The danger of the F/O calling STOP before V1

[Centaurus]

During recent type rating training on a 737 with pilots inducted into an airline, the syllabus called for demonstration of an outboard tyre failure 20 knots below V1. The pre-flight briefing included the advice that it is normally safer to continue the take off, rather than risk a high speed abort with degraded braking.

Despite this, when the tyre failed with noticeable vibration, the first officer called "STOP" and the captain under training immediately rejected the take off.

Both pilots had come from an operator where a rejected take off could be initiated if either pilot called "STOP" -without giving the reason for the call.

I understand this policy is common SOP at many airlines - the theory being the PNF may spot a problem which, in his personal opinion, requires an abort and that the other pilot was not aware of.

The B737 FCTM puts a different light on the subject by saying "the PM should closely monitor essential instruments during the take of roll and immediately announce abnormalities such as ENGINE FIRE, ENGINE FAILURE, or any adverse condition significantly affecting the safety of flight. The decision to reject the take off is the responsibility of the captain and must be made before V1 speed. If the captain is the PM, he should initiate the RTO and announce the abnormality simultaneously".

The executive word "STOP" as used by some operators, carries with it an awesome responsibility. A company policy that requires the captain to initiate an abort purely on another crew member's personal opinion, is fraught with legal issues. Perhaps that is why Boeing - ever vigilant to the risks of litigation - have not recommended the PM call "STOP" to start the rejected take off chain of events - but instead recommend the PM announce the problem rather than have the authority to call "STOP" with the full expectation the captain will follow his (the PM's) command.

I wonder how many captains crewed with an inexperienced first officer (quite common nowadays from reading Pprune) have been stunned to hear an F/O call "STOP" for a perceived serious problem, and have retorted "You have to be kidding" -and kept on going.

There are risks in any take off and a personal opinion call of "STOP" must be one of them. Personally, this scribe prefers the Boeing advice..

Thoughtful discussion appreciated.

[Max Angle]

I understand this policy is common SOP at many airlines

Actually it's not, very few do it, most airlines stick with the Airbus and Boeing recommendation that the Captain makes the stop/go call.

Been done to death on this forum in the recent past and people from both camps are convinced they use the correct method.

[Zippy Monster]

Perhaps that is why Boeing - ever vigilant to the risks of litigation - have not recommended the PM call "STOP" to start the rejected take off chain of events - but instead recommend the PM announce the problem rather than have the authority to call "STOP" with the full expectation the captain will follow his (the PM's) command.

I don't think it's just Boeing - my airline, a large mainly-Airbus operator, specifies the same. Only the commander can call 'STOP' and reject the takeoff.

As an F/O, I agree with it. Circumstances have to be analysed and decisions made in such a short space of time that the decision should be down to one man (or woman) alone. Having two people trying to make different decisions in such a critical stage of the operation while barrelling towards V1 is a recipe for disaster. Leave it to the commander.

In a recent sim check we discussed the unlikely but feasible scenario of a commander becoming incapacitated on the take-off roll. Even in this situation the outcome was that the F/O should continue, get airborne, take whatever time is needed then return and land; the logic being that the F/O is not trained in the physical handling of the aircraft during an RTO but should be well practiced in landing. That gives you an idea as to how the company view the risks associated with an RTO.

[Kiltie]

100% with you on this. Only the Captain (or more correctly,the pilot in command) should use the call of STOP in my opinion. In fairness, I usually catch any difference to this at the departure briefing stage, when FOs are PF and often state "after 80 knots I will call STOP for......" At this point I will interrupt and make it absolutely clear that they should assertively announce any problem but NOT mention the word STOP.

However....

The airline I have been working for recently, supports the method of FOs being able to call STOP. Fortunately, this is not evident in any of the company's Operations Manuals, NOTACs or Memos and is merely hearsay from the Training Department so I continue to politely deny the existence of any such responsibility other than from the PIC.

I remember a refuelling panel (door flap position) caution illuminating during a take off roll some years ago when I was an FO. I recall discussing with the Captain in the cruise that I thought we should have stopped for it; however he explained to me why it was safe to continue. I went away from that day with some more experience and knowledge under my belt, not least the realisation that I was at the time, still too inexperienced and unfamiliar with the aircraft to have the confidence or responsibility to call STOP, and that's why they trained me not to say it in the first place!

Sometimes new CRM methods can disrupt common sense operating. I for one will remain a stuffy old fashioned git on this one.

[rubik101]

As mentioned, this subject has been srutinized closely and at length in these forums. A search of 'FO call STOP' brings a wealth of topics, if you take the time to peruse them!

