ADF Deployability of Armoured Elements [Archive]

Bushranger 71

25th Oct 2010, 22:22

Conceptually, the ADF may need to deploy company or battalion group sized elements regionally within the neighbouring wet tropics archipelago environs. Wherever deployed, such forces should have adequate integral mobile fire support expeditiously lodged as close as practicable to prospective scenes of action, which means air insertion and sustainment.

Existing and planned air resources employable for this purpose are 4 x C-17, 12 x C130J, 12 x C130H, 6 x CH-47D (to be replaced by 7 x CH-47F). Under the now outsourced system of aircraft maintenance, it is realistic to assume only 50 percent of these assets will be continuously on-line. Not all aircrew conversion training/currency requirements can be achieved in flight simulators and this need is fundamental to maintain adequate manning otherwise the system would grind to a halt; so some of the on-line availability must be dedicated to this purpose but perhaps intermittently. And; allowance must be made for support of military exercises and training for the same reason.

An optimistic assumption is that these air mobility assets would be continuously available to support operations: 2 x C-17, 6 x C130J, 6 x C-130H, 4 x CH-47F with the Chinooks providing only in theatre mobility.

For the small ADF, these principles of war should be paramount: flexibility, versatility, economy of effort so the nature of integral fire support must be tailored to what can be cost-effectively deployed and sustained. Deployment of towed artillery would also require towing vehicles whereas light armoured vehicles equipped with cannon and mortar ('poor man's artillery') would arguably be more flexible in the wet tropics.

Australian Army primary armour assets are Abrams tanks, ASLAV, enhanced stretched M113. For simplicity, let's assume empty weights approximate 67, 15 and 15 tonnes respectively. ASLAV has cannon and some M113 will have mortars, but neither as yet have dual fire support capabilities. Some physical characteristics for these vehicles are available via Wikipedia and see also this link: Australia’s M113 APC Family Upgrades (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Australias-M113-APC-Family-Upgrades-05133/)

A C-17 can carry 1 x Abrams or 4 x ASLAV/M113 and a C-130 2 x ASLAV/M113. Characteristics for these heavy lifters are also found in Wikipedia.

While landing heavy C-17 and C-130 on unsealed airstrips is possible, there are limitations including bogging potential, foreign object damage to engines/propellors, manoeuvring constraints on small aprons. The C-130 would be less restricted than the C-17, but the Hercs could not necessarily go into all airfields in say PNG where Caribou once went. Nevertheless, some capability exists to deploy armour nearer to prospective scenes of action than an airhead.

If main battle tanks are employed anywhere, large transporter/recovery vehicles must also be deployed (see this link: Heavy Equipment Transport System - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_Equipment_Transport_System)), but not mandatory for lighter armour which is more mobile and easier recovered. Strength of pavement, roads, bridges also constrain movement of heavy armour and whether large transporter/recovery vehicles would be able to function off roads in the wet tropics is very dubious.

Deployment of armour by sea is not a quick reaction option and presently constrained by availability and strength of wharves and cranes. The LPDs when (if?) they come into service may offset some present limitations, but then Abrams tanks would have to be ferried from a destination port to a scene of action if not close to a coastline, provided roads exist. The escort requirements for an LPD carrying substantial equipment and personnel assets is also another economy of effort consideration.

In theatre heavy lift would require Chinook deployment and it seems unlikely that more than 2 could be operationally deployed, even when the CH-47F comes into service; but one Chinook properly utilized can do a lot of work. Armour guzzles fuel that is generally externally loaded by Chinooks in big rubber 'donut' bladders, although M113 were often used to carry fuel for their own elements in Vietnam.

The whole Army concept of operations really comes into question as employment of main battle tanks seems a core principle. Present Air Force mobility resources would enable quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles closer to prospective scenes of action to provide integral mobile fire support. But are C-17, C-130, CH-47 resources adequate to cope with multiple ADF deployments and contingencies that might emerge at short notice?

Like This - Do That

26th Oct 2010, 00:13

Present Air Force mobility resources would enable quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles closer to prospective scenes of action to provide integral mobile fire support. But are C-17, C-130, CH-47 resources adequate to cope with multiple ADF deployments and contingencies that might emerge at short notice?

Short answer is a qualified "no". In fact I would even argue that the "quick reaction deployment of light armoured vehicles" you mention would be unachievable by air with the ADF's current assets.

The current ADF fleet of FW & RW transport / lift aircraft are insufficient to provide anything like the lift required to pick up a battlegroup that requires much armour (and remember that the CT or BG is not a fixed entity, but tailored to task). I think we're down to 8 'H-model' Hercs, and may be getting another 2 'J-models'. But even so, with all the other things that the ADF would be having to do with its lift fleet ..... not much scope for provision of dedicated lift to armoured vehicles.

