Incident: Delta B763 blew tyre on takeoff

[md-100]

http://avherald.com/h?article=43d9325b&opt=0 (Incident: Delta B763 at Detroit on Jun 1st 2011, blew tyre on takeoff)

Why did the crew continue to GRU flying 10 hours with a blew tyre to a very distant airport instead of returning?

[galaxy flyer]

Let's see,

1/ Did not want to do a heavy weight, fully laden with fuel, landing with a blown tire.

2/ No other damage, so no immediate need to land.

3/ Crew did not know it was blown. Unable to link, so the answer to this one maybe in link

4/ Having had a blown tire, I can assure you landing at normal weight at the destination is better than a heavy weight landing at the departure point. Yes, they might have been able to dump fuel, but what for?

[sabenaboy]

_66mlsFwB9I

[kiwibrit]

I presume this (http://avherald.com/h?article=43d9325b&opt=0) was the link intended. Speaking as a (now retired) maintenance man, I am unclear why md-100 thought the aircraft should return. Surely, Sao Paulo would have been just as capable as Detroit at handling the incident, so safety would not have been compromised. The passengers arrived at their destination without extra delay, fuel was not wasted, and the aircraft was correctly positioned. I guess there was a risk of brake unit damage, but I would expect there to be spares at Sao Paulo. Leg damage was a possibility, I suppose, but I would have been very surprised had that happened.

Bit out of turn expressing an opinion here, I suppose. I am well past my sell-by date.

[BEagle]

No other damage....

Difficult to be certain of that - tyre flail can cause all sorts of damage which might not be immediately obvious. If the cause of the failure wasn't positively known, there would be some possibility of another tyre failing inside the undercarriage bay later in flight.

Which caused a fatal accident in (I think) a Swissair Caravelle years ago - and an RAF VC10 lost 2 engines when a tyre exploded insie the undercarriage bay, damaging the LP cocks.

Was it wise to continue for another 10 hours? I'm not sure that it was.

The hell with 'fuel waste' or 'delayed passengers' - if your aircraft has suffered a tyre explosion and the extent of the damage isn't known, it might be preferable to leave the undercarriage extended, burn off (or dump if available) and land as soon as practicable?

[ManaAdaSystem]

This scenario is discussed in the Boeing FCTM. There is no definite answer (as with most situations we may encounter), but they pretty much did what Mr. Boeing tells them to do.

Good call, IMHO.

[Mercenary Pilot]

From the Boeing FCTM:

Tire Failure during or after Takeoff
If the crew suspects a tire failure during takeoff, the Air Traffic Service facility
serving the departing airport should be advised of the potential for tire pieces
remaining on the runway. The crew should consider continuing to the destination unless there is an indication that other damage has occurred (non-normal engine indications, engine vibrations, hydraulic system failures or leaks, etc.).

[forget]

... tyre failing inside the undercarriage bay later in flight. Which caused a fatal accident in (I think) a Swissair Caravelle years ago ...

Tragic, but rather self inflicted.

Swissair Flight 306 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_306)

[stator vane]

when i was in the back seat and then the right seat of a three man aircraft, i made it a point to learn from every flightcrew's reaction to every event we encountered. one very good captain, now with atlas cargo, had a philosopy of waiting til the possible malfunction would "manifest itself"

yes we are to use our hopefully indepth systems knowledge and wide read knowledge of all the aviation incidents/accidents/causes-effects-results to our individual minds' abilities to imagine all the possible ramifications of any malfunction that we experience. but to let our imagination go free range without any manifest evidence is not any safer that a conscientious continuation of the flight as planned until some other "damage" does clearly display itself.

i don't know the route taken, but if the captain proceeded knowing that there were alternate airports with sufficient runways and services to deal with whatever might come up, and basically using the fuel to produce distance while reducing the weight in case a landing was needed, there is nothing unsafe about that.

perhaps he/she did consider all the possible reduced stopping capability-possible flap/hydraulic and other second stage effects all along the route and especially at the proposed destination. being delta i would be very surprized if they did not communicate with ground mx-operations-maybe even other pilots on the company frequency and get second, third opinions. i would. perhaps he/she configured early on the approach, cautiously watching each flap and gear event and feeling of the aircraft flight controls. very few things can happen to reduce safety that will not make some manifest display of one sort of the other if carefully observed.

he/she was there, not i and the lack of significant event is evidence enough that the correct thought process was followed and executed.

