Aussie MRH-90

[TBM-Legend]

Are the Australian Army/Navy MRH-90's back in the air after their grounding with engine issues.:confused:

This chopper seems like yet another French "dud"...:uhoh:

The Oz Tigers are not operational either I hear. Big issues with low power engines in hot wx and avionics issues big time.

I note the "off the shelf" projects aka C-17/F-18F/Ch-47's are going great..:D

[gsa]

This chopper seems like yet another French "dud"...http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/worry.gif

The Oz Tigers are not operational either I hear.

Or is something wrong with their ability to bring them into service?

[Tallsar]

In my rather too long experience, there are many reasons (the real ones often hidden from general view) as to why a project has not enterred service as successfully as anticipated or planned - so jumping to conclusions is not always helpful - quite a few customers seem to be using the NH90 quite successfully for such a new type. Often this starts at the top with far too optimistic planning targets particularly if the variant concerned has been modified to meet a customers specific requirements - the manufacturer doesn't always help here in their eagerness to secure a contract within a customers budget timescale. Often the operating environment and usage spectrum is not considered in enough detail either - and the frontline operating customer not given enough early time to see if what the maker is saying is supportable. Funny old thing then when the customer gets its hands on the real kit all sorts of issues emerge. Furthermore, its no use comparing it with other customers who might well have accepted the ac into service on different criteria (and maybe even living with the same issues but not making a song and dance about it - often again for potential embarrasing political cover up reasons). One thing I do know, is the the Aussies have a very rigourous approach to requirements assessment and airworthiness, which (sadly) many other nations do not share. It is almost inevitable therefore that such an approach will show up issues that perhaps have not been so well exposed by other customers. The UK had this approach once...but then that discussion is on another thread!!

Cheers
:ugh::)

[BentStick]

It's the digital age TBM, it might pay to check the great web-of-lies before you bang on like that (Pages 9 & 24).:cool:

Army - The Soldiers Newspaper : June 24th 2010, Page 1 - Defence Newspapers | The Soldiers Army (http://digital.realviewtechnologies.com/default.aspx?xml=defencenews_army.xml&iid=37428)

[TBM-Legend]

BentStick..check your facts. That article was written [page 9] BEFORE the grounding of the aircraft which followed an engine failure of one operating in South Australia....

My question on the MRH-90 is simple; are they back flying?

I was aware of the ARH Tiger movements but much much behind schedule and over $$$$

PS: Maybe the Tiger should be the ARH "Koala"...not to be shot at or exported!:8

[Andu]

A quick question for any AAVN readers of this thread: what percentage of your normal ops would be what I'd call "normal logistical support" for ground units? I'm talking about one or two bodies, small amounts of supplies, maybe a commander's recce of tommorow's area of ops etc.

Is using a 45 million dollar helicopter for such tasks, especially for a country with Australia's limited military budget, even remotely cost-effective? Surely an updated Kiowa/Iroquois for that kind of work makes infinitely more sense than a Tiger or MRH-90?

What do ground units do in today's Army when they require those everyday resup/support tasks with only a VERY SMALL fleet of squillion dollar Rolls Royces available? Do without?

[finestkind]

Totally agree, (he he he he) you guess.

By the way how does something become "off the shelf".

[TBM-Legend]

"off the shelf" for military hardware is to buy a current mature production model configured per a standard spec instead of some hybrid models where the customer wants to customise it. e.g. fitting completely different systems etc.

RAAF successful purchases as stated are the C-17/F-18F/CH-47D/F [to come] which were purchased from the US production run with US standard options.

I'm amazed that politicians and defence neddies talk about standardisation then don't do it!

[Herod]

Levitation, transportation, gravitation, in that order.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

TBM - no, the MRHs are not back flying yet. Engine investigation still underway...:hmm:

ARH is ~2 years late but is not over budget - Eurocopter have paid substantial $$$ and provided EC 135s at DRW for crew training as compensation. French have taken their Tigers to Afghanistan as part of OT. Rumours persist that we're about to do the same, especially as Dutch pull out soon, but no movement yet.

[MTOW]

Is using a 45 million dollar helicopter for such tasks, especially for a country with Australia's limited military budget, even remotely cost-effective?I'd like someone to answer that question too. It's a long time ago now, but I'll bet it's unchanged - I couldn't count the number of times I flew sorties out to some unit in the field with nothing more than new batteries for their radios as the payload. It simply doesn't make sense to use a 45 million dollar helicopter for such tasks.

What do units do in today's Army when they need minor (but vital) resup. that used to be provided by the Kiowas or Hueys?

[Brian Abraham]

Is using a 45 million dollar helicopter for such tasks, especially for a country with Australia's limited military budget, even remotely cost-effective? Hit the nail on the head there. The RAAF considered the Huey too valuable an asset to risk by having it exposed to unsecured areas of operation in Vietnam. Though they did do good work with the SAS.

[BentStick]

TBML - Your question was simple, and I was not attempting to answer it. I was merely providing you with a credible source of information to address the other twaddle.

As for the MOTS projects going great, those you listed are for capabilities already familiar to the ADF. The ARH introduces a totally new capability to Army and I'd guess the inability to "export" ARH has more to do with developing the expertise to apply that capability effectively.

Koala's may look cute and cuddly but are in reality, smelly little buggers with attitude and a decent gouge!

[TBM-Legend]

Interestingly, the common platform brigade to simplify the supply chain don't seem to understand that if a serious issue develops with the platform [ie. MRH-90 engines] the whole show could be grounded leaving us with nothing. I see that issue arising in the RAAF F-35 only going forward vs. F-35/F-18F [or whatever] mix. With the MRH we could have had no operational ADF utility choppers if the Black Hawk/ Sea King was retired.

[MTOW]

I can't help but feel that too many decisions are reached at Russell Hill (and higher up the political greasy pole) more with an eye to that nice little post-retirement job working for an aircraft or arms manufacturer than to what would be the best fit for the job.

A large proportion if not all of our military commitment over the last 30 years has involved peace keeping rather than full on battle against a well-armed contemporary army. Even the current commitment to Afghanistan wouldn't fit into the 'full on' description. So if ever there was a country that needed a 'cheap and cheerful' second tier helo (like a modern Kiowa or a SuperHuey), it's Australia.

What we've bought and are buying is a crazy mix, like buying a Porsche with top of the range trim to haul the sheep carcasses up from the back paddock - or a B777 to fly 30 pax from Sydney to Dubbo four times a day.

[TBM-Legend]

now who was it that said 'he who get's there the fastest with the mostest wins!'...

In the helo world we'll be back to flying the general in an MRH-90 to view the vista rather than a next level down comms/support helo....

[zic]

TBM-L,

In answer to your original question - my understanding is no they are still grounded and will be for a few months yet! The engine is not fit for purpose.

[TBM-Legend]

Sea Sprite Mk 2...*

*at least the engines worked on the SeaSprite!

I wonder why our precious media haven't picked up on this one??

[Andu]

How many billions were written off on the Sea Sprite project?

And probably more importantly, how much FAA ASW experience was lost in the people who sat around year after year unable to pass on their experience to the next generation of naval aviators?

[DominiqueS]

Please correct me if I'm wrong (and I'm certain you will), but doesn't this engine power some aircraft other than the NH 90. I seem to recall that the Brits selected this engine for some of their medium/heavy aircraft too.

Does anyone here know who called for the Ausstralian fleet grounding? Was it Rolls Royce/Turbomeca or was it the ADF? Has any other operator also grounded their fleet?

[GreenKnight121]

The NH-90 can be ordered with either of two engine types:
2Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322-01/9 or
2 General Electric T700-T6E

MRH-90 uses the RTM322-01/9.

This engine also powers the AW101 (Merlin) and the AW-built Apaches.

[Andu]

What we've bought and are buying is a crazy mix, like buying a Porsche with top of the range trim to haul the sheep carcasses up from the back paddock - or a B777 to fly 30 pax from Sydney to Dubbo four times a day.Pretty well sums up the current situation except for one thing - the giant, inappropriate 777s (or most of them) are almost permanently grounded.

[TBM-Legend]

Army/Navy needed new choppers.

For Army; Off the shelf Mike's from Uncle Sam would have been a low risk proven solution.
For Navy; Off the shelf Knight Hawks

Forget building this stuff in Oz. The cost goes thru the roof to keep a few bods in jobs for a few years only..

Interesting to see how the Sea Hawk replacement goes...

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

TBM

UH-60Ms would have provided no appreciable capability increase over the current Black Hawk. Army chose the MRH because it had appreciable increases in range, payload and flexibility over the 'Mike'. The fact that it isn't working at the moment doesn't mean the original decision was necessarily a bad one - it's more to do with the program's painfully slow industrial ramp up in Europe and a corresponding lack of spares here, combined with an overly cautious (re airworthiness and IOC criteria) ADF.

By Knight Hawk I assume you mean the 'Romeo'...looks like an almost done deal. Notification of possible MH-60R sale to Australia | Australian Aviation Magazine (http://australianaviation.com.au/notification-of-possible-mh-60r-sale-to-australia/)

The MRH/ARH build program will transition to through life support for both types - all DM work and upgrades through to life of type will be done by the workforce at Pinkenba, so it's more than just a few years.

[oldpinger]

TBM,

Slightly off thread but the R in Romeo actually means reworked/refurbished/refitted B. ie new avionics, but same Old design airframe.
At least the MRH shouldn't rust as fast being mostly plastic.

[Hilife]

FA18

Yes the BlackHawk has a slightly smaller cabin, no ramp and carries less gas, so cabin and range not as impressive as the NH90 with standard fuel, but the 701D powered UH-60M’s operating with a vastly improved cockpit and wide chord blades are knocking the spots of their predecessors with regards to performance at hot and high ops and dispatch reliability in the Stan. So to suggest the combat proven UH-60M would have provided no appreciable capability increase over the ageing Australian Army’s S-70A’s is simply ludicrous.

The U.S. Army BlackHawk’s in Iraq and Afghanistan have accumulated more than 1 million fleet flight hours without a single Class A material failure.........Not bad for an old technology [sic] platform.

If you placed UH-60M’s and NH-90’s side by side on the pan and told the grunts and crews alike to pick a cab to go fight in, I’ve no doubt the Hawk would be the platform of choice every time.

When the NH90 has proven combat experience and reliability under its belt, then let it stand side-by-side with other war fighting helicopters, but the introduction of the NH90 in any variant to any of the five or six nations with inventory has been a sorrowful tale to date, which might explain why many are looking elsewhere for their next acquisition.

[emergov]

Actually Foxtrot is pretty close to the money. The M can still only fit 8 troops in Marching Order, even if it can lift as much as an MRH90. After all the messing about, the MRH90 will fit 12 pax (marching order) in proper, crashworthy seats. That's a 50% capability increase.

Now, if they would just do that 'flying' thing a bit more often...

[TBM-Legend]

having a machine that is entirely compatible with big brother when you're fighting with them is a big plus. All the talk about the NH-90 series being composite therefore not corroding belies the fact that we've operated Sea Kings for 30+ years and the Black Hawk for 25 years without them 'rusting out'! [don't mention the Huey]

More Chinooks and newer Black Hawks was the correct answer. This combo seems to work real well in ops.

Re keeping a few bods employed at Pinkenbah; well these work for the dole schemes are not cost effective...

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

You sure there are UH-60Ms deployed to Afghanistan yet, Hilife?

I'm sure the NH 90 vs Black Hawk preference argument is a valid one, same as it was 35 years ago for the Black Hawk vs Huey...

Ask one of the MRH 90 guys what they think of their new steed (granted, when it actually flies!), and you'll get overwhelming praise for it...anyway...

[Fubaar]

TBM, I believe the blame for whole Tiger/NH-90 debacle can be laid at the door of some very senior idiot at Sikorsky who was so sure that the Australians would see the absolute commonsense of your argument that he made absolutely no effort to sweeten the pot when Australia came looking for a deal. (I'm told the offer made to the Australians by the Americans was utterly ridiculous.)

The Australians went away and bought the opposition's product.

I hope and pray the day never comes to cause our helicopter units and the units they (currently don't) support to curse that nameless American. Some might say that day is already long past.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Yeah, well...sort of...

Sikorsky don't have an ARH equivalent, but I guess the same claim can be made of the Boeing/US Army team pitching the Apache (plus the Longbow radar was going to be extra!)

The other problem with the UH-60M program at the time of the MRH decision was that it was substantially a remanufacturing program with (I think) less than a quarter of the total planned buy scheduled to be new builds.

My understanding is that not a lot of effort was put into marketing the new-build program to the ADF by the US Army and Sikorsky at the time and there wasn't a lot of certainty about whether Australia's S-70s could be 'remanned' to UH-60M standard because of their differences to the US UH-60A/Ls.

Anyway, right or not, Army wanted something A) bigger and longer ranging (read: flexibility) than the Black Hawk, and B) with some commonality to the ARH, hence the choice of MRH.

[TBM-Legend]

another myth is Tiger and MRH-90 commonality. Completely different model engine Tiger MTR390 - MRH-90 MTR322,,,,

The Army wanted the AH-64 by the way until DMO got involved in the benefits of local manufacture etc. More like better trips to France..

So who will win the next Naval chopper contest?

[BentStick]

All the talk about the NH-90 series being composite therefore not corroding belies the fact that we've operated Sea Kings for 30+ years and the Black Hawk for 25 years without them 'rusting out'! [don't mention the Huey] They didn't rust out because we spent a gazillion dollars on deeper maintenance! Composite airframes involve much lower DM costs, allowing you to spend more of your finite defence budget at the sharp end.


More Chinooks and newer Black Hawks was the correct answer. This combo seems to work real well in ops. Only if the question starts with "If money were no object..." and ends with ".....an unlimited supply of TRGBs".

[emergov]

No one said Tiger and MRH90 had the same engines! They have the same EWSP fit - and that's a significant plus.

"Army wanted AH-64..." There are 25000 people in 'Army' Not all of them say the same thing, let alone the right thing. Perhaps "some people in the Army wanted AH-64" would be more accurate. Some people in the Army want jet boots and nuclear hand grenades; doesn't mean they're a good idea.

And trips to France are pretty much like trips to America, except that it's France, and not America. People are still going to have to travel overseas. I really don't think the location of the factory was much of a player when cabinet sat down to make the decision.

[Hilife]

You sure there are UH-60Ms deployed to Afghanistan yet, Hilife?

Quite sure

The UH-60M first arrived in Afghanistan with the 101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Combat Aviation Brigade in March 2009 as part of operation Task Force Thunder.

[oldgrubber]

It’s a different version of the RTM engine, that’s why we aren’t grounded and haven’t had a front end failure on the Merlins.

[Super 64]

BH can 'only' fit 8 where as MRH can fit 12. This would have to be one of the most ridiculous arguments out there.

2012 infantry construct is now 8 men per Sect (down from 9) so a BH can carry a full sect in marching order. If that's not enough take the seats out and OCL will take 18.

In the BH troops can at least wear their webbing in the seats, something that can not be done in the fantastic crash-worthy seats of the MRH.

Even with the craftiest use of numbers you'll find that the MRH can only give you about 10% more than the BH M/L.

This is all before the tactical aspect of splitting Sections and bump plans (losing a Sect vs a Sect-and-a-half)

Let’s not start on the cabin floor or the door guns!

And the Mikes seem to be doing pretty well in Afghan.

New Army Black Hawk succeeds in combat (http://www.army.mil/-news/2010/03/04/35310-new-army-black-hawk-succeeds-in-combat/)

S64

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

emergov

Crashworthy seats!!! - I couldn't get my slender ass in there in DPU let alone with any marching order, let alone with the amount of bang our boys will need in Uruzgan.

Stop selling the party line, the M S70 and F CH47 are bloodied already!! The wrong decision was made.....

HPT

[emergov]

Slender ass? I think not if it wouldn't fit.

Those advocating OCL have obviously never sat in a BOI, or senate estimates, or an AWB.

If you're wearing belt webbing (which won't fit) then you don't need to hit the ground running. If you do need to hit the ground running, you'll be wearing MCBAS, or the newer armour, and you'll fit in the seat.

The acft was acquired, in part, because it beat the Blackhawk in a DSTO-study modelling Amphibious force generation. The only acft that actually met the requirements of the study was Merlin.

If we followed the argument that 8 is all we need, and losing a section and a half would be awful, then we'd have bought Bell 412 and our Chinooks would only have nine seats in them - unless we're OCL, which apparently is tops, and we'd forget all our previous arguments and have 85 pax standing back to back.

No argument Black Hawk would have been easier to bring into service. MRH90 will end up giving better capability to the ADF.

[TBM-Legend]

The acft was acquired, in part, because it beat the Blackhawk in a DSTO-study modelling Amphibious force generation. The only acft that actually met the requirements of the study was Merlin.


Buy the right equipment then......
Australia – MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
July 12, 2010
The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress July 7 of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Australia of 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission helicopters and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support for an estimated cost of $2.1 billion.
The Government of Australia has requested a possible sale of 24 MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Mission Helicopters, 60 T-700 GE 401C Engines (48 installed and 12 spares), communication equipment, support equipment, spare and repair parts, tools and test equipment, technical data and publications, personnel training and training equipment, US government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services. The estimated cost is $2.1 billion.
Australia is one of our most important allies in the Western Pacific. The strategic location of this political and economic power contributes significantly to ensuring peace and economic stability in the region. Australia’s efforts in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan have served US national security interests. This proposed sale is consistent with those objectives and facilitates burden sharing with our allies.
The proposed sale of the MH-60R Seahawk helicopters will improve Australia’s anti-submarine and surface warfare capability and provide an improved search and rescue and anti-ship surveillance capability. Australia will also use the enhanced capability in future contingency operations encompassing humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and stability operations in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia will have no difficulty absorbing these additional helicopters into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractors are Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in Stratford, Connecticut, Lockheed Martin in Owego, New York, General Electric in Lynn, Massachusetts, and Raytheon Corporation in Portsmouth, Rhode Island. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of ten contractor representatives to Australia to support delivery of the MH-60R helicopters.
There will be no adverse impact on US defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.

[Doors Off]

Might be wrong but I thought that the UH60M's operating in AFG are not the full production model that was being touted to the ADF. I think that they are yet to field the fly-by-wire production model.:O

The ADF, by the sounds of it, should have stuck with Wessex (tried and proven in the ASW, Littoral (Falklands) roles), the S51 from the 1950's and the Sioux (plenty of parts and the supercharged version had fantastic H&H performance and easy to get fuel for at your local servo). What 'real' benefits could technology offer?:8

[dat581]

The only acft that actually met the requirements of the study was Merlin.

Does anyone know why the Merlin was not considered/down selected/purchased if it was the only aircraft that met the requirements?:confused:

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Men,

Have been off this forum for a year or so and a friend requested I contribute to this thread, so herewith some input.

The major arms manufacturers have been hugely overpricing all of their products and bribing nations into purchases, mainly through industry offset deals. In this murky 'arms bazaar', the outrageous unit costs of hardware and particularly operating costs have been more or less shrugged off by defence planners.

Australia has a 'defence industry policy' not a 'military preparedness policy' because in-service military assets have generally not been progressively optimised to maintain continuous adequate military capacity and credibility. Had Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk all been progressively upgraded, then the ADF could have provided broader integral helo support in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now of course, there are serious force capability gaps.

Lets consider Australian dollar operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided to ASPI by Defence (see ASPI Special Report 21):

RAN Fleet Air Arm: Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Squirrel - $5,208.
Army Aviation: Blackhawk - $20,659; Iroquois - $7,738; Kiowa - $2,865

The higher than normal Hotel model Iroquois operating costs were explained as due to reduced flying on phase out from service. For comparison, a civilian medevac twin-engine Bell 412 operator provided an hourly cost of $5,755. Bell Helicopter claims single-engine operating costs for Huey II to be 30 percent less than for Hotel model Iroquois so arguably below $5,000 per hour if actively utilised. Who knows what operating costs will be for Tiger, MRH-90, MH-60R, but likely to be prodigious!

Hot and high performance is fundamental in Australia's regional tropical archipelago environs, as for Iraq and Afghanistan, and tropical trialling was once undertaken before aircraft acquisitions were confirmed; but this essential performance requirement was apparently not first validated for Tiger and MRH-90 so what is their capability in this regard? The Huey II can hover in ground effect at maximum operating weight at 12,000 feet in ISA +20C conditions.

The Army media link provided earlier this thread reveals the much increased field support capabilities necessary for Tiger and similarly for Apache wherever operated. The complexity of the MRH-90 and MH-60R will also entail substantial deployment penalties. The RAAF operated the Huey extensively throughout the neighbouring tropical archipelago with just 2 flight fitters, tool-boxes and a few basic spares. Single-engine Huey types can be pretty quickly prepared for C-130 deployment and be assembled again and flying at destination within about one hour. Not that easy for Blackhawk and MRH-90 and if C-17 transportation is necessary, then that becomes expensive.

Army Aviation blundered hugely by shedding the Iroquois sacrificing the most valuable battlefield asset, a light inexpensive proven utility capability with multi-role characteristics. But now, 5 Iroquois will apparently be retained for training and the remainder parked mainly at military base locations for historical purposes, just getting covered in bird****. That is just irresponsible defence planning.

