Latest research on Automation Dependency - Regulator please note..

[A37575]

Pilot Reliance on Automation Erodes Skills



By ANDY PASZTOR



MILAN (WSJ)-Increasing reliance on cockpit automation appears to be significantly eroding the manual flying skills of many airline pilots, who are then "sometimes not prepared to deal with non-routine situations," according to the researcher behind a sweeping air-safety study released Thursday.

Presented to an international aviation safety conference here by senior Federal Aviation Administration scientist Kathy Abbott, the study's conclusions buttress the idea that a significant percentage of airline pilots rely excessively on computerized cockpit aids. Such adherence to computer-assisted pilotingg-and the confusion that can result when pilots fail to properly keep up with computer changes-increasingly are considered major factors in airliner crashes world-wide.

Prepared by a team of industry, labor, university and government experts, the findings reveal fundamental safety gaps in commercial aviation. And they are likely to prompt stepped-up debate over whether pilot training should be changed to reverse that trend.

Kathy Abbott, the agency' s chief technical advisor for flight deck design and human factors, said the participants analyzed more than 730 incidents, 26 accidents and some 9,100 flights word-wide between 2001 and 2009.

The study found, among other things, that manual flying errors contributed to about 60% of selected accidents and 30% of selected incidents perused by the team. Those statistics "got our interest, as you can imagine," Ms. Abbott said. The errors included inappropriate control inputs by pilots and incorrect responses when trying to recover from aircraft upsets.

Thursday's report summary was long awaited by regulators and airline officials, because it is a way to understand and highlight the hazards of excessive pilot dependence on automation. The group of experts, including aircraft manufacturing executives and pilot-union representatives, isn't expected to release the final document until next year.

But already, the preliminary conclusions are pinpointing problems some pilots have in properly recognizing when autopilots should be engaged or disconnected in certain types of emergencies. Focusing too much on manipulating flight-control computers, according to Ms. Abbott, often "distracts from managing the flight path of the airplane."

The study is intended to update an influential 1996 FAA-sponsored examination of the benefits and drawbacks of cockpit automation. But because automated flight-management systems, navigation aids and autopilots have progressed so dramatically since the 1990's, the latest study is widely expected to set a benchmark. Other groups and organizations are looking to conduct follow-up research based on its findings.

One cross-cutting theme spelled out in the report, according to Ms. Abbott, is that "pilots sometimes abdicate too much responsibility to the automated systems." Part of the reason, she said, are persistent messages pilots receive from airline management and trainers stressing that "automated systems can do the job better than they can." The study also found that in some cases, pilots don't get adequate opportunities to practice hand-flying skills and therefore often don't feel comfortable grabbing control away from sophisticated flight-deck computers in an emergency.

[Brenoch]

How about scrapping the Multi Pilot License?

[MATELO]

the participants analyzed more than 730 incidents, 26 accidents and some 9,100 flights word-wide between 2001 and 2009.

Is the info taken from all of the above 730, or "selected" accidents to prove the point.

contributed to about 60% of selected accidents and 30% of selected incidents Apologies for being sceptical.

[protectthehornet]

about time someone made it official.

time to spend the money on people not on boxes

[bearfoil]

PTH

Howdy. Point well taken, especially when the savings realized are planned and safety computed. In other words, "Let's dumb down the entry level pilot, and skimp on recurrent?" How much of this "New" report was lifted from BOAC's paper?

bear

[Jabiman]

The problem with automation is that it just keeps getting more complex until it is just too intricate to manage and impossible to make fool proof.
Also just because a technology exists, engineers feel the need to use or incorporate it regardless of the need.
Finally, computers are just stupid and only as good as their designers. Not everything can be foreseen and it is exceptionally difficult to make these systems adaptive.

So in summary, piloting skill will always be paramount, and telling anyone to rely on a computer ahead of their own judgement is a recipe for disaster.

[MTOW]

So in summary, piloting skill will always be paramountBy "piloting", do you mean manipulation, Jabiman - i.e., hand flying? If so, I think it's gone way beyond redeemable in some airlines, (certainly the one that paid my salary for 20 years), where for years now, they've operated under an official policy of maximum use of automation at all times on the line, to the point where you're not even allowed to practise doing a localiser approach if there's a glideslope available.

I'm sorry to say it, but the beancounters have long ago worked out that maintaining a training regime for a large pilot workforce that keeps all those pilots' manipulative skills at an acceptable standard is more expensive than a possible hull loss every 'n' years - and to date, most (stress 'most') have been very, very lucky that when a really serious situation occurs, they've just happened to have a captain at the controls who was once required to do it the old fashioned way and has retained enough of the old skills to get out of it, or a younger captain who has somehow managed to develop those skills despite his company rules.

Unfortunately, as the years progress, fewer and fewer people will those old skills to fall back on are out there - but the beancounters don't care. They (or their PR Departments) will tell the public that safety is their paramount concern, but behind closed doors, they'll 'prove' to you that, given the minuscule percentages involved where multiple failures or a failure and outside conditions will gang up on a crew to leave them without the automatics, it's simply not worth the money to maintain a training program that insists on pilots maintaining manipulative skills beyond a cursory hand flown approach squeezed into an already crowded sim session maybe once or twice a year.

[protectthehornet]

right bearfoil.

point 1. I spoke with a professor at MIT in 1990. He occupied the Boeing Chair. He said the automation would enable pilots with 250 hours to safely operate (note, not pilot) a 747 sized plane.

I spoke to the defense of skilled, experienced pilots. He said they wouldn't be neccessary. I reminded him of failure modes and he ''pooh poohed it".

I know I could do more with a 30 year old DC9 flying the north east corridor shuttles than someone with a brand new airbust 320... I could squeeze in with a ''crowbar'' approach, or be ready for a reroute without busting a fingernail.

I know I am right. You have to have the skills and experience....sure automation can help...I love it when it does the paperwork for proper pay and ''duty rigs" etc.

I also remind people about the film/novel: "Failsafe". Or, "collosus, the forbin project". People can't keep up with machines and if they fail, you can get in real trouble. Machines can help us with information, but I want a HUMAN BEING on the button, or yoke to still have the option to NOT PUSH IT.

Good pilots, beautiful flight attendants, moon landings, great sitcom theme songs...all things of the past!

[bearfoil]

PTH

While I'm at it, I may as well demand Pure jet, no Propellors. Colgan should be enough to get the ball rolling, Eh?

(And I'm starting to look at giant Fans as Ducted "Propellor" propelled a/c).

bear

[protectthehornet]

bearfoil

40 years ago we were on the verge of the Boeing 2707. Gadgets weren't part of it so much as power and swing swept wings.

we aren't any faster now, but more gadgets.

I think we took a wrong turn at albuquerque.

you in wisconsin bearfoil????? I love it there.

[bearfoil]

pth

More like 55 years ago, and a sweet a/c. Many Legacies furloughed their senior Captains when taking delivery of the 707, thinking they were washed up, and Propellor heads. If they still had them on board by 1970, they were re-winged, (the Captains), and typed on Fatty. Their Gray Hair inspired "Confidence" in the Pax, as they climbed, (or walked) on board this "HUGE version of the 707". (:ugh:) Money for danger, the name of the game imo.

Nah, California, Petaluma. Wisconsin? c-c-c-cold, for a Calikid, not that there's anything wrong with Wisconsin. It's habitable....about five months out of the year. Mosquitoes the size of sparrows, but fireflies, so it's a wash.

[protectthehornet]

bearfoil...I meant the Boeing 2707 that never flew...it was Boeing's SST and named the TWO seven oh seven...swing wings.. 300 pax...2000mph. and where did that go?????nowhere...but now we have planes that go slow with lots of gee whiz buttons

Pet-A-Lama...I know that place...near Gnoss field?

[bearfoil]

yep, Gnoss. Spaced on the SST, my bad. How "soon" we forget. Like politicians, sometimes a/c designers and salesmen love the attraction of "complicated". If "fly by wire" is supplanted by "fly by signal", well.......bound to happen. "Wait, microwaves to spark controls", "there's the ticket".....sheesh.

take care, bear

[Maurice Chavez]

Wonder what happened to the screaming crowd that keeps insisting that manual flying belongs in the sim.....Funny how the industry recognizes that pilot skills are deteriorating due a lack of flying manual.

protectthehornet, I concur with you sir! I fly old 727's and can do a whole lot more and faster with her then with a fully automated fluff.

But sure, don't fly manual, that belongs in the sim, right?? :E :E

[4Greens]

Another problem is that on some aircraft there is no absolute reversion to manual. There is still automation playing around at the edges. Added to all this there is a known lack of unusual attitude recovery training.

[trent892b]

I have recently done training for pilots from turboprop upgrading to jet in the sim. When confronted with a sitiuation where they were getting high on approach, their immediate reaction was to disconnect the A/P and push the nose down. Who cares about flaps right? There was no need to disconect at the time as they weren't that high, and well within the abilities of the automation. Having automation helps a lot especially for the PM, who has to monitor the flying and do the R/T. Anyhow pushing the nose down was couterproductive for that particular sitiuation leading to the fact that they were not sure how to use automation to its fullest and also had less than the required basic flying skills.

On the other hand another gentleman doing an upgrade from the widebody,when confronted with a sitiuation where the A/P and A/T suddenly "failed", was all over the place because according to him, he wasn't prepared. Obviously not a Scout in his past life.

I advocate the use of as much automation as possible and the thorough understanding of its abilities and limitations, but the very least you need as a PILOT are your BASIC FLYING skills and I train that way.

[Maurice Chavez]

Having automation helps a lot especially for the PM, who has to monitor the flying and do the R/T. Anyhow You really need to explain that philosophy to me. What is the difference between flying manual versus flying on automation when it comes to the PM "monitoring"???The only thing the PM will have to do extra, is make selections on the MCP as requested by the PF, the "monitoring" doesn't change one bit, nor do the rest of his responsibilities....

