The Enemy within

[thebword]

I am extremely disappointed at the lack of understanding of air power in the recent debate over the SDSR; indeed it was for this very reason that Lord Trenchard formed an independent Air Force in 1918 – a vision that delivered victory in the War that followed. If the Army had controlled the Air Force in 1940 we would have lost many of our fighter aircraft in France and the Battle of Britain that followed would have had a very different outcome.

At a time when air power has never been more needed (ask any soldier in Afghanistan who is currently only getting less than half the air support he is asking for), only those who do not understand it call for its abolition or its absorption within the other two Services. Regrettably, this is being done by individuals who seek to protect their own self interests, rather than to provide this Country with the Defence capability that it needs to meet the threats of tomorrow – in my dictionary that equates to betrayal or treason and they should think before they speak.

In modern warfare there are always competing priorities for air power in support of different phases of a campaign, or in different geographical areas. It is for this reason that unified air power needs to be controlled centrally and apportioned where the priority is greatest (a central tenet of air power that is universally accepted). Not only is this the most efficient use of assets it is also the most effective because weight of effort can be switched quickly in order to unhinge and defeat an enemy (the Taliban know this which is why they are so quick to discredit air power – something that they know is untrue because most civilian casualties are caused by ground based fire and Taliban action).

Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence or firepower for lightly equipped troops (e.g. the USMC), are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Ultimately, such a decision would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results.


This defence review must reduce costs without impacting unduly on capability, only an independent air force can deliver the efficiency required and every other major military power has learned this lesson. In Afghanistan, RAF aircraft operate across the entire country helping and protecting troops wherever they are needed, this allows relatively small numbers of fast aircraft the ability to cover many tasks simultaneously.

What is needed ultimately is a balanced force, and that would be best achieved through a balanced argument – armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved. The terrible casualties suffered by our brave soldiers in Afghanistan through relatively low tech threats today would pale in to insignificance if they ever faced a credible air threat. A quick look at the World’s Air Forces will quickly show that other Nations are not so keen to remove their asymmetric advantage or have them parcelled out to have them defeated piecemeal!

[tonker]

Humans never learn.

And when the next threat comes over the horizon, and history tells us it surely will then we can look forward to the 20-30 year lead in time to it takes to re-quip our forces with frontline equipment. But of course then it will be far too late!

Still, at least we won't have much dept:rolleyes:

[Pontius Navigator]

A well argued piece. One could believe that this is indeed from TheBWord himself. While it is a cogent arguement for an Independent Air Force it does not address the central question of the composition of that Air Force.

Fox said we can't afford everything. Is he right or wrong?

He questions the need for C130, A400 and C17. While the A400 has similarities with the C130 and can supposedly undertake some of the C17 roles, do we need it?

It would give us a marginal increase in AT at the cost of a third support infrastructure and training cost. Is Fox suggesting cancellation? Cancellation might involve penalty clauses but would avoid all the additional support costs.

Would Fox or TBW advocate a similar axe in one of the FJ types - Typhoon, F3, GR4, GR7/9? The F3 is effectively out of the game. The Typhoon is the new kid on the block. This puts the GR4-GR7/9 in the frame. Chopping the GR4 offers the additional attraction of chopping out the WSO training stream too and in the medium term getting rid of the remaining WSO in the multis.

If MRA4 continues then you should be able to train all the mission crew at one school.

So, how would TBW slice the cake?

[vecvechookattack]

Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence or firepower for lightly equipped troops (e.g. the USMC), are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Ultimately, such a decision would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results.


Are you saying that the RAF should take over the role of the FAA and go to sea? It makes sense....would cut costs and use less manpower. But with a small RW force of just 3 types - Chinook, AH and Wildcat, there may not be enough aircraft for all of us to fly

[Mr C Hinecap]

Rumours abound that High Wycombe is rather fast jet focused for SDSR and willing to cast out everything else in order to achieve this - everything. Everyone wants air power for the height, speed, reach and ubiquity we were all taught. I'm constantly surprised how little noise Air Cmd made over UAVs and similar low-level but obviously air-orientated developments - new technology that we should have made more light blue?

[Tourist]

bword

You say:
"A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force."

and then site the falklands as an example:

"armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) would do best to study their history and recognise how that superiority was achieved"

The reason that we had such losses in the Falklands was due to the results of the last time the RAF said that they could do all of the aviating and the RN did not need proper carriers.

The RN needs organic air power.
You mention lack of understanding of air power and efficiency, but you totally fail to understand the other forces and specifically fail to understand how efficiently the other forces manage to support their air arms in terms of manpower and bases.

[Chugalug2]

bword, I agree with your defence of the need for an Independent Air Force. However, that very name was given to a Strategic Bomber Force, not a Fighter one, and was the war winning component of which you speak. The Battle of Britain prevented defeat, as did the Battle of the Atlantic. It was the strategic bombing campaign, the only way to take the war to the enemy heartland itself, that ensured victory. Nazi Germany lacked such a strategic bomber force and was unable to interfere with the huge arms production ramped up by the soviets in the east, for example. That is why they lost at Kursk, and was a major cause of them losing the war.

[The B Word]

I'd just like to say that I am "The B Word" and not this impostor!!

[Finnpog]

If accepting the precedent of Trenchard's wisdom, and therefore by extrapolation the value of establishing of the Rocks by Royal Warrant... surely Inskip's decision is equally as valid.

Whether we can afford everything is another matter - and unfortunately it is the key driver here.

[thebword]

Apologies to “ The B Word” – I should have checked the monikers already in use! Mine was a play on many levels - I will leave you to make your guesses!

My thread was started to raise intelligent debate – rather than the very asinine one that seems to pervade our newspapers, with so-called informed comment.

I wanted to avoid falling too quickly in to what goes and what stays – that needs to flow from a policy that states what we are and what we must do. If we did, I am confident that air power would have a key role to play in our future, as it has in our past. I have my own views and they are less drastic than those that make headlines. Comment here suggests Air Command is too fast jet centric – I think you will find that impression has now been created by the need to defend so strongly the almost fanatical drive to kill off the very core of our being. It is the voracity of that attack from all quarters that has generated so many questions and thence answers. Undoubtedly there will be trading towards the end of the review – for now there are no direct trade offs being made between one type or another – that may have to come but that is the price of having a force that is too small to do everything. We will have to establish what is more important, but only when we have the policy baseline to do so. If the fast jet critics were to look at the reductions in combat squadrons over the last 20 years they might be surprised. Current plans will have us down to less than 10 (small ~ 12/15 crews) combat sqns (RAF and FAA) by next year (not including OCUs) that is about half the size of the French or German Air Forces!

I do support the capabilities that fast air (manned for now) brings, without expecting to be accused of being a cold war dinosaur. Moreover, the capabilities that we now deploy are more diverse and balanced that at any time in our history. However, we are approaching critical mass in many of those hard edged capabilities that will be difficult to maintain and impossible to recover once lost. We should think very carefully before we trade them in for something else. The last time I looked the word Force was in RAF – our current and future enemies would take full advantage of its loss. I accept that numbers will come under review but they can only be derived once you establish your need. It is no good playing on the world stage when you have a third class act.

The Falklands was another time and may prove to be the last time we have to launch an amphibious task group for a non-discretionary operation. But that is for others to decide and history to prove. My point there was to argue for control of the air, and to remind those who have forgotten what it is to operate without it.

As for “owning” the FAA I make no such play, as I stated some assets need to be dedicated to roles that make complete sense to remain in the ownership of their employers. Of course we have already made a great leap of faith with the joint nature of Joint Force Harrier – aircraft “owned” by the RAF, flown by men and women from both Services and operated from Land and Sea – Joint employment of airpower at its best. JCA is planned to operate similarly.

What I was saying is that air power is inherently flexible and adaptable, and that must include the time, place and method of its employment – that is best done from a position of oversight to the entire campaign and ones beyond it. Our aircraft in Afghanistan could very quickly be retasked to meet another threat (not a million miles away) in very quick time and without skipping a beat. That is what air power brings and why it needs to be controlled by an airman.

[The B Word]

thebword

No worries on the "handle" front - I just wanted to clarify :ok:

I totally agree with your stand point and that we need to maintain a "Force Mix", if at all possible. If this is not possible, then we need to front-load the "high end" capabilities, in order to PFI the "lower end" capabilities (aka AT and AAR). Which is already incoming with FSTA - how much it will save is up for debate though!

The problem is three-fold in my opinion:

1. Not enough money to invest - we've spent it all on point "2"!
2. Insistence on buying British - which is normally costly and late!
3. Still too much "stove-piping" in capability (eg. Typhoon is still too AD focused, Nimrod MRA4 (where on earth does the "A" come from!!!), Sentinel R1 (one trick pony), Rivet Joint (another one trick pony) and the legacy fleet such as AWACS (one trick pony)). Luckily, Reaper is a true multi-role capability, but is still a UOR, and I really hope that JSF/JCA delivers the true multi-role that we need.

Finally, the growth in ISTAR or ISR capability is draining the FJ resource for the current fight. Really this should be a "system of systems" approach - aka CDS' "Combat ISTAR". Sadly, I suspect that SDSR will not have grasped this nettle until it is too late and something stupid like scrapping AWACS will happen. "Control of the Air" is so very important in Air Power and without AWACS we will stabbing in the dark with a few assets. Just like AAR the AWACS is one of the "force multipliers". But we do need to modify it so that it isn't a one trick pony, as we cannot afford to this anymore.

On a plus side, I sense that the Army are not going to get away with the cuts that were so smugly pointing out a couple of months ago. The tanks will be hit hard and also it is not surprising that Brigade rotation for HERRICK past 2014 has not been announced. I know the Govt plan for HMForces to be out by then, but I would have thought the Army would have announced that by now? Maybe, they're not expecting to know which Brigades are available for post 2014?

