If you have a choice at your airline - Airbus or Boeing?

[aa73]

Serious question here. Why? Rumors here at AA that, if Airbus gives us a good deal, we may go with the NEO as a 757 replacement.

I've only flown Boeings and McDD. I am currently on the 75/76 and LOVE it. True pilot's airplane, albeit old technology. All my buddies who fly the A320 series and above say the same thing - great comfort and ergonomics, but if you love hand-flying a lot, it SUCKS (too much automation, pilot interface with machine is removed.)

Opinions? Let's have a fun debate!

thanks...
73

[bubbers44]

Going from an MD80 FO going back to the B737-200 as a captain was a baby step back in technology but even though my 18 months in the MD80 was brief I had to struggle to get by basic flying skills back to what they were.

With the auto everything on the Airbus going to a B757 would be a giant leap. I stayed with the 727 until they were gone and retired in the 757 because it was such a fun airplane to fly. I let the other guys play with the B777. I found my niches.

[misd-agin]

As I'm sure you're well aware my BIL has flown both 737-800's and A320's. I asked him his opinon about the 737(with all due respect, the 737NG is NOT a 757!). He prefers the 737-800.

Rode a A320 jumpseat this past weekend. Loved the size, view, and quietness vs. the 737. I wouldn't bothter switching aircraft to get A320 qual'd but IMO the cockpit is worth it if everything else(relative seniority, trip quality) is the same.

Now if Boeing comes out with the 797 in 2019-2020 as speculated, that, IMO, would probably be worth the wait.

[Denti]

Personally i would love the quiet and roomy flightdeck of the airbus compared to my pretty cramped 737 flightdeck. And if i would switch fleets at the moment i would be able fly MFF A320/A330 within a year. However staying on the boeing might be nice as well as we should get our first 787 in only three years or so and we gonna operate 737 and 787 in MFF as well. All in all it is more about what kind of operation i want to do currently than about the pure flying thing. I do love the 737, especially the 700, for its pilot friendly way of operation as well as the new gadgets we have on them (currently the 737 is more "modern" than the A320), as well as the easy way to switch it all off and just fly the plane. Best for day to day operation would be a mix of both worlds though, the spacious and quiet flightdeck of the airbus with most of the boeing systems inside :)

[aa73]

Thanks for all the opinions, keep 'em coming!

Misd-Again, I hope to see you on the 75/76 fleet soon, as I'm sure you're aware. :8

[Dan Winterland]

Oh great. yet another A vs B thread. But what pilots think is irrelevant. It's the accountants who make the decisions.




BTW - I find the Airbus a much less fatigueing working environment - and at the end of the day - that's very important.

[Slasher]

Stick with Boeing - after 6,000 hours on bloody Airbuses I'd
go back to them in a heartbeat.

with the 797 in 2019-2020 as speculated

797? Rings a bell. Didn't one of those end up at McMurdo base
in the Antarctic in 1985?

[White Knight]

The 'Bus is quiet and it's got a table............. What else can I say:cool::cool:? Oh yeah - all the guys on the 777 seem to be at the chiro getting their spines straightened:eek:

[aa73]

797? Rings a bell. Didn't one of those end up at McMurdo base
in the Antarctic in 1985?

FINALLY!!! someone else who's read "Down to a Sunless Sea..." one of the BEST aviation fiction books I have ever read! Highly recommended reading, and quite accurate from a pilot's point of view.

Keep the comments coming, I want to be able to make a good decision if/when Airbus shows up on the property!

Cheerio... 73

[FlightPathOBN]

as we should get our first 787 in only three years or so

emphasize...or so.....

[bubbers44]

I could have made more money flying the A300 with our company but didn't trust it like I did Boeing so stayed put. Everybody has to make their choices in life. I am glad I stuck with Boeing. Our copilot that got blamed for the JFK accident was a scapegoat. The vertical stab that was defective and patched out of the factory broke where the repair was done. I don't think the FDR can compensate for a fluttering VS about to leave the aircraft. I think if the back of the vertical stabilizer gets loose the rudder then becomes a trim tab so right rudder input gives left yaw. How would the pilots know that the VS was coming off?

[parabellum]

Interesting to hear A320 pilots say it is more quiet on the flight deck than a Boeing. As a passenger on an A320, sitting around row 3 or 4 the noise is dreadful, more like a farmers tractor flat out than an aircraft! An engineer told me it was probably fan noise?

[SKS777FLYER]

Bubers44 The vertical stab that was defective and patched out of the factory broke where the repair was done.

Yes that particular A300 had delamination issues during production and was "patched" as you say..... Boeing has done the same to a few of their composite tails.... but none of themn have as yet come off either.
Also, the accident aircraft had earlier in its' life been involved in a pretty significant in flight upset. So much so that AA pulled or downloaded the flight recdorder data and submitted it to Airbus for guidance. I do not know what guidance AA received from Airbus... but Airbus DID NOT share their calculation that the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft had been subjected to ULTIMATE load factor during the upset. That came out during the discovery phase of the accident aircraft legal battle.
As of yet I don't know that Airbus has complied with recommendations of changing rudder feel-throw-limiters on the A300 jet.

[Slasher]

and quite accurate from a pilot's point of view.

I wouldn't say it was all that accurate (overweight T/Off from
Azores with a V2 of an Aztec?) but yeh a good story when it
first came out. Absolute bummer ending though.

The only true accuracy was that Brit captain wending his way
into the Russian crew chick's pants (I don't think he shagged
her FO), and the Brit FO doing his nuts over some skinny NY
tart.

- all the guys on the 777 seem to be at the chiro getting their spines straightened

WK you seem to be confusing perceived cockpit discomfort with Shagger's Back! ;)

[Jane-DoH]

I'd get DC-9's for short hops, 757 and 767's for the medium and long-range flights, and 777's for the ultra-long range trips.

[3holelover]

FINALLY!!! someone else who's read "Down to a Sunless Sea..." one of the BEST aviation fiction books I have ever read! Highly recommended reading, and quite accurate from a pilot's point of view.

Yup, the blend of DC10 with 747 was inspirational! :ok:(jk ;)) Great story!... I'd hope pilots aren't smoking what those guys were though! :eek:

[raraa]

I like the table, I like the noise, I like the way she seems to get what you want, I like the autotrim, I like the way we operate her.

[RTO]

I'd take any Boeing first, then a catering truck, then a cleaning truck, then McDonald's and perhaps a bit after that Id reluctantly consider an airbus.

[ggofpac]

Flown both A and B.

Like the Boeing manuals better. Easier to find the info u want, be it systems or abnormals.

Finds Airbus manuals....abit all over the place...

currently flying A320.

[Cough]

When the day is easy... Rather be in an Airbus.

When the chips are down, with system failures - Boeing.

Agree the above comment about Airbus manuals!

[Slasher]

I'd hope pilots aren't smoking what those guys were though!

Of course we're not. I'm on extreme low tar if I ever
smoke at all but some of the FOs tend to suck on the
stronger 25mg brands claiming it increases the time
between the need to weed. I'm still out on those gay
skinny thin things the cabin crew smoke, but they're
quite aromatic which means in their case no one has
to turn the cabin fan switch off.

I like the way she seems to get what you want, I like the autotrim, I like the way we operate her.

Since when is a 320 a "her"?? A DC3 is a her, a 747 is a
her. The 320 isn't a "her" - the 320 is a really seriously
paranoid robotic C3PO on pure steroids with a massively
humongous arrogance problem.