[FE Hoppy]

1) How was the tyre burst simulated?
2) Was this training or a check ride?
3) Were the crew members properly briefed and practiced in the new companies procedures.

One incident in a sim session is no reason to drop the litter. You have to allow people to learn before you can expect them to know.

I would worry more about the training methods than the pilots performance if I were you.

[Kiltie]

Well, silly-you then Centaurus, that's you told.:rolleyes: Honest to God these forums are suffering from more "Do a Search" prowlers than 121.5 and its infuriating Guard Police.

[Intruder]

I hope there is more to that training that a simple simulator demo, or a set of them...

Consider the single simple fact that a tire failure on a 737 will effectively reduce braking ability by almost 25% (1 of 4 tires with brakes), while on a 747 it would be closer to 6% (1 of 16 tires with brakes). The stop distance for the 737 would be increased considerably, so if there is not much stop margin to begin with, a rejected takeoff even 20 Kt below V1 could well result in an overrun...

[411A]

so if there is not much stop margin to begin with, a rejected takeoff even 20 Kt below V1 could well result in an overrun...
Indeed, it would appear so.
With our ops, the First Officer is tasked with the duties of calling the reason for STOP, and the Captain is tasked for stopping the airplane, IF necessary, in HIS judgement.
Works for us, quite well.

[safetypee]

If an operator empowers a pilot to decide on course of action (call stop), in a time critical event, then it essential that the procedure and crew’s activities are well defined.

This requires that the circumstances for an RTO be clearly defined.
Certification regulations focus on engine failure – loss of thrust (fire etc). Operational issues have been added to this, often without sufficient thought in the process of detecting and assessing the failure.
Thus the first point might be – how do you know it is a tyre failure?

Engine ‘failure’ is reasonably easy to define and thus the decision tends to be an “if - then” activity. However, with other failures the situation is rarely clear cut, e.g. a 'bang', tyre failure or engine surge; – some would argue that neither warrants an RTO in a time critical situation, i.e. at high speed.
Thus the decision process may depend on the stage of the take off.
Does P2 call stop below 80 / 100kts? Or because there is relatively more time for assessment is the decision up to the Captain?
From this example the P2’s duties might be simplified to calling stop only for an engine failure (as defined by the procedure), and only at high speed.

It may be preferable for the decision maker to be the same person as the actor; a subconscious decision may already be in action before the verbal decision is given.
However, this may have complications with Captain-only actions and P2 handling.
Alternatively this arrangement enables the monitoring pilot to aid situation assessment; the call can describe the situation on which the decision maker can act.
On balance it may be better to accept a small delay in change of control for P2 take offs, traded by possibly greater experience of the decision maker.

At high speed, a time critical decision should be biased towards a GO mindset.
When and how is the experience necessary to reinforce this mindset acquired by a pilot; can you be sure that a P2 has reached the required standard?

[Pugilistic Animus]

I think for 411A's method is the best---the FO says Engine Failure---Captain decides whether or not not stop---trouble with it is that it requires that both crew-members are pilots:ooh:

:}

[divinehover]

If the FO can't call stop what is he doing there. Let's make it a single crew operation and make it easier for everyone. If your company training is so poor that a professional pilot can't make a Stop/Decision maybe there's a need for an overhaul in your trg dept.

[TopBunk]

I think my previous company has it about right for the B747-400:

either pilot will call stop for:

+ Any fire
+ Any engine failure confirmed by 2 parameters, at least one must be internal (eg swing or bang plus N1 decrease)
+ configuration warning
+ "Windshear ahead" warning
+ "Monitor Radar Display" caution

additionally, when the co-pilot is handling pilot, he may call stop for:

+ Significant handling difficulty
+ blocked runway

anything else the FO sees is brought to the captains notice for a decision.

=========================
At the call of "STOP" whoever is handling will commence the recall items of the REJECTED TAKEOFF checklist.

+ for the handling pilot (close thrust levers/disc A/T /confirm RTO brake operation else apply max manual brakes)
+ for the non-handling pilot (selects rev idle/confirmsSpeedbrake deployed else deploys them/ above xxkts selects all available reverse.

Then it reverts to Captain and FO drills (with the Captain assuming control if the FO had been handling pilot) and the stop and poss evac items are completed.

In this way the stopping is commenced as soon as possible, governed by a strict set of requirements, with no superfluous cross-cockpit passing of the decision making process.

NB FO if handling handles the thrust levers.

Note: not expecting approval from certain quarters:rolleyes:

[TheKabaka]

Hi Topbunk,

I work for your old company and agree its a good system. Except the P2 selecting reverse. Why not the guy who already has his hands on the levers?

