a330pilotcanada
20th Nov 2010, 00:55
The following letter was written by General (Retired) Paul Manson C.D.S. C.A.F. 1986 1989 and Lieutenant-General (Retired) Angus Watt former NORAD Director of Operations, Deputy Commander I.S.A.T. Afghanistan and Chief of the Air Staff
The F-35: The Best Package Deal for Canada
By General (Ret’d) Paul Manson and Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Angus Watt
An understandable controversy.
The announcement by the federal government of its intention to purchase 65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters has produced a frenzy of controversy and criticism, much of it seriously misinformed. That the F-35 decision is generating headlines is understandable, given the cost and complexity of the program. Opponents have had a field day cherry-picking individual aspects, all too often failing to take the bigger picture into account. Their task has been made easier, however, by the government’s surprisingly weak communications effort. The public has been given only a sparse explanation of the need to replace our aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets, of the characteristics and capabilities being sought, and of the extremely thorough analysis that has gone into the decision to acquire the F-35. Prior to the announcement, there was little or no public airing of the key issues. Without an informed discussion, the field was left open to wild speculation and misinformation about costs, capabilities and alternatives, and to unwarranted criticism from those who oppose the F-35 acquisition for political or other reasons. In fact, a compelling case for the F-35 does exist, but it has not yet been presented to the Canadian public. Some recent testimony by government ministers, officials and military commanders represents a useful start, and there are signs that more considered views are emerging in the media. But a lot more needs to be done. Here, in brief, are some of the critical points that we believe ought to be brought out in order to restore balance to the public debate and to offer a clear understanding of what in fact was the right decision.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a package.
To truly understand the JSF deal, it needs to be seen as a package. Critics have pointed out that there are many things that the JSF is not. It is not the fastest, cheapest, most maneuverable, longest range, biggest payload-carrying, stealthiest or best-looking fighter in the world today. For each of these individual elements, you might find an aircraft that is better. But of all the available alternative aircraft, none comes close to the JSF in combining an exceptional range of capabilities across all of these factors and many more, making it the most versatile and capable multi-role fighter on the market today. It comes as a package, and one that has unique advantages in terms of scale. Being part of a huge multinational production program (three to five thousand F-35s are to be built) means a very favourable purchase price for Canada; indeed, it is entirely possible that the F-35 will be cheaper than the alternatives. Of course, the massive JSF program also offers enormous opportunities for Canadian companies wishing to compete for industrial participation. Furthermore, the large number of participant countries ensures interoperability—an important military consideration for nations like Canada who almost invariably undertake overseas operations as part of a coalition. Canada will do much better as a member of the large JSF family – at least ten countries operating thousands of F-35s -- than it would in a small group of two or three countries with a production run of perhaps 300 less-capable fighter aircraft. It just makes good operational and economic sense to go for the F-35 package.
The competition question.
We are generally in favour of open competitions, such as the one that brought the CF-18 Hornet to the Canadian Forces 30 years ago, but only when there are viable competitors. To run a competition for a high-performance military aircraft, there needs to be a valid specification and at least two competitors that can potentially meet the specification. In this case the government has yet to lay out its formal “statement of requirement” for the new fighter. This is in part a consequence of the classified nature of some of the information, but enough releasable material exists to table the requirement in understandable terms. It would then become obvious that the JSF is in a league of its own, and it would surely win a fair competition. So why incur substantial extra costs(to both government and competing companies) as well as delays, all for no good reason? Furthermore, if a commercial competition were to be run, as called for by so many in recent weeks, the door is then opened for proponents of less capable options to attack the specification, pressuring the government to make it less demanding so that their favoured aircraft can compete. The outcome would then be skewed toward solutions that give the Canadian Forces the wrong aircraft. This is not mere speculation; it has happened all too often in recent years. The better option for Canada by far is to acquire 65 F-35s via the JSF Program Office, assuring Canada of the same advantageous pricing arrangement as that received by the US armed forces and all the other international partners.
Fundamental needs.
The underlying question in all of this of why the country needs fighter aircraft in the first place. Ironically, one of the benefits of the current F-35 controversy has been to provoke a debate about the need to replace the CF-18 Hornet. Opponents, in opposing the requirement for an advanced multirole fighter, apparently disregard new and emerging security concerns within our borders emanating from sovereignty challenges, terrorism and climate change, to say nothing about the manifest global threats facing Canada and her allies in the decades to come. In this latter regard the air force has to be able to provide air support to our troops engaged in international operations, including peacekeeping. This means the provision of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and precise ground attack operations, all of which the F-35 is superbly well-equipped to perform. Even the F-35’s stealthy design is occasionally made to appear as something sinister, where in fact it simply helps to ensure pilot survivability and mission effectiveness through the avoidance of radar and other electromagnetic detection. In all of this, it is not good enough simply to rely on allies, nor is our security interest just tied to our home territory and airspace. The government has focused attention on the F-35’s role in the protection of Arctic sovereignty but, much as that is an important part of the fighter role, it is by no means the only one. More than ever, Canada’s prosperity is closely linked to the global economy. If we do not contribute credibly to international security, we undermine our ability to draw upon its benefits. Our allies and our potential foes notice what we do and what we contribute. The F-35 provides the best package of capabilities to meet new and emerging threats, domestically and internationally, in direct and meaningful support of our national interests.