Upgrade of the 20 or so remaining Iroquois to Huey II via the Bell Helicopter factory program would only cost around $40million overall, less than the price of a single Tiger or MRH-90! Better to negotiate a reduction in the order for the flawed MRH-90 and upgrade all Iroquois to Huey II, even if some were stored, because it is very obvious that both the Tiger and MRH-90 will not have the requisite versatility for regional archipelago operations.

If anybody wishes to debate the military capabilities of the Huey II, then let's joust.

[TBM-Legend]

what's now lacking in the Oz Army's fleet of helos is a utility helicopter to carry out the admin and other tasks including supporting units in training. The MRH model will send the Army broke and there will never be enough cabs to meet training and other comms requirements.

USA is now using UH-72 for this which is a civil chopper fitted for the 2nd tier purpose. The ideal Huey replacement it seems..


Also does it look like Navy has settled on MH-60R?

[Bushranger 71]

TBM-Legend; see this link: Bell Helicopter - The Bell UH-1H (Huey II) (http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/aircraft/military/bellHueyII.cfm)

Why buy an expensive new aircraft for roles which are arguably better performed by existing wholly-owned hardware that can be cost-effectively upgraded through an ongoing factory program with long-term supportability?

Parking very usable Iroquois as monuments will just be a criminal waste of valuable defence assets.

The USAF ordered 24 Huey II with a glass cockpit option; Iraq has since ordered 16 and will upgrade another 16 of their UH-1H.

[Doors Off]

Damn! :ugh:I should have kept my HQuey Station Wagon and fitted a turbo diesel, air conditioning, some airbags, another seatbelt in the rear seat, an additional bench seat in the rear baggage compartment (to make it a seven seater), another differential to make it 4 wheel drive, bigger wheels, raised the suspension, a CD player (unecessary technology but nice for the driver), mobile phone kit and called it the HQuey II.:rolleyes: But wait, I already sold it and bought a Turbo Diesel 4WD made by somebody else rather than Holden, therefore it can't be as good as the HQuey.

BR71, they are gone, sad I know and to see them covered in Bird**** will be kind of sad, but some parents like me, will stop in front of them and tell their kids about their grandparents/Uncles who flew into battle in them in Vietnam. Better than seeing them turned into scrap metal.

Embrace the future and these pesky new machines might even get the job done. I am pretty sure our guys and girls would rather fight in an ARH, MRH S70 rather than a Huey II:bored:

[Bushranger 71]

Okay Doors Off; come up with some valid hot and high performance figures for AAH, MRH-90, S-70 (your designation) and then we can do some good analysis and have a proper debate that might interest other forum participants.

Combat operations have to be conducted cost-effectively with affordable losses. Flexibility, Versatility and Economy of Effort are longstanding principles of war-fighting and none of the fore-mentioned types relate well to that guidance. Consider this extract from a very comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam War operations:

‘The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’ – Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

Discarding the Iroquois leaves the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat. Will the MRH-90 be utilized for ammo resupplies and casevac during ongoing close quarters engagements? Doubtful, at around $45million a copy.

Over the past 2 years, Australian defence expenditure has increased from 7.6 percent of government revenue to nearer 10 percent, which is unsustainable without further impost on taxpayers. Operating costs for the ADF are going off the clock and will worsen significantly in the helo field, but nobody is being held accountable.

The Iroquois are not yet gone; they are keeping 5 and the rest could be retained by a sensible political decision.

[Andu]

As a commander in the field, would you prefer to have helicopter support widely available to your unit and other sub-units, or have two or three bright, shiny high-tech aircraft that, (even if they were serviceable and based anywhere near you), simply had to be rationed to such a degree that they could only be made available in highly critical circumstances?

That's not even going into the question of whether the rare as bat**** shiny new toys could carry the load (or as much load as the sneered at "HQey" could) or even be capable of operating into your LZ if you were in a hot and high location?

Nor whether the tasking agency was willing to put said shiny rare toy at risk if your loc. was (or went) hot?

MTOW likened our chopper selections to "using a Boeing 777 to carry 30 pax from Sydney to Dubbo" in an earlier post. With the choppers we're buying, I can't see them being even marginally economical in being used for 90% of the tasking I used to see in the field. (And let's face it, whether you like it or not, costs, both acquisition and operating, have to be considered.) I can see sub-units waiting a very long time - or having to move overland to 'hubs' - to get vitally needed supplies as multiple tasking requests are 'bundled' into one 'more economical' sortie.

.... or the military falling back on contracting to civilian operators for the 'bread and butter' stuff - surely not something that should be part of any planning strategy? Have the bean counters gained such ascendancy that 'surge capability' has been replaced with 'just in time'? If the military own and operate those 'bread and butter' aircraft, in an emergency, they can be employed outside their role, in some cases accepting risks - even losses - that would be considered unacceptable in normal operations. With civilian contractors, particularly foreign civilian contractors (as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan), any such outside normal role is very problematic.

[Bushranger 71]

Brian Abraham; re post #13 regarding 9SQN RAAF Vietnam War operations. With respect, you are way offside.

9SQN RAAF flew 58,768 hours, 237,806 sorties during 5.5 years (2,000 days) of Vietnam war involvement. That was the highest flying effort of any Air Force unit in any campaign since the inception of the RAAF in 1921.

The squadron did perform 1,100 plus SAS patrol insertions/extractions and 110 were in contested situations; but that was only a portion of the much broader effort in support of all of the 1ATF fighting arms, US and Vietnamese forces.

The primary role was support of the Infantry battalions with direct involvement in the fighting during hundreds of engagements. Lots of ammunition resupplies and casevacs during brawls. 7 aircraft were lost due to multiple causes and another 23 suffered mostly minor battle damage. 6 aircrew were killed and 8 wounded.

Regrettably; much misinformation mostly based on hearsay has been propagated over the past 40 years, some of it disappointingly originated by members of the other services. A recent example is the book VIETNAM: The Australian War by Paul Ham. Unfortunately; if lies are told often enough, they become the accepted truth.

The following statistics may help dispel some of the mythology generated over a few decades. Note in particular the casevacs, ammunition expenditure, maintenance effort and aircraft availability.


http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/9SqnVNStatsAwardslr2.jpg

[DominiqueS]

BR71. What war? Did Australia ever formally declare war on Vietnam, or the other way about? Did the US? Just checking on possible misinformation.

[Fubaar]

Maybe not the optimum place to expect a sympathetic hearing from too many for that kind of campus crap, Dominique.

I can assure you that the people one might expect from your comment to be those you sympathise with - the North Vietnamese and those in the South who supported them - believed it to be a war.

[Bushranger 71]

Dominique; 3,629 Australian casualties overall during Vietnam involvement, including 426 battle-related deaths, seemed like war-fighting to me.

The Australian Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986 embraces these provisions. For conflicts after WW2, qualifying service (for benefits) is either allotment to and service in an area described in Schedule 2 of the VEA, during the specific period, or force assigned and service in an area determined to be warlike. A written Instrument by the Minister for Defence determines warlike service and a bunch of these were created retrospectively in recent years to formalize veteran entitlements for conflicts in which Australia became involved wherein war was never formally declared.

The terms Korean War, Vietnam War, Falklands War, Gulf War, War in Iraq, War in Afghanistan, War on Terror do not necessarily relate to formal declarations of war although there may be statutory requirements for some of the nations involved.

[DominiqueS]

Ouch!

Fubarr - Campus crap my ar*e. My only comment was "Just checking on possible misinformation". The rest of the post was questions, readily identifiable with the ? suffix.

BR71 - I guess thats a "No" then.

We're kinda drifting away from the thread aren't we?

[Bushranger 71]

Dominique; you digressed from the theme this thread. Post #50 has also been updated.

[7x7]

I'm know I'm dating myself with this question, but nevertheless, it is an honest question.

Even if we disregard the operating/acquisition costs question (which I agree, we really can't). have things changed in the helicopter recce game to the degree that a man down in the weeds with his head out the open door of Sperm or a Kiowa has been replaced by someone cocooned in an airconditioned cabin of a Tiger? I know the electronic gizmos of today are a quantum leap from what was available 30 years ago, but I really wonder if they'll ever completely replace a set of eyes with day to day knowledge of the ground.

[Like This - Do That]

7x7 I can offer this analogy: it's comparing

(1) sticking one's head up out of a T50 turret on a bucket and looking in vain for old mate, sitting quietly in the weeds; vs
(2) sitting in the turret of a LAV and seeing old mate from 1200m away on TI and sending some love his way. "FIRE" "ON" "FIRE" "FIRING NOW" "STOP TARGET DESTROYED"

Not being AAAvn myself it's the best I could do at short notice. Leo vs M1 Abrams comparison probably similarly valid ...

[GreenKnight121]

Lets see... having to get close enough to use one's eyes directly (and thus vastly increasing the probability of getting blown out of the sky by an RPG or machine gun), along with having to go to each spot you want to check out, and carrying a small weapons load that can only deal with one or two of what you find.

Or, tooling along at a respectable distance/altitude, using FLIR (with image-enhancement/enlargement modes) and other sensors to see in detail day or night, etc . Being able to look at more spots in a short time because you are able to see details from further off, thus not having to actually go to each spot. Having a significant load of more effective and numerous weapons to deal with trouble "right now" vs having to call in someone else who might not be able to acquire the target you want to hit (if it hasn't moved off by then).

Of course, those are just "electronic gizmos", and therefore useless, right?

They are BETTER than unaided human vision, and they give more info to the human mind, thus giving BETTER knowledge of the ground!

Please come forward from the 1960s (you said "30 years ago", but even then military professionals were embracing more advanced tech than "sticking one's head out the door"), and inform yourself about just what those "electronic gizmos" really do, and what they add to the capabilities of the modern recon helo and the crews flying them!

[Bushranger 71]

A really good point 7x7.

Utility, recce, gunship helos all need good visibility as aircrew must be able to see and hear ground-fire as they normally operate at the coal-face of operations. That is why the Huey, Kiowa, Sperm were so good for their roles. Conversely, any helo with an air-conditioned cabin, more vision impairing ironmongery surrounding cockpits - as in so-called stealth attack helo designs - and inboard mounted defensive weaponry will arguably be less suited for close-quarters battlefield support than the fore-mentioned types.

Review of the book APACHE by Ed Macy reveals some of the pluses and minuses of the Apache and those aspects mentioned above are discussed. FLIR is beaut technology for reconnaissance; but if 2 heads are more in cockpits peering at screens and/or through monocles or HUD, then visual observation capacity is arguably further diminished.

Project Air 87 acquired the Tiger '... to replace the capability currently represented by the Bell 206B-1 (Kiowa) and UH1-H (Iroquois) gunship helicopters with a new reconnaissance and fire support capability for the land force early in the next century.' But Tiger will be inadequate on both counts in my view.

Consider this extract from the very comprehensive US Army study of Vietnam War operations:

'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’

But sticking with armed recce for now; the Kiowa could have been very cost-effectively upgraded and appropriate certified weaponry mounted as required. That would have provided an adequate capability and the Kiowa is of course actively employed in Afghanistan.

[500N]

Bushranger

"Review of the book APACHE by Ed Macy reveals some of the pluses and minuses of the Apache and those aspects mentioned above are discussed. FLIR is beaut technology for reconnaissance; but if 2 heads are more in cockpits peering at screens and/or through monocles or HUD, then visual observation capacity is arguably further diminished."

I have read both his books, a couple of times. Isn't being able to "see" from further away, in both modes better than just one normal eye mode close up ? They do have the option of then going closer for an eyeball if needed once possible threats have been assessed ?

"'...While many (US Army) gunship crews liked the speed, agility and hard-to-hit slender lines of the Cobra, there was another faction that preferred the old Huey gunships since the door gunners not only provided additional eyes and ears but could lay down suppressive fire to the rear of the helicopter…The debate between the two factions went on through the war.’"

Fully understand the tactical situation here, but isn't that why the Apache's work in pairs in opposite sides of a clock so one can also cover the other ?

Same as when they both landed at the fort, 2 other Apache's were covering them ?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi 500N,

Good discussion and I may be mixing apples and oranges a little.

Much valuable use was made of sensors for reconnaissance in Vietnam from a range of fixed wing aircraft moreso than choppers and usually from above about 4,000 AGL. We operated 'people sniffer' gear from Hueys at tree top level level but no other electronic detectors. The state of the art sensor stuff is of course great and much of this kit is now an optional fit for fixed and rotary wing enabling cost-effective adaptation for particular roles.

War-fighting in barren open terrain like Iraq and Afghanistan requires some variations in operating practices compared with counter-insurgency in tropical jungle environs. As always, there is still need for a range of recce capabilities including visual reconnaissance where sight, sound, smell can locate human activity not necessarily detectable by sensors (e.g. cooking, toilet odours) emanating from caves, tunnels.

Attack helicopters have special applicability including of course armour busting for which they were initially conceived. But they are super-expensive and mostly not equipped with an adequate mix of gun weaponry for intimate close-quarters support (as close at 10 metres from friendlies) where weapon redundancy is essential.

The 2 helo gunship (light fire team) operating concept was not sound in my view because the trailing aircraft only provides support for the lead, but that differs when wagon-wheeling. Similarly for the AAH which tend to fly further apart for radar and sensor considerations. The following illustration depicts both 2 and 3 ship attack profiles for Huey gunships with the advantages of a 3 aircraft flight apparent. A 3 or 4 gunship/AAH flight would be best conducted in fighter low level battle formation during transit or reconnaissance giving effective cross-cover for all aircraft. But as indicated in APACHE, units operating that complex aircraft struggle to maintain 50 percent on line availability so they probably get stuck with the 2 ship concept (likely so for the Tiger).
.
http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/Firing-pattern06b.jpg

Basic 2 & 3 ship Bushranger attack profiles

[500N]

"Good discussion but we may be mixing apples and oranges a little."

I was thinking the same thing when I typed my reply. I hope I am not the cause of thread drift !!! LOL

Understand.

Since I am new, FYI, I am not a flyer or backroom, just an interested party that
did some time in the ARES green machine where the blue and green machines
flew us around a bit. I understand strategic and tactical concepts etc etc......

thanks

[MTOW]

Reading between the lines on this topic, the most important phrase would seem to be contained in ARH Tiger's last paragraph:If only they flew/worked............................?????That, and the sad fact that Australia simply cannot afford enough units of this top shelf equipment to make them useful to enough land units that AAVN attempts to support.

[Bushranger 71]

There is a fair bit of apprehension in many forums re supposed vulnerability/survivability of helicopters during combat operations and perhaps some questionable thinking generally re the merits of armed helicopter escort.

Consider this extract from the previously referenced US Army study on Vietnam War operations: ‘Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted.’ Some of these statistics resulted from the dubious merit practice of attempting to land troops right on to known enemy held positions via so-called combat air assault.

No. 9 Squadron RAAF operated Iroquois more prudently during 5.5 years of Vietnam involvement flying 237,808 sorties with only 25 aircraft being hit (1:9,512 probability), 3 aircraft shot down (1:79,270) and only 1 lost to ground-fire (1:237,808). Although RPG-style weaponry in particular has improved over the past 40 years, the risk of being hit is still very low depending somewhat on helo operating techniques.

The only aircraft lost by 9SQN to enemy ground-fire was when attempting winching of a Vietnamese soldier who had both legs blown off by a mine. The fighting was still ongoing among rocky outcrops in mountainous terrain when an enemy soldier stepped out from behind an adjacent boulder firing a burst directly into the engine of the hovering Huey. The aircraft fell on to some on the ground beneath and 2 Australians and 1 American perished in the inferno. Bushranger gunships were also involved but could not prevent the shoot-down. Incredibly, the disabled Vietnamese soldier managed to crawl away and is still living.

Another anecdote in the opposite sense. A gentle straight-in approach toward the treeline of a 100 metre diameter clearing to deposit a SAS patrol; virtually stationary and touching down when 4 enemy popped up from behind fallen timber in the middle of the clearing and began engaging us with AK-47s. Swift collective response from our crewman with his M60, SAS on board and supporting US Army charlie model gunships clobbered the opposition. The 4 enemy fired maybe 100 rounds all up at a stationary aircraft, side-on and in clear view at 50 metres range; but amazingly, we did not take a single hit. It is much more difficult to hit a moving aircraft due to a continually changing aiming picture and especially when adrenalin is pumping.

During 4,360 sorties and involvement in 50 engagement scenarios with the opposition, my aircraft was only hit twice; once by a 12.7mm fluke shot when flying at !,500 feet over jungle and by 2 x 7.62mm rounds in another instance during a ground level close-quarters contest.

Some contend the threats in Afghanistan differ from Vietnam. The proliferation of 7.62, 12.7mm and RPGs is similar, but there is a greater MANPAD risk in Afghanistan causing some losses. The necessity in that scenario is of course adjustment of operating practices. Over years, many have said that AC-130 gunships would not survive, but they have done so in multiple theatres against much stronger anti-aircraft threats incurring only minimal losses and they are still one of the most valuable firepower assets in the USAF inventory with the USMC also moving in that direction. War-fighting is a dangerous and risky business and some losses just have to be considered acceptable – it is all part of the warrior game.

Army Aviation generally contends that higher speed attack helos are necessary to escort other battlefield helos like Chinook, but the value of this requirement is overstated. Would escort deter launch of missilery targeting a Chinook or whatever by some doped-up fanatic hoping to be glorified at meeting Allah? Highly unlikely, although the launch site if detected could be belatedly suppressed but not before an aircraft might be downed.

Escort of RAAF Iroquois by gunships in Vietnam mainly applied to special operations roles and the principal value of gunships in troop insertion situations was having them loiter for immediate response to ground actions. Most single aircraft operations were conducted unescorted and battlefield survivability was more about operating methods. I could also enumerate mutliple instances where utility helo door-guns knocked the opposition around appreciably.

Finally; responding to ARH Tiger post #63. Mate; the principal reason Chinooks are being used in Afghanistan for utility helo roles is hot and high performance. If sufficient up-engined Blackhawks and Huey II were available, then much of this very costly effort would not be necessary.

Futuristically, the ADF might at best have 4 of 7 CH-47F available continually to provide for whole of Army's heavy lift needs. We already know that the US Army removed Longbow radar on Apaches so they could carry enough ammunition and the ADF Tiger was accepted with deficient engine performance; so is anybody aware of what operating limitations have been revealed by belated French trialling of the Tiger in Afghanistan? On present indications, both Tiger and MRH90 will be seriously deficient regarding hot and high performance, let alone operating cost penalties.

There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious. Army Aviation will likely be very seriously embarrassed through lack of capability downstream if this prudent action is not taken. They should appeal to Minister Combet to exercise commonsense.

Apologies for the hefty post, but I hope it promotes some beneficial discussion.

[BBadanov]

Bushranger 71 wrote: There are multiple reasons why it would be wise to upgrade all the Iroquois to Huey II or even just leave them stored until the serious operational limitations and cost penalties of the envisaged new ADF helo fleet become glaringly obvious.

Good call BD, that would be the way to go, bearing in mind the ADF's poor record of trying to take the Rolls-Royce solution.

Of the current 6 CH-47D (remembering 4 are recycled CH-47Cs from 12 SQN), 2 are in-theatre, 2 probably typically in DM, leaving 1 out of 2 serviceable on the flight line.
With the 7 CH-47F, these figures will improve slightly, but doubt we would ever deploy 4. Fairly pathetic numbers. I don't know if there is an opening to recycle the 6 Ds to F standard, but 13 aircraft would make a viable force. In the meantime, we are playing at capability.
MRH - ok they can carry more troops than a UH-60 (S-70) and further. Certainly a plus. But were they fully militarised for war? And what does our major coalition partner fly? Our requirement for an MRH has changed I would suggest since the original spec was released (around 1998?), but MRH is not flying, and it is doubtful whether it would be deployed to theatre.
ARH - similar sad story. When will it see IOC? We should have picked Apache (did not need Longbow). The Tiger's engines were always under question for H&H performance. Another orphan, which may never be suitable to deploy.

Upgraded Huey IIs from our surviving Hotels would make strategic and logistical sense, as also may upgrading Kiowas for retention in the training role.

[MTOW]

A question for the AAVN drivers: does the mix of European (clockwise rotation) and American (counterclockwise rotation) cause any problems in training and switching between types? Probably not a big deal for experienced crews, but I would have thought it might be one extra dimension ("which foot do I use today?") that less experienced pilots could do without.

[reacher]

Good points raised however it doesn't change the fact that AAAvn has to play the hand it's dealt i.e MRH and ARH. The jets are ordered and / or on the way now we have to make it work. The rest is pure 20/20 (6/6) hindsight and wishful thinking.

[Bushranger 71]

Some of the contributors to this forum seem to give up too easily. If Army Aviation does not retain the Iroquois and Kiowa, then there will foreseeably be less flying available as the inevitable pressure comes on regarding soaring ADF operating costs. Defence spending over the past 2 years has increased from 7.6 percent of federal government revenue to nearer 10 percent which will not be sustainable as the world slides toward economic stagnation.

Politicians seldom take notice of occasional letters from people like me; but multiple communications on the same topic can make them squirm a bit, particularly with an election imminent. Herewith my submission and feel free to copy/massage as suits; but if you are a serving member, then of course use another name. Recommend despatch by both electronic and postal means.