They'll have to go by sea. No drama getting them to the SPOE, not from SPOD into the battle. The ASLAV can move itself, as can Bushies to and from SPOD or APOD. The Army has sufficient MAN HHTs to move a modest number of M1s & M88s; S Liners and Macks and heavy plant trailers to move M113s; TTFs and BLFTs to carry fuel; and other vehicles for the B Ech that drags itself along with the elements that would make up an 'armour-heavy' BG.

We're hamstrung to a degree by a number of factors: penny pinching by successive governments; lack of 'purple' awareness / inter-service distrust; historical over-reliance on powerful allies (and the assumption that they'll come to the rescue); and an Army that often seems to be run as an RAInf benefit scheme.

I'll stew in my bitterness for a while, have a grumble to the dog about the CA's idiotic beret ban, have a cup of tea and revisit this thread later.

Trojan1981

26th Oct 2010, 02:40

Right on Like This - Do That. A very well informed post. I have very little to say that you have not already said. Bushranger, we shouldn't go into availablity of assets too much, but suffice to say that even your reduced figures for airlift availlability are optimistic. And remember, it's not just about the initial deployment of assets, but also the sustainment of assets; which over time can prove much more difficult. Why do you think there is no Hornet Squadron deployed? Supply chains for modern equipment are much longer and more complex than in the past.

Lost Again..

26th Oct 2010, 08:38

Availability is a touchy subject. To say the ALG crews and maintenance is stretched is an understatement.

You can see from the public road near Richmond that there are 4 mothballed C130H on the flightline. Deep storage if you want the official term however with no engines these frames won't be up and running any time soon.

Carriage of a single ASLAV by Herc is iffy. Not with external armour as it doesn't fit. The weight is an issue too as vehicle weighs more than the ramp hinge limit allows. We needed a waiver every time we lifted one.

Frazzled

26th Oct 2010, 08:54

Put forward a ASLAV in a c130 be less than iffy , let alone a bushmaster.

Stretched they are...............:ugh:

Bushranger 71

27th Oct 2010, 00:40

Hi Trojan 1981; I was in the transport ops side of the Air Force for a time and live near Williamtown so get feedback pretty often over beers.

Post #2 by LT-DT leads us toward issues I hoped might emerge and I think it is worth reviewing what has generated the worsening decline in Australia's military capacity.

4 plus decades back, the separate armed forces were properly under political control and military hardware acquisition projects were pretty well-managed within the respective service departments and mainly well-proven 'off-the-shelf' gear was usually speedily introduced to operational service – C-130, Caribou, Iroquois to name just a few.

About that time, the RAAF and RAN both had more capacity to support the Army which was able to grow to 9 infantry battalions and supporting arms were expanded enabled by conscription to sustain the Vietnam War commitment

Forward to the 1980s and the Australian armed forces had become a thinly-veiled unified force subjected to public service domination with progressive centralisation of functions, like supply, impeding operational responsiveness. Technical capacity of the military was eventually deliberately de-skilled by shedding long-standing apprentice training schemes with ultimate elimination of Engineering and Equipment Branches within the Air Force. Outsourcing of aircraft maintenance and multiple other functions became widespread, predictably lowering on-line availability of expensive assets because contractors function to commercial requirements and not the military need to sometimes increase maintenance effort to cope with necessitous flying effort.

The military was downscaled in some respects post-Vietnam but the civilian component of Defence has since grown prodigiously, particularly the DMO/DSTO bit from the 1990s onwards with these agencies now having significant influence in capabilities planning and procurement and an intimate relationship with the major arms corporations that now largely parent defence industry in Australia. Support of defence industry has now become the central plank of defence policy, not maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimization of in-service hardware (where cost-effective).

Both major political parties have endorsed compounding unaffordable defence expenditure toward a conceptual Force 2030 embracing an enlarged 'hardened and networked Army' – near 10 percent of federal government revenue will be outlayed on defence in 2010/11. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, which is patronised by Defence and some major arms manufacturers, largely drafted Defence White Paper 2009 around multiple dubious merit projects already in train and unrealistic military capabilities expansion.

Army cannot grow unless Navy and Air Force capabilities are commensurately expanded, particularly the airlift fleet, to enable timely deployments and sustainment of operations. If we have now got to the stage of mainly cannibalising ADF aircraft and other resources to sustain operations, then that can only lead to shrinking military capacities, particularly for quick reaction deployments. Manning of the military is also deficient and DWP2009 force growth expectations seem unachievable considering the apparent attitudes of Generation 'Y'.

