N2195B Seneca report out [Archive]

IO540

29th Oct 2010, 20:46

I tried to find the original thread on this and was going to tack the post on the end of that, but could not find it. A search on N2195B does not find any of the original discussion on it.

A number of things do not add up about this flight.

For starters I don't think he got any "weather" before going; he would not have gone "VFR" otherwise (other than firmly tongue in cheek). The departure weather (http://www.wunderground.com/history/airport/EGKA/2007/02/10/DailyHistory.html?req_city=NA&req_state=NA&req_statename=NA&theprefset=SHOWMETAR&theprefvalue=1) was BKN008 or thereabouts. I got some ascents at the time and IMHO he was in solid IMC most of the way to Lyon. This doesn't matter if you keep an eye on the obstacle clearance... A friend of mine (an FAA ATP/CFII who I fly with) was the last person to speak to the three of them (the pilot, his GF, and the little boy), shortly before departure, and when he questioned the really crappy weather, the pilot indicated that this is OK; he always flies.

The radar image for the relevant time is this (http://s101.photobucket.com/albums/m74/peterh337/?action=view&current=20070210.jpg). I don't suppose he saw it; very few pilots knew about meteox.com then, and not many more know about it now. Also it is a safe bet he had no internet access before departure (no facilities in the hangar, for sure).

He carried no oxygen - I have this from a pilot who flew with him. So his FL240 ceiling would not have been any good. But he could have cleared the terrain at say FL100-120.

The radio indicates that the min IFR clearance would have been FL120.

However he did not appear to know how to request an IFR clearance: Yes could you make us I F R for the rest of the descent down to D G N or whatever.

He also did not appear to know one can request an IFR clearance when airborne: All right we can’t just do that we have to file an I F R flight plan for you

I don't know how much of the bad radio is a lack of radio competence or just really poor English, but he was a lecturer at the University of Sussex (among other places).

The French were not quick in digging out an IFR clearance but these things always take some minutes. I have had instant ones in France but those were on arrival to say Caen, from the final approach controller. I have heard others on the radio and they took some minutes and a lot of chatter. In the UK, you could probably forget it.

There is also a comment on his license validity but the google translation is hopeless there.

I suspect there is a reason why this report took over 3 years to come out but I have no idea what it is.

Duchess_Driver

29th Oct 2010, 20:54

En Anglais?

DD

Jan Olieslagers

29th Oct 2010, 20:59

BKN 008 at Shoreham departure?

Les TAF et METAR des aérodromes de Shoreham (GB) et de Cannes (06) indiquent que les conditions météorologiques étaient compatibles avec la réalisation d’un vol VFR au départ et à l’arrivée. <My non-authorative translation>
TAF's and METAR's for both Shoreham and Cannes airfields show that meteo conditions were sufficient for VFR flight at departure and arrival.
</translation>

now BKN008 is not strictly incompatible with VFR, yet marginal at best. I'd be surprised if the French reporters hadn't elaborated on the matter, if it was really this marginal. Especially as they took so long to report - strange indeed.

Edit: the report itself has
METAR EGKA 100950Z 36007KT 9999 SCT006 07/07 Q0994
which I find confusing - very humid, yet 9999 i.e. unlimited visual range, and some bits of low cloud? Strange.

PS feel free to request short translations, but not the full 42 pages please.

Jan Olieslagers

29th Oct 2010, 21:01

PS I was unable to make the R/T dialogues appear legibly from the PDF - even at 400% the dots only became squares - what's the trick?

what next

29th Oct 2010, 21:07

There is also a comment on his license validity but the google translation is hopeless there.

It says that his license was last renewed in 2006.

The French were not quick in digging out an IFR clearance but these things always take some minutes.

If you tell them that you just lost visual reference to the ground you will get an instant climb clearance to MRVA, a swawk and a heading vector that will keep you separated from other traffic. The IFR clearance to the destination may then take some minutes to come through, but this is no concern once you are safely on top of the mountains.

What a pity that two innocent persons have died for such a stupid reason. There are quite a few commercial services around who will do the flight planning and filing of flight plans for 25 Euros or less. Two people (I dont count the pilot since he obviously wanted it that way) dead to save 25 Euros. I can't believe it.

Contacttower

29th Oct 2010, 21:11

The report states that he had a 1/1,000,000 scale VFR chart but not a 1/500,000 one, possibly explains the airspace confusion that seems apparent from the radio and also the lack of awareness of the terrain.

There was a discussion on FLYER I believe after the accident.

IO540

29th Oct 2010, 21:30

now BKN008 is not strictly incompatible with VFRBKN008 is 100% legal for a VFR departure on a VFR flight plan ;)

You need to be 500ft AGL so that leaves 300ft to play with. And over the sea (which was the departure route) you can go as low as you like, so long as you don't meet any boats.

It is "obvious" the flight, with about 600nm to run through pretty much the same sort of weather, is not going to be "VFR" for much longer, but there is limited mileage in pontificating about an illegal flight as such. Accident reports rarely comment on "obvious" things like this, and IMHO that is probably reasonable because only the pilot would have known the actual flight conditions. Also, a VFR departure into OVC005-OVC010 is standard in the UK, Class G airports. I have done worse than that, in the "right" conditions ;)

What a pity that two innocent persons have died for such a stupid reason.Well, yes. But without oxygen he cut off his weather and obstacle avoidance options even before he departed. Lots of pilots fly low-level (VFR, or scraping around the bottoms of airway MEAs if IFR) because they won't carry oxygen. However, I don't think he would have outclimbed the weather anyway, although with de-ice boots he might have been OK despite a very rough flight.

The 1M chart would have been the SIA one, which shows all the airspace OK. I have used these. (What the SIA chart does not show usefully is the vertical extent etc of military airspace and RAs etc). A 500k chart would have been either the IGN one (useless; no depiction above 5000ft or so) or the Cartabossy one (OK, but few non-French pilots know about it).

Contacttower

29th Oct 2010, 21:40

What a pity that two innocent persons have died for such a stupid reason. There are quite a few commercial services around who will do the flight planning and filing of flight plans for 25 Euros or less. Two people (I dont count the pilot since he obviously wanted it that way) dead to save 25 Euros. I can't believe it.