[A37575]

the lack of significant event is evidence enough that the correct thought process was followed and executed.

Stop being coy. The captain decided to accept the risk of possible unknown damage (his choice) and by so doing saved his company heaps of money. A good company man at heart.

[ross_M]

How did the guy end up filming this? Just lucky? Or was this a notable flight for some other reason. :confused:

A naive question: Is it easy to notice on the flight deck right when a tire blows? Are there pressure sensors that detect this or just by the handling on the runway.

[astonmartin]

It appears that they postponed gear retraction. So maybe they knew right away that there was something wrong. Could be through tire pressure, maybe through tower/ATC.

You have to land anyway, so good decision to continue and land with less weight and less fuel. The decision that comes before that decision is whether you should retract. Because retracting a blown tire can damage the interiors of the wheel well. Due to debris or do to hight temperatures/ wheel well fire.

[vlkyplky]

We had three cases where the protector (tread) ripped from the tire on B378. With most cases it was just damage to the trailing edge flaps but could have been easily worse. The repairs were very financialy demaning... But consider that the tread around 160 kts is round 1000G's! and the kinetic energy is massive (like a golf ball at speed of sound). After V1 you have to consider the route, wx, etc... basically it comes down to pilot's airman ship.

Great vid, thanks for sharing.

I actually thought there are systems that doesnt allow the gear to be retracted if the tire is blown... any one?

[kiwibrit]

BEagle - never worked on Caravelle. Did on the RAF VC10 - as a deputy shift boss on the flight line. Never say anything like that damage from a burst tyre. Never saw reports of the incident. OK, I was on that flight line for 18 months only - but I think I would have seen something on it unless the incident happened after the early 90s. Of course aircraft layout can affect things - notoriously did so for the Concorde.

[PAPI-74]

I wouldn't retract the gear either. If the temps were right up - as you would expect them to be - getting the Dunlops out of the air flow at that stage is asking for a well fire. Not to mention that they maybe distorted or hanging rubber, which might jam the gear up. Far too many possible bad scenarios to risk retraction. A bad call in my mind.
As for tyre pressure, the 767 does indicate this on the status page (bottom EICAS).
THE 757 ONLY TEMP....

http://www.smartcockpit.com/data/pdfs/plane/boeing/b767/misc/B767_Flightdeck_and_Avionics.pdf

Page 113

[BEagle]

kiwibrit, it was a 10 Sqn aircraft in the late 1990s (I think?) flying from Scotland to Brize Norton. A worn tyre was thought to be capable of 'one more landing', it wasn't and exploded in the undercarriage bay during flight. The crew made a safe 2-engined landing at Brize, but a lot of fuel was seen to be leaking out of the damaged wing.

An abandonment on the RW was initiated NOT by the captain; the first he knew of it was when he saw people running past.....

The fuel stain stayed on the runway for quite a while.

[Checkboard]

The Caravelle was Swissair Flight 306 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_306), a bit of pilot-induced failure. Illustrates the problem of retracting damaged gear, though - and you never know why the tyre blew. Were the brakes "grabbing" for the taxi out - overheating the tyre? Who knows?

Delta Airlines said the crew was aware of tyre debris being found on the runway following their departure, Delta technicians however were unable to positively identify from photos whether the debris belonged to a Delta aircraft or not. The crew therefore declared emergency on approach to Sao Paulo as a precaution.

So, having said that - they retracted the gear as normal, and without knowledge of the failure (which is normal for an aircraft of this size). Contacted some time later about the tyre debris - you have already retracted the gear, and been monitoring the performance for some time ...

50:50 call, I reckon.

[BEagle]

Thanks for the confirmation, Checkboard.

I reckon if they knew they'd had a tyre burst on take-off, they should have left the undercarriage extended, burned off (or dumped fuel) and returned. But if they didn't know until someone told them later on, then that would have been a different matter.

[Airbubba]

As for tyre pressure, the 767 does indicate this on the status page (bottom EICAS).

As page 111 of the document you cite indicates, tire pressure indication is an option on the '76. Not sure whether the Deltoids have it or not.

[stator vane]

That's imaginative indeed. Perhaps a better word-phrase would be "non-judgmental of an event
I did not experience"
What can have gone wrong that would not manifest itself somewhere along
a time line?
Perhaps the safest path would be stay in bed?