The Hon. Greg Combet, AM, MP
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600

Dear Minister, IROQUOIS HELICOPTER DISPOSAL


You recently announced shedding of the invaluable Iroquois, primarily for historical purposes, but this is a monumentally bad decision compromising the national interest.

Successive Australian governments have generally failed to maintain adequate military capacities through continuous optimisation of in-service hardware (where cost-effective) leading to widening capability deficiencies. Inability to provide integral ADF helicopter support in Afghanistan beyond a token commitment of just 2 Chinooks is testimony.

Blackhawk, Iroquois, Kiowa versions are being widely operated in theatres of conflict around the world and moderate cost upgrading of these proven Australian military assets would have made waste of around $4billion on unproven and technically deficient Tiger and MRH90 unjustifiable. Hot and high performance capability is essential in many geographic environs like Iraq, Afghanistan and in the regional tropical archipelago with only later model Chinook having adequate performance. Both Tiger and MRH90 were not thoroughly evaluated in this regard and are proving very inferior.

ADF helicopter operating costs per flying hour for 2006/07 provided by Defence were: Seahawk - $45,317; Sea King - $23,616; Blackhawk - $20,659; Iroquois - $7,738; Squirrel - $5,208; Kiowa - $2,865. Operating costs for Tiger, MRH90 and MH-60S (if acquired) are not yet determined but will likely exceed those of Blackhawk and Seahawk.

Bell Helicopter conducts an ongoing Hotel model Iroquois rebuild program in the US enhancing the aircraft to much improved Huey II performance standard. UH-1H from military reserves storage are converted to virtually as new condition for around US$2million including multiple improvement features. The comparative hot and high performance of the Huey II surpasses all fore-mentioned helicopter types with long-term supportability and reduced operating cost approximating $5,000 per hour. The USAF ordered 24 with a glass cockpit option and Iraq will eventually possess 32 Huey II.

The Iroquois is the only utility helicopter in the ADF inventory that can be speedily prepared for deployment by C-130 for regional support needs and discarding this very versatile asset will leave the ADF without the most valuable of battlefield support helos, a light inexpensive utility aircraft capable of widely varied roles that can be operated very cost-effectively with some affordable losses in combat.

ADF helicopter fleet rationalisation planning is proving to be hugely flawed and diminishing military capacity, ultimately causing national embarrassment. All 20 or so Iroquois could be upgraded to Huey II for less than the cost of 1 Tiger or MRH90, so they should be converted through the Bell Helicopter factory program at modest overall cost of about $40million or just remain stored until the deficient capabilities and forbidding operating costs of outrageously expensive replacement aircraft become glaringly obvious.

I respectfully urge you Minister to rescind the Iroquois disposal decision, in the national interest.

[BBadanov]

The Hon. Greg Combet, AM, MP
Minister for Defence Material & Science
Parliament House
Canberra, ACT, 2600

Dear Minister, ??

The Election being called today for late August, which means no decisions by Govt now as they enter caretaker mode. It may be better to feed this information to the Opposition so they can stir the pot.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Of the current 6 CH-47D (remembering 4 are recycled CH-47Cs from 12 SQN), 2 are in-theatre, 2 probably typically in DM, leaving 1 out of 2 serviceable on the flight line.

You are quite correct BBadanov - how on earth does AAAvn think it can keep it pilots current in even the simplest manoeuvres when back home, let alone prepare its crews for deployment. How can you do multi-ship NVD training with just one aircraft available - oh yes, that's right, train your crews in the operational theatre - nice plan.

Dear Mrs Smith, we are sorry to tell you that your son was shot down and died whilst flying a training sortie in Afghanistan that he couldn't do back in in Australia because we don't have the appropriate number of aircraft or hours to support the Government's Strategy (or is it that the Army won't tell the Government that it shouldn't be deploying ill prepared crews to war fighting operations?).:ugh:

HPT

[Wiley]

Hydraulic Palm Tree, I'd written my post (below) before seeing your offering, but I see we're on almost the same wavelength.

The Opposition would normally be the right avenue to take to stir the pot on a matter like this. However, too many of the bad decisions on equipment purchases for the military were made by the Opposition when they were in power.

If you think the choice of helicopter types for the Army have been bad, ask someone with a Navy background about some of the choices that have been made for fleet replacement. And forget Seasprite. I'm not talking about helicopters, but ships. (Hint: try "Spain" as a starting point. I assure you, the mind will boggle, I kid you not.)

I can see Army Aviation pilots in their incredibly expensive and almost impossible to maintain in the field Rolls Royces following the path of European fighter pilots over the last 20 years - getting 100 hours or less (a LOT less) a year and only being allowed to actually fly their aircraft in once a year carefully stage-managed exercises.

I suspect you'll be logging a lot more sim. time than actual.

[Bushranger 71]

The Opposition Shadow Cabinet were badgered in this regard when Combet announced his disposal decision and one of their MPs has requested I meet with him next week. Earlier this AM, I also despatched the subject letter to 30 Opposition MPs. Please assist by adding pressure.

[7x7]

I suspect you'll be logging a lot more sim. time than actual.And God help us all if our AAVN soldiers ever have to actually use them for a protracted period in a crisis like Australia faced in 1942.

Australia needs:
(a) something that will work
(b) something we can afford to fly and train in
(c) something we can afford to buy in large enough quantities to make a meaningful contribution in the field to all the land units who will require support

I don't think what we have and are getting fits any of those requirements. But golly, they'll look good on the flight line.

[500N]

"You are quite correct BBadanov - how on earth does AAAvn think it can keep it pilots current in even the simplest manoeuvres when back home, let alone prepare its crews for deployment. How can you do multi-ship NVD training with just one aircraft available - oh yes, that's right, train your crews in the operational theatre - nice plan."


I would hope the Aust Def forces would have learn't a few lessons from the past about night flying. We don't need another accident.

[BBadanov]

Wiley said: However, too many of the bad decisions on equipment purchases for the military were made by the Opposition when they were in power.

Yes, correct. But they can claim that withdrawal of UH-1H is current Govt decision, and push the sense and economy of keeping the airframes.

Remember too, it was the Libs that pushed the increase in Defence spending, and the supplementary allocations for C-17 and F/A-18F acquisitions - you will never see Labor do that.

[emergov]

Why is it that posters on PPRUNE are perfectly gullible when it comes to negative or scandalous gossip, and hardened and cynical when people post positive information? It does my head in.

When someone says MRH90 will be OK, people reply "no it won't, Black Hawk is the only answer". When someone posts "Tiger may never be deployed" everyone nods wisely, and waits eagerly for the next bit of unsubstantiated errant crap to be anonymously posted.

Maybe it's because the issues are never simple enough to be described adequately on a thread like this, and the only guys who actually know anything about the subject are generally not willing to comment. So, we are stuck with people who know someone who quit 10 years ago, people working as contractors and people who flew in Air Force 30 years ago discussing their own feelings that everything might be all screwed up.

I must make the following points:
1. The entire ARH program is designed to end with the aircraft in a deployable state. There is nothing, and I mean nothing to suggest that it may never be deployable. Ditto for MRH90.
2. There is no underlying scandal brewing about costs of ownership and sustainability. The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.
3. Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform. The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle. Let's not forget the US Army lost almost 10,000 helos in that conflict, and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.
4. Every pilot and aircrewman in AAAvn is getting all the night flying they need. Those who fall uncurrent for whatever reason are given all the training they require before we ask them to step out on a dark night.
5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.
5. The assertion that MRH90 is not "fully militarised for war" is equally absurd and based on nothing other than inference from foolish and ill-informed posts on this thread.

Finally, I am stunned and ashamed of all of you for suggesting that our fighting men and women in some way don't deserve the Rolls Royce solution.

Bushranger 71, why not use your 9 Sqn contacts and go visit or just phone any Avn unit. Talk to the people who are actually going to war - there are lots, and ask them how they feel about the prospect of, in 2020, flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops. Ask them if they feel the need to smell the enemy. Then get back to us.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello again Men, A bit more to fill out the political picture.

Both of the major political parties have been complicit in dubious merit acquisitions and strongly supportive of the murky nexus between DMO and the major arms conglomerates. Recall the 'me too' extravagant defence spending promises out to 2018 preceding Election 2007 and see this link trumpeting the 10 year Defence Capability Plan: Combet back flips on critical defence capability plan - Liberal Party of Australia (http://www.liberal.org.au/Latest-News/2010/02/23/Combet-back-flips-on-critical-defence-capability-plan.aspx)

Arguably, a 10 year DCP done in pencil is wise, but the existing document aiming toward a mythical Force 2030 structure seems welded to the long-range spending promises, as does Air9000 the ADF helo force rationalisation program embraced therein.

Consider also the employment of a former MinDef and a CGS by big arms corporates associated with the Tiger, MRH90, LPD decisions with Nick Minchin also having been a strong driver of these projects in the Howard Government. Seems to me now that both of the major parties are so in thrall to the all powerful arms industry that they are very loathe to even bend long-range hardware acquisition planning. This statement by Bob Baldwin indicates where the priorities lie: ‘Defence industry, independent Defence policy analysts and the Coalition all advised Minister Combet that a four year DCP would not provide industry with enough information to plan for future Defence projects or to develop future workforce structures.’

In my view, Joel Fitzgibbon got it right pulling defence spending projections back to a 4 year budget forward estimates horizon as nobody can judge what the economic and perhaps strategic scenarios will be beyond that time-frame. And defence spending should be all about maintaining the best affordable continual military preparedness, not primarily benefiting defence industry.

It would cost little to just put Iroquois, Kiowa and maybe Squirrel in storage as appropriate and then to figure out whether and how to fund upgrade as the necessities become obvious. I have been hammering this angle but it is just bouncing off both political parties and I will be far from nice if necessary at my meeting with Bob Baldwin next Thursday (he needs my vote).

Both Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will eventually be in dire straits if we cannot get the politicians to act sensibly so we need to apply serious pressure on the Opposition pretty quick. Please get involved, in our national military interest.

[emergov]

The acquisitions planned under the 8 phases of AIR 9000 will be in service for 25-30 years. They are expensive because the airworthiness assurance framework, and initial sustainment funding (for approx 10-15 years, depending on the platform) are included in the cost.

Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.

Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.

I wish you well in your quest to have our government spend much less money for much less capability. I think the best you can do is mention the light utility gap left by the departure of Huey.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello again emergov; a while now since we jousted on a forum; but, respectfully, I think you are yet again off track in your #70 post.

First up; I have been retired from the military for 32 years but I am still just as capable as anybody of research and analysis, where you seem to be falling a bit short.

'...The very reason we are getting rid of our current fleet of ageing legacy platforms, some of which were designed in the 1950s, is to reduce cost of ownership. Huey II will cost us more than an equivalent buy of MRH90.'

Really! 46 x Huey II would cost around $100million or less considering we own about 20 Hotel models, but double that if you like to $200million for sustainment support costing. 46 x MRH90 will apparently cost us around $2.5billion.

'Huey is not suitable as an airmobile or air gunnery platform.'

Go have a look at posts #48 and #50. The overwhelming bulk of US Army and 9SQN RAAF Iroquois employment was airmobile trooping. The US Army UH-1C and RAAF UH-1H Bushangers were highly successful air gunnery platforms.

'The only reason they got away with it in Vietnam is because of the thick jungle.'

You should look at picto-mapping on the web for awareness of terrain and vegetation in and around Saigon, Bien Hoa, Phuoc Tuy and neighbouring provinces. Perhaps half of Phuoc Tuy was largely cleared of vegetation and much was rice paddy surrounding urban areas. Many engagements were within villages or in fairly open terrain.

'...and designed the Black Hawk (starting in 1968) as a direct result of the lessons learned.'

Blackhawk was arguably not a quantum leap on the Iroquois being twice as heavy and about 4 times more costly to operate for general utility roles, although it has some better attributes for special operations requirements. Both Boeing and Sikorsky erred somewhat in not sticking with the Huey cabin floor plan in the UTTAS competition. The twin-engined UH-1Y, which has a 500mm cabin extension, is being produced new for the USMC for general utility and gunship roles and they have previously used the UH-1N in those capacities for years.

'...flying a 65 year old acft with lashed up avionics and no EWSP on ops.'

The Huey II is a virtual as new platform with long-term supportability envisaged and for which a myriad of modular and bolt-on systems are certified. A range of enhancements are offered in the avionics upgrade and EWSP could be easily incorporated. These are hardly 'lashed-up' systems if incorporated in the factory upgrade program.

You cannot choose your chariot for war-fighting or expect to go to war in a cocoon. It really gets down to affordable capabilities.

Finally; I do have multiple former Army Aviation friends, one of whom kindly supplied me with all of the Bell Helicopter technical data for Huey II.

[BBadanov]

emergov says: Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement.

3 years from concept definition to govt decision - Really, you know how long AIR 87 (ARH) went? It was more like 20 years wasn't it? From a cheap-and-cheerful Kiowa recce helo, through a crazy phase that also included a fixed-wing SAR surveillance platform and UGS, finally back on track to an armed reconn helo? And still over a 20 year period the procurement/DMO process got it wrong.

[emergov]

BR71,

I think you are very much understating the costs associated with acquiring a new helicopter platform. If we bought 46 Huey II in place of the MRH90, it really would have cost a lot less. I was rather coming from where we are right now, where we are, where your proposal would be an increase in the number of aircraft we operate, and another type we would have to sustain.

The costs associated with any new purchase are only partly explained by the platform. We have a unit cost of $35M per MRH90, with no role equipment. times 46, that makes about $1.6BN. The other costs associated with the project are TLS, simulators, role equipment, training contracts, other training devices and facility upgrades. This includes funding for the systems project office personnel and links to the engineering authority.

This buys us 46 aircraft which are fly by wire, with integrated systems architecture, with upgrade potential, with new engines at the start of their development life. It includes floatation systems, external tanks, chaff and flare dispensers, FLIR, MFD, ballistic protection, crashworthy seats for all occupants, FDR, CVR, maintenance management information systems, a mission planning suite, and weather radar.

These aircraft have already demonstrated a deck landing envelope roughly twice that of Black Hawk, and their blades can be folded without use of a crane. The aircraft has wheels - it can be easily towed around the deck of a naval platform. It is made of composites, and so will not need the kinds of stringent corrosion preventative measures a Huey would when used as an amphibious assault platform.

Almost as an aside, it has 18 seats for soldiers and an endurance on internal fuel of over 5 hours. The only other aircraft that even comes close to meeting the requirement established by defence, and agreed to by government is Black Hawk Mikes, or Merlin. Merlin is too big and too expensive, Black Hawk lost the competition, so we have MRH 90.

As I said, your proposal is to pay a lot less money for a lot less capability.

Just because Huey was acceptable when Col Joye was on the wireless doesn't mean it's acceptable now. The fact that it would be cheap is kind of irrelevant, because it would be an additional cost to AIR 9000.

As I said, Hueys for light utility, great idea. MRH90 was selected for a reason - actually for dozens of reasons. Your suggestion that HueyII could do the same job does not stand scrutiny.

[emergov]

BBad, AIR 87 didn't start in 1987 any more than JP2048 started in the year 2048. There was a lot pie in the sky thinking, but when the proposals were put to government, that was the end of a 3 or 4 year analysis.

Bear in mind that the entire ADF acquisition process has been fundamentally changed twice in the last 15 years, with the Kinnaird review just the latest version of a difficult and unwieldy system. The big problem with Kiowa/Tiger was convincing government we needed a new recce platform at all.

DMO didn't get it wrong any more than CDG got it wrong. Against the criteria set, the Tiger was the best platform. Many people were more upset that we didn't select Mangusta, and the Cobra lobby was quite vocal too. It's one thing to say "we should have bought Apache", it's quite another to convince cabinet of that fact.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

emergov

4. Every pilot and aircrewman in AAAvn is getting all the night flying they need. Those who fall uncurrent for whatever reason are given all the training they require before we ask them to step out on a dark night.

5. We do all sorts of training in theatre. We always have. The assertion that we are somehow putting our people at risk because we don't have enough Chinooks is absurd, vexatious and based on ignorance.


Mate, you are seriously deluded if you believe that all crews are adequately trained. It isn't absurd, vexatious or ignorant - it is fact absolute fact. Tell me how you many hours are available to train crews before they deploy and whether all formation, NVD and tactical training is completed before deployment.....my evidence would suggest a different position to that which you are suggesting. And to say that you do all sorts out training in theatre because you always have is a feeble excuse and surely must signify that you are one of the 16th Aviation Brigade spin doctors....you should be ashamed of yourself....!

HPT

[BBadanov]

emergov says: BBad, AIR 87 didn't start in 1987 any more than JP2048 started in the year 2048.

Emergov, don't want to get into slanging matches here, as we both know the sorry procurement system and we're not anarak wearers.
I didn't say it started in 1987, but said the process took "more like 20 years" - which is not too far off the mark. I stand corrected, but think the process for AIR 87 started circa 1992. We may see IOC in 2012?

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

As someone involved in delivering capability to Army, the 'initial' training system is first rate. In fact we train and our pilots to death and I believe they are overtrained compared to the civilian/other countries. I agree we may not have the hours in unit to prep for ops, but the initial training is excellent.


Agree, good 'initial'training, but too much emphasis on IFR and not enough NVD slung loads, hovering etc.

I meant operational unit training is insufficient....glad you agree about emergov being a spin doctor....

[emergov]

I'm not a spin doctor. I have no responsibility to anyone to 'spin'.

I just happen to actually be in the capability, and I will tell you all what I think.

I have not ever stated that we are kicking great goals with ARH and MRH90.

It's been a long hard road, and there is a long way to go. I also didn't say everyone is getting 300 hours each. What I will say is that 150 hours in Afghanistan, or 250 in Timor is worth 400 hours transiting between Darwin and somewhere useful, or Townsville to Shoalwater Bay.

The people we send overseas are indeed well trained and ready for their operational mission. ARH pilots aren't going anywhere soon. When it's time to deploy and they haven't managed to get sufficient night flying, then my comment will be wrong. until then, my comment stands. We have simulators and part task trainers, and as ARH Tiger said, the product from the school is still first rate.

I don't see the hand wringing and anguish. I just see a bunch of keen, smart pilots, aircrewmen and maintainers going about their job and doing great things. The frustrations with Tiger and MRH90 are well known and briefed to the highest levels. The legacy aircraft are flying and operating very well thanks.

Hydraulic Palm Tree, you need to reply to my personal message with your concerns about pre-deployment training. Doing an HDA course in Timor with a QFI is not the end of the world, and the capability runs Mission Rehearsal Exercises and certification before every Timor and AFG deployment specifically to ensure everyone is ready to go.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

It's been a long hard road, and there is a long way to go. I also didn't say everyone is getting 300 hours each. What I will say is that 150 hours in Afghanistan, or 250 in Timor is worth 400 hours transiting between Darwin and somewhere useful, or Townsville to Shoalwater Bay.

Nobody has said they argue with that, but it would be good to get some time in before deploying.

Hydraulic Palm Tree, you need to reply to my personal message with your concerns about pre-deployment training. Doing an HDA course in Timor with a QFI is not the end of the world, and the capability runs Mission Rehearsal Exercises and certification before every Timor and AFG deployment specifically to ensure everyone is ready to go.


There is no PM from you and I don't need to reply to one if you send one later. Again, who said anything about HDA in Timor.....at least they went this year, unlike 2009.....!

Who approves the deployment and ceryfies the crews are ready? That;s right.....hardly going to say they are not ready.....might lose the next rank or gong!!

I just happen to actually be in the capability, and I will tell you all what I think.

and what makes you think me and ARH Tiger are not actually in the capability.......?!

[emergov]

I thought you were not in the capability because your pessimism and lack of insight are breathtaking.

You should have your PM now. Reply or not, it's your choice.

If you really think the guys deployed without sufficient NVD and formation training, at least talk to your OC, or call DDAAFS. This really isn't the appropriate forum to address your concerns.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

I thought you were not in the capability because your pessimism and lack of insight are breathtaking.


You are amazing....must just be out of Staff College or thrusting hard for it.....delusion!

If you really think the guys deployed without sufficient NVD and formation training, at least talk to your OC, or call DDAAFS. This really isn't the appropriate forum to address your concerns.

I did, to the Sqn OC, the CO, COFS 16 BDE and more.... and was ignored.....please don't patronise me with your breathtaking arrogance by saying this isn't the appropriate forum to address my concerns......got something to hide clearly!

[emergov]

OK.

Well done for speaking up. I guess your boss disagreed with you. I hope he was right. If you want to have another shot at the issue, PM me and I'll take it up with those people you have lost faith with.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

I had ethics....nobody else did.....too scared of losing their incomes/careers I guess, but rather that than lose your life!

[Brian Abraham]

Bushranger is on the boil. A mega million dollar platform is not going to be put into harms way. We saw this in 9 Squadrons Vietnam deployment. The edict from Department of Air was that Hueys were not to be exposed to possible enemy action. This lead to much aggravation with the Army as might be expected, since they were fighting a war. An extract re the Long Tan battle,

A grave dispute between the army and the RAAF imperilled Smith's men. They desperately needed ammunition, and Jackson had approved the ammunition resupply, to be dropped by helicopter.` But the RAAF's Group Captain Peter Raw opposed the plan; he refused to permit his pilots to hover at treetop height, in a monsoon, exposed to heavy ground fire. Raw invoked the Department of Air doctrine that required forward landing zones to be 'relatively secure'.` Permission may even be needed from Canberra, Raw suggested.

