Crash near Bude, Cornwall: 24th July 2011 [Archive]

Helinut

25th Jul 2011, 23:28

My condolences to the pilot's family and friends. RIP.

I should say that I know nothing about this tragic accident, but from what others say it seems to be almost exactly the same as so, so many others.

Talking in general, these VFR into IMC accidents in light helicopters are just awful, but oh so avoidable. It is nothing to do with what we spend time training students about (i.e. how to control the aircraft) but it is about quite awful decision making.

VFR helicoptering over open countryside, if you don't like what you see, land in a big field. I have done it many times, as I am sure have others. But I did have to learn this the hard way. No one really lead me through it, I learnt by experience. The more you do it, the easier it is to (mentally) do again. The mental barrier is broken.

Our training of pilots is seriously deficient because these sort of decision-making processes are not part of "the syllabus". Of course, we also tend not to train in these poor conditions. As training gets more and more regulated/restricted it is less and less likely that we will find ourselves out in these sort of conditions, where an experienced pilot/instructor can pass on his "wisdom".

If you think about it, there is not much clever about this. A certain amount of pole twiddling - keep clear of cloud, slowdown to be able to stop within your visibility; look critically at what is ahead of you. But mainly it is a question of recognising the land-out option and not being afraid/embarrassed/feeling it is a failure to land-out.

Oh and we should immediately stop that pointless and dangerous "instrument flying" that is part of the standard syllabus. It says exactly the wrong thing to the student. And it simply does not equip them to go IMC, whilst pretending to them that it is possible. In practice, in a small unstabilised light helicopter almost no one will survive a real inadvertent IMC incident.

Of course, change is now unlikely to be possible within a generation (in Europe). The great EASA monolith has been created with all its inertia: committees of non-aviators completely obsessed with bureaucracy and airlines, checking the checkers and auditing almost everything to death. Who cares if a few tens of GA hele pilots get killed? Are the IHST and similar people going to be able to make changes? I would not bet my modest pension on it.

Very sadly.

Camp Freddie

25th Jul 2011, 23:34

Same old story and I sometimes wonder why the training does not include these conditions

I am not sure what you mean because JAR PPL(H) training does include 5 hours instrument training and every LPC includes turns 180 to 360 degrees by sole reference to instruments. and has done since the introduction of JAR in 2000.

I dont have the stats but it seems to me that accidents of these type have continued to occur at a similar rate since this training was introduced.

it could be that:

1) instrument training does not replicate very well the actual conditions of going into cloud as depending on the way external references are removed by hoods or foggles that often some external references are still available and therefore it is much easier than flying in real cloud which is also more turbulent and disorientating

2) more emphasis should be placed on avoiding cloud in the first place, as the training and LPC may give the pilot the idea that they have the skills to recover the situation when actually Instrument flying is a perishable skill and actually quite hard in an unstabilised A/C like a 22/44 even if you are current.

maybe time for a rethink about whether IF is taught at all in unstabilsed helicopters as was the situation before 2000.

just my thoughts CF

Whirlybird

26th Jul 2011, 07:50

maybe time for a rethink about whether IF is taught at all in unstabilised helicopters as was the situation before 2000.

Not maybe. Most definitely!

During my CPL course I remember flying with both foggles and makeshift screens. I was managing just fine. I was quite certain I could see nothing outside. Then suddenly, I got a severe case of 'the leans'. I felt as though I was in a very steep right hand turn, and I got so nauseous I told my instructor we might have to stop. He later told me that the time of my disorientation exactly corresponded to us flying through a tiny cloud!

Now, imagine if that had happened if I'd been on my own, as a low hours pilot, in a twitchy little R22, and had had to try to do a 180 and get out. Would I have managed it? I doubt it.

OTOH, I never remember doing even one simulated bad weather landout. Why not? These things are easier if you've tried them first.

Pandalet

26th Jul 2011, 08:05

I suspect the problem is less with the 5 hours training and more with what attitude students come out of the course with. I suspect some people will find a way to kill themselves regardless of what they're taught or told, no matter how many times they're told that turns out of cloud are an emergency procedure, just like autos etc.

I think the 'instrument appreciation' time can be useful, if done right. For me, when I did my PPL, I came out absolutely damn sure I didn't want to fly into cloud, because I was scared silly by what I expected the outcome to be. Much later, doing an IR, even having prepared and spent hours in a sim, the first time I took a Bolkow into cloud for more than the time it took to pop above the layer was interesting, and I'm really, really glad I had an instructor in the other seat to catch the initial wobbles. IFR flying requires training, practice, and recency, and PPLs should be made absolutely aware of their deficiencies in this respect as part of the training (or at least, as much as possible).

Having said all that, I'm not an instructor, so I've only been on the receiving end. I believe the 5 hrs in the PPL are useful if done right, as evidenced by my instructor(s) along the way.

A.Agincourt

26th Jul 2011, 08:06

CF&Helinut - agree with you both also, irrespective of the current 'introduction' to IF flight, there is insufficient' or non existent instruction on the correct planning processes involved to cater for a potential inadvertent IMC whilst en-route - and what to do after that circumstance has been entered into. I prefer to think of the current situation as a familiarisation to enable the pilot to learn how the instruments work and how they are used in such conditions only. Not a means to get you out of the muck when you fly into it. The simple essential fact in all situations where there is an inadvertent IMC is that the pilot failed to make a correct command decision in time and either divert whilst still VMC, or in the worst case land. Unfortunately, not all pilots who hold a license have sufficient quality in command ability.

FLY 7

26th Jul 2011, 08:07

Is the R22/R44 not particularly hazardous in IMC conditions?

I'm thinking of several incidents in recent years where an inexperienced pilot has gone into IMC and the resulting consequences have led to the aircraft breaking up in the air.

The Nr Fairy

26th Jul 2011, 08:54

I don't recall any recent midair breakups due to loss of control in IMC, in helicopters in the UK, at least. In most cases the breakup appears to be the result of hitting the ground (this recent accident, Steve Hislop, et al.).

ANY unstabilised helicopter, single or twin, is likely to cause even the experienced pilot issues in IMC or at night with poor cultural lighting (Mike Goss in an AS355 in 1996).

Perhaps R22 and R44, being the most prevalent light helicopters, are the most likely to feature in the accident reports ?

rotorspeed

26th Jul 2011, 09:35

So sad. But LOC in IMC is a tragically familiar scenario - and of course it's only a question of time before the next one happens.

Helinut is right here, some pilots are just too reluctant to put the thing down whilst visibility is good enough - and frankly it can be pretty poor to achieve this safely. I frequently wonder how inexperienced pilots can get into this situation - do they just not appreciate how bad the vis is and simply stumble into IMC at presumably low level, or are they knowingly taking huge risks pushing on, groping through the murk and trying to dodge around the lowest cloud and mist? The right approach is simple - fly lower and slower in order to maintain good ground reference until you need to land or turn back, possibly trying another lower route if it exists.

Pilots certainly need to be ready to land as soon as concern and doubt hits them - decision making will deteriorate rapidly from this point. Maybe training should include a number of simulated bad weather landings using pre-arranged farmers' fields known to the flying school? Agree with CF that IMC training is of limited benefit. If you get IMC when you should be VMC you are likely to be very low in mist and the chance of maintaining height accurately enough through a 180 deg turn on instruments to avoid hitting the ground is negligable. The 180 turn must be done earlier when still in albeit maybe poor VMC, and then to the right (assuming flying from RHS) and pilots trained to turn this way and get used to clinging to ground reference, even through the door window, because their lives DO depend on it. Teaching low level, tight turns like this would be more beneficial than turns on instruments in IMC, I feel.

The best instrument escape from inadvertent IMC entry at low level on flatish terrain is likely be a wings level steep climb to MSA and sort it out from there, but that's a whole different ball game and unlikely to be survived either by a non IR pilot.

But as has been said before, it's atttude that's the biggest issue and killer. Most of us fly in poor VMC weather from time to time and a very high level of judgement is required. Perhaps the best thing that should happen is that all students should have to read at least 10 LOC in IMC AAIB reports and maybe have detailed cause identication as an exam subject.

eivissa

26th Jul 2011, 09:36

At the risk of being hit by stones...my guess is that a mid air break up in IMC is more likely to happen on a semi-rigid rotor system. For one, having lost spacial awareness, if a pilot unknowingly flys a low G manoeuvre and ends up cutting off his tail boom or rotor mast...

Also there might be lots of bad things happening to a two-blade system when youve gone upside down in clouds...

Not saying that i want to be lost in cloud in an AS350, but it feels more recoverable from unusual attitudes and doesnt care much about being flown in low G conditions.

I totally agree on the need for more training in decision making when weather has gone bad. Instructors should actually go out flying with the students when reports tell you to reconsider, just to show them where the limits should be.

I am not saying every instructor should depart with his student in the worst weather possible, but to plan trips into an area with deteriorating weather to show them how things go worse and giving them the chance to make the decision on their own.

Ok, until here and no further! Can I circumnavigate this, am I going back or should I wait for things to clear up? Can I actually go back (weather, fuel, airfield closed)? Any airfield in the area or am I looking for a suitable field nearby? How and whome should I notify now? Will I get fired for this? <-- that last question should not pop into my mind right now!!!

The only task in my PPL/CPL training, apart from the IMC stuff was something called a "bad weather introduction" and that basically meant flying with grey clouds above my head and having "some" wind. Any common day in Germany or the UK then...:ok:

FLY 7

26th Jul 2011, 09:45

I've read several involving R22/R44 - eg Steve Hislop

INQUIRY UNDER THE FATAL ACCIDENTS AND SUDDEN DEATHS (SCOTLAND) ACT 1975 INTO THE SUDDEN DEATH OF ROBERT STEVEN HISLOP v. , 30 May 2008, Sheriff Principal E.F. Bowen (http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/HYSLOP.html)

Now this may be due to the popularity of these helicopters with private users, or is it to do with the inherent limitations of the Robinson rotor system?

Johe02

26th Jul 2011, 10:13

Helinut -
Oh and we should immediately stop that pointless and dangerous "instrument flying" that is part of the standard syllabus. It says exactly the wrong thing to the student. And it simply does not equip them to go IMC, whilst pretending to them that it is possible. In practice, in a small unstabilised light helicopter almost no one will survive a real inadvertent IMC incident.

The best thing I've read on here for a long time.

When I did my ppl I was told - keep away from clouds!

It does seem since the introduction of the extra 5hrs 'instrument training' there has been more of these type of accidents but how can you campaign for less training :ugh:

Sulley

26th Jul 2011, 10:17

obvious statement but- instrument flying is an extremely perishable skill, and as such has to be practised regularly. Instrument appreciation is just that ,an insight, nothing more.
I would suggest that the 'worst' part is the initial whiteout when you enter cloud,and its how you deal with it ,that matters because if you get that bit wrong then the rest is irrelavant.
Herein lies the problem as to go from happily flying along to into cloud straight onto instruments is very difficult if you are not practiced at it, and particularly in a small unstabilised aircraft.
The instrument appreciation whilst useful cannot prepare you for inadvertant IMC - and it should always be stressed that the best way of dealing with it is to make sure you dont get into it in the first place!Increasing the amount of IF flying for the grant of a PPl will not achieve much, except increasing the cost.

Whirlybird

26th Jul 2011, 11:17

OK, keep instrument appreciation. But it should be just that, ie learning to use the instruments properly. Forget foggles, screens etc. They don't work, you pick up visual information around them even when you think you aren't, and they give students false confidence. How do you convince a student who's managing to do instrument flying really, really well, that he/she won't be able to do it for real? How do you tell them that real IMC is very different, when you just gave them the foggles so that they had a simulated IMC condition? "OK Bloggs, this is how you do it, but don't ever try it, because actually it's not at all like this. You did really well, and you'll pass your Skills Test, and you've learned how to do it, but now don't". Mixed messages or what!

John R81

26th Jul 2011, 11:37

In training I was told to keep away from cloud, think of landing, etc. Instrument appreciation was flown (and I repeat this perhaps 4 times a year). But I set myself a rule that I have stuck with since: if I can't keep 500ft clear of the ground and 60kts airspeed due to viz I turn around or put it down and wait.

Perhaps the most valuable experience for me was when PUT type training on EC120 with a PPRUNE resident FI. Whilst away from base (instrument appreciation flying, as it happens) tower announced they were closing due to weather deterioration. We thought it best to abort training and see if we could return. We could not, and he took control and landed in a field, where we sat until things cleared enoughnto go home.

A practical demonstration in real circumstances is priceless!

To this day, when I fly with a safety pilot I am proud of the fact that I chicken out before they think things to be too difficult to go on. I intend to retain my status of being the coward of the pack because I will never accumulate the experience of these guys, so if they ever get worried I would be so far beyond my capabilities that without them I would certainly feature in the next AAIB report. They will not always be with me so I need to recognise when I approach (not reach) the edge of my competency.

John

EN48

26th Jul 2011, 12:26

but how can you campaign for less training :ugh:

IMHO, the answer (at least for some) may be more training. I have long been an advocate of the idea that most pilots should train for an instrument rating. In addition to improving ones chances of a successful outcome in an IIMC encounter, the discipline required carries over into all other aspects of flying.

A recent experience drove this home (again). In a B407 recurrent training course the instructor announced in the preflight briefing for an FTD (Frasca Level 6) session that he would give me a scenario (a short trip) to fly and that somewhere enroute he would give me an IIMC situation that could not be corrected with a 180 deg turn. Furthermore, he stated that the entire area would go to low IFR and I would have to fly to an airport with an ILS and fly the approach. Gulp! During the initial part of the "trip" he introduced a few failures while still VMC which,in part, were designed to direct my attention away from the upcoming IIMC encounter. The IMC weather occurred suddenly and required flying for about 40 minutes in hard IMC before reaching the airport and flying the ILS to near minimums.

This worked out without calamity, but my heart rate was definitely elevated! I have an IR but am years out of currency. IMO, a pilot with only the minimum training could not have survived. Even with an IR, an unstabilized helicopter is no place to be in IMC, but one's odds of survival would seem to be greatly enhanced. I have recently installed a Cobham HeliSAS system in my helicopter. While not nearly as sophicticated as an SPIFR approved helicopter autopilot, it is cabable of flying a coupled approach with vertical guidance (ILS/LNAV-VNAV/LPV). It does this quite well and could well save the day in an IIMC situation. However, staying out of IMC is by far the best solution.

heli1

26th Jul 2011, 12:32

Absolutely right JohnR81.
I have twice been caught out by weather flying VFR. Once in North Wales when I saw cloud rolling over the ridgeline ahead of me.....a rapid turn in the valley and rerouting sorted that , and a second time when visibility just started vanishing in a heavy downpour and I put the helicopter down in a field and waited until it was over.Absolutely the right decision because when it cleared I saw pylons about half a mile ahead !
Why some pilots push on in a helicopter when it is so easy to land when you run into weather trouble I can never understand.

Geoffersincornwall

26th Jul 2011, 12:33

You hit the nail on the head. The training should focus on making that impromptu landing and getting that experience under your belt. Having done that at least 4 or 5 times in my career I can swear that the warm glow you feel looking up from a position where your feet are firmly on terra firma beats the hot sweat you felt moments before when you contemplated pushing on.

Maybe the CAA wont like me suggesting this but maybe we should substitute forced landing for the IMC training. It would shift the focus in the right direction even though there may be a few p***d off farmers, sports field owners and park administrators to cope with. A 'Code of Practice' should cover the training exercise but it is I believe a realistic step in the right direction.

G. :ok:

500e

26th Jul 2011, 12:49

I agree with WH & 81.
Instrument Appreciation would be a better lesson name rather than the present.
In my job we rely on believing instruments\ test equipment (you cant see radio waves)
I do not question what I see on them, but with foggles on & not cheating I found it very difficult to believe what they were telling me & even harder to make the control movements required to keep flying as requested by instructor.
He kept repeating this is not instrument flying you will not be able to fly IFR it is a requirement of the licence at present.
His other mantra was if the weather deteriorates land or go back if safe, you are flying a helicopter find the field\airfield & land the old saying "better down here wishing etc" & we did a lot of landing out fields, forest clearings private roads.
"Land there" was a regular thing, followed by where's the wind? any wires noticed ? do a rece & put it down.
Being old & managing to stay alive this long I feel any help I can give god the better:E

that

What Limits

26th Jul 2011, 13:48

Again and again we try to apply the band-aid to the problem. So far posters have suggested more or less training and I can see the point of both.

Why don't we address the root cause - poor decision making and threat and error management.

If ALL pilots worldwide had to do this at every level of their training (yes, even ppl's) then there would be a lot fewer accidents.

JEM60

26th Jul 2011, 13:52

I'm not a heli pilot, but someone once said 'if you get into IMC in a light helicopter, the only known fact is that you are going to die.' Sad, but probably true.

HEATHROW DIRECTOR

26th Jul 2011, 14:01

<<I have thought what I would do in same situation, and maybe for the benefit of others/investigators I would, if I had the presence of mind, keep my transmission open?>>

On what grounds? It simply means that nobody can talk to you. Lots of controllers are pilots and I have seen situations where a controller/pilot has saved a young PPL. It's senseless and dangerous to jam a frequiency.

hihover

26th Jul 2011, 14:13

It seems to me that the term IIMC is becoming a useful excuse for poor airmanship and non-existant captaincy. In my opinion, this is where the problem lies. And without supervision, there is nothing stopping pilots luanching with this mindset.

If a pilot is within 500 feet of the cloudbase or in visibility of less than 3km, then he really needs to be asking himself why he is there. Sometimes the answer will justify being there in those conditions, but really, for most non-professionals, if you go below those parameters then you are asking for trouble.

IIMC at night is excuseable under certain circumstances, IIMC by day is inexcuseable.

Brilliant Stuff

26th Jul 2011, 14:30

I agree with you all chaps but I will add my two pennies for the lurkers.

If the cloud has you flying at 500' land or turn around, same with the viz. It's a helicopter after all and that's what's they are there fore.

I had to put down twice once was on the "beach" of the severn heading south and I knew was safe over the water but I could not see the severn bridge which was due very soon hence I landed. 20 Minutes later the weather improved and I launched only to find that bridge wasn't to far off.....

The other time it was a bit more high pressure because I had pax with me who had a lunch appointment but fortunately (IMHO) I was still very green and when I found myself at 500' I landed again. And again after 20 Minutes I launched except the band of rain & cloud had me divert into Southampton. Pax were livid since they missed their expensive lunch, I pointed out to them that they paid me to deliver them safely this calmed them though knowing pax they were more calmed by the fact that my boss picked up the tab for the missed lunch. That day we all got caught out by the weather even my colleague who had a gazillion hours under his belt and even he had to park in a field.

The message dear lurkers is there is no shame in landing and having a short break waiting for the weather to improve.

My condolences to the family.

griffothefog

26th Jul 2011, 15:55

One of the beauties of the sim.....:ok:

This is where a PPL could learn so much outside of the normal arena, a controlled slow deterioration into the clag and all the decisions therein to be made by him/her only until the dreaded red screen...:{

That would learn em..

Brilliant Stuff

26th Jul 2011, 18:41

Griff you are so right. Even FlightSim FX could do that.

pilothlc

26th Jul 2011, 21:36

I was taught to treat clouds like upside down mountains. Having said this whilst I am only beginning to get a little better at keeping straight and level in the R44 after over 200 hours it still happens that when changing radio frequency or playing with the GPS, or worse still looking at my chart I hit a thermal or just move the cyclic a milimeter, and rise 100 feet, this I suspect if flying too close to cloud base could be the cause of many in indvertant excursion into IMC.

helicopter-redeye

26th Jul 2011, 22:26

The best instrument escape from inadvertent IMC entry at low level on flatish terrain is likely be a wings level steep climb to MSA and sort it out from there, but that's a whole different ball game and unlikely to be survived either by a non IR pilot.

The only problem with this approach is 'where are the cloud tops' (may be above the MSA), but if you can be reasonably sure that it is layer cloud, then a climb is a safer bet than a descent into a hill.

To paraphrase Arthur Ransome in Swallows & Amazons/. "If not duffers, not in cloud. If duffers, duffers better drowned"

Take your pick. Drowning or flying upside down in a helicopter gives the same results.

VFR flying is just that. Clear of cloud. When in doubt. Land. And enjoy a cup of tea from your pre packed flask. Cloud around coastal areas like Cornwall or west of Scotland can be very unpredictable, and hence, best avoided.

VeeAny

27th Jul 2011, 06:31

Video of the site and wreckage (http://www.itv.com/westcountry-east/fatal-helicopter-crash65650/)

Posted to show the crash site and aircraft in more detail only.

RIP.

AnFI

27th Jul 2011, 09:49

One aspect of this which I personally find incredibly sad is my view that there is a basic mis-understanding about the cause of this class of accident.

I have studied this problem at great length and I am fairly certain that I have identified a major contributing factor which, sadly, is not accepted in general.

How to maintain VMC is not taught - often it does not need to be taught because it is obvious to many (70%-80%). If you are someone to whom it is obvious then you will conclude that the person who has this accident was reckless / disregarded the bad weather / didn't have the captaincy to make a decision to stop or return / was asking for it / was disrespectful of the limits ....

