Aussie MRH-90

[BluenGreen]

It's primarily core avionics systems. To keep the S-70B-2 going for much longer would require fitting a new avionics system into an old airframe, and we all know how well that works ! Re-roling the Wessex occurred in a much simpler time - that decision would not have withstood today's risk management or airworthiness processes.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Bluegreen

Wasn't advocating dumping the MRH, just passing on what I have heard. Might just be for leverage to get Eurocopter to lift their game. I agree the MRH is a better long-term prospect...if only the Euros could deliver half-decent manuals and airworthiness paperwork.

[BluenGreen]

Agree - manuals are not good and customer service has to date been poor.

[TBM-Legend]

In the civil world upgrades of avionics g0 on every day without major dramas. It seems the the defence will not buy and"off the shelf" solution for almost anything.

By the way in our archaic ways I don't recall too many Wessex losses caused due to re-rolling the aircraft.

Done properly things work eg. The Chinooks from A thru D in some cases

[BluenGreen]

I only had one ride in a RAN Wessex, and it crashed !!

[FlareHighLandLong]

Av upgrades easy for simple transports - e.g 2 ka350 sqns with vastly different setups.

Tac aircraft with weapons/radar/sensors/link is a different story. Sea sprite was way more than that again.

[TBM-Legend]

the issue with the s-70b's is not to make it a combat chopper but a simple hack. bit like the squirrel..

[BluenGreen]

The core avionics issues are just that - core. It has little to do with sensors or weapons, but basic flight management systems. Many of the components that make up the avionics in this aircraft are now, or soon to become, unsupportable. The only way to make these cabs useful for fleet utility would be to undergo significant work (=lots of $'s). Even then you will still have old airframes. Bringing in the Romeos will not address the Fleet Utility issue - they are not built for that and cannot readily do ANY utility tasks.
Looks like the MRH90 will be busy at sea.

[Trojan1981]

Bluengreen

Good to hear that a few fixes have been devised. I'm still not convinced it will work for Army (though I hear from Navy mates that they are happy) but I hope it does. The same issues affecting the Seahawk also apply to Blackhawk. Right now BH availability is dwindling to the point where currency training (not just for aircrew, remember, their whole job is moving soldiers) and deployability is severely restricted. The MRH is not coming on quickly enough to fill the gap and is not yet up to speed.

WRT battlefield airlifter, I think it's fair to say that we have little to no tactical airlift/airdrop capability anymore. Our sharp end is becoming very blunt indeed...

[500N]

"The army's $2 billion Tiger attack helicopter fleet has been grounded after fumes seeped into the cockpit on one aircraft.


Defence last night gave no date when the 22 choppers would resume flying."

[BluenGreen]

Good to see that safety is still a focus. As we all know, this is just routine, and anybody who reads too much into this does not understand the safety culture of the ADF. I expect the Tigers will be returned to flying within a couple of days.

[Trojan1981]

The recent Blackhawk grounding seems to have gone almost unoticed with limited reporting. The usable fleet is dwindling.
As for the Tiger, they have 19 delivered in final fit, with another three currently undergoing conversion. Things are looking good for FOC this year; finally! :ok:


Only thing is, this comes as the ADF is pulled out of it's major theatre of operations...

[slow n low]

Ok it seems this debate needs a revival. Aside from the current state of ARH, the MRH project seems to be on the go slow (again). My information suggests AAVN will try to stretch the life of S-70 until the 2018-2019 timeframe. My concern is that the S-70 in its current form is becoming a basket case in itself. The GPS replacement is problematic in its current form. The genius(s) who decided to degrade the functionality (no nav database?:confused:) should try operating them; I for one have no trust in the integrity of the system after being left in the lurch right when I needed it. The mixed fleet with up to 4 cockpit configs is just a headache. Mission planning is becoming un-wieldy and ultimately degrades the end product. Duplicating everything to account for the mixed fleet is wasted effort. :ugh:

Yes, we will (and do) “suck it up”, but seriously, the “just make it work” mantra is getting old. The reality is S-70 along with Chinook will remain the backbone of the lift fleet for the foreseeable future. MRH (so we are told) will be a great platform…when it gets here. Great, bring it on and we will make it work, because that’s what we do. The reality for MRH appears to be a never ending slide to the right, with no capability to speak of.