[GlueBall]

"There was no need to disconect at the time as they weren't that high, and well within the abilities of the automation...."

Unless I'm faced with CAT-II or CAT-IIIb arrival, I disconnect whether I'm high or low, or on profile! Why? ...Because after 12hrs in cruise I want to do something, I want to hand fly...and feel like a pilot. Get it? :ooh:

[ChristiaanJ]

Just an ancient here....

Isn't "flying" about always being 'ahead' of the airplane?
Isn't the effect of some of todays automation, that it not only allows you to take your hands off the controls, but also that you end up about fifty miles 'behind' the aircraft, and when some does go not according to plan, you have an awful lot of 'catching-up' to do?

"Now why did it do that?" more often than not does not seem to be a joke any more...

CJ

[DozyWannabe]

Isn't the effect of some of todays automation, that it not only allows you to take your hands off the controls, but also that you end up about fifty miles 'behind' the aircraft, and when some does go not according to plan, you have an awful lot of 'catching-up' to do?

If it is then it shouldn't be, because that's not what it was designed to do. Automation is there for one thing and one thing only - and that is to assist the pilot by taking care of some operational tasks, usually menial and repetitive, that can be handled by a machine. The idea that pilots can take their focus from the safe handling of the aircraft by allowing the automation to run ahead of them is a fallacy.

The problem we perenially run into with this subject is that over the years it has become hard to separate the safety aspect of integrating automation into the pilot's workflow from the political aspect ("Automation is responsible for de-skilling our jobs", "The beancounters demand automation at all times", "The engineers and beancounters are trying to make us obsolete" and "I want to feel like a pilot damnit, not a computer operator!"). The former is of paramount importance in aviation, the latter is at best unhelpful and at worst a dangerous distraction.

[Hahn]

Even if the company manual and the guys who preach it tell me to "use the highest level of automation whenever possible" I still pratice hand flying whenever feasible because: It is my life. The only one! They may fire me for that but they will fire me alive!

[Sir George Cayley]

21 posts and no-one has mentioned airmanship. Funny that.

Children of the magenta line is now starting to worry me.

Sir George Cayley

[p51guy]

SIR, you are not alone on this one, we know airmanship is much more important than keymanship. I have frequently Xed out of auto mode and gone to manual when things are not going right. Boeing lets you do that. I love Boeing ability to let pilots do what they want to do. Letting Airbus override pilot inputs seems wrong to me. What do you think?

[protectthehornet]

we don't have pilot's licenses...we have AIRMAN certificates.

oh well. the big selling point of the new buick is that you can ''rewind or pause live radio shows''.

I don't give a damn...I want a car that starts and stops and steers and is comfortable...who buys a car for the radio?

who buys a plane for a radio ?

I truly think that if sully had been flying a pratt and whitney JT8d engined plane, he would have made CLT on time

[p51guy]

True, but if he hadn't have landed in the Hudson he wouldn't be a hero today. No book deals. Those few moments putting that broken airplane in the Hudson made him more money than his whole career at USair. Airmanship vs SOP's worked well for him.

[protectthehornet]

the heroic pilots are those who don't make headlines.

you never see: Captain X retired today without losing a plane or killing anyonein 40 years of flying

[p51guy]

I guess we should be happy to fall into that group. 23,000 hrs of mostly boring flying where nothing that memorable ever happened over the 40 years. To get back on topic maybe it was because we didn't rely on automation to fly our airplanes. It is scary when pilots say it is not safe to hand fly a cat 1 approach. Most of the older planes I flew couldn't be trusted to fly a coupled approach.

[A37575]

maybe it was because we didn't rely on automation to fly our airplanes.

There was something that was very satisfying about being able to fly a single engine (the other having stopped), limited panel (no artificial horizon only a turn and slip indicator plus altimeter, VSI, ASI and small magnetic compass) aural null NDB approach in a Dakota. The Sperry autopilot couldn't cope so you had no choice except get on with the job and try to stay clear of an unusual attitude. All part of an instrument rating renewal. The proverbial one-arm paper hanger job.

Of course that was a different era. Having said that I was unable to get the same sense of achievement monitoring the automatics on a coupled approach to the minima in a 737..:ok:

[Bergerie1]

protecthehornet

You are so right. We have never honoured sufficiently all those people who kept doing it right and were never noticed because through good planning, attention to detail, constant practice, and good airmanship they prevented potentially hazardous situations from becoming a catastrophe.

[DozyWannabe]

I have frequently Xed out of auto mode and gone to manual when things are not going right.
That's not airmanship though - Airmanship is handling the flight in the most appropriate manner for the conditions. What you're talking about is stick-and-rudder skills, which are a different thing entirely.

In response to this example, I'd like to bring up the example of the Captain of the ill-fated 737 at Kegworth whose instinctive reaction to disconnect the AP and fly manually while troubleshooting effectively handed him a heavier workload and reinforced his mistaken impression about which engine was actually malfunctioning. Result - 47 dead and 74 seriously injured.

Boeing lets you do that. I love Boeing ability to let pilots do what they want to do. Letting Airbus override pilot inputs seems wrong to me.
Modern-day Airbuses are perfectly capable of being flown manually. The only time they "override" a pilot's input is when they are taken beyond 60 degrees of bank - and to allow a situation to arise where a maneouvre that extreme is required in an airliner indicates a pretty serious deficiency in airmanship, to my mind.

[bearfoil]

Then again, AB330 will "x" itself out at 45 degrees of bank and above, right? And leave no choice but "manual" flight, right? Are we talking autoflight or FBW? Direct Law is not exactly "manual flight", it is manual on the terms of the aircraft, No? It also does not resemble manual flight if it is a result of "defaulted to" rather than selected?

Splitting hairs? If an aircraft drops autoflight (and throttle), should it also dictate the sequence of "Degrades"?, the time is not available (AB) once the degradation is on authority of its own, to "unwind", and start over. If airmanship caused the involuntary loss of autopilot, then whether the crap airmanship is at fault or not, the airman is in control (command) at loss of autopilot, or should be. Up to and including Direct Law profliles, neither pilot has the freedom to "immediately" attempt to recover.

Bad time to have to recall new parameters of control "Laws"? "What is it doing Now?"

[DozyWannabe]

Then again, AB330 will "x" itself out at 45 degrees of bank and above, right?
I don't know the figures for the A330 offhand, but the FBW computers don't "kick out" when a level of bank is exceeded - they just don't allow the bank to develop any further*. I think you're getting degradation of the automatics due to systems failure confused with the Normal Law protections provided by the automatics.

* - As opposed to FMS autopilot disengagement in response to large flight control inputs, which is pretty much the same as any other airliner.

[alf5071h]

The problem is not necessarily automation. Aircraft have used autopilots for many years, apparently without the specific errors being highlighted.
The change (if real) appears to be associated with the use of modern technology; FMS and EFIS, and complex autoflight systems in modern aircraft.
More likely the problem involves several factors; e.g. a constraining operating environment, social and economic pressures, which demand greater use of technology and automation, and aspects of ‘modern’ human behaviour in operations (changes due to external influences).

It was reported that the much focussed-on ‘manual flying errors’ were only amongst other things, which involved inappropriate/incorrect inputs and responses, i.e. both proactive and reactive behaviour.
Comparing this with the conclusions in Orasanu and Martin (1) – errors arise from either an incorrect understanding of the situation resulting in the wrong choice of action, or with good understanding, the wrong action is chosen. In this, the behaviour has no direct relationship with either automation or manual flying, but situation awareness, knowledge, and decision making are significant contributors.

If training is to be reconsidered, which aspects should be addressed?
Pilots are still taught to fly the aircraft and use instruments. Have any aspects been removed or changed with the introduction of enhanced technology, if not, then the problem is more in the understanding and use of technology, or even the technology itsef; thus, poor knowledge and know-how relating to the technology make further contributions as might system design.

Many accidents evolved from automatic flight, and whilst the subsequent erroneous manual flight exacerbated the situation or prevented recovery, manual flight was not a direct contribution to the cause (origin) of the accident.
Thus calls for more manual flying, particularly on a clear day, are unlikely to improve flight skills in unusual circumstances. Upset recovery training is valuable for accident prevention, but only in a reactive capacity.
For proactive safety, the industry must understand the complex nature of the ‘automation’ problem, identify key issues, and then seek appropriate solutions. Calls for more manual flying, more flight hours, etc, could be an expensive overreaction (headless chicken) that fails to address the problem.

(1) Errors in Aviation Decision Making. (www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/~johnson/papers/seattle_hessd/judithlynne-p.pdf)

[PJ2]

alf5071h;

I like very much what you have to say.

Dozy,

You're right, "large control inputs" meaning high pitch or bank angles.

Bear, for the record, for the A320/A330 series, the autopilot disconnects and the FD's are removed at a bank angle > 45deg; the autoflight system remains in normal (C*) law, it does not "x itself out". Alternate Law is purely the result of system degradation - where the autoflight system does not have sufficient information to retain all autoflight protections. The degradation is transparent to the pilot and, while slightly more involved, so is Direct Law. No big deal, in and of itself, but any airplane, sufficiently degraded, even the oft-quoted example by some, of the beloved DC9 or B737, can "get" a crew or may tax an aircrew to its limits, (Alaskan at LAX, Turkish at AMS).
Bad time to have to recall new parameters of control "Laws"? "What is it doing Now?" If I may and from experience, too much is being made of this notion.

Though handling of the airplane by the pilot necessarily will change, (gentler, smaller inputs, etc), the airplane is emminently flyable, without confusion, in all laws.

If one is confused by one's airplane, (and I expect complete agreement here on this principle of aviation by those who tout their old-fashioned, steam-driven airplanes), then one doesn't know one's airplane well enough and that is as much a professional standards matter as it is a training and/or competency matter, not an Airbus matter.

None of these notions or states should be a surprise to an Airbus pilot and if they are, they are responsible for sorting it out so that they are comfortable. The airplane requires a different approach and both personal and cockpit discipline to operate but it is merely different but not qualitatively so.