So how would I carve up the RAF to make it affordable? Remember "Front Line First" that wasn't actually "Front Line First" at all?

Get rid of:

1. PTI branch and ask SERCo to run gyms and also Multi-Stage Fitness Tests - they run hundreds of Leisure Centres accross the UK already.
2. RAF Regt - ask the army to protect our airfields (sorry Rocks, you do a great job, but this is really Land Force's business - especially since you lost Rapier SHORAD).
3. RAF ATC - civilianise with NATS/SERCo, keep a cadre of "Sponsored Reserves" augmented by the ABM branch for theatre based ATC.
4. The ridiculous trg regime to get to theatre - about 6 weeks of PDT followed by a repeat of everything again when you arrive at KAF/BSN (pointless!!). And how difficult can it be not to "op lock" people on JPA as they leave the UK at BZN!!!
5. The majority of MT - get people to use their own cars, public transport or hire cars through companies like "Easy Car Hire". Especially, if we could use our Govt Procurement Cards (GPC) to provide "Value For Money" as they were designed to do!
6. Travel Control departments - the amount of time this wastes, allow us to use GPC and save money!
7. Education centres - outsource!
8. Stn Police Flights - use MPGS and stop the Police trying to do computer security and leave it to the professionals (the A6 branch!).
9. HSE - grow some b@lls and stand up to this shower of mini-Hitlers. For example, how many disabled Typhoon pilots and engineers do we have? Then why on earth does 29 Sqn need expensive disabled access FFS? Jeeeez!! Why on earth can't we self-help and paint/decorate our accomodation anymore?!! Maybe if we did then the buildings might last a bit longer and not need an expensive contractor to come and fix them.
10. Groups - put everything into Air Command, bin 1Gp, 2Gp and 22Gp. Obviously, there would need to be a rebalance of manpower but it should save 30-40% of the manpower.
11. Air Warfare Centre - reduce in size significantly - why are there nearly 1,400 people in the AWC? Most people can't even access the Universal Tactics Manual at present anyway, so it's a self licking lollipop (IMHO).

Now I believe that lot would save a few "high end" capabilities - remember "Front Line First"....

The B Word

[Grimweasel]

Great synopsis there B-Word - do you still have any influence with the likes of Dalton et al? Maybe you should appraise him - the earlier comment on the fast jet focus is worrying - one reason why the RAF should potentially have CEO's that are not from the pilot, single seat background. Could be refreshing if Bryant was the next CAS - less front seat FJ dominance. Not that I'm jealous but I hate to see the rest of the RAF sacrificed for the sake of a few expensive toys!

The GR4 should be axed and if the A400M is procured get rid of the c130J - Would we still need a huge AT fleet if our external operations are going to be limited by lack of funds over the next decades? The C130K should also be totally axed and with it the WSO capability. That would save money getting rid of a branch. We should keep the GR7/9 as its a cheap and effective CAS platform with less of the GR4s limitations. If GR4 goes, close Lossie and Marham too. Keep CH47, bin Merlin (to the Navy). Do all RAF Trg at Cranwell and close Halton. Close Benson move RAF Helo ops to Odiham. Do all FJ trg at one Stn (Valley) and move the RAF Regt into the Army, close Honington. Bin the Red Arrows or get the FO to pay for them and move into one Logs and Admin function across all 3 services. Simples!

[The B Word]

Grimweasel

You, Sir, have hit the nail on the head very squarely...

The B Word (the other one) :ok:

[StopStart]

thebword

A well stated piece with which it is fairly difficult to find fault. Air Power is, however, hugely expensive and we, as a fighting force, should be looking to produce the same effect from within a shrinking budget. We cannot afford to sacrifice the other, less dramatic pillars of Air Power simply to support an overly expensive fast air fleet purchase.

You consign the Falklands conflict to another era and that may be so, however we cannot cherry pick which parts of history we would like to fall back on to support our argument. I would contend that in arming to fight in the modern world we can find little in history from which to draw guidance. Our future involvement in warfare will be in coalition conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan and in colonial "adventures" like Sierra Leone. There will be no repeat of the BEF, the Battle of Britain or Malaya. The UK Armed Forces must configure to be lightweight, adaptable, rapidly deployable, relevant and - above all - very well trained. It is our training and the quality of people that has traditionally filled any "gaps" in equipment capabilities.

If the fast jet critics were to look at the reductions in combat squadrons over the last 20 years they might be surprised. Current plans will have us down to less than 10 (small ~ 12/15 crews) combat sqns (RAF and FAA) by next year (not including OCUs) that is about half the size of the French or German Air Forces!

I'm not a fast jet critic but one only has to look at the relative sizes of the different defence budgets to start seeing holes in this argument. We are given the cash - how we chose to spend it is up to "us". I could take £1000 and get one massively oversized flat screen 3D HD TV for my sitting room and then moan that I need a TV in the bedroom and kitchen. Or I do what my European neighbour has done and go and buy 3 smaller TVs. I then have what I want albeit without the overpriced front room showpiece. I may lose in pub stats with the American exchange officer next door who has a 50" LCD in every room in his house but he's a millionaire and can afford it. Gone are the days of Keeping-up-with-the-Joneses. There is no reason why we can't have umpteen sqns of fast jets (if thats we need to achieve the aim) but one has to cut ones cloth accordingly. How many F/A18s would one get for half the JSF budget? And how much less would we be able to do with them? Not a lot I suggest, especially if you consider who and what we may be going up against in the future.

The B Word

I suspect trimming away support elements of the RAF would save the square root of stuff all, especially when we're talking in terms of cuts of up to 20% of a £36bn budget.

As for "front loading the high end stuff" I refer you to my comments above. Which great air battle are we going to fight outwith a coalition? Yes we need organic AAR and AWACs but not the extent we currently have. And without wishing to be overly defensive your consigning of AT to a "low end" capability just demonstrates the usual FJ mindset that generally can't see past the end of it's radome. How many CQWI & COMAO training packages have come back high-fiving each other for having shot down a few bad guys only to discover they all failed to defend the C130 which was shot down doing the SF/para/whatever insert that was the point of the whole task anyway. Control of the Air isn't a aim in itself, merely a facilitator for other war fighting activities to be able to take place down below. The RAF needs to remember that and configure accordingly if it is to be of any relevance within what is fast becoming a tiny UK defence community.

We do ourselves and Defence in general, no favours through internal quibbles over who has the most important toy in the playground. We need firm, stated direction and policy from the Govt through which we can then configure ourselves accordingly. Any such configuring must be done through reasoned and informed debate, untainted by petty parochialisms.

[Lightning Mate]

All I would like to say is that I'm glad I was once in a real Air Force...

.....circa late sixties.

[Lima Juliet]

Stopstart

As for "front loading the high end stuff" I refer you to my comments above. Which great air battle are we going to fight outwith a coalition? Yes we need organic AAR and AWACs but not the extent we currently have. And without wishing to be overly defensive your consigning of AT to a "low end" capability just demonstrates the usual FJ mindset that generally can't see past the end of it's radome. How many CQWI & COMAO training packages have come back high-fiving each other for having shot down a few bad guys only to discover they all failed to defend the C130 which was shot down doing the SF/para/whatever insert that was the point of the whole task anyway

I would say that AT and AAR are at the lower end of what we need from a uniformed capability. However, when it comes to TAC AT, especially iso SF, we definately do need this. But why, oh why, do we have to pretend at playing civvy airports at BZN with Tristars and DISCOM charters. Just TAC AT, that should be our aim...IMHO

LJ :ok:

[The B Word]

LJ

You beat me to it!

Stopstart

When it comes to Tac AT, then you have my vote. But Tristars and all their support infra and personnel must be expensive and in my opinion uneccessary. There is no point in having loads of FSTA aircraft and AWACS if they don't have the FJs to support - just the odd 3-4 FSTA to support extended range Tac AT ops (but that's a big luxury - in support of your argument, then why rely on the Coalition to provide).

The Coalition argument is also a bit thin, IMHO, it reminds me of this

http://www.mchumor.com/00images/1914_crime_cartoon.gif

How do you know that the next Coalition will have the right assets!!!

The B Word

[thebword]

Stopstart, Grimweasel and the “real” B Word, I hear all your arguments and I did try to avoid picking what capabilities should prevail – as I think we generally agree, the review should set the context first. However, here goes on a few points…

The support areas that get such a hard time are relatively small in cost terms, but I accept that we must seek efficiencies where it is right to do so. I can assure you that the examples offered will not make much of a dent in our deficit. Every little bit helps, but we must avoid taking disproportional pain for little gain. The Moral component is critical as we manage our way through the next few years and a potential upturn in the economy; if we lose the trust and sense of worth of our people then any amount of kit will count for nothing.

As for our command structures, a quick look at the Air Command phone book would show that it is not the Groups that dominate our costs. Less than 10% of the Command staff budget is taken up by the Groups, and they run over 90% of the RAF’s final outputs. Also, in case everyone has forgotten (and it would appear some have over the years), command is something we should focus on rather more then just the management of our business (all those MBAs and consultants have done little to improve the way we deliver combat effect). The RAF’s 2* Combatant Commanders are the Group Commanders, just as the Army have their Divisional Commands and the Navy their own 2* appointments. Of course if we are down sizing then we can all down rank. However, take a look across any coalition command structure and see that the influence begins at 2*, not below.

The GR4/GR9 debate is difficult as they both provide utility. The challenge is that you are not comparing like with like and the costs are not as simple as is presented here. There is much more to be saved from cancelling GR9 than the same amount of GR4 squadrons; only by taking larger slices from GR4 do you approach the same savings. Without giving away actual numbers, GR4 provides 4 times more of the RAF’s offensive combat power than GR9. Moreover, with the current situation in Afghanistan, this capability is in increasing demand. Having set out our stall to reduce fleet sizes and reduce costs, going to three small and, therefore, less efficient forces is counter intuitive. In capability terms you also have to balance the loss of mass, penetration, range, and weapons effects against the GR9’s one trump card of embarked capability – so it is a question of risk benefit. We have taken embarked capability at risk for the last 6 years, why not another 6? I have yet to hear the compelling evidence that we will find ourselves in a non-discretionary operation where embarked strike will be required - and no the Falkland Islands is not such a one (I can’t go into why here).

