DZ FG OVC002 RMK FG5ST3=

SPECI CYRB 210502Z 29003KT 1/2SM R35/3000FT -DZ FG VV001 RMK FG8=
METAR CYRB 210500Z 29003KT 0SM R35/2400FT -DZ FG VV001 04/04 A2996
RMK FG8 SLP151=

[aterpster]

Aldente:

The airfield has an ILS on RW 35 but the wind was from the south at 10 knots or more. The runway is just over 1900 m long.

Crash position was to the south east of the airport.

Perhaps they flew this IAP:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/11-2.jpg

[BOAC]

That hill is only just over 430' high and they hit below the top, below back-course DA and well below circling:confused:.

[hetfield]

The crash site is located less than 2km west of Resolute Bay Community in rugged terrain.

First Air confirmed their Boeing 737-200 C-GNWN had an accident in the hills about 8km from the airport of Resolute Bay.

(AVHerald)

So it looks almost like the 732' hill.

[Aldente]

aterpster

My knowledge of the geography of the area is not good but news reports say the aircraft came down near the settlement of Resolute Bay. Looking on Google maps satellite view confirms that this small town is to the south east of the airfield / runway. In that case, seems unlikely that they would have been flying the ILS back course procedure for RW17.

Further information taken from the The Aviation Herald website :-

The crash site is located less than 2km west of Resolute Bay Community in rugged terrain.

A listener on frequency reported the crew of C-GNWN had called 3nm final for runway 35T, which proved to be their last radio transmission. Temporary Tower tried to raise them without success. Another aircraft was on approach to runway 17T and went around because of fog, they were asked by tower whether they could see anything. During their second approach the fog lifted and the crew of that aircraft was able to see a debris field and black smoke at the top of a hill


CYRB 201900Z 15008KT 8SM VCFG OVC006 07/06 A2985 RMK SC7 VIS N-E 3 FG TOP OF HILL SLP113
CYRB 201800Z 19008KT 10SM VCFG SCT003 OVC010 07/07 A2983 RMK SF3ST5 SLP108
CYRB 201700Z CCA 20007KT 10SM VCFG SCT002 OVC009 07/06 A2982 RMK SF2ST6 SLP105
CYRB 201649Z 18013KT 5SM -DZ BR OVC003 RMK ST8
CYRB 201600Z 18008KT 10SM -DZ OVC007 06/06 A2981 RMK ST8 SLP100
CYRB 201533Z 17008KT 5SM -DZ BR OVC006 RMK ST8
CYRB 201500Z 18016KT 1/2SM R35/2200FT -DZ FG VV002 06/06 A2979 RMK FG8 SLP095
CYRB 201450Z 17013KT 5/8SM -DZ BR VV002 RMK FG8
CYRB 201434Z 17016KT 15SM -DZ OVC005 RMK ST8
CYRB 201400Z 16014KT 15SM BKN009 OVC070 07/06 A2979 RMK SF4AC4 SLP094


As said previously, not great circling weather IF that's what they were trying to do......

[readywhenreaching]

First Air released a rather cool statement to this worst accident in their history today:
First Air confirms accident (http://www.firstair.ca/2011/08/first-air-confirms-accident-3/)

[Jazz Hands]

The actual source of Aldente's posted information seems to be The Airline Website, but they don't appear to have been credited for it. The full post is below. Nothing to determine whether it's credible data, but with that caveat:

"I was there. They called 3 miles final RW35T then nothing. The temporary tower tried to raise them. A Borek B99 was on approach to RW17T on the Back Course, planning to land after the 737. The B99 missed its approach on 17 (fog) and was asked by the temp tower "if they could see anything". Just after they tried a second approach, the fog lifted a bit and the top of the hill in the distance started becoming visible, with black smoke and eventually flames and a debris field coming into view.

"Something I had hoped I would never see in my lifetime. If it hadn't been for the military presence, a response would have taken many hours if not days. Reports of 3 survivors means I and our crew may have witnessed a miracle."

[jimbo canuck]

Reported that 3 of 15 aboard survived - two stewardesses and a seven year old girl.
All flown to hospital in Iqualuit by C-17. One stewardess reported to be in critical condition.

[BoyFly]

Jetplan shows following NOTAM for CYRB, also VASIS U/S on Rnwy 17

CYRB APT 20110813ABAV01 110122 WIE /11 22AUG2359
CYRB ILS 35 UNSERVICEABLE
TIL 1108222359

[westhawk]

Jetplan shows following NOTAM for CYRB, also VASIS U/S on Rnwy 17The FAA does the same thing following a crash where NAVAIDs could have been involved. They typically send a flight check aircraft to survey the approach before returning it to operational status. Results of the flight check are also forwarded to the NTSB for their investigation. I would expect Canadian procedures to be similar.

[twochai]

Aircraft registration reportedly C-GNWN msn# 21067 in service initially with Wien Air Alaska in 8/1975

Flightglobal's ACAS database last listed the aircraft as being owned by the carrier, and showed that it had logged over 86,000h and 62,000 cycles.



When is somebody going to design and build a modern jet airliner with gravel runway capability?

The B737-200 equipped with Boeing gravel kit is the only viable choice for gravel runway operations at frontier airports such as Resolute Bay...

[sleeper]

When is somebody going to design and build a modern jet airliner with gravel runway capability?




Up to now there are no facts that supports a runway mishap. It looks more like a CFIT, so what does a gravel kit (or not) have to do with this accident?

[CONF iture]

The crash print shows some similitude with what was seen in Tripoli.

http://cdn-www.airliners.net/aviation-photos/middle/2/0/1/1881102.jpg

[Kalium Chloride]

It looks more like a CFIT, so what does a gravel kit (or not) have to do with this accident?

I don't think Twochai is suggesting the gravel kit is relevant to the accident, I think he's suggesting that better navigation capability, on a more modern aircraft, might have helped - but that the airline uses the old 737s because they have the gravel kit.

[aterpster]

Based on info on AvHearld it appears to be a circle to land from the ILS 35 to land Runway 17.

These are the topo data with CAT C and D TERPs CTL protected airspace.
The "X" marks the approximate impact point followed by the dashed line representing the break-up path.

(following that graphic is the Jepp chart for the ILS 35.)

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/CYRBCTL.jpg


http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/11-1.jpg

[BOAC]

aterpster- Jepp appear to disagree on terrain elevation - or is the 653 the lump between Cat C and D??

Where did you get the graphic of impact/track from? CNN now reporting the crash was 8km from the airport. Picture in post #8 certainly does not look like 8km..

[opale4]

Seems odd if true that they would choose the ILS 35T with a circling for 17T. The straight in 17T LOC appch has decent limits.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

aterpster- Jepp appear to disagree on terrain elevation - or is the 653 the lump between Cat C and D??

The red obstacle mark between Cat C and just north of the village. I believe that is what you are looking at.

Where did you get the graphic of impact/track from? CNN now reporting the crash was 8km from the airport. Picture in post #8 certainly does not look like 8km..

From AvHerald. The first report about 8 km was an incorrect report. The Av Herald site shows people standing at the airport looking at the smoldering wreackage on the hills.

[GlueBall]

Interestingly enough, the smoke trail in photo [post-8] shows more of a tame crosswind, so ILS Rwy-35T would have been manageable. No need to circle to 17 with the low cloud deck.

[punkalouver]

Interestingly enough, the smoke trail in photo [post-8] shows more of a tame crosswind, so ILS Rwy-35T would have been manageable. No need to circle to 17 with the low cloud deck.

The picture is looking to the east and shows a southerly wind. The hill is to the right of runway 35 and has the VOR/DME on it, 1 mile from the airport.

[twochai]

It looks more like a CFIT, so what does a gravel kit (or not) have to do with this accident?

Nothing at all - except that more modern aircraft have much improved instrumentation, nav gear and autopilots, as Aterpster pointed out.

It's a very serious issue for those operators north of 60. Boeing still charges outrageous amounts for the paperwork to modify a 737-200 for gravel kit installation, even if the hardware is available. The razor thin margins of northern operation (very high fuel and maintenance costs, comparatively long stagelengths and low utilisation) make the economics marginal, at best.

But unfortunately, the 732 is the only game in town.

[PJ2]

Deep condolences to the familes of those lost. Very sad day for aviation in Canada, and those doing northern flying.

I suspect, but do not know, that the aircraft's DFDR will have only basic (minimum legal) parameters with which to investigate this sad accident.

The relevant CARS governing the number, type, resolution and sampling rates of required parameters required for aircraft of various type certificate and manufacture dates is available here (http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/regserv/cars/part6-standards-625-2451.htm#625_33). Registry details for the aircraft can be found using this Transport Canada page (http://wwwapps2.tc.gc.ca/Saf-Sec-Sur/2/ccarcs/aspscripts/en/quicksearch.asp). "Mark" is the registry of the aircraft, in this case, C-GNWN.

[aterpster]

downnorth:

It is a very sad day here in Yellowknife.

I'm sure I have seen these folks while passing on the ramp maybe even said hello. It is a small/tight aviation community here in Yellowknife and in Canada's Arctic.

Any loss of life of innocents is always sad, not just in our vocation.

My wife and I recently enjoyed the TV series about Buffalo Air, or such.

I have a question for you: why do these remote Arctic locations have to have gravel strips? Is it economics?

Seems like a paved strip would open that airport up to modern, perhaps smaller jet airplanes. Seems like a state-of-the-art, dense seating Gulfstream jet would make a lot more sense if the pax load is typically small.

[RobertS975]

The ground shifts due to permafrost. Pavement would crack annually,

[Lost in Saigon]

I have a question for you: why do these remote Arctic locations have to have gravel strips? Is it economics?

Seems like a paved strip would open that airport up to modern, perhaps smaller jet airplanes. Seems like a state-of-the-art, dense seating Gulfstream jet would make a lot more sense if the pax load is typically small.

I really don't see how the type of aircraft has ANY bearing on this accident.

I am quite sure this was a cargo charter that also carried passengers. I doubt a smaller aircraft, or more modern aircraft, would have made any difference here.

[ST27]

I have a question for you: why do these remote Arctic locations have to have gravel strips? Is it economics?

Seems like a paved strip would open that airport up to modern, perhaps smaller jet airplanes. Seems like a state-of-the-art, dense seating Gulfstream jet would make a lot more sense if the pax load is typically small. Maintaining a paved runway on permafrost is quite difficult due to frost heaves. It's easier to maintain a gravel strip, particularly for only occasional use. Resolute is a community of only about 200 people, but is the jumping-off point for any northern exploration, so they do get more flights than the size of the community implies.