If I may, and please suspend judgement in favour of curiosity until pondering this notion of comparisons: - The state of affairs in computer automation today resembles, among many fields, the state of photography, (or music if you will). I still regularly use a 4x5 view camera to photograph as well as a Nikon D300 digital. For those who don't know what a 4x5 camera is, it is that camera that was/is mounted on a tripod and which the photographer was always under a cloth so he could see the upside-down image. It has a lens, a frame in which to insert the 4" x 5" film-holders, a corrugated box to keep out the light and nothing else. It is photography's version of the Wright Flyer... ;-)

I run an active darkroom printing 16x20 silver prints and use Photoshop CS4 printing 16x20 archival ink photographs with equal familiarity.

The processes of production bear no resemblance to one another. They are essentially "old world" and "computer world".

The numbers of people who today use a camera and who also actually comprehend the concepts of exposure , ƒ-stop/shutter speed, film development and final printing controls in the chemicals, are, as those who actually still use film, plummeting, because automation has provided the means to photograph through the encapsulation of "understanding" within software. Unlike cables, pulleys, bell-cranks etc, the means by which "understanding" is accomplished is invisible and is therefore an interpretive act of the imagination - a defined cognitive event process and not a "visceral" process.

The 'veil' of software prohibits the sense of visceral comprehension and changes such comprehension to cerebral, (higher level cognitive processes which must be interpretive of signs before they can result in correct actions, where as "experience" as one might say a pianist's hands "have", is not the same process at all. If it were, no one could play the piano, or even walk upstairs...

However, if one comprehends photographic principles, or one's autonomic nervous system and muscular structure of arms and hands "comprehend pianistic processes" that make music out of mere black marks on pages of a Bach or an Oscar Petersen, then "automation" becomes transparent to such a user and the camera, regardless of make or type, (film/digital/pinhole/obscura, etc) or piano (Korg/Roland/Rodgers, where one can press a button and "be" Paderewski or Horowitz or a Bill Evans) becomes a more sophisticated but undifferentiated tool for accomplishing the taking of an image, the presentation of a concert or the flying of an airplane.

In short, if one doesn't viscerally as well as cognitively understand airplanes, flight, engines, physics (not formal training but instinctual understandings of mass, intertia, 'g'-loadings, etc), one is at best, a "mechanical", rote operator. In photographic work or music the results of such understanding may be merely embarrassing...

Flying is an art, not a science. It cannot be "taught" - it can only be demonstrated - one has to feel it below the cognitive level to render software transparent to the entire process of flight. Engineers have not tried to turn it into a science but we have mistaken them for trying to do so.

That doesn't mean that the Airbus series cannot become a mess, but, in other ways, so can every other airplane.

As a final question which demands some consideration and a broad view of the current industry..."who" is coming into flying today? Is it that kid who used to build balsa-wood models by the hour/day/week/year and who drove his or her parents crazy because of a single-minded passion for anything to do with airplanes, or who would "pester" those who flew with incessant questions about "how, what, why, where, when" and who by the time he or she took flying lessons at 15 or 16 already "understood" in the belly, how flight worked and how airplanes stayed up in an invisible medium?...and all one's instructor did was demonstrate the manoeuvres and later test them - such individuals already "knew". So - who is coming into aviation today?...who spends a hundred thousand dollars on university and flying lessons to the multi-engine/instrument-rated/commercial level and then fights with employers running a bush operation in the north, for example, for a rare lottery-ticket to the majors? In fact, given the way most carriers treat and disrespect their aircrews, who would want to?

Or are they now someone who in their late twenties chooses aviation as a career and who hadn't considered/thought about/loved airplanes until the notion came along through someone else? Is this the kind of budding-pilot-market that the MCPL programs are designed to capture?

How can you honestly, really, put someone who never thought of airplanes before he/she was 25, into a cockpit of an A320 after 250hrs of sim time and line experience and call them a "pilot"?

Yes it works, with those who dream of flight. But, contrary to much magical thinking, not everyone is capable of flying an airplane.

So, how is "competence" understood by those doing the hiring? Do MCPL programs work? Does MS FltSim and gaming actually provide skills with which to address "computerized flight"? Clearly I would suggest that such a notion is foolish.

One cannot live/breath/bleed 0's and 1's because the principles of flight don't live there. They live elsewhere and automation is, and should be, a supplement to flight. One renders automation to that role when one understands airplanes; one is at automation's mercy when one yields that role to engineers.

This may not advance the discussion on automation because the discussion is about..."automation" and not about, as Sir George Cayley has wisely observed, about "airmanship", and, most here would offer, more. I think staying alive in the air has more to do with artful passion than it does with comprehending computers. Such passion, (where is it today?), leads to using computers appropriately and not yielding to the subtle agenda.

This is not merely about "hand-flying" versus "automation". One can actually be more dangerous hand-flying than letting the automation do the work - the question is not simply answered.

PJ2

[DozyWannabe]

"large control inputs" meaning high pitch or bank angles.
Sorry, was typing with my "Software Engineer" hat on again. ;) Thanks for the confirmation though!

I like your post - and the questions it raises - a lot. However as someone who has a journeyman understanding of "1s and 0s" as well as a love of flight I think the matter is not as easily divided into an either/or concept. I think that in today's climate, with junior commercial pilot salaries as they are, the hypothetical individual who has worked in another discipline or industry until they're 25 and would willingly spend their own money to get into the right-hand seat of a commercial aircraft - in all likelihood taking a cut in salary to do so - said individual would probably have to love flying to take on that potential risk. I'm sure they probably made balsa-wood gliders too.

I'm going to take the thoughts on the "software veil" away and come back later, because I want to get the response right.

[Maurice Chavez]

The thread is about automation and lack of pilot skills thereof, no where does it mention the aircraft manufacturer, nor are we debating "airmanship"....As usual, let's get carried away....

[PJ2]

Maurice Chavez;

Understand your comment - I recognized that I was focussing on Airbus after I composed and posted and thought of deleting the entire thing. But I reconsidered because what I wrote I think applies to automation in Boeing and other types even though the post strays. Also, when one thinks of "automation issues", one doesn't usually think of Boeing...just noting, not commenting...

On discussing airmanship, Dozywannabe made a similar comment and I concur. "Airmanship" can mean many things so I decided I'd leave that notion in as well even though it is oblique to the discussion. However it is interpreted, wouldn't you think that a discussion like this on automation can't be had without discussing handling/manual flight and cognitive notions as it relates to a philosophical predisposition which accepts software as a legitimate role in aircraft?

Dozywannabe;
Yes, it is most definitely not an either/or - its a human enterprise with all the subtleties that a human brings to the endeavour. But I'm trying to tease out a sense of this while remaining non-prescriptive, non-definitive.

The "veil" (of software) was my instant, unconsidered emotional response when I first stepped into the cockpit of the A320 in early 1992. Every other airplane I'd flown was "accessible" - familiar. This one wasn't.

The metaphor is intended to convey the sense that I felt which was an obscuring layer between me and the airplane. The 8 simulator sessions gradually removed that sense but when I actually got to fly the airplane all sense a disconnection with the airplane was removed simply because it flew like a DC9 and the automation was "nice toys", if I may.

Pilots are familiar with the notion of "looking through the flight director" when the FD is momentarily commanding something ridiculous while it catches up with a fast-changing flight regime...one isn't ignoring the FD - one is holding it "in suspension" until it is believable/useful once again. So it is with all autoflight modes - one "looks through" the automation to see the airplane and how it is being commanded. Pilots know instantly when an instrument reading or the airplane is reading/doing something out of the ordinary and when it does one "looks past" the immediate to see the trends, and disconnects if the trend is wrong.

On any automated aircraft, as has been said dozens of times on PPRuNe, the FMA [Flight Mode Annunicator] section of the Primary Flight Display should be the closest-monitored information section in the cockpit. In unexpected behaviours, the autoflight system may be sorting itself out and doing it gently, or it may be taking/not taking the airplane on the intended path/altitude. If Airmanship includes Situational Awareness, then that's an airmanship item which is learned through experience, not taught in groundschool by non-pilots.

One does not slavishly follow what software requests/requires/commands in an airplane. The stance is, quietly but always...always!, "Sez who?" when software wants something and never ever a sense of obedience because it is software.

The A320/A330 etc is an airplane first and that is the key point that keeps getting missed by those who don't fly the airplane. Looking stuff up in smartcockpit.com may be useful for a technical comprehension but in the end, there is nothing that can substitute for the gestalt of flying the machine when commenting on its quirks and jollies whether Boeing or 'bus.

PJ2

[BOAC]

As usual a perceptive and accurate post (#34), PJ, but I would extract part of one paragraph which I would challenge:

Do MCPL programs work? - Judgement reserved - what are they designed to do?

Does MS FltSim and gaming actually provide skills with which to address "computerized flight"? Clearly I would suggest that such a notion is foolish. - I disagree - from what I have seen, in terms PURELY of system operation, they provide excellent skills. You did specify "computerized flight". So, back to the first question?

[Sir George Cayley]

I believe one can demonstrate airmanship through the automatics not in spite of them.

Decision making is key to this, and automation can give a crew a breather. But there again as we may eventually fully understand, automation can sometimes (maybe over the south Atlantic) deliver too heavier a load.

Sir George Cayley

[bearfoil]

PJ2

Thank goodness you're here.

1. If the pilot of fbw a/c is confused at any stage he is in the wrong a/c, or at least in the wrong seat. Agreed

2. "Reliance" can lead to dullness, or even nonchalance, we know this.

3. If the "Reliance" of a confused PF allows him to bank on his a/p when it is overmatched, when it may "vamoose", where is my parachute?

4.If he needs to summon his inattention instantly, to recover an a/c that is at the a/p limits, wouldn't he also be ill prepared for the sequence and timing of ALI, ALII, and Direct? Especially with (perhaps) a lack of instrumentation?