Which leads us to the future and the transition period; JCA is some way off and Typhoon deliveries are still small, you need to maintain some mass in order to have a trained workforce to introduce the new capabilities. Current criticism of Typhoon is unfair, the fleet size is too small to absorb the AD role it currently delivers and still grow in to MR – this will take time. However, both Typhoon and JCA will be great platforms that will provide far more than just the basic combat power roles, in any scenario across the full spectrum of warfare. They are not cheap (and that is the rub) but they will deliver the capability and agility that we seek and will be world beaters.

And just to provide balance and avoid making this a fast jet centric debate…

The other assets that we are intent on buying/replacing all have utility. Lift (rotary and fixed wing) is non-discretionary, but only to the levels required to meet future need – will we continue to run enduring operations at current levels, if not then we could take more risk? Just shaping our future needs on current demands is a mistake and our Coalition Government must have the courage to make the hard decisions without being “blackmailed” by current or past shortfalls. Personally, I think they have the courage to make that change but it will not be easy and the usual lobbies will be in full voice. The recent announcements on Afghanistan may be a signpost that they are ready to make that call, we shall see?

As for the larger ISTAR platforms we could see some rationalisation, but there are no obvious multi role/capability solutions. Each provides unique utility but we will have to make hard choices and platforms such as JCA will revolutionise air power employment in the future – as will future RPAS systems. Of course we also have to decide what things we need to do unilaterally and when we can rely on a coalition to provide capability. This is probably the nub of the problem; my view is that we should seek to provide the harder edge capabilities for three reasons; we have the will and the intent to use them, we are damned good at it, and it buys influence. The key appointments in Coalition HQs and the influence they bring must be bought and earned. If we want to become just another member of the coalition then we can offer the bare minimum and let others do the heavy lifting. Personally, I don’ think the UK is ready to become a bit part player and that means earning that place at the table – let the others do the easy stuff.

[Bismark]

thebword,

Part of the problem the RAF has is in the way it portrays itself to the other 2 Services and the politicians. The attitude "if it flies it must be RAF" articulated most forcefully by the immediately previous CAS (and still argued by some 3*s) does the RAF n o favours at all. Similarly, to articulate that only the RAF does "Air Power" when this is clearly not the case also does your Service no favours. Air Power takes many forms, including AH , the RN's attack and ASaC helos.

I guess the highlight of this attitude was the overt attempt to get rid of the FAA from the Harrier Force. This action did real damage to the RAF in the eyes of both Services and politicians and has not been forgotten by either. The ultimate removal of the capabiliity from Afg and subsequent FE@R reduction in favour of GR4 was cynical and spiteful. The same could be argued for the senseless removal of the, very cost effective, RN Jetstream T3s by the then RAF ACDS(RP).

I am a huge fan of the RAF but they need to get rid of their inferiority complex, be inclusive and start winning friends if they are to have a robust future.

[Two's in]

Nothing new here, and C Hinecap summarized why SDSR will be so damaging to the RAF with this comment;

Rumours abound that High Wycombe is rather fast jet focused for SDSR and willing to cast out everything else in order to achieve this - everything.

It's like taking candy from a baby for the Army and Navy when the only thing CAS wants to see secured for the future are fast jets. SDSR will demonstrate exactly what this level of paraochialism brings.

[thebword]

Bismark,

I think I avoided any such claim, indeed I accepted fully the need to keep organic air assets with their rightful owners. However, we cannot afford many organic systems and the assets that should remain independent are those that can be employed widely and, therefore, need to be controlled centrally by an airman (note I did not say by the RAF).

As for recent history you have to go back to the demise of the Sea Harrier to see where the trouble began. I would suggest that the RN’s actions and recent priorities have been the preservation of the carriers rather than the aircraft or aircrew that fly from them; this is even more true now as the RN have now mortgaged their surface fleet totally to protect QE & PoW. The fixed wing element of the FAA are as much a part of the RAF’s combat power as their RAF brothers and sisters. Apart from the hairstyles and the rank tabs there is nothing to tell 800 NAS apart from 1(F) Sqn in what and how they deliver. A quick glance at the hierarchy of the RN would suggest that they are not as valued as their more traditional sea going sailors, with SO1 the traditional ceiling in rank (higher appointments seem to be the preserve of rotary aircrew). I think that as we can no longer afford the luxury of small niche force structures the fixed wing element of the FAA is too small and fragile to survive easily. Even now the FAA cannot meet the 50% requirement of the now reduced JFH fleet.

The “if it files it must be RAF” was a single quote from a very long interview; it was convenient for those who had designs on the RAF to blow it out of proportion, which they did. The assets you cite, AH, and RN rotary aviation should remain firmly where they are, quite rightly. However, I do believe that this is less the case for other assets. Moreover, ownership should be about who understands it best not just who uses it – only an intelligent and capable JHC stands between the Army and potential mismanagement of the SH Force.

The forthcoming decisions on the Harrier Force will be about costs and taking risk, not removing the FAA; the most recent cuts to JFH saw only RAF cockpits lost, not RN, so claims that it was about the removal of the FAA are false. There will still be plans to ensure that the FAA crews can still take their place on the JCA ac once they come on line. As for removal from Afghanistan that was done because the Force had eroded all its high end skill sets (including embarked capability) and safety was in danger of being compromised (read the KAF accident report of the final Harrier crash). The subsequent FE@R reduction from Harrier was the most cost effective because it allowed the closure of a base, something that could not be done with GR4 without cutting capability deeper. I am afraid I am no expert on Jetstreams!

Like you with the RAF, I am a huge fan of the RN; their skills and capability are still world class, although somewhat hindered, like all of us, by a lack of resources and kit. As a result, we need to focus on what we do best and learn to work closer together and trust each other more. That will take time, but we must learn quickly if we are not to let this review divide and conquer us. Our inferiority complex is borne from constant attack (show me an airman who has called for the abolition of the Army or the RN?), stop those and you will find us the most loyal and trusted friends.

Two’s In,

As I stated the so-called fast jet focussed High Wycombe is fighting a sustained attack on those very assets, hence the skewed debate. Just take a look at the key seniors and you will see a better balance than has been the case for a long time. I know this is a rumour network, but any belief that the RAF will cast out anything to save fast jets is untrue and unfounded. If you read any of CAS’ speeches you will see that he argues for a balanced air force that possesses a broad mix of capabilities. He has also kept wise counsel whilst others (mostly retired admittedly) have made sweeping, scandalous statements which do us all harm.
As I said at the beginning of this thread, this is about our Country and its Defence capability, all single service agendas need to be kept in check if the debate is to be rational and the outcome sensible.

[StopStart]

Whilst the coalition "excuse" can be seen as something of a cop out you do have to realistically consider who it is we will be going up against on our own and why. thebword suggests:
Our aircraft in Afghanistan could very quickly be retasked to meet another threat (not a million miles away) in very quick time and without skipping a beat.
This is of course true and demonstrates the flexibility of air power but are we really going to configure our military to be able to take on someone like Iran on the off chance we get cross with them but no-one else does? Yes, our slack handful of GR4s could flash off across the border in very short order but I'd suggest it would be a brief and inglorious sortie without the full weight of the USA behind us. The UK has long passed on the mantle of unelected World Policeman to the USA and it would have to be a very peculiar set of circumstances that would lead to us loading up the bombers to take on some "rogue state" single-handedly.

Perhaps I lack suitable foresight, am too much of a realist or simply haven't read enough Tom Clancy but I do struggle to see a situation arising that would either require us to vigorously defend our borders alone or see us air-landing main battle tanks into a capital city we've just captured. Gulf War 1, Bosnia, Kosovo, Telic and Herrick were all coalition adventures and set the trend for future coalition warfare. Coalition campaigns are about bringing international unity of purpose to bear on a state or government that the world at large is generally hacked off with. The government can express their support for the cause by sending 1 platoon or one 1 battlegroup - with the USA involved (as they invariably are) it genuinely doesn't matter. Unlike your cartoon The B Word, coalition ops aren't analogous to "disorganised" crime. Gulf War 1 was a swift venture to clear out an invader from a friendly nation. All the key players were united in that aim and the war proceeded to rapidly achieve it's stated aims. The "disorganisation" comes when you insist on hanging about afterwards and the coalition members start poking off, happy that they've achieved what they came for. That's where politics and governmental direction should step in....

On our own then I'd foresee us operating against either failed states/rebels in a former colony or going to the aid of a former colony against an external aggressor. I'd suggest it'll be a long time before we go rolling into another Iraq/Afghanistan again so these scenarios (along with home defence) post-Afghanistan should be our focus. The result is, again, a lightweight but well equipped portable and projectable force. For the RAF this sees a force (forgive the specifics) of multi-role FJ (Typhoon) with modern AAR support (FSTA) and AWACs overwatch (E3D). To maintain an organic ISTAR picture, assets such as the Sentinel & the R1 are key players along with our Reaper/Predator. Your rapid airland/para/airdrop/SF support comes from your TacAT platform (C130J/A400) with C17 providing the heavyweight and rapid airlift. Chinook provides your battlefield rotary support. FJ, rotary and AAR/AT are obviously all key elements of a balanced force structure and only a fool would suggest we denude ourselves of one to bolster another.