Keep in mind also that this flight was a cargo charter using a 737 combi. As such, it could have had as few as 12 seats in it, depending on the number of pallets they were carrying on the main deck.

First Air's scheduled flights into Resolute are performed using an ATR 42 or 72. They can also be set up for various amounts of freight. This airline is the lifeline into these northern communities, since they are frozen in during much of the winter, and can only get supplies by air.

[Huck]

GPWS? EGPWS?

[Lost in Saigon]

GPWS? EGPWS?

This aircraft had GPWS.

With the gear down, and flaps in the landing configuration, only the pilots can keep the aircraft from hitting high ground.

[ZBBYLW]

If the gear and flaps are in the landing config the GPWS would not sound - further more the rad alt does not give call outs.

[Popsiq]

Roger on three survivors. I've read that one is a middle aged man, one a young girl, serious condition, both evacuated for hospital treatment down sounth. The third, a woman, is being treated at Resolute.

[ross_M]

What's modified when a gravel kit is specified?

[grizzled]

Ross...

From the Boeing tech website:

"Whatever surface was to be used, certain guidelines had to be observed. The surface had to be smooth with no bumps higher than 3 inches in 100ft; good drainage with no standing water or ruts; and the surface material had to be at least 6 inches thick with no areas of deep loose gravel. Boeing offered a survey service to assess the suitability of potential strips. If a surface was not particularly hard it could still be used by reducing tyre pressure down to a minimum 40psi in accordance with a chart.

The Boeing "unpaved Strip Kit" components include:
Nose-gear gravel deflector to keep gravel off the underbelly.
Smaller deflectors on the oversized main gear to prevent damage to the flaps.
Protective metal shields over hydraulic tubing and brake cables on the main gear strut.
Protective metal shields over speed brake cables.
Glass fibre reinforced underside of the inboard flaps.
Metal edge band on elephant ear faring.
Abrasion resistant Teflon based paint on wing and fuselage undersurfaces. Strengthened under-fuselage aerials.
Retractable anti-collision light.
Vortex dissipators fitted to the engine nacelles.
Screens in the wheel well to protect components against damage."

More info can be found at: http://www.b737.org.uk/unpavedstripkit.htmI

I was aboard a PWA B737 conducting tests of the effectiveness of the kit components at various unimproved strips in the Pacific Northwest waaaay back in 1971.

[ReverseFlight]

Thanks Grizz, as I was puzzled by different bits of the kit when I saw its photos. Btw, this link works better:
Unpaved Strip Kit (http://www.b737.org.uk/unpavedstripkit.htm)

[GlueBall]

very high fuel and maintenance costs, comparatively long stagelengths and low utilisation make the economics marginal, at best.

The operation, as any viable business, whether subsidized by the state or not, has to be cost based. Or would you be in the business of giving away candy? "High fuel and maintenance costs" are universal. The rest, including pricing your product, is a management factor. :ooh:

[oceancrosser]

Punkalouver wrote:I should think that you don't know what you are talking about. You delete your post and I'll delete this one.

As I recall with older GPWSs with gear down and flaps in any landing position, no further warnings. And the old radio altimeters sure don't talk to you. So both ZBBYLW and Lost in Saigon have it right.

Either you don't know what you are talking about punkalouver or you have forgotten... It's even described on Wiki. :=

[aterpster]

Lost in Siagon:

I really don't see how the type of aircraft has ANY bearing on this accident.

It didn't nor did I state or imply that it did.

I was thinking in terms of economics of operations.

[Rockhound]

As a geologist (but not a pilot), I've flown in and out of Resolute many times over the course of 40 years or so, so am familiar with the area.
I'm pretty sure that the wreckage trail shown in purple on Aterpster's map is incorrect. Judging by the photo posted by Downnorth (post #8), the trail ends to the right (south) of the stream cut, which is very apparent in the topographic map. I would imagine the wreckage trail is actually roughly parallel to the runway
I would be very surprised if it turns out that the pilots had decided to attempt a landing on Rwy17. In my experience, back course approaches at Resolute are almost never done.

[Zeffy]

I'm pretty sure that the wreckage trail shown in purple on Aterpster's map is incorrect. Judging by the photo posted by Downnorth (post #8), the trail ends to the right (south) of the stream cut, which is very apparent in the topographic map. I would imagine the wreckage trail is actually roughly parallel to the runway



So, your estimate is that the initial impact was Southeast of the 587' elevation on aterpster's map?



http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/CYRBCTL.jpg

[BOAC]

Has it been established which way the wreckage trail runs? Does 'X' mark initial or final point? There could almost be a fuel spill line running to the right of the main fuselage part. I'm not sure the exact location of where the poor souls died is too critical - altitude and direction of flight will be more so?

[hf4you]

I'm thinking they were still northbound, based on the wreckage trail. Light stuff stays put heavier stuff moves in the direction of the flight and it sort of looks like engine components are to the left in the picture. Perhaps they were visual and circling, Captain flying from the left seat so he widens to the right to keep the runway in sight. In low vis he may not have had good visual detail of the terrain and flew right into in. The relatively long wreckage trail, and the fact there were survivors suggest controlled flight into terrain at relatively shallow impact angle.

[hetfield]

Perhaps they were visual and circling,Maybe, but at what altitude....?

[punkalouver]

Punkalouver wrote:

As I recall with older GPWSs with gear down and flaps in any landing position, no further warnings. And the old radio altimeters sure don't talk to you. So both ZBBYLW and Lost in Saigon have it right.



Earlier message deleted.

As for circling, I suspect a red herring. Why would you circle when there is more than one straight-in approach to similar minimums for runway 17. Why not just do the ILS and land with a tailwind within limits.

[aterpster]

Rockhound:
　
As a geologist (but not a pilot), I've flown in and out of Resolute many times over the course of 40 years or so, so am familiar with the area.
I'm pretty sure that the wreckage trail shown in purple on Aterpster's map is incorrect. Judging by the photo posted by Downnorth (post #8), the trail ends to the right (south) of the stream cut, which is very apparent in the topographic map. I would imagine the wreckage trail is actually roughly parallel to the runway.

The wreckage trail is an approximation. But, the point of impact is from AvHerald and is in conformance with the photo you refer to. The point is, it appears he crashed within the Runway 35 ILS T circle to land area. My circle to land areas are indisputable.

I would be very surprised if it turns out that the pilots had decided to attempt a landing on Rwy17. In my experience, back course approaches at Resolute are almost never done.

That means you don't understand the circle to land option on many instrument approach procedures, including this one. I don't mean to be negative, but the nuances of an instrument approach procedure are not learned overnight by pilots.

As to the back course approach another pilot flew that just before the crash and missed the approach because of a low cloud deck. He tired the back course approach again with better weather a bit later, and saw the burning wrecking as he broke out of the clouds on final approach to Runway 17.

[Rockhound]

In the photo in post #8, the wreckage pile on the right includes the tail so the motion of the aircraft must have been from right (south) to left (north). The trail does not cross the stream cut. The "x" in Aterpster's map may well mark the impact point accurately.
I still find the suggestion that he was circling to land on Rwy 17 difficult to accept. A tailwind of 10-15 knots straight down the runway should present no difficulties for a 737.

[hetfield]

In the photo in post #8, the wreckage pile on the right includes the tail so the motion of the aircraft must have been from right (south) to left (north).

Well, if in motion..., you never know, unless on video.

[777AV8R]

I've shot approaches to both sides (17/35T), numerous times, both in PWA/Canadi>n Airlines B7372s and Hercs. What to say other than its a very sad day up there. We can sit here all we want and try and 'figure out' what was going on there but in the end,some of the answers will be found on the FDR, and CVRs if the data is good, and by the investigators who are charged at trying to figure out what really went wrong.

There are so many variables about flying into Res'...if there was fog, then it can be a real can of worms. The fog takes on a life of its own up there, depending on the prevailing wind. Sometimes, what one expects to see and what actually 'is' are two different things. Let me say that flying in the Canadian high arctic was some of THE most demanding flying that a pilot could ever experience, on a good day...when was the last time that any of you ever used 'destination grid' and 'grid offsets' or ever aligned your compasses with a sextant, prior to the approach? Why you ask? Magnetic compasses don't work up there and the gyros have to be manually aligned because they aren't slaved.
'Thoughts are with the families who lost a loved one in this'. Its never easy.

[aterpster]

Rockhound:

Check this site. It has a second photo that better shows the wreckage distribution. The text also indicates the flight reported on final for Runway 35:

Crash: First Air B732 near Resolute Bay on Aug 20th 2011, impacted terrain (http://avherald.com/h?article=4419c56e&opt=0)

[Rollingthunder]

I might be way off base but something about the wreckage does not look right.

[Lost in Saigon]

Lost in Siagon:

I really don't see how the type of aircraft has ANY bearing on this accident.




It didn't nor did I state or imply that it did.

I was thinking in terms of economics of operations.

I really don't think anyone reading this thread is interested in "economics of operations". They are either grieving the loss or trying to figure out how it could have happened.

In any case your suggestions of "economics of operations" are incorrect.

This was a privately chartered cargo aircraft that also is configured to carry passengers. I am quite sure it would have been filed to capacity with cargo and would have been operated as economically as possible. Cargo charters are the only lifeline to remote communities such as this. Everyone in the far north knows fully well what it costs to maintain a community in such a remote location.

But, even if the person who chartered the aircraft chose to fly it half empty, why would that be worth commenting on?

[RESA]

After reading the Aviation Herald article and comments;

Crash: First Air B732 near Resolute Bay on Aug 20th 2011, impacted terrain (http://avherald.com/h?article=4419c56e&opt=0)

I am concerned that, given the perceived impact location and track of the debris field, the a/c may have been chasing a false localizer course. The location’s offset from the localizer’s centreline (localizer being a couple of thousand feet past the stop-end in this case) suggests a possible false course. This ILS is thirty years old plus (and a second hand installation . . . used elsewhere before Resolute). ICAO deemed this ILS model unacceptable . . . no longer to be installed as of about the end of the 1990’s. This model has had a know history of false courses.

The installation is somewhat “unique” and apparently required some optimisations given the immediate airport terrain. On a false LOC course . . . the GP course (rate of descent) may not look that unreasonable. The locator NDB (2.1 N.M. before threshold on extended centreline) was decommissioned last summer . . . so you no longer have that reference to tell you it’s on your port/starboard/or behind you when the DME is counting you down to threshold.