Fifth generation capability.
The world of fighter aircraft has recently gone through a major technological shift. The F-35 belongs to what has been called the “Fifth Generation” -- a handful of new fighter designs that are so far in advance of earlier aircraft that they represent a quantum leap in capability. Advocating, as some do, the “good enough” strategy of buying older designs because they are proven and cheaper is like saying at the end of the Second World War that piston engine aircraft won the war, so we don’t need this new jet engine technology. Canada is buying an aircraft for service through to at least the middle of the century. It needs to have a robust initial capability and the growth potential to meet changing operational circumstances and evolving technology throughout a very long service life. Clearly, it is better to have an aircraft at the beginning of its technological lifespan than at the end. The logical answer is to buy something with the staying power and the diverse mission capabilities of a modern multi-role aircraft to carry us through to 2050 and beyond. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the only aircraft on the market today that can do it. Many of our allies, having undertaken the same cost/benefit analysis, have come to the same conclusion.
The F-35 is the best insurance.
Buying a fighter aircraft is like buying insurance. You hope you never have to use it, but it’s better to be safe, just in case. You can’t buy fire insurance after your house has burned down. As with insurance, it’s a matter of risk management, balancing the cost of protection against the consequences of disaster and the need to preserve those things that are most important, even in the face of disaster. Imagine the situation in 2020 and beyond if Canada were to choose not to replace the CF-18, or to select an aircraft that doesn’t meet our needs. Such a decision would weaken the enforcement of our sovereignty, diminish our influence in the world, reduce our aerospace industrial base and tie the hands of future governments struggling to respond to the security challenges that history tells us are bound to come.
Conclusion.
The reality is that Canada faces an uncertain strategic future. None of us has clear insight into whatever opportunities and threats might present themselves between now and mid-century. To use this reality as an argument for taking the cheap and easy route is disingenuous and risky. We must apply our national resources prudently in order to give the citizens of this country an assurance that we are able to counter strategic challenges, while at the same time taking full advantage of the opportunities that come our way. In this regard the F-35 represents a wise investment in the security of our nation. By all means, let’s have a rousing national debate on this proposal, but let’s make it informative, thoughtful, and factual. We are convinced that, looking at the F-35 acquisition as a package deal, the outcome is inevitable: it is the best choice for Canada.
General Manson, a former fighter pilot, was program manager for the CF-18 acquisition in the 1970s. He was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986-89. Lieutenant-General Watt is a former NORAD Director of Operations, Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Chief of the Air Staff.
The F-35: The Best Package Deal for Canada
By General (Ret’d) Paul Manson and Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Angus Watt
An understandable controversy.
The announcement by the federal government of its intention to purchase 65 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters has produced a frenzy of controversy and criticism, much of it seriously misinformed. That the F-35 decision is generating headlines is understandable, given the cost and complexity of the program. Opponents have had a field day cherry-picking individual aspects, all too often failing to take the bigger picture into account. Their task has been made easier, however, by the government’s surprisingly weak communications effort. The public has been given only a sparse explanation of the need to replace our aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets, of the characteristics and capabilities being sought, and of the extremely thorough analysis that has gone into the decision to acquire the F-35. Prior to the announcement, there was little or no public airing of the key issues. Without an informed discussion, the field was left open to wild speculation and misinformation about costs, capabilities and alternatives, and to unwarranted criticism from those who oppose the F-35 acquisition for political or other reasons. In fact, a compelling case for the F-35 does exist, but it has not yet been presented to the Canadian public. Some recent testimony by government ministers, officials and military commanders represents a useful start, and there are signs that more considered views are emerging in the media. But a lot more needs to be done. Here, in brief, are some of the critical points that we believe ought to be brought out in order to restore balance to the public debate and to offer a clear understanding of what in fact was the right decision.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is a package.
To truly understand the JSF deal, it needs to be seen as a package. Critics have pointed out that there are many things that the JSF is not. It is not the fastest, cheapest, most maneuverable, longest range, biggest payload-carrying, stealthiest or best-looking fighter in the world today. For each of these individual elements, you might find an aircraft that is better. But of all the available alternative aircraft, none comes close to the JSF in combining an exceptional range of capabilities across all of these factors and many more, making it the most versatile and capable multi-role fighter on the market today. It comes as a package, and one that has unique advantages in terms of scale. Being part of a huge multinational production program (three to five thousand F-35s are to be built) means a very favourable purchase price for Canada; indeed, it is entirely possible that the F-35 will be cheaper than the alternatives. Of course, the massive JSF program also offers enormous opportunities for Canadian companies wishing to compete for industrial participation. Furthermore, the large number of participant countries ensures interoperability—an important military consideration for nations like Canada who almost invariably undertake overseas operations as part of a coalition. Canada will do much better as a member of the large JSF family – at least ten countries operating thousands of F-35s -- than it would in a small group of two or three countries with a production run of perhaps 300 less-capable fighter aircraft. It just makes good operational and economic sense to go for the F-35 package.
