UA497 Smoke, Emergency Landing and Evacuation

[grumpyoldgeek]

KENNER, La.— United Airlines flight 497 had to make an emergency landing at Armstrong International Airport this morning. Airport officials reported smoke in cockpit and immediately landed the plane around 7:20 this morning.

Once landed, passengers had to use emergency chutes for a safe exit from the plane. Some passengers are complaining about smoke inhalation. The flight was headed to San Francisco for a 7:07 am departure.

[SaturnV]

English has improved.

KENNER, La. (AP) — A United Air Lines flight from New Orleans to San Francisco returned to the New Orleans airport within minutes of taking off Monday after rocking back and forth.

All 100 passengers and five crew members on Flight 497 were safe, airline spokesman Rahsaan Johnson said.

Copilot Ronald Lee Young told an Associated Press reporter aboard the Airbus 319 that he landed on backup systems, with minimal steering and braking ability, after the plane lost all electronics.

"When things start to go wrong, there's always a system ... we can go back to," he said.

He said the plane, heavy with fuel, ran off the runway and blew a tire.

Journo on board, so first hand.

[sb_sfo]

Flight ends in minutes, returns to La. airport - San Jose Mercury News (http://www.mercurynews.com/breaking-news/ci_17768155?nclick_check=1)

[blueloo]

From Sydney Morning Herald:

Airbus Overrun (http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-incidents/plane-overshoots-runway-as-pilot-lands-with-little-steering-ability-after-jet-loses-all-electronics-20110405-1cywh.html)

[skidbuggy]

For those who have waaay too much time on their hands;

Liveatc's audio.

Roughly 11+30 into the recording.

http://archive-server.liveatc.net/kmsy/KMSY-Apr-04-2011-1200Z.mp3

[Shaker One]

Having an emergency in the US is such a pleasure with ATC on your side. I departed a major airport in a very large Asian country recently (in the same type - A320) and asked for vectors back to the field due to a problem I won't go into here - and was told to maintain the SID which took me further away from the airport. Had to declare a PAN to get what I wanted.

[Bealzebub]

Had to declare a PAN to get what I wanted.
That is what it is there for.

[mickjoebill]

Approx 9 miles out
Ground crew "we need three minutes to clear (construction vehicles from) the runway"

Approx 7 miles
UA497 "lost all our instruments right now and we are gonna need just a PAR"

Approx 5 miles
UA497 "we've got the water we gonna stop here at about 600 feet"


Not an ordinary day at the office.:D

[rob_ginger]

I've had a listen to the ATC recording (from skidbuggy's link), as well as a few others over time - Sully's Hudson River landing, the Thompson 767 bird ingestion video on Youtube, etc. I know you'd expect it, but nevertheless it's very comforting to see how hard the controllers try to help a plane in trouble.

Now, an SLF question that may be a bit off-topic.. In the background of the UA497 transmissions I could hear the alarm bonger sounding continually. I can imagine the tremendous pressure that a cockpit crew would be under in an emergency, and having that damn thing beeping away would drive up my stress level to breaking point. Is there any way to permanently silence that ? I'd take to it with the fire axe as the first thing on *my* checklist.

[avspook]

News from ABC & Live ATC
smoke in cockpit & loss of electrical power


United Airlines Pilots Declare Emergency - ABC News (http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/video/united-airlines-pilots-declare-emergency-13295017?tab=9482931&section=1206833)

[lomapaseo]

TRANSCRIPT OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER, PILOT CONVERSATION