[TopBunk]

The Kakaba

I think it works better because:

1. It splits the initial actions more evenly and allows the HP to concentrate more on the tracking and braking while looking outside.

2. The NHP gets the correct sequence of rev idle, speedbrakes then up (manually if necessary), to max reverse concentrating initially inside the cockpit.

To add; in general terms I think it is good for the FO to get used to the decision making processes early on, then in the aforementioned mode of operating, whe converting to the LHS as Captain, it is just an incremental change of responsibility and not a whole new ballgame.

[Tmbstory]

Centaurus:

The "old fashion" standards that stood the test of time were as follows:
"Emergency Drills and Procedures: A malfunction during a critical phase of flight, i.e requiring immediate action tasks by recall, should be positively announced by the observing crew member. As time permits, the other crew member should make every effort to confirm / identify the malfunction before initiating emergency action. On take-off, for example, the PNF usually is the first to observe any indication of a critical failure. Upon observing such indication, he announces it and simultaneously verifies the malfunction graphically to the PF (pointing to the indicator / annunciator )

On verification of the malfunction, the PF announces his decision and commands accomplishment of recall action items, monitoring the PNF in those tasks accomplished by him.

The take-off stop / abort manoeuvre is made only by the Commander."

Tmb

[PappyJ]

I for one will remain a stuffy old fashioned git on this one. I fully agree! :ok:

[PappyJ]

If the FO can't call stop what is he doing there. Let's make it a single crew operation and make it easier for everyone. If your company training is so poor that a professional pilot can't make a Stop/Decision maybe there's a need for an overhaul in your trg dept.

You're gonna be singing a different tune if, or when, you become a Captain.

[PappyJ]

I think for 411A's method is the best---the FO says Engine Failure---Captain decides whether or not not stop---trouble with it is that it requires that both crew-members are pilots

Not true. I've flown a couple of different airplanes which included an FE (Flight Engineer).

As an F/O on the 747 (100 & 200), both myself and the F/E were trained, and expected, to call out the problem, but then let the captain make the decision.

As a DC8 captain I had PFE's (Professional Flight Engineers) who had never been pilots, nor had they any intentions to be. They "called" a problem if they saw it, and I decided if stopping was necessary (We used to call it "Abort" until someone became too politically sensitive about the word).

On the A330/A340 the FEs doesn't exist anymore, and I for one, miss having them.

[DFC]

Whenever I see this argument come up again and again the only common issue for me is that there is a general lack of understanding as to what the difference is between "doing something" and "saying something" and "being responsible for something".

The closer one gets to V1, the less time is available for discussion.

Everyone seems to be clear on this aspect. However, few seem to remember that at slightly lower speeds there is the problem that calling continue can cause a bigger problem.

The rejeted take-off figures for the aircraft are always based on a set criteria and include very specific time intervals between failure and decision to continue or stop and if stopping the initial actions to do so.

To look at the situation very simply, whoever has the throttles in their hands must be able to call stop because as most people will have experienced (in the sim if not in real life) that while the intention is usually - "stop stop", throttles closed - in reality the closing of the throttles can often lead the call.

I have seen lots of operators in the sim where one called stop, the aircraft was stopped and the other looked across and asked "why did we stop?" - happens especially on a 3 engine aircraft when the middle one starts to run-down at V1-10. :E

So personally I don't see any problem with either crewmember calling stop or the alternative of only the PIC calling stop. However, what I do have a problem with is the idea that there should be some conversation / discussion / interpretation involved in the procedure.

The person who can't call stop should never be expected to have some long winded failure call eg EGT high engine 3 or N1 reducing engine 2 or even I believe use the word "failure" because that word leads the other crew member down a specific thought path which might not be correct.

Fire

Engine

Danger

are examples of key words that should be used alone because they are short, clear, not open to interpretation and we don't require the person who is tasked with making the decision to take-in, interpret and confirm what was said, digest that and come up with some decision.

Now hands up all the Captains who at V1-10 whiler PF are not going to stop when the FO calls Engine (or any of the key words?). Hands up those that are going to look inside to see what the problem is?

However, it is critical if only the PIC can call stop that they have the throttles in their hands at all times.

This leads to another issue;

While Captain is sitting there keeping the throttles up as the FO (PF) calls "SMOKE" - which you can't see do you think that at V1-10 they (the FO) will slam on the brakes that are right there under their feet? if they can see smoke coming from the panel down by their right leg which you can't see?........do you think you want to search out the smoke before saying stop? do you want to get airbourne with a cockpit fire????

Does it make any difference if the FO calls "Smoke" or "Stop"?