Assuming that's the basis for your force structure then the question really becomes one of size within a defined budget. If the Typhoon truly is multi-role then expand that fleet and we operate as a single type with Sqn sub-specialisations. Where does JSF fit in? In the RN on their carrier perhaps but in the RAF? I'm not seeing it frankly. AAR from FSTA with a pax/cargo capability on top is a key enabler but, as other posters have alluded, we have no need for a an RAF internal "airline". Once civilian contract airlines start fitting DAS to their aircraft the justification for us maintaining our own airline evaporates. Our E3 fleet is about twice the size of that of France. Strictly necessary? No. Can we incorporate more sensor suites into it to reduce reliance on other types (R1/RIVET JOINT etc) or do we reduce the fleet down to a sensible size? For the rotary world, can we justify £300M on upgrading the creaking Puma fleet? One could go on.

As the last couple of posters have noted however, it is our internal machinations and "empire-building" that truly threaten us. Perhaps JSF is super important for our future force structure but then so is owning a Aston Martin to my future lifestyle structure. If we can't afford it then we can't afford it. I am just disheartened that we all know that the RAF hierarchy will rip the RAF to pieces just to make it "affordable".

[Something witty]

thebword:

You set out to defend the RAF from absorption into the other services. I agree with you on this. However you also state some way down:

…A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force.

I have answered your points as raised in the defence of the AAC & FAA:

I am extremely disappointed at the lack of understanding of air power in the recent debate over the SDSR; indeed it was for this very reason that Lord Trenchard formed an independent Air Force in 1918 Indeed it was for a similar lack of understanding that the Royal Naval Air Service was reformed as the Fleet Air Arm only a few years later - the RAF focused entirely upon their bombing to the detriment of every other discipline, including support to the RN. We have an Army Air Corps today for the very same reason.

– a vision that delivered a victory in the War that followed. It prevented defeat and gave us the breathing space to achieve victory. The RAF (and the many members of the FAA involved) did not 'win' WWII alone in the BATTLE of Britain. Just as the RN did not in rescuing the Army at Dunkirk, winning the Battle of the Atlantic against the U-Boats or delivering the Army to the beaches of Normandy - their collective efforts however set the conditions to enable the Army to take the fight back over the Channel and Rhine and defeat the enemy.

If the Army had controlled the Air Force in 1940 we would have lost many of our fighter aircraft in France and the Battle of Britain that followed would have had a very different outcome. Possibly true…and were it not for the Royal Navy and many civilian volunteers we would not have saved the Army, a different outcome again.

At a time when air power has never been more needed (ask any soldier in Afghanistan who is currently only getting less than half the air support he is asking for), Are we talking CAS? If so then I can only speak from very limited experience - it was on station when needed. I understand too that its practical use is now reduced anyway (due circumstance); I did not hear of any shortage of CAS but it may have been the case. If you mean AT then I certainly agree, there need to be far more airframes (and crews?) available; replacement of the older a/c would help too.

If talking SH then I also agree to a point, however there needs to be far better use of the assets there - bean counters need to allow us more hours but also a certain service need to change their approach to the logging of hours (aka 'BA Tokens' by some members of that service); their approach, given the cap on hours available, was (and I believe still is) directly reducing the hours available to task in support of troops. They continued this practice despite direction to do otherwise. That members of that service can then stand and say they should absorb the FAA and AAC I find disgusting and for this example and many other good reasons, ‘one airforce’ is totally counter to the interests of those on the ground and therefore the national interest.

only those who do not understand it call for its abolition or its absorption within the other two Services. And here I wholly agree! The fact that we have evolved into three services and fought successfully says that we should remain that way; as does the Canadian debacle combining into one service.

Regrettably, this is being done by individuals who seek to protect their own self interests, rather than to provide this Country with the Defence capability that it needs to meet the threats of tomorrow – in my dictionary that equates to betrayal or treason and they should think before they speak.Agreed again. Unfortunately the RAF has taken it upon themselves to brief against the other two services recently and over the preceding decades, both in public and behind closed doors. I have many friends in the RAF and they are good folk, however I think on your basis above that as an organisation they are morally corrupt and treasonous, furthering their own service ahead of the national interest. If you want to talk of the threats of tomorrow then consider this: since the end of the Cold War which conflicts were predicted? GW1? Bosnia? Kosovo? Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, GW2? None. All, except Afghan, have involved the use of RN ships and aircraft launched from those ships. In GW1, Sierra Leone and GW2 we were heavily reliant upon Naval aircraft, especially in Sierra Leone and GW2 – remember the Al Faw amphibious assault by 3 Cdo Bde RM that secured the oil fields from further damage? I should not need to tell you that RN / RM operated Harriers and Lx7 have operated and SK4 / SK7 are still operating in Afghan today. We are not bound to our ships and happily deploy forward to the fight. Terry will tell you what the Royal Marines have brought him. The Amphibious capability costs us some money and training but it does not preclude our use ashore in a land-locked country. It is also a capability used often (and I have avoided using the Falklands since you unreasonably discount it). With our reducing budget (and dare I say, ambitions?) an Amphibious capability must remain central to our approach – it delivers the ability to push over the horizon to coerce, to threaten to demonstrate, all without any commitment to protracted conflict. We can aid or raid, assault or secure a situation then hand over to civil authorities before quickly withdrawing – it limits our exposure – all from ships and without land bases, assuming the RAF permit us and the blokes ashore to benefit from organic air defence and CAS aircraft!

In modern warfare there are always competing priorities for air power in support of different phases of a campaign, or in different geographical areas. True enough. It is for this reason that unified air power needs to be controlled centrally and apportioned where the priority is greatest (a central tenet of air power that is universally accepted). Which is why, when required, assets are pooled under a joint command and operate together – JHF(A)? Or do you only talk of Jets? JFH? Not only is this the most efficient use of assets it is also the most effective because weight of effort can be switched quickly in order to unhinge and defeat an enemy... and that central, Joint command within the appropriate theatre effects that coordination and your switching if required, 'central control' of assets back home (in the all encompassing RAF as you evidently would have it) is not required.

Only when there is a need for assets to be permanently attributed to organic tasks, like ship defence (Sea Harrier or GR9?!) or firepower for (lightly equipped) troops (e.g. the USMC) The USMC are hardly lightly equipped troops... they do however have everything from Cobra to CH-53, C-130 and F/A-18, are aircraft directly allocated to those units. A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force. Emotive language. Who says we can not afford it? You? The service that (you assume) would gain from the elimination of these 'Private' airforces?

Can the blokes on the ground (Army and Royal Marines) afford NOT to have the AAC and FAA? Who will champion their cause? Will the RAF fiercely defend the requirement for and support to AH? Will they maintain the Lx force and their role? Will the RAF fiercely defend the capability to mountEMCON silent multi-a/c Amphibious Assaults by night? Will the RAF fight to maintain deck currency for aircrew and also the ships? Yes...? Read on!!!!

Lets face it, the latest change to currency requirements has been brought in to ensure that RAF crews do not allow themselves to go uncurrent night on return from theatre, awaiting pre-deployment training to regain currency... The RAF think that all things flying should be controlled by them -they can't even be trusted to enforce maintenance of the ability to fly at night - that is both dangerous and hardly a ringing endorsement of their resolute will to maintain an interest in the finer points of military aviation,be it in support of troops operating ashore or from afloat. Night flying is for 'Bats and Tw*ts' - few like it but we are professional enough to realise that we should maintain the capability for both Flight Safety and Operational Capability (or ‘effectiveness’ to use your bit below)... funny old thing, flying at night avoids the enemy far more than by day.

Ultimately, such a decision<to retain separate ‘private airforces’ I assume> would cost more money or result in reducing overall effectiveness – with the obvious results. A further point to this effect is that, in the alignment of flying regs we have been forced to adopt the most restrictive – the RAF’s rules. The RAF approach to crew duty / rest is also most restrictive, oft quoted by them and frequently gets in the way of ops. (to avoid debate, that is not a blanket ‘ignore rest’ but an acknowledgment of rules being for guidance in risk assessing circumstance.. 7:59 flown, safe… 8:01 flown = dangerous? No)

The other aspect is the RAF attitude of ‘we can’t do that…so nor shall you!’ Their lack of capability should not hamstring those in other services from using their hard won capability to best operational effect on ops - that is playing politics.

This defence review must reduce costs without impacting unduly on capability, I think I have raised a number of points to argue merger into the RAF would leave us with a REDUCED operational capability and that has only one result – unnecessary loss of life. .only an independent air force can deliver the efficiency required and every other major military power has learned this lesson.

US : USAF, USN, USMC and the US Army all operate aircraft.

Russia : Air force did absorb Army Avn I believe, but Russian Naval Aviation continues. They have a total of SIX services, usual three plus Airborne Forces, Space Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces… bit much perhaps?!

China : PLAAF, PLA Ground Forces (unsure, helos listed in wikki but that’s only mention) PLAN – includes marines with aviation support – moving to blue water ops.

France: Aviation Légère de l’Armée de Terre, ALAT (their AAC) Aeronavale (their FAA) and Armee de l’air (their RAF)

Germany : Marineflieger (Their FAA) Heeresfliegertruppe (their AAC) and the Luftwaffe of course

India : Indian Naval Air Arm, Indian Air Force, Indian AAC (formed in 1987 apparently – they saw the need for independent Army Avn.

Australia : RAAF, RAN and Army all operate aircraft.

I support your assertion – however, you will note that in supporting it I have also demonstrated something else – that every power mentioned has retained their Naval Aviation’s independence and that the vast majority retain their Army Aviation’s independence. Canada is the only single service example I know of and it was a disaster.