The post incident flight check will be performed by the same people who installed and maintain this ILS. Transport Canada and the TSB no longer have flight inspection capabilities . . . unless they contract it from somebody other than Canada’s privately owned air navigation system operator.

Sure hope the CVR and FDR are good and have lots of data points.
And please remember, ILS is a System with many other information inputs . . . not just LOC & GP crosshairs . . . . . . .

[PLovett]

the a/c may have been chasing a false localizer course

RESA, not saying you are wrong but another aircraft flew the backcourse approach twice, the second time becoming visual without reporting any anomalies.

[Rockhound]

Aterpster,
Thanks, I did see that photo shortly after I put up my last post. It's the most instructive I've seen of the crash site.
Looking at the wreckage, I am amazed that anyone survived. Most probably they did so because they were seated in the very tail. That's where they put the pax on largely-freight flights to YRB (that's what the majority of the flights are anyway). The degree of fragmentation of the aircraft is remarkable. Maybe that's what Rollingthunder means when he says that the wreckage doesn't look right.
One thing's for sure, you don't want to find yourself at low altitude east of the YRB runway unless you're in a helicopter in CAVU conditions.

[RESA]

PLovett

CYRB back course is 17T . . . no GP

Approach is 35T with GP(glidepath)/DME.

Technically, the only correct way he could report 3 N.M. to threshold is on the 35T approach.

[Capn Bloggs]

I still find the suggestion that he was circling to land on Rwy 17 difficult to accept. A tailwind of 10-15 knots straight down the runway should present no difficulties for a 737.
A sub-2000m gravel runway in poor weather with up to 13kts of downwind in a 737-200, which most probably has a Flight Manual 10kt tailwind limit (as other early model 737s). I would not class that as a "no difficulties" approach.

Also interesting was the presence of the other aircraft. While the timings are not clear, if an aircraft had gone missing, I would have thought it prudent to hold somewhere out of the way until the whereabouts of the missing aircraft had been resolved. It might have had a radio failure and be attempting further approaches. It would certainly load me up knowing there was another aircraft doing instrument approaches in the opposite direction to mine.

[JammedStab]

I am concerned that, given the perceived impact location and track of the debris field, the a/c may have been chasing a false localizer course. The location’s offset from the localizer’s centreline (localizer being a couple of thousand feet past the stop-end in this case) suggests a possible false course. This ILS is thirty years old plus (and a second hand installation . . . used elsewhere before Resolute). ICAO deemed this ILS model unacceptable . . . no longer to be installed as of about the end of the 1990’s. This model has had a know history of false courses.

The installation is somewhat “unique” and apparently required some optimisations given the immediate airport terrain. On a false LOC course . . . the GP course (rate of descent) may not look that unreasonable. The locator NDB (2.1 N.M. before threshold on extended centreline) was decommissioned last summer . . . so you no longer have that reference to tell you it’s on your port/starboard/or behind you when the DME is counting you down to threshold.


Have heard of false captures but not a false localizer.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/461349-737-reported-down-canada-2.html#post6654152


Looking at top post in the above link,


I can guarantee that it is standard procedure for a crash investigator to check the position of all instruments, knobs, handles, etc in the cockpit. This includes the nav frequencies selected.

[RESA]

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Welcome (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/index.asp)

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Featured Investigations - Aviation - 2011 - A11H0002 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/majeures-major/aviation/A11H0002/MI-A11H0002.asp)

[PLovett]

RESA, I understand that there is no GP on a backcourse approach but it was the localiser signal that you referred to in your post as being possibly at fault. That is the same signal either for localiser or backcourse.

[RESA]

PLovett

BC 17T has an NDB (YRB) 1.5 N.M. before threshold on centreline.

Sation passage at YRB should put you inside +/- 20-degrees of centreline, so any LOC lock should be very near centreline and not a false capture or false course. If your LF DF doesn't spin before you are a mile from the runway . . . you are likely not heading for the runway centreline . . . ?

The prop jockey landing on 17T had this advantage (albeit with no GP) . . . likely more "aware" because of no GP?

[RESA]

JammedStab

Older Localizers (certain brands) frequently have false capture problems . . . particularly on very long runways as the equipment is being overdriven in order to narrow the course width.

Some older equipment (still in use) employ an antenna system that can partially fail causing both false capture and false course that the executive monitors will not detect.

nuff said . . . not about to give course here . . .

[Sonny Hammond]

Is it possible they still had 29.92 set as opposed to local qnh?

[mauswara]

B732 max tail wind limit 15 kts(AFM:Tkof/Ldg) .Can't find a reference to gravel ops that reduces it.Nicest aeroplane I've ever flown,by far.

[remoak]

I might be way off base but something about the wreckage does not look right.

How can the wreckage "not look right"? Are you suggesting that somebody has been out there moving things around? If not, what ARE you suggesting exactly? (not having a go, genuinely interested in what you are thinking)

[Mad As A Mad Thing]

Looking at the maps that have been put up showing the crash site it strikes me that the aircraft's track to the VOR indicated on The map looks very very close to the ILS course.

Is it possible that they had mistakenly selected the VOR frequency rather than the ILS and flew what they thought was the localiser course straight towards the VOR with it's unexpected high ground in the way?

Pure speculation from a non-pilot so feel free to explain why this would or would not be possible.

[BOAC]

Probably because I cannot find a VOR there?

"B732 max tail wind limit 15 kts" 10kts is a standard unless negotiated with Boeng (ie pay more money)

[opale4]

There is no VOR approach, but there is a VOR in the vicinity of the impact location.

[Rockhound]

Capn Bloggs and BOAC,
Pilots flying in the Canadian Arctic of necessity tend to push the envelope routinely, but have the experience to do so in a professional and safe manner. Their excellent safety record, in a challenging environment, speaks for itself.
Rockhound

[BOAC]

There is no VOR approach, but there is a VOR in the vicinity of the impact location - tell us more. Jepp do not know of it.

Rock - not QUITE sure why I was addressed in that post, and I see no justification in 'pushing any envelopes' when you may kill yourself and your pax/crew?

Forgetting all about tailwinds, back-courses, front courses, circling etc:

1) The impact was too close in for a 'downwind' (yes, even in TERPS)

2) IF major technical failure is ruled out, what does that leave you with - 'envelope pushing'?

[opale4]

- tell us more. Jepp do not know of it.

I don't have access to Jepps right now, but the link below shows the location of the VOR.

http://www.ourairports.com/navaids/YRB/Resolute_Bay_VOR-DME_CA/

[Zeffy]

Thanks, opale4.

Because the YRB VOR DME wasn't relevant to the ILS 35T approach, it does not appear on the AIP or Jeppesen chart. The VOR DME is depicted on the enroute chart.

Check out this report of a GIII accident at KHOU (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2006/AAB0606.pdf) in 2004.

[westhawk]

Check out this report of a GIII accident at KHOU (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2006/AAB0606.pdf) in 2004.

I remember following that one. A very early start, a rushed approach and tracking the VOR instead of the LOC. Confusion about the EFIS presentation of fast/slow and G/s indications. They were supposed to be picking up George H.W. Bush. Two highly experienced pilots made a mistake that's not all that difficult to make.

[Zeffy]

The Google map within opale4's link (http://www.ourairports.com/navaids/YRB/Resolute_Bay_VOR-DME_CA/) can be zoomed to quite a remarkable resolution -- revealing a slight offset from the icon for the VOR DME and the actual navaid.

Published elevation is 67 meters/221 feet.

Aterpster's terrain map has a 70-meter contour line East of "Strip Lake".

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/CYRBCTL.jpg

[RegDep]

BOAC, see link in post #56. There is now a new GoogleEarth picture, pointing out the location of the VOR vis-á-vis the impact site. Just for the picture - I am inferring nothing else.

[aterpster]

The Jepp enroute chart and airport diagram show the VOR. All airways lead to the RB NDB so it isn't clear to me what purpose the VOR serves:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/YRBVOR.jpg

[Lost in Saigon]

The Jepp enroute chart and airport diagram show the VOR. All airways lead to the RB NDB so it isn't clear to me what purpose the VOR serves:

On the Jepp Canada-Alaska High Altitude Chart 3-4 there is an "ATS" airway from the YRB (Resolute Bay) VOR to YCB (Cambridge Bay) VOR.

On the Jepp Canada 9-10 High/Low chart there are 5 different High Altitude Airways using the YRB VOR.


EDIT: It appears as though these airways are actually based on the RB NDB, but the charts seem to imply that they are co-located

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/IMG_6816.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/IMG_6814.jpg

[BOAC]

Thanks all for that, but I do not see a connection in reality? I guess it is possible, but.......?

[henra]

Hmmm, it sounds indeed a bit like a weird possibility but maybe there is something to it.
The course matches scarily well. Elevation at crash site is ~500 - 550ft.
Elevation of airport is 197ft.
Distance between impact point and VOR is roughly 3/4 mile.
FWIW.

[Lost in Saigon]

I don't think they were tracking to the VOR.

I flew in the Canadian "Bush" for many years. Old habits stay with you. I have trouble believing they would not have had the 2 NDB's tuned in to their ADF's to confirm their position. I still do this 30 years later if there are NDB's associated with the runway.

Like many others have said, I believe they were doing an ILS 35 circling for 17.

[MLHeliwrench]

Three persons survived the crash, which evidently occurred as the aircraft was on an ILS/DME approach under a 200-foot cloud ceiling with three miles visibility in some fog and drizzle. The last radio communication with the aircraft occurred when it was approximately eight kilometres from the airport and the crash occurred 10 minutes later on a low hillside on line with the gravel runway.
First Air Flight 6560 | Canadian Aviation News (http://skiesmag.com/news/articles/first-air-flight-6560.html)

[hf4you]

The guys in the lab in Ottawa probably know already. It'll take a couple of days to filter out.

[BOAC]

the crash occurred 10 minutes later on a low hillside on line with the gravel runway. - a different position.

[MLHeliwrench]

I interpret their use of "on-line" as "in the same direction" or "parallel"

[zerozero]

I don't think they were tracking to the VOR.

I flew in the Canadian "Bush" for many years. Old habits stay with you. I have trouble believing they would not have had the 2 NDB's tuned in to their ADF's to confirm their position. I still do this 30 years later if there are NDB's associated with the runway.