UA 497: Clear for takeoff runway 19, thank for you very much.
UA 497: We need to vector back to the airport, we got a smoke issue with the airplane.
N.O. Approach: Turn right 030 (degrees) and maintain 4,000 (feet.)
UA 497: 030 4,000. And we'd like the longest runway please.
N.O. Approach: There are men and equipment on the runway - they're going to try to get them off now. Descend at pilot's discretion. Maintain 2,000.
UA 497: We are declaring an emergency and please roll equipment for our landing please.
N.O. Approach: We are unable for (runway) 10, can you take (runway) 19?
UA 497: ..no..
N.O. Approach: Roger, we are clearing the runway now.
Airport operations: How much time do we have?
New Orleans Tower: I'd say they are about 11 miles to the west.
Airport operations: Tower, we can start trying to pull them off, but I don't think we will get them all off in time.
N.O. Approach: United 497, Say souls on board and fuel remaining.
UA 497: 106 souls on board, fuel remaining 32,400 pounds.
N.O. Approach: They are still trying to get all the vehicles off the runway and 19 is still available if you like....
New Orleans Tower: ... working as fast as they can (unintelligible) There is a bunch of equipment on there they're tying to get off now.
UA 497: You need to clear it for us.
New Orleans Tower: I understand, sir. We're getting them off as fast as we can.
N.O. Approach: Turn right heading 140, main 2,000 ....cleared ILS runway 10 approach.
New Orleans Tower: Can you verify the vehicles are exiting?
Airport operations: We are attempting to get the vehicles off right now, I'm removing the cones also.
New Orleans Tower: OK, cause I haven't seen any of the vehicles move and the aircraft is ten to the northwest and they have to have runway 100.
N.O. Approach: United 497, Turn right heading 180.
UA 497: um.... We only have one... um ... (Alarms sounding in background.)
N.O. Approach: United 497 say again sir?
New Orleans Tower: We need three minutes to get the runway clear.
UA 497: (alarms blaring) We've lost all our instruments right now and we're going to need (directions)
N.O. Approach: United turn left heading, 20 degrees left
N.O. Approach: Just continue left turn, I'll tell you when to stop.
UA 497: (unintelligible) What vector are we from the airport?
N.O. Approach: Right now sir you are on the 330 degree heading from the airport. Northwest of the airport for runway 19er. If you continue on this present heading you'll set up on the shoreline for 19.
UA 497: Shoreline for 19.
N.O. Approach: I can set u up there or I can vector you, what'd you need?
UA 497: That's fine.
N.O. Approach: (unintelligible...)You got the water, right?
UA 497: Yeah, we got the water and we're going to stop here about 600 feet.
N.O. Approach: Roger that. The airport's currently at your 1 o'clock and five miles.
UA 497: 1 o'clock and five miles roger.
New Orleans Tower to fire crews: Fox-6, next arrival runway 19er is our aircraft. And the aircraft is approximately 3 miles northwest runway 19er.
N.O. Approach: If you start your right turn now I can set you up on final.
UA 497: Start turn on final.
New Orleans Tower to fire crews: The aircraft is over the shoreline around two miles out. You do have permission to proceed on to the runway after he lands.
N.O. Approach: Make a right turn. The airport is off to yoru right side,
N.O. Approach: 497, clear to land 19er. You'll be able to make it sir? Winds 180 at 16, gusts to 20, Clear to land. Runway 19er.
New Orleans Tower to fire trucks: Fox-5, this is our aircraft touvh ing down bow.
New Orleans Tower: Follow the aircraft down the runway.
New Orleans Tower: We're going to need runway 10 operational. Runway 19er is fouled at this time.
Fox-5: The aircraft is off the runway.
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/united_airlines_jet_landed_aft.html (http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?llr=gqvqzbdab&et=1105065214426&s=9197&e=001vxTbKxaE5JAJH-X50JmozxnRXNYDcFuRJyuAYJadff78sqtuQcf_OcpvZmE9vZYvHRcJkHFW-lMzDEWj0-F6LoGzAOoQJplB4g8eooA3yFe5g0cS81Hz2W9PYI_EoFG89OD0Q4K1vxcbjE AJX17uZ7NAg_elBHNHBTyRb1XnWkrjtw7JacvEzYLjOKu-T8ESCHy0PJf5md4=)



Reading this I thought of all the times that I was on inactive runways and also what I thought were inactive railroad lines. I was generally nervous only because I was dependant on somebody else to warn me what to do in an emergency.

I did have one emergency pop up where we were told to clear an inactive runway for an emergency air-turn-back. That was simply handled because my driver was part of the airport management and always had the tower on the frequency.

[pattern_is_full]

Makes one wonder if all non-aircraft runway operations should include a bulldozer among the equipment - to ensure the runway can be cleared on three minutes notice. :E

Shades of Airport. "In case of emergency, break trucks!"

[p7lot]

I have sim'd for fire warning more times than I care to remember and it has to be my worst nightmare.

BIG pat on the back for the crew :D :D :D

[nnc0]

Curious thing but thought I'd pass it along. It applies to Airbus but I can't say if it's the same for Boeings. In the aircraft (not the sim) the lenses on the O2 masks have a protective plastic film over them to protect against scratches when they're stowed in the box. It's easy to not notice them in the heat of the moment (sorry about the pun) but if you don't remove the film when putting your mask on, they can do a nice job of obscuing your vision in an already difficult situation.

[BOAC]

I believe this 'film' is there to degrade vision for sim purposes.

[ECAM_Actions]

that he landed on backup systemsIf he lost all instrumentation:

UA 497: (alarms blaring) We've lost all our instruments right now and we're going to need (directions)does this mean he was using mech backup or was he still using the FBW system for aircraft control?

ECAM Actions.

[flyingflea]

there is no mechanical back up for the Flight Control System. They are talking about flight instument failure I believe - not flight control system

[poorjohn]

I thought Precision Approach Radar disappeared from [most?] airports decades ago. Mis-remember?

[aterpster]

poorjohn:

I thought Precision Approach Radar disappeared from [most?] airports decades ago. Mis-remember?

KMSY, unlike most airports, still has ASR approaches:


http://i201.photobucket.com/albums/aa214/aterpster/MSYASR.jpg

[ECAM_Actions]

@flyingflea: The A32x does indeed have mechanical backup in the event of total loss of the FBW system. It comprises the stab trim wheel for pitch and the rudder pedals for roll control.

The FBW system itself has Normal, Alternate 1, Alternate 2 and Direct Laws.

Given the smoke, assumed electrical fire, and loss of avionics, I wondered if the FBW had been adversely affected as well (thinking back to electrical generator problems on another flight where FBW was also affected by the fault leading seemingly to temporary loss of control).

It was more curiosity than anything else.

* Patiently awaits initial report *

ECAM Actions.

[BOAC]

poorjohn - you are correct - the only places you are likely to see a PAR is at a military base. ASR is fairly common.