'Defeat (of) armed attack upon Australia' is unrealistic as the continent is physically indefensible by military means. China has a strengthening economic stranglehold on Australia so invasion would be needless folly, apart from the mammoth military logistics issues involved. The best we might achieve (and afford) is deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and modest scale (battalion or company group) military interventions where assistance is requested by other nations. So; do we really need a larger Army equipped with main battle tanks?
...have a grumble to the dog about the CA's idiotic beret ban...LT-DT; Chief of Army forsaking the Armoured Corps beret is just appalling as that head-dress reflects hugely important fine tradition and esprit-de-corps. I guess if public nudity became acceptable, the Army might still all be made to wear slouch hats! Both Navy and Air Force used to have working dress that was quite presentable in public; but many now move around in scruffy looking spotted pyjamas. 'No Saluting' areas are signposted around RAAF Base Williamtown so some once respected standards and traditions seem to have got trampled in a politically correct ADF.

Ducksarse

27th Oct 2010, 05:21

You've obviously put a lot of thought into this, unfortunately I don't think anyone here is in a position to really help. Have you considered writing to your local member or maybe the Minister for Defence.

Bushranger 71

27th Oct 2010, 10:38

Hi DA; my wife often grizzles about me relentlessly assailing politicians, mainly the Cabinet, Shadow Cabinet and any others whom I think might ask probing questions; but it is good occupational therapy for an old bugger, although minimal acknowledgements generally and replies are usually very scarce.

I got involved in the political realm for a while post-Air Force and learned that pollies seldom react positively to isolated complaints; but they all seem to have trigger levels where the weight of correspondence on particular issues obliges them to do something. I thus feel it super-important for all who are concerned about the parlous state of the military in this country to be putting our elected representatives under pressure, otherwise nothing will change.

Adding something to the thread debate; our defence planners seem to be focused on trundling brigade size formations around the globe and armies understandably like to think in terms of big formations so multiple specialized fighting elements can become involved.

Over about 50 years, Australia gained comprehensive military experience in the regional tropical archipelago embracing the ability to quickly deploy and extract suitably structured force elements which might futuristically ideally include mobile integral fire support elements like M113 with cannon and mortar capabilities. Such vehicles were initally designed for C-130 airlift but other hardware being introduced into service is diminishing this cost-effective capability.

I am a fan of armoured cavalry considering its flexibility and versatility and it fits very well with Australia's realistic force deployment capacity at about battalion and company group level, without the encumbrance of heavy armour back-up support. Maybe 'tankies' like LT-DT might add some other dimensions to discussion.

Lonewolf_50

27th Oct 2010, 12:04

I noticed that with your last post, your age and post count match, which is sorta like shooting one's age in golf. :ok:

In re rapid deployment, I'd suggest that the last thing you want to put on that C-17 is the Abrams. You'll get a better fire support, and deployed package mix, by deploying the tracks with their fire support (and a variety of Command and Control and spares, I imagine) in a C-17 Sortie than a tank of that weight. The scenario you mention, which is island warfare in the Pacific, does not appear to be where the Abrams would be the best air payload. Suggest Abrams be follow on capability, seaborne. On the other hand, if the mission is an urban environment, Abrams might be a great idea, with one small problem: how many bridges in your expected Theater can withstand one? ( A non trivial problem for some US Army Op Plans when the MBT went from M-60 to M-1, and that was in Germany, where there are a lot of good bridges and bridge builders, and NATO common funds to build a few more). Does your deployment package include bridging assest (mobile bridging on tracked vehicles)? If not, on ground mobility of a variety of wheeled and tracked assets can be restricted in low infra operational missions.

Your concerns in re airstrips also ought to include MOG/Handling capacity, and refueling: do you bring bladders, or fly missions that keep "return fuel" on board to avoid exposure during the turn around?

Good post, though, on the problem of "rapid deployment" capability on a budget. Excellent food for thought.

TBM-Legend

27th Oct 2010, 21:47

In A/Stan the Dutch had self propelled 155 guns, the Canadians have Leopard tanks, etc....

Armour will not meet all situations obviously but are force multipliers in many areas.

Inspite of what the Govt says a couple of my Army friends who have served tell me that our "armoured" vehicles are sub-standard compared to some of the UK and US force vehicles. Also the lack of close air support is a real problem. Heavy arty can be a big help as the guns can range out some 25-30km with guided projectiles if needed. A few units well placed offers cover for a big area. Also SP guns can relocate quickly as well as traverse to engage targets in a wide area without having a major move.

Lonewolf_50

28th Oct 2010, 12:19

TBM: agreed on the utility of SP, however, depending on the operational theater, they run into as many mobility problems as tanks. Also, my ground pounding friends have often pointed out to me the different needs for direct versus indirect fires.