5. Isn't that what the discussion is here? Automation leads to dependence, this we know. It isn't in the nature of even pilot's to sit on the edge and wait for something bad to happen.

6. If 58 ECAMS need to be addressed, that's a lot of prioritization. Especially if there is any latent "dependence" on the format that just took a powder?

6a. Glad to see you, you bring a patient and highly skilled energy to the debate.

bear

[funfly]

We have reached the stage where currently the majority of airline pilots are those who have proceeded through the art of flying following a passion and perhaps starting with SE aircraft, in other words they are ‘pilots’ in the way we understand the word.

We might have to accept that the operation of commercial aircraft in the future will best be serviced by ‘aircraft operators’, men or women who are skilled in the operation of the systems that fly aircraft. There is little doubt that the systems can fly an aircraft safely and handle most situations that will occur in flight, in fact many military aircraft can only be flown by their computers under certain circumstances. It may well be that the people operating the aircraft will take control of the systems in the case of an unusual situation rather than take control of the aircraft - flying commercially by holding the joystick, as we know it – may be a thing of the past.

I can certainly see a scenario in the not too distant future where freight is carried by pilotless aircraft.

It’s a bit like the camera, sure very few people understand f numbers but the digital cameras do it all for them and, to be honest, can take pictures as well balanced as where speed and exposure had to be determined by the photographer. Indeed, how many people who use complex computer programs understand basic programming, no they are skilled at using the program and lack nothing by not being able to program. That doesn’t in any way prevent those who want to use film and manual cameras from doing so and enjoying the process. (I can still develop film and I can program so I know how frustrating it can be to find that these skills are no longer necessary to get good results)

So aircraft will crash under certain circumstances but who is to say that any different result would have been gained by the aircraft being operated by a ‘proper’ flier as opposed to an ‘operator’.

I am not advocating this and just don’t ask me to fly as a passenger on one, but I think it will happen - I am sure that it is only passenger attitude that is holding this back.

[PJ2]

BOAC;
Does MS FltSim and gaming actually provide skills with which to address "computerized flight"? Clearly I would suggest that such a notion is foolish. - I disagree - from what I have seen, in terms PURELY of system operation, they provide excellent skills. You did specify "computerized flight". So, back to the first question?
Well I think your point is very well taken, and I hesitated when I wrote that because I know that far from dumbing this generation down, I believe it has been shown to increase hand-eye work and certain cognitive skills in logical thinking, insight into software responses, etc. I have never tried/done MS Flight Sim but I understand it is a very good teacher for some things. You just don't get that adrenaline punch and the blood rush to the head after knowing you've just about killed yourself and perhaps a lot of others plus written off a beautiful airplane and put your company at risk in doing so...

I think what was on my mind was "the whole enchilada..." - those skills plus the ability to think and build and aggressively use the crap detector, and I know you see that.

The present privileging of certain skills, (those fostered by gaming, etc, - and note!...no judgement here in re gamers), over others, (traditional Wright-Bros etc), is not "progress" as we think of the phenomenon, it "is what it is" without any innate value attached or necessity to support/legitimate its existence or power over our thinking. Someone created it, (many here may remember "ET"), and some complained but we all got used to it - it could have been different.

It is a response to a particular and specific technological culture (out of many possible cultures we could have had) and not one in which what has unfolded is in any way a necessary evolution of design. In other words, nothing mandates how "automation" has been done; it is one way, and it could have been different.

We could have had the reverse kind of "automation, (and I have discussed this and it was considered as long ago as the early '80's according to a paper I have been sent written by an airline pilot so this thinking isn't new or novel), - iow, the other way around - pilots fly the airplane manually in short-term, to remain cognitively-engaged and through manipulations, physically situationally-aware, and for long-term flight a bread & butter autoflight/FMS system is employed while the "real automation" is latent, quietly monitoring "normal". "Normal" is the categorized gathering of all flight regimes (and perhaps even ground ops), which has been defined by the analysis of thousands upon thousands of flights, not necessarily on the same type of aircraft, under all circumstances out of and into all kinds of airports under all manner of approaches - we can get as sophisticated as we wish.

The analysis would define and "algorithm-ize, (apologies to software people), the data to create a detailed set of defined boundaries of flight and possibly ground ops, (again, not type specific - that would be a separate set of "interventions"), of "what human pilots do to maintain 'normal' " under all these circumstances.

When the boundaries of normal are approached, a response which mimics "heightened awareness" begins and at some point, "Abnormal" is defined from a set of disparate circumstances including all the obvious ones we are quite familiar with and know occur, (TAWS-EGPWS/TCAS/Stall/Ground Collision/Wrong Runway, etc) but could include first sensing of a non-stable approach as even some rudimentary FOQA software already do, or signs of loss of control, (Tripoli, Bahrain) and begin resolution not by taking over but by visual and audio warnings which themselves would be modelled after what humans would do/say.

I recall the first think someone did when trying to get the attention of the captain who was fixated on getting in and in a very unstable approach was to call the captain's name to break the fixation and then called for a go-around. Now we can imagine all kinds of humourous situations unfolding to audibly get someone's attention, but it worked. There are others. In fact, here's an idea... (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ljFfL-mL70) If unsuccessful and the boundaries of safe flight are nearby, the system could interevene as does the Boeing 777 and, though more aggressively, the AB series.

I am well aware of the large holes in all this and how far we have come in the present mode of privileging software over pilots while the human is relegated to the role of Monitor. A lot of this has to do with cost and the industry's desire to "get rid of expensive pilots and replace them with cheap software and black boxes", (that process actually began with the Boeing 767, which was built orignally for 3 pilots but came with seats for 2...I remember the shock very clearly when I first heard it). Because the profession of Pilot has been cheapened in so many ways, the social/psychological/philosophical "web" of all the connections which make the profession work well have been shaken and haven't stopped quivering yet. I don't like the present trend but here we are, and a number of "competency accidents" later.

These ideas aren't new, but when they were thought of in the early 80's they weren't doable. Today they are.

Sir George, "I believe one can demonstrate airmanship through the automatics not in spite of them." - Precisely.

Bear;

On autopilots vamoosing, yes, it is a surprise for sure and the present priorities dull, not sharpen response. But that is the very nature of flight...years of boredom, etc., and when it is truly serious, denial takes its place in the first few moments just as the higher cognitive skills may. Like hijackings and other such interventions, the industry has rightly chosen to resolve most of those problems "on the ground"...here, through design, redundancy, and so on.

Autopilots only vamoose only because they are engaged in the first place. They are a supplement to manual flight, not a substitute though both reliability and airline policy breed complacency.

Perhaps it is possible, perhaps not, but there is no autopilot system in existence which will handle serious jet upsets. At some point, the autoflight is going to disconnect and hand the airplane back to the pilot. And in fact all autopilots vamoose given the opportunity.

That said, the Air Canada A319 upset near Calgary is instructive. If I recall, while the autopilot disconnected, the report states that if the pilots had left the controls alone (use of rudder was heavy, requiring a change of the vertical stab if I recall), the airplane would have righted itself using the remaining flight-control laws - going from memory here and haven't looked it up.

Because most mechanical/technical/performance problems have been solved on the ground by the designers, when they do come along they are indeed a shock. I flew 35 years without a single engine failure, had one tire-rim failure on a DC9, one cabin compresser explode on a DC8, and only one serious hydraulic failure on an A330.

All those years and I can remember all the failures because they were so rare. The rest of the stuff that happened was just ordinary stuff that pilots handle all the time and no one ever knows except the incident reporting system and FOQA. I think that is most airline pilots' experience.

The "58 ECAMs" drill is "normal" for such a serious failure. There are a lot of systems to secure, landing data to re-calculate and communications to look after, (ATC, Flight Attendants, Company) and it all takes time. The Emergency Electrical Configuration or a 2-system hydraulic failure will take 45 minutes in the sim. There is no rush to get the airplane on the ground whether a 777 or 330, not unless there is uncontrollable smoke or known fire or known structural damage.

Given what the crew (and we, through the photos) could see, I wouldn't judge this failure as serious structural one in terms of a wing or engine breaking away mandating an immediate landing, but that's just me. I haven't been trained on the B777 so I don't know if the procedures are similar for such emergencies - perhaps someone here can talk about it.

funfly;
I can certainly see a scenario in the not too distant future where freight is carried by pilotless aircraft.

I don't think so.

The reason why I think this is not because it is not doable. It is doable right now. The Airbus is an entire digital platform and can be "remoted".

The problem is again, cognitive, not technical or social, (fear of getting on transportation with no operator). An airplane is not a streetcar or an elevator. The multitude of highly-complex decision-making which cannot yet be mimicked, is the hurdle. We may ask ourselves about the present A380 incident and try to come to terms with the design requirements which would have assessed the damage, created a course of action and carried it out, all without human intervention. It is always risky to say such stuff in one's own time, but I don't think pilotless flight is possible in the sense that it would be the routine, commercial way the world's airliners would be operated.

PJ2

[PAXboy]

Just a regular Pax
Bergerie1We have never honoured sufficiently all those people who kept doing it right and were never noticed because through good planning, attention to detail, constant practice, and good airmanship they prevented potentially hazardous situations from becoming a catastrophe.This mirrors what I have seen in general commerce over the past 20 years. What I saw in Telecoms/IT was the move away from planned maintenance and prevention to fire fighting when it went wrong. Of course, general IT has the benefit that when it stops going round - it is already sitting on the ground. :hmm: BUT it can bring a company to a juddering halt and I have seen it often times.

Then I saw the manager apply lots of money to fix the problem. He/She did not get criticised (by the mgmt) for not having spent the money on better maintenance, better quality kit, better staff to prevent the problem in the first place - just got praise for fixing it! The staff, meanwhile, saw them spend at least as much money as we had asked for before and been refused - and them watch them get praised! So, staff get disaffected, unappreciated and drift away. Others have to stay for the sake of their income and pension.

I'll bet that there are folks in every single carrier in the world who recognise that pattern. My reason for mentioning it is to say that the airlines are just going down the same slippery path as the rest of commerce.