If you are such a person then please take a moment to run this possible scenario through your mind: You are using techniques which you do not realise are techniques ... If a conscientious person with good will and good intent does not possess the required techniques then regardless of the fact that he does not intend to loose his visual references he inevitably will do so REGARDLESS OF THE WEATHER - and many pilots have, some then obviously kill themselves in the process. It is an insult to the pilot to start talking about his 'willful disregard' etc. if it is actually a case of the fellow just not understanding what he needs to do.

I estimate that 20%-30% of pilots do not possess the techniques required to effectively guard and maintain their visual references. Even if the weather is relatively good - they are still at great risk. There is not a set of conditions criteria which will prevent the pilot's loss of visual references at some stage.

The required technique is called VRF Visual Reference Flight

In IMC flight is performed under a set of rules called IFR, and IRF is used to do it. Instrument Reference Flight is the technique.

In VMC the rules are VFR and the technique is VRF - a major part of VRF is to guard ones Visual References - this is TOO OBVIOUS to many for them to grasp that there are actually some techniques being used. Techniques which some people do not possess. It is a tragic insult to 'blame' these dead pilots who may well have been highly conscientious but just unequipped.

There is nothing wrong with teaching people some basic IRF skills as long as it is not taught instead of teaching how keep Visual References. IRF is not the solution to keeping Visual References.

Until pilots know how to stay visual they'll keep doing IIMC - the I is not Inadvertent it is Inevitable !

(Someone said it was understandable that IIMC might be encountered at night - but I beg to differ - the key technique required is to guard Visual References especially at night.... )

[email protected]

27th Jul 2011, 14:47

The fundamental problem is that there is no mandated post-graduate training for PPLs once they have their licence. It is all very well being shown something once during your initial flying training but it needs to be repeated (whether it is PFLs, instrument appreciation or weather avoidance) regularly until a reasonable level of competence and experience is achieved - even then currency is always the big issue.

Once a PPL has his/her licence they can pretty much do what they like - we wouldn't let junior pilots in the mil fly without supervision, why let it happen in GA?

Torquetalk

27th Jul 2011, 14:48

AnFI

Thank you for that concise and pertinent contribution which many at-risk pilots will think long and hard about. For the benefit of even more ppruners, could you repeat it in English?

hihover

27th Jul 2011, 15:11

AnFI,

I hear what you say about the root cause of this type of accident, however, I believe you are over-simplifying things and feeding excuses to those who will put themselves in harm's way. Every pilot has been taught the dangers of flying in or near bad weather, and they have been given a number of tools to stop them getting themselves into that position. Upon finding themselves in that position, they have also been given a set of tools to get them out of that position, and if none of these tools are used, they have the final option of landing the helicopter anywhere (it doesn't get any better than that).

Yet, some keep on going.

Sadly (depending on how you look at it), in uncontrolled airspace, VFR minimum weather requirements are at THE absolute minimum, ie, clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.........to some, it seems acceptable to fly to those limits. It is not acceptable, except under dire circumstances.

Even military helicopter pilots (regardless of experience) who have had the best training available, are limited to a minimum visibility of 1km for VFR flight, and if they have to fly to that limit they may well have to convince a senior pilot/authorisor before he lets them launch.

You may well have something in your teminology (VRF) by covering how to maintain visual reference, for those pilots who are not able to figure it out for themselves. The problem, however, started way before that pilot needed to maintain visual reference. Unless he is at war or performing life-critical flight then he should be nowhere near those limits. This is what pilots need to understand....thankfully, most do.

Your VRF solution to the "cause" of this type of accident is too simplistic, in my opinion. I think it is a tool, a valuable tool, and it should be with the other tools, ready for use when common sense, airmanship and captaincy have already failed.

Tam

hands_on123

27th Jul 2011, 15:19

AnFI - I didn't know John Prescott was on pprune.

revit

27th Jul 2011, 15:47

I am not a pilot so read my opinion as you will.

After a fatal accident, would it not be a good idea for the AAIB to send a paper copy of the report to every pilot qualified on a similar type of aircraft? I definitely find them quite sobbering to read. I feel it might just hit home to some pilots how easy things can go from okay to seriously bad. Just a thought.

Cheers,

Gordon

ShyTorque

27th Jul 2011, 15:58

Sadly (depending on how you look at it), in uncontrolled airspace, VFR minimum weather requirements are at THE absolute minimum, ie, clear of cloud and in sight of the surface.........to some, it seems acceptable to fly to those limits. It is not acceptable, except under dire circumstances.

Not forgetting, in UK, an in-flight minimum visibility of 1500 metres.

hihover

27th Jul 2011, 16:07

Yes Gordon, it would be a good idea, unfortunately, by then, the accident may have lost relevance to some pilots and the reports tend to be lengthy and very specific, making them a challenging read in some cases. Nonetheless, they are an interesting read and you can often see things from a different perspective afterwards.

We used a very good system when I was in training with the Army. Each day we had a selected incident report read to the course, and we all had our chance to put ourselves in that pilot's position and ask ourselves what we would have done....or not done, in order to avoid being there in the future.

I found those short sessions to be very useful for me, but I don't think you could make the same use out of them without a classroom environment full of your peers and your superiors, with the chance to discuss/listen/learn.

Good idea though, I wonder how we could implement something like that outside the classroom environment???!!!

Tam

Jonwil

27th Jul 2011, 16:14

Unfortunately Crab, much of the GA private market does not have the budget to provide continuation training like the Mil have.
If you made it law to have a 100+ hour PPL course then you would not get many people through the system.

Don't forget that even a fresh CPL does not have a great deal extra in terms of flying training than a PPL so you would then be increasing the CPL route also.

Accidents like these are always tragic but if we start on the thread of increasing the ability of VFR pilots (generic) then you could apply that to many other walks of life like driving. If we were all trained to advanced standard (IAM) then there would be less accidents.

RIP to the victim and regards to his friends and family.

EN48

27th Jul 2011, 17:11

Not forgetting, in UK, an in-flight minimum visibility of 1500 metres.

Legal minimums are just that. Not guaranteed to be prudent for every pilot. Each needs to think carefully and set "personal minimums," usually more conservative than legal minimums. For those of us who fly for reasons other than to earn a living, way more conservative. Even with lots of experience (mostly plank) I set mine at 5 mi/1000ft. I usually have the option to fly another time/day so this doesnt cramp my style - it is quite rare when I dont fly because the wx is below these mins but at or above legal VFR mins.

EN48

27th Jul 2011, 18:49

Good idea though, I wonder how we could implement something like that outside the classroom environment???!!!

Yes, a great idea! And one that any motivated pilot can take advantage of. Most of these reports are readily available online at no charge (at least in the U.S.) and developing the habit of reviewing these reports at least annually is a terrifc learning opportunity and safety "device." One can take this farther by printing the more relevant reports and discussing with an instructor or other pilots.

AnFI

27th Jul 2011, 20:14

Yes hihover - I think it really is very simple - and I suspect you are of course a pilot (like the majority) who can look out of the window and understand what you are seeing ... and then of course it's easy do do the appropriate thing....

I'm not talking about how to fly in 200meters - I'm talking about pilots who become IIMC in 10k vis - it happens often it is pathetic but true !

You would have to see it to believe it and perhaps then you would see that it's not all about pilots deliberately exceeding personal limits but often pilots who just are not equipped with the basic necessary skill set to survive long term...

Please don't be blind to this I've seen it often and it's around 20% of new pilots - until this is studied / investigated / understood / addressed this high level of this class of accident will continue - often to really nice conscientious pilots who are trying to do the right thing but just don't know what they are doing - it is unacceptable!

... it's a training issue - everybody agrees - but that means different things to different people....

S76Heavy

27th Jul 2011, 21:17

pilots who just are not equipped with the basic necessary skill set to survive long term...
Perhaps they should be weeded out of the training before they get a chance to kill themselves and others?

If they don't understand something as basic as maintaining sufficient visual reference to ensure the safety of the flight let alone compliance to the rules, they have no business being in control of a helicopter that will kill them due to the lack of skills.

I have been around long enough to be surprised by a lack of skills displayed by people I have flown with, and no doubt some have shaken their heads at my performance. But this is basic stuff.

Perhaps not everybody with the money to buy the hours should gain a licence at the end?

hihover

28th Jul 2011, 00:00

Sorry AnFI,

Your argument suggests that, of the 1000 LSTs I have performed, somewhere between 200 and 300 of those pilots do not possess the skills to maintain visual reference......I think you may be looking too deeply into this.

If a pilot is unable to "sense" the dangers in his immediate vicinity, then he can simply apply some numbers to the danger zones, eg. stay 500 feet below cloud, 1000 feet above ground, slow down when the vis gets below 5km, go back home at 3km......simple big numbers that can be modified as necessary, depending on factors like - recency, total number of hours, total number of children etc etc.

In an unsupervised environment, a solution is almost impossible without draconian regulation.....and nobody wants to go there.

From a professional pilot's point of view, the solution is less complex. If a pilot does not adhere to sensible personal limits/Ops manual, then the word will get around and he will be identified as a risk, not always, but mostly, and he will treated accordingly by his peers and his supervisors.

I wish I knew the solution.

Tam

Shawn Coyle

28th Jul 2011, 00:06

But this is the sort of thing that could be easily taught in a Flight Training Device (FNPT for the Europeans).
No need for an expensive sim, just good visuals and a well trained instructor to set up the scenario.

212man

28th Jul 2011, 01:31

Heathrow Director
It's senseless and dangerous to jam a frequiency.

With respect, I don't think you comprehend the likely scenario of someone gripping the cyclic - with the PTT switch on it - for dear life whilst rapidly losing control and in mortal danger!

My understanding is that the crew of the Bond AS332 L2 that lost its head and free fell from 2000 ft, also held the PTT in all the way down - but I don't think anyone would accuse them of anything :ugh:

verticalhold

28th Jul 2011, 07:33

212man;

It has to be the most awful sound on earth, I heard it coming from a helicopter, and again from an aeroplane, in the background on the plane I could hear the pilot's son and daughter pleading with him to make it stop, the helicopter pilot just broadcast his gasping breath, I never want to hear it again.

As a very scared trainee, crap weather and high ground I blocked Luton approach the same way, a ploughed field has never looked so good.

VH

herman the crab

28th Jul 2011, 08:17

A controversial opinion follows:

Clearly as several have said this is a mindset/mentality issue with the pilot.
Yes the AAIB/NTSA reports are good reading but those that bother to learn from them are probably those that least need to.
I am sure that the likely candidates for this type of accident are fairly easily identified by the CFI (I'm not a CFI so might be wrong).

The crunch is - how many schools/CFIs will throw away $/£k's income and tell a student that they are dangerous and should take up flower arranging/etc. Even if they have a conscience and do will the (wannabe) pilot of the attitude I can do it because...take any notice and give up or will they just move to a school that isn't as ethical in trying to stop the 'wrong' type of people learning to fly?

HTC

VeeAny

28th Jul 2011, 09:26

HTC,

I have done so twice, after having other instructors try their magic on said students first.

£s and $s should not get in the way of doing the job properly.

I know there are some schools around who will just keep taking the money.

GS

Flingingwings

28th Jul 2011, 09:41

I must be missing something. Albeit I get the basis of AnFis post.

PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable?

Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides?

IMHO the problems are far wider than the individual. So to add to the controvesy.

Because helicopter flying is fun, a ppl course may not point out they can't fly all of the time, or that as a PPL no flight is that urgent that it cannot wait until another time.

A mindset that failing to reach your planned destination is a shamefull failure. From one of the earliest posts on this thread - it's been suggested local weather was worse than forecast and after 3 failed attempts to make progress (to a site less than 20 miles away) a low ground route and a break in the weather allowed progress to be made. The forecast is but a planning aid, if you encounter worse then rework the plan. If I diverted or picked a field due to unexpected nasty low clag, then I'd need a significant sustained improvement to warrant an attempt to continue VFR/VMC. So why do we try multiple attempts in the hope of finding a lucky gap?

Some schools simply authorise SFH sorties taking little direct interest in exactly where and what a sortie will involve. Perhaps some places actually enforcing their SFH limits and taking some accountability would be another good starting point.

In a similar vein hands up all those pilots that know of industry peers that fly unstabilised single engined helicopters in cloud. (Or proclaim that in bad weather you simply go lower and slower and then lower and slower still.... so that some get so low and so slow, without landing in a field, that control in IMC becomes basically impossible) We all know that many feel that they have the required skills so why restrict flight in cloud to stabilised twins and IFR qualified pilots. Legality aside, these pilots may have the required ability, but lesser mortals that hear of their tales (because skud running and going into cloud and the subsequent recovery is so easy/so cool/so much fun and therefore warrants boastful group discussion) and attempt similar may/clearly don't. I've overheard stories like this from ppls, and cpls and am as guility as all the other listeners for sometimes staying quiet and not saying publicly to their face that they are idiots. Instead we do it quietly. Perhaps as a community we should all take an interest in trying to stop these type of crashes before legislation cripples us?

The SIM IMC training I felt was included to show it was different to looking out the window. I dont think it was ever intended to be a panacea for surviving if going IMC at low level and/or low speed when stress levels are already through the roof. Every CFI on the planet has the ability to ensure their FIs make it clear that SIM IMC is nothing like the real thing and that failing to heed that warning will probably prove very costly.

Re the FNPT suggestion. This was an idea I discussed with another probably two years ago. Our slant was to suggest that insurers offered a lower premium to operators/owners whom only used pilots that had voluntarily attended a course on poor weather flying run at an FNPT. We came up with a basic course suggestion run over 1-2 days (depending on numbers) in conjunction with an FNPT operator and even had discussion with a major UK insurer..... but some how the idea just fizzled out :(

FLY 7

28th Jul 2011, 10:00

Meteorology may also play a part.

This accident happened near the Cornish coast and the film of the crash site clearly showed IMC weather conditions.

But, I was speaking to a non-pilot, who surfs around Cornwall, and he said that, at times, the sea mist can roll in very quickly and unexpectedly catching out sailors, surfers and even people on the beach, who lose site of their kids - one minute it's bright and sunny, the next it's grey and gloomy.

What are the tell tale signs to look out for?

Thomas coupling

28th Jul 2011, 11:39

My son has just passed his driving test. Occasionally when I sit with him while he drives, I often squirm at his inexperience and I have to say to myself, he has passed his test and he has proven he is competent to drive.
As we all know in the Uk, this does not include skid training, night driving, heavy rain, heavy motorway traffic moving at speed, etc etc.
We all hope and pray that our young ones will survive those precious months/years where they gain that experience and where they can put more and more distance between themselves and that awful day when/if they do crash.
It's called LIFE and us humans court risk just getting out of bed. It's what controls the gene pool!
This unfortunate character didn't have the luxury of putting that distance between passing his PPL(H) and his day of reckoning. He becomes another statistic and frankly, I don't think anyone on this planet could have prevented his demise....least of all himself. No-one to blame - just a roll of the dice - wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong tools.
Very very sad, he must have been absolutely frozen with fear.

LH2

28th Jul 2011, 11:58

Of course, change is now unlikely to be possible within a generation (in Europe). The great EASA monolith has been created with all its inertia: committees of non-aviators completely obsessed with bureaucracy and airlines, checking the checkers and auditing almost everything to death. Who cares if a few tens of GA hele pilots get killed? Are the IHST and similar people going to be able to make changes? I would not bet my modest pension on it.

I like the way you have managed to blame EASA for this. Bit unrespectful towards the deceased and bereaved, towards EASA, towards you audience, and towards yourself, I would think. :cool:

AnFI

28th Jul 2011, 14:23

Hi Flingwings, you said:

I must be missing something. Precisely my point! Albeit I get the basis of AnFis post. Thanks

PPLs are taught to fly VFR/VMC referencing a visual horizon to a position on a windscreen. They start this exercise away from the ground and learn how it is harder (in the early stages) mastering this art nearer the ground whilst hovering. If the horizon disappears due to low cloud, then how is there anything inadvertent about the inevitable? Yes - they can't see the cues you (and I , and most people here) just find blindingly obvious ... try it with in-experienced pilots - I am sure you will be surprised. Yes that is what I am saying - the I is Inevitable not Inadvertant
(and it's not as simple as the horizon disappearing due to low cloud ... it depends on combinations of poor vis and low cloud - if the vis is 40km when the horizon dissapears due to cloud it is because the guy has flown into it already ... if the furthest point in your world is 4k away with varying visibility then avoiding flying into a cloud which you have not detected because it has no contrast against the poor vis requires some skills not yet formally identified - these skills are required when the vis is 100km over featureless conditions etc etc etc too many variables to do justice to it here...)

Why do sections of our community insist upon pressing on until tragedy? Sometimes they just don't know they are Many FIs and FEs go to great lengths to ensure their students are safe and responsible. Legislation aside, you're an FE aren't you AnFi? For the 20-30% you quote do they fail check rides? The flight tests do not require the specific tests required to reveal whether pilots have this skill set - it should ... personally I do my best to make sure pilots are equipped - if the issue is not recognised then it is unlikely that others will know of this issue.

Skill tests are most often not performed under conditions requiring skills which the pilot becomes licensed to exercise. A conscious effort by the examiner to place the candidate in a position (under appropriate conditions) where he must make these judgments is not as far as I am aware a common feature of the testing process....

When the vis is 8km in haze, in a low-cue environment and the visual world stops ahead as the cloud and hills meet - almost everybody here would recognise the dead-end nature of that flight path ... some do not. I don't believe that basic skill is tested in general...

HIHOVER of the 1000 LSTs you have performed on how many candidates have you performed this in challenging conditions (even 6k 1200ft) and deliberately loaded the candidate with a task whilst placing him in a scenario where he must take action to avoid IMC?
I suspect if you did you might be surprised at the result ...
(1000 tests is not 1000 pilots - maybe 300, of which 20% were 'babies' 10% in poor conditions perhaps, gives 6 pilots 20% of those displaying questionable ability to maintain Visual References leaves about 1.2 pilots who you might have encountered were not good at maintaining VR - have you notice 1.2 pilots like that ?) - Just a thought - worth considering - no?

... it is rather surprising that there is a skill set SO BASIC that you (and I and others) don't even realise that it is a skill set, and can't imagine there are people who don't have it. Look with an open mind and you might be surprised.

I know a thoroughly excellent (now) instructor (of 7 yrs) who whilst a PPL of 5yrs I overheard saying something which made me believe he was not processing the visual field correctly - I took him immediately flying and found that it was indeed the case that he was mis-interpreting what he saw ... showed it to him it was obvious to him and he was cured, and very good. It made me attuned to the issue.

Only trying to help....
... of course I might be wrong and the world is really full of adults with five year old children who are just so irresponsible and suicidal that they happily arrogantly and confidently launch into conditions requiring skills they don't posses - knowingly because they are mad and should be hit with a bigger stick...
... dead pilots can't speak ... those left have a duty to consider their case with absolute fairness, and not just brand them as idiots (although that may still be the case)

Good analogy TC - and 'wrong tools' includes teaching... Experience is only experience if you don't kill yourself getting it...

(obviously there is a mix of reasons and scenarios in reality - I am just saying that one factor is the surprising inability of some to interpret what they see and how to maintain their visual references - I'll get my coat then....)

Three Blades

28th Jul 2011, 14:31

FLY 7, I can concur with your source of information. I happened to be not far from the accident site (fortunately surfing rather than flying) and the cloud did seem to just descent in a very short period of time. One minute there was good vis, the next you could not see the hill tops and the next you could hardly see across the car park. A grim day for many reasons.

As for the debate around the 5hrs of PPL IR 'training'. I can admit to having been foolish shortly after passing my test and found myself with heavily reduced vis (again by the coast but more from going into a wall of clag rather than it coming down on me from above) but managed to remember enough to execute a smart 180 and popped straight out again. It scared the cr@p out of me but things would have been far worse if I had not had that training.
Did the training give me a false sense of ability ? - yes
Would I rather not have had it ? - no
Should simulated precautionary land-outs be taught ? - yes (but how does this fit into the UK restriction regarding training at licensed airfields only and does every training establishment have a friendly farmer nearby ?)

TB

Gordy

28th Jul 2011, 15:00

HTC

The crunch is - how many schools/CFIs will throw away $/£k's income and tell a student that they are dangerous and should take up flower arranging/etc. Even if they have a conscience and do will the (wannabe) pilot of the attitude I can do it because...take any notice and give up or will they just move to a school that isn't as ethical in trying to stop the 'wrong' type of people learning to fly?

In my days of instruction, I did this about 7 times in 8 years. Those who did my CFI course over the years have heard me talk about the "guitar talk".....