There was a military theorist some years back who opined that tanks would be overtaken by helicopters (darnit, can't recall his name, he's a 20th century sort, post WW II) as the mobile striking arm/cav. He also presumed that air assault, like the US 101st, would become the standard infantry formation. Needless to say, it hasn't quite panned out that way, but bits and pieces of his idea have, to include reliance on helicopter.

Which brings me to my actual question and point: in Aussie doctrine, do you consider helicopters a Close Air Support asset, or a different form of airborne fires? Even in our own armed forces, Army and Marines typically view CAS and Armed Helicopters as different sorts of things, even though both are in the broad sense "airborne fires" when seen from a ground commander's view.

This takes me back to that C-17. Rather than bringing a tank, bring a few attack helicopters and some kit/maintenance capability to keep them running during initial force insertion.

OK, I am biased, I are a (retired) helicopter pilot. :ok:

herkman

28th Oct 2010, 22:14

Like This - Do That

28th Oct 2010, 23:56

Which brings me to my actual question and point: in Aussie doctrine, do you consider helicopters a Close Air Support asset, or a different form of airborne fires? Even in our own armed forces, Army and Marines typically view CAS and Armed Helicopters as different sorts of things, even though both are in the broad sense "airborne fires" when seen from a ground commander's view.

We're talking about ARH (or AH-64 or Mangusta or AH-1), not RW lift, right? Sorry if I've misread, just want to clarify that.

You're pretty much on the money. The ARH is part of the combined arms team, and Army pilots now do the COAC (combat officers advanced course) alongside their Crunchie, Turret Head, Sapper and Gunner colleagues. The ARH brings effects to the battlespace in the Manoeuvre BOS. The Offensive Support BOS has CAS platforms providing the effects, and ARH isn't included in the doctrinal OS BOS - the CAS platforms in the pams are Hornet & Pig.

So the ARH is considered part of the collection of platforms and capabilities that deliver manoeuvre effects; having said that, I doubt one would be penalised for including ARH in the 'concept of OS' during a TEWT.

Trojan1981

29th Oct 2010, 02:19

Our Government needs to understand, based on the experiance of other Air Forces particularly the RAF, that four C17 long term will not be enough. We should be looking at least another two. These aircraft will fly more hours than planned and then we will be caught short.

There are I believe an average of only six H models and the J models are rapidly approaching centre section fatique problems.

Old and tired the Carabou may have been, but it was still doing a good job, Why we never re engined when first proposed in 1970's is beyonf many of us.

Two of our tankers were pinched by KRudd which affectively meant that we also lost yet more uplift capacity, and the jury is still out on whether we will retro fit the frieght floor.

Timor should have tausght us that we do not have enough air lift capacity.

Really to day we have no more affective capacity than in 66 when we have 24 C130's.

Yes I know one can play the sums and say a C17 equals 4 C130's and 1 C130 equals 4 Caribous but if you have four different tasks that equals does not work out.

The Government needs to put some real on the ground brian power in its ranks, because they make decisions not understanding the results of their decisions.

The RAAF has a proud history of uplift and support, but why do we have to work with one hand tied behind our back,

Regards

Col
:ok::ok::ok:

Head of nail, struck!

We now have next to no useful tactical airlift capability for places like Timor/PNG and our strategic airlift assets are overstretched and declining.

So the ARH is considered part of the collection of platforms and capabilities that deliver manoeuvre effects; having said that, I doubt one would be penalised for including ARH in the 'concept of OS' during a TEWT.
So as per the definition of Armed Reconnaissance, in support of land elements? I would like to see how the platform is utilised when actually supporting other FORCOMD (with limited experience working with Avn) units on ex and eventually ops; as opposed to it's use in TEWTs.

TBM-Legend

29th Oct 2010, 02:45

On paper everything looks good [haha]. In reality the show is broken. Lack of airlift for the tasks. The F-18 world can barely muster a 2 x 4 ship fly-by.

The Navy is a rusting relic of poor planning and decisions.

Army Avn is another 'paper' force. The news showed a couple of Tigers in Townsville flying around with 5-6 Blackhawks [which I'm told is about all that can be mustered on a regular basis.

and we laugh at Indonesia...!!!!:confused::confused::confused::confused:

Wiley

29th Oct 2010, 07:24

and we laugh at IndonesiaTwo posts lifted from the "Should we be afraid?" thread regarding the Indonesians plans to buy lots of state of the art high performance Russian kit.
From racedo: As much as people dismiss the idea that somehow the Indonesians could buy these, maintain them and have a viable air force I would caution people that money talks.

Just because they did something stupid in the past doesn't mean they will do so in the future.

Acquiring the technology is easy but given the state of military salaries around the world it wouldn't be that hard to persuade young "retired" experienced personnel to move to a sunny place with mega nice salaries and perks.