The word 'Canberra' surged through Jackson like an electric shock. Relations between the RAAF and the army, already strained, now fell apart. 'Well, I'm about to lose a company Jackson fumed. 'What the hell's a few more choppers and a few more pilots!" Raw demurred and insisted on sticking to correct procedure.

A disgusted Jackson sent for the Americans. None doubted the exceptional courage of the US rotary wing pilots. Air Marshal Murdoch, US Chief of Air Staff, had just visited Nui Dat; his liaison officer casually promised a few Hueys within twenty minutes. Raw had little choice: either send the Australian pilots or leave the RAAF open to charges of failure. In any event, Raw's own pilots scorned 'correct procedure'. Flight Lieutenant Frank Riley insisted on flying to Delta Company's relief and would go on his own, if necessary'." Flight Lieutenant Bruce Lane felt the same way.'At last a little RAAF guts!' thought Jackson, greatly heartened.

Riley and his co-pilot Flight Lieutenant Bob Grandin boarded one helicopter; Flight Lieutenant Cliff Dohle and Lane flew the second; there were two machine-gunners per helicopter. Major Owen O'Brien and Warrant Officer George Chinn volunteered to hurl the ammunition boxes down to the men. Chinn, the 6th Battalion's formidable RSM, 'forcefully and almost insubordinately' demanded to go, 'come what may'. Grandin was less keen; he felt it a suicide mission:'It was insanity. I felt petrified. I tried to talk Riley out of it. Frank said shut up, stop giving me the ****s.`

and

The Army felt very undersupported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army. "The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurb" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.

Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.

With all due respect to Bushranger (I know from whence the callsign comes) we can only advance if we recognise our past failures. To my mind, a mega dollar piece of equipment, of which we can afford to buy few, is going to suffer from the same mind set as the RAAF in Vietnam.

[Bushranger 71]

Emergov; re your #79 post.

'Keeping and upgrading Huey and Kiowa will be a waste of money. We need to shed the airworthiness and sustainment overhead for the 8 or nine (or 10) types we currently operate and reduce to four or five types.

The Australian military was largely technically de-skilled when Defence committed to outsourcing of maintenance services on a false economic premise that strongly favoured defence industry (which is largely parented by the major arms manufacturers) so operating costs have climbed. When the services controlled their own maintenance, airworthiness assurance was inbuilt. These days, Defence seems to mainly call in retired pilots and engineers to conduct the airworthiness assurance process so I question whether that would be a significant cost factor.

Sustainment funding and operating costs need to be budgeted for any military hardware acquisition, but the outrageous unit cost of some gear, like Tiger and MRH90, is not justifiable when there are adequate lower cost alternatives.

The Project Air9000 helo force rationalisation program seems unduly inflexible and is thus inferior planning.The overall cost of upgrading Iroquois and Kiowa and keeping them in service to maybe around 2030 would be piddling compared to other wasteful expenditure in Air9000.

'Most acquisition projects take about 3 years to get from concept definition to government decision, except where there is an urgent operational requirement. Most acquisitions require a multi-year acceptance program. A 4-year budget is flawed for that reason alone.'

I guess you are referring to cumbersome processes in the Defence Procurement Policy Manual which was created in Year 2000 to replace the worthy Capital Equipment Procurement manual. I am told the DPPM has been turned into a very academic publication by DMO legal council and its provisions are shaped to favour the nexus between DMO/DSTO and defence industry which both major political parties abide.

Acquisitions requiring a multi-year acceptance program will inevitably generate capability gaps if they involve Australian-based defence industry because Defence does not adequately invest in progressively optimising in-service hardware to maintain military preparedness. This is why the Service Chiefs now push for buying more 'off-the-shelf' proven gear like C-130J, C-17, etcetera.

Flexible 10 year draft acquisition planning has obvious merit, but long-term taxpayer funding for defence industry should not be guaranteed when overall national budgeting can only be reasonably projected for 4 years.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Brian Abraham;

Like many, you seem to have succumbed to the plethora of misinformation and emotive stuff that has been generated in numerous writings over decades, much of it based on hearsay. Have another look at post #50 and I will respond further soon.

[emergov]

Hi BR,

Brian's point is really about C2, not about whether the aircraft are too expensive to risk. Whatever the risk management methodology used in Vietnam, it seems that the end result was that the high risk of certain missions was passed to Air Command (or whatever it was called then) in Canberra. This is clearly unacceptable.

In a similar situation today, the risk would be held by the Joint Task Force Commander, who could make decisions about tactical risk based on his read of the situation. It may end up being a person of the same rank and service, but that person would be responsible for the outcome of the mission as well as the aircraft and crews, and will have a better perspective on the level of acceptable risk.

[500N]

emergov

But that's if they ever get to the theatre.

Before all this happens, the Gubbermut has to actually decide to
put the assets in harms way, something they always seem reluctant to do.

[TBM-Legend]

Dithering, procrastination, failure to look at reality, thinking that "they" always know best inspite of the evidence has always been the hallmark of the post World War 1 defence planners and procurers...

Wirraways as fighters!
Spitfires in the Pacific as fighters [long legged machines actually needed]
Ignorance of helo capabilities in 1950's not remedied until purchase of some Hueys for SAR in about '62. The carrier Sydney had to "borrow" USN helos for SAR in Korea.

A concept of buying stuff fitted for but not with almost always...

Our fighting Allies in this area will be the USofA so why not tailor all of our core major equipment off the back of their proven product? Commonality should be part of the big picture not the little one.

[Bushranger 71]

Re post #94.

Pre-Vietnam involvement, the Australian armed forces functioned in accord with British Joint Service Planning doctrine and this was applicable in Malaysian counter-insurgency operations by 5SQN RAAF preceding change of name to 9SQN on deployment to Vietnam. The 'infamous' Air Staff Instruction issued in Canberra pertaining to Vietnam operations was simply an extract from the JSPs under which RAAF helos had been operating in conjunct with Brit forces. It was ignored at the operating level in Vietnam and soon after by the in-theatre command chain although I think it still remained in the Confidential Order Book throughout involvement.

I am not familiar with the publication from which you offer extracts Brian and to be truthful, I ceased reading many of them years ago because the bibliographies reflect so much regurgitated stuff that was largely ill-informed hearsay promulgated by people who were not involved. Even some of the so-called military historians have published inaccurate records of happenings.

If you are really interested in factual accounts of what occurred at 1ATF in early days Vietnam regarding 9SQN activities and the Battle of Long Tan, best speak with Air Commodore Ray Scott who was then CO 9SQN and Air Commodore Bruce Lane. Both are retired with Ray living at Banora Point, NSW and Bruce in Canberra.

'The Army felt very under-supported in Vietnam, and came to regard the RAAF's reluctance to face ground fire with contempt. They were under orders not to get casualties. Many RAAF pilots sympathised with the Army.'

Far from the truth considering the statistics in post #50 and the number of Army unit reunions to which former 9SQN personnel get invited.

"The RAAF policy on helicopters was a bit absurd" said Air Commodore Roger Wilson. They told them "don't lose any aircraft, be safe". Hell there was a war going on.'

Roger served as a FAC with the USAF between April and October 1968 and I was there either side of his tour on my first of 3 stints - I later served a few months at Nui Dat as Task Force Air Commander Representative. I cannot recall his presence much down Phuoc Tuy way but he is correct in stating that the ASI was inappropriate, but it really was irrelevant. There was never any edict to 9SQN like that inferred, according to my pretty comprehensive awareness of records and unit history.

'Long Hai mountains 21st Feb 1967, the Task Force suffered many casualties as a result of mines. The RAAF refused to supply support (medevac) to extricate the dead, dying and wounded, and the tasking was left to the Australian Army 161 Recce Flight in Bell 47's and US Army Hueys.'

Can you supply the 1ATF Log reference to substantiate this claim? 9SQN was involved in lots of operations in and around the Long Hai mountains and that is where the sole shoot-down loss occurred.

The ammo drop at Long Tan was a fly-by exercise and herewith another anecdote to portray how it was done in scores of later instances:

An OPDEM for V Coy/4RAR in contact in lowish jungle about 80 feet high towards FSB Bearcat en route to Saigon. Sunray: 'We are pinned down and cannot move, do not go past our smoke' . A slow crawl forward at tree top level to hover over yellow smoke. The din of continuous firing from both sides was deafening causing raised voices on intercom. 'Move laterally a bit Albatross and we will tell you when to drop. Overhead, drop now. Thanks Albatross, right where we need it; can you take out a casualty?' Albatross 01: 'Sure'. Sunray: 'Please move a bit more but no further forward'. We were right over their gun muzzles and employing some near vertical door-gun suppression while winching up a grinning perforated Maori warrior. We slowly backed away from the brawl and headed for Vung Tau with our casualty who was in worsening state but we got him to hospital pretty quick and he survived. Gunship support was not available for this episode, as in some other similar situations.

Hoping the discussion can stay a bit more civil now.

[eagle 86]

Just a couple of perspective points
Prior to the build up in helicopters in RSVN the US Army went to great lengths to develop Air Assault doctrine in the early '60s in the US by the 11th AIR Assault Division (Howse Air Mobility Study). Over a period of 2 years this unit developed Air Assault tactics out of Fort Benning, Georgia and became the 1st Cavalry Division on deployment to SV.
The other side of the coin, RAAF 9 Sqd consisted of a bunch of "old and very bold" Meteor pilots who had done a helicopter course and were essentially SAR pilots who took a bunch of "B" model Hueys to SV not knowing WTF they doing.
I personally knew and flew with Frank Riley and Bruce Lane - in fact I still have a .303 SMLE given to me by Frank with his initials FTR stamped on the receiver - both these men were prepared to put their lives on the line to support the Digger. My FIRST hand experience shows this to be the case with 99% of all junior Navy and RAAF pilots who served in Nine. I'll walk naked through Victoria Barracks if you can find an SAS soldier from SVN who says RAAF support was sh1te.
In the early days Army hierarchy hadn't a clue as to how to utilise Huey assets and, yes, some of Nine's more belligerent CO's had a rather tactless way of pointing out Army's lack of knowledge. I've got to say both in the 135th and Nine the pilots most likely to hang out their @rse were Navy.
It is a fact that the US Army lost more helicopters due to accidents than to enemy action in SV. The trend continues today - three of Australia's finest were killed in the latest US Army stuff up. I have a vested interest in this - my son is on his sixth deployment to Afghanistan in the infantry.
By the way, Army is now learning (relearning?) that helicopters are not Land Rovers and that a tradesman can't work all day on a $30 million helicopter and then stand on a gun all night. Have even heard the comment that AAAVN is developing a "RAAF attitude".
GAGS
E86

[eagle 86]

Good trick - must have really hacked you off!!
GAGS
E86

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Emergov; re your #97.

HQ 1ATF was initially structured as a Joint Force HQ via Army/RAAF planning in accord with doctrine existing at the time. This embraced a Task Force Air Commander, Task Force Air Support Officer, small transport ops cell and a (close) air support cell with essential communications infrastructure. These latter bits were small annexes of the Command Post.

9&35SQNs were properly based at Vung Tau with a Base Support Flight that was later enlarged to 1 Operational Support Unit when a RAAF cantonment had been developed on Vung Tau airfield. The anomolous situation then was that only 9SQN was under operational control of 1ATF with 35SQN Caribou under opcon US 7th Air Force; so the initial Air Force representation at Nui Dat was arguably top heavy, although conforming with JSPs.

After the cantonment was established, TFAC moved to Vung Tau to become a virtual RAAF base commander and 9SQN provided a TFAC Representative at Nui Dat. This was a defacto TFASO role shared by Squadron Leaders and experienced Flight Lieutenants.

Post-Battle of Long Tan, there was soul searching within 1ATF regarding command and control aspects among Army fighting arms which was ultimately sorted. Late 1967/early 1968, another battalion was added plus a squadron of tanks and 9SQN doubled in aircraft and personnel strength. A very comprehensive upgrade of 1ATF SOPs was undertaken involving 9SQN and thereafter, the system hummed along quite smoothly in joint fashion.

Opcon of 9SQN activities was exercised by the CP via the small transport ops tasking cell manned by a couple of RAAF junior officers and clerks. TFAC Rep acted as an air advisor as did the FAC in the offensive air support cell, although both got involved in the planning aspects for major activities. The secondary function of TFAC Rep was to monitor the integrity of 9SQN operations.

I usually only spent enough time in the CP to stay across all of the briefings and to get the Sitreps at start and end of each day. The only time I ever intervened in a CP decision was when the 9SQN night dustoff aircraft was tasked to recover a badly wounded prisoner whom the Intell guys wanted to interrogate. The aircraft captain was a pretty inexperienced young pilot who was approaching a strobe light in dense jungle for winching up the prisoner and reported seeing 2 strobe lights in close proximity. I was monitoring all of the radio nets and the ground callsign was adamant they only had one strobe light. The opposition had another nearby so I directed the aircraft captain to abort. The G2Ops got pretty peeved but the prisoner died soon after.

There was no requirement to refer tasking aspects for 9SQN beyond local command, either to higher headquarters in Saigon or in Australia.

Post-Vietnam, the Air Force established Air Liaison Officer appointments at several major Army formations in Australia.

Finally, the RAAF has long been criticised for basing 9SQN at Vung Tau, just 10 minutes flight time from Nui Dat; but proceedings of the Chief of Army History Conference 2002 belatedly acknowledged that 1ATF should have been based at Vung Tau in lieu of Nui Dat.

[What Red Line?]

Any chance we can stick to the thread "Aussie MRH-90"?

I suspect there are lots of folks here steadfastly clinging to the past but fair go, Vietnam is long gone and (mostly) forgotten and so are the 50"s & 60's aircraft. You wanna see old aircraft, go to a museum! Look to the future - you'll only get a crick in the neck looking back.

Most of us don't have a problem if you want to re-hash sh*t from the 50's & 60's and the old days military "strategies", but start another thread rather than hijack this one! Lots of pensioners would welcome it. Some of you sound like my old Dad who could have taken out an Olympics for "Back in my day . . . . ".

Having got that away, are there any/many real NH-90 alternatives? Note that I'm asking for 21st century kit here. Know also that the ARH and MRH purchase decisions were made before Rudd/Ranga/Swan raided the money-box.

[Bushranger 71]

Yes, there are 21st century alternatives to the NH90; 'new' Huey II and UH-1Y. Go do some research and think outside the square.

[eagle 86]

WRL,
Lessons learnt from history are well learnt lessons.
GAGS
E86

[What Red Line?]

Yeah, like bows and arrows, spears, swords, horses, B47's S55's, B204/5, all good in their day but that was yesterday. That's why we aren't still training in B47's, a bl**dy good aircraft in their day.

Willys jeeps and GMC 6 X 6's were great transport too, but even if you fitted them with turbocharged 454 ci engines and glass instrument panels, they're still yesterday's kit.

[MTOW]

Yesterday's kit that can operate in hot and high conditions where the new kit can't.

Yesterday's kit that can be maintained in the field where everything points to the new kit requiring a huge and unrealistic maintenance tail.

Yesterday's kit that's affordable, both to buy and operate and far better suited to 90% of the helicopter's usual role than the new kit.

Yesterday's kit that Australia could afford to buy in such numbers that AAVN could support far more units than it can with a handful of hugely expensive "Rolls Royces".

Yesterday's kit that would allow enough units to be operated that crews could be trained in all aspects of their job before deploying.

Yesterday's kit that actually WORKS where the modern stuff has yet to do so after how many years is it now?


Yeah, a load of rubbish all that yesterday's kit.

[What Red Line?]

Yes, I hear what you are saying but sadly it sounds like yesterdays warriors still living in the past. If the B204/5 is so damned good, why are you spruiking an upgrade?

[Andu]

People keep quoting the maritime requirement. Will the MRH-90 fit in the hangar of the new frigates?

I'm ready to be corrected, but I understand they won't.

[BBadanov]

ARH Tiger: "A ****e maintenance contractor does not mean the aircraft are not fit for purpose..."

It means they are not fit for service.

[eagle 86]

WRL,
If you are referring to me you might like to know I am a CAR 217 qualified instructor still teaching Defence Force pilots and preparing them for MECIR civvy qualification on EC 135s.
Hardly living in the past.
GAGS
E86

[Doors Off]

Hello Men,

I have been asked by myself to post after being off the forum for a while;)

BR71Some of the contributors to this forum seem to give up too easily.

Gee, I really wish you would with all of this Pooie-II garb. Arguing with you is like wrestling with a pig in the mud, pretty soon you realise that he enjoys it. Your, anorak like, want for facts would be better off directed at utilising the AAAvn contacts you boast of and finding out some facts from the current drivers / commanders. Oh yeah, I noted in the latest Army news link that there are a couple of ex Brit Apache drivers on Tiger, who also fought in AFG, they might be able to educate you, but only if you promise to listen with a closed mouth and an open mind.:oh:

Your want for Pooie-II, may well be possible under the plans for a LUH/Trg acft that the army navy have a requirement for, but I doubt it. It has been around for a very long time and the only takers are a small element of the USAF for missile sight servicing and a few to Iraq, because the technology is so old and keeps Texans in jobs. :ooh:

Maybe your youthful vigour, passion for RAAF aviation and upcoming minister meeting would be better utilised to ask the questions as to why Australian Soldiers do not have the requisite Helicoter support in theatre - eg ARH, more CH47 and maybe some S70's (by the way the designation is the S70A-9 Blackhawk, Australia's designation not mine) to carry 4 man sticks like the yanks are doing with theirs in AFG? Our current serving members need bastions, zealots and guardians, but ones who are on their side.

I am glad that you value the Australian tax payers dollars so nearly, more people should, but the old girl is gone for good and the ADF has some very capable kit. The Brits had a 5 yr delay in implementing Apache and many people (current serving, ex servicemen, AAC and other corps) were super critical of the decision. Luckily, HM Forces and HM Government saw the need for Apache in AFG and they have been serving the Squaddies very effectively and with great loyalty. No doubt Tiger will do the same if given the chance. Maybe, the ADF should have bought 35 Tigers and not 22. That would be a really good capability.

The MRH will be back flying soon enough and I look forward to seeing one in the skies, just like I look forward to seeing the UH1H in the museum. Both will be good sights. To have seen the Huey's scrapped into boot lace eyelets for the grunts would be money saving, but sad.

I don't have access to the Flight Manuals for ARH/MRH so I can't give you the figures for H&H, maybe you could use your contacts and obtain the information for yourself. However, given that the MRH and ARH have wheels, I bet they could hover and hover taxi WGE (Without Ground Effect!), get up to ETL, grow wings and fly away, without dragging the skids across the gravel.

"ARH Tiger" seems to indicate that the problems with the ARH are spares/contractual based - if that is true, maybe you could raise that with the minister? I have been to Darwin in the wet season and it is a pretty harsh environment - hot, wet and ****ty, like a jungle without the trees. I wonder how ARH is handling that? If it can work there, then she must be apples.

It has been fun in the mud with you, thank you. I hope that your contacts can provide you with information / access to the "current" serving members on ARH/MRH.

Doors Off

[TBM-Legend]

ahem.

Back to the original question. Are the MRH-90's back flying and if not when?

We have 'got what we got' as they say. Let's pressure those than can do something to do something.

Our guys on the "two-way rifle range" deserve the best that we can get there NOW to support them to do the mission assigned effectively.

[MaroonMan4]

My dear Southern Hemisphere Cousins,

Why on earth you went down a procurement strategy of aligning to the US (Kiowa, Huey, JSF, Abrams, Blackhawk, CH47 et al) to suddenly jump to not only a 'new' Eurpoean defence contractor, but one where the R&D was not complete?

Sadly, what you missed with the all shiney, new, and what appeared very cheap in comparison was the R&D that you believed that the French and Germans were doing on your behalf.

The big lesson for your country is cost v value, and sadly you have now execeeded the cost if the initial buy was Apache and more CH47 (and improved Blackhawks if you wanted a Medium capability). You certainly have not had value, and I would humbly say the exact opposite as Eurocopter (or whatever its trading name in Australia is) has (by the sounds of it) reduced value and added absolutely nothing (possibly a few VIP seats at some sports functions or a good pi$$ up at an airshow) - but nothing of military worth?

It is not rocket science - and surely someone should have acknowledged the risk (both in financial and not achieving IOC/FOC) when they signed the dotted line.

But, with an election for you guys just around the corner, just so NO! to your procurement and treasury - enough is enough. Hand the ARH and MRH back for foreign sales disposal and buy AH (digitised, but no radar) and more CH47, with an upgrade in your Blackhawk fleet (to PEDRO standard).

If not, just continue whingeing on this forum about wishing you could fly and what a pity it is - meanwhile a few thousand miles away your countrymen (and the rest of the coalition) need your support (2 Chinnies - aaah, how sweet) and if RUSI are to believed then you have a future role in stabilizing the potentially volatile SE Asia sector.