[DozyWannabe]

the 320 is a really seriously
paranoid robotic C3PO on pure steroids with a massively
humongous arrogance problem.

No bias there then... :rolleyes:

You are aware you can turn the FMC off on an A32/3/4/80 series and it hand-flies rather well, aren't you? As I said on another thread, "C-3P0" didn't try to tell Capt. Sullenberger how to do his job, did he?

Also, the accident aircraft had earlier in its' life been involved in a pretty significant in flight upset. So much so that AA pulled or downloaded the flight recdorder data and submitted it to Airbus for guidance. I do not know what guidance AA received from Airbus... but Airbus DID NOT share their calculation that the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft had been subjected to ULTIMATE load factor during the upset. That came out during the discovery phase of the accident aircraft legal battle.

Come on - this isn't relevant. In the AA587 incident itself the VS stayed on for a time despite being subject to loads in excess of Ultimate Design Load, which means that *despite* this earlier incident, the VS was still attached strongly enough to stay on if the aircraft was flown within - or even slightly beyond - it's design limits. The PF in that case was attempting to use a technique designed for DC-9/MD-80 series aircraft which have a completely different configuration (rear-engine, T-tail) - one that requires far less rudder authority than the type (wing-mounted engine, traditional empennage design) he was flying.

The very existence of the B787 renders the composite vs. aluminium part of the A v. B flamewars moot in any case.

Not a pilot myself - but if I were, I'd be happy to take an office seat in either manufacturer's machine. But before I even set foot in one, I'd make the time to fully understand every aspect of how the bird is designed to work and try to discover any "gotchas" (which all aircraft have) relevant to the type - on top of any official training I'd received. The vast and sweeping majority of modern accidents attributable to pilot error these days seem to come from a lack of that kind of knowledge.

[SKS777FLYER]

Hello Dozy,
Yes getting all the knowledge you can is great in theory, somewhat difficult in application, particularly in the early 90's thru the early years of this century.

I can assure that no pilot I encountered in line flying over the decades and just a very select few in the nether regions of the training and flight ops centers had the vaguest clue that at less than maneuvering speed (AA accident A300 was flying at, I believe significantly less than maneuvering speed) that it was remotely possible for a pilot to cause the vertical stabilizer of a modern jetliner to separate from the fuselage..... particularly the latest flight control computer assisted aircraft. We were trained about the protective safety provided by rudder limiters, etc. etc.
It was not until AFTER the tragedy that Boeing, and probably AB as well provided information in flight manuals about weak tail feathers on jet transports, weak as related to ANY rudder doublets, and rudders only suitable for use in relatively low speed single engine flight.

You don't get any shivers when you learned that the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft that crashed in NY had already flown beyond it's design limit a fact learned by Airbus, but not shared with its' customer??

As to getting the most knowledge about the aircraft a pilot flies, I might remind you that Airbus AND Boeing BOTH were putting together composite tails in those early days with insufficient knowledge of the composite assembly process; otherwise they would not have encountered delamination of layers of composite material, which they BOTH used a bandaid technique of basically clamping the delaminated structures back together with rivets during the build.

[DozyWannabe]

I want to be careful not to drag things off-topic, so I think I'm going to limit myself to one reply here...

Hello Dozy,
Yes getting all the knowledge you can is great in theory, somewhat difficult in application, particularly in the early 90's thru the early years of this century.

Possibly, but I'm talking about things that should be easy to discover by judicious use of the manuals - such as :


Unlike the 737-300 model, the 737-400 model takes it's aircon input from both engines (Kegworth)
Inputting a single letter into the FMS of a 757 will give you a list of options, and hitting "Enter" twice will give you the first (Cali)
Holding the A/THR disconnect switch for more than 15 seconds will completely disable A/THR, and it can only be re-engaged on the ground (Habsheim)
Popping a CB related to the nosewheel will also disable Takeoff Config Warnings (Spanair Madrid)


Things of that ilk. While there has been no shortage of expressed opinion that losing the F/E (and thus an extra pair of eyes) may have negatively affected safety, I think that what may be more important is the loss of the career progression which meant that a lot of pilots spent some time as F/Es at the beginning of their careers - and spent that time having to learn the inner workings and foibles of their aircraft. That learning can still be done without spending time as an F/E, but when the business case is to get newly qualified pilots into the right-hand seat (and thus getting the airline a return on investment) as quickly as possible, it may be a dangerous thing to neglect.

Also, we're in the second decade of the 21st century now. Even senior pilots in their 30s and 40s will have spent at least some of their formative years around computers. Computers occupy a place in the human world that no-one could have conceived back in the '60s and early '70s, when they occupied a space in culture where computers were room-sized devices pored over by men in white coats (or later, coffee- and pizza-stained T-shirts), or largely informed by sci-fi stories about rogue computers trying to take over the world. Pilots who qualified back then would naturally have been very suspicious of such a device sharing the cockpit with them to the extent it was when the A320 first hit the market. These days we're more aware of their usefulness, their limitations, and what they are and are not capable of.

The A320 has spawned a successful series of aircraft which carry millions of people around the world every day, and Boeing's latest models, even while they retain the "classic" flight deck controls and "pilot-centered" philosophy, are reliant on computer-driven feedback to acheive the feel they do.

I can assure that no pilot I encountered in line flying over the decades and just a very select few in the nether regions of the training and flight ops centers had the vaguest clue that at less than maneuvering speed (AA accident A300 was flying at, I believe significantly less than maneuvering speed) that it was remotely possible for a pilot to cause the vertical stabilizer of a modern jetliner to separate from the fuselage..... particularly the latest flight control computer assisted aircraft. We were trained about the protective safety provided by rudder limiters, etc. etc.
It was not until AFTER the tragedy that Boeing, and probably AB as well provided information in flight manuals about weak tail feathers on jet transports, weak as related to ANY rudder doublets, and rudders only suitable for use in relatively low speed single engine flight.

Then that was a failure of the industry as a whole - and in a way we come back to a possible desire for pilots to have some grounding in engineering. The BOAC 707 that practically disintegrated in mid-air near Mount Fuji should have been a warning that the stresses an airliner can be subjected to in mid-air can in very short order cause a catastrophic failure. The story of the DH Comet was a salutary lesson in the dangers of material fatigue - that if you apply pressure in opposite directions over a period of time, materials can fail. The knowledge was out there, but it appears few put two and two together in this case.

Also, since the story of the DC-10 and the "Gentlemen's Agreement" was made public, it's also been common knowledge that manufacturers will go to any length to downplay potential problems with their product - so while you can usually trust them when they tell you how to fly the thing, it's probably a good idea to keep in the back of your mind that they may not be telling you the whole truth.

So if it became common knowledge that in an aircraft configured in the manner of the A300 (which seems to be the standard configuration of most modern large jet transports these days), that if you push the rudder pedal one way, then the opposite way - and repeat this action enough times - that the VS will break off, there'd be a public outcry. Which manufacturer would risk being the first to admit that was the case? Their orders would dry up before you could say "commercial suicide"!

You don't get any shivers when you learned that the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft that crashed in NY had already flown beyond it's design limit a fact learned by Airbus, but not shared with its' customer??

It's certainly not an ideal situation, and if it had turned out to have any impact on the AA587 incident itself, then I'd be at the head of the group calling for investigations and prosecutions. But on the other hand, you can speculate that Airbus had sufficient data to conclude that the previous incident would not have had a detrimental effect on the lifespan of the airframe (which, given the VS stayed on past Ultimate Design Load, the evidence suggests strongly was indeed the case).