PJ2 #34. Your Old/New photography simile is VERY good and so easily grasped. My nephew was fixated by aircraft from the outset and went up for the first time when he was 13. He's now 34 and RHS of a 738 in the Southern Hemisphere and he likes the 738 for it's blend of the old and new.

[p51guy]

Automation is fine if it is doing what you want it to do. Why let it run away if it isn't? Just disconnect it. Pushing buttons when things go amuck might solve the problem but disconnecting and hand flying will fix it every time if you know how. If you don't know how, get another job. The automation is there to help you, not take care of incompetent pilots.

[Jabiman]

So where does that leave those pilots who go straight to TR and then into a jet and whose employer encourages them to rely on automation as much as possible?

[p51guy]

I think that is the problem. If they don't hit the right buttons in time they are screwed. That is why it is nice to have a qualified crew instead of these students. A qualified crew could disconnect and make an easy approach, the students would just mash buttons and see what happens. We have a lot of qualified pilots out there so hiring students to fly aircraft they are not ready for is really stupid. Yes they are cheap, but they aren't qualified.

[DownIn3Green]

PTH...Off topic, but have you ever lived in Annapolis, Md., owned a sailboat and one day take two tired crewmembers to your home one night on our day off...if so, please PM me...

If not...I agree 100% with you...A DC-9 or 727 in good hands hold no torch to this new computer stuff...

If you're not the pilot I'm thinking of, sorry, but I learned my (and your) trade because of mentors like you...BTW, what were you doing in 1968 after getting out of the Navy???...If I'm on target...

[PJ2]

Jabiman;

So where does that leave those pilots who go straight to TR and then into a jet and whose employer encourages them to rely on automation as much as possible?
It leaves them in the same place one is in when, after spending thousands of dollars and hundreds of hours hard work on learning a foreign language and having your very first encounter with reality in that country and not just ordering tea.... perhaps a complex, emotional situation that is rapidly unfolding with the person in front of you, (buying bananas and arguing the price, dealing with a car accident, dealing with a robbery or a heart attack, etc etc), and you can't understand what the (angry, sick?) person is saying to you and you need "the words" to explain what you're trying to accomplish but can't find them because of all the commotion, excitement, distractions, idioms and wild gestures that they didn't (and couldn't) teach you in language school. That's where it leaves you.

And for me, that's where the MCPL leaves a 250hr pilot in an airliner in which the captain is relying upon you when reality strikes.

PJ2.

[Mister approach]

We can postulate over the potential negative consequences of Automation dependency and the 'dumbing' down of basic piloting skills.
We can concern ourselves with the MPL's abbreviated curriculum and the 250 hr 'virgins' ability to avail him/herself in a situation but we certainly cannot dispute the irrevocable fact that accidents rates during the first decade of the 21st century have remained constant , more than we would like but nevertheless ,not on the increase.

Let's move forward , learning , embracing and adapting.

But most importantly - not regressing

Mister Approach

[protectthehornet]

accidents not on the increase...

we've been flying now for 107 years...as of dec 17 this year...and the accident rates should be zero...not steady.

[PJ2]

Mister Approach;
We can concern ourselves with the MPL's abbreviated curriculum and the 250 hr 'virgins' ability to avail him/herself in a situation but we certainly cannot dispute the irrevocable fact that accidents rates during the first decade of the 21st century have remained constant , more than we would like but nevertheless ,not on the increase.

Let's move forward , learning , embracing and adapting.

But most importantly - not regressing
These are noble sentiments. You will not find anyone here disagreeing with your wishes.

The reality however, is quite different.

The commercial aircraft accident statistics do not agree with your "irrevocable fact" statements regarding accident rates remaining constant, and "not on the increase." PTH voices it well - "Zero" is what the rate should be and if not, it is where this industry should be aiming.

The rise shown in the Boeing documents doesn't make a trend yet as it only began climbing in 2006. But it is neither flat at zero, nor is it decreasing. There are clear reasons for this and this and other threads here are telling the industry why.

Below are three graphs from the larger Boeing "Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents 1959 - 2009 (http://www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf)" pdf. The first two graphs show the worldwide commercial jet fleet fatal accident rate and the second shows the same for only the US and Canada. For those who wish to compare which airplanes are involved, the third graph shows the Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet Hull Loss and Hull Loss with Fatalities rates. The curves are slightly flatter for the worldwide fatal accident rate but sharply higher in the US and Canada.

PJ2

(better image quality can be had in the original report)

Accident Rates and Onboard Fatalities by Year
http://batcave1.smugmug.com/photos/1082183698_cKe3D-M.jpg

US and Canadian Operators Accident Rates by Year
http://batcave1.smugmug.com/photos/1082183576_zUzxo-M.jpg


Accident Rates by Airplane Type
http://batcave1.smugmug.com/photos/1082183838_Rrjmv-M.jpg

[A37575]

A few years ago I was tasked to give dual instruction to a student pilot on a Cessna 152. He already had ten hours of dual but had not yet gone solo. His regular instructor was on leave hence I got called in.

We strapped in and I waited for him to begin his pre-start cockpit checks. In an apologetic voice he said he had forgotten to bring along his checklist. I said no worries, just go ahead and start the engine. After all he had flown several trips in the Cessna.

He then said he did not know how to start the engine without a checklist to guide him. He was so embarrassed and I felt sorry for him while mentally gritting my teeth that his instructor had taught him to rely solely on a checklist as a Good Thing. In the event we finally got airborne. After the session was finished and after the student had taxiied in I suggested he should park the brakes and shut down the engine. Embarrassed silence after which he said he was sorry but he did not know how to shut down the engine in the Cessna 152 without reference to checklist guidance.

At a different level, this is what is happening in some parts of the airline industry where new (and not so new) pilots have lost the confidence that would enable them to fly safely without the crutch of the autopilot and it's associated goodies

[Mister approach]

'we've been flying now for 107 years...as of dec 17 this year...and the accident rates should be zero...not steady.'

We've been practicing medicine for close to 5000 years yet 100's of thousands of people perish every year as a result of avoidable medical error , I can guarantee that most Physicians and primary healthcare providers would suggest that the figure should be zero as well and so do I.

Aviation has been remarkably safe and it continues to be so, it is the ideology behind the 'zero' accident rate that propagates this notion of infallibility .

I wish for a zero accident rate , I hope that the research into the accidents attributable to the over dependency in automation will serve to educate future generations of so called 'playstation' pilots but will we really ever have an infallible system capable of producing zero accidents ? I hope so , if any industry can do it , aviation can, but my reasoned , rational side suggests that we will never have perfection. If automation is the reason for our imperfections as pilots , then should we abandon it? Go back to the basics?
If we can logically conclude otherwise then it would be logical to embrace our new reality , understand our limitations and in turn attempt to mitigate potential traps.

Mister Approach

[Oakape]

Automation is not the problem. The miss-use of automation & the lack of automation monitoring are the problems. Along with over zealous cost cutting in training, which leads to over dependance on automation as a patch to try and cover up the shortcomings in the pilots these training systems produce. It's not usually the individual pilot's fault, the fault generally lies within the system.

When you combine this over dependance on automation with a lack of adequate knowledge of the automation systems, again caused by shortfalls in training, you start to see acidents like some of the recent ones that have been discussed on the various PPRuNe forums of late.

I recently had a TRE stand in front of a recurrent ground school I was in & state that there are at least three pilots on the flight deck of a B777. The Captain, the First Officer and the Autopilot. This kind of thinking will invariably lead to disaster sooner or later. Autopilots are not pilots, nor were they designed to be.

[Oakape]

The autopilot is not a pilot. It is an aircraft 'manipulator' that only manipulates roll, pitch & thrust (I know - autoland. Lets not get too complicated!). And it only manipulates under the guidance of the pilot (read MCP selection).

To call it a pilot can, and sometimes does, lead an inexperienced, incompetent or complacent pilot into believing that he/she can 'hand over' to it & drop out of the loop of 'piloting' the aircraft for a period of time. You can't. And if you do, the stage is set for some unexpected event to place the aircraft in a situation that may not be recoverable, given the circumstances & crew ability and/or experience on the day.

It does not think, reason, draw on experience, make judgement calls, discuss, use CRM, learn, remember, feel or the myriad of other things we do as human beings. And, unless you remain completely in the loop, it does not provide feedback.

It is simply a tool used to assist the pilot as he/she 'pilots' the aircraft. Like an FMC, or a radio, or EICAS.

[4Greens]

Think more along the lines of mode confusion and better training to prevent it.

Also the accident rate is very low and has been for a number of years. It tends to be forgotten that a steady rate, with many more aircraft flying, equals more crashes and hull losses.

[PJ2]

Mister Approach;

Over the past fourty years, (essentially the beginning of the '70's), the move towards privatization and deregulation of the economy, particularly in the United States, the need to strike a balance between "safety" and "profitability" has been extremely difficult to come to terms with. A perfectly safe airline doesn't fly at all, and an airline that is responding to the pressures for short-term profit by cutting costs to the bone without due regard for the effects of such cuts isn't going to be in business for long and likely wouldn't be a safe carrier to travel on.
If we can logically conclude otherwise then it would be logical to embrace our new reality , understand our limitations and in turn attempt to mitigate potential traps.
That is exactly what the industry has been doing over the last fourty years to get the accident rate down as low as it is already.

The approach comes in many forms..."Error-trapping procedures", "Crew Resource Management", "Standard Operating Procedures", "Training Standards" and the industry has also responded with brilliant developments such as TAWS-EGPWS, (Don Bateman, Honeywell - google him), TCAS, Runway Incursion and Ground Position and yes, even high-level autoflight/autothrottle systems.