Maybe it’s time to revisit UH60M? Or at the very least admit the S-70 needs a little more attention to see the old girl through. The customer still wants a capability; the bandaid fix will not work for another 6-7 years. It’s time to make some difficult decisions.:hmm:

BTW, I am not a one eyed fan of “mike model”. I am a fan of being able to get the job done with a bit of kit that lets us just get on with it, whatever that happens to be. :ugh:

[TBM-Legend]

so what is the actual status of the MRH90 with Army. I spoke to a techo the other week who told me that one "Navy" bird is in Townsville with a trashed floor undergoing major mods and that they have at least 8 delaminating tailboms. He is a Navy CPO [ex-Sea KIngs] attached to Army for amphib help etc. He also said some with Army already think they know about riding the boat and maintaing at sea. Very different ball game to the home drome...

It is very interesting to see Sweden buy M model Black Hawks for combat use and that Norway's NH90's are six years late and they are now looking at Black Hawks and cancelling their order.

Whoever bought these $hitheap$ for Australia needs to be tarred and feathered.

[500N]

For a first world country with some very bright brains in it,
we sure do make a hash of buying gear for the military and
not testing or thinking ahead of potential problems
before purchase :ugh:


Re the Army, if they call it a boat, no wonder the Navy
thinks they have a long way to go !!!


Seems to be a lot of flak coming out of the investigation
into the Chinook crash. Is that going to affect how things
are done in the future and who runs them ?

[TBM-Legend]

They haven't mentioned the mid-air with the SASR at High Range. The culture urgently needs a change. Choppers aren't trucks and aircrew aren't grunts first either.

The US Army aviation seems to work...

[Tibbsy]

.Whoever bought these $hitheap$ for Australia needs to be tarred and feathered.

Wasn't that the Howard Coalition Government?

Given the ALP's recent poor performance in Defence matters, I would have thought there'd be some political mileage to be made out of the MRH debacle by the Federal Government. The Army would be pleased to see the back of the MRH 90 'Taipan' (Carpet Python more like it) I'd reckon.

[Tibbsy]

TBM-Legend They haven't mentioned the mid-air with the SASR at High Range. The culture urgently needs a change. Choppers aren't trucks and aircrew aren't grunts first either.

The US Army aviation seems to work...


I'm not sure comparing US Army and the Australian Army is reasonable.

Are you talking about the '96 crash, and if so, do you believe that the culture has not changed? Not necessarily disagreeing with you but I'd be interested in hearing an argument rather than a throw away line.

[TBM-Legend]

Look at the Kanimbla accident for a recent example of undisciplined flying. My CPO friend was there and the briefed procedures were not followed. Why?

It is risky business therefore requiring an even higher level of training and discipline.

I wish them luck as there are many good boys and girls in the Corps.

[kbrockman]

They still take deliveries it seems,MRH90 N° 14 was just handed over,
Defence takes 14th MRH 90 | Australian Aviation Magazine (http://australianaviation.com.au/2011/11/defence-takes-14th-mrh-90/)
Also the New Zealand forces are still going ahead with their program,
http://pacificsentinel.********.be/2012/07/news-story-new-zealand-successful-nh90.html

As an aside, the Tiger seems to be back on track, testing to be finished somewhere late this year.
Australian Tigers flying again after source of cockpit fumes discovered (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/australian-tigers-flying-again-after-source-of-cockpit-fumes-discovered-375073/)

[Tibbsy]

TBM-Legend: sure - two accidents nearly 15 years apart involving a very specific capability. Probably a legitimate line of examination. With the greatest respect to your CPO mate though, I doubt he was intimately involved in the flight authorisation and AVRM process of the incident flight, particularly as it sounds as though his job is fixing them not flying them.