The competition question.
We are generally in favour of open competitions, such as the one that brought the CF-18 Hornet to the Canadian Forces 30 years ago, but only when there are viable competitors. To run a competition for a high-performance military aircraft, there needs to be a valid specification and at least two competitors that can potentially meet the specification. In this case the government has yet to lay out its formal “statement of requirement” for the new fighter. This is in part a consequence of the classified nature of some of the information, but enough releasable material exists to table the requirement in understandable terms. It would then become obvious that the JSF is in a league of its own, and it would surely win a fair competition. So why incur substantial extra costs(to both government and competing companies) as well as delays, all for no good reason? Furthermore, if a commercial competition were to be run, as called for by so many in recent weeks, the door is then opened for proponents of less capable options to attack the specification, pressuring the government to make it less demanding so that their favoured aircraft can compete. The outcome would then be skewed toward solutions that give the Canadian Forces the wrong aircraft. This is not mere speculation; it has happened all too often in recent years. The better option for Canada by far is to acquire 65 F-35s via the JSF Program Office, assuring Canada of the same advantageous pricing arrangement as that received by the US armed forces and all the other international partners.
Fundamental needs.
The underlying question in all of this of why the country needs fighter aircraft in the first place. Ironically, one of the benefits of the current F-35 controversy has been to provoke a debate about the need to replace the CF-18 Hornet. Opponents, in opposing the requirement for an advanced multirole fighter, apparently disregard new and emerging security concerns within our borders emanating from sovereignty challenges, terrorism and climate change, to say nothing about the manifest global threats facing Canada and her allies in the decades to come. In this latter regard the air force has to be able to provide air support to our troops engaged in international operations, including peacekeeping. This means the provision of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and precise ground attack operations, all of which the F-35 is superbly well-equipped to perform. Even the F-35’s stealthy design is occasionally made to appear as something sinister, where in fact it simply helps to ensure pilot survivability and mission effectiveness through the avoidance of radar and other electromagnetic detection. In all of this, it is not good enough simply to rely on allies, nor is our security interest just tied to our home territory and airspace. The government has focused attention on the F-35’s role in the protection of Arctic sovereignty but, much as that is an important part of the fighter role, it is by no means the only one. More than ever, Canada’s prosperity is closely linked to the global economy. If we do not contribute credibly to international security, we undermine our ability to draw upon its benefits. Our allies and our potential foes notice what we do and what we contribute. The F-35 provides the best package of capabilities to meet new and emerging threats, domestically and internationally, in direct and meaningful support of our national interests.
Fifth generation capability.
The world of fighter aircraft has recently gone through a major technological shift. The F-35 belongs to what has been called the “Fifth Generation” -- a handful of new fighter designs that are so far in advance of earlier aircraft that they represent a quantum leap in capability. Advocating, as some do, the “good enough” strategy of buying older designs because they are proven and cheaper is like saying at the end of the Second World War that piston engine aircraft won the war, so we don’t need this new jet engine technology. Canada is buying an aircraft for service through to at least the middle of the century. It needs to have a robust initial capability and the growth potential to meet changing operational circumstances and evolving technology throughout a very long service life. Clearly, it is better to have an aircraft at the beginning of its technological lifespan than at the end. The logical answer is to buy something with the staying power and the diverse mission capabilities of a modern multi-role aircraft to carry us through to 2050 and beyond. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is the only aircraft on the market today that can do it. Many of our allies, having undertaken the same cost/benefit analysis, have come to the same conclusion.
The F-35 is the best insurance.
Buying a fighter aircraft is like buying insurance. You hope you never have to use it, but it’s better to be safe, just in case. You can’t buy fire insurance after your house has burned down. As with insurance, it’s a matter of risk management, balancing the cost of protection against the consequences of disaster and the need to preserve those things that are most important, even in the face of disaster. Imagine the situation in 2020 and beyond if Canada were to choose not to replace the CF-18, or to select an aircraft that doesn’t meet our needs. Such a decision would weaken the enforcement of our sovereignty, diminish our influence in the world, reduce our aerospace industrial base and tie the hands of future governments struggling to respond to the security challenges that history tells us are bound to come.
Conclusion.
The reality is that Canada faces an uncertain strategic future. None of us has clear insight into whatever opportunities and threats might present themselves between now and mid-century. To use this reality as an argument for taking the cheap and easy route is disingenuous and risky. We must apply our national resources prudently in order to give the citizens of this country an assurance that we are able to counter strategic challenges, while at the same time taking full advantage of the opportunities that come our way. In this regard the F-35 represents a wise investment in the security of our nation. By all means, let’s have a rousing national debate on this proposal, but let’s make it informative, thoughtful, and factual. We are convinced that, looking at the F-35 acquisition as a package deal, the outcome is inevitable: it is the best choice for Canada.
General Manson, a former fighter pilot, was program manager for the CF-18 acquisition in the 1970s. He was Chief of the Defence Staff from 1986-89. Lieutenant-General Watt is a former NORAD Director of Operations, Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Chief of the Air Staff.