Indeed, for example EuroFPL was until very recently actually completely free, and in fact for pure filing still is. I always use it...although I had to learn that myself obviously doing my IR in the US taught me nothing about how to actually go about flying IFR in Europe.

Reading the report though it seems that awareness of the terrain simply broke down, he asked for the IFR clearance, and apparently crashed either while or shortly after the controller was on the phone trying to get it. The initial media reports suggested that he may have lost control, although there doesn't seem to be any mention of that in the report.

what next

29th Oct 2010, 22:00

Well, yes. But without oxygen he cut off his weather and obstacle avoidance options even before he departed.

When I'm unsure of my position and lose visual contact with the ground in potentially hazardous terrain, I couldn't care less about oxygen or not. I can easily survive 30 minutes at FL160 without oxygen but not even one millisecond inside solid granite.

However, I don't think he would have outclimbed the weather anyway, although with de-ice boots he might have been OK despite a very rough flight.

I have flown all over Europe in Senecas in all seasons and in every weather. Always without oxygen and (nearly) always below FL120. No problems whatsoever. Although I truly hate the Seneca, I never had to complain about its de-icing capabilites.

IO540

30th Oct 2010, 06:46

The initial media reports suggested that he may have lost control, although there doesn't seem to be any mention of that in the report.That's very true, but the radio log does not show this at all.

Always without oxygen and (nearly) always below FL120

It varies. You may be fine at FL120 but one instructor I flew with could not read the altimeter at FL120. After that he accepted that oxygen is a really good idea ;)

I don't think it would have been a good idea to file and fly EGKA-EGMD at FL120 without oxygen. Somebody is pretty likely to get a headache, at least.

Although I truly hate the Seneca, I never had to complain about its de-icing capabilites. What I wonder is to what extent his ability to make decisions was affected by flying through what appears to have been a TS, in a whiteout due to snow, which would have been even more exciting due to severe turbulence in the mountanious terrain which he was flying very close to, in the final minutes. Regardless of de-ice equipment, I bet it was like inside a tumble dryer.

Is there any indication why the report took so long to come out?

Contacttower

30th Oct 2010, 16:43

Also it is a safe bet he had no internet access before departure (no facilities in the hangar, for sure).

Very surprised to hear that at Shoreham he couldn't have had internet access, not that I'm particularly familiar with the place.

JW411

30th Oct 2010, 18:04

N2195B Piper Seneca met a sticky end in France.
N403HP Piper Malibu met a sticky end in Austria.

Both from my local airfield.

Is there a common denominator?

vanHorck

30th Oct 2010, 18:26

Ouch......

N reg
(over-)confident people
IFR weather
(over-)confident people
mountains
(over-)confident people

Katamarino

30th Oct 2010, 19:55

Not to mention "Your local airfield".

Of course, a sample of two is not an impressive statistical sample.

IO540

30th Oct 2010, 20:45

Very surprised to hear that at Shoreham he couldn't have had internet access, not that I'm particularly familiar with the place.

Unless he had a laptop with GPRS/3G, I can guarantee it. Even the cafe(s) haven't got public wifi.

Same with most UK airfields.

Not suggesting it would have made any difference in this case - even if somebody handed him printouts of everything available on the internet before he departed.

I would really like to know the reason for the 3+ year delay, but sadly to me the radio transcript of the pilot's calls says it all.... how he managed to accumulate all those hours, beats me.

N reg
(over-)confident people
IFR weather
(over-)confident people
mountains
(over-)confident people

AAAAARGH oh no not another thread on N-reg :ugh: :)

Still, I am N-reg too and if I do a CFIT then I authorise you all to dissect it mercilessly :)

N2195B Piper Seneca met a sticky end in France.
N403HP Piper Malibu met a sticky end in Austria.

Indeed, and both had very "interesting" angles. We did N403HP to death here at the time. Both completely pointless accidents.

dublinpilot

30th Oct 2010, 20:47

The 1M chart would have been the SIA one, which shows all the airspace OK. I have used these. (What the SIA chart does not show usefully is the vertical extent etc of military airspace and RAs etc). A 500k chart would have been either the IGN one (useless; no depiction above 5000ft or so) or the Cartabossy one (OK, but few non-French pilots know about it).

Crucially, what is missing from the 1M scale SIA charts is a depiction of terrain.

There is no terrain shown, and the pilot would have needed some other form of information on the terrain if he was to have any hope of avoiding it.

While the IGN charts might have been useless for airspace above 5000ft, at least they would show the terrain.

dp

IO540

30th Oct 2010, 21:13

I have just looked at the 2010 SIA 1:1M southern one and it shows some colour coding but importantly it does have plenty of spot elevations.

In the crash area it carries loads of hints about terrain.

He seems to have crashed near the PINED-RETNO airway where the 7680 spot elevation is clearly shown, and was on the 2007 chart too

Following a suspicion that N2195B might have been somehow relying on electronic terrain data which might have been defective, someone in PPL/IR did an analysis of a popular PC-based flight planning product and found massive systematic elevation errors in it - mostly in the unsafe direction. I have the PDF. However, there is no indication that this pilot was using that data, or indeed any other elevation information.

dublinpilot

30th Oct 2010, 21:46

I stand corrected!

I just checked, and you are indeed correct, it does show shading colour and spot heights.

I hope my memory improves by the time I reach your age! Being able to remember that at 92! :p :D

LH2

31st Oct 2010, 00:35

The initial media reports suggested that he may have lost control, although there doesn't seem to be any mention of that in the report.

Actually, the report does mention that he crashed while flying straight and level, and was probably using the autopilot at the time.

On an unrelated note, the report also mentions that although no weather info printouts for this flight were found in the wreckage, there were plenty of them from previous flights, suggesting (heavily paraphrased) that the pilot was in the habit of collecting that info pre-flight. Of course, whether he actually looked at it or knew how to interpret it is a different story.

What a previous post says about the controllers getting you into a safe direction and altitude as soon as they think (or you tell them!) that you might be getting in trouble is absolutely true, and I can vouch from personal experience. That is also reflected in the telephone transcript where the ATCO asks from the FISO if there is any urgency to the request, and tells him to climb the guy to any altitude while they sort out the clearance.

In the crash area it carries loads of hints about terrain

Well, you only need to know that you're in the rough vicinity of the Alps to realise that FL65 in IMC might be a rather bad idea. No need to even look at a chart.