As to getting the most knowledge about the aircraft a pilot flies, I might remind you that Airbus AND Boeing BOTH were putting together composite tails in those early days with insufficient knowledge of the composite assembly process; otherwise they would not have encountered delamination of layers of composite material, which they BOTH used a bandaid technique of basically clamping the delaminated structures back together with rivets during the build.

But as yet there has not been the loss of a transport-class airframe due to composite failure alone, and it seems that they're getting to grips with the peculiarities of this new material over time, just as they did when aircraft manufacture went from wood to aluminium. Indeed, it was the loss of the Comet that woke the industry up to the fact that aluminium was not a panacea when it came to strength in aircraft construction (though it's likely some engineers probably nodded sadly to themselves when the cause of those crashes was discovered).

Ultimately, the passengers put their lives in the hands of the pilots and crew, and even the best pilot is, to some extent, putting his or her life in the hands of the engineers who designed the aircraft they are flying. Ultimately it becomes a matter of trust, and the sad truth is that commerce cannot cheat physics. With that in mind it is encumbent on pilots and engineers to do the best they can with the knowledge that's available.

[Neptunus Rex]

DozyWannabe

What a great post! Thank you Sir, or Madam.

Your quote below should be emblazoned on every airline manager's coffee cup and door:

the sad truth is that commerce cannot cheat physics.

[misd-agin]

The A300 was not "the latest flight control computer assisted aircraft". Recent report about the A320 event in Canada shows that even newer designs still can have rudder induced control problems.

Agreed about Va. AB, as well as Boeing, produced information about rudder sensitivity after the accident.

The tail failed at 2.03(?) load factor, even after the previous incident.

[letsjet]

If the choice is Airbus or Boeing, I'd go Boeing.

..... But, prefer Gulfstream.

[stilton]

I cannot endorse more heartily Boeings Philosophy.


The Pilot should be in full control of the Aircraft, without restriction at all times.



How can you argue with that. The B777 has a switch that disables all 'protective' flight control laws. Boeing protected their philosophy.


I think that many of the Airbus protections are excellent. But you should be able to turn it all off.


And how is non back driven autothrottles and non connected control sticks an advance ?

[PENKO]

And you can turn all those protections off on the Airbus, but there is absolutely no reason to do so.
Are you rated on the Airbus?
It just takes a sim session or two to convince you.
Back driven throttles, what are those? :)

My airline over the years went from Boeing 737 to Airbus 320.
I know not one pilot who really wants to go back to the 737, the tractor.
Why?
Tray table.
Tray table.
Comfort.
Good design ergonomics.
Big flight deck.
Protections.
Did I mention tray table?

Of course the Boeing is a good machine and we all enjoyed flying it.
It certainly has its plus points, it is not inferior at all.
The VNAV and autothrust work much better (not talking about moving thrust levers, which are obsolete on the Airbus and rightly so), the FMS is more intuitive.
But on the whole I much prefer the comfort of the Airbus.

[DJ77]

Cannot see why some AB pilots praise the throttle system so much. The B. system is so easy, natural, intuitive ...

[Clandestino]

Airbus or Boeing?

As long as plane is well maintained, pay is good and roster decent, I don't care if it's 380, 738, G550 or L-410 Turbolet.

The vertical stab that was defective and patched out of the factory broke where the repair was done.

Never, ever let facts get into way of a good story.

No deviations from the original design and materials specifications were found in the vertical stabilizer (including the repair to the left center lug area that was made during manufacturing) that would have contributed to the vertical stabilizer separation.

In the structural analysis of the accident condition, computational models predicted that, with increasing aerodynamic loads, the right rear lug would experience increasingly higher stresses that would eventually exceed the strength of the lug material and the right rear lug would be the first structural component to fracture

Fracture features and damage patterns on the right forward, center, and rear lugs were consistent with overstress failure under tensile loading. The right rear lug, in particular, had fracture features that were consistent with failure in the cleavage-tension mode. Fracture features and damage patterns on the left forward, center, and rear lugs had features that were consistent with the vertical stabilizer bending to the left after separation of the lugs on the right side.

Good enough?
Also, the accident aircraft had earlier in its' life been involved in a pretty significant in flight upset. So much so that AA pulled or downloaded the flight recdorder data and submitted it to Airbus for guidance. I do not know what guidance AA received from Airbus... but Airbus DID NOT share their calculation that the vertical stabilizer of the aircraft had been subjected to ULTIMATE load factor during the upset. That came out during the discovery phase of the accident aircraft legal battle.You can always count on lawyer to discover what accident investigator missed. Would you be so kind to provide reference to that claim of yours? I can give you something written by NTSB:
a detailed inspection of flight 587’s wreckage, including an extensive examination of the vertical stabilizer main attachment fitting fractures, revealed that each main attachment fitting had features that were consistent with overstress fracture and exhibited no evidence of fatigue features or other preexisting degradation.

I can assure that no pilot I encountered in line flying over the decades and just a very select few in the nether regions of the training and flight ops centers had the vaguest clue that at less than maneuvering speed (AA accident A300 was flying at, I believe significantly less than maneuvering speed) that it was remotely possible for a pilot to cause the vertical stabilizer of a modern jetliner to separate from the fuselage..... That, sir, is quite appalling. Pilots of my class were certainly made aware that under no circumstances is cycling any flight control, at any speed, on any fixed-wing aircraft useful and can turn out to be lethal. It's not just tails that were in jeopardy, stories of gliders shedding wings through aircraft-pilot-coupling were used to illustrate the point. Of course, you have to be quite familiar with concepts of dynamic stability and pilot induced oscillation to appreciate the lesson. That was before they let us sit in mighty Cessna-150 and yet i find the "If you find yourself stirring the controls, give it up, you're probably fighting no one else but yourself" advice useful even when hand flying the A320. Go figure.

[PENKO]

Cannot see why some AB pilots praise the throttle system so much. The B. system is so easy, natural, intuitive ...
DJ77, are you rated on the Airbus?
Anyway, I'm not praising the system, I just say it works quite well. And if you really want to manually adjust the thrust, you press a button and presto.

[DozyWannabe]

The Pilot should be in full control of the Aircraft,

He or she is in the A320+ series too...

without restriction at all times.

Honest question here - what do you think the protections are and when do you think they kick in?

I think that many of the Airbus protections are excellent. But you should be able to turn it all off.

If something's gone wrong with the system (IMO the only time one should turn them off), they turn themselves off.

Another question one might ask is that if you've got yourself into a position where the protections are working and you need to override them to recover, is it possible there wouldn't be enough time to turn them off and perform the necessary actions?

And how is non back driven autothrottles and non connected control sticks an advance ?

Not an advance or step backwards, just a different philosophy. We've been through this so many times now that it's painful, but backdriving the sidesticks could theoretically prevent the pilot(s) from recovering the aircraft if the controls are wired up in reverse (which has happened). It would be difficult, if not impossible to get enough leverage to override the force feedback system due to the way the sticks are positioned. Thus far no mechanic has inadvertently wired a 777 yoke up backwards, but that doesn't mean it will never happen...

Regarding moving throttles, much has been made of their tactile feedback, the lack of which is controversial in the Airbus system. But moving throttles didn't help those poor Turkish guys in Holland.

[DJ77]

PENKO:
DJ77, are you rated on the Airbus

No I'm not and never was. That's why I ask. I don't intend to criticize, just to understand. I note you are not praising the system.

I am praising the system I used on the 777: Not quite happy with what the system is doing ? No need to press any button, just move the throttles a bit to get what you need and when you are happy again, let them go and mister Computer will take over gracefully. That's really user friendly.