Like many others have said, I believe they were doing an ILS 35 circling for 17.

I used to fly in the Alaskan Bush and have been following this story.

I agree with you and disagree with you.

I agree old habits stick with you and I do the same EXACT thing with NDBs, even in a glass airplane with a magenta line. It's just a habit.

But I have to admit, it's *feasible* they tuned the VOR, tracked the final app course for the ILS, couldn't get a GS so reverted to LOC mins and tracked that down to the MAP and tagged the hill on the way.

My question is, if they reported on the ILS for 35 and circled, why wouldn't they circle to the WEST out over the water? That would be my choice having never been there and just looking at the chart. Why would you circle towards the higher terrain?

Or maybe they did circle to the west and overshot final and ended up east of the field?

We still don't seem to have any agreement on the direction of flight...

Tragic, but I'm sure we'll all learn a good lesson.

[Chu Chu]

I've read an AP article saying that there was a temporary military base set up 2KM from the crash site. Is there any chance they might have brought in equipment that could have complicated the navigation picture? I certainly hope not, but it seems just possible to my uneducated mind.

[Rockhound]

BOAC,
It's just that I had the impression from your post that you felt a tailwind of >10 knots was too strong for a safe landing. I am quite sure that the crew of the ill-fated 737 had no concerns in this regard. If you fly strictly by the book in the Arctic you wouldn't get much done. The only safe approach to YRB in marginal weather is from the south, where you let down over the sea, line up with Rwy 35, cross the coast and arrive at the runway threshold with no obstructions to negotiate.
I don't wish to speculate on what the crew intended (I'm not qualified to do so in any case) beyond reiterating that I am quite certain they did not decide on a back course approach.

[500N]

Chu Chu

It was said early on that an Unannouced SIMULATED aircraft crash in the vicinity of Resolute was going to occur a couple of days after this tragic event occurred. Not sure if that temp base was part of this set up or other Mil ops that are occurring but I think everyone is thankful that so many military personnel and aircraft were at Resolute Bay.

[aterpster]

zerozero:

My question is, if they reported on the ILS for 35 and circled, why wouldn't they circle to the WEST out over the water? That would be my choice having never been there and just looking at the chart. Why would you circle towards the higher terrain?

So the captain can have the sight picture.

[OK465]

So the captain can have the sight picture.

With the forecast wind 110 degrees at 25+ knots, a circle west may have been preferable to allow a gradual decrease in bank around the turn toward the runway, let alone terrain considerations or which seat is flying.

There's a guy in the right seat who can update the captain on the turn progression. Never had a problem circling right from the left seat. This kind of wind is ideal. But you choose what you choose.

All speculation of course, but the VOR thing raises hairs on the back of my neck.

[zerozero]

OK465, that's exactly how we would have done it in Alaska. The Capt can make a right hand circle with good participation from the the FO. After he negotiated the 545' foot obstacle to the west of the final for 35, it would really be a matter of following the shoreline downwind for 17 and hooking it in tight inside of the NDB.

I'd much prefer that than scud running to the east over rising terrain.

Just my honest opinion having circled for many, many years.

Very interested to see how this shapes up.

[BOAC]

It looks like time to take a deep breath and re-establish known facts as many appear to be getting confused.

My understanding:

ILS 35 working, so why fly anything else if the wind is in limits? Anyone have the minima?

Why then, fly an approach on an en-route VOR with no published procedure?

Why then are folk talking about a BC17?

Only one NDB available - RB, north of the field.

The impact was nowhere near a circling track nor a localiser track.

If anyone has definitive contradictions please correct.

It's just that I had the impression from your post that you felt a tailwind of >10 knots was too strong for a safe landing. - you need to re-read my posts - I have not said "a tailwind of >10 knots was too strong for a safe landing." - I have said that 10 is the 'normal' limit. I do not know if this company had a 15. Your post implied that it was a 'done' that crews would ignore limits to get the job done. That is not unknown territory to me in military life, but it is potentially dangerous - it will work a lot of the time. Not all, and when someone pays to be safely carried one needs to think carefully before doing it and be prepared for the consequences. Aviation history is littered with bold aviators, not so many old.

Aterptser seems to think that a right-hand circle of an ILS 35 gives the captain 'the sight picture'??

[aterpster]

BOAC:

Aterptser seems to think that a right-hand circle of an ILS 35 gives the captain 'the sight picture'??

Circling with the airport on the captain's side would be a left-land circle. That way he sees the airport. Depending on the competency of the F/O that may or may not matter.

On poster mentions that the clouds often tend to be lower over the higher terrain. In that case a right-hand circle would be better.

[BOAC]

In that case a right-hand circle would be better. - it isn't getting any clearer!zerozero:

Quote:
My question is, if they reported on the ILS for 35 and circled, why wouldn't they circle to the WEST out over the water? That would be my choice having never been there and just looking at the chart. Why would you circle towards the higher terrain?
So the captain can have the sight picture.

[westhawk]

I'm not saying this is what happened, just that it's one possibility.

So it may be a complete coincidence that if you dialed up the FAC on your HSI, but were tuned to the VOR (maybe tuned enroute) the flight track would lead to the approximate crash site position. If one descended to the NP MDA for the G/S inop (which one might believe if unintentionally tuned to the VOR instead of the LOC) it seems from looking at the various charts and IAPs posted here that the flight track would pass very near the crash site. I say again, this is only ONE of several possible explanations for what happened.

As someone already pointed out, it's possible that the boys at the TSB lab know right now what frequencies were tuned in the radios and what was said in the cockpit. Time will tell.

[Capn Bloggs]

Ref the possibility that they flew an "ILS" with the VOR dialled up, surely both pilots would have independently identified the ILS frequency before starting the approach?

[westhawk]

Ref the possibility that they flew an "ILS" with the VOR dialled up, surely both pilots would have independently identified the ILS frequency before starting the approach? Stranger things have happened. The NTSB report on the HOU Gulfstream accident linked somewhere above reveals that two highly experienced pro pilots did precisely that.

Of course that doesn't necessarily mean that the same thing happened here, but it's a possibility which might explain the facts as they are presently know to us. If newly revealed facts eliminate this possibility, then something else will have to explain the "new" facts.

[RegDep]

The link to the above reference Accident Investigations - NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/fulltext/AAB0606.htm)

[geoheath]

Regarding the discussion of the possibility of the AC flying the approach to the VOR instead of the ILS, it has been done before and therefore possible. The location and elevation of the wreckage is consistent.

I was an air traffic controller in YXS during the mid 70's when a CP Air 737 flight from YXJ nearly flew into Tabor Mnt. doing this very thing. Both pilots were fired.

For this to occur, both pilots have to fail to carry out the check list duties. Nevertheless, it happens.

The ancient FDR will only provide basic info so it will be of limited utility.

[Lost in Saigon]

I have not said "a tailwind of >10 knots was too strong for a safe landing." - I have said that 10 is the 'normal' limit. I do not know if this company had a 15. Your post implied that it was a 'done' that crews would ignore limits to get the job done. That is not unknown territory to me in military life, but it is potentially dangerous - it will work a lot of the time. Not all, and when someone pays to be safely carried one needs to think carefully before doing it and be prepared for the consequences. Aviation history is littered with bold aviators, not so many old.



Regardless of what the max tailwind allowed may be, you must also consider the landing performance was on that day for the landing weight they had.

I don't know the usual landing distance for a 737, but 6,500 feet of gravel with a tailwind doesn't seem like a whole lot.

Was Jet A available in CYRB? Were they tankering fuel?

Were there any aircraft systems unserviceable that day?

Thrust reverse?
Anti-skid?
Spoilers?

All these factors could have contributed to a decision to circle for 17T.

It has been reported that 10 minutes elapsed from they time they reported "3 miles final for 35T" until they hit the hill. That implies either circling or multiple approaches to me.

[BOAC]

Regarding flying an ILS on a VOR - I agree the track looks frighteningly matched, but as someone else has said, that does not require an FDR or CVR even to diagnose and will already be evident if it happened. I find it difficult to even contemplate as a possibility as it is 'un-charted'. We would have to be looking either a gross error by both crews - failure to brief, lack of cross-checks etc or a 'home-grown' procedure - maybe one of Rock's 'tend to push the envelope routinely', but surely with an ILS there................:confused: Does not make sense.

All those considering 'pushing the envelope' DO remember that g/a performance is affected too by 'excessive' tailwind.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

- it isn't getting any clearer!

1. The airport has no control tower (no ATC at all actually) so the pilot is free to circle in any manner so long as not restricted by the approach procedure.

2. Circling is in no way restricted from the ILS 35 T other than to remain within the TERPs circling maneuvering area for the correct approach category and not descend below MDA until in a position to make a normal descent to landing on Runway 17.

3. Circling with a left-hand pattern (over the higher terrain) gives the captain the best view of the airport at all times.

4. Circling with a right-hand pattern avoids the higher terrain (although remaining at MDA also avoids the higher terrain), but as a poster who knows the weather there says, the clouds are often lower over the higher terrain than they are to the west side. Right-hand circling requires an experienced F/O as he then is the one seeing the airport and when to turn base and final.

5. The winds that day, as one poster mentioned, somewhat favored a right-hand circle (on the west side of the runway).

These facts may or may not have anything to do with the accident.

[evansb]

I don't know if they were tankering fuel, but JET-A is normally available at CYRB, and without a call-out charge for the flight's ETA. FYI the distance from CYZF to CYRB is approx 842 NM.

[BOAC]

Aterpster- I think I'll give up here. You just have your 35's and your left and right a bit confused! We are, I think all agreed that a left-hand circle (TO THE WEST!) off an ILS35 is the most sensible for a Captain flown pattern. I certainly give up on para 4!

These facts may indeed have a bearing on the accident.

[westhawk]

Now I'm confused too BOAC!

Does circling to the left mean offsetting your circling maneuver to the left of (West) the FAC or does it mean that all turns will be to the left such as would happen if you offset to the right of (East) the FAC? I would have thought the latter myself as it's consistent with flying a left hand traffic pattern.

Best,

westhawk

[aterpster]

westhawk:

Now I'm confused too BOAC!

Does circling to the left mean offsetting your circling maneuver to the left of (West) the FAC or does it mean that all turns will be to the left such as would happen if you offset to the right of (East) the FAC? I would have thought the latter myself as it's consistent with flying a left hand traffic pattern.

you have it correct (not to be confused with right :))

Of course the initial turn off the Runway 35 localizer has to be a left westerly turn (say heading of 300 or 310 true) following by a right turn to parallel the runway, then a right turn to base, and finally a right turn to final.