RatherBeFlying

31st Oct 2010, 03:07

My surmise of the report:

The pilot planned a direct route along the VORs which were nicely placed for that -- and his highest obstacle would have been about 5600.

However he had to deviate around Paris Class A; once he turned the corner, the direct route from there crossed a 7600' obstacle.

When he got to Lyons, the cloud squeezed him down to 6500 which is perfectly fine in the Lyons TMA, but just barely outside to the South is this high N-S ridge that tops around 7500:uhoh:

It was all snow covered at the time; sandwiched between layers it would be hard to see even if the slope happened to be out of cloud at the time of impact.

He had the fuel to deviate down the Rhone valley and the report indicates that the weather was better there, especially because the upslope flow piled clouds against the mountains.

The Marseille VFR controller he was talking to did not have minimum safe altitude sectors marked on his radar -- and had to phone the Lyons controllers to get the Seneca into the system. In the short time the VFR controller was talking to the two IFR centres, the Seneca continued flying straight ahead.

The minimum sector altitude was FL120.

LH2

31st Oct 2010, 14:00

He had the fuel to deviate down the Rhone valley and the report indicates that the weather was better there, especially because the upslope flow piled clouds against the mountains..

Exactly, often only one side of the mountains is covered by cloud, and the river is as you mention frequently an option to escape out of cloudy weather in that area, but I would suggest you need to know the local weather and orography sufficiently well before flying there in marginal conditions (and even so. Plenty of sunny days to fly on so why risk it).

421C

31st Oct 2010, 17:48

An informal translation of the BEA report into English is available here:
PPL/IR Europe - N2195B CFIT Report (http://www.pplir.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=521)

IO540

31st Oct 2010, 18:32

Over 3000hours, including at least
800 IFR [presumably ‘Instrument time’]Does anybody know this pilot's history?

I have 1200hrs+ but only 136hrs "instrument time", plus 57hrs under a hood. When flying IFR/airways, one usually logs hardly any instrument time, because the ability to penetrate CAS freely facilitates VMC on top. The scenario where one would log a lot of instrument time would be if flying IFR OCAS.

How long did he hold the FAA IR?

I also can't square up 3k hrs in Europe with the radio calls.

A google doesn't turn up much... this one (http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=43866) among other similar ones.

IO540

31st Oct 2010, 21:48

This is the pilot (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/obituaries/article1421151.ece)
his website (http://www.awerbuch.com/)
This (http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/1188847.plane_crash_family_were_very_close/) suggests that he came from the USA.

Contacttower

31st Oct 2010, 22:30

It probably meant 800hrs in accordance with IFR as opposed to actually in cloud/under the hood.

Actually, the report does mention that he crashed while flying straight and level, and was probably using the autopilot at the time.

Well spotted, I missed that bit...

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 09:26

No doubt there is a simple explanation here but to me a number of things don't add up.

The pilot comes from the USA, where there is not much of the "UK VFR in IMC" culture. The FAA does prosecute obvious VFR into IMC departures (where there were witnesses, etc), but the FAA has a very achievable IR. In Europe, the IR is hard so most instrument-competent pilots readily fly VFR in IMC, and - terrain excepted - they get away with it because there is zero enforcement.

The FAA aircraft record (http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=2195B) suggests that a ferry tank was fitted in 1993, which the press reports seem to have misinterpreted as "long range tanks". It does not show whether the 1999kg Seneca STC was applied; a lack of this STC would be a very good reason for flying "VFR", too.

Yet this man was doing a no-holds-barred kind of VFR in IMC, despite having an FAA IR. IMHO he was VFR in IMC all the way from Shoreham to about Lyon. The explanation I got from a pilot who flew with him, as mentioned above, is that he could not work out Eurocontrol routings so flew VFR. This makes some sense as I get probably a hundred emails each year from non-Euro pilots who are totally stumped by this silly Euro airway route validation computer crap. So this might explain it but an IFR pilot should know better, and he did live here (Brighton) for some years.

It is a double tragedy if this man and his family died only a year before the first Eurocontrol route generator (http://www.autoplan.aero/) came out. Sadly, that program no longer works because the developer gave up (in 2009) the constant work, with Eurocontrol repeatedly trying to frustrate these tools (apparently because the well known executive flight support companies were putting pressure on Eurocontrol to protect their businesses) by modifying the validation site; first by changing it from HTML to Java and later by making it HTTPS.

The other thing is that his 3k hours, together with him being a fluent English speaker, does not make sense against his apparently poor radio manner, and his 800hrs "IFR" does not make sense against his lack of knowledge about IFR clearances. On the latter one, I would expect a "US educated" pilot to simply and directly ask for a popup clearance, and expect it to work (which is the case in some parts of Europe). OTOH how big a motive for not asking for the IFR clearance would the 1999kg factor be? The charge would have been small, from Lyon to Cannes. Maybe £20, but he may not have known that.

I suppose it is possible that he gave up on IFR when he came to live in the UK (2001?). That might explain his 800 "IFR" hours which IMHO is highly unlikely to be genuine instrument time - unless he was logging instrument time on VFR flights around Europe, which I certainly wouldn't do ;) The old logbook found in the wreckage does suggest that he simply stopped logging flights after 2001. Perhaps a good French speaker can work out whether this translation is 100% correct:

The logbook found in the wreckage did not contain flight records beyond August 2001 for flight hours.
However, there was a logbook record of a renewal of the private pilot license in July 2006i.e. whether the report indicates whether the logbook was full, or merely had no entries after 2001. It would be bizzare to not log flights after 2001 but log a BFR in the same logbook in 2006. (Sometimes a BFR signature is provided in the form of a sticker, however).

Anyway, why on earth would one carry an old logbook in the plane?

And an FAA IR holder would religiously log all flights, especially instrument approaches, to keep the 6/6 IR rolling currency. But if you have given up on IFR, or given up on flying IFR legally, then there is little point in logging anything. The BFR is mandatory anyway.

Is 3.5 years a normal delay for French reports?

As with N403HP, we have a pilot who is apparently brilliant in his day job and then does something really crazy when flying, and from speaking to other pilots who knew him, this was his normal flying mode. But to learn a lesson from what happened, one needs to know a bit more about the background, otherwise it is easy to say "this could never happen to me".