[Smilin_Ed]

i don't know the route taken, but if the captain proceeded knowing that there were alternate airports with sufficient runways and services to deal with whatever might come up, and basically using the fuel to produce distance while reducing the weight in case a landing was needed, there is nothing unsafe about that.

Stator Vane has it right. Keep the gear down to eliminate the possibility of further damage and use the fuel you need to get rid of to take you to another company airport along the route. They probably had enough fuel to get to Cincinnati or Atlanta if not Miami. Then land at an acceptable weight, get it fixed, and proceed on to Sao Paolo. Sure you waste some gas and delay your passengers but you don't take the chance that the gear would hang up in the well when you tried to put it down.

[kiwibrit]

BEagle, fair enough, I was out of it in 1992. As non-aircrew, I shouldn't be here anyway. I'll leave you to it.:ok:

[sabenaboy]

I got this info from a thread on airliners.net (http://www.airliners.net/aviation-forums/general_aviation/read.main/5160499/) started by the movie maker, KDTWflyer.


"The gear retraction sequence appeared to me to be within a normal timeframe following Vr." (A picture (http://www.flickr.com/photos/tsholcom/5794968235/in/photostream) of this flight on climb out)
'There was a DTW ops vehicle that went down the runway about 20mins after DL 257 left"
"One thing I would like to point out is how hard N195DN appeared to land on the right side before this departure..." (Picture (http://www.flickr.com/photos/tsholcom/5795518338/in/photostream/lightbox/)of the previous landing)[
Combine this with the info from Avherald:
Delta Airlines said the crew was aware of tyre debris being found on the runway following their departure, Delta technicians however were unable to positively identify from photos whether the debris belonged to a Delta aircraft or not. The crew therefore declared emergency on approach to Sao Paulo as a precaution.


I think it's safe to assume that the crew hadn't noticed anything wrong with the TO roll, raised the gear normally, were informed later that tyre debris was found on the runway that might have come from their A/C and therefore declared an emergency before ldg just in case.

[stillalbatross]

Always fun reading these threads with the ex-air force types who have limited understanding of the commercial aspect of things ie the airline is actually here to make money. VS the ex GA types who have worked for a bunch of operators who went broke and therefore try to balance commercial and safety.

Bringing up the VC10 is interesting but as a percentage of tyre failures on the T/O roll what are the chances of that happening. The LH 340 centre gear tyre failure and associated hyd failure also makes good reading but statistically IMHO chances of secondary failure are slim.

[Golden Rivit]

I remember a training seminar at an airline I worked as a mechanic,that covered the importance of completing all work to specs,and the proper sign offs required.
The accident was a Nationair DC8 that had wheel failure on the taxi out and subsequent inflight fire and crash,The tire pressures had been "pencil whipped" by a manager,and the results were human lives lost.
Nationair Canada History on the Web (http://www2.gol.com/users/daleh/nationair/crash.html)
Deltoid 767=Wrong decision

[stilton]

Too many variables I think to continue after a failure with that much potential damage.


Unless performance demands it I would not raise the gear.


Climb to a reasonable altitude, run the appropriate checklists, dump down to a lighter weight , then land as soon as possible having prepared for a possible evacuation.

[nike]

The decision to leave the gear out is predicated on knowing that a decision to leave the gear out or not is required.

[stilton]

Er, yes, that's true,


Have you ever noticed, wherever you go, there you are ?


:confused:

[BEagle]

...therefore try to balance commercial and safety...

I hope that I never fly as a passenger with any such airline which is prepared to compromise safety on so-called 'commercial' grounds.

The decision to leave the gear out is predicated on knowing that a decision to leave the gear out or not is required.

True enough - if you don't know whether a tyre burst occurred during the take-off roll, then you won't know whether or not you should consider leaving the undercarriage extended.

[NigelOnDraft]

"Leave the gear down"? Why? How do you know a tyre has burst? Yes - there are TPIs on the Flt Deck but they are really for maint purposes and about the most unreliable eqpt fitted (most of our Airbus ones currently disabled).

NB "leaving the gear down" on a MTOW jet = invalid performance in case of engine failure (if you have to leave the gear down e.g. brake unit U/S your MTOW is limited based on climb perf).