That is a right-hand or right-hand-traffic if you will, circle to land.

[aterpster]

This is from the U.S. AIM for airports with control towers:


Circle to land instructions:

Used by ATC to inform the pilot that he/she must circle to land because the runway in use is other than the runway aligned with the instrument approach procedure. When the direction of the circling maneuver in relation to the airport/runway is required, the controller will state the direction (eight cardinal compass points) and specify a left or right downwind or base leg as appropriate; e.g., “Cleared VOR Runway Three Six Approach circle to Runway Two Two,” or “Circle northwest of the airport for a right downwind to Runway Two Two.”

[OK465]

BOAC: Just make sure the rock is clutched in the correct hand. :)

[MLHeliwrench]

Police have been able to talk to at least one survivor about the flight's final moments, says Supt. Howard Eaton of the Nunavut RCMP.



"They knew they were going in on approach and everything looked normal," Eaton said. "They saw a couple of buildings when they were looking out. And then bang. There was no warning. The bells didn't ring. It just happened suddenly.


"There was no real warning from anybody that they were in trouble. I think it was unexpected."




Resolute passengers had no warning of crash - North - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/08/24/north-resolute-bay-rcmp.html)

(http://www.cbc.ca/news/interactives/map-plane-crashes/)

[pattern_is_full]

Comments:

1. That beige rolling terrain has to be almost a worst-case scenario for trying to distinguish ground obstruction in scud (excepting darkness, of course).

2. The location of the VOR set off alarm bells in my mind right away. The crash site is certainly consistent with accidently flying a VOR radial 350 inbound instead of the ILS, but there are other possibilities, obviously...

3. ...such as a right turn (followed by a left turn) to enter a LEFT downwind and subsequent left hand turns to base and final (in my book, that is a "left" circle to land - but call it what you will). This gives the left-hand seat the best continuous view of the runway....

4. ....assuming the PIC, left seat, was actually handling the controls. In tricky conditions, probably a good assumption, but not a certainty. Much of the time, the pilot flying is the FO in the RIGHT seat.

I guess we'll know sooner or later, if the CVR and/or radio frequncy dials survived.

[FSTD]

I'm with you BOAC. This was an ILS approach to 35. There is no reason that approach wouldn't have resulted in a landing. Wx is 300 sct at 3octas. 1000 OVC, at least it was 20 mins later. If their on the ILS, they make it. Why circle? Too much tailwind? 35 is an uphill runway, with about 100 feet difference between the button of 35 and the other end. There's no calls either and theres another aircraft somewhere out waiting to try, or actually trying, the 17 approach. Just don't see the Boeing crew launching off toward them with no calling the missed and advising that they were circling. If they were circling, they have a 1000 ovc above, they are going to circle over the much lower terrain to the left.

I say ILS to 35, but the scenario which seems to explain is the one about flying the approach with the VOR frequency selected instead of the ILS. That wouldn't result in a landing. Exactly what happened would happen. It would have been flown as a localizer approach as no glideslope indication, the wreckage is right on track, and the wreckage trail looks to start very close to minimums for that approach.

Only other possibility is a dodgy ILS. It was notamed us after the crash, which posters say is normal after this type of thing, and then test flown. Now its off till approx Aug 31. As you'd want to have that up and running as quick as possible, 10 days seems like a lot of downtime, unless they can't get a flight calibration machine in.

[BOAC]

BOAC: Just make sure the rock is clutched in the correct hand. - right! The other one is dragging the wench along by her hair?

[ZeeDoktor]

That's definitely not something you want personal opinions to thrive on... It's the same logic as with flying circuits:

- left hand = manoeuvring area is left of the runway as seen from final, you fly left turns (except for the break on the LOC)
- right hand is the corresponding opposite...

:)

[J.O.]

Only other possibility is a dodgy ILS. It was notamed us after the crash, which posters say is normal after this type of thing, and then test flown. Now its off till approx Aug 31. As you'd want to have that up and running as quick as possible, 10 days seems like a lot of downtime, unless they can't get a flight calibration machine in.

I read elsewhere that a flight check aircraft arrived there yesterday.

[Lost in Saigon]

I read elsewhere that a flight check aircraft arrived there yesterday.

They were pretty quick doing their job because the ILS U/S NOTAM has already been canceled. The ILS is now serviceable.



"RCMP Supt. Howard Eaton said Aug. 24 that the girl recalled the plane was making its final approach and that everything looked normal."

“She said she was looking out the window and she could see the buildings [of Resolute Bay] as they approached,” said RCMP Supt. Howard Eaton, “and then, bam - they hit the hill.”




The survivor testimony seems to suggest that they did not do an ILS/DME 35T circling for 17T. That would have required an increase in power to level off, and then at least two turns to get lined up 1 mile downwind where they crashed.

It does sound more like they did a straight in approach and then hit the hill. That could support the theories of them accidentally approaching on the VOR instead of the ILS.

I am still puzzled by reports that they reported 3 miles final and then hit the hill 10 minutes later.

[J.O.]

But given that the aircraft wasn't seen until the fog bank rolled off the hill to the east, we don't really know when the accident actually occurred yet.

[BeechNut]

aterpster 1. The airport has no control tower (no ATC at all actually) so the pilot is free to circle in any manner so long as not restricted by the approach procedure.

There is a temporary class D and temporary tower set up due to the military exercises going on in the area at the time. NOTAM below:

110102 CYRB RESULUTE BAY
CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
CLASS D RESOLUTE CTL ZONE IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 10 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
SFC TO 6000 FT MSL. FOR OPS NANOOK
1108101300 TIL 1108280100

[Rockhound]

I hesitate to add a further two cents to this discussion but because BOAC and others have referred to my remark that pilots in the Canadian Arctic tend to 'push the envelope', all I meant was - as an example - that if one of these pilots was approaching to land at Resolute in a 737 - the manual for which specified a maximum allowable tailwind of 10 knots for landing - and was advised to expect a tailwind of 13 knots, he would have no hesitation in landing.
Some pilots push harder. I've landed on a remote gravel strip in a Twin Otter on big wheels in a crosswind gusting up to 37 knots but that was with a highly experienced, highly skilled bush pilot at the controls, who knew his limits and knew exactly what he was doing. That was an exceptional case of 'pushing the envelope' and by no means representative of Canadian Arctic aviating.
I will now hold my peace and wait for the NTSB report.

[ReverseFlight]

I certainly hope the pilots were on the correct frequency but if they had tuned the VOR instead of the ILS, and then decided to changed to a LOC-only instead of an ILS approach when they couldn't get a G/S signal, that should have set off alarm bells in their heads. I can only say that if it happened in future to any of us flying IMC, we should not hesitate to initiate a go-around immediately.

It still does not explain why they might have ignored an anomaly on the ADF if the NDB was tuned. The frequencies tuned will be the most important aspect in resolving this most puzzling accident. I do hope the preliminary investigation report will be released soon.

[hartley]

Some B737-200 Gravel equiped AC of that vintage had instrument transfer capability. it will be interesting to know the position of that switch and the frequency of nav 1 and nav2.

[RESA]

ROCKHOUND

I hear you!

I remember, thirty-six plus years ago (can't believe I said that) sitting on the ramp in Resolute waiting for Aeradio to allow me on to the runway (wintertime . . . ya, dark). There was a PWA Herc on final so I had to wait (you probably remember PWA Stretch-Hercs?). Blowing snow conditions were at best "marginal". I heard the Herc call "down" on the radio. I saw blasts of snow go by in front of me. Couldn't really tell it was an A/C until they passed me on the (very short) taxi. These folks were in/out a couple of times a day . . . and we made a point of keeping everything on the A/P as much the same as we could. I dare say that the "regular scheduled" jockeys anywhere are surprised by sudden changes in the topography and such? And ya, I do remember landing on the tundra in the middle of nowhere . . . always in daylight . . . and after a few low passes to check it out. Also however, never in anything bigger than a DC-3 . . . when your stall speed is like 50 MPH it make a BIG difference!

I do wonder if the recent decommissioning of the RU/Martyr NDB (2.1 N.M. on centreline and before threshold) didn't remove a possible chance for this flight to realize their deviation.


REVERSEFLIGHT

F.Y.I. The locator NDB (2.1 N.M. on centreline and before threshold) . . . which I assume you are referring to, was recently decommissioned by Canada’s privately owned air navigational operator . . . I can only assume it was for a cost savings initiative? The only remaining NDB is the YRB (RB) which is located 1.5 N.M. past the stop-end of the ILS runway approach of 35T.

[aterpster]

hartly:


Some B737-200 Gravel equiped AC of that vintage had instrument transfer capability. it will be interesting to know the position of that switch and the frequency of nav 1 and nav2.

Interesting point. The 727s I flew of the same vintage had those transfer switches. I understand they were a customer option that my airline ordered. Those switches in the 727 were very rigid and took deliberate action to move. I doubt a crash where the panel survives mostly intact would disturb the crash postion of those switches.

[CaptainSandL]

Some B737-200 Gravel equiped AC of that vintage had instrument transfer capability. it will be interesting to know the position of that switch and the frequency of nav 1 and nav2.

Are these the infamous "Killer switches" to the side of the MCP as shown here (http://www.b737.org.uk/flightinsts.htm#Classic_Flight_Instruments)?

[grizzled]

geoheath...

I remember the CP 737 incident very well. And I also remember a (US registered) Piper Seneca that descended directly into the YXS VOR (on Tabor Mt, as you say) while on approach a few years prior to the 737 incident. He too thought he was on final for rwy 33, but in his case the mistake was fatal.

[aterpster]

Beechnut:

There is a temporary class D and temporary tower set up due to the military exercises going on in the area at the time. NOTAM below

In that case the temporary tower could have issued circle to land instructions.

I wonder if temporary towers have recorders? Those could provide a wealth of information independent of the airplane's recorders.

[Lost in Saigon]

Beechnut:

Quote:
There is a temporary class D and temporary tower set up due to the military exercises going on in the area at the time. NOTAM below


In that case the temporary tower could have issued circle to land instructions.

I wonder if temporary towers have recorders? Those could provide a wealth of information independent of the airplane's recorders.