Are you saying that there is a wider (corps-wide) culture of 'undisciplined flying' or are you suggesting some other cultural issue? What evidence have you seen or heard of that indicates that Army Aviation treats their choppers like trucks or that aircrew think they're grunts? Once again, interested in your argument but so far you haven't made a very coherent one.

[Bushranger 71]

I agree with Tibbsy (Post # 268); it is quite unrealistic to compare the huge US Army organisation with smaller forces. They arguably have a different culture than the other US 'air' arms because they have fundamentally different organisational structures.

Perhaps one dated example illustrates different thinking for Australian air elements. Soon after takeover of battlefield support helos from the RAAF in 1989, Army Aviation began operating Blackhawk with the External Stores Support System (ESSS) and drop tanks often fitted for predominantly low level operations. Air Force advised continuing the practice would substantially damage the airframe, and it did.

But the root cause of the diabolical mess that has since been created regarding functionality of the whole ADF helo fleet seems to lie in failure of the DoD organisation to maintain adequate and credible military preparedness through progressive optimisation of in-service assets. And note the increasing emphasis by the Labor Government on the usability of many assets being acquired for disaster relief and humanitarian roles. Do we not acquire hardware primarily for military purposes and thus need to keep it combat ready?

An obsession with trying to reduce the fleet to as few as 4 types via the absurd ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan (HSMP – Projects Air 87 and Air 9000) has been a major factor generating serious capability gaps and the architects of that scheme were the hierarchy of Army Aviation. The intention to ultimately shed the most vital of battlefield functions, utility helo capability (Iroquois/Blackhawk), reflects shallow combat appreciation. That capability cannot be adequately replaced by a twin-engined so-called LUH seemingly intended to be acquired downstream ostensibly as an aircrew training platform (see: http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/CapabilityPlan2012.pdf, Page 68), nor will the medium lift MRH90 adequately suffice for utility helo roles and the operating costs for that platform will likely well exceed Iroquois/Blackhawk.

Tiger and MRH90 were inappropriate Howard Government acquisition decisions; but what is needed now is some bold decision-making to scrap the damaging hugely costly HSMP and restore some lost capabilities by diverting modest funding into optimising the Blackhawk, Kiowa and what remains of the Iroquois fleet. Perhaps just put the Tiger and MRH90 into storage as they are going to suck up a huge slice of Army's overall budgetary funding to the detriment of primary functions.

If DoD can find money for ships to restore run-down Navy capabilities and to donate to Customs (the Skandi Bergen), then funding can surely be recast to restore vital utility helo capacity. A burning question is though, are the Service Chiefs prepared to acknowledge the diminishing operational status of the ADF helo fleet?

Interestingly; Sikorsky-Helitech, who have been awarded a contract for further maintenance of Blackhawk/Seahawk, are also the Bell Helicopter authorised facility for Iroquois and Kiowa engineering services (see: Sikorsky - Certifications/ Approvals (http://www.sikorsky.com.au/?page=73)).

[500N]

A couple of questions for those that might know re the Tiger.

Looking at how long it has taken for the Tiger to become operational,

1. Are we the only country that takes such a long time to go from delivery to being operational, especially when their seems to be a need for that exact type of capability in a current operational theatre ?

2. Was their a "hidden agenda" that the hierarchy didn't want the Tiger to be deployed to Afghanistan and so took it's time to get the Tiger up to the level required ?

Would be interested in forum members thoughts.
.

[Bushranger 71]

Expanding a bit on the MRH90 discussion

Recently, Australian media showed several RNZAF UH-1H Iroquois (3?) being loaded on a RAAF C-17 for airlift to PNG to provide support for national government elections. Another report mentioned ADF Blackhawks (4?) also being deployed for that purpose and presumably ferried not airlifted.

The Huey is of course readily air deployable by C-130, although Blackhawk less easily. MRH90 is only deployable by C-17 and any difficulties regarding airlift not known.

Hourly operating costs for Huey are perhaps 20 percent of Blackhawk and MRH90 is presumably higher.