Personally, I find that the best option is that anyone can call stop (no debate required as to why stopping) but the PIC can override that decision if they believe that it would be unsafe to stop. This method generally provides the quickest reactions and the shortest stop distances.

Therefore in the example that started this debate the FO called "stop", the PIC (if they recognised that it was a tire failure and it's safer to continue) would have said "Continue" and the flight would have got airbourne. The problem described is not because of the call, because of responsibility or because of procedurs it is because neither pilot recognised the situation correctly.

Perhaps we should have had:

FO "Thrust Set"

FO "80 Knots"

PIC "Checked"

...........

FO "Loud bang Captain"

PIC "What Banged?"

FO " I don't know"

PIC "Stop Stop"

FO "but V1 was 10 knots ago we are already 5 knots above Vr"

Bang

FO "Another Loud bang Captain"

PIC "What Banged?"

FO "we did through the airfield fence"

:E

[Centaurus]

As mentioned, this subject has been srutinized closely and at length in these forums. A search of 'FO call STOP' brings a wealth of topics, if you take the time to peruse them!

Humbly apologize. You are right. Old age you know does strange things to one's brain...:ok:

[Centaurus]

You have to allow people to learn before you can expect them to know.

I should have been clearer judging by the above remark. Yes - the pre-flight briefing on the subject of tyre burst ramifications was discussed carefully.

A couple of accident reports that covered tyre burst events was given to the "students" to read the day before the sim trip.

The FCTM coverage of below and above 80 knots reject policy was discussed.

In the simulator the students were told that around 20 knots below V1 that they would get a tyre failure of the left outboard tyre and could expect a slight pull to the left and lots of airframe vibration.

It was a training exercise not a testing exercise and they knew it. If with all that preparation and knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, I believe that most people would accept the instructor could not do much more to help the students learn?

[Tee Emm]

The executive word STOP yelled by a 500 hour copilot would frighten the hell out of me. Thank goodness the company I flew with would not have a bar of that policy.
I was jump seating on a 737-200 taking off at night from a 5600 ft length runway on a Central Pacific atoll. The over-run area was a cliff less than 30 metres from the end of the runway. Max thrust used because we were runway length limited.
We did not know when it happened but both engine Pt2 inlet sensors were totally blocked by debris from dust from a nearby phosphate works. Remember the Potomac crash where ice blocked the Pt2 sensors and the 737 got airborne and hit a bridge and crashed into the Potomac River.

The crew of our aircraft set max EPR and although the equivalent N1 was tabulated we never noticed that both N1 were down by around 10 percent from expected. But the EPR needles and digital readout showed exactly 2.18 EPR as expected.

It was only when the realisation hit that with just a few runway lights to go, we were still 10 knots below V1 and no hope ever of aborting safely, that the captain realised the danger and slammed the thrust levers forward against the full power stop and rotated quickly 10 knots below VR. Later it was discovered the jet blast angle had blown part of the perimeter road back along the runway.

Without going into the why's and wherefore's of not spotting BOTH N1's being lower than tabulated, my fear while observing the last few seconds was the danger of the PF (the copilot) suddenly rejecting the take off of his own volition at about the same time we all realised the danger of the captain aborting for the same reason.

There is much more to this story as there always is, but any abort by either pilot under those specific circumstances would have been disaster as the 737 would have been smashed against the rocks that were the seawall.

In our case, both the captain and first officer were highly experienced. But the real risk would have been a cadet with a basic type rating and 250 total hours and as PF, calling STOP and aborting before the captain could prevent an irrevocable action.

The statistical chances of both engines simultaneously being effected by a dual Pt2 sensor blockage during a take off on a runway limited take off is minute - but it happened that dark night.

[SNS3Guppy]

If the FO can't call stop what is he doing there. Let's make it a single crew operation and make it easier for everyone. If your company training is so poor that a professional pilot can't make a Stop/Decision maybe there's a need for an overhaul in your trg dept.

Your comments do not appear to be those of a pilot in command, or to have been made with the benefit of PIC experience.

The operator for whom I presently work requires anyone in the cockpit (Captain, First Officer, or FE) to call out the malfunction loud and clear. The captain makes the decision to reject the takeoff. There is no "stop" call. (In fact, I've never heard it used in any company for whom I've worked, or training I've undergone).

If the captain is performing the takeoff and elects to reject (in accordance with the prebriefed criteria for the takeoff), then the captain rejects. The flight engineer backs him up on the reverse and speed brake lever. The first officer notes the airspeed (for brake energy calculations later) and notifies the tower that the takeoff is being rejected.