EN48

28th Jul 2011, 15:00

This thread seems to focus on errors in aeronautical decision making committed by "PPL's." One only need read a reasonable number of accident reports to observe that those with CPL and ATPL are having difficulties with ADM, not only with respect to IIMC, but many other issues as well (but hopefully to a lesser degree). At risk of being acused of thread creep (and possibly other serious transgressions), here is a link to a recent NTSB investigation which drives this home in a compelling way. This is a plank accident but, highly relevant when we are trying to better understand failures in ADM. The report is long and somewhat repetitive, but an education and then some. For those not inclined to read it, a brief summary:
1. the pilot held an ATP certificate, was ex-military and ex-airline, and had 2000+ hours in make/model (Pilatus PC-12). He had recent recurrent make/model training and an otherwise unblemished flying record over about 40 years.
2. He made a choice to operate the accident aircraft with 14 people on board (certified for a maximum of 11, and in this case, equipped with 10 seats/seat belts), at almost 600 lbs above max gross weight, and did not add fuel anti icing agent (FSII) as required by the AFM. Furthermore, the accident flight was not the first time he made these choices.

He killed himself an 13 others as a result of these decisions. I would agree with others here that pilots with limited experience often dont know what they dont know. This was not a case of not knowing better. Why did he choose the course of action that he did?

NTSB report here: http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2011/AAR1105.pdf

hihover

28th Jul 2011, 15:12

EN48, you just beat me to it. Yes there is a tendency in this discussion towards pointing fingers at PPLs....and that should not be the case because this is an issue that is industry-wide. IIMC occurs occasionally at all levels in the industry, professional pilots, military pilots, instructors, examiners.....no group seems to be exempt.

Tam

hands_on123

28th Jul 2011, 16:32

Here's what I think should happen

- Ditch the 5 hour IF PPL training, its a complete waste of time and money, and it hasn't reduced the accident numbers

- Introduce a 3-5 hour FNTP training session to cover flight in reduced viz, 180 degree turn, etc - this not to teach people to fly IFR, but more to teach the how hard/dangerous IMC is and how the workload increases quickly

- Change the PPL syllabus so it doesn't end up with instructors concentrating on auto rotations ("engines hardly fail - people do")

- Introduce some method that PPL students and PPL holders are forced to regularly read accident reports and learn about decision making - maybe some sort of computer based training/online course or attendance at a safety seminar(s)?

- Introduce some sort of "land immediately" lesson in the PPL syllabus - it should have just as much importance as PFLs/Autos do now

At the moment instructors are scared of teaching people to land in fields because of daft regulations and scare stories about Rule 5 etc.

The PPL syllabus and LPC testing/training MUST be changed to include decision making, weather avoidance, and landing in a field. At the moment the average LPC is a couple of circuits, and couple of autos, maybe a running landing and that is it. It's a joke.

hihover

28th Jul 2011, 18:52

"Land Immediately" or Off-Field landings due to weather are an absolute last-ditch fix for the basic problem which seems to be poor decision making, poor airmanship or non-existant captaincy. Practice at landing in a field would almost be a waste of effort, any helicopter pilot can do that, it is the lead-up to that point where I believe we need to focus.

Not being there is the first place is what I would like to see pilots aim for. If a pilot has to land in a field because he was "pressing-on" then he has missed several stages of correction and is in need of re-education.

Tam

f0xhunter

28th Jul 2011, 19:29

If IIMC accidents were primarily confined to PPLs, then I would believe that poor decision making/captaincy was a primary underlying cause. However, it seems that IIMC misadventures are well distributed across the experience range. It also seems just too frequent to blame on poor decision making.

Maybe weather conditions in many flying areas are just normally unpredictable enough that flying un-stabilized, un-autopiloted helicopters is just inherently dangerous.

Twiddle

28th Jul 2011, 19:33

If you want to teach PPL's what entry into IMC is like get them to wear foggles when facing out to sea on a grey day, that's the closest they'll get beyond actually going into cloud.

Removes the visual references and they may then appreciate how bad it can be.

Also the training relating to "if you inadvertantly enter cloud turn 180..." is far from how most people will end up in this state.

For my sins, I've been in solid cloud at an unusual attitude and it's not fun, I was flying fast between cloud on top and fog below and decided to grab a map from the back, in the short time it took to root around and find the right map in the bag and with no peripheral vision I went from straight and level at 120kt to decreasing airspeed, almost 1000ft/min climb, pitched over at least 20 degrees and in solid cloud. Not fun, with all the best will in the world it took a lot not to panic and to rely on the instruments and not the feeling in the pants. The final outcome probably dictated more by luck than skill or judgement.

I'll put that one in the accumulated luck bag........

kevin_mayes

28th Jul 2011, 21:16

Hmmm, perhaps the outfits that owned the expensive simulators could give one hour to PPL's ffor free, then us ordinary chaps could experiance bad could and vis without tripping accross it for real... costs nothing in real terms, and what better PR.

I'll get my coat.

Kev...

AnFI

28th Jul 2011, 22:47

If you are a pilot in doubt you could 'book in' with a very experienced local instructor to go out in weather requiring judgment and learn survival/coping strategies... perhaps it will fill some gaps? Might save your life.... Striving for constant improvement is the best way forward...

Three Blades

29th Jul 2011, 07:18

Some details of the pilot are printed in the Bristol Evening Post:
This is Bristol | Helicopter victim a top businessman (http://www.thisisbristol.co.uk/Helicopter-victim-businessman/story-13010082-detail/story.html)

floatsarmed

29th Jul 2011, 15:31

5 hours of IMC training is a waste of time.

It may actually give the inexperienced or unwary a false sense of reality. In that they might actually believe they can instrument fly out of an IMC condition so they believe it's not really a drama if they go IMC.

Flying well 'on the clocks' takes constant practise and is not to be taken lightly. IF is a hard skill to master and 5 hours will get you absolutely nowhere. It will just make you dangerous to yourself and others.

The decision making processes to keep yourself out of the worst sort of trouble are relatively simple.

1. Unless you are flying a fully IFR capable aircraft with a CIR and you are IF current do not go near or in cloud.....EVER.

2. If the vis is getting worse or is even forecast to deteriorate to the point where you can't really see whats coming up then either land immediately in a safe place or turn around and go back to where the weather was good.

Flogging around unqualified and uncurrent in a VFR helicopter when the weather is crap WILL end in disaster sooner or later.

Most, if not all of those minimums and rules found in various forms of legislation around the world are written as a direct result of the last poor guy to push his luck.

One of the harder decisions to learn as a pilot is the decision to land or turn back before it all goes pear shaped. Being in command of an aircraft either VFR or IFR is a big responsibility and with that goes the ability to make the hard decisions. If anything that is the skill that needs to be instilled in training?

Pressonitis....will kill you....one day.:=

QDMQDMQDM

29th Jul 2011, 16:38

From one of the earliest posts on this thread - it's been suggested local weather was worse than forecast and after 3 failed attempts to make progress (to a site less than 20 miles away) a low ground route and a break in the weather allowed progress to be made. The forecast is but a planning aid, if you encounter worse then rework the plan. If I diverted or picked a field due to unexpected nasty low clag, then I'd need a significant sustained improvement to warrant an attempt to continue VFR/VMC. So why do we try multiple attempts in the hope of finding a lucky gap?

This was me. I was in a Super Cub within ten miles of home and I know this local area intimately. The clag does often hang on the high ground between me and my destination. I went up for a couple of looks above the strip I had gone into and it wasn't quite nice enough to go on, but not absolutely dire. I then headed South around the low ground and it was actually fine with never less than five miles vis all around, but obviously to the West and North it was a lot worse, which was not an unexpected finding. Knowing the area, if anyone had suggested to me on that day at that time that I should continue towards Bude I would have laughed at them. At all times I had a variety of options (not least Dunkeswell clear behind with a 1500 ft cloud base) and intimate local knowledge with up to the second on the ground weather reports texted from pilots in three different locations on my route.

Every situation is unique, but what is important is to have a plan with options and to use the options at the right time, not just press on into deteriorating conditions with no 'out'. That's judgement.

Helinut

29th Jul 2011, 19:17

This sort of accident is certainly not the preserve of low hours pilots. As you gain a bit of experience, you distinguish (in your head) yourself from those who have less experience. Inexperienced pilots are less well prepared but it is of course a mistake to think that these things do not happen to those with more time.

Over the years, I can recall several accidents involving CPLs/ATPLs who I had worked with and even checked-out and considered to be "good pilots". They seem to have made what would at first glance be inexplicably poor decisions. The AAIB are very good at what they do, but can only go so far at digging into the motivations of the pilots. But these motivations are, or can be very important. A number of the accidents I am thinking of the pilot had a particular reason to want to complete the flight. In some cases it was because the pax was a "very important" client and the pilot may have felt he needed to ensure the flight was completed as planned. In other cases, there was a rather personal reason for the pilot getting to his destination.

It seems to me that almost any pilot will make really poor decisions, given the right pressures. Not so much a bad pilot as a pilot making poor decisions on a particular occasion. We all need to guard against those pressures, whoever we are.

I have had the (generally) pleasure of doing a fair bit of safety pilot flying over the years. Often this is for the PPL non-IR owners of IFR twin helicopters: they or the operator to whom the aircraft are leased have the good sense to spend a bit of money on a second pair of hands and a bit of a brain. On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.

FIs and FEs cannot be blamed for doing what the syllabus includes and no more. It is possible to get a little continuation training done with some private pilots, but you will never get the opportunity to work with the pilots who need it most, when the aviation authorities do not even recommend it.

LH2 had a go at me for suggesting that EASA made any changes to solve this problem more difficult. I was just pointing out that we are an extremely low priority on their hit list. Much of their regulation for helicopters is simply a cut and paste job from the fixed wing world. Even though these IIMC accidents are a major risk for the light helicopter world, it won't figure on their radar. Since, in Europe, they make the rules I think my point was valid.

AnFI

29th Jul 2011, 21:09

Helinut said:
On a number of occasions, I have seen these pilots continuing on in deteriorating conditions. I can see things getting worse, but it would appear that the handling pilot cannot, or does nothing if he does see it. By talking to him/her you can then get him to start to see the clues and to take control of the helicopter. I think it needs more than to tell students/new pilots not to fly in poor conditions: I think that you need to show them what it looks like and what to do about it. I am not sure that the simple simulators do this very well - the real thing is different.

Quite right - some just cannot see it until shown - simulators don't do it...

....it's called VRF

ShyTorque

29th Jul 2011, 22:46

AnFI

Poor use of colour!

I find your strange habitual use of wording in pink hard on the eyes, to the point of being annoying and at times confusing.

Quotations from previous posts would be better made using the quote function.

Thanks.

B47

29th Jul 2011, 23:08

I think the definition of experience is very simple: those who have have made mistakes, been scared, and have the balanced attitude to reflect on them, and decided not to repeat the mistake. More experiece means a greater 'bank of scares'. Some pilots have had the scare but are too arrogant to heed it, i.e. nothing learned.

A 10,000 hr pilot has had scares and made mistakes that a 2,000 hr pilot has not yet experienced. The same goes for me at 800 hrs when I think of the mistakes I made at 300 hrs.

To distill the problem: we could all have made a list of the pilots we knew that were most likely to perish. That generally came true. They were the ones that after the warning, didn't learn and repeated the mistake.

Experience is having made mistakes once and being frightened by them - it's not, as generally thought, just greater precision in your flying technique. You simply can't legislate for those that don't learn the lesson from the first warning.

But, the PPL syllabus is severly wanting as it doesn't address in any way that flying is about decision making, not the physical skill of controlling the machine. When to fly or not is the most basic of these. Plenty of met theory but nothing about how to read a weather chart and assess likely conditions for the return flight! The 5hrs wasted on instrument flying plus dozens of hours practising engine failures is far better spent skirting bad weather with an experinced instructor in order to at least attempt to get across the fact that poor decisions will kill you, and more importantly your passengers, ten times more frequently than any other cause. I realise that the flaw in this is that many instructors don't have enough hours to have had sufficient experience 'scares' either. This is not the snobbery of more hours means you're better than those with less - simply that you've made more mistakes, hopefully small ones, and survived them.

If the PPL syllabus is to attempt to equip the PPL with the skill to exit IMC then the experience of my night rating taught me that 15 hrs is pretty much the minimum, plus the constant need for at least 90 days currency.

Do the legislators really care? I think not, especially now they are in Brussells not Gatwick. A couple of dozen deaths doesn't really figure in the aviation bigger picture. The rotary community is alone in this - it has to find a way of influencing the mindset of the 'it'll never happen to me' types. If it doesn't, there will be constant rate of deaths that will not change.

There is only one opportunity to do this and that is before handing someone a shiny new license. After that, whoopee, they are a helicopter pilot! and invincible. I always thought the non-syllabus rule of thumb for FIs and FE's was 'would I let my family fly with this person?' I've seen many signed off that clearly didn't pass this test. The FE has the student for an hour and can't possibly assess this other than in respect of their physical skill. The key is FI's being ruthless about those with the wrong attitude. They know - they really do.

hihover

30th Jul 2011, 13:44

I understand why some are advocating that the PPL syllabus is changed to include what they feel is more relevant. If you work in that field then I'm sure you have a good grasp on what you'd like to do, so include more stuff. The 45 hour course is the minimum time, it's not a target.

I cannot subscribe to taking pilots out into bad weather to scare the crap out of them to demonstrate superior decision making. Most instructors nowadays don't have the experience in any case, so including bad weather flying in any syllabus is asking for disaster, all that would be achieved is launching into weather on a flight you plan to abort.....I don't see a lesson there, other than a bad one.

This thread started after an accident with a PPL, for that reason, it seems to point towards a PPL issue. It is not a PPL issue. Can we please stop trying to cure a "PPL issue" by changing the PPL syllabus.

There have been several accidents in helicopters in the past few months which happened in bad weather, as far as I am aware, this is the only one with a PPL at the controls.

This is a widespread problem which has nothing to do with unstabilised, single-engine helicopters, it is about not allowing it to happen in the first place. Why not introduce a "Stop-and-think" point. For example, when you get to within 500 feet of the cloudbase....stop and think....what are my options, why am I pushing on?? Or perhaps at 5km or 3 km visibility, stop and think.....

This is probably what most of us do subconsciously.

Tam

hands_on123

30th Jul 2011, 14:57

Most instructors nowadays don't have the experience in any case

Maybe in the USA, but most instructors here in the UK will have experience of bad weather, if they don't then they won't earn any money!

EN48

30th Jul 2011, 15:00

Why not introduce a "Stop-and-think" point. For example, when you get to within 500 feet of the cloudbase....stop and think....what are my options, why am I pushing on?? Or perhaps at 5km or 3 km visibility, stop and think.....

Many useful ideas here, but perhaps ignoring human nature. Perhaps a bit cynical, but for some, the "anti-authority, invulnerability and macho" attitudes often mentioned in ADM training will likely prevail despite the training. One of my early plank flight instructors told me, "this thing will kill you if you let it." He wasnt trying to scare me but to get me to "stop and think." Worked in this case, but IMHO there are some who will not stop and think no matter what.

Here is a useful review of ADM: http://www.faa.gov/library/manuals/aviation/pilot_handbook/media/phak%20-%20chapter%2017.pdf

toptobottom

31st Jul 2011, 18:26

EN48 has hit it on the head for me. Changing a syllabus, introducing post licence training/checks, IIMC avoidance training, etc. won't have a material impact on the statistics. IMHO, most of these accidents have much more to do with the pilot's attitude and personality. Even having been previously scared in seriously dangerous situations, I know pilots who habitually gamble with their (and their pax's)lives in similar avoidable situations. Their arrogance and ego take over and the "I'll be alright - been here before" attitude overules all training and common sense. It's just another challenge and each successful outcome pumps up the arrogance even more, fuelling over-confidence and the feeling of invincibility.

It would be interesting to compare personality profiles of those pilots who thought they were better than all the others who also shared that arrogance and paid the price. I don't think many would be surprised by the common theme.

RIP. My condolences to the pilot's friends and family.

nigelh

31st Jul 2011, 21:30

TC mentioned about his son getting his licence but not having any experience of motorways , icy roads etc etc I was lucky , as my son has been , to have had a father who took me round race tracks etc so a skid was controllable and not the start of a crash . I know i will be shot down ...but flying in poor viz just has to be taught to be done safely . I genuinely believe it can be done safely if done in the correct way but of course it is not something that is taught . You can drive a car safely in fog if you slow right down . You can fly a helicopter safely in poor wx if you slow down , even down to 20 knots if you have to . Sling load is difficult and v dangerous performed by a pilot without the correct training ....i see no difference with this . There are many many pilots who spend most of the year flying vfr in crap wx , and manage to do it safely .
Before someone bites my head of i am saying you should NOT fly in very poor viz without the proper training ...

toptobottom

1st Aug 2011, 02:29

Nigel

You're a brave man to risk incurring the wrath of the PPRuNe community with a post like that :D

I think there's a huge difference between learning to cope with 'crap wx' (an occupational hazard in most of northern Europe) and learning how to avoid avoidable situations where the canopy suddenly goes white. I've heard stories of experienced PPLs flying perfectly well for 10 minutes on foggles, then inexplicably initiating a 90 degreee roll, totally oblivious to the instrument readings they're staring at. JohnR81's approach is spot on; if it gets sticky, don't be a hero. Get it down and be thankful your maturity kept you out of the AAIB statistics.

AnFI

2nd Aug 2011, 06:25

TopToBottom:

I think there's a huge difference between learning to cope with 'crap wx' (an occupational hazard in most of northern Europe) and learning how to avoid avoidable situations where the canopy suddenly goes white.

Please could you explain or expand ?
This issue needs to be pinned down...

Johe02

2nd Aug 2011, 09:35

The phrase "if I have to explain you wouldn't understand" springs to mind. .:}

chopjock

2nd Aug 2011, 10:26

I am wondering how many auto pilots are available for single engine helicopters in the UK, so that when this happens again you simply flick a switch, turn into wind, reduce speed and slowly descend. :}

hihover

2nd Aug 2011, 12:04

Chopjock,

You're not thinking this through. Does that auto-pilot also light-up a fag for you in the slow descent?

Tam

hands_on123

2nd Aug 2011, 12:17

‪HeliSAS for Robinson R44 [1/2]‬&rlm; - YouTube

EN48

2nd Aug 2011, 12:44

Does that auto-pilot also light-up a fag for you in the slow descent?

Recently instaledl a HeliSAS system in my B407. It wont light up for you but might well save your butt in an IIMC encounter. Will fly a nav course and hold altitude, and will fly a coupled approach to minimums with the hardest thing for the pilot to do being keeping hands off the cyclic. Originally intended for R44 but never certified for R44 and probably not practical for R44 even though much lower in cost than typical SPIFR helicopter autopilots.

However, a band aid fix for the real problem!

hihover

2nd Aug 2011, 17:03

The Helisas looks like a very useful piece of kit, but it is not a solution for the problem being discussed in this thread. The problem we are addressing is keeping pilots out of weather that is beyond their ability level.

Although Chopjock's switch would be a nice to have item, I think it is only available from Harry Potter Helicopters at the moment.

Tam

AnFI

2nd Aug 2011, 17:46

a - I wasn't asking you
b - that's not a helpful answer
c - if you are not helping you are making it worse
d - I am not asking because I don't understand - I am asking because I want to understand TTB's thinking more...

e - would you please point out to me what you think the huge difference is

AnFI

2nd Aug 2011, 21:21

"anti-authority, invulnerability and macho"

No !

try:

"conciencious, fastidious, niave, well intentioned and untrained"

Wake up please ... how many more need to die before someone understands what the true cause is?

I find this constant insult to the dead grossly distasteful, unfounded and unfair.

A guy who learnt in blue sky - had his flight test in clear weather, doesn't understand parallax and who has never seen a cloud up-close from a moving helicopter may well not know how to keep himself out of the cloud... it does not mean he 'deserves' to die !! He was just let down by a system which couldn't make up its mind how to advise a VMC pilot how to maintain Visual References ... treats IMC as something can 'just happen' and gives them 30minutes (or maybe even 5hrs) in some 'foggles' (which don't even limit the peripheral vision) of pseudo IMC ...and expects them to save their live this way.
Disgusting.

Pilots must be shown how to maintain Vis Ref and perhaps even be tested on it... simply because it does not come naturally to some pilots.

(.... who made the Darwin comment? Tasteless! families and children and lovers read this.... Heartless, thoughtless, B'tard - Apologise!)

time for a beer....

Camp Freddie

2nd Aug 2011, 21:58

AnFi,

Having read all this, as far as I can see your theory is based on your own subjective assessment that 20-30% of people can't process visual references normally and therefore need showing techniques that they should use to guard these references whereas the rest of us learn through experience how to do this (helped or hindered by the 5 hours basic IF)

My problem with this is the only source for this info is you and who knows if you are right or not, you sound like a doctor defining a new illness with no peer reviewed evidence to back it up.

I just don't buy the idea that 20-30% of pilots out there have got their brains wired differently, I think we just have many people of different abilities and that the current IF training is not vigorous or relevant enough and suggests to the student that a 180 turn is all you need, and that cloud avoidance is undertaught as a skill. That's it really.