It’s not as if members of NATO forces have not taken on assignments as "trainers" with Govt sanction with various militaries around the world often as an assistance to an arms deal.

and from MTOW:Of course, looking at the parlous state of much of the ADF's current high tech inventory, the reverse argument (that just because we used to be able to do it right in the past, we'll not necessarily always be able to do it right in the future) holds true too.

Food for thought... It would seem from the comments above and some of the comments on this thread that I'm not the only one with such unhappy - but (sadly) looking increasingly realistic – thoughts about the current state of the ADF.

Col/Herkman, you touch on one glaring current shortcoming, the absence of a light tactical fixed wing transport aircraft in the ADF inventory after the recent retirement of the Caribou, virtually putting many of the airfields in PNG and the islands to our north out of practical reach of the ADF, be it for military response or disaster/civil relief purposes.

The real problem (and one apparently totally lost on damn near everyone of star rank and certainly among the Defence civilian mandarins in Canberra), is the loss of aircrew skills in having our "light tactical transport squadron(!)" crews maintaining their currency in a motley collection of near superannuated Beechcraft King Airs.

I'd be willing to lay a substantial bet that there are people, both uniformed and non-uniformed, (some with an eye on a nice post retirement job with Bell or some other major defence contractor), who are entertaining fond hopes that we'll eventually replace the Caribou with Ospreys.

Gents, here's a fact that can't be ignored - we can't afford yet another overly complex, top shelf, incredibly expensive and therefore too small in numbers piece of equipment in the ADF.

And here's a prediction as certain as night follows day - if we go that route, it will go the way of every other project except the C17 in recent times. Delays, cost overruns, less than promised performance, expensive retrofixes... you’re all of you all too familiar with what amounts to a set in stone checklist.

The ADF needs something that:
- has already been proven to work (who was the wise man who said a long time ago now "Never buy the 'A' model of anything"?)
- cheap enough to buy and to operate that we can afford to buy it and operate it in meaningful (read 'effective') numbers so that enough crews can be trained and kept current on it to provide a surge capacity in times of crisis
- is common with equipment operated by our major ally so that we can have ready access to spares and extra airframes at short notice if required.

Like damn near everything we’ve bought over the last few years – (even the otherwise successful C17 suffers problem of too expensive and therefore too few) - the Osprey doesn't fit any of those criteria.

herkman

29th Oct 2010, 08:30

Instead of taking the armies cast off aircraft and then to buy yet more completely throws me.

Stories that we need to have aircraft of 2010 era so staff can learn to work on more complex airframes, rather than that but how about looking at what task they can perform. Caribou it will never replace and I wonder how the leasing deal works on these airframes being used in combat roles. Once again the RAF found that out with the C17 and now if they have not already done so have bought their first ones.

We should have bought the C27, would have suited PNG areas well. has high interchange with the C130J and we would have had staff to service and repair them.

The problem is that Australian forces are controlled by the government, and some who tried to run the show the ADF way have been shown the door.

A question that no one from the government has answered is how do we remain operational when 40% of the tanker fleet is to have VIP fleet fitouts at a cost of $85M.

The ADF does not need to be told what their duties are, but many in Parliament need to look at their self focused desires which impact onto daily ADF operations.

Regards

Col

Flyingblind

29th Oct 2010, 08:36

Whilst I agree that the ADF is facing a capability holiday in the delivery of Tactical airlift, and support calls for less silver bullet procurement.

I would also like to suggest the formation of a credible RAAF / Army Avn element that is able to support not supplant the full timers during weekends / stand down.

With Australia's population passing through 22 + Million and increasing at 300,000+ per year we will have the population to support these efforts. Ah but, these positions require very specific and a highly skilled workforce I hear you say? Well, set up a tent at any RAF / Navy / Army Base and I'm sure ADF recruiters would meet their yearly quoter in a fortnight.

It's all down to our political class's failure to realise that our region should rank much higher than current ops suggest. It would appear that various faceless persons are so concerned with the 'Big Picture' that they fail to understand our own growing importance (and their reliance to Aus) to our regional neighbors that face stark environmental realities in the not too distant future.

Enough already with the war in Afghanistan, focus on Australia's area of interest and develop capabilities to suit, the UK is now going through the pain of a political class unwilling / unable to understand that behind the promises to play alongside the big end of town to adequately fund and support that promise which comes at a very high price.

Pay up or change your tune.

Bushranger 71

29th Oct 2010, 23:08

Lonewolf 50 raises some interests points re fire support and I will make a separate post in that regard.