Proceed to dest? Well, it's pretty clear the manual says fine if no further indication.

In short 2 decisions to make:

1 short term, and I would be most concerned if there was a decision to leave the gear down, outside the SOPs, that compromised takeoff perf.

1 long term - proceed? It would take an hour+ to decide "what" went wrong (as they say, info they later got was vague anyway), dump fuel to as light as possible etc. Might as well continue en route with suitable divs. Later becomes apparent no further issues, continue seems fine.

To me, the most likely reason to return was the company considering damage needing to be repaired, and facilities at dest. This is a commercial decision, and in the days of modern comms, would be "requested" from outside the Flt Deck. Up to the Flt Crew whether they then followed that, and how (and to an extent same for a decison to continue).

Each of those advocting a return is doing so outside the SOPs. This is perfectly OK, but might need to be justified ;)

[763 jock]

From the Boeing FCTM:

"Tire Failure during or after Takeoff
If the crew suspects a tire failure during takeoff, the Air Traffic Service facility serving the departing airport should be advised of the potential for tire pieces remaining on the runway. The crew should consider continuing to the destination unless there is an indication that other damage has occurred (non-normal engine indications, engine vibrations, hydraulic system failures or leaks, etc.).

Continuing to the destination will allow the airplane weight to be reduced normally, and provide the crew an opportunity to plan and coordinate their arrival and landing when the workload is low. Considerations in selecting a landing airport include, but are not limited to: sufficient runway length and acceptable surface conditions to account for the possible loss of braking effectiveness, sufficient runway width to account for possible directional control difficulties, altitude and temperature conditions that could result in high groundspeeds on touchdown and adverse taxi conditions, runway selection options regarding "taxi-in" distance after landing, availability of operator maintenance personnel to meet the airplane after landing to inspect the wheels, tires, and brakes before continued taxi, availability of support facilities should the airplane need repair."

There is no QRH drill to run for this scenario and the Boeing advice is good. Virgin had a similar incident last year and also elected to continue with the flight. G-VROC (http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/bulletins/november_2010/boeing_747_41r__g_vroc.cfm)

[NigelOnDraft]

I hope that I never fly as a passenger with any such airline which is prepared to compromise safety on so-called 'commercial' grounds.Guess you won't be flying on many airlines then ;)

In my "limited" airline flying (15 years with 2 UK majors, 8 as Capt), I reckon most flights have had a level of "compromise" (e.g. MEL items including TCAS / Reversers / Brakes / Generators U/S). If the weather is anything other than CAVOK, then there is a compromise. I have operated into discretion - and whatever anybody says, that is invariably a commerical judgement v safety.

The regulator, airline and crew each have their inputs and judgements into the "Safety System". I have refused to accept aircraft that are "legal" as far as the Operator and Regulator are concerned, because I judged the circumstances / my judgement warranted it. Many will, in other circumstances, accept a flight / aircraft that is bordering on strictly "legal" under the rules, but the circumstances they judge safe. One would need to be fairly naive to consider that "commercial" considerations are not part of those judgements ;)

[helen-damnation]

Colleagues,

I challenge you to have a "pop" on take off, especially near to Vr, get airborne, get the "positive climb" call and NOT call for the gear up. It's ingrained by SOP and is very difficult to override.

Try leaving the gear out on take off from Johannesburg/Addis/Entebbe or any other high altitude airport and you could be asking for a lot of trouble. In the absence of positive signs of damage to the airframe/other systems, get the gear up. If there are signs of control damage, chances are you don't want to be juggling with that and performance issues with the gear down either. However, that's subjective.

Fly the aircraft, get away from the ground and safe, then work it out. Assess and manage.

Sure you waste some gas and delay your passengers but you don't take the chance that the gear would hang up in the well when you tried to put it down.
So if the gear's going to hang up: A - How do you know?
B - Why be half way when you could be at destination at the lower wieght?
If you are worried about it, you've got longer to think about problems and solutions, look at checklists etc.

If there are no other factors, landing at destination is as safe and commercially sensible.

[BEagle]

That Boeing FCTM extract is so typical of the way that airmanship and captaincy have been replaced by beancounters' SOPs.