So man up, do something about it or go and sit in Darwin feeling all hot and sticky and very sorry for yourself.

[emergov]

TBM-Legend,

Now that RRTM have diagnosed the problem, and we have identified some good engines, the acft should be up again by the end of this month.

Been some world class thread creep, hey?

[Bushranger 71]

Re post # 116 by MM4.

'It is not rocket science - and surely someone should have acknowledged the risk (both in financial and not achieving IOC/FOC) when they signed the dotted line.' Hallelujah!

Taxpayers worldwide are entitled to the best affordable military preparedness being maintained with no capability gaps. This means progressive optimisation of hardware in service until it no longer provides 'adequate' capabilities. So, some of you please shed your prejudices re upgrading of existing hardware and consider these facts as examples.

The ADF Iroquois gunship capability was decommissioned mid-2004, a decision driven by Army Aviation and supported by an Air Force Chief now CDF; but Tiger is not yet operational! Better to have some capability than none, and don't dream that the Tiger would be better suited for regional archipelago fire support requirements than a Huey II Bushranger version because they have quite differing capabilities – PNG differs from Afghanistan in climatic characteristics although is comparable in the necessity for higher altitude aircraft performance. I will post an image/document downstream (maybe on another thread) just to illustrate the point so please leave that aspect aside for now.

Similarly for the RAAF B707 tanker which was decommissioned near 2 years back; the MRTT is also not yet proven and will only carry an extra 10 tonnes of fuel offload. Would it not have been far wiser to just lease a few enhanced KC-135 from the USAF instead of acquiring yet more costly unproven hardware?

MM4 more or less gets at the real issue here which is a badly broken Defence organisation. Hardware acquisition worked pretty well pre-1974 when the military managed their own procurement projects with some dedicated public servants embedded in the respective service departments. But now we have the military governed under one ministry and the procurement system controlled by another.

The central plank of defence policy is support of Australian defence industry which is now largely parented by the major arms manufacturers. The DMO/DSTO organisation is presently staffed by around 8,000 public servants and there is an incestuous murky relationship with the arms industry. This situation seems likely to worsen if DMO becomes detached as an independent corporate entity as seems favoured by the major political parties. Note that a former MinDef and an Army CDF were/are directly employed by big corporates providing Tiger, MRH90, LPD hardware.

But back to the central MRH90 theme. If the lessons of war-fighting in previous conflicts are heeded, then amphibious assault and helicopter combat air assault are arguably no longer viable (affordable) concepts of operations. Many nations now seem to be opting for modest size LPD vessels that can be cost-effectively utilised more or less as floating logistic support bases with just a small number of helos embarked and they are better suited for regional archipelago operations. The escort and operating costs for the Canberra class LPD will likely be monumental and scads of unproven MRH90, whether Fleet Air Arm or Army Aviation, will probably be very expensive to operate and maintain. They were an unnecessary purchase announced just before Election 2007 by then Prime Minister John Howard.

The world is facing protracted economic stagnation which should severely impact on defence spending. If small nation Australia continues down its present acquisition path, then I sadly predict that Army Aviation and the Fleet Air Arm will be largely neutered within about 5 years.

Putting wholly-owned Iroquois and Kiowa in reserve storage so at least some capabilities can be cost-effectively resurrected downstream would be responsible defence planning, like what has been happening in the USA for decades. If some among you prefer that not to happen, then you will likely see a lot of Army and Navy aircrew just sitting on arses in crew-rooms for much of their flying career.

[Trackmaster]

Following on from Emergov

You say they have found the engine problem...are there any further details on that?
The media in Australia have been very quiet on this.

[DominiqueS]

From Shephard Rotorhub:

"Farnborough 2010: Eurocopter diagnoses Australian MRH90 engine failure

July 18, 2010

Eurocopter is confident it has identified the issue that caused a ‘catastrophic’ engine failure to an Australian Defence Force (ADF) MRH90 multirole helicopter in April.

Speaking at an EADS pre-Farnborough Airshow briefing in London on 17 July, Eurocopter CEO Lutz Bertling revealed that in addition to the engine failure that resulted in the grounding of the MRH90 fleet, three other aircraft had experienced related problems.

An investigation was launched after the 20 April incident, which saw the helicopter lose one of its two Rolls-Royce Turbomeca RTM322-01/9 engines about 30 minutes north-east of Adelaide. The aircraft was able to return to Royal Australian Air Force base Edinburgh without further incident.

Bertling said the root causes of the failure had now been determined and related to pilots following the wrong procedure for a hot start. ‘We know now precisely the sequence that the engines have seen it their history – all the engines had seen an improper procedure for a hot start. In all cases the improper procedure was done in the same way and if you do so then you see damage to bearings and seals in the engine,’ Bertling said.

He added that now the sequence that leads to engine damage was known, the aircraft that had not been through the incorrect procedure had been cleared as safe to fly. ‘All engines that have seen the procedure will be removed from the aircraft and inspected – if there is an issue or not. And I need to say that of the engines that have had a wrong hot start procedure it is only a very small percentage that have had damage to them.’

Eurocopter has developed a software patch that will make it impossible for pilots to follow the sequence that led to the engine damage.

Meanwhile, Bertling confirmed that the company plans to spend EURO3.6 billion in the next five years on new products, new services and for the extension of the company’s international network. The company plans to fly one new helicopter, major upgrade or technology demonstrator every year, following the first flight of the EC-175 in 2009.

By Tony Skinner, "

[Bushranger 71]

Doors Off; re this bit of your post #114, and I will just ignore your insulting remarks:

'Maybe your youthful vigour, passion for RAAF aviation and upcoming minister meeting would be better utilised to ask the questions as to why Australian Soldiers do not have the requisite Helicoter support in theatre - eg ARH, more CH47 and maybe some S70's (by the way the designation is the S70A-9 Blackhawk, Australia's designation not mine) to carry 4 man sticks like the yanks are doing with theirs in AFG? Our current serving members need bastions, zealots and guardians, but ones who are on their side.'

As you should know, the Helicopter Systems Division of DMO is headed by AAvn 2 Star, Tony Fraser, with several other 1 Star assistants, both AAvn and RAN FAA. These are the guys driving the Air9000 helo fleet rationalisation program. No point in asking politicians why the ADF does not have adequate integral helo support in Afghanistan because progressive optimisation of in-service equipments (Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk) was forsaken by AAvn to advance the projects which now have serious shortcomings. Simply; AAvn created their own capability gaps.

Regarding spares provisioning mentioned elsewhere concerning Blackhawk and MRH90. The RAAF Blackhawk project officer sought very comprehensive spares provisioning, but this was denied. If there is already a problem in this regard re MRH90, then that maybe rests with the HSD guys at DMO.

You mention the Americans carrying only 4 troops in their Blackhawks in Afghanistan but not the engine type, operating altitude or ISA criteria. Herewith what the Huey II can do:

In ground effect hover at 12,000 feet at 10,500 pounds max operating weight in ISA+20C.
Out of ground effect hover at 5,400 feet at 10,500 pounds max operating weight in ISA+20C.

You could fit 10 plus troops in Huey II with some available clip-in seating plus a 4 man crew and door-guns so seemingly, quite a big performance and utilisation differential.

Somebody may be able to provide performance specs for up-engined Blackhawk for comparison; also, the MH-60S to see how that works out for ship boarding party operations.

[AFGAN]

Emerg Gov, I have been biting my tongue for some time now but I can't hold back any longer.

Your repeated defence of what now can only be described as an unmitigated disaster of a project must mean that either;

(1) you actually work for the supplier, or
(2) you have a strong, yet to be revealed, reason for defending this project from necessary external scrutiny by using misinformation, or
(3) you elected that optional extra at Staff College called the "frontal lobotomy" and now believe everything you read in the shiny brochures and what your boss tells you.

The MRH 90 will never be able to do what it was purchased for despite all the nifty avionics. All that great technology such as composites and avionics and increased payload and range mean nothing if it can't be reliable and do the job. It is all just words and numbers. I have thrashed over this before but was it really necessary to reinvent the wheel and take all this developmental risk for something that was just supposed to be a battlefield truck? Ask the aircrew involved with this lump of c...p today would they like to convert tomorrow to the UH60 M/L or indeed anything that is actually proven to work and you would be knocked over in the rush out the door. Never mind the poor diggers O/S who are screaming for more helo support in theatre.

Given another 10 years and unlimited funds, yes, you could make a Citron or a Peugeot into a battlefield helicopter or even a half decent car but then it wouldn't really still be a Peugeot, Citron or an MRH would it?

The only thing I agree with that I have read on this thread so far, is that, we have this lemon now, so we will just have to get on with making it work as best we can, whilst secretly hoping that someone, somewhere higher up will find a bucket of money, admit the mistake and replace it with something that is a proven capability.

Rant out.

[emergov]

I don't agree with the 'unmitigated disaster' line. I think it's ill-informed and unnecessarily negative. Hurricane Katrina was an unmitigated disaster. MRH90 is just late.

I'm getting used to being described as a spin doctor, idiot or career-preserving-thruster because I don't share the negative point of view. Slouching around complaining makes you part of the problem. You'll probably end up flying or maintaining the thing anyway.

I happen to believe this will be a great capability for defence. A newer, better Blackhawk would have been easier, not better.

If it had been possible to predict the current delays, MRH90 may never have have been selected in the first place. COL Peter Simpson used to say that 'hindsight is the vision of arseholes'. Getting mad and telling everyone we're all doomed isn't going to change our situation any more than modifying 25 old Hueys.

[zic]

B71,

Having just got back from theatre I can assure you that the PA for most FOBs starts at about 3500ft (KAF = approx 3300ft PA), and most ops are being conducted way above that often pushing 6000 - 7000 ft PA. With temps currently ISA +35 at most FOBs, you do the maths - I just don't think your Huey II will cut it.

Back to the thread, the reason why the MRH-90 doesn't work is because the pilots have been using the wrong engine shut-down procedures. See the latest link from the Eurocopter CEO speaking at Farnborough yesterday.

Farnborough 2010: Eurocopter diagnoses Australian MRH90 engine failure | Shephard Group (http://www.shephard.co.uk/news/rotorhub/farnborough-2010-eurocopter-diagnoses-australian-mrh90-engine-failure/6742/)

zic:cool:

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

emergov

Melchett: 'If nothing else works, a total pig-headed unwillingness to look facts in the face will see us through.'

HPT

[AFGAN]

Emergov

Like I said, I can accept the argument that "ok it's a lemon but it's what we have got, so let's make the best of it and get on with the job". That is probably a widely held view by many involved. You are correct that negativity for it's own sake is unhelpful but "the truth will set you free".

What I find impossible to understand is that, with all that has happened and what we now know about the limitations and problems with this aircraft, how anybody can still defend the decision to purchase it in the first place or even praise it. To say that it will eventually be proven to be a good buy is very optimistic to say the least. I am trying hard to think of another ADF major procurement project that started so badly but eventually proved to be a success, perhaps someone can enlighten me??? Even if you can think of one, anybody could name another 10 that went from bad to worse.

In my personal experience with B/F helicopters, easier, simple, reliable normally always means better.

[Doors Off]

The late F111

[emergov]

AFG,

Collins Class
Leopard
Black hawk
LPA and subsequent upgrade.
Nomad (OK, I'll give you that one).

If you cast your mind back 20 years, pretty much the same things happened with Black Hawk, and lots of people said the same things you are saying now. BR 71 is still saying them.

HPT, don't forget Melchett also said "Crevice is a positively disgusting word". He was indeed a prophet.

[AFGAN]

Emergov,

that you started that list with Collins Class tells me all I need to know. How many of those are operational at the moment? How many hundreds of millions are still being poured into that black hole to salvage some sort of capability? Next you will be telling me that Sea Sprite was a winner. Poor old Navy are unfortunately a great example of ADF procurement failures. That they managed to make the LPA workable was only the result of political embarrassment and many millions of dollars. At least now they look likely to buy Sea Hawk so they will have something that works (as long as they don't go for a new avionics setup).

Were you involved with BH in the early days? Not to many of the operators or end users had a bad thing to say about it. In fact, it was to many of us, awe inspiring. The only thing that was a real problem was the lack of spares (underfunding). The cracking came much later and probably only as a result of our continued use of the external fuel tanks. But that it was perfect for it's role was never in doubt for one second.

Can't comment on the intro of Leopard except to say Leopard 2 is still rated the number 1 MBT in the world so we probably should have stuck with it. I guess the Germans are to tanks what the yanks are to helicopters.

As I see it, and as somebody has already stated on this thread, the only recent successes have been off-the-shelf. How many failures does it take, how much money will be wasted, and sadly how many lives will be lost (due to lack of capability) before the ADF and the government admit that we are too small to take developmental risk on large projects? We have been rated as one of the worst amongst developed countries for the capability delivered per defence dollar spent. Gosh. Really!!!

That you continue to defend this woeful record makes you, Sir, part of the problem. A problem can only be resolved after it first becomes recognised as being problem.

[emergov]

You are almost right. The only recent successes have actually been FMS. There is a difference between FMS and off the shelf.

There is no intent to take development risk - never has been. Hindsight is the vision of arseholes.

You wouldn't be the first person to suggest we should just buy FMS and thereby reduce our risk. The only problem with FMS is that you don't get exactly what you want. MH60R cannot be fitted with floats, for example, and CH-47F has no rotor brake. If we modify those acft, we take development risk, and assume an AW oversight for the life of type.

It's not easy. If it was easy, we would be there by now.

As Edmund Blackadder said "They may go up diddy up up, but they're still gits"

[AFGAN]

My thoughts,

90% of a proven capability is always better than 100% of an unproven dream of a hanger queen.

When you buy something that does not have proven operational in service history in sufficient numbers then you are taking on developmental risk. It's not hindsight and it's not rocket science. There were voices saying this before the decision was made.

It doesn't need to be perfect, it just needs to be reliable and capable.

[Andu]

The cracking came much later and probably only as a result of our continued use of the external fuel tanks.Not probaby, but fact. The RAAF repeatedly warned AAvn of the potential problem of leaving the external tanks fitted, and like virtually all other advice from the RAAF, it was totally ignored. In those early days after the Army takeover, you could be forgiven for thinking that if the RAAF did it one way, the Army went out of their way to do it the other way. Ask any of the small number of RAAF pilots who transferred to the Army. Sidelined and ignored would be a kind description of the way they were treated. ("Arf", are you reading this? I'd love to have you share some of the tales you told me with everyone here - or at least the ones you could tell.)

My main memory of those days is anecdotal, involving an exercise where a detachment of four Blackhawks was based on an exposed beach for two weeks. At the end of the exercise, all the BH groundcrew were tasked to wash down all the Landrovers and then sent on two weeks' post-exercise leave. Their helicopters were left, salt-encrusted, for two weeks before they were given the same attantion as the Landrovers received immediately after the exercise.

As I said, it's anecdotal and might not have happened. However, I can assure you that the person who told me, who was there, was insistent that it did.

[AFGAN]

Andu, you are exactly right. The Army maintainers were on a big learning curve when BH was introduced and many mistakes were made. Also, the C&C of Engineering support was completely screwed up and caused me personally immense frustration. The TST's were not under command of the Sqn OC's and quite often had different priorities. Having said that, BH spares were not given a high priority by the RAAF so there was plenty of blame to be shared around.

We probably share some friends by the sounds of it. Let me assure you that their experience and skill was appreciated by many of us but unfortunately not always listened to by those running the show at the time.

I still maintain though that it was a great buy only we should have just stuck with bog standard UH60's. Even when we buy something good, for some reason we still have to "Australianise it" which you could also describe as "f.....g it up".

[DominiqueS]

Seems some of us have gone very quiet on the MRH-90 "engine problems". Doesn't seem we can blame NH Industries, they only manufacture the airframe, not the engines. Can't blame Eurocopter either, they only assemble some of the aircraft. Can't blame Australian Aerospace either, they only assemble the Australian variants. Can't really blame RR/TM as it appears that they do have a correct procedure for engine starting, hot, cold or otherwise. The "problem" doesn't seem to have affected the other operators very much. Anyone care to comment?

Back to the thread title without any mention of museum pieces.

[Stick Monkey001]

MTOW:
"A question for the AAVN drivers: does the mix of European (clockwise rotation) and American (counterclockwise rotation) cause any problems in training and switching between types? Probably not a big deal for experienced crews, but I would have thought it might be one extra dimension ("which foot do I use today?") that less experienced pilots could do without."

Nope. First time it caught me out. Second time the brain was pretty much right to go. Aircraft helps as well.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

MRH 90 flight restrictions should be lifted this week or early next.:ok:

[Brian Abraham]

The RAAF repeatedly warned AAvn of the potential problem of leaving the external tanks fittedNot buying into the argument, but perhaps the Army had their reasons. Navy Hueys flew with drop tanks and accepted the fatigue (cracking) that was the outcome. Never saw a RAAF Huey with drop tanks, and no doubt they had their reasons, just as the Navy had for fitting them.

[oldpinger]

FA 18

So, changed pilots assessed servicable then:E



Sorry, couldn't resist it, personally I think what's his name from Eurocopter is talking cr#p.

[cj0203]

Sighted MRH-90 over Amberley today. Back in the skies.
Huey would've been better!:cool:

[TBM-Legend]

RAAF UH-1B Hueys flown for SAR had external tanks....Navy Hueys were B/C models...

[TBM-Legend]

MRH90 Recommencement of Flying Operations


(Source: Australian Department of Defence; issued July 22, 2010)




The MRH90 helicopters operated by the Australian Defence Force are back in the air after having been grounded because of engine-related incidents. (Eurocopter photo)The Australian Defence Force (ADF) today announced that Multi Role Helicopters (MRH90s) will recommence flying operations later this week.

This follows an incident north of Adelaide in April this year where an MRH90 suffered an engine failure in one of its two main engines.

The Defence Materiel Organisation's (DMO) Head Helicopter Systems Division, Rear Admiral Mark Campbell, stated that media reports alleging pilot error being a factor in the engine failure were incorrect.

"There is no suggestion of pilot error as alleged in one UK report," Rear Admiral Campbell said.

Eurocopter CEO, Dr Lutz Bertling, has also written to the Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, Greg Combet to directly refute any suggestion that engine damage was caused by improper handling of the aircraft by ADF pilots.

Rear Admiral Campbell also said an inspection regime and preventative measures have been developed to lift the current flying suspension.

"I can confirm flying operations will commence shortly following approval by Defence's Operational Airworthiness Authority.

"Extensive work has been conducted by Rolls Royce Turbomeca and our Industry partners with support from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation to identify the cause of the engine failure.

"We are advised the failure resulted from compressor blade fracture due to contact with the engine casing." The impact of the engine failure combined with the workload to address some technical issues with this very capable but highly complex digital aircraft will delay the first flight at sea for Navy, which is now expected to occur in mid 2011.

The first Army capability objective of one deployable MRH90 troop will also be delayed.

Of the 46 MRH90 helicopters ordered for the Australian Navy and Army, 11 have been accepted and are being used for training and testing which contributes to the development of operational capability over the next few years.


(EDITOR’S NOTE: The four engine incidents experienced by Australian MRH90 (Australian designation for the NH90) helicopters were due to “improper procedures for hot starts [which causes] damage to bearings and sealants,” Eurocopter CEO Lutz Bertling told reporters July 17 during an EADS media seminar in London. He added that the engine management software had been modified to prevent reoccurrence of this problem.)

[Bushranger 71]

BA; re your post #137.

RAAF UH-1B at some SAR detachment locations were fitted with external droptanks to enable quick filling if extended range was required.

The UH-1H (and ergo Huey II) is plumbed for fitment of auxiliary fuel, either in externally mounted droptanks or much larger capacity inside cabin collapsible quad (quarter) tanks positioned in one or both of the rear crew stations. These tanks enable very long range ferry or carriage of some additional auxiliary fuel depending on payload availablility when configured for widely varying roles. They were often used by Air Force during operations throughout the northern archipelago such as support for Army Survey Corps.

There is a very wide range of optional equipment fits presently available for the Iroquois family, including state of the art avionics and multiple certified bolt-on weapon systems as seen with UH-1N, UH-1Y versions. The external hardpoint attachments on later model Iroquois are stronger than on the UH-1B and I don't recall there being any fatigue or cracking of mounts for aircraft configured as Bushranger gunships, although there was some tailboom cracking in Vietnam due to sustained high AUW operations. Tailbooms were pretty easily repaired or replaced as appropriate.

[Brian Abraham]

Thanks Bushranger. TBM, for historical accuracy the Navy Hueys were all B models, no C. The only C's produced went to the US Army, and 6 to Spain. The C had a different tail boom and rotor system than the B. The Navy did have one odd child though, an aircraft with a C type forward fuselage (bigger fuel tank than the B) and a B model tail boom and rotor system. The production run lists that particular aircraft as a B, and I don't know how even official RAAF and Navy sources refer to C models. One RAAF source states the Navy as having 3XB and 4XC.

[BBadanov]

According to "US Military Aircraft Designations and Serials" by J M Andrade, pg.125.

UH-1B c/n 881/883 ex 63-12953/12955 [became N9-881/883]
UH-1C c/n 3101/3104, ex 64-17621,22,23, and 65-12846 [became N9-3101/3104]

"UH-1C late production UH-1B but modified rotor and increased fuel capacity."