If the first officer is performing the takeoff and the captain elects to reject, the captain takes the controls while announcing the reject. The flight engineer backs him up on the reverse and speed brake lever. The first officer notes the airspeed (for brake energy calculations later)and notifies the tower that the takeoff is being rejected.


If the captain is performing the takeoff and the captain elects not to reject, the captain continues flying the airplane. If an engine failure has occurred, the captain proceeds to fly the engine-out profile. As soon as practical, the captain will usually turn the airplane over to the first officer to fly, in order that the captain can work with the flight engineer in addressing the problem.

If the first officer is performing the takeoff and the captain elects not to reject, the first officer continues flying the airplane. If an engine failure has occurred, the first officer proceeds to fly the engine-out profile, as briefed.

When an abnormality occurrs on the runway, we either continue or reject the takeoff. There's no "reject" call, other than the captain announcing that he's rejecting the takeoff. Any malfunctions are called out loud and clear, but in general terms. When the engine fails close to V1, we don't care if it's #1 or #4; the gist of it will be apparent through the necessary footwork, so the call is simply "Engine Failure."

Generally the brief is conducted along the lines of "We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question."

Given that rejecting a takeoff, especially when heavy, can be one of the most dangerous acts one can attempt during the flight, the responsibility to make that call and take that action for us rests with the same person who assumes the ultimate responsibility for the airplane and the safe outcome of the flight; the PIC. The first officer does not instruct the captain to reject and the first officer does not make the call. The first officer calls out the malfunction, but the captain decides what to do about it. Much of the time, especially approaching V1, the decision will be to let the first officer fly it off, and then handle it in the air.

[reivilo]

We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question.Interesting. Could you explain why you don't reject for a cargo fire warning, or cockpit full of smoke? But you will reject for an 'outward opening door' ?

In my current company the decision to reject lies only with the captain. Any failure will be announced, captain will decide and either call 'Reject' or 'Go' (and assume control in case of reject).
> 80kts we will only reject for: engine failure, ANY fire, aircraft unsafe/unable to fly or predictive windshear warning (not windshear caution).

In my previous company, where I was type rated, first officers were also trained to decide and perform a rejected takeoff. If F/O was the PF, he would be PF untill airplane stopped, thereafter change to Capt/F/O area's of responsibility. Worked fine that way and in my opinion prepares the pilot in a better way for his transition to the left seat.

[SNS3Guppy]

Interesting. Could you explain why you don't reject for a cargo fire warning, or cockpit full of smoke? But you will reject for an 'outward opening door' ?

I didn't say we wouldn't reject. You really can't have a conversation when you make things up. Don't assume.

You might have missed the crucial, all-encompassing...


or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question.

Certainly a cargo fire or cockpit full of smoke may fall under that heading, but then so may a number of other emergencies or abnormalities. We don't name them all or cite them all.

[reivilo]

Ok. Could you then explain why to reject 20kts below V1 for an opening door? I personally think that you should not reject in this event, so I find it interesting to hear your thoughts about it.

The reject for an 'unsafe to fly' aircraft is just to cover anything unexpected and therefore I agree that it might be better to leave this decision with the captain.

[DownIn3Green]

Reivilo...now you're back to square one...who decides what condition(s) make the A/C "unsafe to fly"?

Captain's decision, period...not some 250 hr "cadet"...

[Pugilistic Animus]

Not true. I've flown a couple of different airplanes which included an FE (Flight Engineer).

Sorry, professional flight engineers too:)

but by including that qualifier---it totally destroys the timing and rhythm of my joke:}

I still think ideally other flight crew members call the failure and the captain shall decide the RTO---a seasoned professional FO will have no trouble with that,..if you upgrade then you'll get your chance to practice RTOs:)

[SNS3Guppy]

Ok. Could you then explain why to reject 20kts below V1 for an opening door? I personally think that you should not reject in this event, so I find it interesting to hear your thoughts about it.

You're not familiar with side cargo door on the B747, are you?

[reivilo]

You're right, I am not.
My opinion is only based on the tiny type I fly, so I'm curious!

[FE Hoppy]

I should have been clearer judging by the above remark. Yes - the pre-flight briefing on the subject of tyre burst ramifications was discussed carefully.

A couple of accident reports that covered tyre burst events was given to the "students" to read the day before the sim trip.

The FCTM coverage of below and above 80 knots reject policy was discussed.

In the simulator the students were told that around 20 knots below V1 that they would get a tyre failure of the left outboard tyre and could expect a slight pull to the left and lots of airframe vibration.