In the same way that Airbus had to legislate for idiots who didn't understand that FMS fuel predictions assume a specific configuration - and refused to accept that the fuel quantity indicators were correct, not the FMS predictions, when an A310 was being flown with the gear down.....until it ran out of fuel on an emergency approach into Vienna. So now there's an Idiot Clause in the FCOM to remind dimwits of this.

Mind you, back in the late 1970s a colleague had a main gear red in one of Desperate Dan's fine old Comet 4s. They reselected down and three greens were obtained, so flew on with the gear down, telling the passengers that the delayed arrival was due to 'strong headwinds' (they'd carried round trip fuel). After the turnround and a quick thump on as many microswitches as possible, they flew back with the same snag and again reselected the gear down. Being prudent, they'd taken off with 'just in case it happens again' fuel. On landing, once again they blamed the delay on strong headwinds.... "Funny that", said one of the passengers, "my friends told me that they'd had strong headwinds on the way out. Amazing that the wind should have changed quite so much today!"...:\

But that was in the days before CRM, TEM, MELs and TCIC appeared on the scene, of course.

[matkat]

BEagle/kiwibrit i was closely involved with the VC10 incident it was from Leuchars 1988 or 89, as the shift leader on the visiting aircraft section(for BEagle George Smiths section) I advised the flight crew not to take the aircraft due tyre damage they declined my advise after the incident they then tried to 'stitch' up several of us at the subsequent board of enquiry:= shame on all of them from the Captain downwards.

[Neptunus Rex]

That Caravelle incident is a comlete "Red Herring.
The Caravelle performed a high-speed rejected take off, then taxied for a second attempt. The brakes were too hot before the second take off run, and the wheels "let go" well after retraction.

Remember, it takes 20 minutes after final brake release for the brakes to reach maximum temperature.

[BEagle]

matkat - 8 Nov 88 as I've now discovered.

Good old Big George Smith - a real Leuchars character! If one of his lads had advised me or my crew of such a problem, I'd certainly have believed him without the slightest hesitation.

Sorry to hear that the crew behaved in such a deplorable way at the subsequent BoI - did the truth ever come out?

Neptunus, the cause of the hot Caravelle brakes was certainly different, I agree. But had a draggy brake unit caused the Delta tyre failure, then an adjacent tyre might have been on the point of failure and could have cooked up and burst 20 min into the flight as you rightly state.

[Iron Duke]

My opinion ...

If they had not known they blew a tyre, and were only subsequently informed by ATC of tyre remains i.e after the gear had been raised normally ... then it would be better to continue to destination as any potential problem would only emerge on "gear down" selection ..

If they were aware immediately that they had blown a tyre then maybe the best option would be to return to departure airport (leaving the gear down), as a ragged tyre carcass, particularly if rotating ( i.e. brake problems, hydraulic lines) could cause significant damage to an already very tight wheel well ...

[forget]

That Caravelle incident is a complete "Red Herring. The Caravelle performed a high-speed rejected take off, then taxied for a second attempt.

Sadly it's true. About a year ago the accident was raised on another thread. An ex Swissair captain not only confirmed the Caravelle fog dispersal attempt but (I believe) produced evidence that Flt OPs actually condoned the scheme.

I'll see if I can find it.

No sooner said than done -
http://www.pprune.org/aviation-history-nostalgia/416029-swissair-caravelle-disaster-zurich-1963-a.html

[763 jock]

The wheels are braked automatically on gear retraction. They are not rotating as they enter the wheel well (which has fire detection fitted).

[Mercenary Pilot]

That Boeing FCTM extract is so typical of the way that airmanship and captaincy have been replaced by beancounters' SOPs.


You will find that it is not an SOP, it's a recommendation by the manufacturer after extensive certification, flight testing, previous experience and feedback from the airline training departments and line pilots over the last 50 or so years. The crew did exactly as they have been trained to do and did it well. End result, everyone got home safely and the aircraft was returned to service quickly.

[IGh]

Back in slot #24 "GoldenRivet" cited the best exemplar: Nationair / 11Jul91 Canadian registered DC-8-61 C-GMXQ, chartered as "Nigerian Airways flight 2120"
One of the lessons from that investigation focused on the very short life of the sister-tire on that axle, immediately after the failure of the first tire. So, perhaps there were two tire-failures on this recent B767 incident????

Scanning this thread there are WEAKNESSES in two other certification standards that haven't been mentioned: -- Part 25 still does NOT require Wheel Well Fire Warning. Boeing has provided this as their own standard, DAC did NOT provide it [nor AirBus?]. So all those MD80's are still flying without that Wheel Well protection.