Jan Olieslagers

1st Nov 2010, 09:50

englishal

1st Nov 2010, 10:44

IO,

I see you have aged a bit since I last met you:

IO540

Join Date: Jun 2003
Location: England
Age: 92Posts: 11,289

:}:}

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 11:13

Yeah, no way to change my birthday in the profile :)

421C

1st Nov 2010, 11:46

I think there's no mystery here.

Fuel was not a factor on this flight - as the BEA said. He'd been 2.5hrs airborne at the impact and was most of the way to Cannes. We can forget all the long range tank speculation.

apparently poor radio manner
His radio transcripts read to me "averagely not-great radio work, a bit informal", but the weakness seemed more in the planning than in the actual RTF.
And an FAA IR holder would religiously log all flights
I think it is not uncommon for people not to. Especially at the 60yrs old, 3000hrs stage of a private flying career. You do your BFR and that's it. Maybe you record IAPs somewhere else.

Yet this man was doing a no-holds-barred kind of VFR in IMC
I don't quite read it that way. He seems to be making a consistent effort to remain VMC, although it is clear he didn't. I've done a lot of similar flights when I flew a Seneca from the south coast on trips to the Med. You depart in a bit of IMC from the UK, climb to ~FL100, and generally can stay genuine VFR all the way.

I also don't think the VFR FPL is a mystery. IFR is just a bit of hassle if you don't enjoy mastering some of the flight planning tricks. Plus you are more constrained on time and on Nice TMA not messing you around, which they do with Cannes IFR traffic at times. Then you add the extra cost (which, BTW, eurocontrol will charge for the full transit of a country, even if you pop-up just at the end) and a VFR plan in the circumstances is understandable (but wrong unless you were prepared to treat it as a true VFR flight - which must be hard with an IR in a deiced Seneca....).

we have a pilot who is apparently brilliant in his day job and then does something really crazy when flying, and from speaking to other pilots who knew him, this was his normal flying mode. But to learn a lesson from what happened, one needs to know a bit more about the background, otherwise it is easy to say "this could never happen to me"

I think you are misinterpreting the flight conduct as "really crazy". It may be you don't want to fly this way, but a lot of people don't want to use oxygen and find IFR a hassle. So they try a VFR trip at non-O2 levels with IFR as a back-up. The mistake this pilot made was the easy one of continuing just a bit to long into misleading visual cues and deteriorating VMC. I am sure he thought he had enough vis to avoid terrain and then at the moment he went IMC it was too late. It's very easy to transition in seconds from looking ahead thinking "not great but I can see that I am not going to hit anything" to zero vis. I think this could happen to me, you or anyone undertaking a VFR flight near terrain with deteriorating weather. The lesson is not to wait for "convincingly imminent IMC" or even "temporary IMC" but to trigger a turn back or transition to IFR as soon as you slip below the threshold of assured visual terrain separation.

brgds
421C

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 12:41

a lot of people don't want to use oxygen and find IFR a hassle. So they try a VFR trip at non-O2 levels with IFR as a back-up. That is completely fine but one can't do it in this kind of crap weather.

Anybody taking even a half look at the weather data on that day, and thinking it could be done VFR, must have though it was Xmas. (That, however, is not an unusual factor in AAIB reports).

And one needs to keep ahead of the game for potentially requesting an IFR clearance - which one is prob99 not going to get in the UK, anyway, short of declaring a Mayday.

The mistake this pilot made was the easy one of continuing just a bit to long into misleading visual cues and deteriorating VMC.I disagree there; he pretty clearly departed straight into IMC and almost certainly sat in IMC for a few hundred miles. I am not criticising that (well, it is illegal VFR but let the pilot without illegal VFR cast the first ILS (http://www.topical-bible-studies.org/10-0001.htm) ;) ) but I mention it as an indicator of wider issues with the planning and conduct of the flight.

Maybe you record IAPs somewhere else.I would find that highly odd.

I know of one pilot who runs a separate logbook for RHS jet time logged as SIC without a type rating, which one would do because one would not want the UK CAA to see those hours, but for a straight private pilot this doesn't make any sense to me. I am just 7 years younger than this pilot.

Also if he had any plans to elevate the flight to IFR, he would have been looking after the legality of him flying IFR, which means logging the 6/6 approaches. A VFR to IFR transition under duress is going to draw attention...

soaringhigh650

1st Nov 2010, 12:56

The incident show how important it is to be aware of the MSA and to get an IFR clearance before entering IMC.

mm_flynn

1st Nov 2010, 13:13

I think this could happen to me, you or anyone undertaking a VFR flight near terrain with deteriorating weather. The lesson is not to wait for "convincingly imminent IMC" or even "temporary IMC" but to trigger a turn back or transition to IFR as soon as you slip below the threshold of assured visual terrain separation.

I wonder if being based in the South of England would be a factor. I am a bit of a chicken, but do operate in the UK VFR/IFR in poor vis going into fields without instrument approaches. At 800 feet above flat terrain with nothing more than 200 ft tall anywhere near you, loosing visual contact is no big deal as you just climb a little and you are back to solid IFR (sort of like missing a circling approach). But in the Alps?! I would choose to be IFR just on general principles (but then again have spend a lot of time coming to grips with routing!).

Also if he had any plans to elevate the flight to IFR, he would have been looking after the legality of him flying IFR, which means logging the 6/6 approaches. A VFR to IFR transition under duress is going to draw attention...
Which may have been part of the problem, if he didn't normally file, he might well not have been looking after the legality and he might have been very reluctant to draw attention through a plan filed in this situation. If he did normally file, I would have expect him to just go IFR and let the boots do their stuff if necessary.

421C

1st Nov 2010, 13:15

and almost certainly sat in IMC for a few hundred miles.

I disagree. See the diagram in Annex 4 of the BEA report. I stand by my opinion, on this basis, that "the mistake this pilot made was the easy one of continuing just a bit to long into misleading visual cues and deteriorating VMC."

Even if he was in IMC over northern France, that is irrelevant, because he was at FL100 with no terrain conflict. The unknown is why he crashed hundreds of miles later at FL65 near terrain extending above FL75. I believe it more likely the scenario and explanation is deteriorating and deceptive VMC into IMC and that he wasn't at IFR MSA because he was hoping (too long) to maintain visual terrain seperation.