AnFI

3rd Aug 2011, 07:32

Camp Freddie:
Having read all this, as far as I can see your theory is based on your own subjective assessment that 20-30% of people can't process visual references normally and therefore need showing techniques that they should use to guard these references whereas the rest of us learn through experience how to do this (helped or hindered by the 5 hours basic IF)Yes that is approximately correct. (although 'learn through experience' must include (for example) experience on a bicycle in the woods when you were a kid etc hence most people already have the ability to process the cues as required...)

Camp Freddie:
My problem with this is the only source for this info is you and who knows if you are right or not, you sound like a doctor defining a new illness with no peer reviewed evidence to back it up.YES!!! Precisely... Who knows if I am right or not? I am suggesting that someone with sufficient ability/comprehension/analytical skills to investigate should do so.

Yes my observation is indeed merely a hypothesis - (based on my experience(s) and analytical skills) - requiring investigation ....... and then peer review.

Camp Freddie:
I just don't buy the idea that 20-30% of pilots out there have got their brains wired differently,Yup - I was pretty surprised too !!

Camp Freddie:
I think we just have many people of different abilities and that the current IF training is not vigorous or relevant enough and suggests to the student that a 180 turn is all you need, and that cloud avoidance is undertaught as a skill.IF is a terrific skill - teaches higher level control techniques - makes better pilots - (has saved some people from their Inevitable IMC encounter... but don't let that confuse you) and, as you say, that training is not vigorous or relevant....

.... correct:
"IF training is not ... relevant" is the point there - it does not reduce the number of IIMCs (probably increases it .. ?)

....but it is of course not addressing the issue of VRF - How to avoid IIMC - call it 'cloud avoidance' if you like ... but really there is more to it than that - including techniques to interpret what you see.

(like the first time a pilot sees a ship floating above the horizon in a grey sky when he crosses the channel in 'ONLY' 15km visibility. etc etc etc)

:ok:
CF : this is good news... I am suggesting perhaps you investigate / will be surprised / are in a position to make a serious contribution to saving the misery caused.:D

rotorspeed

3rd Aug 2011, 12:53

AnFI

I'm not sure whether you're living proof that bull**** baffles brains, just having a laugh or really have got a very wierd take on all this.

Maintaining visual reference is a pretty simple concept that doesn't need some pyscho-babble analysis, guaranteed to confuse those you're supposedly trying to help. Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.

Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying. Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference.

RVDT

3rd Aug 2011, 12:56

Does the first "I" in IIMC mean idiot?

5 hours of IMC training is a waste of time.

Correct.

ROT - fly halfway between the cloudbase and the ground. Simple. Think about it.

AnFI

3rd Aug 2011, 15:05

Rot : yup ... half way between the cloud and the ground at a speed that lets you stop before the cloud meets the ground

Some people cant see that.

You say they shouldn't be flying... well some of them are not because they've already killed themselves so that's ok with everyone is it?:ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh::ugh:

rotorspeed

3rd Aug 2011, 15:27

AnFI

Er, and how can they kill themselves if they never go solo/get a licence to fly in the first place, because instructors realise they shouldn't be flying? :ugh:

[email protected]

3rd Aug 2011, 15:52

At risk of igniting a mil v civ flaming, I will suggest that some of those who fly PPL are not in fact God's gift to aviation and there is an element of Darwinism about the results.

In order to get a PPLH you have to get a medical, do some studying and achieve a relatively low standard of aircraft handling and captaincy - this can take you as many hours as you can afford but the licence at the end of it is no guarantee that you are competent to deal with every weather situation you might encounter when flying out in the real world by yourself.

In most cases experience is gained without another pilot next to you and so the quality of that experience is a very variable feast - are you the type of person to recognise that you have made a mistake in the first place and then learn from those mistakes?

Just as teenage boys are most likely to crash cars after passing their driving test because they want to prove themselves capable and tend to push the envelope, so some PPLs will bite off more than they can chew when making decisions about weather and whether or not they should fly in it.

Probably the worst PPLs are likely to be those with a few hundred hours - enough to convince themselves they are competent and capable but not enough to actually be so - this used to be identified in the military as the 1000 hour pilot, statistically the most likely ones to have an accident/incident.

Whilst IIMC can catch anyone out, it is far more likely to be fatal when that person is relatively inexperienced, has not undergone recent training, has a slightly inflated opinion of their own ability and is under perceived pressure (whether self-induced or otherwise) to go flying in less than ideal conditions.

With a modest amount of ability and a big wallet you can transport yourself into the magical world of aviation but if you don't treat it with the respect it deserves, you can't complain when it comes back and bites you hard.

hihover

3rd Aug 2011, 17:12

Crab, hello matey.

Whilst I don't disagree with any of your comments, we need to stop pointing the problem at PPLs. Sure, they are at significant risk due to their inexperience and general lack of any supervisor, but I can't emphasise enough that this is not a PPL issue.

I am not trying to protect PPLs, I am trying stop us all looking in the wrong direction because this is industry wide and military wide, and it is a worldwide issue as well.

VFR is VFR.

Tam

toptobottom

3rd Aug 2011, 17:21

Crab - that's a bit unfair, but I agree with the rest of what you say. The mil vs. civvy argument is old and a bit off-piste, so I don't want to resurrect it again here. There are lots of PPLHs with 000's of hours, the vast majority of whom are perfectly safe, conscientious and competent pilots (there also a lot of morons that should be grounded, but I digress). This thread is about VFR pilots getting into IMC.

Your "slightly inflated opinion of their own ability" comment is absolutely key. I'm sure that this has far more to do with why the main factor in 39% of fatal helicopter accidents is 'continued adverse weather' and in 34%, 'dis-orientation' (stats from 1980 - 2009), than any other.

At the risk of repeating myself (http://www.pprune.org/6610057-post86.html), most PPLH's I know are type A entrepreneurs and successful in their own business. Chris Watts was one. Steve Hislop was another. Mark Weir was another (although we're still waiting for the AAIB verdict on that one). Typically, these individuals are used to being in control, not being accountable to anyone but themselves (unlike mil drivers), resent authority and see all obstacles as just another challenge to be overcome. Turning back (in business as well as flight) isn't high on their list of options. I believe this 'It'll be fine' attitude is the major issue. Top that up with a big dollup of inexperience and some very basic instrument training and the results are all too familiar.

Not getting into IMC in the first instance is the only solution. If all VFR pilots could recognise and accept when it was time to admit defeat - and then do something about it before it is too late - instead of pressing on and getting into the 'white canopy' situation, we wouldn't be reading about these accidents every other month (AnFI - this was the point I was trying to make in my earlier post).

TTB

[email protected]

3rd Aug 2011, 17:36

Tam, you are right that it is a more widespread problem than just PPLs but those are the ones we keep reading about on this forum.

An excess of ambition and aspiration over ability can get to any of us but there is more control (I believe) over CPLs, ATPLs and the mil which seems to stop it happening as often - each step up the ladder requires more ability and the demonstration of better decision-making and captaincy.

The PPLs are by far the most vulnerable and, as toptobottom says, more likely to be successful in another field which can add to their tendency to overconfidence and a reluctance to accept failure as an option.

There are industry-wide pressures to get the job done because helicopters are expensive and those who pay for them expect to get value for money but the PPL pressures are more likely to be self-induced.

Sadly, I don't have an answer to the problem so regarding it as a Darwinian selection process seems fair.

delta3

3rd Aug 2011, 18:09

Anfi:

"yup ... half way between the cloud and the ground at a speed that lets you stop before the cloud meets the ground
Some people cant see that."

I fully agreed with this seemingly "simples" statement, especially about the speed part.

I do not agree that it is "easy to see it", certainly if some form of terrain is involved.

And I think it involves 109E (for example) as well as R44's

m2c
d3

homonculus

3rd Aug 2011, 19:27

If you want to prevent IIMC in PPLs (and I am not sure they are the only ones at risk - Matthew Harding) then the best thing the pilot fraternity can do (ie those of us not in charge of the regulations) is to engage them.

The risk with the last few postings, whatever their validity, is that it will get the backs up the very people deemed to be vulnerable. Time and again I meet low hour PPLs who would love advice and wisdom but are terrified of being ridiculed by their seniors.

As a pretty poor amateur CPL I have modified my flying and recognised my limitations far more from a word of encouragement and support from my seniors than from people shouting how dangerous /studid / ideotic I am. The latter may have been right, but my natural instinct was always to go on the offensive and deny.

toptobottom

3rd Aug 2011, 19:53

homonculus

If good advice on how to prevent your own death gets your back up, then you should be in neither a helicopter nor indeed any vehicle. This is exactly the attitude I'm talking about; individuals who truly believe they know better, despite knowing they have received only basic training and have no/little experience of IMC situations. Almost all 'seniors' in the industry are prepared to give advice slowly and calmly, without being intimidating or demeaning and almost all low time PPLs will be genuinely receptive - on the ground. It's getting them to lose that arrogance and realise they're only moments from death when they're alone in the air :ok:

Thomas coupling

4th Aug 2011, 13:31

Turning back (in business as well as flight) isn't high on their list of options. I believe this 'It'll be fine' attitude is the major issue. Top that up with a big dollup of inexperience and some very basic instrument training
Absolutely bang on - not bad for an amateur :ok:

toptobottom

4th Aug 2011, 13:42

an amateur with an IR :ok:

nigelh

4th Aug 2011, 16:30

As far as our industry goes I think it is one where experienced people are almost always very happy to offer help and advice . I have had a few over the years take me under their wing ( for all the good it did !!) . Most of the best and most experienced pilots I know will talk the hind leg off a donkey imparting their wisdom IF they think you are taking it in , the problem is that most of the great guidance I have had has been when I have been in a professional environment . A lot of ppl,s I think just get cut loose with nobody ( like a chief pilot ) to have to hand for advice .
I do have some sympathy for some peoples views that when you have an aircraft that can hovver that means there is no need to fly into a cloud .. You can go right up to it , touch it , and land or turn back . Personally I think trying to keep 500ft causes problems ... I would rather be 300 ft with good viz , going slow , rather than 500ft half in it ... Regardless of what the book says !!

212man

4th Aug 2011, 17:10

And I think it involves 109E (for example)

Having seen the wreckage, I would venture to suggest that there was no semblance of trying to stay VMC.

EN48

4th Aug 2011, 18:38

A lot of ppl,s I think just get cut loose with nobody ( like a chief pilot ) to have to hand for advice .

Yes, but... there is a wealth of info/knowledge/advice/training out there for any pilot (PPL/CPL/ATPL) to take advantage of, much of it at no charge. It does, however, require at least a small amount of initiative on the part of the pilot to use these resources. Those who understand that they are "moments from death" when flying a helicopter (as a previous poster expressed it) ought to be motivated to make the effort. Some will and some will not no matter what the penalty. Back to the bell curve of human nature.

Sliding Doors

4th Aug 2011, 21:26

I think trying to keep 500ft causes problems ... I would rather be 300 ft with good viz , going slow , rather than 500ft half in it ... Regardless of what the book says !!

Or alternatively a pilot could have altered his/her plan and landed earlier. Decided not to get progressively lower and slower before it's too late.

Going close enough to touch the clouds is what's killing people :{ (be they ppl,cpl,atpl, civvy or mil - you get all sorts (good, bad, indifferent, reckless etc etc in all 'camps')

AnFI

5th Aug 2011, 11:53

Crab:
Sadly, I don't have an answer to the problem so regarding it as a Darwinian selection process seems fair.

Yes - you do not have the answer - so; sorry no it's not really a Darwin thing.

No more than if someone had never been shown instictive RRPM preservation when the engine fails to deliver full power. Or not shown full throttle operation say at altitude...
... skill set required for maintaining Visual References is the same (just because 80% of people don't even realise they are using a 'skill set' does not make it 'ok' for people to die ... they have families/lovers etc...

TTB:
Not getting into IMC in the first instance is the only solution. YES!

If all VFR pilots could recognise and accept when it was time to admit defeat - and then do something about it before it is too late - instead of pressing on and getting into the 'white canopy' situation, we wouldn't be reading about these accidents every other month (AnFI - this was the point I was trying to make in my earlier post). Not really right... They must be able to Maintain Visual References - regardless of the weather ... there must not be a set of conditions where there is any elevated risk - risk translates to a proportion of accidents (unacceptable) I haven't really explained that very well but please excuse me I don't have the time just now... gotta go:eek:

rotorspeed

5th Aug 2011, 21:32

AnFI

And just to help those vulnerable pilots, could you just set out exactly what the "skill set" is in your mind to maintain Visual References?

Sliding Doors

What sort of cloud base do you think is involved in most of these fatal IIMC accidents at the point of LOC? 400ft? 300ft? Lower, I suspect. Have you ever experienced circumstances when a flight can be completed by flying lower and slower, legally and perfectly safely, when the cloud base is less than 500ft?

ShyTorque

5th Aug 2011, 23:49

I wonder if the taught mindset of the 180 degree turn, as taught under the hood, is the actual danger. I'm thinking of the disorientation / loss of spatial awareness factors here.

A few folk will recall an accident to a police aircraft in UK, at night, about eleven years ago. The pilot got caught out by very low (unforecast) cloud at night during departure from base. In an attempt to turn back to the helipad the aircraft hit nearby trees. The pilot was seriously injured and an observer lost his life.

I took off about an hour before, in the dark, from an unlit helipad in similar circumstances and hit the same unforecast low cloud at about two hundred feet agl. Never having been through the PPL course, my own escape plan was to descend only in a straight line to regain visual contact before carrying out a very low level but gentle circuit back to the helipad. We learned of the accident to the other police helicopter in the neighbouring force a few hours later.

chopjock

6th Aug 2011, 09:54

Have you ever experienced circumstances when a flight can be completed by flying lower and slower, legally and perfectly safely, when the cloud base is less than 500ft? I can answer this one..... Yes, plenty of times.:ok:

toptobottom

6th Aug 2011, 10:41

AnFI: I haven't really explained that very well

Well, when you've got more time, please explain some more (in plain English) cos I'm not sure I understand your point :confused:

Sliding Doors

6th Aug 2011, 10:42

Rotorspeed,
Yes, thanks. I feel that simply suggesting lower and slower is not the solution to the problem. There are times when that course of action may be wise (and legal seeing as you raised that point) and others when it's not....

and it seems you at times agree :cool:

Ref the Gazelle accident, the real issue here is why did the pilot keep (pretty accurately) to a presumably straight line route that he had planned, rather than simply divert a few miles west, which would have enabled him to keep to much lower ground to the west of Gloucester where the cloud base was quite adequate at 1000ft. He was obviously aware of the lowering cloud base and rising ground, causing him to descend to an unsafe and probably illegal height.

He was clearly being too rigid in his navigation. Mention is made of him having a hand written note of his route, so he had flight planned to an extent. But was it because he was being too inflexible? Are pilots taught enough in training to be prepared to improvise in flight and modify their routing when weather requires?

Preflight planning will for me dictate limits beyond which I won't proceed. I'm paid to deliver people safely, not at any cost.

With regard to your cloudbase enquiry - at a height whereby:
a)the aircraft is under control in IMC/IIMC when it hits something solid, or
b)the loss of control IMC/IIMC still exists when the aircraft hits something solid, or
c)the return to vmc does not allow sufficient time for control to be regained before hitting something solid.

Not getting in to the situation is the wisest solution to this problem. How to achieve that solution in terms of training is the Golden Question

Torquetalk

6th Aug 2011, 11:28

I don't have the time just now... gotta gohttp://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/eek.gif

Jesus fella! you okay? Hope you didn't have gangsters at your door.

A small quibble: folk often talk about instinct when they mean learned responses. Some reactions might be instinctive; like pulling back on the cyclic when going IIMC. But most inputs in a helicopter are about good or bad learning (and their respective teaching counterparts).

RRPM management is taught and learnt; or poorly taught and poorly learnt; or not taught, and not learnt. Unless, that is, you are a born RRPM manager.

AnFI

7th Aug 2011, 16:28

Not showing people how to fly visually is like not showing people what dynamic roll over is and just telling them to stay away from sloping ground

I am becoming more surprised that the ability /understanding of how to guard visual cues is not that widespread – maybe worse than 80% !

Fundamentals of Visual Reference Flying – VRF - (1st Draft)

1st principle:
Guard your Visual References – never lose your VR – (you are in a machine who’s position and velocity can be controlled quickly and very accurately – for example you never have to take your machine 1 foot further than you can guarantee. If you can see to guarantee 20feet ahead then planning on flying 10 feet further should not be dangerous – but obviously you can’t be flying at 60knots because that would then commit you to occupying a position further than you can guarantee.)

A. know what visual references you are using – normally this is easy – you have Billions of visual cues – if that falls to a million visual cues then you probably wouldn’t give that much thought – even a thousand Visual Cues can look pretty good … 100 not too bad … 10 getting pretty serious … how many more can you afford to loose? At 3 then loss of one would be very serious (unacceptable), know what your reliable cues are and guard them.
B. The End of The World
In VRF the Limit of what you can see (and interpret) is the ‘End Of your World’… do not fly beyond the End of your World! The furthest Visual Reference in the direction of travel is the Critical Reference (CR) – it is the most important VR…
B.i The End of the World should always advance as you advance – if the EoW ceases to advance (or worse is ‘consumed’) then this must a) be detected immediately b) be responded to immediately – it cannot be allowed to persist for ‘any’ time at all…
B.ii The line from your eye to the CR is the demarkation between guaranteed VR and probability … (probability is unacceptable) the A/C must be actively controlled so that it is always able to stay in the ‘Guaranteed Sector’. (so : if you are too energetic (speed/height) you almost certainly are committed to a trajectory which forces you into the Probable Sector… (unacceptable)
B.iii Angle to the CR: at about 2degrees or less in the cruise the cyclic is often sufficient to stay in the Guaranteed Sector. 3 degrees is about the limit. ( and equates to 600ft at 2nm(4kvis) or 4nm (7kvis) at 1200ft) at Cruise speed at say 3kvis and 1200feet it is not plausible to guarantee staying in the Guaranteed Sector – you are ‘at DANGER’ because the speed loss will force your angle of descent to be shallower than required… You need to be at sufficiently ‘low energy’ to be able to stay only in the Guaranteed Sector…

So to simplify:
You must fly at a height and speed which enables you to stay in the Gauranteed Sector. With a speed which enables you to stop by (before) the End of the World.

You must be (totally) alert to the disappearance of the furthest cue (ideally not only on the direction of flight but in all possible directions).

Often people avoid clouds by ‘seeing’ them … this is obviously* not good enough. Clouds may not be visible (discernable/detectable) by day (as can be the case at night). So if you depend on seeing them to avoid them you will fail… sometimes (ie … not good enough)
… this applies not just to clouds but many types of obstacles, coal slag heaps at night, snow banks, white mountains in a field of white, trees at night from over-illuminated cockpits in badly lit landing sites … etc.

So there are some principles which need to be stood on their head.
One is you must assure the definite absence of cloud – this principle is often used at night – where an invisible object is revealing background – you cannot see the object but you can see where it certainly is not. (most people would do that instinctively – for others once this principle is shown/used it can become instinctive). This happens in daylight with clouds sometimes – where a cloud is above the ‘demarkation line’ but has no contrast with the poor visibility … the vis may be 8k but the (undetectable) cloud is at 1k… It becomes detectable by what it obscures rather than actually being visible (directly discernable).

Parralax – used often in mountain flying – is no more than using a normal visual cue although during ‘normal life’ is seldom relied upon – once the ‘victims’ attention has been drawn to this aspect of the visual field then the information from it becomes more relevant/obvious/natural.

Sliding doors:
I am sure you intend to fly your pax safely – obtaining the weather forecast is all very commendable – it enables you to cancel when you don’t like what it says. BUT holding a (worthless) piece of paper in your hand which claims the wx is good (enough) gets no prizes from St Peter when the wx turns out not to be what they said. IE a WX forecast (or sparse actuals) are not sufficiently certain to avoid IMC … they enable you to not go – but they don’t help when you meet circumstances requiring total guaranteed ablity to maintain your Visual References in light of the actual conditions encountered – I suspect that the casual way you refer to IMC and re-gaining visual cues infers that you are (or have been) an IRF pilot…

Sliding Doors - the example of the Gazelle pilot is a great one - weather (basically) ok but Visual Referance Flight methodology missing... result dead.

One clue (I often hear) to someone getting the wrong picture from outside is when people say the vis is getting worse – when infact they have climbed into a position where the forward view has reduced – the conditions were the same but their positioning of the aircraft has changed (they think it is something happening to them – rather than something they are causing) (some others: “the cloud has come down” – when in fact they have gone up! “That plane looks very low” – when infact it is at 2000ft and you are at 3000ft etc)

(TorqueTalk: pedantic (true) point about instinct – sure, nature/nurture etc blah blah.. but if you are taught then know then understand then implement subconsciously … then I think it’s fair to call it ‘instictive’ . But more importantly I think your point about pressing on into a place where the screen goes white points to a belief that there are a set of conditions where suddenly there is risk when previously there was not – only a ‘no risk’ approach is good enough and that should not depend on the conditions actually encountered…. )

IMHO early exposure to IRF diminishes the importance a pilot attaches to staying VMC and undermines VRF. It also can make him think that “life is like a box of chocolates” and becoming IMC is just something that can just happen to you if you fly in poor conditions… no you must keep VR in a VMC machine full stop. You need to want to AND you need to know HOW to (VRF) - both!