DJ

[PENKO]

DJ77, I didn't mean to sound too harsh :ok:
Assuming that the autothrust on the 737NG is similar to that of the 777 I quite agree with you that it is very user friendly. If you don't like what it's doing, you just help it a bit.

In that sense I did have to get used to the lack of thrust feedback on the Airbus and to be honest, it did feel weird the first couple of hundred hours to fly an approach in rough weather without the moving thrust levers. But after a while you get used to it to the point that you don't miss it anymore. I know exactly what the autothrust is doing by the engine sound, seat of the pants, engine instruments etc.

Also and more importantly, there is less need to 'help' the autothrust on the Airbus, because in windy conditions the target IAS on approach is never ever fixed. This is due to a nice protection called GROUNDSPEED MINI. One second the bug is at 135kts, then it moves to 140kts, then back to 133kts, it just varies with the headwind component to maintain a constant groundspeed. This is radically different from the Boeing. It's nice to see how the autothrust works together with the FMGC in this. The less you interfere, the better it works. (In more than 3000 hours on the Airbus I have only once had to correct the autothrust because it was giving me a speed slightly below Vapp)

[DJ77]

PENKO, many thanks for your detailed answer. I understand that the AB system has its own skillfull merits. On a turbulent approach, the 777 also tends to maintain an average airspeed higher than Vapp but I only have suspicions about how it is done. Not as clever as using groundspeed anyway.

PS. I didn't find you harsh at all so never mind.

DJ.

[keesje]

No attempt to stir the pot, but as a passenger I would like the aircraft to take control if the pilot fails.

E.g. the aircraft computers are welcome to do a last second intervention avoiding a collision or controlled flight into terrain.

Category:Accidents and incidents involving controlled flight into terrain - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Accidents_and_incidents_involving_controlled_flight _into_terrain)

Why not? Maybe a natural fear for machines increasingly ruling mankind ? ;)

[Slasher]

..."C-3P0" didn't try to tell Capt. Sullenberger how to do his job, did he?

No thank christ - it left him alone with B HYD and the gamestick to do what he had to do.

[Young Paul]

I flew 737-3/4/5 for 9 years, and was very used to it. It stopped surprising me after about 7. I've also done sim checks on 737-200 and 737-800. I'd even stopped noticing the trim wheel rattling round and the wind noise above 280 knots (actually, thinking about it, it was because we lowered the cost index and never flew above 280 knots).

I've now flown A319/320/321 for 10 years. It took me about half an hour to get used to it. I think it's excellent. I don't think I've ever needed the protections, except in the simulator, I've never had to pull full back (that is FULL back as hard as you can) and firewall the throttles (that is FULL forward to the stop) to escape from terrain (though I like the fact that you can and the aeroplane will do everything it can), I've never had an ECAM as confusing as the ones that they've thrown at us in the sim (and I've not had one in the sim that I've not managed to puzzle out), I've never used the RAT for emergency hydraulics and electrics. I've had one abandoned take-off in that time, miscellaneous electrical glitches, most of which were resettable, I've ended up poling it around at circling minima breathing prayers of thanks that the autothrottle will look after the speed whilst I point it where I want it to go. Yeah, the Boeing you can fly like a "real" aeroplane - but in poor visibility at 600', I'll take all the help I can get. This isn't (as somebody described it on one of the other fora) willy-waving - this is about safely transporting people from A to B.

So basically, give me an Airbus. If I want to fly a real aeroplane, I'll go and rent a Stearman or something. But I forsook being a "real" pilot when I started flying down lines on computer screens. An Airbus is better at helping me keep my job, which I would be the first to acknowledge is not being a "real" pilot at all.

(Yes, I do still have those skills, last time I was checked ... and they do still need to underlie our operation of the airliner.)

[stakeknife]

Well having flown both A&B , both of which I really enjoyed I would plump for the Airbus! I don't subscribe to one being better than the other just different. The boeing is much more simple to study and therefore non normals are pretty straightforward while the bus is tricky to study and requires more thought! As for the AA accident in NY, I was always taught from day one on any jet to be very careful with the rudder, the aircraft type wasn't the problem!!

Bottom line though is I would fly either for the right roster!!

[Slasher]

If I want to fly a real aeroplane, I'll go and rent a Stearman or something. But I forsook being a "real" pilot when I started flying down lines on computer screens. An Airbus is better at helping me keep my job, which I would be the first to acknowledge is not being a "real" pilot at all.

I have to say yeh, well said. My thoughts exactly.

BTW how much do they charge for hiring out the Stearman?

[Sciolistes]

On a turbulent approach, the 777 also tends to maintain an average airspeed higher than Vapp but I only have suspicions about how it is done.
It is designed to quickly increase thrust for speeds lower tha Vref and more slowly reduce thrust for higher speeds.

[sevenstrokeroll]

if you have a choice buy douglas...boeing did!

[DJ77]

It is designed to quickly increase thrust for speeds lower tha Vref and more slowly reduce thrust for higher speeds.

Yes, that's what we see. Works well enough. But I suspect the implementation is a bit more subtle. However, I don't remember it being documented.

[DozyWannabe]

if you have a choice buy douglas...boeing did!

Let's be fair though, Douglas were responsible for one of the biggest airliner design SNAFUs in history (DC-10 cargo door/cabin floor failure), and then got caught with their pants down trying to hush it up.

In fact a lot of people forget that the earliest "What's it doing now?" accidents occured to neither an Airbus nor a Boeing product, but to the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar (EAL401) and the aforementioned DC-10 (ANZ901).

[porch monkey]

I don't think the ANZ accident was a real "what's it doing now" moment. The pilots knew exactly what it was doing, just not WHERE it was doing it. Not really theirs or the aircrafts fault really.

[DozyWannabe]

IMO the AA965 Cali accident (widely considered as part of the "What's it doing now?" category) was practically identical, though in that case it was the pilots that entered the wrong co-ordinates, not the Chief Navigator at base* (as was the case with ANZ901)

Don't want to drag this off-topic again, mind...

[* - Yes, I know that "technically" he corrected co-ordinates that were wrong in the first place, but by failing to inform the pilots, he ended up sending them somewhere they didn't think they were going. ]

[Graybeard]

EAL401 had everybody troubleshooting LG anomaly and nobody flying.

Same thing for the SAS DC-8 that crashed on approach to LAX. Study CRM.

GB

[aa73]

Thanks for the comments, keep them coming!

Speaking of past accidents and "what's it doing" scenarios:

EAL401 (Everglades, FL) was a simple case of all 3 crewmembers forgetting to fly the aircraft while troubleshooting a burned out bulb.

ANZ901 (Erebus) was a loss of SA thanks to the company's navigation department screwing with flight plan coordinates the night before the flight and never telling the crew, essentially luring them down the wrong track in Antarctica, despite the crew having been briefed weeks earlier to fly a different track. Then, sector whiteout contributed to their loss of SA. The aircraft had nothing to do with it.

AAL965 (Cali) was a case of the PF (Captain) entering a fix into the FMC that had the same identifier as numerous fixes and executing it without confirming with the F/O. The aircraft turned towards the closest fix as they were in a descent in mountainous terrain, taking them off the airway and below the peaks.

In all three of these cases, the aircraft was not to blame - and they were all 3 different types (Lockheed, Douglas, Boeing)... ironically enough, neither one Airbus. That said - I'm sure there are several documented incidents of Airbus types confusing the heck out of their pilots, specifically in the earlier years.