In Afghanistan, RAF aircraft operate across the entire country helping and protecting troops wherever they are needed, this allows relatively small numbers of fast aircraft the ability to cover many tasks simultaneously. This is a pretty sweeping and meaningless PR statement. They undoubtedly do support troops through ISTAR, movement & resupply, IRT, CAS and AT. Do they do it across the entire of Afghanistan? Or Kandahar & Helmand only? I only ask because the rest of your information is incomplete so leads me to question… you forget the AAC and FAA (to include RM aircrew of course) both in AH, SH, ISTAR and of course CAS (FAA Harriers). Meaningless: What exactly allows ‘relatively small numbers of fast aircraft the ability to cover many tasks simultaneously.’? Is that the ‘independent air force’? I suppose the AAC & RN/RM crews are numerous and very slow to react and hate to stray too far from BSN / KAF?What a load of ***t, this is exactly the kind of rubbish that is spouted to the media by RAF PR that actually means nothing.

I have heard of a member of an RAF Puma crew include in a familiarisation lecture to a course that the Puma has an Amphibious capability. Of course no one knew better unfortunately. However, this is just the kind of out-right lie that the RAF seem to tell – I’m sure they could land on a ship in the right circumstances – but its massively top heavy, never does so and certainly is not cleared to shut down and they don’t practice – that is NOT an Amphibious capability, it just illustrates the willingness to mislead.

What is needed ultimately is a balanced force, TRUE and that would be best achieved through a balanced argument TRUE – armchair generals who have retired with the benefit of unparalleled air superiority in every campaign they fought (except perhaps the Falklands and look at the casualties suffered in that Campaign) Where there was no RAF air defence or Airborne Early Warning (despite previous promises) and the organic Air Defence in the form of SHAR was only there because the RN had fought tooth and nail to keep it in the face of the RAF’s vehement opposition to British Carrier Aviation – Hardly an advertisement for listening to the RAF’s demands to subsume the AAC and FAA? would do best to study their history (and you yours) and recognise how that superiority was achieved. The terrible casualties suffered by our brave soldiers in Afghanistan through relatively low tech threats today would pale in to insignificance if they ever faced a credible air threat. TRUE A quick look at the World’s Air Forces (and indeed Army and Naval Aviation!!!) will quickly show that other Nations are not so keen to remove their asymmetric advantage or have them parcelled out to have them defeated piecemeal!

You raise some interesting points, however, in your defending the scrapping of the RAF you also call for the destruction of the FAA and AAC. Your arguments are at times confused and also seek to cherry pick the facts. You appear to speak as a Fast Jet pilot with little appreciation of the Rotary side. That is not a criticism, we are all necessarily specialists, but it does come through. Given that, I shall use a FJ example: HMS Invincible, Med, 1997. Dark night, very low millilux. Two ship GR7 to launch for NVG sortie. This is the first NVG deck landing for the crews, indeed I believe it may have been the first NVG deck landing for a Harrier. At the brief, the RN Sea Harrier boss said in no uncertain terms that the sortie would result in an accident and was foolish in the extreme. RN crews always went through an exhaustive series of ‘Duskers’ before working up to full night capability the more so for new pilots. IIRC this was also their first night deck landing, if not ever then of the deployment. Couple that with the low millilux, at sea and lack of references. The RAF cracked on, unfortunately lost the jet - far too high on approach with no overshoot, correcting gave a very high ROD and a swim. Happily he was fished out alive and his wingman flew to a successful landing moments after – bloody good effort.

What do we learn? There was an enormous amount of pressure on that deployment to achieve and much of that came from above. Nonetheless, an undeniably capable pilot came to grief ignoring the clear advice of someone who was vastly more experienced in role. You can not just jump on board ship and expect to fly without accident. Nor can you rock up, bounce the deck and depart job done – one a/c fine, six ship lift? How about those procedures, at night, no radios, no horizon, poor weather on 1 Spot… no references? How about the ship and deck crew’s currency? You MUST maintain currency and where uncurrent allow a progressive workup.

You and the RAF seem to think that you can take over all aspects of Military aviation. I do not believe for one second that the RAF has the interest to maintain an effective Naval / Amphibious capability nor an Army Avn one. Maintenance of experience within an organisation is critical as it prevents (assuming it is listened to) costly accidents and loss of life… and funnily enough, your Operational Effectiveness / Capability.

Petty, but since you bash on about air superiority perhaps we ought to consider the number of enemy aircraft shot down since the end of WW2. The exact FAA total escapes me, but 22 or 24 springs to mind…. How many by the RAF? None.

I do not seek the dissolution of the RAF, however I note their corrosive attitude towards the FAA and AAC over the years and our resultant reduction in OC – You reap what you sow; now you know how it feels perhaps your organisation ought to wind its neck in, cease feathering its nest and focus on its job like the rest of us.

SW… with apologies for length, hope you’ve all got colour screens…

[Finnpog]

StopStart.

A well balanced response. Well played.

The corrosive attitude against anything which wasn't small and pointy was also effectively demonstrated (and commented about on here) in Spring last year http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/360809-harrier-dispute-between-navy-raf-chiefs-sees-army-marriage-counsellor-called-10.htmlwhen the previous CAS pointed out that

CAS said:
".......the majority of key appointments are held by FJ pilots (indeed exclusively at 3* and above at the moment). This is not by accident.....the very intellectual and mental capacity attributes that help distinguish a FJ pilot.....drive these statistics."


We need much better intellectual capacity than arrse comments like that if the RAF is going to come out of this decade as an integrated air arm and not just the AD wing of something purple.

However, if being FJ streamed and operational is the only requirement, there are a couple of Booties who are not only qualified, but also bring other combat command experiences to the table.

We need all 3 air arms IMO.

Now all I need to understand is why we can't have very effective and highly skilled NCO pilots across all 3 air arms.

[thebword]

Something Witty,

A very comprehensive response, which regrettably lost its way towards the end. It would appear that the RAF have either killed your first born or stolen your inheritance! Yet again, I state that I did not make an attempt to steal the AAC or FAA assets from them. Independent air forces are for wider roles than those filled by organic assets. I accept your counter arguments on many of the themes you identify; however, your assertion that the RAF are up to something is unfair and unfounded. The SDSR work is challenging and potentially harsh for each of the Services – you would expect any Service to defend what it feels to be right. You go on to appear to suggest that RAF aircraft would not support Army or RM units on the ground – that is complete b******s and does a dis-service to the brave men and women who do so every single day. Be emotional by all means, but do not sully the sacrifice and efforts of airman who never question who they are supporting or responding to.

Your comments on night flying and currency are so very wide of the mark. If you are referring to the current regeneration plan then the slow recovery is about safe operations and seeks to avoid the very case you highlight. Our regulations are now enshrined in Joint publications, and now the MAA, do not accuse the RAF of making them up for their own gain.

Your passion is self evident but your overt defence of the FAA is misplaced and not required – I do not call for its abolition. I am sorry that you feel the way you do, I hoped to keep the argument balanced but you clearly disagree with much of what I say. We will have to agree to differ, but please don’t accuse me of things I have not said. I accept that my argument was rather fixed wing centric, but that was because we have very clearly worked up structures and processes for rotary and I do not question those at any time in this thread. I have re-read my submissions and have struggled to find anything corrosive from me here; I did try to ask for a balanced debate and I appreciate your candour and engagement.

I entitled this thread “the enemy within” because I was seeking to expose those who are using poor and emotional arguments to further their own self interest. It will not surprise you that I was not pointing the finger at the RAF (or RN) in this regard. In case it has escaped anyone’s knowledge, it is certain retired Generals at whom I aimed my criticism. Fly safe friend.

[Dan Winterroll]

Congrats to TheBword (and I never thought I would say that) for raising the tone with some intellectual rigour. It’s a shame that this has to be done through this forum as "at work" we as a force are not engaged in any form of meaningful discussion (apart from "will there be a redundancy package?").

This lack of discussion or awareness of our place in the military jigsaw has been an endemic fault in the RAF for many years. I remember back in the 80s being most impressed when talking to a USAF serviceman who when asked what his job was pointed to an F4 (I show my age) getting airborne and stated "I keep them flying" not the response I suspect one would get from one of our MT drivers.

Most right minded people (apart from a few rabid posters on this forum) would accept that we require a balanced Air Force and similarly balanced Navy and Army too. We must remember that we don't know where the next war or commitment is coming from. The UK military (and yes that includes all services) that went to war against Saddam in Jan 1991 was up until August 1990 configured equipped trained and postured to fight only in North West Europe against the Russian hordes.

So for Gawd's sake stop fighting amongst ourselves, we all know the pot is getting smaller and we will all have pain to bear. Our real enemy is the politicians who are prepared to pay fast and loose with our countries security for the purpose of short term political gain. One only has to look at the lack of medals on our political leaders at the Cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday to see that they have no comprehension that part of the reason we have so many war dead to remember was the woeful state of the UK armed forces in the 1920's and 30's when defence spending was halved.

So I appeal to all members of UK defence (especially the retired “leaders” from all services). Yes defend your corner but remember to say:

THE UK REQUIRES A BALANCED CAPABILITY TO FIGHT ON THE LAND, ON AND UNDER THE SEA AND IN THE AIR

(+cyber and space but that’s another thread!)

[Pontius Navigator]

We must remember that we don't know where the next war or commitment is coming from.

True but remember the difference between wars of necessity and wars of choice.

It is even arguable that WW2, at least at the outset, was a war of choice. Korea was a war of choice, Suez was a war of choice.

Malaya, Cyprus, Malaysia, Borneo, Belize, Falklands, Sierra Leone and Kuwait were wars of necessity.

The first question that has to be addressed by our political masters where and to what extent might we have to engage in wars of necessity?

The second is to what extent we wish to engage in wars of choice?

Only once these have been answered and likely scenarios agreed can we even decide if we even need an Army, Navy or Air Force.

A minimalist scenario would see an expanded brown water fleet with day-running patrol boats no more than 2 hours steaming from any port. A few interceptors for air policing; the F3 would do but the Typhoon is probably cheaper now we have it. The Army would be largely lightly armed, highly mobile and trained as a heavyweight backup or even subsume the border agency.