[N1EPR]

United Airlines, the FAA and NTSB are looking into an incident Monday in which a United Airlines Airbus A320 departed New Orleans and immediately declared an emergency due to smoke in the cockpit. As the situation progressed, the crew reported that it lost all power to its flight instrument, although the comm radios continued to function. The flight was en route from New Orleans to San Francisco when the incident occurred. The pilot told controllers: "Flight 497 we need to vector back to the airport. We have a smoke issue with the airplane." Shortly thereafter, the crew declared an emergency and landed at New Orleans, possibly with impaired braking and steering, since the aircraft exited the runway and got its nosewheel buried in mud. The emergency slides were deployed and all 105 passengers and crew exited safely.

It's not clear if smoke in the cockpit was so dense that the crew couldn't seen to navigate visually or if they were just too far from the airport to navigate back without vectors. The pilot told ATC that he had lost all instruments. Controllers got the airplane back on a heading toward New Orleans' Louis Armstrong Airport and cleared it to land. Most of the passengers were placed on later flights and arrived in San Francisco Monday afternoon.

[gbour]

A feature of United is that pax can listen to cockpit communications on one of the IFES channels. Wonder whether this was on...?
Or is there a SOP to switch it off in non-routine situations?

[K_9]

On airplanes with opening side windows in the cockpit (e.g. 737--not sure about a320), is it an option to open one or both of those windows when at low altitude to help vacate the smoke?

[stepwilk]

Often opening a cockpit window creates a negative pressure flow and sucks far more smoke into a cockpit than would get in with the side window closed.

[K_9]

That makes sense. Thanks.

[DingerX]

Channel 9 is at the discretion of the flight crew. Al Haynes turned it off after reporting engine failure, but before the hydraulic failure became apparent.

In this case, it's pretty irrelevant, since we don't have any passenger reports about the "smoke issue" from the cockpit; from what's been reported so far, the first sign of trouble in the cabin was the cabin PA about in-flight meals for sale going dead in mid-shill.
If the cabin PA went dead, so did the IFEN, and thus, so did channel 9.

So, sure, someone could have heard something, but not much.

The folks at Louis Armstrong demonstrably did a fine job, managing an escalating condition and providing maximum service and coordination (while keeping the field open), and all the signs currently point to a great job by the flight crew as well.

(shuts up)

[Silvio Pettirossi]

K 9: You can open the side windows of the 320 series aircraft at up to a IAS of 200kts. In fact, it is part of the smoke removal QRH procedure to open the windows and the cockpit door to get the smoke out after you have depresurized the aircraft.

[flyingflea]

OK, I stand corrected, on the A320 there is limited mechanical back up, primarily to give some degree of control whilst fault finding a complete electrical failure. Not sure how successful an attempted landing in mech mode would be though.

[742]

...the lenses on the O2 masks have a protective plastic film over them...


In an actual decompression there is a substantial temperature drop. The film is there so that it can be peeled off to remove frost that may have formed.

Unfortunately the strips are often missing from the masks because, I assume, pilots and mechanics think that they are for shipping purposes.

[nnc0]

Good to know. It's an obscure bit of info but worthwhile to know.

They should be a bit more obvious though with red stripes or something because I can tell you they are often not noticed (most cases) and left in place with subsequent complaints about poor vision through the mask.

[Zeffy]

NTSB Press Release (http://www3.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2011/110407.html)

NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 7, 2011

FIRST UPDATE ON NTSB INVESTIGATION INTO UNITED AIRLINES RUNWAY EXCURSION INCIDENT IN NEW ORLEANS

The National Transportation Safety Board continues to make progress in its investigation of United Airlines flight 497, which returned to the airport on April 4, 2011, in New Orleans, shortly after take-off due to automated warnings of smoke in the equipment bay. The airplane's nose wheel exited the side of runway 19 upon completing the landing roll and an emergency evacuation was conducted.

The NTSB team, comprised of 3 NTSB investigators and representatives from the designated parties and advisors, arrived on scene April 4 to document and examine the aircraft and retrieve the data and voice recorders. Two other NTSB investigators, specializing in operational factors and maintenance factors, traveled to various locations to review pertinent documentation and records and conduct interviews.

After documenting the condition of the equipment in the electronics bay, investigators applied limited electrical power to various systems on the airplane. At this time, the preliminary examination has not revealed any signs of burning, indications of smoke or other anomalous system findings.

The NTSB operations group completed interviews of the flight crew yesterday. The crew indicated that, at about 4000 feet, the airplane's electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system provided an autothrottle-related message, then an avionics smoke warning message, accompanied by instructions to land. Despite receiving this message, neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.

The captain indicated that he used the electronic checklist for the avionics system smoke warning indication, which included shutting down some of the airplane's electrical system. The crew reported that the first officer's display screens went blank, the ECAM messages disappeared, the cockpit to cabin intercom stopped functioning, and the air-driven emergency generator deployed. The captain said that he took control of the airplane at this point and managed the radios while the first officer opened the cockpit door to advise the flight attendants of the emergency and their return to New Orleans airport.