The fundamental reason why the ADF is in such decay is because the central plank of Australia's defence policy is support of defence industry which is now largely parented by foreign major arms corporations. Successive Australian governments have been pouring vast amounts of money into building and/or modifying military hardware in Australia which is really only job creation at forbidding cost because profits from such endeavours largely get siphoned offshore. It makes no sense to sustain low productivity industries in this land when we keep on importing people, supposedly to make up for labour shortfalls in the resources industry in particular. We should be sourcing only proven gear 'off-the-shelf' from the US (diesel submarines excepted) and cease slapping our great ally in the face by acquiring European origin military hardware.

Had we been continually progressively optimizing in-service US origin hardware to maintain adequate combat readiness, more credible military capabilities would now exist, particularly across the airlift and helicopter fleets. Enhancing the F-111, for around one third of the Super Hornet project cost, would have provided excellent long-range maritime strike deterrence of interference with our sea trade routes and we could have just leased some enhanced C-135 tankers from the USAF in lieu of involving in the MRTT. There are of course multiple other examples of inferior hardware decisions among all 3 services and the Service Chiefs are culpable to some extent although nobody has hitherto been held accountable.

Australia's defence policy is hugely flawed and this needs to be strongly emphasized to politicians of all species via correspondence so please generate some letters, in the national interest.

7x7

30th Oct 2010, 03:54

we could have just leased some enhanced C-135 tankers from the USAF in lieu of involving in the MRTTBushranger 71, that particular argument has a major flaw - a flaw I'm surprised a man with your experience didn't see. Half of the KC135s we leased, enhanced or not, couldn't be modified (at huge expense) to give our Fearless Leaders a widebody VIP transport worthy of their egos.

You gotta get those priorities right, Bushranger.

TBM-Legend

30th Oct 2010, 14:37

Tiny Singapore operates 4 x refurbed KC-135R tankers plus latest Strike Eagles/F-16/AWACS/etc etc etc

7x7

30th Oct 2010, 22:45

Yeah, TBM-legend, they do - the difference being, the SAF actually uses their KC135s as tankers and not VIP transports that they snuck into the inventory under the guise of tankers.

Historians have expressed disbelief that the Nazis sidelined huge resources (rail rolling stock, manpower, materials, etc) to ship Jews and other 'undesirables' to the death camps almost right up the very end of WW2 when those resources were desperately needed for the failing war effort. It was a classic case of a twisted ideology overriding common sense.

What our politicians and the senior public servants in DMO have been doing with defence acquisition over these last few years is on a par with that.

emergov

31st Oct 2010, 12:21

7x7, that's a champagne post.:D

You have just compared the DMO to Nazis, and made the assertion that our government is operating under the same twisted ideology as the Third Reich.

Don't listen to your family, I think you are a great Australian, and not a tool.

Now run away and find your marbles before Goebbels slips over on them.

Bushranger 71

31st Oct 2010, 21:04

Hi Lonewolf 50; you make some interesting points in your post #11.

Complaint from Australian infantry elements in Afghanistan re lack of mortars seems justified as they need that form of integral direct fire; but it should be mobile because those poor buggers are so over-burdened with all the gear they wear these days, it would be unrealistic to expect them to lug around heavy mortar hardware and ammunition. Ergo, the value of a light armoured cavalry vehicle with cannon and mortar, like a readily air transportable M113!

Some enhancements to armoured vehicles would affect air transportability, like adding necessitous external armour; but I ponder how stretching an M113 - as being done in Australia – affects carriage of multiple units in C-130 and C-17? Australia does not have an adequate fleet of C-17 so C-130 would foreseeably be the airlift asset most utilized for rapid response scenarios.

Airborne fire support by whichever armed forces can be broadly categorized as 'close air support' delivered as close as 10 metres from friendly forces with acceptable risk in necessitous circumstances or several hundred metres due to safety distance requirements of more powerful weapons. Although indirect fire support, helos if loitering out of earshot can react pretty swiftly; but response may not necessarily be timely if ferry to a scene of action is involved.

Intimately close fire is more safely delivered by pilot operated fixed forward-firing weaponry in my view which leads to thoughts about the characteristics of close air support platforms and the merits and otherwise of attack helicopters versus gunships, both rotary and fixed wing. Some desirable characteristics of good close air support platforms are strong hot and high performance, multiple gun and cannon redundancy, simple systems for reliability, lots of ammunition, optimum ability to see and hear ground-fire, quick turnaround and good field maintainability. If rotary wing, they should also be air transportable into remote areas. No problem in that regard for a conceptual Huey II Bushranger by C-130, but an MH-60L DAP Blackhawk (160th SOAR - MH-60L DAP - Special Ops Photos (http://www.americanspecialops.com/photos/night-stalkers/mh-60l-dap.php)) for example might require C-17 airlift. Whether attack helicopters like the ADF Tiger are well suited for the intimate close air support role is debatable.