I would find that highly odd
It would be. My point is it is the logbook thing is neither mysterious nor relevant IMHO. A lot of guys stop logging, especially I would guess as a PPL of 60 with 3000hrs. He would be in breach of the rules on IFR currency without a log record, but people do that kind of thing.
brgds
421C

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 14:02

Which may have been part of the problem, if he didn't normally file, he might well not have been looking after the legality and he might have been very reluctant to draw attention through a plan filed in this situation. If he did normally file, I would have expect him to just go IFR and let the boots do their stuff if necessary.Yes; probably 2 issues there.

One is that not having ever formally requested an IFR clearance (his words work around the topic in a curious way) he could not be had for anything illegal, following a landing.

He may have been reckless but he wasn't stupid and not having logged anything since 2001 suggests he had given up on IFR completely. So the last thing he would have wanted to do is to formally request an IFR clearance.

The other is that without oxygen (I have it from his occassional co-pilot that no o2 was carried) he was a bit limited on the climb. My guess is that he would have been reluctant to even do FL120; the MEA if going IFR. Most non-o2 pilots I know don't like flying at FL120, which I fully understand.

A lot of guys stop logging, especially I would guess as a PPL of 60 with 3000hrs. He would be in breach of the rules on IFR currency without a log record, but people do that kind of thing.

I agree that is common among VFR-only Bembridge-run old-timers but it is really dumb if you want to maintain any pretence of IFR capability, especially on N-reg where you become illegal after 6 months...

Fuji Abound

1st Nov 2010, 14:44

An interesting report.

The radio log is revealing. It would suggest the pilot was VFR (over the top) from very early on in the flight and maintained VFR for a long way.

I dont see the radio log as all that unusual. The log has the style about it of an old timer who is "relaxed" and "informal" with his radio work - you hear plenty of this in the States, although at times it does become a little too informal. It fits someone who has spent more hours the other side of the Pond.

There doesnt seem to been any evidence the pilot encountered any real issues with the weather. The calls are relaxed right up to just before the accident.

I get the impression he was pretty comfortable IMC or VMC although maybe slightly keener to stay on top if he could than you might expect.

I also get the impression he was trying his luck with French ATC hoping he could negotiate a route with them rather than necessarily understanding what might or might not be granted before the flight. How many of us have done that before!

I think he probably could make it up as he went along. By that I mean he had the capacity and knowledge to prepare a diversion and work things out in flight however on this occasion for some reason he made a disasterous mistake - what triggered the mistake I doubt we will ever know. Perhaps he was distracted by the weather or some other issue or perhaps he "just" overlooked to check his MSA, misread this form the chart or thought although he was below the MSA he was not in the vicinity of the high point, sadly all too easily done.

If anything I find it surprising he elected to fly through a front over the mountains when he could have stayed behind the front and the more so to put himself in IMC (I appreciate he had no other option having elected that route) so as to gvie himself no idea of what lay in those clouds (and I dont just mean the mountains) but whether turbulence, icing or something else was a factor is impossible to speculate.

All in all I think he was too relaxed with his planning, but I think ultimately if only he had questioned his decision to accept a flight over the mountains in conditions in which he should have known it would be very unwise to skud run or risk IMC he would not have had the accident.

I recall a good friend, instructor and commercial piloting telling me reasonably early on in his a career albiet already high on time returning to base at night in reasonably poor weather, he elected a descent over the sea (which he had done many times before) to find himself saving the aircraft a couple of hundred feet above the water. In the aftermath he realised he was exhausted after a long days flying, had misread the altimeter and very nearly killed himself. It would have been all too easy for the report to conclude he was another IMC into terrain vectim which he nearly was but the reason had little to do with inexperience or inability, but a far simpler human condition. He was exhausted, his concentration was impaired all for which he nearly paid dearly.

In short, FWIW, I dont get the impression that this chap was even close to a mile out of his depth, I do get the impression he was too relaxed with planning and record keeping, but I am not convinced that contributed to the accident on this occasion, rather I would hazard that for some reason he flew a leg of the flight in a way that he should have known gave him no margin for error - that has always got to be a pretty risky way to conduct any flight.

421C

1st Nov 2010, 14:59

I think his IFR legality may be a bit of a distraction. If he did not log his IFR currency then he was in breach of 61.57. But who knows? Either way, he certainly attempted a VFR flight, and may have done so for all sorts of legitimate reasons.

20mins before the accident he clearly raised the possibility of changing to IFR with Lyon Control (my underline): "Roger, we’d like to have a gradual descent down to maybe 7point5 or 6point5 with VMC conditions, I think we can do it VFR but if not we might be best IFR"

and then just before the impact with Marseille "Yes could you make us IFR for the rest of the descent down to DGN or whatever"
If he was desperate to avoid IFR, he could have turned back, or asked for advice on VFR conditions via an alternative routing. Equally, the radio transcripts are consistent with someone who just preferred to avoid IFR - it could have been the Eurocontrol cost, it could have been hesitancy about the ATC process to get a pop-up IFR clearance (having struggled with VFR near the Paris TMA), it could have been the misconception that he could continue VMC or it could have been that he was not current. But it is clear he was willing to transition to IFR when he had to. The interesting thing IMHO is not why he preffered to attempt to stay VFR, but the mis-cues that led him to think he could delay the transition to IFR.

People will attempt marginal VMC in all sorts of circumstances. The lesson here is about the caution, planning and contingencies needed. In particular that the combination of terrain and "marginal VMC" is insiduous. The lesson for me is to trigger "Plan B" not at the "ok, I'm in IMC now" threshold but at the "ok, looking ahead, I can not be sure I will consistently maintain good VMC terrain separation" threshold.

421C

1st Nov 2010, 15:01

Good lord Fuji. I used to find myself disagreeing with eveything you wrote and recently I find the opposite! I thought your post was spot on, and it is exactly how the report and transcripts resonated for me.

Justiciar

1st Nov 2010, 16:59

Le carnet de vol retrouvé dans l’épave n’était renseigné que jusqu'au mois d’août de l’année 2001 pour les heures de vol. Il comportait cependant la mention du renouvellement de la licence de pilote privé effectuée en juillet 2006.

<my very direct translation>
The logbook found in the wreckage had only been referred up till August 2001 for flight hours. Nevertheless, it mentioned a renewal of the PPL in July 2006.
</translation>

"renseigné" in this context means "filled-in".