There are TWO NOTAMS regarding Class D airspace at CYRB. The first one only established a Control Zone. The second NOTAM established a Military Terminal Control Area with Tower, Ground, Terminal Control, etc.

You can have a Class D Control Zone without a tower. I believe the Temporary Tower was only fully operational during the period of the second NOTAM which began Aug 22.

While the Temporary Tower Facilities may have been in place at the time of the accident, I bet they were only giving advisories. This would possibly explain how the Borek flight was able to do an approach while First Air was still un-accounted for.

110102 CYRB RESULUTE BAY
CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
CLASS D RESOLUTE CTL ZONE IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 10 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
SFC TO 6000 FT MSL. FOR OPS NANOOK
1108101300 TIL 1108280100


110124 CYRB RESOLUTE BAY
CYRB DAH IS AMENDED AS FLW:
CLASS D RESOLUTE MTCA IS ESTABLISHED AS FLW:
THE AIRSPACE WITHIN 80 NM RADIUS 744301N 945810W
700 FT AGL TO FL200. FOR OPS NANOOK.
FREQ FOR OPS NANOOK:
RESOLUTE TML: 228.5000 MHZ
: 123.075 MHZ
GLOWWORM(MIL PAR): 243.4000 MHZ
: 128.850 MHZ
RESOLUTE TWR: 236.5 MHZ
: 122.1 MHZ
RESOLUTE GND: 122.6 MHZ
: 149.15 MHZ
1108221200 TIL 1108280100

[hartley]

Are these the infamous "Killer switches" to the side of the MCP as shown here (http://www.b737.org.uk/flightinsts.htm#Classic_Flight_Instruments)?


In the 737-200 that we used to operate these switches were on the overhead panel. Not killer switches, but had to be used with caution.

[Pratt X 3]

Further to what Lost in Saigon just said (he must type faster and probably wasn't eating his lunch at the same time), Resolute Bay is in Northern Domestic Airspace and the closest controlled airspace is normally overhead at FL270. The first NOTAM created a Class D Control Zone but since there isn't an operating control tower, it automatically reverts to Class E airspace. The only operational impact this has is to increase the VFR Weather Minima within the zone. The MTCA, control tower and radar were not due to be operational until 3 days after this accident occurred. So on that day, the flight would have been cleared out of controlled airspace as it descended below FL270 and would have just needed to report intentions and postion as required for operating in the Mandatory Frequency (MF) area. No positive or radar control would have been available on the approach.
Canadian AIM - Airspace (http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/publications/tp14371-rac-2-0-2599.htm)

[J.O.]

If I recall correctly from the investigation report at the time, the Canadian Airlines airplane that had the close call with Tabor Mountain was also equipped with those nav transfer switches. The crew that was flying it were unfamiliar with this feature as they had only flown 737s that were not so equipped prior to the CP - PWA merger. There was no documentation of the differences provided to the pilots until after that incident occurred. If the crew really were fired, then an injustice was done, IMHO.

[grizzled]

J.O.

Your recollection of the circumstances and the report (re CP and descending on the VOR instead of the localizer) is spot on re the switches. And yes the crew were fired, and yes an injustice was done.

[ReverseFlight]

RESA, thanks for your comment. I was in fact referring to the existing NDB RB (freq 350) on the extended centreline track of 347M at the northern end of R35T. Good airmanship would dictate this to be tuned on the ADF for better SA but the report will indicate whether that was the case.

[BOAC]

Good airmanship would dictate this to be tuned on the ADF for better SA - far more to the point it is part of the procedure! However, I suspect that at those latitudes determining you were a few degrees off a QDM would be very difficult.

[OK465]

As a part of the missed approach profile, I would think the NDB 'relative' bearing would be something I would incorporate in my overall assessment of how things were proceeding.

edit: although with any east crosswind component you get the same effect on relative bearing.

[Lost in Saigon]

- far more to the point it is part of the procedure! However, I suspect that at those latitudes determining you were a few degrees off a QDM would be very difficult.

QDM [not an acronym] Magnetic Bearing to A Station Under No Wind Conditions (I had to look it up!)
At those latitudes everything is done in TRUE so it is no more difficult than at any other latitude.

It is my understanding that even though it is not used for the ILS/DME 35T approach, the Cape Martyr NBD is still active. I would have tuned that NDB as well.

Here is an older approach:
http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/016.jpg

[BOAC]

You are right - should I have said QUJ............. Resa disagrees on that NDB. Someone will know for sure.

[Lost in Saigon]

edit: although with any east crosswind component you get the same effect on relative bearing.

When using 2 NDB's that are aligned with the runway (especially before and after the runway) you get a VERY accurate, simple to use, display of your position. Even in a crosswind.

[Lost in Saigon]

You are right - should I have said QUJ............

QUJ
QTE
QDR
QDM

QFG
QFF
QNE
QNH

Are all these "Q's" only used in the UK? or Europe? Other than QNH and QFE, I have never heard of them before.

[BOAC]

It is an international code, but time to stop!

Falcon 827

[Lost in Saigon]

........... Resa disagrees on that NDB. Someone will know for sure.


I don't have access to current CYRB approach charts. But I have the latest High Altitude Enroute Charts.

Canada-Alaska 3/4 (eff May 2011) and Canada 9/10 (eff Mar 2011) both show the Cape Martyr NDB as active.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/IMG_6816.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/IMG_6814.jpg

[FSTD]

Port Martyr NDB "RU" was decomissioned. Looks like only a few months ago. It's no longer on the approach plate. Now theres a DME fix at 4 miles.

[aterpster]

Lost in Siagon:

When using 2 NDB's that are aligned with the runway (especially before and after the runway) you get a VERY accurate, simple to use, display of your position. Even in a crosswind.

More so when one NDB is the final approach fix and the other is on the approach end of the runway, which used to be (may still be) common in eastern Europe. It does require two ADF receivers displayed on a slaved RMI. I don't know how that would work in a far north area of true navigation, unless the RMI card could be switched to true, which could be the case in current high-end airplanes.

[Lost in Saigon]

Port Martyr NDB "RU" was decomissioned. Looks like only a few months ago. It's no longer on the approach plate. Now theres a DME fix at 4 miles.

Found a link that confirms that: http://www.navcanada.ca/ContentDefinitionFiles/Newsroom/ServiceProjectAnnouncements/2011/an0506a_en.pdf

[aterpster]

These are all of the current Jepp charts including snippets of the electronic low and high altitude charts. Note that the VOR supports no airways, low or high.

Index of /CYRB (http://www.terps.com/CYRB)

[Roadster280]

QUJ
QTE
QDR
QDM

QFG
QFF
QNE
QNH

Are all these "Q's" only used in the UK? or Europe? Other than QNH and QFE, I have never heard of them before.

ACP131 (http://jcs.dtic.mil/j6/cceb/acps/acp131/ACP131F09.pdf) refers. You'll find them all listed in there. No idea whether they're supposed to be used by civil air traffic though!

[Lost in Saigon]

These are all of the current Jepp charts including snippets of the electronic low and high altitude charts. Note that the VOR supports no airways, low or high.

Index of /CYRB (http://www.terps.com/CYRB)

What is the source?

Those "snippets" seem to be drawn by someone how has little knowledge of actual airways. The VOR and tracks seem to be orientated in magnetic with incorrect headings.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/017c.jpghttp://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/017bbb.jpg

[Lost in Saigon]

ACP131 (http://jcs.dtic.mil/j6/cceb/acps/acp131/ACP131F09.pdf) refers. You'll find them all listed in there. No idea whether they're supposed to be used by civil air traffic though!



Great resource. Thanks!

[aterpster]

Lost in Saigon:

What is the source?

Current copy of electronic JeppView.

[aterpster]

Little Saigon:

Obviously, the en route charts in JeppView are screwed up. Shame on them.

Following are low and high altitude en route charts from the iPad application Jeppesen Mobile FD. The FAA has approved this Jeppesen application as a replacement for paper charts on the Flight Deck.

I don't believe the electronic en route charts are quite ready for prime time, but the FAA seems to think so.

These are screen shots from my iPad, which is current. My client pays a lot of money for the Jeppview application and its derivatives.

Low altitude chart:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/CYRBLow.jpg


High altitude chart:

http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/CYRBHigh.jpg

[KKN_]

The discussion may have moved on, but I'd like to review a bit what is known and what not really.

Some of the thoughts were centred around circling east and about an mistakenly chosen navigation source, mostly based on the debris trail.

The debris trail orientation is deduced from 1) the pictures of the crash site (avherald (http://avherald.com/h?article=4419c56e&opt=0), post #8 mirrors the second) and 2) from the map view satellite images. Both sources are spatially referenced by the creek running down the hill and steps in the terrain. While there is no doubt the trail is generally running in a north-south direction, the uncertainty of the exact direction is considerable, owing to the individual errors:

a) Uncertain point of view: the pictures of the site are taken from further away, likely from the airport, the second appearing to be taken from a more southerly position. The second picture shows also small dots arranged left to right (RWY?), towards the depression that is probably the northern end of the lake. That would, if correct, position the camera approximately at the latitude of the apron. Uncertainty is on the order of hundreds of meters.

b) Zoom skew: picture one is apparently taken with a strong zoom factor. Any variation in depth (along line-of-sight component) would appear smaller than real, so that an oblique line would appear much more parallel to the image plane. There are some spectacular near-frontal shots of cross-wind landings that demonstrate this, where the aircraft appears only to crab as much as 45° to the runway. Effective uncertainty maybe 10 to 20°.

c) Definition of the "trail": the north end of the debris field appears wider than the south end. There are larger parts in front but the smaller parts stretch further to the W. If one chooses the bigger parts and the tail to define a line, it would slightly climb hillwards and move away from the camera towards the south (cf. b) ). One may as well prefer a triangle or a curved southern end. Uncertainty maybe another 15°.

d) Georeferencing: the creek and accentuated steps in the topography (likely geological bedding) are the visual references to link source 1 and 2. The first picture shows a small blue object where the northern of the two elongated snowfield on the satellite map would approximately be along a prominent step. The location of the impact site is quite well constrained, but the step retreats toward the creek. That makes it more difficult to map the trail.

All in all, if anybody can determine a trail direction more accurately than say ±20°, then he is damn good (as a disclaimer, asked to draw a line, I would certainly do something similar like aterpstr on his map, maybe even tracking 300°). It seems mostly settled now, but the argument whether the track was parallel to the RWY or not, at least me, I simply couldn't answer, even less whether the last heading in the air before a (possibly oblique) impact was 347T or rather something else. (Even though SLF, I work in a profession where visual cues are important).