All these are on the technical side; the Human Factors side examines how people think, communicate, behave and how they respond to abnormal/emergency circumstances - it involves ergonomics, information display, checklist design, and a thousand other factors. This approach extends examination of organizational behaviours in root pathways to accidents. Google the pioneers of this work such as Charles Perrow, James Reason, Robert Helmreich and more recently, Sidney Decker, for examples of the hundreds of specialists doing this work. All these are currently existing mitigation responses in an attempt to lower the accident rate and they have worked - never perfectly, but the rate is lower now than it was in 1950 - dramatically so. But it is, as shown, now rising - the accident rate is turning around but it is too early to say whether it is a trend or a blip as the previous years' show.

The healthcare/medical profession is mentioned and has been discussed widely here at various times and places. Helmreich is doing work as others are in this area. See, "Systems Approaches to Surgical Quality and Safety: Human Factors Approaches in Medicine (http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/471908_4)" for just one story on this.

While medicine is learning from aviation how to lower risk, reduce fatality rates, employ some of the mitigation approaches aviation has developed and so on, the healthcare industry has to develop their own methods for reducing the spectacularly-high fatality rate in medicine, (it is similar to, though higher, the automobile industry in the United States - about one fully-loaded B747 fatal accident every three days), and while that is a statement of fact, that statement, I know, is also an unfair comparison because the two endeavours are entirely different just in terms of problem diagnoses and the fact that medicine deals with patients and we deal with comparatively mechanically-uncomplicated machines and pretty straightforward operational circumstances. That's why medicine must develop its own mitigation strategies.

PJ2

[alf5071h]

The reluctance to cite airmanship may be due to the difficulties in defining it or explaining how it might be taught (gained), when it fails, or is not used.

At best, airmanship is depicted with a model, a concept. The model shows what airmanship entails, but little of how it can be acquired, and less still of how its absence actually effects operations.
IMHO this is because the majority of the constituents are within the mind. How do pilots effect self discipline, what are the mental aspects of skill, how is proficiency (competency) judged, what entails requisite knowledge, a decision, judgment, etc.
Most airmanship attributes are judged by result, success / failure, but the process remains hidden.

We lack details of the data used in the report, but whatever assessments have been made they might only be interpretations of the crew’s behavior (their airmanship). The thoughts remain unknown – what was the pilot’s interpretation of the situation, on what basis was the course of action taken what was known / not known. Furthermore, there is the risk of hindsight bias.

Indications of problems with ‘airmanship’ might be found in broad categories of recent accidents, e.g. -
Speed related, particularly slow speed.
Disorientation – attitude instrument flying.
System mode of operation; human-technology interaction.
They all relate to displays, and thus aspects of awareness; note the link with Orasanu’s work #33.

As an alternative view of the problem, consider the technological changes in recent years.
Airspeed displays - dial vs tape (which way up); attitude formats – a simple display vs full screen with surrounding clutter (including mode annunciation).
We have lost the individualism of separate instruments, the new integrated displays might require greater interpretation.
The majority of the changes are evolutions, where each step has been accepted, sometimes judged superior at other times only acceptable in conjunction with other enhancements. All of these changes have been based on assumptions, the majority of which are unwritten, but each fraction of the industry ‘understands’ them – regulators, trainers, individuals – except like airmanship everyone has their version of the assumption and how the human fits in with it.
We have assumed that these changes will ‘improve safety’ whereas in reality (today’s problems) they may have hidden or moved the old errors – same low accident rate. Errors now appear in another form or elsewhere in the operation.

This is not a simple aspect of man–machine interface involving human factors. It is the understanding of human behavior with the machine, the gap between man and machine. A similar gap between aircraft certification and operational regulations, the gap between what management/training expects from procedures and what actually happens in normal operations, between safety and profitability, what we expect from humans and what the human actually accomplishes, and all these depend on context, which also is often an assumption.

There may not be a specific solution, but with a very wide view, the industry might benefit from considering some of the ‘hidden’ safety gaps in their assumptions.
Is airmanship expected to fill the gaps in these assumptions?

“Knowledge and error flow from the same mental sources, only success can tell one from the other.” (Ernst Mach, 1838-1916; “Knowledge and error”, 1905)

[Maurice Chavez]

Airmanship bla bla bla... Define it.... Most manufacturers will state not to troubleshoot. Taking the assumption you know exactly what the automation is supposed to do and it doesn't, disconnect fly manual. That is if you still know how.....Lot's of fancy talk around this subject, but it sounds like beating around the bush.

As for the wonderful accident rate compared over the years, compare traffic from 1950 and actual now....

[alf5071h]

Maurice –
(1) Airmanship? Precisely my point ?
(2) The assumption is probably incorrect – in many instances crew’s do not know when to disconnect (change the level of automation) – either not appreciating the situation, or with understanding failing to act – full circle to Orasanu !
(3) Perhaps the problem is that we don’t know (understand) if we are beating around a bush or if it is any other object.

I hope that on reflection that you will realise that ‘rate’ considers the different traffic volumes.
A related problem for the industry is that with a constant low accident rate, yet increasing volume, the number of accidents will increase. Therefore in order to satisfy the ‘public perception’ of safety, the rate has to improve just to maintain the same number of accidents per year.

There are many problems in this area of safety management; see The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems (www.ida.liu.se/~eriho/SSCR/images/Amalberti%20_(2001).pdf).
From this, another view of the ‘problem’ could be that it is a manifestation of applying conventional (error reducing) safety strategies to a system (via training) which is now in equilibrium, and thus requires error containment strategies. We need some errors in order to learn.
A failure or misapplication of CRM/TEM ?

[PJ2]

Maurice Chavez;
As for the wonderful accident rate compared over the years, compare traffic from 1950 and actual now....
QED.

From the 2009 Boeing Summary:

"Accident Rates:In general, this expression is a measure of accidents per million departures. Departures (or flight cycles) are used as the basis for calculating rates, since there is a stronger statistical correlation between accidents and departures than there is between accidents and flight hours, or between accidents and the number of airplanes in service, or between accidents and passenger miles or freight miles. Airplane departures data are continually updated and revised as new information and estimating processes become available. These form the baseline for the measure of accident rates and, as a consequence, rates may vary between editions of this publication."

alf5071h, thanks for the link to the "paradoxes" paper - well worth reading.

PJ2

[p51guy]

A few posts back a poster used the term mode confusion. Is this an acceptable term for not being able to control your aircraft as you desire? Why not get unconfused and disconnect the autopilot until you can get it going where you want again. Is it acceptable now days that confused means you have to press buttons to get unconfused? I hope not. I know I am of the old school but what happens if the crosswind exceeds the autoland limits on an unprotected ILS approach and the computer pilot has to figure out how to land it manually if he hasn't in months? I've had localizers deviate full scale on an unprotected approach into MIA at 100 ft and if it had been coupled the 250 hr guy with the push button talent would have been in serious trouble. Stick and rudder is laughed at a lot on this thread with automation taking over but it will bail you out of a lot of situations in real life situations.

[A37575]

Stick and rudder is laughed at a lot on this thread with automation taking over but it will bail you out of a lot of situations in real life situations.

Except this captain couldn't fly stick and rudder to save his life - literally:

A Kenya Airways Boeing 737-800 took off on a dark night and entered a slow right roll that continued for nearly a minute without the flight crew or the autopilot engaged. The captain - the PF -was preoccupied with the weather and had lost situational awareness.

The F/O who was left out of the loop of the captain's "planning" was not effectively monitoring what was going on and he did not notice the autopilot had not been engaged as intended. Confusion and spatial disorientation prevailed when a bank angle warning sounded. The captain responded with erratic flight control inputs that aggravated the situation and precipitated a spiral dive. The pilots were wrestling with the controls when the 737 disntergrated in a mangrove swamp killing all 114 people aboard.

[Tmbstory]

The continuous loss of these flying skills in the present Aicrew of the Aviation Industry will cause the accident rate to increase with unfortunately, more fatalities.

There has to be a way that Automation and Manual Flying Skills can be kept at an acceptable level.

Tmb

[Phantom Driver]

The continuous loss of these flying skills in the present Aicrew of the Aviation Industry will cause the accident rate to increase with unfortunately, more fatalities.

Really? Better take a look at the accident rate before automation was introduced. Not pretty. One guy on this forum wants to disconnect and fly manually after a long haul flight because he "wants to do something". Another contributor can't understand how the PM can get overloaded in his monitoring duties. Excuse me?!

The Atlantic Barons in their Stratocruisers, Constellations, 707's,DC8's were indeed a breed apart as far as pure flying skills were concerned, but you have to admit-they lost quite a few.

The accident rate in those days would be totally unacceptable now. Todays mass market aviation environment caters for the lowest common denominator in flying skills,(of which there is now plenty, due to massive growth in the industry), and so Engineers, not Pilots, rule. Thats the way of the future, and so be it.

Do you really think you are "flying" these (new) generation aircraft? 777 is FBW, but it's been around a long time now, and yet human factor problems still crop up (Air France/ Air India A/T issues in Lagos/Delhi respectively,). As aviators, our energy would be better spent campaigning for more user friendly systems that are easier to understand. Jeez, how many ammendments to FCOM have you seen come out from both Boeing and Airbus with regard to whats going on with the various modes after T/O or G/A?! This after years in service.

Sure you're going to have to disconnect and fly manually while both of you try to figure out what is going wrong, but in todays crowded RVSM /RNPairspace environment, you are going to have other distractions and conflicts vying for your attention. You didn't have this additional "pucker factor" in the old days.

(p.s. How many more times are we going to have to go over all this manual v automation stuff again? I've heard of history repeating itself, but this is getting a bit out of hand..:suspect:

[stepwilk]

What the FAA researcher whose report occasioned this thread is saying is not that automation is bad but that current training is not preparing pilots to operate and interact with it properly. It's not a call for a return to stick-and-rudder skills (not that I'm saying there's anything wrong with that) but for better training to prepare pilots for new-generation automation.