-- The load bearing strength of the TIRE (after failure of the sister-tire on that axle) is poorly regulated [weakness in cert' standards was discussed in NTSB's AAR-79-01, Continental / 1Mar78 ... DC-10-10, N68045, LosAngeles ... Section 2, Analysis, pg 30-1]:
After #2 Tire carcass blew out, the entire load on the axle was imposed upon the #1Tire . . . the #1 Tire failed almost immediately (within two wheel revolutions) after the #2 Tire carcass failed.
The weakness in the tire stds [§ 25.733 Tires] was not a factor in this latest case. In this recent Boeing case, the pilot continued the T/O, and that is good.

The weaknesses in cert' stds might someday be revised if an MD8 suffers a simple TIRE FAILURE on Takeoff, then the sister-tire on that axle FAILs, and both tires shed debris into the engine intake, and remember that DAC never offered Wheel Well Fire Warning ...

[Flightmech]

Captains decision. Just pure luck if you end up at GRU with just a double wheel change or if a piece of tread has put a hole in your flaps and now your grounded for sheet metal repair.

[misd-agin]

Post #22 and the link to the 'hard' landing on it's previous arrival - appears to be normal ops. The windsock is visible. The wind is from the right so the right gear should touch down first. Smoke always occurs on initial wheel spinup.

[Shell Management]

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.:{

[ManaAdaSystem]

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.

I nominate this statement to be one of the least smart posts so far this year.
BTW, where in the FCOM would you look for info on this scenario?

[hfbo]

Report of the Swissair Caravell III accident. The captain was a pilot college of mine.
http: //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_306 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swissair_Flight_306)

[aterpster]

Shell Management:

I bet the crew didn't do a risk assessment - just read the FCOM, called Maintrol and carried on.

What would you have expected them to have done?

With operatonal planning and maintenance control concurring in proceeding to destination then by all means press on. Those folks know what logistics that have at the destination.

The airplane would be a normally functioning bird until time for touchdown, a problem to be faced at departure point, ATL, or destination.

[763 jock]

OK Shell Management.

Please enlighten me with what your "risk assessment" would consist of. What factors would you consider in reaching your decision in this scenario?

As a current 767 Captain with 18 years and nearly 10000 hours on type, I would like to know what I don't know.

[RetiredBA/BY]

As a former 76/75 captain, I consider the desision to carry on as unwise. If a tyre should fail then the load of the failed tyre is mostly transferred to the other tyre on that axle, which could well lead, as a result of the overload, to it being severely overstressed and overheated which could in turn lead to failure, even explosion when in the wheel well. I seem to recall that a Saudia TriStar suffered a wheel explosion with the gear retracted which resulted in a large hole in the cabin floor which led to the loss of several passengers.

About 25 years ago, when working with the UKFSC I wrote a paper which was published in the International Journal of Air Safety suggesting that all jet transports be fitted, as a certification requirement, with tyre failure indicators and brake temp guages, Concorde was. We all assume that all tyres and brakes are intact and cool before every take off, and we calculate our take off performance based on those assumptions. I believe we need to know !

Three of the incidents which got me thinking about this problem, were the nose tyre failure of an EastAf VC-10 in Addis which led to the loss of the aircraft, my own severely overheated brake and tyre on a VC10 taxi-ing in at AUH, (we didnt know about it until shutdown) and my own wheel failure on a 737, fortunatley during push back but could have been catastrophic on take off because the damaged wheel also damaged the reverser. (I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !)

Nope, a damaged wheel should NOT be in the well longer a moment longer than neccessary.

[matkat]

Moi/BEagle the argument was not with Me (I was the lead see off guy) and probably me you talked to, the argument was between the GE and the Master FE the GE did not want to take it but the FE pulled rank on him, I told them all captain included that the tyre was a no go. At the board of enquiry they then tried to lie there way out of it however there were 5 off Us 3 x Techies and 2 mover who all witnessed the tyre damage which I am sure you will understand was extensive, the truth did indeed come out but I am unaware of what punishment was given out. All I know I was called up a few days later by the head of the BoI and thanked for our full and frank recollection of the incident, but as you can tell it still annoyes me what they tried to do to not only to me(I was a 30 year old hardned line Corporal) but 2 young lads in there early twenty's who should have been looking up to this crew instead all they witnessed was blatant lying.