The crew also noted to investigators that they requested runway 10 for landing, but were told the runway was not available due to the presence of construction vehicles. The captain said that he was able to use the airspeed, altimeter, and attitude information on his primary flight display during the return to the airport, and that he ordered an evacuation after landing.

As previously reported, the airplane's forward right slide did not properly inflate during the emergency evacuation. After examining the evacuation slides, investigators found that the aspirator for the forward right-hand slide was partially blocked. The aspirator component is the mechanism for inflating the slide during an emergency evacuation. Investigators have retained the slide for further evaluation.

Preliminary reports provided to investigators suggest that the flight attendants did not smell or see smoke in the cabin, but observed the cabin lights turn off and the intercom system cease to function during the flight. Interviews of the cabin crew will be conducted after the investigators complete their on-scene work to more thoroughly document the cabin crew's observations and communications throughout the flight and emergency evacuation.

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) arrived at NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. on April 5 and were successfully downloaded. The CVR is of good quality and captured approximately 7 minutes and 30 seconds of the incident flight. The FDR contained in excess of 25 hours of data and captured approximately 18 minutes of data relevant to the incident flight. Both the CVR and FDR stopped recording data prior to landing.

Investigators will remain on scene to complete their evaluation of the airplane and documentation of other factors in the incident.


How does a procedure for a (potentially invalid) Avionics Smoke warning end up with deployment of the RAT plus killing the CVR + FDR?

:confused:

[Airbus_a321]

@press release
..probably it was just a blocked filter in the avionic ventilation system, which generates the ECAM warning. happens quite often, especially if you use "cheap" filters.nothing to worry about

The checklist says IF SMOKE EXISTS
neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight....the pilots didn't observe any smoke....so why did they continue with the procedure...unnecessary....pilots fault...no heroes then :confused:

[aterpster]

Airbus A321:

The checklist says IF SMOKE EXISTS

...neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.

I know nothing about the line of Airbus types. But, every airplane type I flew (including two with RATs) had an electrical fire/smoke checklist that did not shut off power to all busses at the same time. Thus, if followed properly the RAT would not deploy.

And, as you say if no smoke exists at any time, seems like they should have had normal electrical for approach and landing unless there were some kind of major buss fault. (?)

[BOAC]

The captain said that he was able to use the airspeed, altimeter, and attitude information on his primary flight display during the return to the airport, - if this is true, where did all the drama about 'lost all our instruments' come from?

[Dr_Tre]

In an Avionic Smoke situation there is the option of entering into Emergency Electrical Configuration with the press of just one button. It is designed to shed all electrics except what's necessary to fly the aircraft manually from the LHS. The FO will have lost his screens, maybe he confused losing his side with losing all instruments?

Not sure why the FDR and CVR stopped though - that obviously shouldn't happen.

[lomapaseo]

In an Avionic Smoke situation there is the option of entering into Emergency Electrical Configuration with the press of just one button. It is designed to shed all electrics except what's necessary to fly the aircraft manually from the LHS. The FO will have lost his screens, maybe he confused losing his side with losing all instruments?



That's the basis of a good checklist. I suppose it's always possible that they went beyond the basic checklist due to some unexplained concern.

I always felt that way about SR111 when they started shutting down engines.

[FIRESYSOK]

"lost all our instruments" may have simply been a way to express that things were getting progressively worse for them, action-induced or not. I personally don't see a need to get into specifics with ATC at that point.

The report did say this incident started with an A/T message or disconnect which by itself is not a big deal but followed by an ARINC smoke or avionics smoke message, this situation warranted a return in my opinion. Had this been a real avionics bay fire, it wouldn't have seemed prudent after the fact to have waited for my nostrils or eyes to detect particulates. As for actioning the elec fire/smoke items, that would obviously make this situation much more demanding.

Also, a PAR is perfectly prudent had they felt electronic navigation may have become unavailable at some later point.

All that being said, it's possible they did de-power the airplane as directed but the RAT deployed for reasons unknown (lazy relay perhaps?). Who knows at this point.

[Knackered Nigel]

FIRESYSOK,

The Airbus A320 has a single smoke detector in the avionics bay. The pilot's nose being the second. If smoke not detected in flight deck by crew - don't action the checklist IMHO. It is one of the ECAM checklists that should not be actioned immediately but refer to QRH according to my airline.

Otherwise potentially you end up in a worse situation than necessary. Await the facts on this one though - not a pleasant experience I imagine.

[sevenstrokeroll]

I just don't get it...a warning light comes on saying there is smoke...but you don't smell anything?

I remember when they gave the first mercury astonauts a small hammer...the advice was if something didn't work...hit it.

are we to the point where warning lights have overcome common sense?

I had smoke, or what we thought was smoke in the DC9...I left the flight deck and went back to take a look...it didn't look like smoke..more like dirt/dust. We shut down the pack that supplied the cabin, used the other pack and flew the thing at lower altitude...arriving on time.

when on the ground, we had found a hose clamp sort of thing had fallen off sucking in some air from the tail compartment...a bit stinky. mx fixed it in about 10 minutes.

thing is boys, think.