So; the economics of the PNG elections exercise would be interesting. Overall cost of deploying/operating/redeploying multiple Iroquois by C-17 versus presumed cost of ferry/operating/return ferry for Blackhawk.

Once the Kiwis have unwisely forfeited their upgradable UH-1H and acquire MRH90, cost-effective helo support for regional operations will be significantly diminished.

Somebody may be able to contribute some data re the PNG elections exercise that might be illuminating.

[TBM-Legend]

Today's "Australian" newspaper:
LONG-standing problems of complacency in Australian army aviation were evident in a Chinook helicopter crash that killed a young soldier in Afghanistan last year, an inquiry into his death has been told.

Head of the investigation into the Chinook accident, Wing Commander Alf Jonas, said systemic failures in army aviation, including an unchecked level of complacency, were factors in a fatal Australian Black Hawk helicopter crash in Fiji in November 2006.

The Black Hawk crashed while attempting to land on the HMAS Kanimbla, killing pilot Captain Mark Bingley and Special Air Service Trooper Joshua Porter.

“It does not appear to the aviation accident investigation team that anything has changed in any of these matters,” Wing Commander Jonas told the Australian Defence Force commission of inquiry in Melbourne today.

“There have been attempts, of course, to fix the system, but in fact the systematic failures within army aviation have continued.”


But the question remains where are the MRH90's...?

[emergov]

TBM are you saying you believe there is a culture of complacency in Army Aviation, or are you just quoting Alf Jonas out of context because of your obvious prejudice?

[TBM-Legend]

I have no prejudice. I wish Army Aviation success. My point is that the Army commanders need to understand aviation a lot more. The focus in the RAAF is flying, the focus in the Navy is water [although the RAN FAA built itself on ex-RAAF aircrew initially] whereas Army is a land based activity in general with air as a support function.

I don't suggest sending air back to RAAF but rather Army lifting its game.

Criticism is not always easy to absorb by some.

Q. Where are the MRH90's????

[emergov]

Cop out.

You are cherry picking discreet pieces of information that reinforce your perception of Army as somehow less able to conduct flying ops than the other services. Your posts as a whole are very anti Army.

I did not see any posts from you demanding the FAA 'lift it's game' after Nias. Your bias is obvious and shallow.

The MRH90 program as a whole is clearly experiencing problems. I don't think anyone will be able to give you an answer or a date on when the acft will deliver what was promised.

[dat581]

[although the RAN FAA built itself on ex-RAAF aircrew initially]

I'd say quite a few RN and RAN aircrew might just have out numbered the ex RAAF spifire crews that transfed over at war's end too.

[Tibbsy]

TBM-Legend I have no prejudice.

Sorry mate, but your cry of innocence isn't backed up in the tone or content of your posts. Selectively quoting the opinion of Alf Jonas (not man known for his impartial and objective views on Army Aviation) and throwing around comments such as "Army Commanders need to understand aviation a lot more" and "the culture urgently needs a change" are all fine, as long as you back up your casual quips with some evidence, or at least a theory. And I don't mean the hearsay of some mate of yours who throws spanners for the Navy and might occasionally speak to the aircrew when they sign for their aircraft.

Furthermore, whilst your questions regarding the MRH-90 project are valid and important, they're hardly related to the theme of your recent posts postulating about a cultural problem within the Aviation Corps.

If you have something plausible to tell us which would support your assertions please state your case. You may even find support for your argument(s) but at the moment you're not making one, you're just making noise.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi slow-n-low; your Post #263 was enlightening and you raised some very interesting points.

A recent 3 man investigation into the dire situation regarding RAN ship maintenance revealed that a prime cause was the Navy's 'can do' culture. Apparently, warships have often been withdrawn from scheduled maintenance/refits to comply with political requirements resulting in snowballing deficiencies and deteriorating operational functionality. According to a serving member source, some vessels on which millions of dollars are now being spent might not see further service.