It seems to me that long-standing principles of war-fighting - flexibility, versatility, economy of effort – should be more pertinent than doctrine regarding concepts of operations when considering force structures and military hardware. It is just not cost-effective to deploy heavy armour and artillery if more flexible and versatile forms of fire support will suffice.

Going off forum for a week or so now to be with my dying friend.

7x7

31st Oct 2010, 22:39

Your ‘outraged’ reply to my last post might be great debating technique and go down well on the floor of Parliament, emergov, but that’s about all it is.

Put aside the mock outrage for one moment and look again at what I said. I compared the expensive mistakes the DMO has made in defence acquisition in recent years to the mistakes made by the Nazis in not using their limited resources more effectively in fighting a war against a far more numerous enemy.

“...using ... limited resources more effectively ... against a far more numerous enemy...”

Does that sound like the potential situation of any country you know?

emergov

1st Nov 2010, 00:35

It wasn't 'outraged' it was a deliberately sarcastic response to a ridiculous point made by you.

Firstly, we are not spending billions of dollars on completely irrelevant and morally questionable goals like genocide. Being upset that the RAAF operates a VIP fleet is one thing, comparing it to the holocaust is just silly.

Secondly, the DMO is not operating on its own whims - it is buying stuff that the government told it to buy after the CDF advised them what is most appropriate.

Thirdly, there is no national emergency or crisis here, and we have no capability gap because we can't deploy a regiment of tanks in C-17.

Most importantly, the RAAF already has a VIP fleet, and your inference that the MRTT will primarily be used for VIP transport; that in fact it is being acquired for that purpose and not for MRTT, is incorrect and silly.

It would be lovely if the VIP fleet ceased to exist, but a quick global survey would prove that every country in the world shares similar Nazi leanings when it comes to transporting politicians and heads of state. Except maybe the Singaporeans?

500N

1st Nov 2010, 07:20

Article in today's WA Newspaper.

Buying high-tech defence kit always risky Max Blenkin
November 1, 2010 - 11:59AM
AAP

Buying high-tech defence equipment is always risky, and attempts to eliminate that risk could result in Australian forces going to war with obsolete weapons, a new study says.
The study says despite many inquiries defence procurement projects continue to experience cost overruns, delays and shortfalls in performance, such as the plan to acquire Seasprite helicopters, which was dumped at vast cost.
In the paper, published in the latest edition of the Kokoda Foundation journal Security Challenges, former senior defence official Fred Bennett said there was always some risk, particularly in acquiring advanced high-tech equipment.
Advertisement: Story continues below
"Problematic as it is, experimental risk cannot be avoided," Mr Bennett said.
"Attempting to do so involves a greater risk - that of going into battle with obsolete weapons systems."
Australia's succession of high-profile defence headaches has included projects to acquire the Seasprites, Collins submarines and Wedgetail early warning aircraft.
To avoid problems, countries can buy proven equipment already in service with other nations, a practice known as military off-the-shelf (MOTS).
Mr Bennett said such strategies created only an illusion of lower risk.
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk," he said.
Australia's relatively small defence force depended on the highest quality of personnel and the best and most suitable equipment.
"But a MOTS-based procurement strategy risks sending our forces into battle with yesterday's weapons designed to meet the needs of a different defence force in a different theatre of operations and unsupported by in-country capability for repair or adaptation to changing operational conditions," he said.
Mr Bennett said the first step was to openly acknowledge that advanced, technologically complex defence equipment projects featured high levels of uncertainty.
It could then be accepted that the schedule and cost of such projects could not be forecast in any meaningful way in the early stages.
"Perhaps the key to successful defence project outcomes is higher quality, better educated and more experienced project managers," he said.

MTOW

1st Nov 2010, 11:47

Sounds awfully like defence industry spin to me. The argument would hold water if the 'cutting edge' kit 'engineered just for Australian conditions' actually worked.

Too much of the 'unique' equipment bought for the ADF over the last decade and more simply hasn't, or at least not for too many years after promised and after costing far more than it should have.

FoxtrotAlpha18

2nd Nov 2010, 01:49

A question that no one from the government has answered is how do we remain operational when 40% of the tanker fleet is to have VIP fleet fitouts at a cost of $85M.

There are NO plans to fit any of the KC-30s with VIP interiors. Where do you guys get this stuff???

oldpinger

2nd Nov 2010, 02:34

Maybe the 'R' in the PPRUNE ;)

MTOW

2nd Nov 2010, 08:06

Another Oz 'A' model buy debacle in the making?

Mainstream US media report signals JSF implosion – Plane Talking (http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/2010/11/02/mainstream-us-media-signals-jsf-implosion/)
The question that one hopes Australia’s defence minister Stephen Smith will ask of his minders and masters in our defence establishment this morning is “when did you know this and why haven’t I been told”.Does this put posts #22 and #23 into a slightly different perspective?