It was a training exercise not a testing exercise and they knew it. If with all that preparation and knowledge of exactly what was going to happen, I believe that most people would accept the instructor could not do much more to help the students learn?

Very thorough indeed but I guess this was the first practical demonstration and they got it wrong. Not the first time that’s happened and certainly in itself not something to worry about. Repetition would soon fix both the misuse of the stop call and the incorrect response.
My real concern would be the impact of them reading your comments on here as I'm pretty sure they would recognise the scenario. As a professional instructor I wouldn't feel it appropriate to post specifics on an open forum. But that might just be me being overly sensitive!

[Meikleour]

Reivilo: United Airlines, B747, ex Honolulu - forward cargo door opened then DETACHED in the climb. Many passengers in their seats sucked out of the aircraft, some going through the inboard engine. Subsequent two-engined approach completed with much skill by the crew despite severe control problems. Usually quoted on CRM courses.

Listen and learn from your elders!!

[reivilo]

Thanks Meikleour. I have ofcourse heard about this accident, but I was in the understanding that the aircraft was pressurized when the door opened in flight, which is why the passengers were sucked out. During takeoff the cabin is only slightly pressurized but the force wouldn't be strong enough to suck everything out, or would it?

Ofcourse I want to learn, thats why I ask a question! Whats wrong with that? Maybe you have misinterpreted my post where I initially ask my question and thereafter you start flaming on me, just because I'm not an 'experienced elderly' guy like you. I apologise for that and now I will bang my head on the table three times as a punishment. :ugh:

[divinehover]

I'm assuming most of the contributers here fly for outfits with very junior F/O's. The F/O's in the company I work for average about 8000 hrs with many 1000's on heavy jets. If these guys are incapable of making such a simple judgment as when to reject then they should never get there commands anyway. After 13 yrs in the right seat of B737 or B744 are you going to wake up one day with a magical understanding of energy management.

Train your crews properly people. Allowing a PROFESSIONAL F/O to call the STOP is not reliquishing your command. On a long haul flight the Capt spends a 1/3 of it sleeping in the bunk whilst trusting his Snr F/O to make sound decisions in the event of ANY emergency.

I would like to see the stats on Stop/Go incidents and compare the two philosophies and see if there is any safety advantage of one over the other.

DH

[Hey Driver]

8000 hours, halve that and you will still have more total time than a Captain and FO combined for many low cost airlines.

Easyjet's policy once allowed the FO to reject. After a few unnecessary and very exciting RTO's they reverted to the manufacturers guidelines.

No matter how well you train someone you can't give them experience.

[BOAC]

The big problem with tapping the Captain on the shoulder at V1-10kts and saying 'excuse me Sir, we have a cargo door open' is obvious.

Time, I think, to chuck in the BA 737 that aborted (V1=Vr) on an F/O's take-off when the Captain said 'Stop' instead of 'rotate'.:p. That should get the righteous fired up here.............:)

[411A]

Time, I think, to chuck in the BA 737 that aborted (V1=Vr) on an F/O's take-off when the Captain said 'Stop' instead of 'rotate'
Nothing especially new, more BA complete nonsense, as usual.:rolleyes:

[BOAC]

Bit busy today?:)

[DFC]

Generally the brief is conducted along the lines of "We will consider rejecting the takeoff for any problem under 80 knots. Between 80 knots and V1 we will reject only for engine fire, failure, or loss of directional control, an outward opening door, or anything which brings the ability of the airplane to fly into question."



Is the take-off roll at 75 Knots the place to be "considering" what to do?

Most places in my experience say "We will stop for anything up to 80Kt".

Then they say that between 80Kt and V1 they will stop for a very short list of critical items.

Most people posting here seem to think that there is some timme for considering what is happening and making a considered decision as to stop or continue.

There isn't. That is why the list of items for which the aircraft will be stopped between 80Kt and V1 is very clear.

Let's think about the following - The Captain is pilot flying anbd at V1-10 the FO shouts "Engine" or perhaps "Engine problem" or perhaps "High EGT".

Does it really matter what they shout? Who is going to stop lookoing outside to check the engine indications?

I am sure that 80% would safely continue to look out side and stop the aircraft on the runway. The next 15% would get airbourne (or try to) with an engine failure well prior to V1 and the last 5% would look inside the "consider" what is happening and run off the side of the runway while accelerating!!

Think of it - you are flying the aircraft. You have a colleague who is qualified to be there on your right and who you have clearly brief what will cause the aircraft to be stopped between 80Kt and V1. provided that they shout loudly about a failure are you ever going to do anything other than stop (unless it isunsafe to do so)? and if so then would it be any different if they used "stop" rather than some possible list of words that you may not hear correctly?