The scenario was have right now is a slimline maxi-force capable of intervention at any level on a 'hold' basis but not capable of the 'hold-win' scenario.

Between the two it looks as if the capability to meet any scenario is the one likely to lost. We already have taken a holiday on maritime patrol. Dannatt was quite keen to relinquish armour and rocket systems. The Navy might be required to forego world-wide deployments although FCO might have a say here, and foot the bill?

Air Force wise we talk of 20-year lead times but do we need constant readiness? Can we not reduce active squadrons and reduce to a cadre basis on some types putting spare jets into mothballs?

[alwayzinit]

Gentlemen.

You all make compelling and logical arguments which are all correct.

ALL 3 services need their own organic Air. What is needed is funding.

The real enemys are the DHSS, NHS and DEFRA. All three are huge money gobbling giants and are hugely inefficient.

What The Services need is to bond together and get Dr Fox to man up and explain to the "Brokeback mountain" boys what is really important and how a strong military actually increases foreign trade, regenerates heavy engineering industries and "encourages" other countries to listen what the UK wants them to think.

Talk softly and carry a big stick.

Sound familiar?

[minigundiplomat]

It is even arguable that WW2, at least at the outset, was a war of choice.


No it wasn't. You are looking at 1939 from a 2010 perspective. Otherwise I agree.

[Lyneham Lad]

Originally posted by Pontius Navigator:

The first question that has to be addressed by our political masters where and to what extent might we have to engage in wars of necessity?

The second is to what extent we wish to engage in wars of choice?

Only once these have been answered and likely scenarios agreed can we even decide if we even need an Army, Navy or Air Force.

Exactly. Until the newbies in charge of our future finish the SDR, one could postulate that the only purpose that threads such as this achieve is to act as a pressure-relief valve.

[Something witty]

Something Witty, A very comprehensive response, which regrettably lost its way towards the end. It would appear that the RAF have either killed your first born or stolen your inheritance! Not yet! ;) Yet again, I state that I did not make an attempt to steal the AAC or FAA assets from them.

…A luxury the UK cannot afford as we have insufficient resources to give each of the RN or Army its own private air force.

Did I miss read the above? I accepted and acknowledged at the start of my post that you sought to defend the RAF from breakup. I agreed and will always agree with you on this. How otherwise though should we read the quote above? As pointed out, yours was something of a party political broadcast for the RAF and required some balance.

Independent air forces are for wider roles than those filled by organic assets. Can you clarify? What is wrong with talking about the RAF? The problem is, the more you talk about an 'independent airforce' the more we suspect that you want something other than what the RAF currently is - that’s not likely to be smaller and denuded of assets (something I would fight against myself) - so what is it? Expanded to assume some FAA / AAC assets and capabilities? If it is then define those assets, if not then why not defend the RAF, not some notional independent airforce?!

I accept your counter arguments on many of the themes you identify; however, your assertion that the RAF are up to something is unfair and unfounded. The SDSR work is challenging and potentially harsh for each of the Services – you would expect any Service to defend what it feels to be right. I would defend that right absolutely, although I would hope that any service would set their position in the context of the other two services and what is right. The RAF therefore have an interservice PR issue - because it is widely recognised that they have at best been unhelpful toward the maintenance of a FJ capability in the FAA for instance. Many members of the RAF appear to have some kind of indoctrinated need to explain why 'if it flys it should be RAF.' I understand (hearsay only) that the RAF had an entire department devoted to securing Apache for itself! The run-up to the Falklands shows the RAF's historical attitude to the FAA and its result.

You go on to appear to suggest that RAF aircraft would not support Army or RM units on the ground – that is complete b******s and does a dis-service to the brave men and women who do so every single day. Be emotional by all means, but do not sully the sacrifice and efforts of airman who never question who they are supporting or responding to. The RAF as an organisation is poor at supporting their own SH / AT fleets that operate in support of troops - the FJ mentality of the heirachy. Crew duty is oft quoted, again that is an RAF thing - if the organisation's line is so hard that is the organisation's choice and I argue it does not offer the level of support it could to their crews or troops. If there is such inflexibility on ops then to be fair to the crew they are right to call time in the way they do. I do not seek to sully the crews, Terry's lead and RPGs fly at us all and the RAF IRT crews do a particularly good job in the most difficult of circumstances. Nonetheless, reference to hours as ‘BA tokens’ and the logging of time sat on a refuel spot awaiting pax for 10 min plus (easily an hour or more a day) does not do them any favours or their troops. As an organisation the RAF's ethos is certainly not as strong in this area as it is in terms of FJ. It is an organisation thing.

It is worth reiterating the point regarding the RAF’s desire not to be shown up by the capabilities of the other services. There is no justifiable reason to deny the use of capabilities on ops when the situation is ripe for their employment. That attitude is hardly helpful to those on the ground is it?

Your comments on night flying and currency are so very wide of the mark. If you are referring to the current regeneration plan then the slow recovery is about safe operations and seeks to avoid the very case you highlight. It was a comment on maintenance, of, not regeneration, unless it has got that bad. We may be talking cross purposes here I am not referring to FJ which I understand is very short on hours (100 pa vs NATO 180 pa? A good example of an organisation failing its crews and putting them in a very dangerous place - I wish you and your oppos all the luck in regaining this in safety) Our regulations are now enshrined in Joint publications, and now the MAA, do not accuse the RAF of making them up for their own gain. I never implied or said that they were making rules up for their own gain, merely that a new rule had to be brought in to enforce something that should have been happening anyway, that rule has no benefit for the RAF (or any other service) other than to reinforce the need to remain night current. That suggests that at a Squadron and Unit/Station level an awful lot were choosing to go night uncurrent and that at those levels nothing was done about it. If this was due to a lack of airframes then I suggest that imposing a new rule would have had no useful benefit.

Your passion is self evident but your overt defence of the FAA is misplaced and not required – I do not call for its abolition. Unfortunately that is just how it could be read - the quote at the start and your 'independent air force.' I am sorry that you feel the way you do, I hoped to keep the argument balanced but you clearly disagree with much of what I say. I seek balance too; be plain in your argument and we will all know what you are arguing for.

We will have to agree to differ, but please don’t accuse me of things I have not said. I accept that my argument was rather fixed wing centric, but that was because we have very clearly worked up structures and processes for rotary and I do not question those at any time - Thank you, so you confirm that the Rotary 'Private Airforces' of the Army and RN should remain? By implication you do question Fixed Wing? Is that your FW vs cuts or other people's FW, i.e. carrier based? Please be clear, rather than talking of 'central control' and 'independent airforces,' either admit to wanting to take over the other service’s FW assets or clarify that you have no designs on the other services and you merely wish to protect the RAF. Then we can then get on with a balanced argument or defending the RAF together!

I have re-read my submissions and have struggled to find anything corrosive from me here; I did try to ask for a balanced debate and I appreciate your candour and engagement. And I yours, thank you. It is the organisation's corrosive attitude over the decades to which I referred and I remain to be convinced otherwise to be honest, we have had a lot of smoke and areguably some flames over the years; time will tell.

I entitled this thread “the enemy within” because I was seeking to expose those who are using poor and emotional arguments to further their own self interest. It will not surprise you that I was not pointing the finger at the RAF (or RN) in this regard. In case it has escaped anyone’s knowledge, it is certain retired Generals at whom I aimed my criticism. Fly safe friend.

As others have said, fighting amongst ourselves does no good. Typhoon, Nimrod, Merlin Mk1... all have their place, all are required, as is the RAF itself.

Stay safe too fella!

[Bismark]

thebword,

Thank you for your fulsome reply. However, I think you view the world through somewhat rose-tinted glasses. The attempt by the RAF to remove the FAA from FW aviation (via the Harrier Force) was blatant and led from the very top of the shop (CAS and ACAS with strong support from CDS). SDR made a very clear case for CVF and JCA, indeed it was set as one of its key capabilities, yet the RAF set about undermining this capability from the start (and in your time....but I make no assertions against you). No matter what you say about how many times the quote "if it flies it must be RAF" was used, it WAS the driving policy of that CAS and permeated down to 1* level.

Much of the FAA difficulty in generating single seat FJ pilots (the only type the RN has to generate) was due to RAF intransigence and blocking of well worn routes for bringing on potential single seat pilots using the F3/GR4 force. This has continued to the present day and which is why the RN have now established a strong training route through the USN and F18/AV8B ie we now have aircrew flying with USN/USMC to ensure we have sufficient pilots to man JCA despite the efforts of the RAF.

I have huge respect for the RAF Harrier pilots that fly from the sea when ordered - but they did not join the RAF to fly from ships, RN FW pilots did...and they love doing it.

What we really need is for the senior members of the RAF to accept that we need true maritime FW pilots and capability, embrace the concept honestly and get on with it....the record so far does not fill me (or I suspect the First Sea Lord) with much confidence that it will happen anytime soon.

[Low Flier]

http://i.telegraph.co.uk/telegraph/multimedia/archive/01685/2507-MATT-ST-web_1685147a.gif

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Thread OFF


It was the strategic bombing campaign...that ensured victory


I can't believe people still come out with this stuff...:ugh:

Thread ON

[TurbineTooHot]

My dear WAFU fixed wing brothers and sister. There's a little bit of creep here toward decrying the RAF for your do-ing over vis a vis the Harrier. I do recognise and champion the requirement for carrier based aviation. It is the finest way to project power about the globe and essential to the security of our dependant territories. Allow me, if you will to suggest a solution. All GR9 to the FAA. Take all the equipment, the base, the groundcrew and aircrew: light blue the option to cross over no questions. Then you have your FJ capability, the legacy to take forward to the new ships and airframes. One proviso. You foot the bill. You pay for everything. You will then be independant. But please don't complain about undermanning or your borrowed training pipeline. Because it will be your issue. And please Bismark, why should we give cockpits to your chaps who, out of 19 sqn, don't make the grade? I re-iterate, you need your fixed wing capability. But, in my opinion you need to take it all, including the financial burden. Cheers.