Similarly little is known about time, with an final call reported at 5 or 3 NM and apparently ~10 (±?) minutes before the fatal impact. None of this is reliable yet. Funny enough, the second most secure information after the location of the crash site is the general pre-impact attitude which was not extremely unusual, according to the recollection of a survivor which should at least be solid enough wrt extreme deviations.

Not to come with a grumbling "let's wait for more official facts", but being aware of how clues could possible fail in an assessment is always a step ahead.

[sgs233a]

Not commenting other than to express my sincerest condolences to all involved, and awaiting the TSB's results.

From the thread on AvCanada at: AVCANADA • View topic - First Air Crash Resolute Bay August 20 2011 (http://www.avcanada.ca/forums2/viewtopic.php?f=118&t=75996)


Yellowknife flypast:
YK Flypast - YouTube (http://youtu.be/omVzwjHekFk)

[CONF iture]

Guys from the North, Emotional tribute really.
Thanks for posting it sgs

omVzwjHekFk&feature=youtu.be

[surplus1]

Class Act!

Fate is the Hunter. RIP

[Rollingthunder]

Work horses of the North. Nice of the guys/gals to do that.

[misd-agin]

Sept 23, 1985. Weyer's Cave, VA (KSHD). Probably cause was using the VOR instead of the ILS for course guidance.

Gets interesting about page 57/87, probable cause on 61/87.

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR86-07.pdf

Lack of intercom, noise level in cockpit, etc, etc.

28% turnover in the previous year, qualifications of applicants dropping(mid 1980's major airline hiring boom)

40% of candidates failing Dash 8 CA and FO upgrade program. FAA hadn't flown an obervation flight in months, etc, etc.

New Captain(one month), FO had 6 weeks with company. FO had falsified MEL time, had not disclosed previous accidents, fired from previous job, etc, etc.

Mentions non-standard, and non-FAA approved, cockpit configurations. I believe they had 8-9 Beech 99's and had 5 or 6 different cockpit configurations.

VOR/ILS tuning was outboard of FO's seat. Investigators believe FO had VOR, instead of ILS, selected. Noise level, lack of intercom, passengers can hear any cockpit discussion, new Captain, new FO, etc, etc, etc.

Hit 200' below the top of the ridge.

[JW411]

Can you just imagine the authorities allowing such a tribute to take place at LGW or LHR and can you just imagine how many local airlines would be happy and honoured to take part?

Well done to everyone at Yellowknife. It was a wonderful tribute.

[twochai]

Thanks be to Buffalo Joe and his people!

Can you just imagine the authorities allowing such a tribute to take place at LGW or LHR and can you just imagine how many local airlines would be happy and honoured to take part?


The difference is that in the Arctic, air transport is the daily mode of transport - there is no other choice, unless you want to walk a CAT(erpiller) across the tundra in winter!

It's how the groceries arrive (as on First Air), how the kids go to visit their cousins in the next village, to play a big hockey game, etc., etc.

It is the daily stuff of life, not a summer vacation in Spain, or winter in Florida.

[Norton29]

The Hare Girls Trust is set up at Scotiabank You can walk up to any teller and let them know you would like to donate to The Hare Girls Trust or use Jane's Name. If you live outside of Yellowknife, you can go into any Scotiabank Teller and let them know you would like to donate to the Hare Girls Trust in Yellowknife and provide them with Hare's name.

The Rutherford trust fund for Noah and Hannah is set up at any RBC branch ,Royal Bank of Canada account # 07159-5041181

Thank you everyone for your incredible support for the Hare and Rutherford Families during this difficult time. Every penny will count for their education.

[ST27]

A few photos of some of the debris have been posted in the Canadian TSB web site:

Transportation Safety Board of Canada | A11H0002 | First Air Flight 6560 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/photos/aviation/A11H0002/A11H0002.asp)

Mostly of the area around the tail, with no shots of what's left of the main passenger section.

[Lost in Saigon]

Mostly of the area around the tail, with no shots of what's left of the main passenger section.

There really is nothing left of the main passenger section:

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/photo_12a.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/004aa.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/010b.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/012a.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/013b.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/013bbb.jpg

[RESA]

The three who survived this (and no, I am not a particularly religious person) must have been protected for some future significant purpose . . . . . . . .

Sure hope the finger of blame points to an unavoidable circumstance and not any individuals . . .

[aterpster]

RESA:

The three who survived this (and no, I am not a particularly religious person) must have been protected for some future significant purpose . . . . . . . .

That's why I never worry when I fly.:hmm:

Sure hope the finger of blame points to an unavoidable circumstance and not any individuals . . .

The only hope for that would be some type of avionics or ground-based nav aid failure, and those types of events are usually avoidable.

[SLF3]

This must be the only thread on Pprune ever that has stayed on topic throughout and not degenerated into a slanging match. Congratulations!

Could it be the stewardesses survived because they were in rear facing seats and the kid because of the lower body mass?

Does seem incredible that anyone survived this.

[ST27]

Could it be the stewardesses survived because they were in rear facing seats and the kid because of the lower body mass?

Early reports suggested that the two flight attendants had survived, but they turned out not to be true. The three survivors were all passengers.

The aircraft was supposedly configured with cargo pallets toward the front, and only 24 seats at the rear. With this arrangement, survivability would be more luck than anything else, and it would only be baseless speculation to suggest why one passenger survived and another didn't with the information available now.

[henra]

Looking at the images it appears to me that we don't see the whole wreckage path.
First of all the quantity of structure/materials we see does not seem to represent the whole structure of a 737.
secondly the wreckage path is too short for my taste. Impacting at 120+ kts at a shallow angle (3-4°?) should produce a longer distance from initial impact to full stop.
So maybe to the right of the image there is some more intact structure left.
Otherwise it would be really incredible that someone survived in this atomised structure.

[Rockhound]

Henra,
Remember that you are looking at telephoto shots of High Arctic tundra, where the absence of trees leads to major problems of scale. Distances can be very deceptive.
In the photos posted by Lost in Saigon, the Canadian military Griffon helicopter in photo #1 and the red Canadian Coast Guard Bo105 chopper in photo #4 do provide some scale but they are sitting well in front of the wreckage trail.
That said, the debris does seem to extend to the right out of photo #4 but I doubt it stretches very far and it would hardly include intact segments of the fuselage - and certainly not "upstream" from the tail.
Of course it is a miracle that there were three survivors, one of them a young woman who actually walked (probably more likely hobbled as she had a broken leg) away from the wreckage and found another survivor, a young Inuit girl, sitting on a rock.
Rockhound

[Lost in Saigon]

Here are three more photos from the TSB website: Transportation Safety Board of Canada | A11H0002 | First Air Flight 6560 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/photos/aviation/A11H0002/A11H0002.asp)

You can't tell where it originally contacted the hill, but these look towards the start of the debris trail.

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/photo_10.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/photo_07.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/photo_08.jpg

http://i2.photobucket.com/albums/y17/msowsun/Airline/photo_09wide.jpg

[Thesongwriter]

Resolute crash survivor shares her story (CBC News)


Resolute crash survivor shares her story - Canada - CBC News (http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2011/09/18/resolute-bay-crash-survivor.html)

[Rockhound]

Nicole Williamson, one of the three survivors and the interviewee in the CBC News story, comes across as a very level-headed and well-spoken young woman, although I could not help feeling that she does not fully appreciate how miraculous her survival was. Typically, for a journalist, Peter Mansbridge, the CBC News anchor and interviewer, did not ask the right questions. Following the cabin crew`s announcement to prepare for landing, did Nicole hear the wheels being lowered? Did she see the ground prior to impact? (I read earlier that Gabrielle, the young girl who survived, saw buildings at the Resolute airport just before the impact.) From what Nicole said, it appears that there was no change in engine noise during the approach, indicating that there was no attempt at a go-around. Putting it all together and reading between the lines, it does appear that the crew was intending to land on Rwy 35.
Also, it was not made clear in the interview that the aircraft impacted the hillside above the runway in a direction roughly parallel to the runway. Far too much is being made of the role the military played in the rescue. Of course, it was fortunate that they had helicopters and a field hospital at the runway 2 km from the crash site. However, no doubt there was a civilian helicopter or two and ATVs available at the Polar Continental Shelf Program, the Canadian government logistics organization supporting scientific fieldwork in the Arctic, which is based at the Resolute airport during the summer field season. These assets could have effected the rescue nearly as well as the military.
It`s far more pertinent to ask, what would the military have been able to accomplish if the accident had occurred hundreds of miles from Resolute?

[Jazz Hands]

Typically, for a journalist, Peter Mansbridge, the CBC News anchor and interviewer, did not ask the right questions.


Maybe because he knows he's broadcasting to a general audience and talking to a young passenger who survived a pretty traumatic event, and not a bleedin aeronautical engineer. Right questions? He was there to ask about her experience, not do the TSB's work for them.

But heavens, don't let me stop someone having a pop at the press. :ugh:

[gwillie]

...I could not help feeling that she (Nicole Williamson) does not fully appreciate how miraculous her survival was- a very shallow read of her self-portrayal in the piece (IMVHO, of course!)

[TwoOneFour]

Typically, for a journalist


The only thing that's typical is a PPrune poster demonstrating cluelessness about journalism. This isn't a technical story, it's a human interest story. That's one in which no-one gives a stuff about the aerodynamics.

[hf4you]

I found the interview quite interesting. She was very articulate and had a clear memory of the whole accident sequence, including the break-up of the fuselage and tumbling across the tundra, strapped to her seat, wondering why she was still conscious. The way she describes her shock, and her recovery to help the young girl was also interesting. I think Peter Mansbridge did a very good job of eliciting what he was supposed to elicit; a good human interest story, with warmth and compassion.

[J.O.]

I think Peter Mansbridge did an excellent interview. He asked the right questions and let Nicole's story speak for itself.

[westhawk]

I don't get CBC so I didn't see the interview. But it seems to me that television networks generally deliver a product intended to appeal to it's core audience. The human interest angle fits the bill.

I would think the answers Rockhound is interested in were given during a TSB interview. These are of course not televised.

Anyone care to profer an opinion as to when the TSB may provide more information regarding their investigation?

[patrickal]

Compared to the interviews we see of victims here in the US, that was an extremely well done piece. He asked the right questions, was gentle when he had to be, and followed a logical, chronological order with his questions. She was amazingly poised and comfortable. If only journalism was always conducted with such professionalism. I agree with Jazz Hands....let the TSB do the investigating.