What I do not understand is how he could have had a BFR in July 2006 without the examiner/instructor looking at his log book. Is there not a currency requirement under FAR? Is there not a similar requirement to log every flight and keep your log book up to date?

This is not helpful to those fighting a rearguard action for N reg in Europe (yes I know it could have equally happened with a JAA licence, but ....).

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 17:09

There is no currency requirement for the basic FAA PPL. You have to pass the BFR (with an FAA CFI) every 2 years. Unlike the JAA version, it is possible to fail this test.

It is possible to get the BFR pass as a "logbook insert" i.e. a piece of paper or a sticker, so you just stick it in your logbook at a later date. I got my complex signoff on a sticker, back in 2005.

The IR is different. You have to either log 6 approaches in the last 6 months (which has to be logged*), or have an IPC (with an FAA CFII; same comments as for the BFR apply i.e. it can be delivered on an insert).

* But nobody says you have to keep everything in one logbook, or indeed any logbook. It would be legal to write the stuff on fag packets. Whether it would be smart to log the last 6 approaches on a fag packet and then fly an N-reg in France, is another matter ;)

BTW I have no idea if the FAA requires logging of flights. I believe the ANO does require all flights to be logged - haven't we done that topic recently?

mm_flynn

1st Nov 2010, 18:57

Is there not a similar requirement to log every flight and keep your log book up to date?
For private pilots I believe only 61.51 applies (titled helpfully Pilot Logbooks) and this details what you must record to document recent experience or for credit towards training requirements. So no, there is not the same requirement that exists in the UK to log each flight.

Fuji Abound

1st Nov 2010, 22:02

Is this a character assassination?

It is debatable whether or not there may have been regulatory deficiencies in the conduct of this flight; but I don’t think we can arrive at a verdict based on the information we have.

A pilot’s lack of attention to detail, might suggest, that the pilot had a similar attitude to his flying. In my experience this can be true. However I find very little evidence of this being the case in this inst.

No.

I think it detracts from the debate and debases us as fellow pilots to imply this tragedy arose from regulatory deficiencies.

Sorry guys but I really don’t see the pilot did that much “wrong”, at least for the vast majority of the flight.

I think he departed in conditions with which he was comfortable and probably experienced. I think he expected to arrive in VMC and conduct the flight VFR over the top; I think that is what he did. I think he had some issues with his route, but I think he confidently negotiated a route that would work for him and AT, and it would appear he accurately navigate this route. I think he seemed confident with his requests and knew what he was seeking to achieve. I suspect, had the pilot been shaking after a dodgy departure into IMC, and then struggled to maintain in the cruise also in IMC while receiving a grilling about his route by AT, the pilot would have fallen to pieces – I have seen this happen on more than one occasion. Again, no, the pilot did none of these things – he maintained his cool.

So, I feel strongly enough to say again NO.

These issues about departures into IMC, and the other licensing aspects are asides, I don’t believe they had anything to do with the cause of the accident and I think we should be careful that we don’t assassinate this poor man’s character unless we are certain of our grounds for doing so.

The debate is good, proper and healthy in my view, for all the reasons debated in the past, but only if we focus on the reasons for the accident and the lessons to be taken. I think the other asides are best left to another thread.

IO540

1st Nov 2010, 23:22

You cannot fail a FR in so far as the Instructor makes no mention in the logbook of a 'Failure'.
He/She simply does not sign the Logbook that a Flight Review as having been undertaken satisfactorily.and then you can no longer fly, so de facto you have "failed" the BFR.

Is this a character assassination?

I don't think so, because not logging 6 years' worth of flights is just too bizzare, for an IFR pilot in particular.

It may not be relevant to the accident, but also it might be. If say he did not have a valid IR, that would be a major disincentive to do this flight in the way most people with an IR would expect to do it.

Justiciar

2nd Nov 2010, 09:28

So no, there is not the same requirement that exists in the UK to log each flight.

I find that rather strange. Does any one know what the ICAO requirements are? I thought that keeping an accurate and up to date log of your flights was something universal and fundamental. Why would you not do it?

I have sped read the "Rapport" from the BEA. It is surprising that little mention is made of the fact that there were no hours recorded after 2001 and indeed some indication that he may not have been legal until the BFR in 2006. In fact, the Rapport is a bit vague on exactly what the 2006 endorsement was. Perhaps they didn't fully understand the FAA system and what is required. Why does the FAA database whow no update for much longer?

Furthermore, there was no recording of instrument approaches to keep his FAA IR valid. Why would you not do this, especially flying over part of the alps in winter? Do you not owe this to your family even if you don't to yourself?

The radio traffic with Paris Information seems to indicate that he had very little understanding of the level restrictions VFR around the Paris TMA, which seems to me to point to poor preparation for a vital section of the flight. Is this a man who had flown for too long with no one assessing his competence?

mm_flynn

2nd Nov 2010, 14:01

The more I have read and re-read the report and considered 421, fuji and other's comments, I have moved from the 'that’s bizarre' to 'I can sort of see how it happened'.

The relatively easier to see points are

Pilot has developed practice in UK IMC style flight (no flight plan required, little hassle, gets the job done)
Pilot flies a pretty capable aircraft, has an IR, but finds the hassle factor of getting valid routes too much trouble, so starts to apply a 'IFR out side the system' style to his European flights. Which if they are like mine, are 95% VMC on top or only 'require' a late IFR clearance from the approach controller or dodging not quite VFR through some broken clouds.
Pilot plans a 'reasonable' DCT route expecting to get on top of the first layer and then fly between layers for a VFR arrival
Looking at the charts and some imagery, I can easily imagine he had 3-4 miles vis 1500 feet above the peaks running just under the clouds, resulting in the peak in question (being snow covered and say 5 miles away) being totally invisible, so when he lost contact with the surface he had a mental picture of mountains below him, not realising that there was one just out of visibility 2 minutes in front of him.

Where I still struggle is

With the available forecast why route ROA DGN CNM rather than ROA MTL CNM. This would have improved the weather and terrain options at the cost of 3 miles (not checked detailed airspace, but it does broadly follow the airway links). I just don't see how you can read that forecast as conducive to VFR flight in the mountains ?
Why change plan at NEV and go GPS DCT to CNM, putting oneself further into the weather and terrain 2000 feet higher, rather than stay with the preplanned route?

mm_flynn

2nd Nov 2010, 14:07

I find that rather strange... [Sic re logging time]Why?
You are not being paid for the time, there are no duty or break times to consider, you are not seeking to use the time for training credits, total time credits, to satisfy any regulatory or currency requirement. What purpose does logging in this case achieve (other than the obvious personal record of experience and compliance with the UK ANO)?