[vlkyplky]

Incident: American B772 at Chicago on Jun 5th 2011, blew tyre on takeoff, multiple hydraulic problems (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=43dbf0d5&opt=0)

Just two days ago, blown tire, multiple hyd problems... there you go. Can happen, but commonly it is immediatelly noticed.

[bullet190]

So.........20 Min's after the incident the bits of tyre are recovered, they are then taken to the Delta engineers for analisis.....which takes possibly another 20 Min's. Meanwhile Delta 257 is well on it's way.
The Delta engineers can not prove the bits of tyre are from a 767, the crew therefore get a 'possible' tyre burst message on route and act accordingly.

During take off, 'Mr camera man' saw the incident and has film evidence to back up his/her story.

My question therefore is........did he/she try to tell anyone ? :confused:

The more accurate information the crew have the more equipped they are to make the best decision.

[A37575]

Three of the incidents which got me thinking about this problem, were the nose tyre failure of an EastAf VC-10 in Addis which led to the loss of the aircraft, my own severely overheated brake and tyre on a VC10 taxi-ing in at AUH, (we didnt know about it until shutdown) and my own wheel failure on a 737, fortunatley during push back but could have been catastrophic on take off because the damaged wheel also damaged the reverser. (I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !)


The East African VC10 nose wheel hit a car wheel jack on the runway that had been inadvertently left there by the pilot of a Cessna. The Cessna I believe had a flat tyre during a night landing so the pilot stopped on the runway and jacked it up and changed the tyre. Which is why the crew of the VC 10 on take off did not see the jack which by coincidence was close to the centre-line of the runway.

The impact of the nose wheels of the VC10 on the jack set up a very strong vibration and nose wheel shimmy - so bad that the VC10 captain aborted the take off. What no one knew at the time was that the anti-skid units of the main wheels of the VC10 had been incorrectly assembled causing alternate sets of wheels to lock on while others released. This degraded braking caused the VC10 to over-run and it went through a fence and ditch causing a massive fuel leak. The fuel caught fire trapping passengers escaping down the ditch. If the captain of the VC 10 had elected to continue the take off he may have got away with it. The incorrectly installed anti-skid system had never been picked up before because no one had carried out a full scale abort before and therefore the defect was hidden.

[ManaAdaSystem]

I dread to think of a wheel failure approaching V1, One wheel lost, therefore two brakes lost, possible overload failure of the paired tyre and only one reverser, not much chance of stopping on the hard top !

That is why Boeing does not want us to abort for tire failures above 80 knots. For those of you who think the FCTM is a substitute for airmanship, maybe you should open the book and have a look at consequence of such an abort?

[brakedwell]

I experience a tyre/wheel disintegration on take off in a DC8 55F and knew nothing about it until we established VHF contact at our destination ten hours later. We took over the aircraft at Winnipeg and after a quick turnround were the last departure before the airport closed at 2300. Shortly after V1 we had a bird strike on the port side. I saw a large white (Owl?) bird flash down the port side before hearing a dull thump. After making VHF contact with Honolulu approach they advised us that Winnipeg had found tyre and aluminium wheel wreckage on the runway during the first inspection of the day. We were instructed to hold for as long as possible to allow the incoming morning rush of traffic to subside. Eventually we were cleared for an approach. The strong gusting crosswind and turbulence didn't make life easy after a long night, but the touchdown was smooth and there were no problems until the speed dropped below 100 knots, when the juddering started and worrying graunching noises increased as we slowed down and cleared the runway at the first opportunity. It turned out the rear inboard wheel on the port bogie was missing and the adjacent rear tyre had deflated and partially shredded, on landing maybe. The port flap had suffered some minor damage and the anti-skid cable had been severed down to one last thin wire. Had we lost that the outcome could have been serious. I spoke to the grooms & stable girls looking after the bloodstock horses on board and they said they had heard a bang during take-off, but thought it was normal! Whether the noise was caused by the bird strike or the wheel disintegrating we shall never know. A new anti-skid cable was fitted together with 2 main wheels from the hold and the flaps were repaired temporarily with speedtape. On completion we we handed the airplane over to the new crew and the flight departed for Auckland just three hours late.