[BOAC]

Step - indeed one of my points on the other thread on 'Safety, CRM etc' - we have been let down over the years by poor training, particularly with the AB, and suffered there with over-hyped sales talk. I think the training system here is close to catching up, but there still needs to be a drastic shift in attitude - modern a/c offer such tremendous benefits in automation and efficiency as long as they are both understood and used correctly. Over-emphasis on 'automatics' OR 'stick and rudder' are both fallacious - we need to instil in this up-and-coming generation the ability to know when and when not - but of course to retain the basic skills more than once every six months..

[Maurice Chavez]

One guy on this forum wants to disconnect and fly manually after a long haul flight because he "wants to do something". Another contributor can't understand how the PM can get overloaded in his monitoring duties. Excuse me?!

The Atlantic Barons in their Stratocruisers, Constellations, 707's,DC8's were indeed a breed apart as far as pure flying skills were concerned, but you have to admit-they lost quite a few.

Dear Sir,
First of all you seem to know better then the rest of the industry, do yourself a favor read this flight safety foundation article (http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CBgQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fflightsafety.org%2Fasw%2Fjul10%2Fasw_jul10_ p30-34.pdf&ei=w6nZTJ-GEdLX4gbTzOSfCQ&usg=AFQjCNH7AKovdccBijARIzYTj-6onngalg). Seconds, the guy that questioned the the workload of the PM, whilst hand flying was me. Again I'm still waiting for somebody to point out this overload...Please explain that whole philosophy......
Third, I'm an ex Diezel 8 driver, and yes we lost quite a few, but not as much as the "new generation" aircraft, or maybe the "new generation pilot" should I say..We did use automation as much as possible, but when "the thing" wasn't doing what it was supposed to do, we took over.....

Read the article posted above and try to be honest with yourself......Hope you learn something.

[Phantom Driver]

Ozy-
Good for him. He wants to preserve essential flying skills.

Agreed, but at the end of a 14 hour slog, even if half was spent kipping in the bunk? There is a time and place for everything.And lets be clear here, we are talking about extensive manual flying on departure and on the approach. I would hope we are all flying manually on finals when visibility permits, especially in adverse x-wind conditions. No excuse for not doing so, and hopefully no company advocates disconnecting the autopilot on short finals, or worse still mandatory autolands (unfounded rumour that this was the case initially with the A380)

I suspect this particular contributor believed that if a pilot can't cope with PNF duties he isn't likely to cope with PF.


Maybe, but I would suggest that even the best of us, when PM, will find things getting a little hectic on a night departure in a busy ATC environment with an SID requiring extensive overwater manoeuvring coupled with low level initial altitudes, followed by non standard vectors/level/speed changes.

In the old days, the PF flew instruments, and the PM (PNF!) watched. No longer so in todays machines.

PM is often working like the proverbial "one armed paper hanger". The main point is -who is monitoring what? PF is busy flying instruments, PM is busy with (maybe) ATC/MCDU/FMC/checklist. OK on nice sunny days, but night IMC? Inevitable breakdown in X checking, as shown in many accidents.

Once again-"A time and place for everything".

Stepwilk-

What the FAA researcher whose report occasioned this thread is saying is not that automation is bad but that current training is not preparing pilots to operate and interact with it properly. It's not a call for a return to stick-and-rudder skills (not that I'm saying there's anything wrong with that) but for better training to prepare pilots for new-generation automation.

Amen. The bottom line? Basic requirement, (when things go pear shaped), is the old "Level the wings and find the horizon", the foundation on which our instrument flying is based. If we can't do that, then there is something definitely wrong. I don't think that is the case; the Aviation system is basically sound, no matter what some may think. The average guy/gal in the cockpit is competent. International standards demand it. Accidents will happen, no matter what; thank God they are at historical lows, despite increased volumes.

But forget about manually flown raw data approaches to Cat 2 minimums. Maybe the Ryanair/EasyJet folks doing 2/3 sectors a day can hack it, but I speak from the perspective of a long haul heavy jet operator who maybe gets one landing a week (if lucky).


Maurice C- Thanks for the link. I will try and read it and hopefully learn something.As the saying goes, We only stop learning when we hang up the headset for the last time!:ok:

[ChristiaanJ]

As aviators, our energy would be better spent campaigning for more user friendly systems that are easier to understand.I thought this hit a BIG nail on a BIG head.
I'm astonished it didn't solicit any comments.

CJ

[p51guy]

Our airline couldn't fly cat 2 approaches hand flown. We had to on check rides but not in the airplane. I hope we never get to the point where cat 2 approaches can't be done by pilots in the sim. We have no pilots under 40 years old so don't have to worry about that unless we start hiring again. Underqualified pilots need to do what the rest of us did and pay their dues and get qualified. Why can't they do what we did?

[bearfoil]

PD, ChristiaanJ

"Campaigning for the logical solution" used to be not ironic. It is of course the least used approach, as it generally results in marginalization, or blank and dim looks. What a state we are in. There are simply too many people noticing the problem. Training? Software? Airframe? Command? In today's environment it takes newsworthy events to frame the dysfunction, and that is insufficient for co-operative address.

"Compromise" in most pursuits is all too welcome. Oakape 08:51 has the problem well-defined. Given Phantom's recent post, it is clear the problem is defined, and at least a preliminary approach, if not attitude, is available.

Safety vs. Money. How did we get in this mess? More to the point, why are the wrong people making the call?

bear

[md80fanatic]

If I understand correctly, when the a/p disconnects it is usually due to flight conditions it cannot manage, for whatever reason. That being said, I was wondering if there could be a worse time to pass control to a pilot not exactly proficient with stick and rudder skills?

[p51guy]

It was unexpected to me on that approach to ATL at 300 ft when the MD80 autopilot said you got it. We did fine but it wasn't what we expected. It was turblulent and unexpected. Don't trust automation. It helps keep the workload down but it can not be trusted to get you on the ground.

[alf5071h]

Whilst I don’t believe that the problem is overuse of automation, nor the lack of stick and rudder skills, the apparent lack of ‘appropriate’ manual flight practice may indicate which mental skills have degraded.
Thus, what are these skills – airmanship, and why aren’t they being practiced during automatic flight. Again, this points towards training, but also the equipment.
Does modern technology require airmanship skills to operate it, or alternatively enable application and practice of these skills – are the new systems ‘easy’ to operate mentally.

Re “… more user friendly systems that are easier to understand”
This is not a single issue (a big nail); there is whole matrix of options here. We can have complex systems, but easy to understand and use, and simple systems but difficult to comprehend and use, etc, etc. The problem revolves around what is nice, what do we need (essential), what is tolerable, and for all of these, in what context both situation and use.
Then of course you might have the same range of options for people - the complex, yet understandable, and the nice but not so good pilots, etc.
Most of the above can be modelled in the SHELL diagram, but the problem is not entirely in the boxes it is in the jagged edges of the interfaces.

As a thought, what if the perceived automation/technology dependency is actual an aversion to manual flight? What would have caused that?

[protectthehornet]

alf made a good point here. I looked back on my humble career and rememberd the first time I flew a sabreliner at FL450...and the autopilot was broken (out of service). No passengers...ferry flight.

It was a handful. I was very new in the plane...my first jet. I was copilot. It took all I had to keep her in the ball park on altitude and heading. but I got the hang of it...might have taken 20 or 30 minutes to really feel things out.

Now, flying my first year at the big airline. Autopilot out at night on a DC9. Lower altitude of course. Copilot there too. I asked the captain for FL260 as a final...relatively short flight. I knew by this point the stability would be easier at the lower altitudes. I could feel the flight attendants move around the cabin. things worked out just fine.

the next day, we had the same plane and it was the captain's turn. he went up to the planned altitude and he had a handful of plane...3 hours, no autopilot. I offered the suggestion to fly lower...he told me I was a rookie. ATC told him he was off his altitude.

He had never flown the plane at max altitude by hand. And these were the old days.

Simulators can't or won't produce the ''feel'' of MANUAL FLYING...and airlines are too cheap to let you go out and wring the plane and yourself out in real life.

If you can't fly ''manual'', then you shouldn't fly automation in that regime...because if you lost the automation, you couldn't handle it.

flight training...that's what needs to be changed.

[DA50driver]

Training needs to stretch your comfort levels. When I had students that thought 45 degree banks were difficult to do while maintaining altitude I made them do 60 degrees and all of a sudden 45 was a piece of cake.

A lot of people who have entered the business have no training outside pass the check ride and oral. I have had "fully qualified" line SIC's that don't want to do a visual, because they have never done one and are uncomfortable with it.

I have to admit that the only days I look forward to flying now is when the weather is crappy with low vis and blowing snow on a slippery runway. ILS on auto pilot all the way down is so boring I would rather stick needles in my eyeballs.

I am a pilot, not an accountant's button pushing little be-atch. (I fly an airplane that uses a mouse instead of button pushing by the way, so as we progress we can't call them button pushers anymore).

My mother thinks I am a piano player in a whorehouse, I don't want her to be too ashamed of me.

[Lonewolf_50]

Really? Better take a look at the accident rate before automation was introduced. Not pretty.

Respectfully, in those days before early auto pilots(which preceded automation), and before the current generation of automation, the ability to forecast weather was comparably nil to now.
Aside: is a trim wheel "autopilot?" I don't think so, I think it is a secondary flight control. It seems that autopilot requires us to have on hand something electronic, using logic and comparison statements in electric form to make a control input to do X part of a pilot's task.
The art and science of human factors and crew coordination was primative. The materials and design art was hardly advanced.
The quality of navaids was lesser.
To attribute to automation the improvement in safety record is, to my view, both reductionist and inaccurate.