[thebword]

Bismark and Something Witty, thank you both for your measured engagement, as that is really why I started the thread - frustration at a lack of balance in the debate.

Quick response to each of your questions-statements and then I think I will retire from the debate happy to have got something off my chest:

I may have made a mistake in focusing on Fixed Wing but I deliberately wanted to avoid making any claims on organic rotary assets.

I referred to “independent air forces” when I probably should have said: “independent air power” – centrally controlled in order to best direct effort (this could include aircraft from any service as now). However, it does become challenging when you have insufficient to meet everyone’s desire to possess organic fixed wing air. This is predominantly based on a lack of trust or faith, fuelled by the fear of a lack of guaranteed delivery – this of course is why the air tasking process can become so fraught but is so key.

Of course this is why the Harrier debate became so complex. It was set on so many levels: threat to the fixed wing FAA (fair cop, but no different to today’s articles about the RM I suggest), belief in who can best deliver embarked skills (mostly disproved recently I would argue, see below), ownership (well the assets are already “owned” by the RAF) and trust in delivery (another fair cop but since when did a military organization get a choice – perhaps MoD and PJHQ should set up a better process to direct delivery to avoid single services exercising options, we are too small now).

The current situation is fraught because of the small numbers of people involved. As the RAF shrunk (more than a 50% reduction in the number of our combat squadrons in less than ten years), there was little capacity to absorb RN crews as, you might expect. The majority of those RN crews that did secure RAF cockpits (I personally know of two) actually jumped ship and joined the RAF (yes some of ours have gone the other way). It was the RN’s inability to grow crews that forced them to accept the JFH concept in the first place – had that not happened we wouldn’t be arguing about those RN crews now. I know that not many RN believe that RAF squadrons can deliver at sea, but check what the Ark’s embarked squadron was for the last few weeks. Well that is the plan so we will have to see won’t we! Maybe the RN has some accepting to do.

Not sure what you mean by “poor at supporting our SH and AT fleets”. I think it is fair to say that a significant re-balancing has taken place to meet current tasks, albeit with ageing aircraft that are still planned to be replaced. I hear your criticism about attitude in some quarters (I used to complain about it too) but circumstances should be more rare now and the AT and SH guys I know are working their cobs off.

I don’t know of any cases of the RAF denying capabilities on ops, in fact whenever they are offered they are often treated and damned as “light blue entryism”
I can confirm that I believe that the rotary assets currently under RN and AAC control should stay exactly where they are. My argument was one of protecting air power in general (and by inference that which is currently delivered by the RAF).

As for corrosive attitudes, that is exactly why I wrote here. Your engagement has restored my faith in the power of intelligent debate here at least, and I just wish it could have been over a beer rather than a keyboard. Trust is what makes us tick and we need to restore it across defence.
Dan Winterroll said it all for me:

“So I appeal to all members of UK defence (especially the retired “leaders” from all services). Yes defend your corner but remember to say:

THE UK REQUIRES A BALANCED CAPABILITY TO FIGHT ON THE LAND, ON AND UNDER THE SEA AND IN THE AIR”

That was precisely my point and the reason I wasted away this weekend with some gentlemen I would be pleased to call comrades in arms.

[minigundiplomat]

Let's not get things out of perspective.........



The Army's focus is blowing sh1t up. They like tanks, guns and apache's and don't like the majority of the RAF. They tolerate the SH Force at times through necessity, but dislike the AT fleet who make them turn up very early before going U/S or running out of crew duty because one of their fat stewards has gastroentiritis. They generally dislike the FJ fleet, apart from when they get a good service from CAS. They are indifferent about the Navy, as they don't understand them; they wear flares and talk funny.

The Navy focus is circling the globe in ships. They don't have that many ships anymore, but would like a few new carriers. They are indifferent to the Army as carriers don't work very well on Salisbury Plain, but at a push will take them where they want to go. They would rather take the Marines, as they own them, but will go along with the Army. They dislike the RAF, as the previous RAF boss spent all the budget on FJ that they didn't want, nor did the Army. They are now worried the money for the carriers may have gone. The same man, who wasn't particularly lauded by his own types also screwed them over with regard to their FJ.

The RAF focus should be on supporting the Army (and Navy where applicable), but has drifted around a bit of late. Generally they are indifferent to the Army who they regard as a necessary evil. The SH Force understands the Army, but the RAF doesn't really undertand the SH Force either. The RAF likes fast and noisy jets that drop bombs. They like these very much and will do anything to hang onto them, even if it often makes no sense. Apart from the Helicopters, who dont like the O Boat, the RAF are indifferent to the Navy, as they don't understand them; they wear flares and talk funny.

The Army like jointery, as it works for them; as long as they are in charge. The Navy tolerate jointery, as they do their own thing anything as soon as they've hoisted the anchor. The RAF dislike jointery, as the Army are always in charge, even though occasionally, they dont seem really sure how to use what they have.




It would seem that if the Army was left to blowing things up (which they are world class at), the Navy was left to doing it's own thing, and the RAF stopped navel gazing and rediscovered it's focus, everything might work out alright afterall.

Hell the occasional bit of jointery may still work, if it saves money and everyone sticks to what they know......

[Chugalug2]

TOTD:
Thread OFF
"It was the strategic bombing campaign...that ensured victory"
I can't believe people still come out with this stuff...
Thread ON
OK, I'll bite as it was my quote,TOTD. Having posted on various Bomber Command Campaign Medal/Memorial threads I am well aware of the default perceived wisdom of today. I just don't share it. What is interesting is that you think it does not concern this thread. I don't know of your "allegiance" but I am quite prepared to believe that it is light blue anyway. A case of having your cake and eat it? The whole point about the "Independent Air Force" concept was that it be independent of Army and Navy to carry airpower into the enemy heartland. That is what it did in WW2. If it had not I suggest that the Army would never have got ashore on D-day, nor the RN survive it, because the Luftwaffe would have been there instead of, by necessity, being elsewhere defending the Reich. That those who are not "airminded" do not see that is understandable, but that those who are do not either is perplexing.
Oh, thread On/Off thingy

[Bismark]

thebword,

Your contribution has been hugely valuable, however...

I know that not many RN believe that RAF squadrons can deliver at sea, but check what the Ark’s embarked squadron was for the last few weeks.

....the simple fact is that the said embarked RAF squadron does not want to be at sea, no matter how good it is when it gets there. There is nothing in an RAF serviceman's ethos that says "I want to operate at sea". The same is true for the Army when considering removal of the RMs. In both cases the Naval man knows that he will be going in ships as part of his job and still he approaches the CPO in the recruiting office. The RAF and Army aspirant sees the CPO, and ships, and turns the other direction to the FSgt or Sgt.

[minigundiplomat]

In both cases the Naval man knows that he will be going in ships as part of his job and still he approaches the CPO in the recruiting office. The RAF and Army aspirant sees the CPO, and ships, and turns the other direction to the FSgt or Sgt.

Bismark,

possibly the truest statement I have read on here. I cannot for the life of me understand anyone wanting to join the RN. That is not a slight, it's just the way I'm wired and I agree fully with your statement. Similarly, I am sure there are plenty of Naval types who can't for the life of them understand people wanting to join the RAF.

Horses for causes.

[Lonewolf_50]

Respectfully to thebword:

A Naval squadron can operate from a ship, or from a shore base.

An Air Force Squadron from a shore base.

Perhaps the Air Force (RAF in your case) needs to learn how to go to sea. I mean that as something more than a novelty deployment. :} (Conceptually. I grant that resource-wise, that may be a non-starter in the UK for the near to mid term).

This argues that the only service that ought to have strike aircraft is the Royal NAVY, and carriers to base them for maritime operations. From that basis ... shore base when needed, sea base when needed. (Gee, this is almost the exact template of USMC aviation ...)

Are you able to think that far outside the box? :ok: Is the RAF/RN/Royal Marines/Army envisioning expeditionary warfare as the expected environment, or home defense? :confused:

I have pointed this out time and again to my USAF friends, (USN aviator here), the EA-6B detachments in Afghanistan/Bagram for the past years as a fine case in point. Carrier capable, shore based, able to do either well.

I have had a running debate with an old USAF friend of mine over why the Join Strike Fighter (JSF) is stupidly named, since it is to come in three variants ...

A non-Joint one (unable to operate from the sea)(Yes, with a modest performance premium ...)
a Joint one (Able to operate from the sea)
One of those amazing Harrier looking things whose utility I often wonder at, and whose deisgner may have been smoking joints ...

Perhaps the True Blue for Tactical Air Power needs to be Navy Blue. :}

[FantomZorbin]

I really appreciate this, generally objective, thread. However, one thing nags at my mind: how may the SDR produce any relevant detail without the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) first deciding its own future policy? Or will the FCO adjust its aspirations to match our military capabilities (a first time for everything ...)?

[Pontius Navigator]

Is the RAF/RN/Royal Marines/Army envisioning expeditionary warfare as the expected environment,

Aspiration, yes.

or home defense? :confused:

Probability, yes.

why the Join Strike Fighter (JSF) is stupidly named, since it is to come in three variants ...

European precedent, for a change, MRCA - multi-role combat aircraft - in GR, ECR and AD variants.[/QUOTE]

The AD variant was a UK go-it-alone aircraft as the other partners would not agree to a true multi-role version. However how do F15C and F15E compare?