Being assaulted by a drunken Russian just now (who’s telling me (in Russian) that he killed 5 in Afganistan … :eek: etc) no time for finishing/editing … please make allowance for that…

toptobottom

7th Aug 2011, 22:21

AnFI
I've read this twice, carefully. Sorry - I really want to understand and I've made allowances for drunken Russian murderers interupting you, but sadly, I still don't have a clue what you're talking about. You're either exceedingly clever, or not. I can't make up my mind.

[email protected]

8th Aug 2011, 12:30

or not............

There is nothing more in there than slow down or go down to avoid bad weather.

Just like driving a car, if the visibility reduces then so should your speed.

All the rest about retaining VR (as if it is some magic phenomenon) is just confusing and pointless.

breakscrew

8th Aug 2011, 12:43

Having taught both mil and civvy students, the major difference I found is that mil pilots will slow down and go down, whereas the civvy pilots are terrified that the CAA will prosecute them for breaking the 500' Rule 5. As a result, they try to stay as high as possible, suckering them into low scud.

dibdab

8th Aug 2011, 14:15

SO there is no post qualification training or checking except in the Mil....? really? don't we all do LPC's? ever tried to SFH without a check ride!? some of us pay for our flying and take it seriously and safely, others have the taxpayers pay for their flying and appear to be out of touch with GA. let's share the sky amicably and not resort to ill informed slagging off? afterall in 2012 the Mil boys and girls will be shutting down whole areas of the UK for the Olympics as their own playground to practice in and patrol in all weathers!

rotorspeed

8th Aug 2011, 14:42

toptobottom

You're not alone! You may have missed my Post 96:

AnFI

I'm not sure whether you're living proof that bull**** baffles brains, just having a laugh or really have got a very wierd take on all this.

Maintaining visual reference is a pretty simple concept that doesn't need some pyscho-babble analysis, guaranteed to confuse those you're supposedly trying to help. Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.

Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying. Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference.

And looks like Crab agrees with me, too.

AnFI: Out of interest, what's your background? Commercial pilot? Instructor? Or armchair theoretician?

hands_on123

8th Aug 2011, 16:52

I haven't a clue what AnFi is on about either. I don't think I'm alone.

delta3

8th Aug 2011, 17:17

Anfi: to apply your list one has to be in an armchair.

Why not keep it simpless as you proclaim yourself.

As been said before, stay in the middle of the clouds and the ground (vertical references), with other words take some margin staying away from both...

And as been said in previous threads: horizontally apply the French rule of 30 sec visibility, otherwise slow down.
For example 800m = 51 knots

d3

[email protected]

8th Aug 2011, 17:33

dibdab - don't get the hump - I know there are plenty of GA pilots with a professional outlook and approach to flying - the ones we are talking about (and who end up having their accidents dissected on pprune) seem to be different.

Out of interest have any of your LPCs or check rides for SFH included dealing with bad weather or were they all about general handling and emergencies? And by definition they are check rides rather than post-graduate training are they not?

AnFI

8th Aug 2011, 19:48

D3: yup it is 'simples' - for those who do get it...

yes the French rule is quite good - 60kts = 100ft/sec (so 30kts = 50fps) - its good to look at distance in terms of time..

The half way between cloud and ground it 'quite good' with 2 qualifiers...
1 Determining where the cloud is is not always clear to all pilots - especially when the clouds have no contrast to the poor vis
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indestinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)

rotorspeed - Can you see the ground clearly? And if not, do something about it so you can, such as turn or descend.You are wrong. TOO LATE !- You don't want to be getting as far as the "if not" part.
Your advice is dangerous - and people die that way...

Frankly if you can't grasp that you shouldn't be flying. They are flying ... what do you think we should do about that ? Just let Darwin sort out these people who deserve to die? (fine carry on without me then!) People deserve to live.

Or driving on the roads in wet, misty or foggy conditions that reduce visibility and present similar challenges in terms of maintaining adequate visual reference. Yes - exactly - but with a third dimension into which people climb and die ...

And looks like Crab agrees with me, too.a) You agree with someone who does not know how to solve the problem..Sadly, I don't have an answer to the problem so regarding it as a Darwinian selection process seems fair. You agree with that?.... great, your choice, your life....
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about :yuk:... etc.

As for the background bit - I am just a guy who is trying to help - with enough experience to know - but I really don't want to get personal about it ... if I can help I will but I'm not here to talk about my size in the shower ... I certainly don't have the confidence Crab has ... but I do have (much) more experience in this field.... Its not about who's saying it its about whether the ideas 'stack up' - the general view here is that my ideas do not ... so fine ... carry on without me - my conscience is clear that I have tried.....

rotorspeed

8th Aug 2011, 20:18

AnFI

Ok well you responded to all the points I didn't ask you to. Some odd answers, again though, to which I comment: (1) Poor vis generally develops progressively, you rarely just hit a white out. (2) When I said people shouldn't be flying, I meant they should not be given a licence to fly. (3) I don't think you'll find many people climb into IMC, they tend to stumble into it more or less ahead of them. Apart from which, the driving principle is the same - maintain visual reference with the ground/road/kerb. And in the air you'll usually achieve that by going down, not up. (4) And I've just agreed with Crab with his answer in his most recent post, 128, not the one you strangely quote from his much earlier post 103.

But you've still not really answered the one the question I did ask you, about your background? We are interested to know, so could we now have an answer to that please? Very general of course. And tell us a bit more about your own practical experience. About how many hours (very approx) might you have flown in poor VMC - when for example the cloud base has been less than say 700ft and vis less than, well, 3000m?

500e

8th Aug 2011, 22:25

"1 Determining where the cloud is is not always clear to all pilots - especially when the clouds have no contrast to the poor vis
2 Visual references is not only about clouds - and indistinct sea may be equally inadequate (or snow, sand, inadequate surface illumination at night etc..)"
I understand where you coming from but think you have not put it over well, as others here say it is not just low hour PPL or commercial that get it wrong, it is across the board, I would like to fly with an IR pilot to see how quick I would loose orientation.
Was there 2 x 206 from same Co that crashed 2 one going to rescue 1 one in Alaska a few years ago cause no\ poor horizon I think.
Seem to remember GP had a bad moment in the gulf with co-pilot flying ? sorry if my memory is wrong GP.

[email protected]

9th Aug 2011, 04:58

You agree with that?.... great, your choice, your life....
b) Crab is an IMC pilot ... (of a stabilised, autopiloted A/C)
c) has very limited experience (with negative success) of civil instruction.
d) Has military self confidence in his military background... believes that civilians cannot possibly know what they are talking about ... etc.

AnFI - just to clarify;

a. I have many hours in IMC in an unstabilised single (Gazelle AH1 - single pilot) as well as many more in stabilised autopiloted aircraft doing full procedural IF.

b. I do have limited civil instruction but 3000 hours of my 8000 total (in 29 years of flying) is instructional time in every role from basic student, through instructing instructors, to teaching and examining operational SAR techniques which, funnily enough, involve very poor weather flying day and night over land and sea and including mountains.

c. I do have confidence in my training and abilities because they are tested on a daily basis. I do not think civilians cannot know what they are talking about but I do have a great deal of experience flying with many gifted (and some not so) pilots and have a pretty good grasp of what happens to them when their capacity limit is reached, especially in poor weather.

I can only hope your ability to explain basic helicopter techniques to your students is better than your attempt to explain VR here.

We have gone a bit off-piste here talking about white-out in snow - the basic premise of this thread has been scud-running or pushing on in worsening visibility and lowering cloudbase and the decision making process required to turn back/land/hover rather than end up IIMC followed by achieving the ground/air interface in a less than fashionable attitude.

Weather appreciation, both in terms of understanding a forecast and in recognising unexpected deterioration and reacting to it are fundamentals for safe VFR flight - perhaps it is this element that needs to be drummed into pilots more thoroughly - proper pre-flight planning considering the what-ifs rather than 'kick the tyres, light the fires and go'. How many low time pilots on a VFR transit have even thought about an alternate LS or a bad weather plan?

toptobottom

9th Aug 2011, 16:38

...and that's the end of that thread!! :E

AnFI

10th Aug 2011, 10:11

It's not about willy waiving...

... the fact that Crab confirms he has less hours/years/appropriate experience should not diminish the value of his input... he'd love to solve it or understand it just as much as any right minded person would...

He is making IMHO the common mistake which I have tried to highlight:

80% of people can look out of the window and interpret reasonably accurately what they are seeing. It is of course completely unsurprising that Crab cannot understand that some pilots cannot use those cues which he does not consciously realise he is using.

Perhaps he (and all of you) might give some thought to expressing exactly what process you do use...

That is those of you who can and do understand how to alter course/slow/ descend or stop in the face of any conditions which might arise... in order to maintain VR .... this is a key task in VRF (Visual Reference Flying - which is a technique)... If people were able to do this then they would probably chose that over death .... don't you think? ( Are you perhaps someone who cannot... ?)

A starting point is to look at the CAA report into DVE (15 yrs study? With analysis of some of the cues used ... 'Tau' for instance) - read that first ... get up to speed then let's try making a more intelligent comment than put downs and insults to the dead..... (if you think my hurried explanation is impenetrable read that first then come back to me!)

Crab - just try analysing/expressing what you do (sub-consciously) use to stay visual ... try to do it from an imperative of maintaining VR and (if you can) compensate for your own excessive exposure/reliance on IRF .... remember the mil expose their pilots to IRF very early as 'the solution' .... inappropriate advice from experts in inappropriate fields of aviation can be dangerous...

why do I bother? - because I care...

[email protected]

10th Aug 2011, 16:22

No it's not about willy waving but you still haven't come down from your ivory tower to state your hours/years/appropriate experience.

So, as someone who trains people to deal with deteriorating weather, especially when there is no IF option due to icing and the job still has to get done because you have casualties on board, I have no appropriate experience???

Your attempt to make a science of VR is pitiful and, whilst there are visual traps and illusions (scale, goldfishbowl and hidden ridgelines for example) the fact is you can either see where you are going or not. If you have to descend below your minima to keep visual then you should turn back or land or divert using a bad-weather plan - this is not rocket surgery.

What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.

If we are talking about analysing visual cues, I don't suppose you have hovered in recirculating snow at night using a mixture of white light and NVG??? You can blather on about 'Tau' all you like but it comes down to searching desperately for enough visual information to assess your height and speed (or lack of it). This is not where we should train VFR pilots to be - we should train pilots to avoid such situations unless they are properly equipped in terms of aircraft fit and adequate training to manage those conditions.

Out of interest, I took part in a BAE study in a simulator in Bedford 15 or so years ago which was looking at visual cueing Vs handling characteristics and how degrading one meant improving the other in order to maintain adequate control. The sortie profile looked a low level flight, hovering, mask and unmask behind obstacles and transitions to and from the hover and I suspect that much of what we discovered was eventually fed into all sorts of other studies (including the CAA) as it was pioneering work at the time.

The fact is that in an unstabilised aircraft like a robbie, any degradation in visual cues cannot be offset by an improvement in handling qualities and a departure from controlled flight is simply a matter of time. Therefore I come back to the same conclusion - only by avoiding those deteriorating conditions can you fly VFR safely and all the macho 'we pushed on but still got through but it was quite exciting' is what keeps encouraging people to push on when they should turn back.

Flying VFR safely is not a science or an art, it is all about decision making - not formulas about visibility vs cloudbase - if in doubt chicken out - pressonitis kills!

By the way - your Desktop Virtual Environment studies are directed towards electronically representing the outside world (HUDs, DNVGs, Apache monocles etc) and are only relevant in that they emphasise that poor contrast due to low light levels or reducing visibility greatly affects the brain's ability to judge distance and speed - no sh*t sherlock!

BTW2 - the answer to reducing visual cues is SCAN but this is not for low-time pilots in R22s - the answer for them is don't go or turn back/land!

hihover

10th Aug 2011, 16:56

From Crab -

Your attempt to make a science of VR is pitiful and, whilst there are visual traps and illusions (scale, goldfishbowl and hidden ridgelines for example) the fact is you can either see where you are going or not. If you have to descend below your minima to keep visual then you should turn back or land or divert using a bad-weather plan - this is not rocket surgery.

What we are dealing with is poor decision making, not whether there are enough visual cues to control the helicopter - that happens after the poor decisions are made and the sucker keeps on going.

I think that just about covers it nicely. Poor decisions, poor captaincy and poor airmanship are the problems.

VFR is VFR, let's not try to complicate things any more. If anyone is having to fly low and slow in order to maintain VMC then it is time to reconsider why you are there.

Tam

EN48

10th Aug 2011, 17:09

Poor decisions, poor captaincy and poor airmanship are the problems.

From another thread:

"The least experienced press on while the more experienced turn back, to meet the most experienced who never took off in the first place."

Not always true, but you get the idea!

Nubian

10th Aug 2011, 18:34

Was there 2 x 206 from same Co that crashed 2 one going to rescue 1 one in Alaska a few years ago cause no\ poor horizon I think.

You're thinking of the 3 AS350's from Temsco. They're were all picked up by a USCG HH-60.... only injuries among the 10 POB's involved, no deaths

JimL

10th Aug 2011, 19:14

AnFi,

The research that Crab took part in at Bedford did indeed find its way into the CAA Paper 2007/03 - Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions:

CAA Paper 2007/03: Helicopter Flight in Degraded Visual Conditions | Publications | CAA (http://www.caa.co.uk/application.aspx?catid=33&pagetype=65&appid=11&mode=detail&id=2887)

It makes interesting reading because of the emphasis on the inversely proportional link between flight in a reduced visual cue environment and handling qualities.

I'm not sure I would like to add anything to Crab's post except to say that birds use the 'tau' strategy to avoid trees and branches, and land so well; and they know nothing about the science of flying.

The nub of this is that you need to have sufficient visual cues in order to be able to fly with visual reference. As Crab has also said, the less stabilised the platform the more visual cues that are required. If there is a secret it is in knowing when the deterioration in the visual cue environment starts to effect your performance; however, that is a function that is heavily influence by the machine, the pilot and the pilot's experience (and personality).

As most have tried to say, it is 'personal limits' that are important; setting them, knowing them and not going beyond them.

Jim

[email protected]

11th Aug 2011, 08:14

Thanks for that link Jim but the trial I took part in was earlier than 2002/3 but followed an almost identical format. Neither of us were test pilots but both experienced A2 QHIs.

The results and terminology are the same though and speak for themselves.

Other trials have used the DVE acronym for Desktop Virtual Environment with regard to electronic representation of the outside world - the CAA one uses DVE for Degraded Visual Environment - too many TLAs!!!!

AnFI seems to have gone rather quiet:)

AnFI

12th Aug 2011, 08:01

Jim

Thanks for your level headed approach and helping Crab out by correcting him on the correct study.

I am not sure why he feels he needs to make a display of his experience and prowess – with stories of daring do in recirculating snow at night using NVG’s, and how he was once used as a guinea pig in an experiment to establish what level of enhancement is required to actually perform in poor cue extremes. Neither do I understand why he is being so unconstructive in attempting to trash a well considered view?

His experience is inappropriate and it leads to him drawing a very common and dangerously incorrect (IMHO) conclusion.

CRAB:rolleyes:: I say again:
There are techniques you use which you do not realise you use - some people do not have those techniques. ... think about it - please (put in some 'substance' .... at least try and define them!)

As you say the bird didn't have to read about 'Tau' to use it ... and most birds use it instinctively - the ones which didn't, evolved out ... your approach of allowing people to evolve out is unacceptable and disrespectful...

if you saw someone failing to 'see' cues which you take as obvious I am really sure you would be amazed... they are not just being 'stupid' - your 'personal approach' stifles free discussion - and I am asking you (again) to try and analyse what qualities of the view out of your window you actually use to maintain your visual references - the bird can use 'Tau' without having to explain it ... since you presumably have evolved to the extent that you could explain it why don't you just try?
You might find that what you say puts a light on in someones head and saves (another) life ... nothing to loose , so why not try? ... please put your ego away and give it a fresh look.

JimL
I think I can possibly have one more go at trying to say what I believe is not being understood – using your clear appraisal:

The nub of this is that you need to have sufficient visual cues in order to be able to fly with visual reference.Yes, but it is more than that really you don't just need to "have" sufficient cues - you need to actively maintain them - even in weather which is not particularly bad. (there are many permutations).

Because you must have them, then merely recogninising when the weather is deteriorating is nothing like good enough. (it might not actually be deteriorating at all….). Like the Forrest Gump reference I was trying to make "life is like a box of chocolates" - it is an insufficiently commanding mindset...

If there is a secret it is in knowing when the deterioration in the visual cue environment starts to effect your performance; Whilst that is partially true, I really think this points at what I think is a flawed method (in the DVE study ...) (also the conditions in the experiment were homogeneous whereas reality ain't like that... same in 'your' study Crab?)
.... In it they fly a defined sortie(s) in worstening conditions and eventually discover that they cannot control if the pilots do not have sufficient visual cues. (as Crab says - no sh*t sherlock!:rolleyes:This is Forrest Gump flying... where 'inexplicable' stuff just happens to you...

So Jim the subtle but important difference is (IMHO):
You say:
It is about recognising when your performance is being degraded
I say:
It is about 'how' to not allow it to be degraded at all.

(although they are not mutually exclusive)

The HOW part is missing!

I have spoken to at least 5 pilots (and studied others) who have somehow gone Inadvertently IMC ... in my attempt to understand it more.

In several of those the vis was in excess of 10km (other than actually inside the cloud they found themselves in). – Generally it is a failure to actively guard visual references.
The onset is often not gradual but sudden and unexpected … creating a difficult situation of a sudden change of references being changed from Visual References to Instrument References – often unsuccessfully.

I have spent my life in the sky and around these people - insulting them is not the answer (nor justified) - they want to live, but inappropriate advice from apparently authoritative sources can cause problems ... they do need to know how to not loose their visual referencestelling them to chose days when the prInt-out from the met-office claims it will be ok is an example of FATAL ADVICE

It might be educational for all if people here were able to freely give their accounts of Inadvertent entry to IMC - if they have one - without feeling that Crab might judge you using his superior military experience of NVGs in Blizzards :rolleyes:( hypocritically "off piste" now Crab:rolleyes:?)

[... and another thing!
It is most definately NOT a 'PPL only' problem: Police EC135, Harding AS355, other 'Chelsea' AS355, S61 NorthSea ... (and countless military cases and others) Encountering 'unforcast' weather is not a good enough excuse to lose your visual references .... forcasts are not reliable enough to avoid IMC with sufficient certainty - you have to be able to do it yourself....]

ShyTorque 's open and frank example of his IIMC (post 6Aug 00:49) is refreshing :ok:- we could use more of that...
Would you say it was because of:
a) failure to recognise deteriorating conditions
b) failure to maintain visual references
c) a failure of the weather report
d) excess confidence in weather report
e) excessive cockpit lighting - poor external awareness
f) Life is like a box of chocolates - this can happen to anyone and being ready prepared and practiced at reverting to instruments is a vital skill.

(what's your answer?)

[email protected]

12th Aug 2011, 09:54

AnFI - you are clearly trying to wind people up on this thread which is a shame as there are lots of valuable lessons to be learned about pushing on in bad weather and myself and others have tried to get the message across.

If you are genuine - not only have you failed to give us any detail of your superior experience but you have just muddied the waters with the assertion that you know something special that the rest of us are just not seeing.

When you start needing special skills to keep visual references, you have already passed the point when you should have made the right decision and turned back.

Basic flying instruction is all about attitude - it is the visual attitude that you use to control the aircraft FW or RW - if you are VFR then you need to be able to see the horizon in order to do that accurately.

So - a rule of thumb for you - if you can't see the horizon then you probably aren't flying VFR and should descend/turn round to re-establish your horizon. One of the worst mistakes people make is to fly just beneath the cloudbase such that any lowering of the base or inadvertant climb will immediately reduce forward visibility and possibly lead to IIMC.

This isn't special technique - this is BASIC flying - any other ideas like scanning to the side for rate of movement are not means to fly VFR safely, they are means to get you out of the sh*t your poor decision making has led you into.

If you had flown on NVG you would understand that it is the perfect tool for teaching flight in a DVE - no depth perception, a monochromatic image with poor contrast and a need to scan rapidly due to limited field of view - but I guess you know better.

In any DVE the flight instruments are your saviour but we are dealing with VFR pilots who do not have an IR and are not properly trained (nor equipped in the aircraft) to do pure IF let alone manage a visual/instrument balance.

So either put up or shut up - at best you are misguided (wow a whole 5 pilots you have talked to about IIMC) at worst you are feeding confusing and inaccurate messages to GA pilots who read these threads.

foxmead

12th Aug 2011, 11:00

Crab. I totally agree with your response on this thread. I have read through these threads from the start and common sense and self preservation must come to mind each time.

No point in repeating what has been said, however the common sense views that have been mentioned are key points for VFR pilots to use.