[Kerling-Approsh KG]

The most powerful computers on both aircraft are the same. They are grey on the outside and squishy. On Boeing, they are directly connected to the aircraft, on airbus, there are much less capable computers in the way.

While some sing the praises of that bl@&£y table, others look at the manuals and see that though not perfect, Boeing present their information (information that might save your life) much better than airbus, yet their aircraft is simpler.

Being build aircraft which suffer glitches, as airbus do, but the Boeing product is honest and doesn't try to confuse you when things go wrong - perhaps the greatest failing of the airbus product line for some time.

If you wish to be an aircraft manager, and don't mind handing some of the authority over whether you live or die to French technology, enjoy the airbus. If you are a pilot, and wish to control a machine, using your skills, experience, wit, and cunning to get the best out of it, then the Boeing is for you.

[Young Paul]

As I've said already, KG, if you want to be a pilot, don't be an airline pilot. The two things have very different objectives. Airline pilots are (in flying terms) fundamentally system managers. This should be built on a foundation of well-maintained flying skills, and there is no reason that these skills can't be maintained on the Airbus - it's possible to switch off the autothrust, flight director and area navigation display, and indeed my airline does that on sim checks (in addition to which, we fly to places where we do everything from IIIb autolands to circling approaches and visual approaches).

As far as the extra skills, wit, experience and cunning you use to fly a Boeing - can you give any examples? I'm not sure I really spotted any in 9 years on the Boeing that didn't apply in similar ways to the Airbus.

[PENKO]

KG, I do not feel more a manager on the Airbus than on the Boeing. Day to day flying is exactly the same: program the FMC, take off, autopilot on, autopilot off, land. However...

There are some neet things that the 320 does for me which the 737 doesn't. It tunes my navigation radios automatically, it sets the courses on the ILS. It starts the engines for me. It handles the pressurisation completely automatically. I don't have to crank 4 switches to get engine anti-ice, just two button pushes. If I forget the packs, it will tell me. It will tell me the signs are on. I physically cannot make a PA over the ATC radio. My seat moves electrically. My seatback reclines. It will calculate my Vapp and it will make sure the groundspeed stays constant during the final approach. All this makes the Airbus very comfortable to fly on a day to day, sector to sector basis. In no way do I feel like a manager. If anything, it makes me feel a bit lazy. But if needed I can revert back to basics on all these points in an instant. I can manually start the engines, I can fly my own Vapp, I can tune whatever radio I want.

Of course there are things I do not like on the 320. The seats have no sheep's skin. The reading lights are vastly inferior compared to the 737. The only way to tell the FMC that we are going around is to actually select TOGA power. The FMS is not user friendly. The wipers are as useless as on the 737. ECAM, QRH, FCOM take years to really understand. Still, the word manager is not what I would call an Airbus pilot.
:ok:

[tpad]

I flew B737-200/300/400/800, B747-400, B777-200,
A300-600R, A310-300
After five years in the Airbus, albeit not a FBW type, when I got out of it for the last time, I never even looked over my shoulder at it, as the crew bus drove away. All that was going through my mind was " Thank goodness that's over ", and I made myself the promise, that from that point on, I would never volunteer for another 'Bus assignment.

What put me off ? The disquieting feeling that I was never really in charge of the machine. At the time, probably 80-90 % of all Tech-Log write-ups were written off as " Re-racked - unable to fault, please report further ". On the very many occasions I saw the machine do or "say " something totally inexplicable out of left field, and went to an engineer to ask, " Hey, what's all this about ? ", the most common response was for them to look a bit sheepish, shrug their shoulders and say " Sorry, no idea ". The Frenglish manuals were seldom of any help. They don't want you to know how ( or why) they built it that way, they just want you to know the absolute basics of how to operate it. (The same, of course, could be said of the B777-200.)

One can never imagine getting ourselves into a situation where you could come out of cloud, pointing at a hill, but plenty of our colleagues have done it in times past. IMHO it would be cold comfort to hit the hill knowing that no flight envelope limitations have been exceeded.

If you look back over the last 50 odd years of jet transport flying, plenty of them have landed battered and bent, sometimes throw-away items after exceeding a lot of design limits, but landed safely nonetheless. Not many of them were Airbus.

If everything is going according to plan ... Magnificent piece of machinery ! For anything that requires a problem solving solution, outside of the square, as for all aircraft, be extremely careful. The technique of flying Airbus requires that a great deal of trust be put in the PNF, far more so, IMHO than any Boeing. When it gets really down and dirty, the sheer complexity of the design and operating philosophy could bring two good men undone. I used to think in those days, that the difference between the two, was that, for the Airbus, the skipper would need far more available RAM after doing his own job, than in the equivalent Boeing. On a good day, any mug can just sit there and play with the buttons, but the Airbus, in a severely degraded mode, really requires an Aircraft Commander who has a third eye on the rhs of his scone.

The salesmen, from both manufacturers would tell you " It is so easy to fly that even a trained chimp could do it ". The reality is maybe a little more complicated.

The earlier Boeings, although a tad agricultural, were pretty much "what you see, is what you get ". Functional , not flash, but with very few vices and no real tricks or traps that I remember. Uncomfortable ? Of course, but if you took a problem to any engineer over say 35 and asked " What's this about then ?", they would either be able to tell you on the spot, or at least go an look it up.

My all too brief flirtation with the B777-200, was a case of mixed feelings. The gee-wizz aspect of the toys was great ( EFB excepted ... what a POS ! Great idea, truly lousy execution.) I was wary of the FBW, but took some comfort in the sense that, if you asked it to do something radical, it would in it's own way. ask you, " Are you sure you really want to do that ? " If the answer was " Yes ! " it would at least let you do it. I was reasonably confident that a jet-upset was recoverable if unconventional technique was required.

So, that's my ten cents worth .... If you wish to discuss it further, PM me and I'll supply an address for the delivery of a case of nature's finest.

Of course this doesn't address the lifestyle, bid-line , domicile etc, etc. But that's another case.

This post is chardonnay assisted, and I'll deny everything.

Fly safe.

Regards Tpad

PS : If the chart table really means that much to you Airbus afficionados, maybe, just maybe, you need a holiday... ( On a boat !! )

[411A NG]

In fact a lot of people forget that the earliest "What's it doing now?" accidents occured to neither an Airbus nor a Boeing product, but to the Lockheed L-1011 Tristar (EAL401) and the aforementioned DC-10 (ANZ901).

Aah well maybe to the inexperienced crews!
Never had any design issues with her.

Lockheed L-1011 - by far the greatest ever! :ok:

[nitpicker330]

I Flew the worlds simplest jet to fly, yep the mighty tripple 7

Now on the Hyundai of the skies, yep the A330.