[hf4you]

The actual TSB report won't be out for at least a full year, and in this case probably close to 2 years (since they are doing a class 2 investigation, which is longer than the class 3 they usually do) Factual information will come out in bits and pieces. I suspect that we will find out the basics within a month or two. The sad part is that everyone focuses on the immediate cause (such as perhaps following the VOR instead of the ILS) but the real investigative work comes down to finding out why a trained crew would make this error, and that takes more time and analysis.

[westhawk]

but the real investigative work comes down to finding out why a trained crew would make this error, and that takes more time and analysis.

Indeed it does.

Once an "immediate cause" is identified, that's a good time for all pilots to start thinking about how the same or similar causal factors may exist within their own operation and what might be done about it. If nothing else, whatever it is can be added to the mental list of things to watch out for.

I have confidence that the TSB analysis and conclusions will be thorough and well founded with respect to this specific accident. I also trust that knowing certain details regarding the immediate cause would be of some assistance to safety departments and the pilot community at large in taking steps aimed at preventing a similar occurrence.

Final reports often cite a number of administrative and managerial factors related to the genesis of whatever went wrong and then go on to recommend policy or regulatory changes to address the problems. This takes time. All well and good, but the more immediate concern is to identify the immediate cause and determine whether steps need to be taken in your own operation or in your own thinking.

Thank you for your response hf4you, I appreciate it.

[Lost in Saigon]

Undoubtedly there will be many factors involved with this accident.

Here are a few factors that caused the holes to line up in this "Swiss Cheese" model:

1) The Military Temporary Tower requested numerous radial/distance reports.

2) The radio quality of the tower was very poor. Other pilots reported hearing frustration in the voices of
the First Air Crew in dealing with the annoying and difficult to understand requests from the Tower.

3) This aircraft had a switch that enabled the Nav display to switch sources.

4) This aircraft was the only B737 in the First Air fleet without EGPWS.

[westhawk]

LIS:

Items 1,2 and 4 your post are new information to me.

Excessive radio transmissions can be a distraction during a high workload phase of flight, especially if they are difficult to understand.

I take it that the airplane was equipped with basic GPWS or TAWS then.



The matter of the NAV source switch has been discussed, but of course we don't know what NAV source was actually selected and displayed during the approach.

A little at a time...

[Rockhound]

I knew there'd be a reaction to my post #173 so, before commenting further, I wanted to listen to Peter Mansbridge's interview with Nicole Williamson again on the CBC website. On the site I found a transcript of the full interview

CBC News - The National - In Depth & Analysis - Nunavut Crash Survivor (http://www.cbc.ca/thenational/indepthanalysis/story/2011/09/19/national-nicolewilliamson.html)

which was edited for broadcast (and IMHO not edited very well).
I take back what I wrote about Mansbridge not asking the right questions but my opinion of journalists' knowledge of aviation matters remains low.
Mansbridge did ask if the cabin crew made the usual pre-landing announcement and Nicole confirmed that they did. Nicole went on to say "the wheels came out". Mansbridge interjected: "You could feel the wheels retract?" Well, it was probably a slip of the tongue but he should have known better. Nicole politely corrected him by repeating "the wheels came out". Mansbridge: Did you see anything on the ground? Nicole: You could see bits and pieces of the ground. But it was pretty foggy. Mansbridge: You never saw Resolute as such? You never saw buildings? Nicole answered no to both questions and went on to say "I saw Resolute for the first time when I was sitting on the hill waiting for the firemen to come [up] to us".
The foregoing exchange was not broadcast. What was broadcast was:
Mansbridge: Was there any sense that there was anything wrong, before it was clear there was something wrong? Nicole: Absolutely not. There were no sights, no smells. There were no noises. It was...completely sudden and violent, but the key is that it was sudden".

It seems pretty clear to me that the pilots were attempting to land on 35. Also clearly, a major navigational error occurred. The question is, how and why?
I cannot get this accident out of my mind. I first flew into Resolute (as a pax of course) in a Wardair Bristol Freighter in 1962, since when I've been in and out of Res dozens of times, in a succession of aircraft big and small, in good weather and bad. I believe commercial jet service to Res started in 1968 (with a Nordair 737). In all that time, up to First Air Flt 6560 on August 20 2011, there has, to my knowledge, not been a single serious air accident at Resolute. Considering the facilities available and the notoriously bad weather at Res, it's a remarkable safety record.

[TwoOneFour]

there has, to my knowledge, not been a single serious air accident at Resolute

ASN Aircraft accident Fairchild F-27J CF-GND Resolute Airport, NU (YRB) (http://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19680612-1)

[punkalouver]

Apparently there used to be all kinds of old wrecks around Resolute from the old days of poor navigation and lots of fog with no nearby airports. But they wer plowed under long ago. I saw the F-27 on the hill and a wreckage pile said to be a Lancaster. Wasn't there a portion of a DC-3 near the lake on final for 35.

All among the many old wrecks that I saw up in the arctic as can be seen here. I have pics of many more. Tucked away somewhere

Abandoned Plane Wrecks of the North (http://www.ruudleeuw.com/search116.htm)

[Rockhound]

Sure, there are (or were) plenty of aircraft wrecks around the Resolute airport but they date mainly from the 40s and 50s. OK, so we now have knowledge of one serious accident since 1962 (the non-fatal, F-27 write-off in 1968) but I'll bet there aren't many more.
Anyway, that wasn't the point of my post. The point was, I believe we can forget about any go-around, back course approach or other deviation by Flt 6560.
Rockhound

[jimbo canuck]

A progress report on the investigation has been publidhed on the TSB website yesterday:

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Media Advisory - Aviation - First Air Flight 6560, 20 August 2011, Resolute Bay (A11H0002) (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/medias-media/majeures-major/aviation/A11H0002/pr-a11h0002-20120105.asp)
Jimbo

[aterpster]

I never flew the 737 but the combination of speed and flap setting seems unusual.

[Lost in Saigon]

I never flew the 737 but the combination of speed and flap setting seems unusual.

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.



What is unusual about a go-around with flaps 40 and the speed at 157 knots?

The report doesn't say they did the approach at 157 knots. It says at the time of impact, they were in a missed approach, and the speed was 157 knots. Seems quite normal to me.

[aterpster]

Lost in Siagon:

What is unusual about a go-around with flaps 40 and the speed at 157 knots?

This is only 2 seconds after they began the "go around." 157 knots is nearly Approach Category E.

The report doesn't say they did the approach at 157 knots. It says at the time of impact, they were in a missed approach, and the speed was 157 knots. Seems quite normal to me.

2 seconds into a "go around" (the report's term). I don't think it would be a missed approach that far off the ILS. Nothing about it seems normal to me.

[Lost in Saigon]

I don't think it would be a missed approach that far off the ILS. Nothing about it seems normal to me.

But THEY thought they were ON the localizer and glideslope on a normal ILS. I think the accident report will say they used the "Killer Switch" to give radial and distance info to the "Temporary Tower", and then flew the VOR instead of the LOC.

It makes sense that when they saw the ground instead of the runway, they did did a missed approach. Having the airspeed increase to 157 knots as they applied Go-around power seems normal to me.

Do you think it is unusual to have the airspeed increase during a go-around?

[aterpster]

Lost in Siagon:

Do you think it is unusual to have the airspeed increase during a go-around?

Your patronizing tone aside, 157 knots is quite unusual two seconds into a go-around, assuming the airplane is being flown at normal precision final approach speed until the go-around is commenced.

[Lost in Saigon]

Sorry, I don't mean to be patronizing. In my experience a go-around is a very difficult, confusing, maneuver where things rarely happen as they should.

I find it totally plausible that the speed could be at 157 knots 2 seconds into a go-around given the circumstances of where they were when they made the decision to go-around.

Please explain why you think it is not.

[BOAC]

a) Yes it is fast
b) No, we do not know why

Next question?

[sleeper]

Sorry, I don't mean to be patronizing. In my experience a go-around is a very difficult, confusing, maneuver where things rarely happen as they should.

No it isn't!
If that is your experience, you or your airline do not live up to a professional standard.

[aterpster]

Lost in Siagon

Sorry, I don't mean to be patronizing. In my experience a go-around is a very difficult, confusing, maneuver where things rarely happen as they should.

That was not my professional experience. We trained twice a year to execute a missed approach from both an ILS and non-precision missed approach. Whenever weather was near minimums for an ILS we were triggered to execute the missed approach and fairly often had to do just that. It was quite routine. The airplane that I flew much of my career that most resembled the 737 was the 727. An average Vref would be 120, to which we added 5 to 10 knots.

I find it totally plausible that the speed could be at 157 knots 2 seconds into a go-around given the circumstances of where they were when they made the decision to go-around.

Presumably, 2 seconds prior to that they should have been flying a normal final segment speed, although it does not appear they were. We really need to learn more from the investigators before we can surmise where the crew knew (or thought) they were.

When we did orderly missed approaches at my airline in a 727 the first objective was reconfiguration to missed approach and altitude gain. Speed increase came very slowly at first. The 727s I flew were not unlike the 737-200 in that they didn't have awesome climb performance like the 767 I flew later on.

As to the term "go around" I am not sure what the investigators mean by use of that term. A go-around for me was usually higher and not because of weather.

[pattern_is_full]

A. it is a progress report, not a final report. Take it with a grain of salt, because details are missing (as they should be, until firm).

B. The wording of the section on speed and the go-around is ambiguous:

The crew initiated a go-around 2 seconds before impact. At this time, the flaps were set to position 40, the landing gear was down and locked, the speed was 157 knots and the final landing checklist was complete.

I read "at this time" to mean "at the time a go-around was initiated" - but it could mean "at impact (2 seconds later)." However, I doubt a 73's acceleration and spool-up time means the speed changed more than a couple of kts in 2 seconds anyway. So likely they were on approach at not less than 154 kts, however you read the timing.

C. Which does seem a high speed in that configuration and that point of the approach (200 ft. above touchdown), but

D. There is a world of difference between a go-around initiated because you DON'T see the runway - and a go-around initiated because you DO see a windscreen suddenly full of grassy hillside! The latter is very likely to be - confused.

[Sidebar]

Transportation Safety Board of Canada - Aviation Investigation Report A11H0002 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2011/a11h0002/a11h0002.asp)