[wiggy]

Shell M

If, as has been claimed by Airbus drivers here, that the checklist contains the caveat:

IF SMOKE EXISTS


Then perhaps we'd better wait until we see the incident/accident report before handing out the :ok:s

[BOAC]

One thing is certain - IF the call went out 'we've lost ALL our instruments" and the NTSB report is also correct, someone will, by now, hopefully have educated that particular pilot as to what ALL means and what that sort of call means to a controller.

[misd-agin]

Airbus. Random E&E smoke warning for a couple of days. MX couldn't find the problem. Ops check normal....

Happens to us at TOC. Intermittent, then full warning w/ECAM. No smell through the sniffer tube.

We divert. Give FO the a/c. Idle/speedbrakes until configured since the divert field was pretty close.

Mx found faint smoke smell in E&E. Mechanic and I climb around E&E trying to find source. Insulation touching runway turn off lights. Use of turnoff lights, and length of use, apparently the reason behind the random nature for several days.

That fact that they couldn't smell anything is no different than it was in my case. We had no smell but a possible source of ignition.

[aterpster]

BOAC:

One thing is certain - IF the call went out 'we've lost ALL our instruments" and the NTSB report is also correct, someone will, by now, hopefully have educated that particular pilot as to what ALL means and what that sort of call means to a controller.

I doubt that crew will be flying in the near future.

[FIRESYSOK]

They had already declared mayday. At that point the crew get anything they desire, including a surveillance approach which was specifically asked for by the captain. Listen to the tapes. He could have asked for a PAR regardless of his instrumentation, weather, etc. and it would have been delivered, no questions asked.

Maybe the Brits think something of this (obvioulsy) but obviously, it was not at issue here. What is at issue is what triggered the faults, was there smoke, and was the crew guilty of gross negligence for landing because of a smoke warning. My guess? The crew is already back flying and the nexus of the investigation is the aircraft in question. That's the way it works here and with any luck will continue to do so.

[lomapaseo]

Sadly in the US there is an increasing tendancy to rapidly blame the crew for everything to try to avoid NTSB opening up training sytem and management issues.:ugh:

A collective "US" vs the "world" comment like this is not appropriate to a valid argument. Contrary to what is often portrayed on discussion boards, investigators, advisory or government, are not involved in the blame game. The contributing factors are all considered and if the crew is in the chain either from omission, or causal then it's expected that the final recommendations will address the reasons for their involvement.

The most simple blame has a tendency to go to the lowest common denominator either mechanical or symptom "were it not for"........
However the presumption of an average skill crew response need also be weighed as an investigative finding in the final recommendations by the board in charge.

[MountainBear]

The report did say this incident started with an A/T message or disconnect which by itself is not a big deal but followed by an ARINC smoke or avionics smoke message, this situation warranted a return in my opinion. Had this been a real avionics bay fire, it wouldn't have seemed prudent after the fact to have waited for my nostrils or eyes to detect particulates.

Exactly. Why have a mechanical instrument to detect what one's biological instruments (nose and eyes) cannot if, when push comes to shove, you are only going to rely on the biological instrument. It makes no sense whatsoever.:ugh::ugh:

Seriously, if you are not going to believe your instruments, why have them.

[BOAC]

I haven't followed this thread in detail, but is there some criticism somewhere on it of the decision to declare a Mayday and RTB?

[Zeffy]

but is there some criticism somewhere on it of the decision to declare a Mayday and RTB?

Although some posters may be interpreting the comments in that fashion, the "criticism" (discussion, I thought) shouldn't be focused on the decision to return and land, but rather on how the event progressed from the initial warning of avionics smoke to a deployment of the RAT -- i.e., --

Was the appropriate checklist followed precisely by the crew?

Was the checklist itself properly constructed?

Were other electrical/mechanical faults not apparent to the pilots?

[Jetjock330]

Being only A330/340 rated, I can say that going into Emergency Electrical config is a RED land ASAP, with with planning in mind. Adding any form of smoke into this equation highlights the point of landing even sooner.

A pilot is able to restore from Emergency Electrical configuration, but will not be able fully restore and there some consequences, hence the request for the longest runway. The RAT is driving the green hydraulic system, which is driving the Emergency Generator, therefore the landing gear needs to be dropped via the Emergency gear down, so as not to interrupt to RAT driving the EMER generator circuit, leaving no nose wheel steering amongst other things after landing. (I am not A320 qualified and no time in it)

Smoke in the Airbus checklist is bit like having the evening fireplace smoking into the living room. Doing a SMOKE REMOVAL by opening the windows ain't going to stop the smoke. First the scource needs to be isolated via, aircon packs off, or isolating electrical busses, the electrical supply. This in turn would supposedly stop the living room fire and now the SMOKE REMOVAL is applied.

If in doubt and SMOKE still persists, turn the power off to the house (put the aircraft ino EMER ELEC CONFIG) and consider opening the windows if needed, but the point is, the problem/scource needs to be found first first.

Some folk feel the need to go straight to main box and kill the power to the house (put the aircraft ino EMER ELEC CONFIG) and then deal with the source, which is not always the way to deal with it.

AVIONICS SMOKE is detected in the outflow(exhaust flow), so it is more difficult to tell which radio/computer is being fried, but it may not put smoke into the cockpit, as it is only being detected in the avionics exhaust flow. Different checklist, although important too.