I believe you can visually distinguish between the two by the air vents on the roof around the rotor shaft?

[TBM-Legend]

In early days when I was at Albatross and they seemed to refer to some as 'C' models. Not sure why then as the regulated noon Friday stand-down washed away many cells...;)

[Andu]

What many might not know about the Navy B models was their radio/naviads fit. (I must say, I never heard anyone refer to them as 'Charlies'.)

When they arrived, equipped with (then) pretty much state of the art American radios, the Navy retrofitted them with (awfully old fashioned 'clunker', I think few would disagree) British radios etc as fitted to their other aircraft.

BUT... how did they go about doing this, I hear some ask? Did the Navy techs simply unscrew the canon plugs to disconnect the American kit? Oh, no, no, no, no... they *** CUT the looms - short of the canon plugs, making it impossible to re-fit the American radios and naviads later!!!

Only in Australia....

[TBM-Legend]

Andu, you're correct. [at least we're consistent......:yuk:]

The RAN Museum site refers to them as UH-1B/C
{Bell UH-1B/1C Iroquois - Royal Australian Navy}

[Bushranger 71]

Hi ARH Tiger, SnapperKharn; re posts #110, 149, 150.

Great to know that somebody is realising that Tiger will not adequately replace Kiowa functions; neither will it suffice as a Bushranger gunship replacement for intimate close air support with envisaged weapon fits – see 'Tiger troubles' thread, my post #18.

I am not across the AAvn project you refer to SK. Coincidentally, 'Kenny' was a FAC callsign in Vietnam.

As some have said; this thread has become a bit omnibus and I will later post an interesting table re Conceptual Huey II Gunship capabilities on the 'Tiger troubles' thread so comparisons might be made with Tiger. They would of course have differing capabilities in some respects.

I will also prepare a couple of new threads for the Aviation History & Nostalgia forum covering key aspects of Bushranger gunship development and procedures for trooping operations as conducted by 9SQN RAAF in Vietnam. These are intended more as abbreviated historical records, but should be useful references for debate in other forums and threads. Quite a bit of imagery involved so they will take a while to emerge.

[Bushranger 71]

ARH Tiger; there has been much ill-informed criticism of the RAAF on a number of threads regarding spares provisioning, but it is an Army problem as you guys now own the aircraft. Have you ever thought how the enormous overspend on Army Aviation over years has disadvantaged the other fighting arms of Army? There have certainly been considerable rumblings in that regard over time. It seems highly likely that the Generals have seen fit to impose budgetary constraints on your spares provisioning.

I will shortly be posting data on the 'Tiger troubles' thread re Huey II so you will have more cause to grind your teeth.

[Doors Off]

Ooohhh, I can not wait! Let me guess, more supersonic, intergalactic, museum piece upgrades. Bring back the mustang. It even has a turbine upgrade and features in a lot of TV history documentaries.

Great to hear that the MRH is back in the air and it will hopefully mean an end to the comedy articles about PooieII

[Andu]

Doors Off, check the RoE on Jetblast. I assume the same rules apply here.

Your last post, like your first, is way out of line and offers nothing to this debate but a display - by you - of personal animus for BR71 and an arrogance - and ignorance - which does you no credit.

[Brian Abraham]

TBM and BBadanov, As BR71 says elsewhere you can't always take official sources as the real gen. ALL the Navy Hueys were B models. Said so on the manufacturers data plate, and you can check on the Historic Flights N9-3104 (898) which is still flying.

Distinguishing features of a C model,

Dual hydraulics (B had one)
Longer tail boom
Broader chord vertical stab which had an asymmetric airfoil to off load the tail rotor (B symmetrical)
Larger horizontal stab
540 rotor system with larger chord blades
Pitot mounted on the roof (B on nose)
Fuel capacity 242 US Gals (B model was either 160 or 242, Navy 894 and 898 had 242, the others 160, but not sure about 896)
Vne 140 (B 120)

Andu, correct about the radios. Had to make the radios compatible with the stores holding of spares for the Vampire and Venom. 5 channel crystal tuned and the designation 1939 rings a bell. The year they were introduced for Spitfires and Hurricanes for the Battle of Britain so the story went.

[Redbeard]

this last 2 weeks.. 2 rrtms failure/ damage on nh-90.. problem solved.. noway:confused:

[TBM-Legend]

The MRH requires a public inquiry..

[BA - re Navy B or C Huey's, it is often the case with production lines, that at some crossover point, aircraft built initially as one version are converted at the factory etc to another version. You'd better tell the RAN Museum. They think we had both types!]

[Brian Abraham]

The history of the C was that it incorporated improvements (listed above) to overcome the deficiencies found when using the B in the gunship role. The C's were new build airframes.

[Doors Off]

Andu,
am not!
If I was bragging about minister meetings = caught up in my own self importance = arrogant and backward (suggesting that an old defunct platform is better than two new platforms (MRH/ARH) without having a thorough knowledge of both) = ignorant, your comments about me would be correct. Alas, I think your accusations are directed at the wrong person. :p

Ref ROE, I think that you may have broken them. The moral high ground is a long way to fall from. :zzz:

Greenknight's comments on Tiger Troubles are pretty much on the money about historical articles and you might like to call in the police on him as well.

[BBadanov]

BA may be quite correct, but a post in this forum or any blog site does not constitute fact - but I would say his arguement has more validity than say wikipedia.

What sources can validate your claim - the Dash 1, for example. I don't have production lists for UH-1s, but based my reference on the Cs purely from that US Serial book I quoted. Unfortunately, it's purely a sole secondary source. [Sorry about the thread drift from MRH-90]

[TBM-Legend]

It is good that the Govt purchased new equipment for Army and Navy with MRH-90. Maybe the engine choice was wrong; after-all the Italians have the proven T700 option....

Mr Bushranger's ideas, while I acknowledge his own 40 year old experiences, is not at all forward thinking. Looking at the AH-64's picking off the Iraqi tanks etc with NVG's/cannon etc etc was something that the venerable Aussie Bushrangers could never do...

Also Brian A. re B's and C's, my source of info includes the RAN Museum's own website. Why would they get it wrong???

[Bushranger 71]

TBM-Legend; re your post #162.

I just happened to live in Kuwait for a couple of years post-Gulf War 1 and crawled all over the derelict and captured Iraqi armour. Some of it had been disabled by accurate groupings of 20mm cannon fire with evidence of good fixed wing shooting in that regard. Same NATO stuff as deliverable from the NC621 low recoil 20mm cannon pod that hangs on multiple fixed wing and helicopters, also as envisaged for the conceptual Huey II Bushranger configuration. A recent post added to the thread 'Tiger troubles'.

Doors-Off; re further insults in your post #160.

For your awareness; I am low profile oriented and not a braggart as you contend. The benefit of forums like these is reasoned debate among worldwide contributors so the lessons of war-fighting can be better appreciated. You seem determined to continue projecting bile which does you no credit. Why not just be polite and allow others to enjoy participating?

[Brian Abraham]

A synopsis of the genesis of the C.

Bell Helicopter proposed upgrading UH-1Bs with the "540" rotor system. This modification was made to about four-to-six UH-1Bs in the U.S. The results were promising enough that additional "540" rotor heads were shipped to a very few units in Vietnam. They didn't receive the full UH-1C retrofit: "540" rotor head, new engine, new powertrain, gears, and rotorshaft, bigger canted tail, bigger tail rotor, asymmetric horizontal stabilizers; just the "540" rotor system.

The first UH-1B/UH-1C hybrid was a plain UH-1B with the "540" rotor head only. It was discovered that in Vietnam's "hot and high" flying environment, their performance was marginal, and they could exceed the tail rotor torque limits. Also, they were too heavy for the UH-1B's T53-L-5 960 shp engine.

The second type of hybrid was the UH-1B with the "540" rotor, T53-L-11D 1100 shp engine upgrade, powertrain, and tail rotor. These modifications improved performance, but with the increased torque from the more powerful engine, and larger tail rotor, the tail had to be modified by adding the camber and increasing the width. These modifications were incorporated into what became the UH-1C model. One unit which flew UH-1B/UH-1C hybrids was the 174th Helicopter Assault Co.

As to why the museum has its facts wrong I don't know but am in contact with them to right matters. N9-3104, which the records you quote to be a C, is in fact a B, as recorded on both its data plate and its civil registration VH-NVV papers. The Navy never possessed any C's.

BTW, I flew the Navy Hueys for a total of 675 hours and put in a few hours on the C in Vietnam.

[Wiley]

Back to the topic: if we're realistic, I don't think the affordability issue can be ignored. Money is going to hard to come by for everyone in government over the foreseeable future, and Defence has traditionally been an easy mark for both major Parties when the culling begins. (I won't even go anywhere near what might happen with the Greens holding the balance of power in the Senate.)

I suppose it comes down to a single question: which would you prefer? A very small number of very expensive state of the art machines (with doubtful performance) that could support only a very few units in the field (if they ever get up and running, which, if we throw enough dollars at them, we can only assume they eventually will),

or,

as well as those very small number of state of the art machines, having a second string of cheap, easy to maintain and plentiful machines that could provide support for many units, allowing the expensive, state of the art machines to be reserved for the high value, high risk tasks where their state of the art kit could be used to great effect?

Anyone who's ever been involved in helicopter ops. in whatever era, (and it would seem quite a few of the respondents here have), would agree that 90% of helo tasking is, as someone before me has already mentioned, 'bread and butter' stuff, not requiring anything more than a lifting platform that in some cases, can defend itself.

Australia, despite what many on Russell Hill might wish for, simply can't afford to operate only top of the range equipment, at least not in sufficient numbers to provide effective support to every unit that wants - and deserves - it.

The RAAF has seen the sense in this approach in using the Hawk as a lead-in, second string fighter/ground attack platform. By the time a RAAF pilot gets on to an F18 squadron now, he's done at least a full tour on Hawks.

The same thinking could - I would say should - apply to the rotary wing world. The advantages are huge. More (cheap) helicopters provides a larger pool of pilots - (even Reserve units, partially manned by Reservists, could operate them). Probably most importantly, it would provide a surge capacity, something the RAAF lost when the helicopters were handed over to the Army, and if stories I have heard are to be believed, the Army manning and retention levels for helicopter pilots are so low that they don't have any surge capacity either.

[Like This - Do That]

... (even Reserve units, partially manned by Reservists, could operate them) ...

Wiley the RAAF appears to have a healthier attitude about reservists than the Army has :mad: The idealised situation you have described (I think it has much merit, for what it's worth) would not work in the Army without a humungous attitudinal adjustment that I think is beyond many of the Army's leadership. If the RAAF operated the fleet I suspect the use of reservists would be tolerated, even encouraged. Army? Not a chance.

Army went into Senate Estimates, for example, and without even a smirk told them that armoured vehicles were beyond the capabilities of mere reservists, despite decades of proof to the contrary, and despite plenty of examples in the forces of our allies.

Having said all that - even 'enlightened' Ronnie would baulk at employing any sort of reservists à la the US Air National Guard, ie genuine part timers as opposed to ex full timers. That would apply no matter how simple and cheap the platform or system.

[Brian Abraham]

Army went into Senate Estimates, for example, and without even a smirk told them that armoured vehicles were beyond the capabilities of mere reservists, despite decades of proof to the contrary, and despite plenty of examples in the forces of our alliesWheels and roundabouts. Was exactly the same argument used by the RAAF when they gave up the Mustang for jets. And I know from personal experience the view still held currency in the RAAF when some attempted to get a slot on 748s as reservists (this well prior to the RAAFs current reserve policy). When all these arguments are trotted out it needs to be remembered that there may well be a mix of politics, inter service jealousies, egotism, personal advancement, budget, a belief due inexperience, or any number of other reasons behind the argument being put at the time. Even outright lies to achieve an aim are not unknown.

In 1971 a chap talked to the RAAF to see if it was possible to swap from dark to light blue as he wanted to fly fixed wing. In the dark once you were helo that was pretty much it. The RAAF conceded it was possible to swap over but Caribous would the only airframe on offer, and there he would stay.

[BBadanov]

The RAAF conceded it was possible to swap over but Caribous would the only airframe on offer, and there he would stay.

Well BA, at least you could have kept flying up until 2009 !! :ok:

[Bushranger 71]

Hello All,

See my final post #46 in the RAAF/Army Relations - History thread which embraces some imagery that should be of interest. I am now aiming to generate some stuff for the Aviation History & Nostalgia forum which might take a week or 2 to begin emerging.

ADDENDUM

This bit from my last in Tiger troubles, for ease of reference.

'To reiterate; we are talking about an enhanced new platform in Huey II adaptable for virtually unlimited roles by outside the square thinking. Glass cockpit options are available and it can be fitted out with whatever modern kit is desired within payload considerations, as for UH-1N and UH-1Y (Penguin or Hellfire missilery also). At around $US2million each and with operating costs less than $5,000 per flying hour, it just has to be the bargain of the century in the 'arms bazaar', especially for smaller nations.'

Cheers for now.

Br71

[MTOW]

It would be a shame to see Wiley's comments about the value of a 'second string' helicopter element lost because his comments about the use of reservists caught readers' attention.

Anyone among those currently serving care to comment on the points he made about the value of a 'second string' element?

[Brian Abraham]

Well BA, at least you could have kept flying up until 2009
I figured 20,000 hours in 2004 was enough. :p

[7x7]

Could we take it as a given that the attitude of current senior Army officers is on average more conservative than current senior RAAF officers? If that's accepted, (I know some won't), I recall the attitude of senior RAAF officers 30 years ago to allowing reservists anywhere near their precious aeroplanes, so I can well believe that 'Like This - Do That' is on the money in his comments about the attitude to the current Army brass to the use of reservists.

It's a pity he's right, because surely to God even Blind Freddie can see that keeping people (and not just pilots) semi-current with (at least) an couple of weeks annual commitment for the first five years after they leave full time service is to everyone's advantage.

It almost makes as much sense as having a second tier of cheap, easy to maintain helicopters to do the simple stuff (even if they're not partially manned by reservists) that allows the complex, expensive top shelf Tigers and MRH-90s to be reserved for the tasks where their capabilities are required.

I know if I was a ground commander in desperate (or even not so desperate) need to helo support, I'd rather make do with a not quite suitable Huey (or similar) than do without, as I fear 95% of ground commanders will have to do if we have only a small number of MRH-90s available.

[TBM-Legend]

now this is training...


Theo Spark: Video: Chopper Pilot - Army Helicopter Pilot Training (http://www.theospark.net/2010/07/video-chopper-pilot-army-helicopter.html)

600 choppers flying each day from Ft Rucker.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi zic; re your post #124.

Am just briefly revisiting this thread and then off again for a while.

We have to consider a common benchmark when making performance comparisons so let's make that IGE hover at maximum operating gross weight (MOGW) in ISA+20C conditions. Altitude capability for the Huey II in that respect is 12,000 feet. You guys at Oakey should have the performance manuals for Blackhawk, Tiger, MRH90 and I am sure thread viewers would be interested to see the comparable performance for those types.

The first image is a bit non-specific in that regard and should relate to IGE (not OGE hover) according to other written performance data provided by Bell Helicopter. No crew composition nor weight mentioned for individual passengers so the number of figures illustrated might be less for a 4 person crew; but the table gives reasonable relative comparisons between Huey II and UH-1H. The second image gives some very interesting maintenance comparisons.

It is of course all a bit academic as far as the ADF is concerned because the Australian Government/Defence/DMO/Army Aviation seem determined to shed the true utility helo capability.

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HueyIIPaxcomparison.jpg
http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HueyIIComponentTBO.jpg

[TBM-Legend]

too late we've already purchased the MRH-90's......:ouch:

Frog Tigers seem to be doing OK in A/Stan according to latest update....

[YBMK Tower]

A MRH-90 has been residing in MK since 31/7.
A crane was in use today, working around the port engine.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Suspected bird ingestion...move along, nothing to see here!:hmm:

[Trojan1981]

It almost makes as much sense as having a second tier of cheap, easy to maintain helicopters to do the simple stuff (even if they're not partially manned by reservists) that allows the complex, expensive top shelf Tigers and MRH-90s to be reserved for the tasks where their capabilities are required.

It makes a lot of sense, however, I am afraid 'Like This Do That' is correct about the attitude of Army brass. Why do we need a full-time regiment of Abrams Tanks that we will probably never deploy?
As a former regular turned reservist and relegated to a non-flying role (although with a regular unit) I can see dozens of opportunities for reservists to fill the gaps and support regular units; particularly for ex regulars or those with specialist experience. It is very, very hard for any unit to gain service air support for Ex or Op in our region these days, and this has a detrimental affect on the capability of our forces as a whole.
Reserve units (with regular cadre) operating third line transport support within our own region and DACC when required would free up the more expensive and complex first/second line assets for 'hotter' operations.
It would also provide a skilled pool of personnel for the ADF to access as required at short notice, and provide both training and operational benefit to units that would otherwise be left with no support.

Too much to say....

As for the MRH, it is still an aircraft in development and there will continue to be teething troubles before and after EIS. It is the same with every new asset. It is, however, a great helicopter and substantial improvement over current equipment. I personally think they got it right with this one.:ok:

[7x7]

Trojan, I'd have thought it made eminent common sense to keep all ex-regular aircrew semi-current with a short annual or even bi-annual reserve commitment. There would be added advantages to the Army in implementing something like this.

There'd be some who'd happily do far more time than the minimum required and there's be others who, with a foot still in each camp, would come back to full time service after they found that civvy street wasn't all they were expecting it to be. A steady stream of such returnees - (I can almost guarantee there'd be a steady stream) - would have a salutary effect on those considering getting out, so it would be a win win win situation of the Army.

Relatively simple, second tier helicopters like the Kiowa or the SuperHuey would be ideal to equip such units. In a similar fashion to the way the RAAF employs the Hawk as a lead-in fighter for graduates of 2FTS before they move on to the F18, it would also allow first tour Army pilots to learn their trade and gain invaluable experience in the more simple aircraft before moving on to the MRH-90 and the Tiger. it would also mean far more land units would receive helo support than can from the very limited number of MRH-90s and Tigers in our inventory - that's if and when they ever become operational and remain serviceable in numbers to fly!

Of course, it'll never happen, because it makes far too much sense.

[Wiley]

The question on whether to employ Reservists in flying positions is possibly muddying the waters. However, there should be no question on the Army providing a second tier helicopter that can provide vital support economically to all the ground units that require air logistic support.

The pitifully small number of MRH-90s Australia can afford to field - (even if they all worked and performed to specifications, which is another question altogether) - is simply insufficient to cover the requirement, and if there's anyone out there who thinks that economy shouldn't feature in Defence planning in the foreseeable future, he's being totally unrealistic.

As a ground commander, I'd prefer there be a second tier helicopter element available that could get me vitally needed logistics, (even if not right to the battlefront), as well as move casualties etc back for treatment than do without any helicopter support because the very few MRH-90s were committed to more pressing tasking. A second tier helicopter element would probably be able to carry out 90, if not 95% of normal tasking, leaving the cutting-edge stuff to the state of the art MRH-90.

[eagle 86]

Money, money, money - personnel, personnel, personnel - there is hardly enough Defence dollars/trained personnel around to keep older and usually more expensive per flying hour machinery in service to support new equipment until the new equipment is "in service" let alone to operate these aging assets in parallel once the new machinery is "in service". For example, many people would love to keep the SK50/UH1H in service but it is not practical/cost effective in a Defence Force the size of Australia's. But now, on the other hand, if one Service operated all the aviation assets.....
GAGS
E86

[Chinook]

The Vietnam C2 model so strongly disparaged by some, and stated never to happen again, is exactly what happened in OP IRAQI FREEDOM with a few RAAF C130s ....

Canberra authorising sorties seems to be quite the fashion ..

[Andu]

But now, on the other hand, if one Service operated all the aviation assets.....To that comment, we probably should add: "Game on!"

For myriad reasons, as sensible as that suggestion is, it'll never happen.

[Doors Off]

But now, on the other hand, if one Service operated all the aviation assets.....


A very worthwhile comment sure to open a can of worms:eek: A Jihad on bureaucracy and too many senior officers would also be worthwhile (The US Military has just begun a review/cutback of senior positions).

I thought that the ADF has purchased more MRH 90 than they had/have Blackhawks, and given that the MRH 90 can carry a shed load more than the short, stubby older sister (UH1H) and a bit more than the Blackhawk, it would seem that the ADF will have at least the same amount of lift capacity (with the additional capability of the CH47F when they arrive) and be able to take it further and faster, than it could on the UH1H, Blackhawk fleet. I don't have the graphs or flight manuals or glossy brochures, so I could be incorrect.

[Trojan1981]

Wiley, you are correct of course. The reservist issue muddies the waters somewhat, it is the logistic capability or lack thereof that matters.

Chinook, the Canberra authorised sortie issue is whole other can of worms! In Timor I remember a battalion GLO telling me "If we want it done, we'll call the Kiwis!" :ugh:

Doors Off, the MRH offers quite a substantial payload and range improvement over the Blackhawk. However, I would like to see what they come up with to solve the door gun issue.:ok:

[Tibbsy]

Enough of this trivia.