IO540

2nd Nov 2010, 15:18

Cheaper insurance?

I probably got a few hundred quid off by going over 1k hours.

FAA IR rolling currency?

Saves doing an IPC, which is a bit if hassle because you have to dig out an FAA CFII who either is a mate of yours, or does it for cash, or does it overtly and then you need to get the DfT permission. But, yeah, if you have chucked away the IR anyway and fly everywhere "VFR", then this is irrelevant.

I also think that flying under the cloudbase, towards rising terrain, and allowing oneself to enter IMC, is bonkers, and not many people with 3k hours would have done that. If OTOH he was in IMC for some time already then it is much easier to believe because then it takes just a nav error.

Fuji Abound

2nd Nov 2010, 16:10

I also think that flying under the cloudbase, towards rising terrain, and allowing oneself to enter IMC, is bonkers, and not many people with 3k hours would have done that. If OTOH he was in IMC for some time already then it is much easier to believe because then it takes just a nav error.

Of course, but who hasnt scud run at some time?

The answer may be that simple.

He was under the base, it looked ok, he could see the mountains, he had looked at the chart and there was only one peek above his level to worry about. The visibility got worse, he was in and out of patches of cloud but it looked better up ahead. He thought he could make it without a climb. If you have been in the mountains which I know you have things can change very quickly and go from reasonable VFR to complete white out even without getting in the clouds.

As we know that is the trouble with scud running - when and how do you throw it away, when and how are you sitting with that tummy clenching feeling as you make the transition and cant relax until you are at the MSA.

Why do it? Well that is another question. In this case others have already made some suggestions which dont seem unreasonable even if that would not have been the choice of others. Of course sometimes it is only after the event that the decision didnt look so smart.

There was a good article in Flying recently whcih I think is relevant to the human condition and this type of accident. I cant recall the aircraft jet type but it was crewed by two highly experienced commercial pilots. They were somewhere out in the flat lands and got themselves hemmed in by some really bad weather. As luck would have it one of them spotted an airport. They were so anxious to land they misidentified the airport and / or misidentified the length of the runway, the fact the runway was wet and the direction of the wind. You would think they were a pair of amateurs in that short time they managed to get so many things wrong - but their history suggested otherwise. Worse still even the multi crew enviroment did not save them. I seem to recall they and their four passengers all died when the aircraft ran off the end of the runway on which it would never have stopped even if they had spotted the tail wind and landed the other way.

I recall having a fuel cap come off once in flight. To my chagrin I was so anxious to land and so convinced I knew where I was I misidentified the airport despite having a moving map GPS - thank goodness it is the only time I have done that.

In short the point I am seeking to make is it might just have been a case of the pilot believing he could make it safely over the top beneath the base in conditions that were more than condusive, to find that events very quickly over took the flight. Perhaps he though about climbing into IMC but was wary of the lumps of bumps he thought he would encounter, the ice and sorting out a clearance with AT (remember they had already given him an ear bashing).

If you try this strategy it is so easy to be drawn into throwing it away a little later than you should and that is all it takes.

Dont misunderstand me the pilot made mistakes but simply because one IFR pilot would have gone the whole way airways with oxygen doesnt mean that another was incorrect to assess he could make it non airways / non oxygen.

In short I accept there were some unusual record keeping issues but I still dont think there is evidence that the whole flight was conducted in the manner of a pilot hopelessly out of currency, short of the necessary skills and with some suspicious agenda.

We have all read reports where you come away thinking the pilot was so far out of his depth it would have been more surprising if the accident hadnt happened - that is not the way I read this one.

IO540

2nd Nov 2010, 16:14

There was a good article in Flying recently whcih I think is relevant to the human condition and this type of accident. I cant recall the aircraft jet type but it was crewed by two highly experienced commercial pilots. They were somewhere out in the flat lands and got themselves hemmed in by some really bad weather. As luck would have it one of them spotted an airport. They were so anxious to land they misidentified the airport and / or misidentified the length of the runway, the fact the runway was wet and the direction of the wind. You would think they were a pair of amateurs in that short time they managed to get so many things wrong - but their history suggested otherwise. Worse still even the multi crew enviroment did not save them. I seem to recall they and their four passengers all died when the aircraft ran off the end of the runway on which it would never have stopped even if they had spotted the tail wind and landed the other way.

I read about that accident. From the transcript, the two pilots were certified cowboys. They were willing to land on a runway whose size was unknown, at an unknown airport which was not in their airport database so they had no data on it.

Justiciar

2nd Nov 2010, 16:29

Cheaper insurance?

That immediately occured to me too. I think every insurance renewal I have been asked to confirm hours, which I could not do if I had kept no log of my hours. The same was asked when I recently joined a new group, both for insurance and their own requirements. Had the pilot survived but his passengers died then he might well have needed an accurate log book to demonstrate that he was not guilty of homicide by gross negligence (some of our continental cousins are far more ready to prosecute deaths caused by negligence) by flying outside of his capabilities and experience. I am sure that there are other good reasons for having an up to date log book.

Fuji Abound

2nd Nov 2010, 17:40

From the transcript, the two pilots were certified cowboys.

Did you read the analysis in Flying?

It is interesting, at what point does a pilot become a "cowboy"?

How do we define in one accident that the cause was because the pilot behaved as a cowboy, which implies at least to me anyway, something different from a pilot that is otherwise sound but scr*ws up?

IO540

2nd Nov 2010, 17:55

Notwithstanding my occassionally flippant terminology :) I accept that there will never be a generally acceptable definition of a "cowboy".

But I think some things should come pretty close to a consensus. Like trying to land a jet on an unknown runway, when it isn't a fuel or similar emergency.

bookworm

2nd Nov 2010, 18:29

I have sped read the "Rapport" from the BEA. It is surprising that little mention is made of the fact that there were no hours recorded after 2001 and indeed some indication that he may not have been legal until the BFR in 2006. In fact, the Rapport is a bit vague on exactly what the 2006 endorsement was.