B47

12th Aug 2011, 12:47

Crab, you're absolutely right. PPLs (I'm one of them) only need the skill in decision making to avoid IMC, not the skill to exit it. This discussion has been tortuous due to AnFI's ramblings and potentially confusing to PPLs' reading it. It's no more complicated than I've just said.

AnFI - your profile says your location is N/A - I beg to differ - can you tell us where you fly please? I need to avoid the same piece of sky (in any weather).

AnFI

12th Aug 2011, 13:22

So you don't think maintaining Visual References is important - amazing!
You don't need to guard Visual References at all ... and if you do it's because you have already gone too far - is that really what you are saying?
No slowing down either?

So life is like a box of chocolates then?:
if you can't see the horizon then you probably aren't flying VFR and should descend/turn round to re-establish your horizon.So you should switch to your instruments: In any DVE the flight instruments are your saviour but we are dealing with VFR pilots who do not have an IR and are not properly trained (nor equipped in the aircraft) to do pure IF let alone manage a visual/instrument balance. which you can't do because you are not an instrument pilot... :confused:
("In any DVE" - surely not...:confused:)

When you start needing special skills to keep visual references, you have already passed the point when you should have made the right decision and turned back. So you think they deserve to die - Darwin right? Marvelous!

You are misrepresenting what I have said quite clearly:
The skills and techniques which people use to Maintain Sufficient Visual References are NOT particularly "special skills" - they are none-the-less skills and there are some people who cannot / do not see the same cues as you (most people) use subconsciously ... you would be surprised if you saw it... (no point in you answering that either)

... infact you have misrepresented much of what I have said - so much that I cannot respond to it all, one example:
I said:
I have spoken to at least 5 pilots (and studied others) who have somehow gone Inadvertently IMC
You:
(wow a whole 5 pilots you have talked to about IIMC) trying to belittle me - not a very constructive approach.
do you know a lot of VFR Pilots who have INADVERTENTLY gone IMC ?

CRAB: you didn't answer any of my questions.
Please answer just one question for me:
In the ShyTorque multichoice which answer do you most closely agree with?

apart from that I think its all been said ......:confused: :rolleyes: :ugh: := ....:zzz:
( I am sure if you needed a pilot to calculate, whilst hand flying on instruments, a 'time on target' 300nm out in an 80kt blizzard at night ... you'd be 'the man'. Demonstrating handling in an R22 - probably not.... wouldn't you agree?:ouch:)

CharlieOneSix

12th Aug 2011, 15:56

Having lurked for many years before joining PPRuNe, and with 40 years of varied professional helicopter flying (military and civil) behind me, there have been many of Crab's posts that I have silently disagreed with. However on this thread I totally agree with him, especially his third paragraph of post #141. KISS. AnFi - give it up mate, you are complicating everything and adding nothing to the discussion.

AnFI

12th Aug 2011, 17:10

Yes - I agree with para 3 also.

You only need ordinary skills to avoid IMC

... and as I say again 20% do not posses those ordinary skills.

(..... so ordinary infact that you don't even realise you use them - wake up!)

B47
only need the skill in decision making to avoid IMC, not the skill to exit it. You don't just need the descision making skill - you need the ability to perceive - so that you can make that decision.:ugh:

I'm not the one suggesting having the skill to exit it , Crab/mil/CAA is, I'm the one saying you shouldn't just amble into it aimlessly in the first place:ugh:

chased out....:yuk:

[email protected]

12th Aug 2011, 17:31

Not chased out just not listening and not explaining:ugh:

griffothefog

12th Aug 2011, 18:04

Are we all done?..... Thank god :hmm:

RIP mate.

toptobottom

12th Aug 2011, 21:41

I do understand (at last) what AnFI is trying to say. 80% of pilots sub-consciously assess the view through the plexi-glass to gauge the suitability of the world outside for VFR. 20% don't, or maybe they do, but either don’t realise it or still don't recognise things that do obscure the ground. If they do but don't, maybe they can be trained such that they do, even if they may not realise they don't. If they don’t but do, then they should be in the 80%. If they realise they do but don’t, and they don’t realise they don't then they should do. If they do realise they don't, they know they're doing it consciously, or if they don’t realise they do, they’re in the 80% who do do it sub-consciously; they may recognise the clues but still do nothing about it, either consciously or sub-consciously because they’re either skilled, or not. Whether in the 20% or the 80%, you may or may not sub-consciously or consciously think about turning back or landing, if you have the skills. Even the 80% that do sub-conciously or consciously recognise the signs, or the 20% that don’t recognise it and do have the skills or do recognise it and don't have the skills and haven't or can't be trained to understand their situation and do something about it, will end up in the do do. And that's it. If you don't and they do and they’re in the 20%, then they do it anyway (sub-consciously), don't they?

AnFI

13th Aug 2011, 06:59

very funny .... Ha Ha ... hahaha

.... but there is a serious point in there..... somewhere......:hmm::confused:

IM(most)HO

I'd just add:
If you are in the 80% who do, and you don't know it, you think the 20% are stupid when they may well not be.

If you are in the 80% but get yourself in the do do any way - then you probably are 'being stupid'...

If you are dead already - there's an 80% chance you were a member of the 20% and you had no idea that you were in the 20% until you found yourself screaming in terror for your mother on the transmit button .... utterly bewildered as to how this 'happened to' you ... you were probably in class 4 (below)
... the training world probably let you down
... if you've been in that situation and luckily missed the ground when you fell out of the sky please share the experience - so that perhaps others are saved by it....

There are clearly different views on how to solve this problem:
1 All helicopters should be stabilised and pilots should hold some type of IMC proficiency. (CAA/DVE study?)
2 Pilots should ensure they stay VMC (me) (5hrs IRF is good for your flying but not a solution to this problem)
3 IIMC is just a fact of life and 5 hours training in IRF should ensure that pilots can make a 180 on instruments (CAA/mil?)
4 Pilot should choose conditions where it is less probable that they encounter IIMC (Crab?)

... is that fair?

[email protected]

13th Aug 2011, 07:11

AnFI just 2 and 4.

The eye to hand co-ordination required to fly a helicopter well enough to get a licence is not that difficult to achieve - the ability to make sensible decisions (often under pressure) is a function of personality, intellect and temperament and means that not everyone is suited to be a pilot - they may be your 20%;)

TTB:ok::ok::ok:

toptobottom

13th Aug 2011, 09:46

Yep - only 2 and 4 work for me.

Crab: the ability to make sensible decisions (often under pressure) is a function of personality, intellect and temperament and means that not everyone is suited to be a pilot

In my experience (of reading incidents such as Mark Weir's (TBC), Steve Hislop's and now seemingly, Chris Watts), the problem is ego, which is a product of attitude and personality (http://www.pprune.org/6610057-post83.html). I know some excellent pilots, mature and professional, safe and sensible, but they could never claim to be intellectual and some have a rather short fuse. Some are really nice people and some a nasty pieces of work, but the significant thing is that either consciously or sub-consciously, whether trained for IIMC or not, they won't let their ego interfere with their decision making - unlike the successful entrepreneurs above and no doubt, countless others in the future :(

[email protected]

13th Aug 2011, 17:09

Very valid point TTB but whether it is control of ego or professionalism (maybe the same thing) that stops you making crap decisions is a subject for discussion. What is clear however, is that some will make the right decisions and some won't - students of the human condition please discuss.

It's not a surprise that many commercial operations use psychometric analysis to determine the suitability of candidates for flying posts - much like the military do - stable extroverts anyone???

Thomas coupling

14th Aug 2011, 09:29

I re-iterate: it's a catch 22 for PPL's: they have to stay alive long enough to experience and learn from those things that stop them from living long enough!!!!

If the PPL won't/can't go on to dedicated IMC training for various reasons, they have to fall back onto their "self preservation" gene. And for some individuals that gene has been replaced by the "self destruct" gene:sad:

When you tell / invite/advise certain people that flying into inadvertent IMC is a no go / inadvisable / stupid / dangerous ....you can bet your bottom dollar its the same as waving a red rag at a bull.

[For some, the national highway speed limit is a target not a limit - the same can be said for flying conditions].

Vee-r

15th Aug 2011, 01:29

To me this all comes back to decision making. I think there are many people out there backing themselves into corners they have no business being in. They don't have a plan and run out of (good) options. Personally, in poor weather I am always thinking about alternate destinations, fuel locations, places with good food.
I try to keep at least a couple of alternates in mind at all times. I'm sitting here wondering how much fuel this poor chap left himself with. Did he just have enough for his destination? Was he past a point of no return? Did he have so little fuel that shutting down in a field might have left him short to get to a fuel stop?
I can't understand what could have been so important that he felt the need to continue in such changeable conditions.
Do people that end up in these situations not realise how quickly you can go from 1 mile vis in mist to in the cloud at 60 knots? By the time you notice the visibility dropping below your 1,500 metres you may not have time to execute a 180.

My thoughts go out to the family.

toptobottom

15th Aug 2011, 08:06

what could have been so important that he felt the need to continue

Just his ego.

Beep_Beep

18th Aug 2011, 07:42

Guys I have followed almost every helicopter crash that has been in the news over the past few years, all to often pilots are pushing the boundries when weather hits.

I bought a bell jet ranger and have a pilot employed to fly the machine, I am in and out of England every week from Ireland. Both myself and my pilot put safety first and if the VIS gets bad and we cannot skirt around it we land in an open field to it passes, there is nothing to be ashamed of.

Safety and life comes first.

chopjock

19th Aug 2011, 22:25

BB
Do you have floats on your Jet Ranger. Just been over there myself and the IAA are telling me ALL single engine helicopters that fly over water MUST have floation, is that true? :eek:

Hughes500

20th Aug 2011, 20:31

chop, Belfast still part of the UK at the moment !!!!

FSXPilot

21st Aug 2011, 06:12

Only if you fly into the Rep of Ireland. If you fly through N. Ireland it doesn't matter. You go figure.

AnFI

30th Aug 2011, 19:00

4 is of course a trick answer - and can have fatal results.

It is not possible to chose conditions which negate the need for the ability to maintain visual references. Yes you may well reduce the number of times you actually need to do what you should be doing all the time anyway as a VRF pilot. You're still just playing Russian Roulette with 1 bullet per 40 chambers instead of 30 ... still a really bad game and should not be played at all.

Weather forecasts are not even nearly reliable enough to keep you visual ...

As Vee-r says Do people that end up in these situations not realise how quickly you can go from 1 mile vis in mist to in the cloud at 60 knots? By the time you notice the visibility dropping below your 1,500 metres you may not have time to execute a 180.

Yes that is right - they often do not realise - they have not been taught/shown.... Some of them are highly conscientious fathers of small children with no desire to kill themselves....

some think it should not be taught and a few people here believe it is not worth teaching this because of some incomrehensible NONSENSE to do with some Darwinian principal meaning that successful businessmen being primarily PPL's who have not been through Military screening and are clearly too arrogant to want to stay alive, in some odd way deserve to die ... to me that is the incomprehensible theory...

TC ... you are so tantilizingly close to 'getting it' with your remark: I re-iterate: it's a catch 22 for PPL's: they have to stay alive long enough to experience and learn from those things that stop them from living long enough!!!! Some do learn the hard way... and narrowly avoid killing themselves ... I was shown how to stay visual a long time ago and I have never even nearly IIMCd ....

I really do think that there are two main camps opposed to showing people how to stay visual:
1) those that do not realise that they do anything to achieve assured Visual References (and for them it is not a skill at all - just perfectly normal to look out of the window and control where you go - they would be surprised if they saw the intelligent conscientious types being incapable and they (you?) might just spare a moment of thought to working out what it is they (you?) actually do to stay Visual)
AND
2) those who think that showing people how to keep their visual references when they encounter the reality of 'the weather of the day' might encourage them to fly in poor weather... (it seems immoral to me, to withhold life saving knowledge)

CAN IT POSSIBLY BE TRUE? :
that people who are capable of maintaining their visual references just don't and choose to die because of something to do with their business success which apparently means they are unsuited to be pilots because they can't make decisions - I am open minded , but that does not seem to make any sense to me .... if that is actually what you are saying then just run it past me again ..... please

Obviously that cannot be what you are saying (surely?).... the bit in the above which makes it ridiculous is the choice of people who ARE capable ... it is not surprising that people who are not capable of maintaining their VR go IIMC - some of them probably tried really hard to select appropriate weather, set themselves personal limits, secretly didn't want to kill themselves (despite being that hopelessly suicidal breed: Successful Businessmen!) others of them may have had an ego problem and been caught in the whole civilian/Darwin/PPL/ego problem .... but the common theme linking them was their Inability to Guard thier Visual References.

... they were just not equipped to Guard their Visual References...

... a vital element of Visual Reference Flying (not taught and not universally understood)

... until it is they will go on dying

(a 900 ft 'invisible' cloud on a 5K vis day gives a pilot at 1000ft and 90kts approximately 6 seconds to notice that the 'Horizon' is no longer running away... but it is actually coming at him. That is 6 seconds before you are actually in the Cloud. You have only 3 seconds to reconfigure your aircraft to descend at 8 Degrees descent angle if you are to avoid flying into the cloud (difficult to acheive from 90kts). The pilot was flying with the 'horizon' at 4 Degrees below his horizontal ... the 'horizon' became 8 degrees down after just 3 seconds).
'Invisible clouds' are clouds with the same tone of grey as the BAD Vis - making them indistinguishable until they obscure something

Thomas coupling

31st Aug 2011, 09:38

Anfi: joking aside, what do you do for a living, please?

AnFI

31st Aug 2011, 11:17

Quebec businessman, granddaughter among the dead in helicopter crash - The Globe and Mail (http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/quebec/quebec-businessman-granddaughter-among-the-dead-in-helicopter-crash/article2144839/)

It'll just keep happening while (ex mil?) IMC helicopter pilots who don't understand this issue keep crediting it to Darwin ... this type of tragedy is avoidable. Something can be done...

VRF is not the same discipline....

TC: Don't get personal, let the merit of the discussion stand on it's own, I've watched you fail to grasp basics of helicopter flight (eg Vortex ring state) don't let your experience cloud your superior judgment and try and take a fresh look..... Do you stay rigidly VMC ? If so how? Lack of respect for VRF has crashed many professional pilots 2xChelsea AS355s, 1 Police EC135, 2xNorth Sea S61, AS365, A109 etc...

rotorspeed

31st Aug 2011, 13:09

AnFI

Do you actually fly helos yourself? If so, what experience?

And where exactly is the relevance of the Quebec R44 accident to your unorthodox campaign?

An awful lot more people die in automobile accidents than flying. Any views on what should be done to minimise these? Did you have any training to drive in poor visibility - you know, rain, mist? Even fog perhaps? Do you think others should have?

Thomas coupling

31st Aug 2011, 14:25

ANFI - I asked a simple polite question: you know what I do. What do you do for a living? Plain and simple. Others have asked but you evade the question. Why is that. What are you afraid of?
[And I won't bite with that last comment of yours, either:E]

AnFI

31st Aug 2011, 16:37

Yea - I have made pretty clear that the whole macho willy waiving culture is IMO not relevant. So I do not wish to answer that OFF TOPIC question.

I may not have a great deal of experience - I do have a pretty strong feel for what the cause of a great proportion of these accidents is - and the merit of the 'argument' should stand by itself... I also feel a moral duty to try and do something.

It is just so much easier to criticise that to DO something....

You could keep an open mind ... could you answer my ON TOPIC questions ..... please?

You might concede that advice from your world does not necessarily translate well to the Private Civil VMC world... try and see it from another place ... perhaps?

You might agree that staying VMC is one of the most important tasks of a VFR pilot in a VMC machine. Do you?

You could perhaps concede that it is possible that some pilots do not recognise the imminent loss of their Visual References.
Do you believe that?

We could perhaps show them how to not just blunder into IMC... It might help ... don't you think?

Do YOU have a better suggestion?
(Or anything constructive to say?)

There was an attempt to fix this problem by introducing 5hrs IRF training ... at least someone was trying!!
There has not been an attempt to solve this problem by showing people HOW to keep Visual References regardless of the conditions encountered...
Worth a try - don't you think?

Or perhaps you could just try critiquing a bit of simplified test logic:
Given:
People who know how to keep Visual References don't IIMC.
People who die in IIMC incidents didn't intend to die.
Then it follows:
People who die in IIMC accidents do not know how to keep their Visual References. Q.E.D.

Anyone trying to fix this problem from any point of view is fine in my book .... but anyone trying to 'attack' someone who is, is just plain disgusting.
:yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk::yuk:

RotorSpeed:rolleyes:
More people die in helicopters per person.hour than cars - I think.
and
They do make many public campaigns wrt automobiles to get people to slow down so that they can stop in the distance they can see. In helicoptering (or whatever you call it) the official advice is to NOT SLOW DOWN and DESCEND because you might bump into the ground. You agree with that?
and
Quebec - reinforces that Successful Businessman is an accident cause (as suggested here on PPrune)

AnFI

31st Aug 2011, 17:17

:}
Driving in Fog - How 2 deal with Driving in Fog (http://www.2pass.co.uk/fog.htm)

Strangely they mention pilots ...

oggers

31st Aug 2011, 17:34

I was shown how to stay visual a long time ago and I have never even nearly IIMCd

Well the clouds just part for some. But for the rest of us, what are these techniques?

Thomas coupling

31st Aug 2011, 18:01

ANfi - stick to your day time job (is it populating wikipedia or amending thesaurus'? because I think you have sent everyone else here - to sleep. Toodle pip Zzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzzz

AnFI

31st Aug 2011, 20:45

TC - u complain when I don't answer your irrelevant question - but u don't answer any ON TOPIC question yourself... and then you are just plain rude.

Not to mention your liberal insults of the dead - ref Darwin and ego etc

... and adding nothing to the solution

Uncivilised ... is the correct word I think.

Good night! :yuk: ...... :zzz:

B47

31st Aug 2011, 22:07

AnFi, are your rambling opinions based upon your own experience or Googled theory? You may wish to avoid the question by lamely declaring it Off Topic but the is little point in constructing such long posts if you don't care if your opinions are respected. If you don't, why bother? It's not 'willy waving' or 'hours snobbery' to simply ask you DO YOU FLY HELICOPTERS OR NOT??!!

Put up or shut up.

toptobottom

1st Sep 2011, 01:46

http://i851.photobucket.com/albums/ab71/prooner/lurker.gif

rotorspeed

1st Sep 2011, 07:33

AnFI

Given your concern on maximum visibility, how come our comments to me are in a tiny point size?

So the Quebec accident proves that being a successful businessman is an accident cause, does it?

Well I'm pretty sure you're not really a pilot, nor now a successful businessman. But I do know you're a grade A moron.

AnFI

1st Sep 2011, 09:48

Given your concern on maximum visibility, how come our comments to me are in a tiny point size?Because pointing out that you are wrong about the safety of cars vs helicopters is not very important and is off topic ...

So the Quebec accident proves that being a successful businessman is an accident cause, does it?
... er ... no! that was the point being made by others (crab/TC and others, successful business men apparently have an ego problem and therefore can't decide when to stop pushing-on etc.) personally I find that suggestion mostly nonsensical.... generally stated by people who are not successful business folk. I am the one saying that it is NOT a cause , 'Quebec' was to point out the ludicrosity of that suggestion... sorry that went over your quick tempered head. But it appears that you agree with me on that point.

Well I'm pretty sure you're not really a pilot, nor now a successful businessman. But I do know you're a grade A moron. Well you are wrong there also and damn rude.

B47 I do hold a current UKPPLH as well as other 'qualifications', and a reasonable degree of experience. FWIW

I don't think it is productive to discuss other than the issue... and you didn't answer my question to you, nor did TC nor Crab.

You'd rather talk about unproductive irrelevance?

I think there is a danger in IMC pilots giving the wrong advice to VMC pilots.... there is a way too casual respect for the Solid need to stay VMC which VMC PPL must have very firmly or they will and do die...

Sweet little 8yr old girls should not have to die because this topic can't be advanced .... this forum should be a great place to do it if the conversation could be a little more mature and respectful.

Please attack the substance of what I am saying by all means .... but leave the personal insult side of it out ... eh?

Moron yourself - with brass knobs on... just sounds a bit childish to me...

..... anyway I agree with TC - I'm beginning to bore even myself do death:zzz:

oggers

1st Sep 2011, 11:24

You were taught long ago 'how to guard your visual references'. What precisely is this technique you talk of? I've run out of vmc a few times and variously punched up, turned about, landed out or latched onto a hover reference. I may be one of the 20% that needs to know what you're talking about :hmm:

AnFI

1st Sep 2011, 13:29

Although there is a slight wiff of 'Troll' .... I'm happy to play that game and 'diagnose' if you are part of the 20% or not - I don't mind looking foolish just on the off-chance that you really are part of the 20%... that do in fact need to be shown something to stay alive ....

obviously this will be boring and painful for the 80% who can't see that there is a 20% ... or indeed anything to do other than look out of the window.

If we play then you need to agree to these rules:
1 you agree to give truthful answers
2 you don't let you ego exaggerate
3 you answer the questions

Do you agree?