The big question is, have the MRH-90's got enough hat racks to carry the crew's compulsory slouch hats...? :E


Soldiers rebel against loss of cherished beret (http://www.smh.com.au/national/soldiers-rebel-against-loss-of-cherished-beret-20100819-12s4b.html)

[TBM-Legend]

The REMF are at it again methinks....:uhoh::uhoh:

I think Ken's been in the sun too long on this one>>>

* what next the Air Force C..t caps?:hmm:

[Yamagata ken]

No surprise there Tibbsy. Why do Orstayans wear thongs and slip and slide in the sweaty heat? Because Poms wear sandals. Why don't Oz military wear berets? Because Poms wear them. Simple.

[TBM-Legend]

So how are the deliveries etc of the fabled MRH90 going? All is quiet for months.

I heard the Navy was less than impressed with its role in replacing "Sir King"...

[cj0203]

Recently added to the "Projects of Concern" list

[500N]

With all the announcements in the last 6 months of US troops, planes, ships
visiting and training here and now even possibly a new airbase in the Cocos islands, to me it just seems to be crazy that we buy other than US, off the shelf equipment.

What does our Military do that is so different from the huge US military
that we have to re invent the wheel all the time ?

Especially with the history of European countries not willing to supply
spare parts if they don't like the conflict / war you are involved in - or in the case of Libya, to not take part at all.

[kbrockman]

With all the announcements in the last 6 months of US troops, planes, ships
visiting and training here and now even possibly a new airbase in the Cocos islands, to me it just seems to be crazy that we buy other than US, off the shelf equipment.

Cocos islands ?
I read somewhere that they are planning to use and expand upon some existing Australian base in the Darwin area ?
Didn't know that the very little and habited cocos islands where also in the planning.

Especially with the history of European countries not willing to supply
spare parts if they don't like the conflict / war you are involved in - or in the case of Libya, to not take part at all.
I'm fairly sure that the US will revert to arms or other embargoes quicker than most European countries if they don't agree with your country's policy.
US State Department - Policy - Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/index.html)
Also I'm a bit baffled by your Libya remark ???


edit ps; Seems you're right about the Cocos plans, didn't know that:
US Eyes Cocos Islands As Spy Base (http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/us-military-eyes-cocos-islands-as-a-future-indian-ocean-spy-base-20120327-1vwo0.html)

[500N]

kbrockman

I am sure the US would resort to an embargo, but some European countries
have a track record of it that relate to Aust. The fact we, Australia are a close friend of the US means we are likely to be in it with them, not by ourselves so less likely to cop an embargo.

Libya
Germany, Poland for a start.


re Cocos Islands - that will be interesting to see if it becomes the next Diego Garcia (for aircraft only) although apart from Political sensitivities of having US base here in Aust, I would have thought Exmouth would have been good - based in a stable country but well out of the way, plenty of space, ships could be located at least on that side of Australia as has been talked about already).

[kbrockman]

I am sure the US would resort to an embargo, but some European countries
have a track record of it that relate to Aust.

A genuine question,
I'm not really up to date in the complete history of Australian-European realtions when it comes to arms-sales, where there specific situations where you guys suffered from a European imposed arms embargo ?

Libya
Germany, Poland for a start.

Germany is never going to join a quick military action for the same reason Japan doesn't, they have a troubled past that has lead to a very difficult process for them to be involved in any kind of adventure ouside of NATO territory, just look at how long it took them to be involved in Afghanistan.
As for Poland, well I cannot tell why they didn't join into the action, maybe for the same reason that many other former Warsaw pact countries didn't get engaged, no expertise, not the right equipment and no funding available, they are not really rich ,compared with the Western EU countries.
As for the rest of the EU countries, it looks like the Libya campaign might well be the first time a military campaign was ended succesfully without the US DoD in the overwhelmingly leading role (apart from the Falklands War).

Also I get the uneasy feeling that you somehow get the impression that the European countries and the US are not on the same side, maybe I'm reading too much into your comments (I probably am) but for most of the European countries that simply is not true, not even for France.
Sure there might be tensions and differences of opinion from time to time but the alliance still stands pretty firm.

Besides alll that when it comes to weapons suppliers, the only place to shop for the full spectrum of high tech weaponry outside the US is in Europe.
I fail to see why Australia should restrict themselves to buying only US made weapons, just as I fail to see why European countries should only shop in Europe and US/Canada etc.. should only look at the US suppliers, it just doesn't make any sense (budgetary wise) to do that.

[500N]

kbrockman

Re the european embargo, others on here are far more qualified to comment but it was during the Vietnam war and I THINK related to parts for one or more of our aircraft - it might have been the Pilatus Porter.

Understand re Germany / Poland. Why have a NATO pushed resolution if one of the major countries of NATO doesn't do anything major.

I am not anti European, (born in the UK). Maybe it's because the DoD in Australia has made a cock up of so many purchases / builds and for such a small military, where possible, why not just buy off the shelf from our major coalition partner ?

If we spend 90% of our time operating with the US, then doesn't it make sense to operate the same or very similar equipment ? Does that have ANY weighting at all in the buying criteria ?

[kbrockman]

Re the european embargo, others on here are far more qualified to comment but it was during the Vietnam war and I THINK related to parts for one or more of our aircraft - it might have been the Pilatus Porter.

Could very well be true, but I never heard of this, also I really doubt that the Porter could suffer from any kind of embargo when you have the US as an ally, Fairchild builts them (with stronger engines BTW) as the "Peacemaker" pretty much negating any kind of embargo possibility.

The only real embargo that existed (and in reality only on paper) from 1 western counrty towards another was between France and Israel and that was mostly because of political problems between the 2 of them.

Understand re Germany / Poland. Why have a NATO pushed resolution if one of the major countries of NATO doesn't do anything major.


NATO is not a country, no decisions can be made solely because they decide so, it needs to be backed up by every individual state, as for GERMANY, it is nothing short of a miracle that they got involved in Afghanistan, an area outside of the original NATO zone of influence.
A quick action like the one in Libya is just out of the question for Germany.
It doesn't mean they are not comitted to NATO, same goes for POLAND.



I am not anti European, (born in the UK). Maybe it's because the DoD in Australia has made a cock up of so many purchases / builds and for such a small military, where possible, why not just buy off the shelf from our major coalition partner ?

If we spend 90% of our time operating with the US, then doesn't it make sense to operate the same or very similar equipment ? Does that have ANY weighting at all in the buying criteria ?

Maybe it is, maybe it isn't, maybe they do factor in commonality with the US military equipment , maybe they don't, I don't know what criteria the Australian MoD uses to determine what they buy.
Fact is that all our equipment is NATO-compatible and therefor US compatible.
Fact is also that even the US looks abroad if they consider buying new expensive weapon programs (LAKOTA, HARRIER, KC30 was a serious contender, GOSHAWK, Minimi, MaG, etc.... ) even if they directly compete with indigenous suppliers, same goes for most European countries.
I think it is in your nations best interest to look at all possible suppliers that can deliver what you need, I'm sure most of the time you'll automatically end up with US systems but opting for US weapons as a matter of policy is just an idiotic policy (pardon my french).

[rjtjrt]

European Arms Support Embargo on Australia during tje Vietnam War.

French - 30mm DEFA cannon ammunition
Sweden - Carl Gustav anti tank ammunition
Switzerland - Pilatus Porter support
and most galling of all
Britain - 1000lb bombs for Canberra bomber - Canberra was operational in Vietnam.
Maybe more I can't remember.

For Britain to refuse to supply (and France for that matter) after so many Australians served in the European campaign of WWII, and with Britain being in recent past one of our closest allies, was a despicable act by the UK Government (spivs, one and all). This is not to say that the people of the UK were part of the low act - I have nothing but the fondest respect for the people of the UK, but not their elected representatives.

We should always remember how the Europeans treated a loyal and close ally when we in the future contemplate arms purchases from a European supplier. To paraphrase, those who forget/ignore history are destined to repeat it.

US are much less likely to do the same low act.

John

[500N]

rjtjrt

Thank you for that list.

The Carl Gustav was the one I was thinking of that I couldn't remember.


kbrockman
I think we are one of the least likely countries the US would put an embargo on.

In fact, I think Australia may end up with a heap of pre positioned US Equipment at some time in the future - in a nice, out of the way location like Exmouth, Darwin or up that way. Darwin would be good, good docks, US aircraft and US personnel close by.

Just my HO.

[kbrockman]

The Carl Gustav was the one I was thinking of that I couldn't remember.


kbrockman
I think we are one of the least likely countries the US would put an embargo on.


First Sweden and Switzerland where non-NATO ,neutral, countries caught in the middle of the Cold war, what they did then hardly reflects on what would happen now.
As far as France and the UK goes, you conveniently forget that the embargo was mainly the result of what happened in the Suez crisis, unfortunately you, as one of the sole partners in the Vietnam war , also got to suffer from the embargo.

If the Suez crisis showed one thing it is that, like all other countries, also the US first and foremost acts in its selfinterest, they basically betrayed their allies to fraternize with the new oilpower aka Saudi Arabia who firmly choose the side of the new Egyptian dictator, Nasser.

If I where you I wouldn't put all my eggs in one basket, even a fairly safe one as the US, if you run into a political conflict with one of your neigbours, and lets be honest there is ample opportunity in that part of the world for that to happen, and your interests somehow clash with those of the US you can make a fair bet that you'll be made to comply with the US either through diplomatic pressure or even unofficial embargoes.
They've done it before , they'll do it again.

This is not a criticism on the US, but rather some kind of reality check.
There will be times your interests differ and if you decide to make yourself so dependant on them, then also be prepared to set aside your own interests from time to time to serve theirs.

[rjtjrt]

kbrokman wrote

"First Sweden and Switzerland where non-NATO ,neutral, countries caught in the middle of the Cold war, what they did then hardly reflects on what would happen now."
YA RECKON!

"unfortunately you, as one of the sole partners in the Vietnam war , also got to suffer from the embargo."

That makes it OK then.
Imagine if this had happened to your troops in the Afghan war now - someone that you regarded as an ally and who you had served loyally in the past suddenly for reasons of "moral indignation", refused to supply AMMUNITION that you were using in Afghanistan currently, and you had no other source for, suddenly refused to support your troops.
It pissed me of, mainly as I had a close relative in Vietnam at the time.

Talk about self interest - the European embargo was done on so called moral grounds - not self interest.
As your country probably felt in the Suez Crisis (ie somewhat let down) we also felt.
As you still remember the Suez crisis abandonment, so do we re the abondonment we received from your government.
Unreliable doesn't do it justice. Disloyal, barstardry are 2 words that come to mind.

As ye sow, so shall ye reap!
We in Australia would be stupid to buy equipment from Europe in the future.

I assume we did so recently because our new generation of beuracrats were unaware of the above info. They need reminding. (Fortunately or unfortunately, our experience with the recent purchases has left a very bad reputation here for European suppliers.)

Once again this is not to imply that the people of Britain and Europe, as opposed to their government, are held in anything other than high regard in Australia and by me.

John

[500N]

kb

I don't doubt what you say re the US.

But I would much rather be in bed with the US than the Cluster eff of the EU
and having to deal with decisions by committee / vagaries of European Governements. "Oh no, sorry, you can't overfly our country on the way to bomb Libya":O

And we have a hell of a lot more leverage with the US than the EU.

We do have one or more of their very important listening bases here in Aus,
which is kind of important to the US and cant exactly be moved in a hurry.
We also have our safe ports for ship visits and stable Gov't - and that goes without saying our reliable track record.

I think we are much more useful to the US, more so now below.
And with China / S East Asia coming even more into play,
then we have even more leverage.

Remember, we had the F111 so we could fly to Indonesia
to drop various things on them if need be, the US knew that.

And we, the insignificant country of Aust that kicks far above our weight
have very few restrictions on equipment from the US. I wonder why that is ?




.

[ozbiggles]

I think you will find that we don't always buy of the shelf because the politicians get involved and look for what can be built in their local area rather than what is best for the job. I can see the merit in that argument but obviously the end product may not be the best.
I think Airforce has got the idea now with its fighter and transport fleet. The tanker and AWAC fleet may not really fit into that but I think in the end they will both prove their worth and there wasn't any real point in buying old technology for those projects.
I think Navy is still under the influence and we are seeing the result with the AWD. Building here a European boat with an American system and we can't even get the 'blocks' right, hold on tight for that mess.
Hopefully the Amphibious boats will work out a little better.
It's a balancing act but in the end you need the best insurance policy for this stuff(within reason), not the cheapest.

[Trojan1981]

500N

And we, the insignificant country of Aust that kicks far above our weight
have very few restrictions on equipment from the US. I wonder why that is ?


While I agree with just about everything you have said, I don't think the above statement holds true anymore.

We are not punching above our weight because our people and equipment are being held back. Our soldiers are very good at what they do and are doing well wherever they are deployed, but our air assets remain largely unproven. No F-111s saw combat, No RAAF Hornets have deployed to support our soldiers and only a very small rotational deployment of AAvn has entered the MEAO. The RAAF is not in a position to conduct tactical airdrop in the AO and our ground forces are largely reliant on foreign support in order to conduct ops. Hopefully this will change, but we have been in Afghanistan for more than a decade now...how long does it take?

IMHO 50+ M/UH-60M/S would have been a zero risk replacement for the next 20 years. Right out of the box they would have been deployable, and that's what we want.:ok:

[500N]

Trojan

Oooops, I meant a small population / economy / politically, NOT the ADF.

I know how well the ADF performs around the world and would totally agree they do a very very good job and are respected for it.

Agree re the RAAF not being deployed and soldiers held back, it is crazy to have an Air force and it not used. Agree re AAvn.

It must be so frustrating to train, train, train on some of the best equipment in the world and not get to use it for real.

Re RAAF not being used / Air drops and not doing them, does anyone know the REAL reason why not ?

[ozbiggles]

Such a short memory.
FA18s did deploy to the MEAO and conducted numerous combat missions. One day you may hear more about them.
And obviously some people have forgotten about Timor already. Although no 'combat' missions were flown there were plenty of F18 and F111s on the ground at Tindal for a long time,ready for just such an event. Most know that event could have gone either way. Just maybe the deterrent value paid for itself just there. As Mr Cosgrove said "walk quite, but carry a big stick".
The FA18 was also ready to be used in the Sandline affair, and that threat was enough to achieve the required aim.

[TBM-Legend]

[QUOTE][/QUOTEMHO 50+ M/UH-60M/S would have been a zero risk replacement for the next 20 years. Right out of the box they would have been deployable, and that's what we want.



Sweden ordered NH90's and has now purchased 15 or so MH-60M Blackhawks for combat operations in A/Stan and elsewhere. That's what they really think of the NH90 as a combat platform..

Australia should do the same. Interestingly there is zip coming out of Canberra on the continued MRH90 roll-out past a vague press release on the "delivery" of unit #15 by the OEM...

[Trojan1981]

Such a short memory.
FA18s did deploy to the MEAO and conducted numerous combat missions. One day you may hear more about them.
And obviously some people have forgotten about Timor already. Although no 'combat' missions were flown there were plenty of F18 and F111s on the ground at Tindal for a long time,ready for just such an event. Most know that event could have gone either way. Just maybe the deterrent value paid for itself just there. As Mr Cosgrove said "walk quite, but carry a big stick".
The FA18 was also ready to be used in the Sandline affair, and that threat was enough to achieve the required aim.


I do remember this OZBiggles, I was in at the time. I still stand by my statement. Talking too much gets people into trouble, but suffice to say they deployed, but did not actually see any real combat. Same-same for C-130s and CH-47s deployed at the time. Hornets did bomb "threat vehicles" etc and
ended up with the same medals as those actually being shot at, but no ADF platform was allowed anywhere near the AO until all substantial threats had been eliminated by US forces. This occurred for a number of reasons. I agree re: Timor (was in then too) But The fact remains they did not fire a shot in anger, although RF-111s were flying sorties in support of soldiers on the ground, and ALG came into their own.

RAAF combat aircraft, however, have not deployed on high intensity combat of any type since Vietnam, and not in air to air combat since Korea (intercepting Cessnas and talking about intercepting Antonovs doesn't count).
Look at Army deployments over the same period. Very few infantry soldiers in
the Army today could say they have never been shot at or employed operationally in their role.

I want to know why our primary battlefield helicopter has not been deployed to
our primary battlefield; and why the RAAF can repeatedly deploy jets to RED FLAG, but not to Afghanistan. Especially since Army has made repeated calls for CAS. I know individual pilots have deployed as part of US units (this is why Ill refrain from using the R-word) but I still don't understand why the ADF is addicted to buying multi-million dollar combat kit, only never to use it in combat, particularly the 95 fighters currently sitting on the Tarmac around this wide brown land. Where is the accountability?


TBM, you hit the nail on the head. Shows what they think of it.

500N. Apologies, I misunderstood you. What is the real reason wrt airdrop?

[ozleckie]

rjtjrt wrote

For Britain to refuse to supply (and France for that matter) after so many Australians served in the European campaign of WWII, and with Britain being in recent past one of our closest allies, was a despicable act by the UK Government (spivs, one and all). This is not to say that the people of the UK were part of the low act - I have nothing but the fondest respect for the people of the UK, but not their elected representatives.





If you check the history books I think you will find that Britain and Russia were co- chairman of the peace agreement after the French/ Indo China war under the auspices of the UN so neither of them could really offer assistance to either side except surreptitiously. Australia became involved because of treaties between it and the US which did not involve any European countries. After their defeat in 1954 the French were never going to get involved.

[flighthappens]

Trojan - the answer as to who, what, when and where the RAAF gets deployed does not lie with the RAAF.

If the pollies wanted Fast Jets in theatre, they would be there. They don't so they aren't.

[kbrockman]

'500n wrote'--
kb

I don't doubt what you say re the US.

But I would much rather be in bed with the US than the Cluster eff of the EU
and having to deal with decisions by committee / vagaries of European Governements. "Oh no, sorry, you can't overfly our country on the way to bomb Liby

I see your point, I really do, and I'm even inclined to agree to a large degree.
Sure some European countries (not the least France) have a very dubious history when it comes to loyalty and putting their own interest above the others, Taiwan comes to mind.
The US is indeed a fairly trustworthy allie, a good friend to have and they deserve the benefit of the doubt.

If the general feeling about the European countries in Australia is really that unfavorable , even today, then sure, don't buy any weapons from us, that's your perogative and I respect that.

I hope the future will proove you wrong about us but I'm not certain it will on all accounts, systemic pacifism and misplaced feelings of righteous indignation still remain strong among some people over here, sorry to say.

[TBM-Legend]

Two reasons the Oz pollies don't want our fast jets, more helos, tanks, our artillery etc in theatre are 1. cost and 2. potential for collateral damage and "bad" publicity.

[ozbiggles]

Trojan
Not trying to pick a fight but you are wrong re the F18s in the MEAO.
I'm not sure the C130 and P3 crews who have been deployed and constantly fly into the 'hot' area for 9 years with some guys over 4 deployments would think its all that low intensity.
It may not be WWII but even being shot at once is probably real enough.
I do agree the army is doing the main lifting however and deserve the best airlift/support that we can give them.As already mentionrd its not up to the RAAF when and what it goes to war with.

[JPJP]

disregard filler

[500N]

kbrockman

"If the general feeling about the European countries in Australia is really that unfavorable , even today, then sure, don't buy any weapons from us, that's your perogative and I respect that."

I doubt what I wrote is the "general feeling", we do have a huge e European population here. It is from the perspective of a white, anglo saxon who heard about the embargo from Vietnam vets and since then my own reading and of course the military procurement stuff ups since I became interested in it - late 1980's onwards and especially those recent and very public fiascos.

As has been posted
"Building here a European boat with an American system and we can't even get the 'blocks' right, hold on tight for that mess."

If we are so small, why do we need to re invent the wheel as above.
Are we facing any threat that is so vastly different from anyone else,
especially the US who deploys the world over, that we THINK we need to design our own ship ?

[LeCrazyFrog]

Kindda makes me laugh to read about "countries being loyal" and so on when history teaches that NO one country will be loyal to NO ONE if it does not serve its own interrests...And our american friends are exactly the same, except they've only had some 200 years to exert put into practice their "loyalty" (Suez for example...)

Self interest, self interest, self interest...and if you don't trust the europeans, as someone said, don't buy... There is another thread dealing with issues about putting all your eggs in one basket...

BTW, I seem to recall that Seasprite was a all-round success for the RAN...:ugh:

[500N]

"BTW, I seem to recall that Seasprite was a all-round success for the RAN..."

Are you saying that because the Seasprite was US equipment ?


I would call it another case of our DoD deciding that they know better
and can turn a sow's ear into a silk purse - in this particular case, a 1960's
decaying helicopter that the US couldn't give away into a state of the art,
current platform.

I think the above is one of the best examples of where by trying to
do things on the cheap by reinventing the wheel, we screwed up big time
- $1 billion on this alone. How many new, off the shelf helos, spares, training and flying time could have been purchased with that $1 billion ?

[TBM-Legend]

Interesting that Seasprites flown by our Kiwi cousins, Poland, Egypt seem to work fine. It was not the airframe but rather Navy/DMO trying to build an experimental model in the avionics area...the cop out was old airframes. The airframe bit including engines etc etc worked real fine...