[Ditchdigger]

AVIONICS SMOKE is detected in the outflow(exhaust flow), so it is more difficult to tell which radio/computer is being fried, but it may not put smoke into the cockpit, as it is only being detected in the avionics exhaust flow.


I hope this isn't a stupid question, and I realize that it may be unaswerable in any specific sense--how long might one expect between the initial smoke message, and the point at which shutting off the electrical supply wouldn't help? In other words, how much time does a crew have to consider the possibilities and react before a fire would become self sustaining?


Makes one wonder if all non-aircraft runway operations should include a bulldozer among the equipment - to ensure the runway can be cleared on three minutes notice.


I know this aspect of the incident hasn't had much discussion, but if anyone is interested, I can comment about the performance of a milling machine such as the one involved here. Among those of us who play in the dirt rather than the sky, the consensus of opinion is that to try and take it directly into the grass would probably have resulted in it getting stuck before it was far enough off for the runway to be considered "clear". (Unlike much construction equipment, they're not intended to be run off-pavement.) Also, with a top speed in the neighborhood of 10 mph, 3 minutes wouldn't be a unreasonable expectation to reach the nearest taxiway.

[Airbus_a321]

maybe they were a little bit too fast with the procedure and therefore rushed into the procedure and created the "homemade" mess.

According the press release:
the preliminary examination has not revealed any signs of burning, indications of smoke or other anomalous system findings.

neither crew member recalled smelling smoke or fumes during the flight.

The QRH says clearly:

AVNCS SMOKE - if perceptible smoke apply.....do this and this and that etc...

further down in the procedure:

QRH "...at any time of the procedure if smoke becomes the greatest threat
ELEC EMER CONFIG.....CONSIDER

QRH "...Refer to the end of the procedure to set ELEC EMER CONFIG..."

Now I guess they rushed into and applied this procedure, although there was no smoke.


@firesysok it's possible they did de-power the airplane as directed but the RAT deployed for reasons unknown... the RAT deployed IMHO not for reasons unknown, but for reasons VERY WELL KNOWN.... because

to set ELEC EMER CONFIG you must switch:

- EMER ELEC GEN 1.....OFF
- EMER ELEC PWR ..... MAN ON (...and now the RAT is already in the air.....)
now the QRH says
WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL:
- APU GEN....OFF
- GEN 2.......OFF

et voila, ...now you have to deal with the "$hit" that you are in

ELEC EMER CONFIG ....and this is not a nice situation. not at all.

I agree with Nigel #39

and I think they did not ....a great job as well....(@DingerX)

wait and see

[Che Guevara]

UAL does not use use the 'standard' Airbus Checklists, indeed their Avionics Smoke procedure is very straight forward by comparison and covers all the important aspects of the situation.

However, similar to the Airbus checklist there is a line, 'IF PERCEPTABLE SMOKE', which I suspect might be interpreted by some as a positive, if they have an Avionics Smoke ECAM warning. I am not suggesting this happened in this case, as I too look forward to the report when it comes out.

The UAL checklist later mentions: IF SMOKE AFTER 5 MN:
EMER ELEC GEN 1 LINE ......OFF, which leads into the EMER ELEC CONFIG. etc.
Again, could this be interpreted as a positive if the Avionics Smoke ECAM Warning still exists?

My point is that Smoke and Fire are unquestionably one of our greatest threats and their should be little or no doubt how to proceed if faced with this problem, whether it is a training issue or checklist design, we need to be very certain what to do and when to do it. There can be no ambiguity.

[MountainBear]

However, similar to the Airbus checklist there is a line, 'IF PERCEPTABLE SMOKE', which I suspect might be interpreted by some as a positive, if they have an Avionics Smoke ECAM warning. I am not suggesting this happened in this case, as I too look forward to the report when it comes out. That is the rational way of understanding it.

I'm not trying to prejudge the matter, either. In fact, I'm not commenting on their performance at all. But anyone on these forums who suggests their decision to return was wrong solely because they failed to see or smell smoke is bonkers. That nothing more than outcome bias, which is pure error.

[bubbers44]

In a 757 i had smoke fumes in the cabin and cockpit and did an emergency return to the departure airport. It wasn't a big deal but had firetrucks waiting for us. We just did what the procedure said and landed.

[Airbus_a321]

@mountainbear their decision to return was wrong.....no bear, guess nobody here will question that the decision to return was wrong....but to switch the aircraft into EMER ELEC CONFIG...obviously without need...see above...was wrong

btw: in my career I had at least 5x AVNCS SMOKE without actual smoke. no findings, except for poor filter quality , which were installed at this time. anyway those filters are very sensitive in creating an ECAM signal.
Maybe Airbus trusts the pilots eyes and noses more than it's installed AVNCS SMOKE sensors :rolleyes: and for this reason: if perceptible smoke

[Graybeard]

Did you ever notice how smoke sneaks up on you, and you don't notice it until it is sometimes really bad? Your nose/brain adapts to odors that come on slowly. That's why an electronic smoke sensor is important. It senses absolute density, and does not adapt to increasing levels.

