kaz3g
2nd Jun 2011, 10:30
The final report on the midair at Moorabbin between a Cessna A150M and a Piper PA28 is finally out now.
Investigation: AO-2008-059 - Midair collision (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-059.aspx)
Both aircraft were flown by student pilots: the C150 had 24 hrs and was solo; the PA28 had 167 hrs, and was dual with an instructor.
The report identifies failures in the air traffic control provided --
The aerodrome controller - west did not provide the pilots of VH-CGT and VH-UPY with relevant traffic information about each other in sufficient time to assist self-separation.
• The aerodrome controller - west had been operating in a high workload environment in the period leading up to the midair collision. That increased the risk of traffic information not being able to be provided to flight crews.
And also states --
The student pilot of VH-UPY had not yet demonstrated an ability to operate safely in a busy circuit environment and his flight instructor did not provide any guidance to the student in the situation were the circuit activity changed during the solo flight.
From a traffic control aspect, the incident almost certainly contributed to the sudden and pre-emptive decision of the new head of the CASA to abandon GAAP procedures and introduce Class D in its place, and the report gives strong support to this.
But shouldn't the question be asked a little more firmly as to why a low hour, newly soloed student was operating in such a busy environment at all? And if his perfomance had been under closer scrutiny at the time, wouldn't it have been reasonable to have seen his failure to obtain clearance for each of several touch and go circuits as a sign he was severely over-stressed?
kaz3g
During the period leading up to the collision, there were at least 7 aircraft landing and taking off around the circuit
Investigation: AO-2008-059 - Midair collision (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2008/aair/ao-2008-059.aspx)
Both aircraft were flown by student pilots: the C150 had 24 hrs and was solo; the PA28 had 167 hrs, and was dual with an instructor.
The report identifies failures in the air traffic control provided --
The aerodrome controller - west did not provide the pilots of VH-CGT and VH-UPY with relevant traffic information about each other in sufficient time to assist self-separation.
• The aerodrome controller - west had been operating in a high workload environment in the period leading up to the midair collision. That increased the risk of traffic information not being able to be provided to flight crews.
And also states --
The student pilot of VH-UPY had not yet demonstrated an ability to operate safely in a busy circuit environment and his flight instructor did not provide any guidance to the student in the situation were the circuit activity changed during the solo flight.
From a traffic control aspect, the incident almost certainly contributed to the sudden and pre-emptive decision of the new head of the CASA to abandon GAAP procedures and introduce Class D in its place, and the report gives strong support to this.
But shouldn't the question be asked a little more firmly as to why a low hour, newly soloed student was operating in such a busy environment at all? And if his perfomance had been under closer scrutiny at the time, wouldn't it have been reasonable to have seen his failure to obtain clearance for each of several touch and go circuits as a sign he was severely over-stressed?
kaz3g
During the period leading up to the collision, there were at least 7 aircraft landing and taking off around the circuit