This topic comes up again and again here and it is well worth reading other related topics here and elsewhere eg the one about Captains refusing to let the FO be PF on the required legs. If one does then one will see that there are quite a few people who clearly prefer to operate as single crew even when they type is required to operate multi crew.

Finally, I have to say that referring to a qualified and rated pilot as "a cadet" is simply going to cause problems again and again because people like that tend to be the ones that find;

1 The FO let's them sink before stepping in to save the day

2 The refueler always seems to take a bit longer when they see who the Captain is

3. The handling agent / dispatcher always takes some extra time before releasing the flight

4. The cabin crew leave the row zero passengers to starve and dehydrate

:)

[Airclues]

In BA the F/O only rejects for a limited number of clearly defined events, which are brief prior to take-off. These include engine failure, fire, blocked runway and loss of control (and the captain calling 'stop' whether intentional or not). For any other reason, such as burst tyre or smoke, only the captain can call 'stop'. The system seemed to work well, and I didn't see many problems on sim checks.

I also flew for an airline that didn't allow the F/O to reject and once again it seemed to work well. The CAA insisted that all F/O's carried out a reject on the simulator every three years just in case of incapacitation. Personally I don't think that this is enough and should be done either yearly or on every check.

Dave

[SNS3Guppy]

You're right, I am not.
My opinion is only based on the tiny type I fly, so I'm curious!

On the B742 we have two big cargo doors for the main deck, and two big cargo doors for the lower cargo areas. One on the main deck behind the wing on the left side, and the nose opens up, too.

Outward opening doors on the airplane have a max wind speed of 45 knots, and a max wind speed once open of 60 knots. Opening at a higher speed in flight is initially going to impart a very strong rolling moment, and the door is mostly likely to separate. If it does, the results won't be pretty.

An opening cargo door is a bad thing, during the takeoff or in flight.

Most places in my experience say "We will stop for anything up to 80Kt".

Then they say that between 80Kt and V1 they will stop for a very short list of critical items.

Most people posting here seem to think that there is some timme for considering what is happening and making a considered decision as to stop or continue.

There isn't. That is why the list of items for which the aircraft will be stopped between 80Kt and V1 is very clear.

There is nothing on the forward caution panel which we consider worthy of rejecting the takeoff. If the safety of the takeoff is in doubt, and below 80 knots, then the option to stop is there. Above 80 knots, it had better be a good reason, and some of the specific reasons are given, as well as the proviso that anything which throws the ability to takeoff safely into question, may result in a RTO. After V1, we're going flying anyway.

Let's think about the following - The Captain is pilot flying anbd at V1-10 the FO shouts "Engine" or perhaps "Engine problem" or perhaps "High EGT".

Does it really matter what they shout? Who is going to stop lookoing outside to check the engine indications?

That would be the flight engineer. Chances are that if someone is shouting out an engine malfunction, it's the FE, anyway.

I'm assuming most of the contributers here fly for outfits with very junior F/O's. The F/O's in the company I work for average about 8000 hrs with many 1000's on heavy jets. If these guys are incapable of making such a simple judgment as when to reject then they should never get there commands anyway.


Presently our new-hire F/O's are in the 10,000 to 20,000 hour range and no, they're not allowed to reject the takeoff. This has nothing to do with their capability. It has to do with standardized policy. The captain elects to reject the takeoff. If the FO is performing the takeoff and the captain announces a reject, the captain takes the airplane and rejects. If the FO is flying and the captain elects not to reject, the FO keeps flying. Simple.

Train your crews properly people. Allowing a PROFESSIONAL F/O to call the STOP is not reliquishing your command. On a long haul flight the Capt spends a 1/3 of it sleeping in the bunk whilst trusting his Snr F/O to make sound decisions in the event of ANY emergency.


Say again?

On a long haul flight, our captains spend the flight at the controls. In an augmented crew, a second captain is available and a second flight engineer. In a heavy crew, a second first officer is available, second captain, and second flight engineer. Ideally in that case, each crewmember will spend about half their time in rest...but at no time do we have a "senior FO" in charge of the airplane.

Whether the FO makes a rejected takeoff or not is NOT a matter of personal decision for the captain at our company. By standardization, the captain will always make the rejected takeoff. There is no provision for the FO making the rejected takeoff. This is NOT an issue of training, professionalism, or anything but a company set standard. It is NOT a matter of trust. It is NOT a matter of experience or background. A 5,000 hour FO isn't authorized to reject, and neither is a 20,000 hour FO...and we've got a number of them.

One shouldn't assume. The assumption that policy is driven by mistrust or an egoistic captain is misplaced, and in error.