[Cytherea]

Before we all jump on the bandwagon take a moment to read this:
Transportation Safety Board of Canada - AVIATION REPORTS - 1998 - A98H0003 (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1998/a98h0003/01report/03conclusions/rep3_01_00.asp)

How many of the causes and contributing factors the SR111 investigators identified in their final report are/could be the same here in terms of smoke detection etc? The crew cannot be criticised in their turnback decision - they and may learn lessons for the future and apply those in the future for safer flight.

[Zeffy]

NTSB Docket (http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=50891&CFID=143465&CFTOKEN=67505734) with four pages of materials.

[drive73]

Nothing like hours of time and a well read report, as usual the pilots had much less time and much less info to judge the situation. Other than a structural failure fire is probably the worst situation you can have. Ecam message of fire would defiantly get me thinking about getting power off and getting it on the ground ASAP. Just think what the discussion would be if they had waited until they saw or smelled smoke, disregarding the ecam, crashed and killed everybody.

[A-3TWENTY]

Just think what the discussion would be if they had waited until they saw or smelled smoke, disregarding the ecam, crashed and killed everybody.

If the Swissair at Halifax had successfully overweight landed for sure someone would show up and criticize them for not dumping fuel.

They decided to dump fuel , and were criticezed for not having oveweight landed.

The same in this case.

People already started criticizing the crew because they declared an emergency without smelling smoke.
Nobody seems to know that statistics prove that in case of fire inside the airplane , we have a life time of 17 min average.

So , I will not let the system burn and reach a critical situation only because I don`t feel the smell.Come on !!!!

I once had an electrical failure and lost a lot of systems. And surprisingly , I didn`t have any ECAM message.Went to the bus equipment list to try to understand a relation amongst the systems lost.As without following any ECAM I turned the APU on , I recovered part of it.And decided to return.
So , since I didn`t have an ECAM message , does it mean that I should have continued the flight?

In another situation , I had a HI OIL TEMP while starting a NPA. The procedure says to reduce THR lever and shut the engine down.
But as I reduced the trhust lever , the temp imediately came from 180º to 70º , making me believe it was just a sensor`s failure. I decided clear the ECAM and land with the engine in idle. It was later discovered an EIU sensor faulty.Should I have shut the engine down anyway?


All this said to say that we have to stop looking for manuals and checklists with lawyer`s eyes because we are not lawyers. From us adherence to the procedures is required, for sure, but above all good sense.Or the industry can start changing pilots for monkeys which will save them a lot of money and headache.

Concerning this incident I fully share and reinforce Ditchdigger`s question and wait those who criticized crew`s decision to return, to answer , which they didn`t do yet:

I hope this isn't a stupid question, and I realize that it may be unaswerable in any specific sense--how long might one expect between the initial smoke message, and the point at which shutting off the electrical supply wouldn't help? In other words, how much time does a crew have to consider the possibilities and react before a fire would become self sustaining?

[drive73]

A three,
Completly agree, the major emergencies I encountered in my career all for the most part, had two things in common. Incomplete information or no information and little time to just enough time it react. Bottom line is everybody is alive no accident or damage. Job well done!
We can all find problems with every real life emergency procedure and given enough time and complete information would do things differently, but those things are rarely present during most emergencies.

[DingerX]

From the docket:

FDR report:

The data indicate that the FDR began recording on the morning of April 4, 2011 at 06:53:47. The avionics smoke warning parameter, which originates from the flight warning computer (FWC), had a warning indication and this recorded continuously until the last recorded data point for the flight which occurred about 18 minutes later at 07:11:42. Neither the master warning, nor any other warnings or faults recorded by the FDR, activated during the recorded portion of the data. Master caution was not a parameter captured by the system.

Airbus meeting notes:

If smoke is detected for 5 minutes, the avionics smoke warning is “latched” and remains active in the FMC even if smoke is no longer detected. To remove the warning requires maintenance supervision to reset the circuit breakers in the cockpit.
‐
If the procedure is cleared by the crew and then latches, it will not reappear until it is recalled by the crew. If the procedure was cleared on the ground, the crew will get a LAND ASAP message on takeoff.
‐
If the procedure latches and is then cleared by the crew, it can be recalled on the ECAM. If a warning is recalled, there is no chime or master caution.
‐
The crew must push the RCL (recall) button for 3 seconds to recall a warning canceled by EMER CANC (emergency cancel). If the warning was cleared by pushing the CLR button, the crew just has to push and release RCL.
‐
The timer will count down from 5 minutes as a conditional statement on the ECAM. If the timer reaches zero and smoke is still detected, the conditional statement will disappear. This occurs even if the event was initiated on the ground before the crew arrived at the aircraft.
‐
If a latched avionics smoke procedure is cleared from the ECAM and the master caution is pushed before the crew arrives at the airplane, the GEN 1 line smoke amber light and the Blower and Extract amber fault lights should still be illuminated on the overhead panel. In addition, the amber vent blower and vent extract messages should have been displayed on the lower ECAM when recall was pressed. Pushing recall is part of the preliminary cockpit prep flow.