I probably don't need to tell you which I prefer:ok:

1/ The table is good on the Bus, I mean it's a very handy spot to put all those crappy FCOM's you seem to forever be needing in flight.:{

2/ The best thing about flying the Bus? After retirement you wont miss flying at all:}

[RedCup]

Having flown both 744 and A330/340, as a place to spend a lot of time, the 330/340 for me hands down.
Cockpit it roomy, quiet(er) and no balancing meals on my lap with a pillow.
Not as fast as the Boeing, but hey, last time I looked I got paid by the hour :-)

[PopeSweetJesus]

I've flown the 727/737/A319/320/A310/A300, not in that order(plus a few other non A or B products). Looking back on it, the 737 is the one I miss the least. I agree that Airbus cockpits are quieter, more comfortable, and in general have more logical ergonomic features although some A310/A300 operators didn't consider a cupholder a necessary feature. While I absolutely love the classic Beast-727 and you won't find me saying anything bad about it, I've preferred the Airbus planes I've flown overall. Basically if you could give me an A320 with as much power as an A300, I'd be quite happy. Same thing for an A300/310 with a retrofitted A320 series style cockpit like they're doing with the 757/767's(plus cupholders!). Nothing is perfect, Airbus, Boeing or whomever, but I really love ECAM. I like coming into the cockpit and not being inundated with a bunch of yellow and red lights/messages on the screens. No messages about low oil pressure, low fuel pressure, low hydraulic pressure, etc because the engines are off. Basically if something on the screen isn't green check it out. I've found it easier to find glaring issues on setup quickly vs wading through a flow to find them or playing guess which one of the six pack lights shouldn't be on now, or which one of the 3 pages of EICAS messages isn't right. There are exceptions to the rule as nature abhors a vacuum, but it's overall a big plus for me along with the obvious ECAM checklist stuff.

As for the flying stuff, I've never really gotten into all the drama. They're both airplanes, they both fly just fine, and like different airplanes they fly differently. All of them will erode your skills if you allow them too. I know plenty of 727 pilots who flew with the A/P from about 800agl to 500agl on the way down and were pretty shaky skills wise if they had to do anything else. They probably had it years ago, but use it or lose always applies. I went from the 320/319 to the 727 and it was no big deal to me as I did a lot of hand flying (AT off as well) in the 319/320. I thought the non moving levers in the 319/320 would bug me, but they didn't. I had a pretty good idea of where the power was by feel/sound and the power lever doughnuts are there as well. Clicking everything off for a TCAS RA, quick leveloff, visual go-around, etc, I pretty much did like any other plane pulling the levers to where I felt they needed to be by feel then confirming with the gauges/speed tape/etc. Doing that a few times in the non-sim world really solidified it for me that I had a good idea of where the power was and it really wasn't an issue. Other than that most stuff seems minor to me. Boeings tend to take more rudder pedal travel to get the desired movement in a X-wind, which is no big deal as long as you realize what kind of plane you're in. Airbus medium autobrakes blow compared to Brakes 3 on a Boeing, I don't know if they fixed it in later planes or not but it seems to be an Airbus trademark. As for the rudder stuff, I also disagree with the poster that said that we weren't warned about the sensitivity of the surface at different speeds and the potential for structural damage. I know I was told about it in training at least 13-14 years ago and told that certain carriers were emphasizing training that was a bit too aggressive in their opinion.

In the end, I prefer the Buses a bit more, but you could plop me in a 757 or a 777 tomorrow and you probably wouldn't hear much out of me other than complaints about cockpit noise or relative comfort(757 not 777). I'd miss some things, like some things, would fly the bird in front of me not my personal idea of how things 'should' be, and enjoy myself which I'm sure you will whatever AA purchases. If you put me back in a 737, it'd be a different story though.....:ugh:

[Dan Winterland]

''Of course this doesn't address the lifestyle, bid-line , domicile etc, etc. But that's another case.''

I used to fly for an airline that had both As and Bs, painted them red and silver and was owned by a man who looked like he should be selling copies of the big issue for a living. We on the B aeroplance, the mighty 744 looked down on our bretherin who flew the 'inferior' A340-300 as we considered our machine was the biggest and the best. And I went with the flow and actually for a while believed we were the best fleet. Then after a while, I noticed they had better destinations, better layovers, more time off and seemingly a better lifestyle overall. And one day I jumpseated on a 340 and realised the extra space and the quietness actually made it a much more pleasant working environemt. -and I found myself thinking that perhaps the 340 was the better option after all.

There's a lot more to life than what type you fly. The type is only a part of the equasion. After 27 years in the industry, I prefer the job which gives me the best lifestyle with the best pay. Not that I mentioned lifestyle and not type. The type comes with the job. And as for the enjoyment of flying for flyings sake, that went for me a long time ago soon after I left the military. I can only recapture that on the few occaisions a year I rent an aerobatic GA aircraft.

I liked the B product, but now I fly A's shorthaul around Asia and the automatics make the long working days very easy. To be faced with an NPA in bad weather with terrain all around at the end of a long tiring day, I thank whoever designed that little APP button which allows me to fly an NDB approach as if it were an ILS.

[rottenray]

An Airbus is better at helping me keep my job

Literally, anything else you could have said would make me, as a passenger, feel better.

Not picking at you - but I sincerely hope that I'm never onboard.

[aa73]

How does the noise level differ between an A320/330/340 and the 75/76/77? About the same?

I just finished a year on the 738... needless to say, the 75/76 is so much quieter.

[stilton]

Well, I can fly a non precision approach in my 75/6 just like an ILS as well.I'm sure you can do the same thing in a B777.


So Airbus has no monopoly there.


I'm still not sure of the advantage of the Airbus 'constant groundspeed' approach.


It does help explain the far more pronounced and frequent power changes I notice on approach while riding in the back on the Ab.


up / down up / down all the way down the glideslope with the power, how is this an advance ?

[3.5 stripes]

Well one thing I've noticed over the years... pilot's will USUALLY say the aircraft they are flying currently is the best. That's because we love to fly them, and they are GENERALLY always improving.

That being said, best ever is the the 757!

[3holelover]

I've worked on the entire airbus fleet ('cept the 380), am endorsed on 310's and the 320 family (19's 20's and 21's), as well as 747 classics, 767's, 737 classics, and 777's... From my perspective, both have their merits, and their downfalls...

For too long Boeing was unwilling to depart from the tried and true.... Airbus had to fiddle for a while to find the true while they tried...

I spoke with a Boeing aerodynamics engineer in 2000 or so... When I told him then I was impressed with some of the airbus treats that we lowly wrench turners appreciated... things like easy access... His response was as genuine as it was perplexing...: "I don't think we've ever spoken to the guys who fix them for their input." Whether true or not at the time, I do believe they Have done so since... the 777 is a fabulous plane to work on/fly in/play with!

....but I wonder how many Boeing pilots realize we could unplug their "control yokes" and plug in an Airbus style joystick to accomplish exactly what they do with all that extra hardware?.... It's just as FBW as the bus folks... it just pretends it isn't.

[stilton]

A strange way of looking at Boeings philosophy and I would turn your statement around and question instead the Airbus flight control system that isolates the Pilots from their Aircraft.


The best of both worlds would be connected, back driven sidesticks and throttles with soft limits a la Boeing.

[3holelover]

the Airbus flight control system that isolates the Pilots from their Aircraft.But the truth is, it does nothing of the sort...

....and why do you want back-driven sidesticks? Do you need artificial feel built into the power steering in your car, or can you feel what you're doing with your fanny? "Seat of the pants" wasn't just a phrase that meant 'very few instruments', was it?....

When you move a stick and feel the response with your whole body, what gain is there in adding artificial "feel" to the stick?

[DJ77]

Because the response is also artificial, due to autotrim.

[nitpicker330]

The 777 has a "back drive" system to move both Yokes together and thus represent a conventional Aircraft.