Presuming you are a good sport and agree...
The first questions are:
When you ran out of vmc and 'punched up' how high were you?
How fast were you going?
Did you have the choice ?
Were you forced to 'punch up' because you ran out of vmc unexpectedly?
Would it have been easily possible at your height and speed to have slowed sufficiently or altered course to maintain good Visual References?
Were you at the time of running out of Visual References in an IMC equipped helicopter and did you possess the skill required to easily switch to IRF? (money on that answer for 'Trolls')
Were you actually trying to keep visual references and believe you were unable to for some reason?
Were you over the sea in a hazy environment?

Agree/Play?

Thomas coupling

1st Sep 2011, 13:47

ANFI: you'll need to start a new thread if you want to play games. This is off topic now.......................

oggers

1st Sep 2011, 15:28

It was a simple enough request*. What are the 'techniques for guarding visual references' you are on about? If you can't manage a straight answer then just forget it.

*it's a tad ironic that you previously criticised your fellow posters for not addressing the substance of your point. I don't really think I could have addressed it more directly. Alas to no avail:suspect:

hihover

1st Sep 2011, 15:56

JFC

I just got back from a great holiday in Coasta Rica and am astounded that this is ongoing without going anywhere!

I think it has to be time to move on. AnFi, if you have a solution let the rest of us have it, please. If all you have are brilliant ideas, don't bother, we all have plenty of those.

Do something with your theories/hypotheses, I mean something real, take them to flight safety meetings and discuss them, help people understand what you believe to be true. I am sure that is what you have tried here but it has failed and now you are a distraction.

Tam Macklin out!

[email protected]

1st Sep 2011, 16:45

Costa Rica!!! All right for some Tam:)

AnFI is just trolling - he does not have any real information to impart, repeatedly evades questions about his experience and qualifications (although he says he has a PPLH, not sure how current he is), has a big problem with instrument rated pilots because we clearly never fly VFR:ugh: and probably writes self-help books in his spare time - you know the ones where you wade through pages and pages of psycho-babble, half truths and misleading promises only to discover that there is no special truth, technique or magical ingredient - just like his posts on here.

AnFI I don't think you are a moron but you are certainly not a professional pilot in any way, shape or form.

ShyTorque

1st Sep 2011, 16:52

When my kids squabbled like this I used to put them outside with a football. :hmm:

toptobottom

1st Sep 2011, 21:38

Did someone say Costa Rica? Just got back from there myself - amazing place...

AnFI - I don't think you're a moron either (even though you've obviously confused yourself and got into a tizzy over the 'entrepreneur/ego/darwin thang') but if you're to retain any credibility at all, you really need to explain to us eager, but clearly mis-guided souls, exactly what this foolproof technique is; in simple and straight forward terms. What is it exactly?? Please don't replay your previous ramblings yet again (with the greatest respect).

TTB

AnFI

2nd Sep 2011, 22:08

TTB: thanks for throwing me a bone ... I'll try and clearly state my point:

I contend that 20% of sub 500hr PPLH's do not have the skills required to avoid IIMC.

These skills are not particularly special - more than 80% of this readership will exercise these skills automatically without being aware that they are even exercising any particular skills.

The skills may be quite complex - we are capable of quite complex processing without it being a challenge - or even being consciously aware of it.

We can see that in the example where the bird "uses Tau to avoid bumping into and landing on branches" - the bird has not been 'trained' and certainly cannot write down what he does. Writing it down and analysing it would appear to be quite complex (although it is not really all that complex at all).

Since they are not rare skills they could be explained by anyone here who uses them .... they may in fact be relatively complex to describe... I have invited people here to analyse and describe what it is they actually do ... with no responses.

It is extra ordinary to observe someone who cannot exercise these basic skills...
They are not taught and they are not tested.

Anyone here could try and identify what they are (but try and give it a little thought first .... please)

It is not realistic nor acceptable to suggest that they should not be flying (since they are) and it is even less acceptable their Inevitable deaths should be joked about as Darwin at work ... when something could be done to save their lives and the misery caused.

I don't have a problem with IRF flight per se - I think it is great fun, rewarding, occasionally useful etc.
I do have a major problem with the unacceptable mis-application of IRF principles into advice to 'baby' PPL's - for example; Crabs that "IIMC can happen to anyone", that a scan is the answer, that an IRF minimum control speed has any relevance in VRF etc - just way too slack headed if IIMC is likely to be fatal....

Step out of your familiar world for just a second ... let's solve this..

It's no fun being slapped around the head by a bunch of bullying Fish Heads - especially when you're only trying to help...

OFF TOPIC: Costa Rica! Fantastic - got rid of their Military in 1947 - put the budget into education - nice people. Great place to fly ... did you get down to the Peninsula de Osa? See the Chain of volcanos down the center of the country? Did you see the banana strips? Swim in the Carribean side? Get sun burned? The downside of having no military is that the Nicaraguans are carving through the North East to make their canal ... and there's not much the CR's can do about it - so you do need a military which at least believes it has the best training in the world...:)

AnFI

2nd Sep 2011, 22:52

oh yea ... it doesn't say what those techniques are.... but since 80% of you could write that part (if you took the time to analyse it)... why don't you?

My spin on it is unlikely to be particularly special (I'd hope)

... I don't mind having a go at expressing them.... if no-one else feels up to it... but there's no reason anyone shouldn't write that part.

(fluid collective, vertical angle to the boundary of your Visible World, angular rates, vigilant to the furthest and critical reference in any direction, determine certain absence of cloud as opposed to relying on actually seeing all clouds - since they may not be determinable, energy trap, rate of change of distance to furthest Visible Cue, fly like you're intending to land just before the furthest thing you can see - instead of having a 'certain to continue' frame of mind, if bad wx you encounter enroute is actually dangerous - then you are not doing it right. etc etc)

.... all just the basic stuff everyone does... nothing special almost any one experienced could do it.. just needs to be formalised and taught...

[email protected]

3rd Sep 2011, 12:32

Yaaaaaaawwwwwwwwwwnnnnnn:ugh:

If you are so maxed out just flying the helicopter that you can't make decisions about visibility and cloudbase then only go flying on really nice days - there is no 'human right' to aviate and it's not other people's fault that some can't do it very well.

OvertHawk

3rd Sep 2011, 13:33

For F£$S sake!

It's really not difficult, despite some people's attempts to make it sound difficult.

Plan properly and have an awareness of the prevailing conditions and terrain.

Fly at a speed and height that allows you to maintain VMC and comply with the law.

Land or turn back before it is too late.

If you can't (or won't) achieve those things after having been through the standard PPL course and ground exams and spent a bit of time in the flying club then it's unlikely that you will learn at all (other than the hard way). Trying to dress it up as anything other than plain old "press-on-itis" is an example of the "phsyco-babble" culture of current fashion.

AnFI - to quote Winston - "A fanatic is someone who can't change his mind and won't change the subject".

Thomas coupling

5th Sep 2011, 09:25

ANFI: I find it hilarious that you are winding everyone up - keep it coming:D
You have a smidgeon of experience in the real McCoy - to be honest certainly not enough to be able to talk from a position of authority. You are what I call an armchair judge, pontificating in cacoethes loquendi, basking in ethical egoism in extremis.

There - even I feel better now.......

Go back to your day job of applying adhesive to the back of stamps and leave the gutteral reality of aviation to.....wait for it.....aviators :rolleyes:

foxmead

5th Sep 2011, 15:38

TC & the others who have commented to this thread have certainly had their patience tested by AnFi. I would suggest that this thread having read through it is totally exhausted and no further repsonse to this individual should be made, why waste the energy!!!!

vfr440

5th Sep 2011, 15:58

Fox
Right on :ok: What a star we have here (and I am not even a pilot!! :ugh:) maybe Mods could intervene so we have some useful info to digest.....? - VFR

Senior Pilot

5th Sep 2011, 22:35

maybe Mods could intervene so we have some useful info to digest.....? - VFR

vfr440,

Like most readers of this thread I dozed off a few pages ago, but I have been assured that AnFI's bona fides are actually the real McCoy.

:ok:

toptobottom

6th Sep 2011, 20:02

SP: not what you posted originally...

what does I have been assured that AnFI's bona fides are actually the real McCoy mean? :confused:

Senior Pilot

6th Sep 2011, 21:29

ttb,

The thread was revolving too much around the veracity of AnFI's dissertations. On advice that I've been given it would appear that reservations about AnFI's background are unfounded and I edited my post accordingly :)

toptobottom

10th May 2012, 10:38

AAIB report here (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/robinson_r44_ii__raven_ii__g_rotg.cfm). No surprises.

FSXPilot

10th May 2012, 17:03

Makes for grim reading. Poor bastard!

AnFI

13th May 2012, 02:36

"the pilot is required to fly a Rate 1 (3o/sec) turn on instruments, through 180o. This is to demonstrate that he can safely turn the helicopter around to regain VMC in the event of encountering a Deteriorating Visual Environment (DVE)." In DVE you want to look outside to keep your visual references - otherwise you'll wind up in IIMC - (which as Crab contends is inevitable.... using that strategy)

Footnote
6 During which flight under instruction is conducted by sole reference to flight instruments. No it isn't - if done at all it is done using 'foggles' which permit sight of external references through at least 120degrees - negating the exercise - you cannot ignore the stabilising cues of reality even if you wanted to...

GIVE ME SOME hELP hERE PLEASE, TANGO GOLF”. The controller acknowledged the pilot’s request and advised him to select the transponder code (squawk) one seven fiv..... - at which point he lost control - workload of selecting XPonder code not worth while - this is at least the second case of Controller training being unsuited to this scenario ....

The helicopter turned through approximately 180o and then started climbing. This was probably an attempt by the pilot to turn around to find better weather conditions, a manoeuvre he would have been required to demonstrated on the JAA PPL(H) LST. This turn was flown at about 1o/sec rather than the 3o/sec required for the LST. This indicated that, while the pilot was doing as he was taught Oh dear ... killed doing what he was taught ----- FOR F:mad:K SAKE WHEN WILL YOU OBSTINATE B:mad:RDS TAKE THIS SERIOUSLY? ---- Visibility rules do not stop this ---- people do not want to be IIMC - they (often) just do not know how to stay VMC ... lets show them ... duh!

It's not about recognising scenarios where IIMC is more probable and having the judgment to land first .... that is just not anything like exact enough.

(...no clouds in South Africa, i guess?)

.... the problem is Darwin deselects the people who do what they were 'supposed to do' and not the people who got the advice wrong.

hihover

13th May 2012, 05:43

Your continued rants, abuse, diversion of blame away from the obvious, and your belief that only you are right, will not get you anywhere.

Having read the report, it confirms what we all anticipated had happened and I see no need to look for further explanation. In fact we should be thankful that he crashed in a field and not into anything else. Very sad, but we have to use "big boys' rules" in the air.

We need to move away from feeding people with excuses for why things go wrong, and allow them to assume responsibility for their actions using the big boy rule #1 - Stay Clear of Cloud and In Sight of the Surface, Minimum Visibility 1,500m. Below that, you are no longer VMC, and therefore, no longer able to fly VFR.

If we keep things that simple, there is no need to try to force GA to understand your mumbo-jumbo. It really IS that simple.

TM

[email protected]

13th May 2012, 07:11

Tam, on the money as ever :ok:

AnFI

13th May 2012, 08:28

TM are you seriously trying to suggest that obeying that rule is enough to keep people safe?

The guy had 275hrs in blue sky, neither that rule nor the famous 180 degree mortal instrument test worked for this guy.

No! obeying that rule will not keep you safe children - you actually have to fly so that you keep sufficient references.

It's ok for you TM and Crab to flit in and out of cloud in your autopiloted stabilised machines ..... Even on an instrument rating in a helicopter pilots are not tested to fly on instruments unstabilised

allow them to assume responsibility for their actions using the big boy rule #1 YES they have to take responsibility for their actions - and believing you are doing it by obeying the big boy rule No.1 will get you killed.

Geoffersincornwall

13th May 2012, 08:42

A week or so ago I was chatting with a JAA licensed ATPL (issued in UK) who had managed to get an FI(H) rating with 2 weeks study and 20 hours flying. Needless to say that even though he had the rating in his hand he said he did not feel competent to teach anyone.

I venture to suggest that we should now turn round to tomorrow's helicopter pilots and say........

"We have tried it your way, the minimalist, affordable way, for all our helicopter licenses and ratings and now we will do it differently because it has not worked. We need PPLs that properly understand their limitations and have a breadth of training worthy of the licence. Instructors will never deliver the transmission of the qualities required for good risk assessment and decision making unless they have them to begin with. They must therefore have demonstrable and meaningful work experience prior to attending the FI(H) course and that course will be at least 6 week and involve 40 hours of flying training with a breakdown that will include mutual training, night flying, instrument training and LOFT training in a suitable FTD."

If the regulators don't respond to the need for change then the industry needs to set up a scheme that provides for all courses to be independently audited by an IOSA-like body set up by the International Helicopter Safety Team that will award Colour coded approval levels, RED - compliant but minimal, GREEN - meets a set of minimal standards or best practices as agreed by IHST sub committee in line with the principles embraced by IOSA.

The horrendous accident rates in GA will only be addressed properly if we seek and maintain higher teaching and proficiency standards that are rewarded by lower insurance rates and the award of Michelin-type stars to schools whose students remain accident free. Yes! they need to take responsibility for the people they sign off.

G.

hihover

13th May 2012, 09:11

:ugh:

Tam Macklin out!

[email protected]

13th May 2012, 09:42

AnFI - following big boy rule #1 will keep them safe, it is when they don't follow said rule that they get into trouble. The 180 option is no substitute for avoiding cloud in the first place but, if sh*t happens it is their only hope of regaining VMC.

It is not, as we have stated before, rocket science to get pilots to estimate their in-flight visibility and proximity to the cloud base - so once they cannot see more than 1500m they should land or turn round.

A lowering cloudbase doesn't just appear from nowhere - the only excuse for not recognising it happening is if it is dark or you are over the sea where it is easier to get caught out.

If a pilot with a PPLH can't assess the vis or cloudbase he/she should simply not be allowed to fly at all.

S76Heavy

13th May 2012, 09:50

I can't help but wonder if there should not be a stricter selection of PPL students or a stricter exam.

If so many end up dead due to poor decision making, then perhaps they should be protected from their own stupidity by not giving them the privilege that allows them to kill themselves in a spectacular manner.

Decision making requires maturity and knowledge; apparently something that is missing in a lot of these accidents.

@AnFI: I've had the "pleasure" of poling a medium twin IMC without stabilisation after my AFCS failed. We not only survived but were even quite accurate on track and altitude. It is not rocket science, it does take practice.
If one lacks the practice, don't get yourself in a position where it bites you.

Big boys rules, indeed: if you can afford the PPL and play in the real world where a wrong decision can kill you, you'd better play by the rules or experience the Darwinian process.

chopjock

13th May 2012, 10:35

I frequently fly in poor wx conditions. When it happens it is usually a calculated risk.
Occasionally it can turn out to be worse than expected and I then have to adapt my risk assessment and decide to continue or not.
"Get there itus" does not have to be a fatal desease if you make the right decisions and know what to do.
This comes from experience. I was never taught how to proceed in these poor conditions, but just told not to do it.
Being told "not to do it" with rules does not help the situation there in the cockpit.
In my opinion you should be shown how to "not do it" by an experienced instructor first.
ie. get out there on a bad day with an instructor, in below vis minima and get scared enough to learn not to loose sight of your visual references.
You can't do that legally so training on how to avoid this situation will never happen.

.

hihover

13th May 2012, 11:45

You two are wearing red noses right? It has to be red nose day in the motherland.

:ugh:

Tam Macklin out this time....really.

OvertHawk

13th May 2012, 17:41

And just when you think it can't get any more ridiculous...... Chopjock arrives!!!

:ugh:

Hughes500

13th May 2012, 20:26

Overthawk

I think what chop is saying is the pplh course should have an element of flying in poor weather and what to do or not as the case may be. Lets be honest too many people bang on about not flying if the wx is bad or at such and such a viz etc etc.Where do you get the info from to make the decision ? The met office is ****e ever since it moved to Exeter, it seems more often the forecast is nothing like reality so the poor ppl goes off and more often than not the wx is better than forecast so he is fine and thinks well it was alright last time ! Then again it can be way worse than forecast and people get caught out :ugh:
Personally the caa's 5 hours of instrument appreciation should be changed to 5 hours of bad weather flying. But to be fair how to you define this ? EASA are now changing the 5 hours to enough hours to excute a 180 degree turn +/- 150 ft.
It boils down to captaincy ( better called common sense !!), probably the most difficult " thing " to teach, if sense was common everyone would have it !

toptobottom

13th May 2012, 22:04

Hughes - the weather forecast is (obviously) just a guide and not something that determines whether a VFR flight can be safely completed or not. The issue (that everyone seems to be in violent agreement about) is that this is about decision making. Changing the attitude of an over-confident and probably under-experienced/ill-equipped pilot is what will save lives. If the Wx gets too ****ty, stop. That's it. Don't press on thinking 'I'll get through somehow', or 'I can always do a 180..'.

Bored now... :bored:

Hughes500

14th May 2012, 06:30

Top2

I agree with you entirely, the wx as a guide is true but when it is so badly wrong it lulls ppl's into a false sense of security. Take this morning for instance, according to Carol Kirkwood on the BBC ( I know its not aviation but info comes from met office)it is supposed to be raining in the SW, well I live 12 miles from Exeter and guess what it isnt and hasnt last night as forecast. When you have this constantly happening your average ppl takes little notice of the weather until one day he gets caught out badly

toptobottom

14th May 2012, 06:40

...but when it is so badly wrong it lulls ppl's into a false sense of security
:confused:

Dealing with what's actually happening in front of you when you're flying is all that counts.

"It's not my fault Mr AAIB investigator, Doris on the TV said it would be sunny and it's actually cloudy, so I was lulled into a false sense of security and went IMC. What else could I have done?" :ugh:

AnFI

14th May 2012, 07:06

ttb - they are not all overconfident types - some are conscientious types who believe that if they obey 'BBR No'1 they will be safe - whereas infact they will be killed by relying on that and then the 180.

Yes they are ill-equipped...

In many cases the visibility was not all that bad just prior to cloud entry when the viz then dropped rapidly to nil...

In some of the accident reports the vis was better than 10k prior to cloud entry...

These guys just could not recognise they were about to fly into cloud...
If they did recognise it then they would not have flown into the cloud...

How is that logic missing you guys?

(flying is riddled with illusions and misunderstandings which even experienced pilots are subject to. Common examples are; that from 2300ft an aircraft passing 400ft underneath will appear to be very low. An aircraft viewed with only horizontal separation will appear to be vertically above a point much further away than the reality. Closing speeds (eg in formation) appear to be small but become surprisingly large with proximity etc)

AnFI

14th May 2012, 08:51

Yes H369 ... wx reports are totally unreliable as a method of avoiding IMC.

A good forecast is often followed by potentially fatal actuals... this happens frequently.

[email protected]

16th May 2012, 15:59

The cloudbase isn't a hard fixture and the transition from VMC to IMC is usually a gradual one. It is quite normal to be able to see the ground when 100' to 200' above the cloudbase - all that is required is to lower the lever to recover to VMC.

The problem comes when a pilot goes lower, ignoring his 500' rule (sometimes legally but not very sensibly) and ends up in the same situation (ie in the cloud) but without the option to just lower the lever because he has little clear air below him.

The answer for a PPL is that as soon as you have to descend below 500' to keep away from the cloud, you should turn round and head back to better weather or land. If they all followed this advice then the number of IIMC events would be greatly reduced.

chopjock

16th May 2012, 17:13

The answer for a PPL is that as soon as you have to descend below 500' to keep away from the cloud, you should turn round and head back to better weather or land.

I think that's a bit too cautious for a helicopter. A plank perhaps.

Thomas coupling

16th May 2012, 18:05

Chopjock - I've missed you. I forgot how irresistably baity you were:rolleyes:
Think carefully before responding to that sort of advice. It comes from experience :cool:you dream of having.

Anfi: I recall many moons ago asking about your experience. I never received an answer. Correct me if I am wrong (again!) but you are not a pilot are you?
My guess is you are an aviation journalist and/or a lecturer in aviation associated subjects perhaps?
Nothing wrong in that, I hasten to add but the proof of the pudding etc etc....

No end of courses / qualifications, can beat experience and the price for experience is time. Unfortunately for some, time is in short supply as they throw valuable caution/advice/instruction/rules to the wind.
All novices have to go through the mill. Those that come out the other end, generally display common sense qualities.
Those that don't can't :ouch:

No-one is with you at moments like those that the poor guy experienced in Bude, Cornwall that fateful day. You simply rely on your own logic and common sense, believe me Anfi - many of us here as SME's know this for a fact.
Your driven, constant pounding of the obvious falls on deaf ears. Human frailty wins everytime - accept it and let's move on now, eh?

griffothefog

16th May 2012, 18:45

I don't know where this thread is trying to go, or what the right answers are to this problem... But as someone who used to regularly have to pump up into IMC in an un-stabilised Bolkow on lighthouse ops, I can only imagine the shear terror that poor bastard felt as it all started to fall apart...:(

ShyTorque

16th May 2012, 19:23

I think that's a bit too cautious for a helicopter. A plank perhaps.