CVR:
HOT-1
managed speed uh one ninety uh five. one ninety three okay yeah. one ninety three. and uh four thousand set.
7:04:55.0 HOT-2
ninety three.
7:05:05.1 HOT-2
takeoff configuration normal. ECAM status check is complete. I thought we had a status message before. did it fix itself?
FDR ECAM PAGE reads STATUS at 7:05:16, sampling is at 4 sec intervals
7:05:15.6 HOT-1
CFDS yeah.
7:05:18.8 HOT-2
alright clear.

Operations report
The FO said that passing 4000 feet he heard a “ding” and saw the ECAM message “avionics smoke.” The captain stated that passing 4000 feet he noticed a “yellow” autothrust message on the lower ECAM screen, and saw that the FO had attempted to re-engage the autothrust. The FO said he pushed the ATHR button on the mode control panel (MCP), but this did not succeed in re-engaging the autothrust. The captain said the autothrust message was followed by a red “LAND ASAP” ECAM message accompanied by the electrical page synoptic display and the “AVIONICS SMOKE” ECAM procedure. The captain told the FO “you lost your autothrust.” The FO stated that he thought the situation was serious and that he was thinking “about the everglades.” The captain said he was thinking about prior in-flight fire accidents and that “he didn’t want to wind up like Valujet or Swissair.” He recalled that the Swissair crew had “taken too long to troubleshoot the problem,” and that the red “land ASAP” was an important message in a fly by wire aircraft.

CVR again
7:09:45.9 HOT-2
and flaps up please. after takeoff checklist at your leisure.
7:10:08.7 HOT-1
alright landing gear's up. flaps up. alright wait a minute what do we got here.
7:10:25.7 HOT-1
okay ECAM I got the uh— uh you got the jet. I got this.
7:10:30.2
HOT-2
I got the jet.
7:10:30.8 HOT-1
perceptible smoke.
7:10:31.5 HOT-2
give me two twenty * stand by.
7:10:33.0 HOT-1
there you go.
7:10:34.8 HOT-1
mask on. we don't have that.
7:10:36.2 HOT-1
cabin fans off.
7:10:38.0 HOT-1
blower...cabin fans.
7:10:40.9 HOT-1
where are where's our cabin fans? that's um—.
7:10:42.4 HOT
[sound of single chime]
7:10:43.6 CAM
[sound similar to engine rpm increase]
7:10:46.6 HOT-1
hey you lost the autopilot too.
7:10:48.2 HOT-2
what's that?
7:10:49.0 HOT-1
your autoflight's just went off.
7:10:51.4 HOT-1
auto— autopilot won't *.
7:10:53.3 HOT
[sound of single chime]
7:10:54.5 HOT-1
we— we got a no # uh deal. blower off.
7:10:57.7 HOT-1
cabin fans. where the hell are they at? uh there on your side.
7:10:59.1 CAM
[sound similar to engine rpm decrease]


Finally, FDR summary:
At 07:10:36, there was a reduction in the throttles before they returned to their previous position at 07:10:44. At 07:10:52, the ATS active parameter changed from “active” to “not active” and the ATS engaged parameter changed from “engaged” to “not engaged” with a throttle reduction shortly thereafter. The last valid data point recorded by the FDR was at 07:11:42. At this time, the aircraft was climbing through 5,224 feet, at an airspeed of 252 knots, and a heading of 251 degrees. There were no data recorded for the remaining duration of the flight.

So, the detector latched on the ground, and Airbus thinks someone reset it. For some reason, the ECAM message surfaced again after TO.
The Captain appears to notice the message before anything affecting the ATS, but . Airbus says:
Avionics Smoke is a Level 2/amber warning requiring attention but not immediate action. This also is true for the amber LAND ASAP message..
Got that? LAND ASAP is an attention, not immediate action message. Air circulation is through the cockpit, through the Avionics bay and out. The Avionics Bay smoke detector is supposed to be a secondary means of detection, and in testing, Airbus ran four tests where they put smoke in the Avionics bay, and determined that the flight crew could smell it.
So, 16000-hour captain reads "If perceptible smoke" to apply only to the Oxygen masks. Why? Well, Airbus Powerpoint (http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F50500-50999%2F50891%2F484165.pdf) gives us a clue on page 13. The ECAM Avionics smoke screen reads:

AVIONICS SMOKE ¦ LAND ASAP
.IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE:
- OXY MASK/GOGGLE.....ON
.WHEN EMER GEN AVAIL:
- APU GEN............OFF
- GEN 2..............OFF
MIN RAT SPEED.....140 KT

So, he takes the "IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE:" to refer to the mask-goggle action, and not the whole procedure (edited, the line reads ".IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE:"). He then reads through the ECAM actions (the five minute timer had run down before they even left the gate, so it goes too the persistent smoke actions) until he loses his screen, then neither gets it back, nor starts up the generator immediately prior to landing.

(edit) -- the ECAM screen above is one of the several screens Airbus shows, starting on page 9, with the "In Flight Effects". The first corresponds to what Avionics Smoke in flight triggers: Chimes (which weren't there), a series of actions, which correspond to the ones read through, and the "5 minute" conditional, which would not have been there either. Whatever screen he had in front of him, the captain clearly understood "IF PERCEPTIBLE SMOKE" to apply only to the masks/goggles (which, admittedly, have as a primary job maintaining perception in the case of smoke).


Back to you guys.