The benefits of this feature should be obvious for all to see but perhaps only Captains see it the clearest!!
The fact that I can immediately feel and see what my FO is doing at all times of the flight but especially in the Flare ( and Rotation ) is bloody good, but on the Airbus I'm totally at the wim of my FO. ( remembering it's still me that will 100% wear the can if he stuffs up ) On the AB below 100' as we enter the flare it's too late for me to take over and if I do it will probably just make things worse!!
On the Boeing I can simply "assist" him on the Yoke and know what's going on. ( Yes, there could be times that even on the Boeing I wouldn't be able to help )

Same goes for the Autothrust not moving on the AB, it works against me not knowing what the system is doing at all times instinctively.( as in the Boeing )

With regards to the mini groundspeed function of the AB Autothrust system, it can and does cause a "de-stabilized" approach with the Thrust moving back towards idle at low levels in an attempt to reduce toward VLS. If you don't watch yourself ( or indeed watch your FO ) this can cause a total cluster f*** approaching the flare when the Trim freezes at 100'. It's not un common for a hard landing ( or a long floater ) to result in this "out of sync situation"


So, on the AB the Pilot is forced into being more conscious of the actual N1 at all times because you can't rely on just seeing where the levers are any more.
The Pilot needs to be more conscious of what the other Pilot is doing on the Sidestick and what the Aircraft is doing in response to his inputs. Especially in inclement weather situations. As a Captain I am more reluctant to let the FO do the Landing in inclement weather for just the reasons above. Whereas in the Boeing I felt much more confident in my ability to "help him along" should the situation arise.


Having said all of that the system must work as thousands of Airbus land safely each and every day, it's just not a Pilot's Aircraft, more a computer game.

Now don't get me stared on the ECAM. It's not even close to being as good as the EICAS/Elec checklist on the 777. ( and now the 787, 748 )

[Rob21]

What you can do for your aircraft ? (Boeing)

What your aircraft can do for you? (Airbus)

[DJ77]

Or
How can we help the pilot do his job ? (Boeing)

How can we prevent the pilot doing crazy things ? (Airbus)

[Slasher]

Boeing - built by geniuses to be flown by idiots
Airbus - built by idiots to be flown by geniuses

[3holelover]

That's the clearest and best description of the benefits of a back-driven yoke system I've ever seen. Makes perfect sense. Thanks for that.

[DozyWannabe]

nitpicker330 : But (as I said earlier) what if the backdriven sticks/yokes are inadvertently cross-wired, or wired in reverse? Then you have a force-feedback system working against you, and it would be very hard to work against it. As far as I know there's no way to easily disable the force-feedback system on the 777.

There are benefits to both philosophies, so playing one off against the other is a pointless exercise. If I get on an airliner as SLF, I want to know that the pilots are doing their job and not fantasising about how much like an old-school stick-and-rudder jockey they want to feel like today. If you want to do that, go hire a Stearman for a day!

DJ 77, Slasher - grow up. If you can say things as off-the-cuff and daft as that, then I might as well voice my opinion that a pilot who needs a large moving yoke between his legs to feel good about his job is obviously compensating for something...

[DJ77]

I might as well voice my opinion that a pilot who needs a large moving yoke between his legs to feel good about his job is obviously compensating for something

Yes, you might but my advice is: don't do it. That would not make you look smarter.

[poorjohn]

I spoke with a Boeing aerodynamics engineer in 2000 or so... When I told him then I was impressed with some of the airbus treats that we lowly wrench turners appreciated... things like easy access... His response was as genuine as it was perplexing...: "I don't think we've ever spoken to the guys who fix them for their input." Whether true or not at the time, I do believe they Have done so since... the 777 is a fabulous plane to work on/fly in/play with!Recall that during 777 design, Boeing hooted loudly about the wonders of the new CAD/CAM system they were using to design it. Adverts showed little computer-generated people proving easy access to internals. I wonder if they still use it.

[DozyWannabe]

I like to think I've earned enough karma on this board over the years to get away with a tongue-in-cheek facetious comment. Whether people want to think of me as smart or otherwise doesn't really concern me. As I've said many times, I'm not a pilot (I did a few years of AEF and AEG in the Air Training Corps before I got long hair, rock music and pacifism) - though I do have a passion for aviation and engineering that's been with me since childhood. I consider it an honour and a privilege to be allowed to communicate with you guys and learn facts about the things I love from the people who design, fly and maintain the aircraft that make it possible. That said, I'm not inclined to tug my forelock unthinkingly, and I will speak my mind if I don't think it will derail the conversation.

I was sad to see an honest question about the relative merits of Airbus and Boeing aircraft in day-to-day line flying (which flying environment do you prefer?) degenerate into the same old mudslinging that I've seen so many times on here over the last decade or so that it's almost painful to read.

And it always seems to end up with the same ill-informed things being said - variations on "I want to feel like a pilot, not a g*d-d*mned computer operator", or "Since when have the French ever made good aircraft?". Then someone will bring up Habsheim and regurgitate the old press inaccuracies about that incident, sometimes more recently we get the "weak composite tail lugs" rubbish - and the general feeling from the anti-Airbus side is a long-held seething resentment at the (false) idea that the design is intended to degrade the skills involved in line flying and ultimately lead to pilotless aircraft.

Those friendly to Airbus and their products aren't entirely blameless in this, but generally they seem to spend a lot of time patiently explaining the misconceptions in the face of people for whom it has become an almost religious argument. For once, I felt like expressing my frustration in a light-hearted, but open manner.

[Graybeard]

Joysticks and stationary throttle levers do the job, and you sense the results in seat of the pants, and your ears. Backdriven yokes and TLAs add a dimension of redundancy, and it's visual.

Turbulence or driving rain will drown out the g feel and audio feedback. That's when it's valuable to have visual feedback.

GB

[nitpicker330]

Back driven Yokes working opposite each other???? Ahhhhhh..........Mmmmmm. I guess a Meteor could strike Seattle too.

Yes Thanks Greybeard, that's exactly my point, thanks...:ok:

[DozyWannabe]

Back driven Yokes working opposite each other???? Ahhhhhh..........Mmmmmm. I guess a Meteor could strike Seattle too.

How so? They've wired up the sidesticks backwards before, and I maintain that the fact that the sidesticks aren't backdriven was one of the reasons it was possible to save the aircraft. Now, I'm sure that both Airbus (after that incident) and Boeing have done more than due diligence to prevent it from happening yet, but Murphy's Law has a habit of getting around the wiliest designers.

Greybeard's right (though I suspect he meant "tactile" rather than "visual"), but again, that's a single aspect of difference in philosophy - it doesn't make one philosophy as a whole empirically "better" or "safer" than the other. I say again, moving throttles didn't help the Turkish pilots at Schiphol.

[Graybeard]

You just added another sensation, Dozy: Tactile. That makes two extra senses involved from backdrive. Thanks.

The Turkish crash had a whole lot of human factors holes. Ignoring the throttle arms was just one, and not a reason to dismiss backdrive.

GB

[DozyWannabe]

Graybeard:

I'm not dismissing backdrive at all! I'm simply saying that in engineering terms there are cases for, and cases against. Airbus chose one way (visual feedback on the pilot-commanded thrust setting at the lever position, and on the actual thrust commanded via the MFD - the "donuts") and Boeing chose another (visual and tactile feedback via backdriven thrust levers). Both approaches are equally valid and it's only natural that some will prefer one method to the other, and that's fine.

Where things get murky is when the assertion that some pilots prefer the backdriven design because it provides an extra feedback channel (and because it mimics older designs) gets transmogrified into effectively saying that one method is definitively safer than another, when there's no actual evidence to support that.

[nitpicker330]

Sorry bud there have been incidents caused by "dual input" errors and other events such as heavy landings ( requiring main gear changes ) that occurred on the AB that probably would not have on a conventional aircraft where the Captain could have simply assisted on the yoke as required.
Sure I accept that on a conventional Aircraft the two Pilots can mistakenly work against each other effecting a safe outcome.
Nothing is perfect but I sure know which system I prefer.