I was fortunate to serve in an era when many Officers at the operating level (Wing Commander downwards) had significant operational experience and were quite prepared to question the actions of higher authority, if they thought directions imprudent. Seldom did situations emerge where maintenance schedules and planned flying rates of effort were ignored to achieve unwise rates of effort. That was just sensible management of air resources.

These days, the ADF culture seems to be one of career ending sanctions if anybody dares question directions of higher authority. A 'can do' syndrome may have been a reason for instances post-1989 when Army Aviation appreciably overflew planned maintenance capacity resulting in rows of aircraft just pushed aside at times gathering bird****.

A 'just make it work' mantra for Tiger and MRH90 in particular is unlikely to yield adequate levels of capability, as the Air Force proved with the CH-47C despite the comprehensive RAAF engineering resources then existing. The Charlie model Chinook was really a technical dog that ultimately had extensive systems redesign and power plant enhancements in later models.

An aspect of concern with new platforms is the bent of DoD/DMO to involve in hugely costly whole of life maintenance support contracts which might greatly limit ADF flexibility regarding force structure variations for unforeseen reasons. For example, if the MRH90 proves such an expensive dog that it is not worth keeping in service, might there be contractual cost penalties regarding maintenance support no longer required?

I am with you on spending money in the right direction to assure adequate capabilities that can do the job, ergo my advocating progressive optimisation of proven platforms at modest cost. Maintaining adequate and credible military preparedness ought to be the primary goal, enabling of course enough flying to keep all the boys and girls sufficiently proficient for operational employment.

[JPJP]

I served as an Infantry officer in the Battalions during and after the switch of rotary wing assets to the Army.

The Air Force seemed to have little understanding of an Infantry units operational needs. They were not readily available and didnt seem particularly interested in staging close to where they were needed. Their participation in air assault appeared to lack any tactical sense, or vigor. Straight and level at 1000 feet, then back to the officers mess or hotel.

The Army Aviation pilots at the time had all been through Duntroon, either solely or after ADFA. They had excellent tactical sense and knew what the Commander needed. They also understood how long it takes to walk 1 kilometer in primary jungle with 40kg on your back ........ After being dropped in the wrong place :suspect:

Ask the customer who they'd want providing fire support from a Tiger. I think you'll find the answer is Army Aviation.

[Bushranger 71]

Hello JPJP; with respect, you seem under-informed re RAAF/Army Relations. There is comprehensive discussion thereof on this PPRuNe thread: http://www.pprune.org/military-aircrew/421418-raaf-army-relations-history-2.htm. See my posts #16, 20, 31 in particular for some enlightenment.

It was always Army who decided which of their units would get Air Force air support and not the RAAF. Herewith self-explanatory extracts from post # 31 of that thread:Before creation of a thinly-veiled unified ADF, the Army had multiple smallish units scattered all around the Sydney region in particular. The HQOC HOPS cell worked hand-in-glove with co-located HQ 1 GL Group which was the agency controlling utilisation of helicopter flying hours allocated for Army support and they decided which units would get support. The when bit was decided jointly to make cost-effective use of helo resources which had to be deployed to support Army units all around the nation, in the neighbouring archipelago and sometimes NZ.

When RAAF helos were assigned to support a particular unit, part of the tasking process involved HQ 1GL Group determining whether that unit could accommodate and feed the Air Force elements. Except for larger Army units and formations, the answer was mostly negative. Living accommodation was often limited and the Army rationing system was quite inflexible being rigidly based on numbers on unit strength. Where accommodation and catering was available at larger units/formations, it was generally availed.

Army did not then have the catering flexibility of Air Force and Navy with lesser staffing for that purpose and this also became a problem in some scenarios as feeding for flying elements often had to be at random hours to get the job done, so it was usually simpler to provide a degree of own rationing. As mentioned earlier, Air Force helo elements began enhancing field deployment capabilities post-Vietnam.Regarding your Tiger comment. The primary activity for 9SQN during 2,000 days of Vietnam War operations was trooping for infantry battalions and they also did 900 days of gunship combat support compared with Army Aviation nil to date. I would argue an AAH designed principally for armour busting cannot adequately do the same intimate close air support job as more versatile utility platforms, like the Iroquois Bushranger, USMC UH-1Y Venom (Super Huey) and the US Army UH-60L DAP. There is good discussion re that on another thread.