[Vasco Sodcat]

This defence review must reduce costs without impacting unduly on capability


I really don't see how we can acheive the former without compromising on the latter. Given the scale of savings Govt Depts are being asked to identify (and don't think we're immune because we're on Ops - we just have less of our "business" in the efficiency gunsight) there are major changes on the way. Until SDSR redefines what Govt is directing us to do this debate is unavoidably imperfectly informed. I just hope that SDSR definitions are not ignored as quickly as SDR ones were - but silly me - there I go forgetting that we're past-masters at doing the impossible with next to nothing :ugh:

[Lonewolf_50]

Compare F-15C and F-15E to what? The USAF took advantage of an excellent air to air design and adapted it to Air To Ground. I think that was done to control costs of new development, to replace the F-111 with something more up to date, and also to stake out their turf in the roles and missions wrestling match between our various services. :p

Converting an air to air machine to air to ground had been donewith the Phantom some years earlier. :}

What was curious is that the F-14 Tomcat was an air to air bird that, in the early 80's, I was advised was never to be an attack aircraft.

Funnily enough in the 90's the USN spent the money to turn it into just that, a decent air to ground platform.

[207592]

As a staunch supporter of the RAF and an ancient taxpayer, I found this thread fascinating and invigorating: it's great to learn that serving staff are debating the future. I wonder if the future armed forces will become one defence force, and that the RN will lose its new carriers, the JHF jump jets jettisoned, and Army's tanks scrapped? It seems that we always resource for the last war when the current war requires foot-sloggers, noisy choppers to leap-frog them into theatre, and transport to get the belligerents near the conflagration. What does that scenario demand? What if HMG said 'UK defence in the UK only'?

And now a conflicting thought: if all the non-combatant roles are civilianised, how can a mobile force ensure mobility? I commend a viewing of Air Commodore Cozen's video on a day in the life of a WWII Lancaster station (Hemswell?). Has the RAF the ability to maintain aircraft and an air force in adverse mobile conditions?

[Pontius Navigator]

Lonewolf, while the F15 is an example of multi-mission in 2 similar platforms your mention of the F4 goes further to explain the difference. That difference was also true of the Hurricane or Mosquito.

You can turn a fighter into a bomber but it is very difficult to turn a bomber into a fighter.

So, is JSF a suerb fighter than can bomb or a bomber that can fight?

[Lonewolf_50]

Good points, Pontius.

You ask a fine question in re the F-35, which seems to be the question upon which hung the fate of the F-22, which was built as a fighter first.

The JSF seems to me an expensive excursion into the realm the F-18 wandered into, trying to build a one sized fits all frame with Attack and Fighter mixed into one.

So, one optimizes neither, though given the current art of attack in the US -- JDAM -- it seems to me that "attack" is no longer a role so much as a collateral capability. The F-16 has done yeoman work in attack roles in Iraq, and it was built as a fighter first.

To answer your question ... I don't think either or question fits the hybrid.

[Justanopinion]

Something witty


Petty, but since you bash on about air superiority perhaps we ought to consider the number of enemy aircraft shot down since the end of WW2. The exact FAA total escapes me, but 22 or 24 springs to mind…. How many by the RAF? None.


Being light blue i was amused by this sentence and relayed it to the office only to be informed that in 1982 a 14 Sqn Jaguar was shot down by a 92 Sqn Phantom 35 miles NE of Bruggen by a Sidewinder. Pilot ejected safely.

May we claim that one as a half 'kill' ?
Please?

[Xercules]

Why is there still a CAS or for that matter a CGS and a CNS?

Already we have an Air Command which seems to run all of the Air Force - and presumably the Army and Navy structures are similar. With the downsizings and re-structruings that have already taken place surely the time is right to get rid of the single service staffs in MoD.

CDS and SofS should have a joint central policy staff aided by a reduced civil service with SofS providing the political policy direction and CDS and his staff providing the military direction.

CinC Air Cmd, and his equivalents, then get on with the job of running the actual operations and could spend far less time protecting their service's personal prejudices.

We seem to have cut the sharp end (front line services(?)) over the last years but no similar proportional cut in the high end appears to have taken place (more admirals than ships, more air marshals than squadrons, more generals than regiments).

This would also seem to have the additional benefit that the manpower savings would be lower in numbers but higher in financial savings and also show that the lords and masters really are prepared to lead by example.

[Jig Peter]

For many years my favourite management book has been by C. Northcote Parkinson: full of wisdom and practical advice. Early in Chapter 1 is a table concerning the Navy between 1914 and 1928, showing how, as the numbers of officers and men in the RN declined by 31.5%, and of capital ships by 67.74%, Admiralty officials increased by 78.45%.
Two of his "axiomatic statements, also in Chap.1 are:
(1) An official wants to multiply subordinates, not rivals,
and
(2) Officials make work for each other.

"Plus ça change" ...

There's more, much more in this seminal work. Enjoy and wonder, if you haven't already.
:8:8

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

If it had not I suggest that the Army would never have got ashore on D-day, nor the RN survive it, because the Luftwaffe would have been there instead of, by necessity, being elsewhere defending the Reich


How would 500 or so twin-engine night fighters have stopped the RN crossing the Channel, or prevented the Army from storming ashore?

[Archimedes]

While I'm not sure I agree that the Bomber Offensive 'ensured' victory, I suspect that the point is that without the bomber offensive, the Luftwaffe might have had a more balanced force, with greater production of bombers and more FW190s and Bf109s (in particular) in Normandy than it did.

Despite what the Longest Day suggests, the Germans did a bit more than strafe Omaha beach, of course - they lost, if memory serves, getting on for 900 aircraft in Normandy during June 1944, and I'm guessing that Chugalug's point is that there would have been far more German aircraft there than there actually were had there been a greatly reduced requirement for AD of the Reich, both during daylight and night-time hours, and far more 88m guns in Normandy than there were - which would've been 'interesting', as my late Uncle (15/19 Hussars Normandy & NW Europe Jun 44-May 45, Cromwell & Sheman Firefly) once reflected when discussing this very issue...

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

Archimedes,

What you say is interesting - however...

If the Luftwaffe had had an extra 1000 or so single-engine fighters instead of its night fighter force, they would have mostly been kept within the Reich to defend against the US bomber offensive. A bigger German day fighter force might have delayed the Americans achieving control of the air over Germany, but the USAAF would have got there eventually. The Allied invasion of France wasn't dependant on control of the air over Germany, so the invasion would have gone ahead anyway even if the Americans were still having a tough time over the Reich. And yes, there was a tiny single-engine night fighter force - but let's not pretend that 100ish Wilde Sau aircaft would have made any difference to events over Normandy.

Once the invasion happened, the majority of the (supposedly) larger German day fighter force would have been sent to the invasion front, where they would still have been decimated - as you say, they lost hundreds of aircraft in the month after the invasion, so had they sent more, they would have lost even more. Let's face it, the air battles over Normandy in June 1944 were hardly a close-run thing!

And had the Germans not needed to use their 88mm guns against Allied bombers (and in any case, their guns were mainly intended to combat the American bombers rather than British ones - just look at the losses to Flak of the USAAF compared to Bomber Command) they would have been sent to the Eastern Front where the real battle was being fought...again, this would have had little effect on German defences in Normandy.

So I really don't think that Bomber Command can be credited with having created more than the most minor distraction to the Germans' defence against either Allied invasion or Russian advances. The tragedy of Bomber Command is that so much effort was expended, and so many brave men were lost (not to mention German civilians), on pursuing a totally flawed strategy - even after it became evident that said strategy was not delivering victory. The Germans were unsurprisingly concerned by the potent British bomber force, but I bet that many in the German High Command were secretly delighted that this awesome weapon was almost entirely squandered. And I suppose there is a parallel of sorts with our current predicament, which is that our collective best efforts and intentions on the 'shop floor' may be wasted by the obstinacy and narrow-mindedness of one or two individuals near the top of the hierarchy.

[minigundiplomat]

It would seem history has become a maleable commodity and can be moulded to fit any point of view, in any given argument.

We are not in 1944, we are in 2010. The only similarities are the lack of paddle and browness of the creek.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

history has become a maleable [sic] commodity


'Twas ever thus. But where's the moulding?


We are not in 1944, we are in 2010


Ah yes, let's under no circumstances attempt to learn anything by looking at the past...

[minigundiplomat]

Ah yes, let's under no circumstances attempt to learn anything by looking at the past..


You can learn a great deal from history, but you miss my point. I think they were a little too busy in 1944 to get into a protracted p1ssing contest, but hey, let's keep arguing over the effects of the bomber campaign during the second world war, rather than tackle more contemporary issues. That's a bit too awkward.

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

MGD,

Fair point - in fact, not just awkward but pointless trying to address the current woes when nothing any of us says on here will make the blindest bit of difference when it comes to the savage and no doubt crazy cuts we are all about to experience. So back to 1944...

I think there probably was a fair bit of a p1ssing contest going on in the upper echelons in 1944, and I would suggest that had Bomber Harris been sligthly more willing to accommodate the views of others during the last 18 months of the war (ie when certain people began to realize that his targeting of cities wasn't bringing the hoped-for results, and tried to get him to use his force in a different way), he wouldn't have fallen from grace to the same extent when it was all over.

[minigundiplomat]

I think there probably was a fair bit of a p1ssing contest going on in the upper echelons in 1944, and I would suggest that had Torpy been sligthly more willing to accommodate the views of others during the last 18 months of the war (ie when certain people began to realize that his targeting of the Navy wasn't bringing the hoped-for results, and tried to get him to use his force in a different way), he wouldn't have fallen from grace to the same extent when it was all over.


Yeah, see what you mean. Still, looking backwards won't solve today's woes; only looking forward will do that. Just a shame we don't have a crystal ball and a pocket full of cash.

Not that it will stop many on here throwing in solutions from the comfort of their rocking chair.

[SL Hardly-Worthitt]

MGD,

Couldn't agree more!! TCT analogy......brilliant!!!:ok::ok:

[TorqueOfTheDevil]

MGD,

Very good!:D


Not that it will stop many on here throwing in solutions from the comfort of their rocking chair


But of course - why else do we come on here?