[DozyWannabe]

I'm talking about the B777 though, which is not a "conventional aircraft" as much as it is a computer simulation of one that happens to be built into an airframe.

Anyway - you don't *need* to "feel" what the other pilot is doing outside of a light trainer (though it's a nice to have for some).

There's no doubt that the envelope protections in the newer FBW aircraft have saved both airframes and lives over the years, and IMO that's far more important than appeasing the dinosaurs...

[Tankengine]

At my airline Airbus pilots get paid more than Boeing.:hmm:
Not my decision, just the way our contract works.
Good enough reason for me! :ok:

[Graybeard]

A yoke moving in response to the other pilot's action, or autopilot action, is detected in peripheral vision, unlike a display screen that must be focused on. Same goes for throttle arm movements not initiated by your own hand.

GB

[DozyWannabe]

Graybeard - true, but there's nothing stopping a pilot simply adding the sidestick/throttle position indicator to the scan - in fact the positioning of those gauges is designed to make it easy.

Let me make it clear again if I haven't already - I'm cool with the idea of some preferring one way over the other. It's when the old-fashioned way is put forward as superior and sacrosanct that I get a bee in my bonnet.

[nitpicker330]

Mate the Sidestick indicator disappears during rotation, not only that it's a little display on the PFD, hardly big enough to "put into your normal scan" during the most important phases of flight ( Vr and the last 200 feet down to touchdown, where you should be eyes up as much as possible, not heads down trying to see where your mate has moved his stick to !! )

I recall a certain A340 incident in JNB where at Vr the PF simply placed the indicator where he thought the Elevator should be!! That little error nearly led to disaster but for the grace of.......
I can categorically state that this has never happened on a conventional Aircraft.

The Airbus is probably ok for those that have very little "flying" experience" but anyone who's ever flown a normal Aircraft will miss this subtle but none the less very important feedback loop.

AB were trying to make a safer Aircraft using these Sidesticks and non moving Throttles but, in my opinion, unfortunately they have in some situations done just the opposite. You need to keep the Pilot in the loop at all times using what he's used to seeing and FEELING as a Pilot.

Now don't get me wrong here, I still enjoy flying the Bus. I actually like the concept of the SS and the Table etc. I just think that they could have easily made it more "natural"

[stilton]

Sorry but Airbus is simply out of touch here, their Aircraft were not designed with pilots in mind.


If it's 'old fashioned' to know what your Aircraft is doing through through every possible cue then I guess Boeing is guilty, I also think it should be mandatory.


Ab is not 'more clever' they just wanted to be different, such a shame they co**ed it up.

[Sciolistes]

As far as the thrusties are concerned, this "backdrive" thing is a bit irrelevant. I'm talking 737 Classic, the A/T is often a nuisance and manual thrust usually results in much less fuss.

Also, I can't tell just by feel if the throttles are in 45% position or 65% position on final, I have to look at the N1s. One usually needs to keep N1 in the scan because of asymmetry, nearly always one lever needs an extra tug or nudge to get it within 10% of the other one. One should keep the N1s in the scan anyway, they pretty much validate the wind arrow and warn you of any likely required thrust changes further down the slope.

Therefore, non-moving thrusties on an Airbus are probably less hassle providing the flying Citroen has a competent A/T system

However, the control wheel backdrive can be a boon. Having experienced large thrust lever splits with A/T in the past, the most visible can be the control wheel, it lends itself to an apriori recognition of the situation in the way that data scans generally don't.

However, if you have an FBW system that limits yaw, then I guess that argument is potentially null and void.

[nitpicker330]

Sorry mate but I respectfully suggest you're wrong.

I can easily see in my peripheral vision the location of the Thrust Levers on a Boeing to know what gives. Also i can ( and have ) easily push them up a bit or pull them back a bit whilst the A/T remains active and achieve a very smooth safe result where needed.

On the Bus it's a bit more complicated unfortunately, you cannot always just take em out of the detent to fix a slow system response. In fact if you push it forward out of the CLB detent below 100' to fix a sudden speed decay and then mistakenly put it back you keep TOGA.!! And around you go....

On a Boeing you simply push the TOGA buttons on T/O and hey presto it sets the desired thrust, on the Bus you must remember to put it in either Flex or Toga, get it wrong with a brain fart and "TO Thrust not set" pops up at 30 odd knots and maybe an embarrassing RTO!!! I know, you should always know what you are doing and where to put the levers but it's just one more thing this AB can lead you up the garden path!!


These things are known to all AB Pilots and we work around the issues but the point is that these issues shouldn't be there in the first place.

[Denti]

On the classic you are right, there is sometimes a thrust lever split. However there shouldn't be with competent maintenance, so if you observe itwrite it up and let them correct it. Once you switch to the NG, thrust lever split is a thing of the past during normal flying.

Of course you can fly without a moving thrust levers, many airbus pilots do that every day. It just is bad design as we only have so many input channels and the visual tends to close down pretty rapidly during non normal situations (tunnel vision) where the tactile channel might still have capacity. Airbus took that one needlessly out of the equation putting even more stress on the already overstressed visual input channel. However that is only one part of a pretty big puzzle.

[Sciolistes]

Denti,
so if you observe itwrite it up and let them correct it
Agreed, but if you would like to take my place and enter this particular infinite loop be my guest :ugh:

we only have so many input channels and the visual tends to close down pretty rapidly during non normal situations (tunnel vision) where the tactile channel might still have capacity.
An excellent point that I had not really considered fully. Is there a study available for perusal? I understand that already the eyes along provide more data than the brain can process, with a similar imbalance for the other senses too. Could the additional channels lead to overload and fixation or do they encourage maintaining a bigger picture?

[Young Paul]

There are 4600 A320 series aircraft that have been built since they were introduced in the late 80s. There are 6600 B737s that have been built, in around 20 years longer.

To be honest, for all the opinions that have been voiced, if either had major character flaws, they wouldn't have been so successful. The early hull losses on the A320 were due to "pilots" who had ceased to be a part of the flying of the aircraft, and were forgetting things like ... you shouldn't be setting up vertical speeds of over 2000 fpm near the ground ... high bypass engines take time to spool up. And in these cases, Airbus have systems available that could have protected the pilots, which were either not installed or had been disabled (by the pilots, who perhaps didn't like being told how to fly their aircraft by the manufacturer?). If we want to talk about aircraft oddities, did Boeing ever get to the bottom of the rudder hardover mystery which means that the manoeuvre speeds for the 737 are now 10 knots higher than they were originally designed to be? IAMFI - I note that the BA 737s still ask for 170 to 5 miles ....

Two FBW Airbuses have made deadstick landings in which everyone has survived, due to external issues (fuel leak, birds); 737s have as well (birds).

If you are going to fly an Airbus, learn to fly it like an Airbus. The information, and more, is in front of you: learn to use it. If you flew it and didn't like it, 4600 built and largely still operating says that the problem is probably yours. If you are criticising it without having flown it, the word we use for that is "prejudice".

The objective of airline operations is the safe, reliable and efficient carriage of passengers from place to place. Both do the job admirably.

[Sciolistes]

did Boeing ever get to the bottom of the rudder hardover mystery which means that the manoeuvre speeds for the 737 are now 10 knots higher than they were originally designed to be?
Before my time, but recent changes to the manuals have removed all references to unmodified 737s, only the lower speeds published and the associated non-normal checklist has been rewritten accordingly too.