I think you missed this bit:

L’examen des documents de maintenance de l’avion a permis d’établir que les moteurs ont été changés au mois d’août 2001. Le pilote étant le seul utilisateur de l’avion, le suivi des heures de fonctionnement des moteurs permet d’estimer les heures de vols réalisées par le pilote entre août 2001 et octobre 2006, date de la dernière maintenance, soit environ 464 heures de vol.

There's no doubt that he had done plenty of flying between 2001 and 2006.

Perhaps, since 2001 he had been logging his hours electronically, as I do. Before the BFR, he printed them out and showed them to the instructor, who then endorsed the only permanent record the pilot had, the old log book?

Justiciar

3rd Nov 2010, 08:03

There's no doubt that he had done plenty of flying between 2001 and 2006.

Perhaps, since 2001 he had been logging his hours electronically, as I do. Before the BFR, he printed them out and showed them to the instructor, who then endorsed the only permanent record the pilot had, the old log book?

Oui, je l'ai lu, je vous asssure!

I did not doubt that he had flown a lot of hours; my query is whether he had a BFR in 2004, 2002, 2000 etc. He certainly didn't log the required approaches for his IR to remain current meaning that his request to switch to IFR was unlawful by both US and French regulations.

Shorrick Mk2

3rd Nov 2010, 11:19

A pilot’s lack of attention to detail, might suggest, that the pilot had a similar attitude to his flying. In my experience this can be true. However I find very little evidence of this being the case in this inst.

Knowing the characteristics of French airspace, planning a VFR flight in poor weather consisting of straight lines from VOR to VOR without consideration to what airspace one is bound to cross doesn't strike me as particularly attentive I have to say. Paris TMA, military zones, interdiction zones... there are plenty of areas that you *really* don't want to bust in France.

IO540

3rd Nov 2010, 11:33

That depends on where you go.

France has the unusual benefit (relative to most/all of Europe) that if you plan your route in the VOR-VOR tracks depicted on the 1:1M SIA chart (often called "airways" by UK pilots), then you avoid most/all of the military and other restricted airspace.

These routes are in Class E and are thus fine for VFR, and are also fine for IFR flights filed via Eurocontrol as usual. Their bases are usually FL065 and you can fly VFR up to FL105; above that you are into Class D and France does not permit VFR up there (anymore). But the routes are still the same, all the way to the FL190 top of the Lower Airways.

These routes are the best way to fly long distances in France, VFR or IFR.

Obviously the FL065 base is a problem for pilots who like to fly low, or who want to fly below the cloudbase. They tend to be good for VMC on top (VFR or IFR).

For example, Shoreham to Cannes you would fly

EGKA SITET A34 KOVAK H20 DOMOD A3 NEV R31 MTL A3 PERUS AGEVU LFMD
FL090

This route is 568nm against 527nm GC but you could never fly the GC route anyway, due to Paris airspace which is closed below FL200 even for IFR. You could cut a few corners off it here and there but the difference would be of the order of 1% off the distance flown.

You can generate the above route by looking at the SIA chart for a minute or two, or with Flitestar in seconds by selecting the "airway" option in the routepack wizard.

It seems to me that this pilot was doing this kind of thing, indeed using the SIA chart, but was trying to hack it as he went along and eventually lost the plot completely.

Once you get off these routes, you are into all the military airspace / nuclear power station RA crap. The mil airspace is usually inactive at weekends but you have to make various radio calls to verify each piece and it is hardly worth the hassle.

The flip side of all this is that if you want to fly "genuine VFR" below the cloudbase, you usually cannot take advantage of these routes (simply because there is a lot of mil stuff underneath them, possibly SFC-FL055) and then flying in France does get a bit messy, planning-wise... This is why an IR is simply wonderful for long distances in France... which brings us back to why this pilot did not take advantage.

I reckon Justiciar may well be onto something i.e. his IR was not valid. Even if he was logging electronically since 2001, it would not make sense to carry such an old logbook because anybody who looks at it is 100% bound to ask the obvious question! I know of several people who log electronically but they periodically print off the sheets and stick them into a folder.

And with the FAA IR system you do have the real issue of needing to prove your IR 6/6 rolling currency, which needs to be done with logged flights. To not log flights and go for the IPC option instead makes a mockery of any time/money saved by logging electronically.

I reckon the French report is very deficient on this aspect of it. It could well be that it was knocked up in a hurry, following pressure from the insurer, after nobody doing anything on it, perhaps because they were waiting for some 3rd parties to confirm some details.

Fuji Abound

3rd Nov 2010, 20:05

I am still trying to understand this obsession with this chaps licence.

I had an "accident" with my car when it hit one of the countless potholes (except it was a ridge rather than a pothole) last year. It caused a lot of damage but more to the point it could well have killed a motor biker.

Amoung other things the Council wanted to know if I was insured and then whether the car had an MOT. It had both, but doubtless they would have tried to deny the claim had it not. In fact I gather they would have failed.

However that is not the point. The accident was unconnected with whether or not the car was insured or had an MOT. Interestingly they did not ask if I had a licence (which I do)!

I dont see this accident was directly connected with this chaps licence.

It is clear he departed into IMC so he was unconcerned about flying on instruments (whatever priviliges his licence gave) and he clearly could not guarantee a VFR arrival. In the radio transcript he seemed pretty unconcerned about going IMC, and some think part of the flight was in IMC.

He thought he could complete the flight in VMC, and thought wrong at a critical point.

I am not sure why we think we should read more into it?

Fuji Abound

3rd Nov 2010, 20:47

SoCal App

For the sake of a point of order I didnt mean me killing a motor cyclist but the bump if they had hit it!

As to the accident in question I agree but so much is based on speculation. We dont know what his licence status was, presumably we dont know if he had a JAR licence and / or an IMC rating, we dont know if he was PIC illegal and we dont know if any of these issues may have dictated the conduct of the flight (although it seems to me based on the information we have unlikely).

As to whether he did anything crazy I am not convinced. Is every pilot that gets caught out scud running crazy? Perhaps, but sometimes in the heat of the moment we make a crazy decision, that doesnt make us crazy. What else he did that was crazy, I know nothing about so I cant comment.

There are elements that are "odd", but I am simply saying that I think we should be careful not too jump conclusions without any evidence because as soon as you set off down that road we become no better than the Daily Mash reporters.