Is contravening the 500 foot rule in an attempt to stay VMC something you do very often? :hmm:

[email protected]

16th May 2012, 19:27

That was going to be my next question as well shy:ok:

John R81

16th May 2012, 19:41

I don't agree with a word he said, but where was this "person. vessel, vehicle or structure" that brought about a breach of the 500 ft rule?

(I have said before, my rule is 600ft agl and viz to maintain 60knt OR retreat / land. I have not yet broken this rule, but I have retreated several times, and I have landed once. Many more times I have stayed on the ground with a nice cup of tea and a grouchy, whinging temprement)

ShyTorque

16th May 2012, 20:05

where was this "person. vessel, vehicle or structure" that brought about a breach of the 500 ft rule?

Many of us here have done a great deal of low flying. Those that have know that it's a vain hope that in UK you will see every person, vessel, vehicle or structure in time to avoid it by 500 feet.

Before anyone tries to trip me up for saying so, I was legally exempt from Rule 5 for 25 years, in previous roles. Military jet, SEP and rotary. Then SAR then Police.

Now, as a civvy rotary pilot, I'm no longer exempt Rule 5 so I have to abide by it, even though I know I could safely continue under the cloudbase. Sometimes, when icing conditions prevail above, I too have to turn back because there is no safe IFR option. Highly frustrating, I admit.

chopjock

16th May 2012, 20:41

Is contravening the 500 foot rule in an attempt to stay VMC something you do very often?ShyT, crab

I presume you know the 500 foot rule is not solely to do with height above the ground.
You should know full well you can legally fly as low as you like provided you don't fly closer than vessels etc etc., remain clear of cloud and have the surface in sight and a vis of 1500m.

So why the BS aimed at PPL's?

Thomas coupling

16th May 2012, 22:14

That's my boy Chopjock - give 'em hell!
It's obvious the lowering cloud will permit you to steer clear of VVSP's, they're just wussies. What do they know eh?

Crack on CJ.

Whirlygig

16th May 2012, 22:35

So why the BS aimed at PPL's?
I don't think the BS was aimed at PPLs (no apostrophe) but at .... :)

Cheers

Whirls

AnFI

16th May 2012, 22:36

Hi TC: You are right I don't like discussing my experience - it's not really relevant - but I am a pilot, with some experience - although I am still learning!

I don't see that there should ever be any danger from bad weather (viz/cloudbase) - it should be embarrassing/impractical/anti-social/impossible to comply with 500ft rule first - with danger never coming into it. Given the choice between the 500ft rule and entry to IMC I hope no pilot will choose the fatal option:{

I understand, TC, that you believe that a pilot needs to go through their risky in-experienced staged and partly by luck will develop the 'toolkit' of judgment and strategy to become safe - I don't think that precludes trying to pass on those wisdoms... and do our best for them.

Crab: It is quite normal to be able to see the ground when 100' to 200' above the cloudbase soft bottoms sometimes - you can't be that slack when there is (effectively) no IMC option...

Griffo: I love that you were doing that - they don't even seem to test the ability to manually and unaided pole about with sole ref to instruments in an IRT anymore:eek: - strange

This guy had never really seen a cloud - but was coached in IMC flight and 180's - I feel very sorry for him and his 'loved ones' - I think we let him down.

[email protected]

18th May 2012, 07:23

Hi TC: You are right I don't like discussing my experience - it's not really relevant condemned from your own words AnFI:)

Ready2Fly

18th May 2012, 09:26

How much time is spent in classrooms to cover the subject of accidents? To my knowledge (JAA syllabus): 0 hrs.

I know some PPL students read these reports (like i did long before i even started flying) to try and learn from them. I doubt the majority does.

I still remember the day we could not go flying due to weather and instead i had to watch the video from Robinson. The scene with the R22 which came down after the MR stalled and on the first flight with his girlfriend after he got his shiny new license is one i will never forget.

It is not to make people afraid of bad weather. In europe and especially in the UK you will hardly fly if you wait for GAFOR's with C's all around. But teach students in deteriorating conditions and make them aware of when it is time for plan B or C and have one (or both).

Attitude is a different issue but those with bad habits probably do not need bad weather to kill themselves one day.

SilsoeSid

18th May 2012, 10:58

How much time is spent in classrooms to cover the subject of accidents? To my knowledge (JAA syllabus): 0 hrs.

So, if the CAA/JAA mandated Single Pilot CRM courses, how many would be crying out 'Nanny State' and the like.

On past threads, Single Pilot CRM has been openly scoffed at, and until it is taken seriously without intervention by an authority, incidents that may well have been preventable at an early stage will continue.

Hughes500

18th May 2012, 13:22

silsoe

Single pilot crm, thats the problem it is really common sense for single pilots and as such is not really crm in the true sense. How do you teach common sense? With great difficulty ( the single pilot does not have someone else to learn from - " the loneliness of command"), and at what point does experience turn to stupidity.
I have seen many a cpl that quite frankly was at a standard of an average ppl but with the atitude i am a cpl so I know best and it wont happen to me :ugh:
Quite frankly there is almost no way in preventing people who want to fly in fog flying in it.

Johe02

18th May 2012, 14:54

I agree with AnFI - but I know its a minority view so nothing will change.

[email protected]

18th May 2012, 15:52

This is where Human Factors training and CRM come together. CRM is HF but HF can be taught to single pilots without the crew element being needed.

A knowledge of HF might help those predisposed to arrogance and poor decision making to recognise it in themselves and the training might also make them realise that such traits are distinctly dangerous in the world of aviation.

SilsoeSid

18th May 2012, 19:49

( the single pilot does not have someone else to learn from - " the loneliness of command")

The thing about a single pilot CRM course is that you don't do it by yourself. :ugh:

Crew Resource Management (CRM), or Cockpit Resource Management as it is sometimes referred to when it comes to single pilot helicopters, encompasses a wide range of knowledge, skills and attitudes including communications, situational awareness, problem solving, decision making, and teamwork.

CRM can be defined as a management system which makes optimum use of all available resources - equipment, procedures and people - to promote safety and enhance the efficiency of flight operations.

It is concerned not so much with the technical knowledge and skills required to fly and operate an aircraft but rather with the cognitive and interpersonal skills needed to manage the flight within an organised aviation system.

In this context, cognitive skills are defined as the mental processes used for gaining and maintaining situational awareness, for solving problems and for making decisions. Interpersonal skills are regarded as communications and a range of behavioural activities associated with teamwork.

In aviation, as in other walks of life, these skill areas often overlap with each other, and they also overlap with the required technical skills. Furthermore, they are not confined to multi-crew aircraft, but also relate to single pilot operations, which invariably need to interface with other aircraft and with various ground support agencies in order to complete their missions successfully.
Helicentre Aviation : Helicopter Charter and Events - Crew Resource Management Course (http://www.flyheli.co.uk/events/detail/crew_resource_management_course/)

Hughes500

19th May 2012, 06:10

Silsoe

Please tell me from your post

"interpersonal skills needed to manage the flight within an organised aviation system."

Where does the private owner fit into an organised aviation system then ? Think you need to wise up to reality:ugh: There is no such thing within EASA land for the private pilot. Yes within aoc operations it is obviously there, within a TRTO/FTO it is there, probably not in many RF's. The system over here requires no checking on owners other than an LPC check ride which is just a handling check. It is normally the owners who fail their LPC's, usually on emergency drills rather than the " normal flying".
I agree crm is important but and it is a big but it will not stop people professional or not when operating single pilot doing stupid things. Once an owner has his shiny licence and shiny R44 there any supervision ends until his lpc which maybe as far away as 15 months ! So how do wish to change this and be practical please ? As a TRE and head of training of an AOC company the other pilots are able to talk to each other and are encouraged to, within the company, we look at case studies of accidents ( yes the one in Bude) As part of their opc check rides there is an element of crm.
Is The solution is to add crm to the lpc every year for pilots ? However would this have stopped someone from flying into fog, probably not.

AnFI

19th May 2012, 07:12

Ok there is no doubt that some people do have an overconfident attitude.

But even a wreckless, arrogant, private pilot, (wealthy?) won't fly into a cloud and kill himself if he knows how not to. :ugh:

Unfortunately some highly conscientious, well meaning and responsible people also don't know how to stay out of clouds.:eek:

Even some police pilots apparently don't know how to stay out of clouds either;)

So if you do CRM at PPLs you might make the arrogant ones more humble - but it won't help any of the three groups above stay out of clouds.

[email protected]

19th May 2012, 07:21

AnFI - we are all still waiting for your expert tuition in the special skill of staying out of the clouds - most of us mere mortals think it is pretty straightforward but apparently you have created a new science/art/religion (delete as appropriate) with knowledge that only you, the chosen one can impart.

Everyone else says 'don't fly in the cloudbase, constantly assess the visibility and turn round early' but apparently your secret of how not to lose visual references is some divine gift which you still haven't explained.

Do please anoint us with your wisdom.

Johe02

19th May 2012, 07:33

Sounds simple doesn't it - I've found many students (and pilots) don't know how to judge if another a/c is on the same level as them. If they can't do this how can they do the same for a cloud?

SilsoeSid

19th May 2012, 08:41

Silsoe

Please tell me from your post

"interpersonal skills needed to manage the flight within an organised aviation system."

Where does the private owner fit into an organised aviation system then ? Think you need to wise up to reality :ugh:

Hughes, did you read past the part that you quoted?

"In this context, .... Interpersonal skills are regarded as communications and a range of behavioural activities associated with teamwork.

In aviation, as in other walks of life, these skill areas often overlap with each other, and they also overlap with the required technical skills. Furthermore, they are not confined to multi-crew aircraft, but also relate to single pilot operations, which invariably need to interface with other aircraft and with various ground support agencies in order to complete their missions successfully."

I guess that if you even got to the work 'teamwork', you were unable to relate that word to single pilot flights and switched off.

There may well not be an 'I' in Teamwork however, look closer and you will find a 'me',
but most importantly you will find 'Tea'.

Why is tea 'most important? Because before going flying, perhaps one should sit down quietly for a few minutes with a brew and go through the planning and 'fly the trip' before actually getting into the aircraft!
Please take a minute now and read the section in the AAAIB (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/may_2012/robinson_r44_ii__raven_ii__g_rotg.cfm) report titled 'Weather Information' and ask yourself if a quick 5/10 minute think through before launching might have made a difference to the events of that day.

Please don't kid yourself or anyone prepared to listen to you, that single pilot flights are always flown alone.
IMHO, with every 'single pilot' flight there will either be someone else in the aircraft or directly involved with the purpose of that flight. As soon as that other person is at the departure point, pick up point, arrival point, sat in the aircraft or in the boardroom waiting, the pilot is put in a completely different mindset. Call it pressonitus, gethomeitis, commercial pressure, loss of face whatever you like, but the ability to say 'no' or 'sorry can't make it', 'I'll be late, lets reschedule', or most importantly "I'm turning round and going back', seems to disappear.

Not quite sure which reality you want me to wise up to :confused:

AnFI

19th May 2012, 08:58

Quite right Crab most of us mere mortals think it is pretty straightforward unfortunately some just can't see it - do you want them to die or do you want to tell them how it works?

(incidentally in your exceptional case I am not sure you do understand how it works)

It's like explaining how to walk - it's easy to walk, hard if you can't and difficult to explain. If you can't walk perhaps you need to go on a CRM course and be told how wreckless arrogant and irresponsible you are? But I don't think it'll get you to walk.

Here's a crack at some fundamentals (bit of a rush):

1 You can't rely on seeing clouds to avoid them - they are often indistinct - you have to fly to places which are clearly not clouds. Positive assurance of flight path.

2 The furthest cue you can see is important you must keep being able to see it or further.

3 If the furthest cue disappears you must respond to that immediately (since you are on a path which will lead to IMC) even if you can still (for the time being) see a good distance.

4 You must have slowed already to a speed which permits you to slow further sufficiently whilst descending to maintain visual contact ahead of you.

5 The angle you can descend at is limited by your energy. You must not have so much energy that you are forced to fly horizontally when you need to be descending.

5.5 you need to keep your collective (energy input) loose and ready to change on a constantly re-evaluating basis - faster/slower higher/lower

6 You need to understand parallax. (like a piece of mountain's relative motion against its background) (same for clouds)

that's all for now , gotta go, must be many others who can complete this liost

chopjock

19th May 2012, 10:23

that's all for now , gotta go, must be many others who can complete this liost

Well I can add to it...

Like in a helicopter you can go really slow and really low. So whats the problem?

Once practiced it becomes easy. In fact if you end up in the hover with the surface in sight, a 1500m vis is not even required to stay safe.

AnFI

19th May 2012, 11:55

quite right chopjock

other considerations become the limit - like practicality, politeness, 500ft rule etc - but it would never be danger (unless you are doing it wrong)

helicopter you can go really slow and really low. So whats the problem? precisely - and the answer to that is; some (30% ish) can't see when and how to start slowing and descending - the first thing they see is nothing and never really know why.

The lethal cocktail is to teach people enough IRF skills to kill themselves , not show them how to stay Visual , and to give them BBrule No.1 with 1500m as the magic number when any visibility limit is arbitrary and will not reduce risk. It's wrong.

cont//...
7 Treat the furthest thing you can see as the 'End of Your World' , fly as if landing just before the End of the World, if the EotW becomes further as you get closer then you can still plan on flying to the new EotW instead, if the EotW never becomes further then you will have landed before it.

(I am not against Instrument Reference Flight training for all tho' - it's just not the answer to preventing IIMC)

[email protected]

19th May 2012, 15:33

1 You can't rely on seeing clouds to avoid them - they are often indistinct - you have to fly to places which are clearly not clouds. Positive assurance of flight path. = don't fly in the cloudbase
2 The furthest cue you can see is important you must keep being able to see it or further.

3 If the furthest cue disappears you must respond to that immediately (since you are on a path which will lead to IMC) even if you can still (for the time being) see a good distance. = constantly assess the visibility

4 You must have slowed already to a speed which permits you to slow further sufficiently whilst descending to maintain visual contact ahead of you. = slow down and go down to avoid the cloudbase

5 The angle you can descend at is limited by your energy. You must not have so much energy that you are forced to fly horizontally when you need to be descending.
5.5 you need to keep your collective (energy input) loose and ready to change on a constantly re-evaluating basis - faster/slower higher/lower you can always go down in a helicopter - its called lowering the lever. If my collective is 'loose' I add friction.

6 You need to understand parallax. (like a piece of mountain's relative motion against its background) (same for clouds) not quite sure what you mean by this but you have obviously run out of ideas
7 Treat the furthest thing you can see as the 'End of Your World' , fly as if landing just before the End of the World, if the EotW becomes further as you get closer then you can still plan on flying to the new EotW instead, if the EotW never becomes further then you will have landed before it. = constantly assess the visibility

As I said, nothing new - just wrapped in pseudo-science and made up stuff

chopjock

19th May 2012, 15:51

crab

Everyone else says 'don't fly in the cloudbase, constantly assess the visibility and turn round early'Not everyone else. I don't think you should turn round early.
I may not turn round until I had to. Even then, I might just land and wait. Or even grovel slowly on until an improvement in the vis. If I'm low and slow, what's the risk?
Turning round comes across as a failure, perhaps that's why some don't.

Thomas coupling

19th May 2012, 16:24

AnFi: I can't imagine letting you loose in a classroom full of newbie's. On the one hand you preach that the art/science that is the ability to identify oncoming danger cannot be taught ("like walking"), yet you obfuscate with a list of miscellaneous useless data (M.U.D) and confuse the listener even more about what to do???
Let me compare the problem (yet again) to another very real and very accurate analogy:
A 17yr old is taught to drive and then successfully pass their driving test. And for the next few weeks they BLINDINGLY and faithfully go forward and drive at night, on the motorway, in heavy rain/sleet or snow, in heavy traffic.......and 99% of them survive. Why is that? Have they been shown the way :cool: Have they had CRM lessons for cars :zzz: Of course not - they fall back on a mixture of instinct and an inherent desire to survive at all costs.
This too, happens in the aviation world, where the PPL is taken so far by the apparatus and then released into the big bad world. The gene pool does the rest.
I really don't know where you are going with this relentless mantra of yours.....it is as if....after a while....you will expose the true meaning of life to the aviation world. {All hail AnFI}.
Or maybe not :zzz:

Chopjock: I love you. Every post a cracker. What an attractive ethos:
When in doubt keep going...just in case it gets better. Don't turn back "too early".
And the piece de resistance: Fly low and slow....Mmmmmm poetry in motion. Another one please? Pretty please.....[Senior Pilot can you invent a smilie for Wa*ker?]

ShyTorque

19th May 2012, 16:57

I really don't think there's any great secret to this. The RAF classifies this as a "lack of awareness" or "lack of capacity".

Thankfully, most who suffered from it in training were removed from the course at some stage or other. I think it just comes from a lack of sufficient brain processing power to cope with more than just flying the aircraft. A lack of the ability to multi-task sufficiently, if you like.

Perhaps tens of thousands of years ago, some of their ancestors would have been caught and eaten by what other men were catching and eating.

nigelh

19th May 2012, 17:57

Maybe his ideas are just a rehash of whats out there ....but i see no harm in putting it out again in a different way .....you have to admit the way we are teaching and training pilots IS letting them down ....they ARE dying , so what have we to lose ??

Some of what Chopjock and ANFI say i do agree with ( not all ...).
Even at the risk of being mauled by that pussycat TC ( Top Cat ) i know that you CAN fly safely in v low cloud ( say 250-300 ft ) . If you know your route and get below the cloud you can often have good viz ....certainly 3 -5 km . And if you fly at a speed that gives you plenty of time to see obstacles and do a 180 within your vision to my mind that IS safe . Most of us who fly up north fly in this sort of weather all the time and without bashing into things :ugh: I think the confusion comes in when people take the view that you should not encourage low time pilots to do this .....quite correct and i certainly didnt fly in the type of conditions when i had 500 hrs as i do now .
I have always believed that you should be flown out towards crap weather by an experienced pilot and see where he turns back , which way he turns , what speed he comes up to it at etc etc You may find that you may have pushed further ....and that in itself is a lesson .
In any event always fun to imagine TC , Silsoe and Crabs moustaches bristling with indignation at the impudence of you little civvies ANFI and Chop ....:D

Sir Niall Dementia

19th May 2012, 17:59

About ten years ago I flew a charter passenger and some of his mates for a boys weekend away, he holds a PPL and flies an R 44, but needed to take 6 so he hired from us and I got the job of flying them.

We left London in viz of 600m and a cloudbase of 250-300ft. As we went IMC he (sitting LHS so he could "help me when I needed it") became quite nervous, we didn't see a thing until 200' on the ILS the other end, all the way he kept saying " I could never, ever do this."

Turned out he'd got himself IMC by accident a little while before and nearly killed himself, his wife and his daughter, coming out of clouds, almost out of control and just missing some power cables. To this day his wife will not fly with him and has banned the kids from flying with him. He told me that the control loss happened in the 180 turn he tried to make, that in cloud he could see nothing, with foggles he could always see a little bit. Looking at the cockpit of his aircraft the thing that struck me was the fact that the AI and HSI are set incredibly low and so you are in an unnatural position for IF with your in-built balance mechanisms at a strange tilt giving a built in version of the leans. I suspect from his description of the weather and the turbulence he may have been in a small, embedded Cu and that the turbulence played havoc with his already overloaded mind and senses.

I sat in the cockpit and put on a pair of foggles and was staggered by how much of the outside world I could see. I'm not an instructor, but I do have 9 500 rotary hours another 4 500 fixed wing and IRs on both and that makes me question just how many PPLs doing instrument appreciation are really on instruments and how many are dishonestly sneaking a peek outside, no-one can really tell, but there are enough AAIB reports to suggest to me that a lot of them are, and very few of them understand the weather properly, or the concept of arranging your flight in bounds. I.e. I can see the next bound 5 miles ahead so all is well at my speed and altitude, I can't see the next bound so slow down, is my altitude ok? How much of the weather is at my altitude? If its a lot I need to change my heading or altitude or speed. Now I need to start re-planning, do I need to turn back? is it worse behind me now? do I need help to find an airfield and land? Do I need to tell my ego to f*$% right off because actually I'm quite scared and I want down?

Like (I suspect) many on here I can imagine what was going through the mind of the pilot of this aircraft and it is not pretty. I have heard a pilot panicking with his TX held open and it was the stuff of nightmares, I truly feel for the Newquay controller who heard this, just as I feel for the Bournemouth controller listening to the pilot of the A109 who crashed on approach in poorish wx at night in 2004.

Flying is a big boys passtime/profession (or girls) it can take the fun away in seconds, if you allow dishonest training, ego or arrogance it will kill you in the same time.

Just my 2d worth

SND

Nigelh; You've actually hit part of it on the head, make the 180 turn while you can still see. Do it in the cloud and your'e probably screwed.