[Andu]

If you check the history books I think you will find that Britain and Russia were co- chairman of the peace agreement after the French/ Indo China war under the auspices of the UN so neither of them could really offer assistance to either side except surreptitiously.'Offering assistance' surreptitiously? Britain? Read some of the books written by USAF/USN aircrew involved in the bombing of North Vietnam and their comments about overflying - and not being allowed to harm - numerous Brit (and other European nations) cargo ships in Haiphong harbour waiting to unload supplies for North Vietnam, with their crews on deck giving them the bird.

TBM Legend is right about the Kiwi Seasprites -v- the Australian ones. The Kiwi models worked and continue to work because they simply refurbished the existing airframes, where the Australians tried to turn an old Apple Mac into an iPod.

As to the RAAF not "really" being involved in the 'Stan... I think there's be a few P3 crews who'd be quite willing to take you to task over that. (But to some, I appreciate, it doesn't really count unless you land your aircraft right on the FEBA every night, break out a MRE and then dig a shellscrape under the wing.)


Meanwhile... back to the title of this thread. The best option would be to hand the MHR-90s to civil contractors (for police, SES work etc?) so they can be what they're designed to be - civil helicopters (not that anyone could afford to operate them) and then buy some real military helicopters.

As the Swedes have done.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Trojan

...but suffice to say they deployed, but did not actually see any real combat.

I beg to differ mate. Whilst we brought a few back because our pods were crap and ROEs were tight, we did drop ordnance on numerous occasions in Iraq.

And while the HVA escort missions were tedious and uneventful, I submit to you that we freed up other coalition assets to join the fight.

[Trojan1981]

Trojan
Not trying to pick a fight but you are wrong re the F18s in the MEAO.
I'm not sure the C130 and P3 crews who have been deployed and constantly fly into the 'hot' area for 9 years with some guys over 4 deployments would think its all that low intensity.
It may not be WWII but even being shot at once is probably real enough.
I do agree the army is doing the main lifting however and deserve the best airlift/support that we can give them.As already mentionrd its not up to the RAAF when and what it goes to war with.


Ozbiggles
The P-3 and C-130 guys are doing a great job in their respective roles. Their deployments are relatively short, but the job they perform is essential. I dont know any P-3 guys personally but I have spoken to them and I know they are constantly over the AO; hats off to them. Unfortunately, due to lack of equipment and training, the RAAF hasn't been in a position to provide tac airdrop for a long time, so most of the ALG sorties are intra-theatre admin transport. The only guys who are actually mixing it with the enemy on a daily basis are the Army CH-47 crews.

Afghanistan has been ongoing for eleven years and the RAAF are yet to drop a single bomb or fly a single FJ sortie over that country, why? Cost? Not good enough when they can afford to send them to the US! The same applies to the Army's Blackhawks, which have deployed to far more AOs than the Hornets, but still not to where they are most needed. And the Tiger... eleven years and still not operational. I have made the point elsewhere and Ill make it again; air assets (in particular our fighter force) are the single most expensive capability in the ADF. Why are they not earning their keep? If you believe a war is worth fighting you can't have some commit all and others commit none.

OZbiggles, I don't want to pick a fight either, but I have seen friends deploy on repeated, long deployments. I have seen some die and others come back and ruin their lives. There needs to be some accountability WRT properly supporting our soldiers with sound and deployable kit.
I agree with 500Ns remarks regarding OTS gear. In some ways (Bushmaster) we have been world leaders. In others, such as battlefield helicopters, we should follow those who do more combat flying than anyone else and buy OTS.

[Doors Off]

Trojan, you are absolutely correct that our soldiers deserve the assets that the ADF has and they need eg: Tigers, more CH 47 and some fast air in Afghanistan.

On the Tiger front, you are incorrect. They are operational and have no operational restrictions. The fighting unit is operational by night with all weapons systems, the question should be why are they not in Afghanistan? The French have been there with theirs since 2009!

On the MRH, Tiger front, maybe those projects are too big for such a small army to handle? I think the benefits of putting MRH, CH47 & Blackhawk in ALG in the RAAF & Tiger in ACG RAAF, should be given serious consideration &'would be worthy of debate. They are expensive and capable assets that deserve the appropriate level of management however, I reckon the Australian Army Air Corps head honchoes would resist that heavily for fear of losing their
empire? Surely an organization like the RAAF would be able to support it better and I doubt the operators/tradesmen would mind changing uniforms?

[ozbiggles]

G'day Trojan
I completely agree with you regarding giving our troops what they need to do the job, I think we all do. I also agree the army is and has been doing the majority of the heavy lifting. And probably like you too I get wet eyes every time I see the families of fallen soldiers dealing with the loss of a loved one and fear for what repeated deployments does to ones life.
But I firmly believe all elements of the ADF do what is required of them by their political masters. I'm not a knuck but I know what the fighter boys have done and what they are capable of if required. The cost of sending an Australian fighter Sqn to the MEAO now vs the amount of work they would do is probably a main reason for there being no deployment. I remember the bidding war an American Sqn had to be involved in a big operation in Iraq post 'mission accomplished' simply because they had been doing months of nothing but CAP. In addition I think we are dealing with the issue of how long we are going to have to keep the classic F18 going before the F35 arrives.
In regards to the MRH 90 I think if it had delivered what it promised we would all be happy now. I think the logic however of buying off the shelf American would have made far more sense, particularly as they are the ones we are going to play with and the support in country that would provide.
As for airdrop, your after my heart there!!!!

[500N]

Question for those in the know.

Can the RAAF still do para load follows of Boats / soldiers
like the Zodiacs. I would assume yes but since we are talking
dropping supplies, thought I would ask.

[GreenKnight121]

As has been posted
"Building here a European boat with an American system and we can't even get the 'blocks' right, hold on tight for that mess."

If we are so small, why do we need to re invent the wheel as above.
Are we facing any threat that is so vastly different from anyone else,
especially the US who deploys the world over, that we THINK we need to design our own ship ?

You didn't "design your own ship".

The AWD is the Spanish F100 design... Spanish-designed hull & basic systems, with the US SPY-1D AEGIS system.

Spain has built 4 successfully, and a 5th is nearing completion.

All the RAN has done is to swap out some radios, etc for RAN-specific units, and ask for a couple-three other really minor changes.


The problems came in when the shipyards stuffed up some basic math, and failed to be able to translate Spanish to Oz-English.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

500N - yes, this capability is maintained in the C-130H.:ok:

GK - I think you'd be surprised how different internally the Hobarts are to the Spanish F104 upon which they are based.:eek:

Plus, the AWD hull block issues have been misreported, and are more related to workmanship (or lack thereof) by a particular Australian company than misreading blueprints. :bored:

The classic Hornets will make it to planned F-35 IOC and then a little bit more...no more Rhinos please.

[Andu]

Re the AWD: what about the enlisted crew accommodation? I've heard reports that the Spanish 'fit' is a total ballsup. Bunks four high and only 1.8m long - limited to that length by structural bulkheads. Might do for the 95 percentile Spanish conscript sailor who might get to spend the occasional one night out of harbour. For the 95 percentile Australian volunteer sailor with our coastline and area of operational responsibility? And bunks four high for three month deployments? Don't think so. Next they'll be putting them in hammocks.

I've heard reports, unconfirmed, that they're moving bulkheads to make the bunks longer.

$$$$$$$$$$!

DMO strikes again.

[500N]

GK

My bad, I meant design or should i say put together a ship
based on bits from here, there and everywhere.

Why can't we just buy the US Ship, lock, stock and barrel ?
We are using the Aegis system, probably more than a few
US Missiles, why try to fit this into a different hull when
the US has already worked most things out already.

If they are good enough for the US Navy, why not our Navy ?

Are our roles and tasks that different ? We seem to be patrolling
the same waters in the Gulf and doing the same job.

I'm being a bit of a devil's advocate here, nothing more.

[kbrockman]

Just as a point of reference,
how are the New Zealand military doing with their NH90's or is it still to early to tell ?
Do they also have the same problems the Australians seem to have ?

[Trojan1981]

FA-18
And while the HVA escort missions were tedious and uneventful, I submit to you that we freed up other coalition assets to join the fight.

That is a very good point. I am sure the deployed force played a significant role.

Ozbiggles

In regards to the MRH 90 I think if it had delivered what it promised we would all be happy now. I think the logic however of buying off the shelf American would have made far more sense, particularly as they are the ones we are going to play with and the support in country that would provide.

Yeah, I think we must be on the same page.


500N
Absolutely! Para load follow, either dropping boats on CEPs or as Bundles is still the go. Great fun too :ok:

Doors off
Glad to hear the Tigers are operational. I was told they'd be signed off after TS11, but then heard that they hadn't been due ongoing problems. It would be great to see these machines deploy.

Apologies for the rant, I have very strong views on the subject.

A former colleague recently told me they will struggle to make the MRH operational except as a rear-ech asset, and believes an FMS sale might be on the cards. Apparently the floor problems and lack of a position for door guns presents a problem which will require a very expensive engineering fix. So far there is no solution. I will say, however, that my former colleague is not posted to that type at the moment.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

The floor fix for the MRHs is in hand - at Eurocopter's expense too! :ok:

The lack of a door gunner position and other issues will limit to the MRH to a pure transport role, and it will likely never be employed in the battlefield assault mission. :rolleyes:

Low-key representations have been made to US Army/Sikorsky for some UH-60Ms...but there is no money to progress this at the moment.

[TBM-Legend]

I'm told from a good source that they are not suitable for the counter terrorism/special ops role and that Blackhawks will be retained for that and that they hope to crossover to UH-60M for that role.

[500N]

So here is a question.

Was the original specification / tender before the purchase written with specs that included the use of the MRH for

- counter terrorism/special ops role
- battlefield assault mission
- door gunner (although it looks like this will be fixed)

If it was envisaged that the first two were part of what the MRH was supposed to do, then where did such a big stuff up occur ?

Surely the people who are purchasing know before they hand over the contract or the $$$ that it will do what we want ?

[JSFfan]

AFAIK getting euro was a political decision based on then being built here, the services wanted usa stuff

[Trojan1981]

The lack of a door gunner position and other issues will limit to the MRH to a pure transport role, and it will likely never be employed in the battlefield assault mission.

Low-key representations have been made to US Army/Sikorsky for some UH-60Ms...but there is no money to progress this at the moment.

That is exactly what I have heard. What fix do they have for the floors? Last I saw they were using rubber load spreader but had not devised a permanent fix. What a waste of time if we only end up with a rear-ech aircraft.

[500N]

Trojan

What a waste of time AND money - for what, a few jobs up north
to keep some pollie happy ?

Would have been cheaper to pay them the dole and to buy the right helo
in the first place.

Oh well.

[MTOW]

If the AAVN blokes are getting as little flying as I'm told they are, what in the hell do they do with themselves all day? And how scary is it for all concerned when 2Lt Bloggs gets his/her knees on each side of a cylic?

[Turkeyslapper]

The lack of a door gunner position and other issues will limit to the MRH to a pure transport role, and it will likely never be employed in the battlefield assault mission.


You have to be F#$%&n S&*^^ing me....thats a joke right? .......where is Bushranger and his Huey II talk :}



If the AAVN blokes are getting as little flying as I'm told they are, what in the hell do they do with themselves all day?


Probably doing EC135 endorsements somewhere....good on em, not their fault :ok:

Cheers

[BPA]

Another one was test flying out of Brisbane today.

[Trojan1981]

If the AAVN blokes are getting as little flying as I'm told they are, what in the hell do they do with themselves all day? And how scary is it for all concerned when 2Lt Bloggs gets his/her knees on each side of a cylic?


Most new pilots are flying Kiowas for training or being trained on UAVs so that they can be deployed on token trips. These are badged, but not ROBC qualified pilots at the base rank of LT (2LT only exists in the reserves).

[Like This - Do That]

Not any more Trojan.

The choc graduating class in Feb 2008 (and all that followed) went straight to LT. I believe the only 2LTs are now AAAvn pre-ROBC SSOs.

[Bushranger 71]

It has been suggested I rejoin the debate this thread.

Why did Australia acquire the MRH90? It was a 'going away' present by then PM John Howard as a virtual last act before Election 2007 - along with 2 x LPD aircraft carriers - for his former MinDef Peter Reith who was working for Tenix post-political life; that outfit later being absorbed by BAE Systems. Tenix of course were driving the prospective LPD and MRH90 acquisitions. But what had happened in the 30 or so years preceding that decision?

'At the end of the Vietnam War, the argument was made in the United States, as well as Australia, that it would be sheer folly to become involved in distant, extended, Asian counter-insurgency campaigns or to structure the armed forces for such contingencies.' - Professor Alan Dupont, The Lowy Institute.

Embarkation on the thinly-veiled unified ADF experiment (a la Canada) initiated in 1974 also saw loss of focus on maintaining the military capacities and operational expertise hard won during the Vietnam War where, contrary to folklore, the independent armed forces functioned well jointly, as in prior conflicts wherein Australian forces had mainly conformed with British Joint Planning doctrine.

Pre-ADF formation, political oversight of the military was appropriately exercised but that morphed into Public Service domination, subsequent dismantling of a system whereby the armed forces had pretty well managed their own hardware acquisitions and the growth of monstrous substitute bureaucracies under 3 separate ministries now dominating defence matters. For years now, the central plank of Australian defence policy has been support of defence industry (largely foreign-parented) at the expense of military preparedness.

Since 1974, little effort was made to progressively optimise military hardware in service in Australia; but, majority of the aircraft platforms employed by Australian forces during the Vietnam campaign and subsequently have since been continually employed operationally by other nations and are still being optimised via ongoing manufacturer upgrade programs. For example; enhanced Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk versions and turbo engined ex-RAAF Caribou are now operating in Afghanistan with more of that discarded herd being re-engined.

Alan Dupont again: 'While our defence strategy must incorporate plans for dealing with a major conventional military attack against sovereign Australian territory (deterrence Yes, defence No - BR71), this remains a low-probability scenario and the ADF should not be primarily structured for such a threat. It makes no strategic sense to allocate the lion’s share of the defence budget to capabilities that have little or no utility for the conflicts most likely to engage the ADF, or which cannot be used because they do not have the necessary protection to survive in a high-threat environment (a failing of many past acquisitions). We need to give much higher priority to maintaining and sustaining the equipment we have by elevating the importance of logistics and remediation.'(my emphasis – BR71).

Maybe some more soon re Post #214 and 'remediating' the ADF helo force.

[Saltie]

Professor Alan Dupont seems to make some very commonsense points, BR71. It doesn't seem to make any sense to have too small numbers of the best kit if we can't afford to operate it - or, because it is so expensive, politically, we can't afford to lose one unit, so commanders are forced to keep it away from high, een medium risk situations.
Looking forward to your next offering.

[TBM-Legend]

The last press release from Gilard and co talked about cancelling 33 multirole helicopters!

Does this mean the end of the MRH90 and that we will keep around 15-16 for Navy etc and rebuild the existing Blackhawk fleet?

I'm aware that Army wants to keep 12 Blackhawks for special ops in Sydney as MRH90 doesn't do the job. Maybe our new helicopter fleet could look like this:

22 Tiger ARH
24 MH-60R
15-16 MRH90 shared Army/Navy
30+ S70A's rebuilt for Army.
*12+ S70B's as utility cabs.
I personally think the S70B's that Navy has should be converted to fleet "cabs" by removing ASW etc gear and using them the way we used the Wessex/Sea King. Make excellent fleet utility aircraft stripped out. Can land aboard all classes of ships if and when required and we own them.

Also Chinooks, when the new F models are delivered upgrade the D's to D+ or F models so we have a decent fleet with enough for maintenance/ops and training.

[Andu]

NH90s: Defence Paper Questions Helicopter Lifespans... | Stuff.co.nz (http://www.stuff.co.nz/sunday-star-times/latest-edition/6867613/Defence-paper-questions-helicopter-lifespans)

The paper says there is a "medium" risk the "fatigue life modelling utilised by NHIndustries may not be accurate, and may not take the Defence Force's statement of operating intent into consideration".

It warned Defence might have to reduce either the annual available flying hours, or the desired 30-year lifespan.

The paper also revealed a "high" risk that some core equipment, including fuel tanks, chaff and flare dispensers, ballistic protection, liferafts, rope rappelling devices and machine-gun mounts, would not be ready before the choppers were handed over. Those delays would "prolong the time" it took for the NH90s to reach their "directed level of capability".

[Like This - Do That]

Question for those in the know.

Can the RAAF still do para load follows of Boats / soldiers
like the Zodiacs. I would assume yes but since we are talking
dropping supplies, thought I would ask.

500N - yes, this capability is maintained in the C-130H.

According to tonight's budget, not for much longer :eek:

Updates of lots of friends' Bookface status this evening are skirting dangerously close to "inappropriate use of social media" ...

[500N]

LTDT

I haven't had a chance to have a good read and won't for a few days.

What did the budget say that makes you say that ? (According to tonight's budget, not for much longer).

[Like This - Do That]

Early retirement of H models. In fact, next FY has "withdrawn" in the 2012-13 budget estimate column for the H model fleet hours. No increase to any other ALG fleet to compensate (modest increase for C-17 to account for the extra aircraft).

I can't help thinking that this hasn't been thought through ... but that wouldn't be unusual, would it?

[Lost Again..]

Offical word from hierachy today in 37SQN briefing. C130H retirement in 6 weeks !!!!!!

That's short notice although to be honest the fleet has been facing the axe for some time, we did expect more notice though. No word on BFA although we're assured it's coming. All training / upgrades cancelled unless a single flight remaining on course etc.

[ozbiggles]

I wouldn't hold out for the BFA.
The Labor vandals will delay that for the next 5 years with a new White paper. (I didn't see any funding for it)
The H models have been on borrowed time for awhile but to have no Airlift replacement for both the Caribou and now H model herc and the lack of capability the MRH 90 is providing is nothing short of pathetic and makes a mockery of any claim Labor has to being able to provide any guidance in Defence or anything else really except more Deceit and debt.
All this to provide more cash handouts for plasma screens...
I imagine the H model Fltengs will get the same treatment the Bou Fltengs got too.

[Tibbsy]

There had better be a pretty big p*ss up for the departure of the H model :sad:

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Feelers have been sent out for a possible UH-60M buy...stay tuned!

BFA is coming...C-130H may have been offered up to seal the deal...

[BluenGreen]

With -$5Billion in the defence budget, and DMO programs already getting slashed, there ain't no money for yet another helicopter program.
The MRH90 is a great aircraft - don't believe the BS. I've flown it lots, I know it well. The hassles are minor, just blown out of proportion by Army senior sirs with their noses out of joint because we didn't buy more Blackhawks.
This aircraft isn't going away, so get with the program and make it work.

[BluenGreen]

Floors have been redesigned (with significant input from Australia) to provide a stronger upper layer. "Baselined" to Super Puma floor specs. It will add about 30Kg to the aircraft. Will be rolled out in product aircraft pretty soon, with a retrofit of the remainder. Tiedown pattern has also been improved. Floors? Tick.
Engines - revised procedures to prevent high temperature restarts. Improved intake screens. Rolled out very soon. Engines? Tick.
Windscreeens - protective film (which has been "field tested" in Australia to work, by he way) plus improved installation procedure that reduces stress transfer from composite airframe to the glass. Windscreen? Tick
And so it goes on......There is a "innovative" gun solution in the pipeline - watch this space.

[BluenGreen]

S-70B-2's are no longer supportable, even as utility aircraft. That's why there was such an unreasonable haste to replace them, resulting in the SH60R decision.

[TBM-Legend]

S-70B-2's are no longer supportable, even as utility aircraft. That's why there was such an unreasonable haste to replace them, resulting in the SH60R decision.



Is this airframe/engines/systems or avionics. There was a proposal from Sikorsky to take then back and refurb them. How could this be. Many other countries still fly the S-79-B.

It's a great idea to by 24 x R's however using the basic S-70B airframe engines etc a small fleet of utility cabs could be used. The same argument re old and unreliable was used when we replaced the Wessex with the Sea King in ASW etc. The old girls soldiered on quite well ;later. When I was on Melbourne we had two Wessex for Perdo and other duties always seemed to be 100% on the go.

[oldpinger]

Bluegreen- :D:D:D

just blown out of proportion by Army senior sirs with their noses out of joint because we didn't buy more Blackhawks.

You said it!

[ozbiggles]

Ok, Ok, Ok
I have to take a hit on the BFA decision...however
1. There will still be a over 4 year capability gap between the withdraw of the H Model (and Bou) in terms of Airlift. Here is hoping the MRH 90 is being sorted out as well(we are trusting you BluenGreen!!!!).
2. The funding isn't in the budget.
I'm not sure as to why it is to be based at Ric. I would have thought at least Amb or Tvl co-located near the Army would have made sense with the Js remaining in Ric. I would have thought that would have been in keeping with a need/desire to move North as well.
All in all, thank goodness the deal has finally been 'done'. Even better if the US finds some money and comes back to it as well.

[TBM-Legend]

Obvious that C-130J and C-27J live together. Same avionics/engines/props etc etc. The backoom boys an girls can support both types.