You're welcome to come re-educate the training department, of course.

[decurion]

See for a recent study on the Rejected Takeoff topic:

http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/1326.pdf

[camel]

Sn3..

So on your 3 man long haul flight ..does the capt never go back for a 'comfort break' cup of tea, stretch legs,nap or heaven forbid smoke or whatever ?

assuming that most will do ....then your trusty f/o (and f/e) IS the one making decisions about weather,routing,levels ,emergencies etc etc.

tad hard to initiate an emergency decent with ur pants around your ankles?

[ImbracableCrunk]

After having followed the thread, the obvious answer to our problem is. . .

CA is PM.
FO is PF.
Every takeoff.

CAs observe and use their abort authority should his/her/its experience deem it necessary.

Nice and safe and logical. I can almost hear the POMs/FOMs being rewritten now. Expect the revision in your mailbox on Monday.

[reivilo]

:ok: Nice conclusion ImbracableCrunk.
This will greatly improve the safety during all takeoffs! Can't wait for the revision ;)

[Denti]

SNS3Guppy, it is indeed common in a lot of airlines that an augmented crew is made up of a captain, a senior FO or cruise relief captain and a normal FO. PIC in this case is the captain for the whole flight, even if he is resting in the bunk. The SFO in that case has some additional training but not full command training.

As far as i know that kind of operation is currently under review by the EASA and other agencies in the aftermath of AF447 to assure that allways a fully trained captain is at the controls.

But that is thoroughly off topic here.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Can't wait for the revision?...I think in certain airlines the revision comes when you're captain ...otherwise...they're Nah Ganna Duit...:}

What the heck..thread creep

YouTube - Gene Krupa sing sing sing (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqOlC4kr53Y&NR=1)

:ouch:

[reivilo]

Can't wait for the revision?...I think in certain airlines the revision comes when you're captain ...otherwise...they're Nah Ganna Duit...Gosh Sherlock, they're not? :hmm:

But on a more serious note, when I think about it: Why not let the captain monitor during all take-offs? If he, apparantly, is the only one capable of deciding to go or reject, he should be given the most time and information that is available to make that decision. And he would have that if he is PM during every t/o...

[SNS3Guppy]

SNS3Guppy, it is indeed common in a lot of airlines that an augmented crew is made up of a captain, a senior FO or cruise relief captain and a normal FO. PIC in this case is the captain for the whole flight, even if he is resting in the bunk. The SFO in that case has some additional training but not full command training.

We don't have senior FO's, nor do we have "cruise captains." We have Captains, FO's, and FE's.

An augmented "heavy" crew for us involves two captains, an FO, and two FE's. A double crew involves two captains, two FO's, and two FE's. In either case, a captain always occupies the left seat.

[reivilo]

When we operate 'heavy crew' (Egypt triangles from EU), It's 1 Capt, 1 FO and 1 SFO, who will occupy the LH seat when the captain is resting in the back. The SFO has received 'cruise relief' training and should be fully capable of making decisions and executing procedures like an emergency descent in case of decompression, or immediate diversion in case of medical. In other cases where the 'decision area' is more grey, the captain will be called back to the cockpit to make the decision. IMHO I actually don't see any problem in this using a SFO as cruise relief 'captain'.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Gosh Sherlock, they're not?

and For $100 bucks I can offer even greater wisdom--Being that I'm the grand high exalted mystic ruler :}

[Maurice Chavez]

Why don't just adhere to the manufacturer? Airplane manufacturer of the types that I fly says: "The captain has the sole responsibility for the decision to reject the takeoff. If the decision is to reject the takeoff, the captain must clearly announce 'REJECT', immediately start the rejected takeoff maneuver, and assume control of the airplane". Doesn't mention the F/O calling out to reject. He or she would reject only following a pilot incapacitation, IE 80 knots call....

Forgot to add, by following the manufacturer recommendations, your @ss and the airline has been covered in the event of a mishap....

But then again, what do I know....

[SNS3Guppy]

If he, apparantly, is the only one capable of deciding to go or reject, he should be given the most time and information that is available to make that decision.

Who has said anything about only the captain being capable? Whether others on board are capable of making the decision is irrelevant, where policy is established and standardized. If policy exists within a company organization that the captain will reject the takeoff, whether the first officer or others on board or capable (or not) is entirely irrelevant.

The first officer may be a first class writer, too...but that doesn't mean he or she will be authoring a novel on this leg. You see the point?

[ImbracableCrunk]

Who has said anything about only the captain being capable?


I'd say about the first ten posters who used the term "cadet."