[cairndow_123]

Swiss air flight SE210, September 4, 1963, a nearly new Caravelle, flight from Zurich to Rome via Geneva Runway visibility 60m, crew requested permission to taxi the runway then back track for take off.

As it was later evident, the crew taxed at high power, keeping taxi speed by braking, with the purpose of clearing the fog with their jet efflux.

With the consequential over heating of the wheel assembly a I tire had exploded during this full power runway fog dispensing exercise ,shrapnel from the burst caused a hydraulic fluid leak soon after gear retraction a trail of white smoke was observed, an indicator of fire resulting in a fatal crash

[matkat]

Surprised no one has mentioned this one.
Nigeria Airways Flight 2120 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria_Airways_Flight_2120)

[captjns]

The airplane does not care where it lands. However, it does not want to land too heavy that for sure... even under normal situations. It does care about the quality of MX it gets no matter where. The US is certainly not the king, nor the worst when it comes to the subject of MX issues.

The destination airport has the same emergency equipment at the departure airport.

Wx considerations were analyized as well.

Passengers did not want to return to the departure airport.

There are numerous airports along the way during the initial phase of flight if a quick landing were required too.

With that being said, the aircraft was airworthy, the crew were airworthy, and maintrol and the crwe did not have any issues prceeding to their destination with some element of caution to be maintained.

Communications today are far better than those pointed out about their former colleagues in the Caravelle, L-1011 and any other aircraft brought into this thread.

[stilton]

Well if the passengers don't want to return that's all I need to know..



Seriously, this is a divided issue, continuing worked out for this crew but that doesn't prove anything except they were lucky.


A burst tyre can cause a lot more damage than you think or would be aware of immediately.


The Aircraft QRH offers guidance but does not substitute for good judgement.


I would have dumped fuel and returned :ok:

[glhcarl]

Tha Saudia L-1011 incident had nothing to do with a tire failure on takeoff. The outer flange of the wheel failed after the gear was up and stowed. The pressure deck above the wheel well was holed and two passengers were lost when the cabin experienced rapid decompression.

[sabenaboy]

I would have dumped fuel and returned

Well, assuming that the crew hadn't noticed anything and that they only heard long after TO that one of their tyres might have burst I think that almost all crews would have continued. Imagine getting a call from dispatch after XXX time (and there's no indication on your instruments whatsoever that there's anything wrong) : "Hey, captain, one of the tyres might have burst on TO, but we're not sure" Well, unless dispatch asks me to return for operational reasons, I would think it's not unwise to continue to the destination.

Decisions can only be as good as the information they are based upon.

[IGh]

Just adding to "glhcarl" mention [two slots above] of the L1011 inflight mishap:Saudia 162 / 22Dec80, L-1011, HZ-AHJ, over int'l waters near Qatar, at 2312z. Explosive decompression while climbing through FL290. Two passengers ejected from aircraft through hole in cabin floor. P.C. = inflight "fatigue failure of main landing gear inboard wheel flange resulting in rupture of aircraft's pressure hull and decompression."
Another mode of wheel failure [mostly on-ground] was the failure of the wheel's Tie Bolts, with the resulting deflation of the Tire, then the failure of the adjacent Wheel & Tire on that axle [eg, 30Jun95 at KBWI http://www.asias.faa.gov/portal/pls/portal/STAGE.AIDS_BRIEF_REPORT_PUB?EV_ID=19950630024329C&NARR_VAR= ] .

Re' Wheel Well safety -- the Wheel/Tire's engineered safety features don't protect against all failure modes, eg:
FTW95IA348 (http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20001207X04228&key=1)

The Tire Pressure Indicator helps, as does the Fuse Plug, & the Brake Overheat annunciator (not sufficient to detect a Wheel Well FIRE on Nation Air DC8).

One other exemplar, for Wheel Well SAFETY: USAF / 27Sep74 Lockheed C-5A 68-0227 hull loss: Wheel Well fire, uncontained, at night, crashed-landed at grass airport (rwy lights in sight) at Clinton OK. [???? Later mod'd LG Wheel Wells for fire suppression. ??? any good write-up on this case & post-accident modifications???.]

[stilton]

If you assume the crew did not notice anything and in fact they didn't that, of course changes everything.



Over ten years on the 75 / 67 experience leads me to doubt they noticed nothing.