Another contributor can't understand how the PM can get overloaded in his monitoring duties. Excuse me?!
Are you referring to the guy monitoring the automation, or the PNF? :confused::confused:

As I see it, autopilot functions are intended as an aid to the pilot, a workload reduction, not a replacement for his function. Automation I suggest is something different from autopilot, since it has grown in so many ways. As I see it, it has been sold to both the military and to aviation companies and operators as, in part, a way to replace the function of the pilot.
If I am being inexact or fuzzy in this thinking, I sincerely believe that this has been the outcome, desired from the outset or not.
The Atlantic Barons in their Stratocruisers, Constellations, 707's,DC8's were indeed a breed apart as far as pure flying skills were concerned, but you have to admit-they lost quite a few.
See above concerns in re state of the art across the whole gamut of issues involving air transport.
As aviators, our energy would be better spent campaigning for more user friendly systems that are easier to understand.
100% agreed. :ok: Design ought not to add workload with systems intended to reduce workload. Seems contradictory to me.

I mention this anecdote again, as I did some months ago. A colleague of mine was an instructor at the Navy Test Pilot School (Rotary Wing), who had under instruction a couple of Seahawk pilots who were lacking in stick and rudder skills despite having each over 1000 hours in the Seahawk. The competition/screening to get into TPS is fairly stout.
He had to let them go. Helicopters are seriously stick and rudder creatures ... or are they?

With AFCS and automation, and missions that rely on them, the opportunity to exercise and grow stick & rudder skills in these basically good pilots had atrophied. (Add some inane SOPs that precluded certain training maneuvers, and you have a systemic refusal to keep S & R alive across a range of skills).

That many veterans in the air transport industry see an almost identical problem with the erosion of flying skills now (just under 20 years after my colleague's experience) strikes me as a sign that over automation is endemic in all facets of the aviation industry, from the design and requirements end.

[Phantom Driver]

No, it isn't inevitable. A competent crew can cope - if they can't, then what are they doing on the flight deck of an aircraft


Of course they cope. Every day. please note the distinction; "Night/IMC". I repeat-there is a time and place for everything. In the sim, I have to demonstrate my ability to fly manual raw data approaches to minimums. Can't hack it? "You failed, Captain!"

In any major airline today, if the examiner is willing to sign that licence (and thereby putting his neck on the line as well), then you at least meet the minimum standard.

But to subject 400 customers down the back to a hand flown approach to minimums in IMC just to prove that you still have the Right Stuff doesn't make sense to me. But then, how often is this required? Very rarely, I would suggest. An autoland is usually mandated anyway by most companys in such conditions.

And I beg to differ from P51 Guy:

Don't trust automation. It helps keep the workload down but it can not be trusted to get you on the ground.


Todays Cat 3B systems, with the built in redundancies & safety back ups, do an excellent job of getting the aircraft on the ground. Again, we are required to demonstrate the ability to recover from a multitude of bad situations on the approach.

However, 99% of the time, I would hope that every one of us is flying the whole final approach manually when conditions permit. (I'll save the raw data stuff for the sim and use the flight director on the line, simply because these days the FDAP "Big Brother" is watching every move. One small step outside very narrow parameters & it's a call to visit the Chief Pilot's office for tea (without biccys). At least that's the way it is on most major operations.

Quite rightly so--it's the least our customers deserve; a smooth, troublefree flight with the minimum of drama or excitement.

Hornet-


Simulators can't or won't produce the ''feel'' of MANUAL FLYING...and airlines are too cheap to let you go out and wring the plane and yourself out in real life.



Well, if the Ace of the Base is up front and having a good day, then he might do as good a job as the autopilot where nailing the needles is concerned. But with the average Joe attempting same after a long haul, i.e hand flying down to minimums (night/IMC)--well, I suggest there would be a few white knuckles down the back. Does anyone actually try to do this on a regular basis? I would hope not.

Das;

I have to admit that the only days I look forward to flying now is when the weather is crappy with low vis and blowing snow on a slippery runway. ILS on auto pilot all the way down is so boring I would rather stick needles in my eyeballs.

Can you guarantee to do it right EVERY time? One or two go arounds and the Chief Pilot will be giving you a call. As professonal pilots, our job is to deliver a safe comfortable product. If I want to have fun I'll go fly a Pitts Special. Solo.

Alf.


As a thought, what if the perceived automation/technology dependency is actual an aversion to manual flight? What would have caused that?



Now you have hit another big nail on the head. Ozy makes the observation; I've seen a few pilots who are too dependent on the automatics, and that is very worrying.
. Very true. I recall an accident report some years back; DC10 overrun landing at (Boston?). The A/T had a known fault of holding excess speed (Vref +20) all the way down to touchdown on a short, slick runway.

The report stated that the Captain had been so used to flying with A/T engaged that he was reluctant to disconnect, even when he saw it not performing to standard. So the problem with automation has been around a long time.

Humans will err. We will continue to reinvent the wheel. The question is-Why? I leave that one to the psychologists and CRM experts.

Re the ongoing debate-My personal opinion?--On sim recurrency training (not check day), lets spend more time "Flying"; more manual, more raw data etc, rather than the beloved "Loft exercises". We try to cover so much in the sessions that half the time you come out at the end wondering "what exactly did I learn there?".

Once well understood (and thats where my plea for simplicity comes in),save the automatics work for the line, And there, the bottom line, (as Mr Airbus and Boeing have always told us) is " Never forget there is something called a disconnect button".No matter how rusty we are, we should still be able to revert to basics, and I'm pretty sure that is the case.

[DozyWannabe]

As I see it, it has been sold to both the military and to aviation companies and operators as, in part, a way to replace the function of the pilot.
Really? The current standard in commercial aviation is 2 flight deck crew. That number was introduced with the DC-9 and the Jurassic 737 - neither of which could be described as an automation-rich product.

I've said this before and I'll say it again - the "automation to replace pilots" meme has only ever come from the press, and given the disdain shown by a majority of people on here for the press's opinion on other matters, why do they take this one so seriously?

[flyawaybird]

Protectthehornet: Heroic pilots do no make headlines.:sad:
How right you are in this statement. My suggestion is that Pilots retiring without killing passengers or losing aircraft, should be honourned. I believe this is about Air Safety. Can Pilot Association campaign for such honour to be carried out in Aviation?:(

[flyawaybird]

Hahn: U are right about flying by hand other than relying entirely on automation. This brings me to a point. I have driven a car manually for several years and now I drive a car using automation. I prefer the former to the latter. Do you know why, I simply relax and let the car go instead of feeling in control by driving manually. I don't know if it is a question of teaching old dogs new tricks. Pardon me I am not rejecting the new technology but that is how I feel when I drive, like I won't be able to stop or something like letting go. By far, one cannot compare this to flying but all the same there is logic in my reference.

[DA50driver]

Yes. If I had doubts about that I wouldn't go fly people around.

I do fly a Pitts S2b for fun.

[Phantom Driver]

Ozy:

If you're flying manually on raw data then perhaps the MCDU/FMGC can be afforded a lower priority.

Unfortunately not so simple, and that's the problem. In todays aircraft, the autopilot and flight director are all integrated. Both require identical inputs, as they both receive info from the same FCC source (flight control computers). So the PM has to make LNav or Hdg Sel and FLCH or VNav selections as requested by the PF.

It is critical (and SOP) that both of you crosscheck and verbalise these selections before executing, and therein lies the rub. With the PF busy concentrating on his flying and the PM busy doing other tasks (ATC coms, frequency changes, config changes, checklists), it is often easy to miss something, and make the wrong mode selection. I have seen it happen many times.

Today's aircraft do not lend themselves to manual flying as we used to know it. They are not designed to be flown that way as a matter of course. Which is not to say it cannot and should not be done. Of course not. ("Time and place"). But that is why it is recommended to use the automation (i.e PF does his own MCP work) at such busy times to ease the workload and improve x checking & SA (sit awareness) for all concerned.

Ditch the automatics (i.e FD) & fly raw data only? Not really an option in todays RNP airspace. RNAV departures/arrivals demand 99.99% accuracy always. If you are not right on the published lateral and vertical profiles, with associated constraints (if any), you risk violations, with potentially serious consequences. Not worth the risk IMHO.

(p.s the link posted by Maurice Chavez with regard to degraded flying skills does make interesting reading.)

[goldfish85]

I just finished renewing my FAA CFI certificate. Over and over the course material emphasized that stick and rudder skills aren't as important any more. It's all decision making.

Now, I'm not opposed to training in making appropriate decisions, but I was dismayed by the downplaying of basic flight skills.


Goldfish

[p51guy]

Good for you GF. Great to see you are staying in the loop and I am sure you will teach your students the value of basic stick and rudder skills. I let my CFI expire decades ago when I got an airline job but would have the same technique I had then of teaching stick and rudder skills. Good judgement is important but so is knowing how to fly your airplane after you have decided what you are going to do.

[Admiral346]

Well, i do not agree with the posts above.

In a sim session, I want to be challenged by some hard to solve scenario, not by a handflown ILS.

I will do that on any day, at any airport. Even the busy ones (Europe is my theatre). My personal minimum for an ILS is set to 800' AGL, below that I will leave the FD on. If the ceiling goes below 500', I will let the AP fly it until certain of visual completion.

And if I go to some not so busy field, I will always opt for a visual, if approved and surrounding terrain and obstacles are visible (no fooling around with CAVOK and going into the sun, that would be dangerous). In case visual is not approved or not possible, I will ask for a nonprecision APP. That does not include GPS approaches, as it harldy makes sense to handfly them and they are the most boring piece of flying I know.

I feel that in no way I do endanger my passengers, as a goaround is always an option (and in my company it is not even mentioned, no questions asked, ever, period - for safety!) and I chose the right weather to do those handflown approaches in. And, admit it, when does the weather really call for an autoland/CAT III?

Autoland on a CAT I beam is inherently unsafe, to begin with.

So in a sim session, practicing "no FD" approaches is an utter waste of time. One should always have the ability to fly one.

Nic

[p51guy]

In the US we don't do it that way. We have been doing just fine doing what we have been doing for over 40 years. Cat 3 approaches are almost never done but we can always hand fly a cat 1 approach. The only cat 3 approaches I have done are in the sim. Cat 1 approaches are not very difficult if you have any piloting abilities so why worry about if it is an auto approach or hand flown? Just land the fricken airplane. What is happening is what is expected of a professional pilot?