MTOW

2nd Nov 2010, 08:18

A very interesting (and worrisome) comment under the Bloomberg article I referred to in my last post.

Go to news.google.com.au. As of this writing there is not a single mention of this in the Australian Media, as reported by Google. Next go to news.google.com and search the news for “F-35.” You will find many dozens of articles describing the problem from around the world, but only this blog post emanating from Australia.

If only the Australian media’s apathy was justified!!

TBM-Legend

2nd Nov 2010, 08:33

Rule 1 - never be first to buy the 'A' model of anything.:rolleyes:

Mature 'A' models can work [C-17/F/A-18/C-130A etc] but not others....

Aussie Tiger/SeaSprite/MRH90/Collins subs.....:=

500N

2nd Nov 2010, 08:41

I like this quote from the same article. It could be applied to all defence projects.

"The lack of critical analysis and demands for action by the US to resolve the JSF issues has damaged the national interest, and a completely new, more ruthless, more performance oriented defence establishment is urgently overdue. The concept of critically managing rather than just applauding major defence commitments remains an alien notion in Canberra."

Going back to my post of the WA Article, he says
"But by precluding innovation or changes to meet Australia's unique needs and circumstances, those strategies expose future military operations to higher risk,"

What "unique needs and circumstances" do we have that the US doesn't also operate in ?

I think we must sometimes "create a problem" to keep people employed finding a solution.
.

herkman

2nd Nov 2010, 09:32

The proposal to convert two of the KC30's to VIP duties is outlined the Australian Defense Magazine . Auguswt 2008.

Also tabled was the conversion costs of $25M per airframe.

Google search will reveal more, including a official statement by Angus.

As the purchase of five allows for two deployments of two aircraft, I sure hope you not rostered to refuel from number four. Number Five was originally purchased as a back up for the four other frames.

As for the the VIP scrongers, put them into couple of C130's that should cull out many of the hangers on.

Regards

Col

Frazzled

2nd Nov 2010, 10:36

Those that believe the tanker will always be a tanker and never do vip duties are either naive or think that the seasprite was a really good buy.

Pssst - got some left handed screw drivers you might be interested in.:E

F:ugh:

MTOW

2nd Nov 2010, 12:03

Frazzled, no one would have a problem with using the standard tanker on the occasional VIP trip. The vitally important word in that sentence is "standard". However, if the article I read some time ago is to be believed, (possibly the same one herkman refers to - can't recall), two of the aircraft won't have the refuelling gear installed "to save money" (and, if I recall correctly, neither will they have upper deck large cargo doors fitted, but I'm not sure on that point).

If that's a fact, two of the airframes will be, to all intents and purposes, near to standard A330 passenger airliners, (3 class of course, with that all-important First Class cabin installed) and next to useless for many of the military tasks they were bought as part of the defence budget to perform - and therefore, since they can't be used for such mundane military tasks, they'll be much more readily available for all those vitally important VIP flights :).

When you consider what two fewer airframes in an already very small tanker fleet will mean to capability, it's enough to make anyone who has even a fleeting knowledge of what's involved in keeping such complex airframes airborne cry.

Lonewolf_50

2nd Nov 2010, 13:18

For Like This - Do That:
Thanks for the response on AH as maneuver. Sounds like US Army doctrine, however, I think most Joint and or Combined Task Force commanders, when CAS (Hornet, A-10, what have you) is not available will fill in that need with AH should the situation warrant, limitations in armament considered. (Ever seen a GBU-12 on an Apache? Me neither).

IIRC, Blackhawk is still offered for foreign sales by Sikorksy with armaments kits on the stub wings/hard points more often used for external fuel tanks. One could, I suppose, deploy Blackhawks that could adapt (with some maintenance hours expended, obviously) from cargo/utilty to armed/attack. Not sure who does that ... memory tells me the Thais were looking into that a few years ago.

Hmm, took a look at Wiki, the variations in kit are quite the mix. Understand Australia chose not to pursue the armed Blackhawk. :confused:

Bushranger 71: many thanks for the two responses. I'd need to go back to a few handbooks to see if an M113 fits in a C-130. Maneuver and fires work together when stovepipes are not created in the minds of the C2 network. :ok:

Frazzled: I was very sorry to see the SH-2 fall flat in Oz, given that a few places have found the G a good enough fit. Poland, New Zealand ... guessing it was the mission equipment that sank the deal?

I recall being very excited by the SH-2G, which USN ended up only putting in the reserve squadrons. (Navy shrank quite a bit between 1989 and 2000, and has shrunk further since. )

Flew the F in the 80's. I was tickled to see the combining gear box dumped, the T-700 added, and the hover attitude nose pitch significantly reduced. (Good for shipboard ops).