[blackhand]

Hit the nail on the head there. The RAAF considered the Huey too valuable an asset to risk by having it exposed to unsecured areas of operation in Vietnam. Though they did do good work with the SAS.
Absolutely NOT TRUE, you denegrate the great men of 9 squadron with the perpetuation of this myth.

[emergov]

BR71,

I am interested in your comments that 'Can Do' and 'Make it Work' are inadvisable attitudes and realms of endeavour.

Your contribution to the ADF, the creation of the 'Bushranger' gunship was an excellent example of 'Making it Work'. You were supplied with a piece of equipment that did not do what you wanted it to, and the readily available, US-engineered alternatives were rejected. You and your team assembled and tested an indigenous gunship configuration for Huey, and then allowed the system to catch up later with certification and AAP amendments. Can Do? I think so.

I believe what slow n low is after is a bit of that aggressive engineering approach where the ADF makes decisions to hasten capability outcomes without necessarily requesting permission from the manufacturer (and waiting, and paying).

The reason why Army overflew maintenance capacity in the early 90's was mainly because the underlying support wasn't there. RAAF may well have fallen into the same situation, and may or may not have curtailed rate of effort. As you say, they didn't manage it with CH-47C, and arguably also mismanaged F-111 towards its end of life, if hours and availability are any measure.

You continue to make mis-statements about the aims of Air 9000. MRH90 is a direct replacement for Black Hawk and Sea King. It lifts about the same, it carries about the same number of people, and is meant to do the same thing. It is a Utility Helicopter, the same as a Black Hawk. Chinook is our medium lifter.

You are on the money about light utility though, getting rid of Huey was not smart.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

emergov :ok:

[Arm out the window]

Straight and level at 1000 feet, then back to the officers mess or hotel.

When was this, JPJP? If it was during the mid-to-late eighties, when I was flying Hueys with 35 and 9 SQNs, that is a total crock of crap.

A BTN or BDE level exercise involved deploying to the bush, living in hutchies or 2 man tents, digging shell scrapes, standing to and all the rest of it.

An airmobile assault was typically a four- or eight-ship split tac nav at 50 feet to RV on time and run in to an insertion, having been planned face-to-face with the ground commander to fit in with his intentions and meet his objectives and, strangely enough, with a full awareness of the appropriate intel factors.

Not readily available? We probably did more bush time than you, supporting numerous units. Funny old thing that a single unit might feel that they weren't getting their helicopters on tap when they were spread around.

I'm sure you found every company commander had a squadron of fully operational helicopters sitting around waiting for his call after the transfer to Army happened, did you? No, I thought not.

Good wind-up, if that's what you were doing! If not, you're talking rubbish.

[emergov]

In a disappointing but utterly predictable twist, we are again trading barbs about RAAF vs Army Aviation.

Service is irrelevant. The same AW regs apply to all three services; the same basic training, the same underpinning skills and knowledge, the same document management system, the same sustainment organisation, and the same HQ when deployed. CAF is the AW authority, and CA (and CN) answers to him a minimum of once a year for each type at an AW Board. DMO manages sustainment for all three services.

There is no doubt that 5, 9 and 35 Sqn did great things with their RW assets. We should be able to accept that A, B, C, 161, 162 , and 171 Sqn are similarly professional and do a job of which we can be similarly proud. Likewise 816, 817, 808 and 723 Sqns.

Accusing Army of maintaining and flying helos 'like trucks' is baseless and inaccurate. Likewise, accusing RAAF crews of staying in hotels and not caring about tactical outcomes is childish and inaccurate.

A bit of mutual respect might be in order.

[Arm out the window]

But Dad, he started it!

[emergov]

I'll turn this car around if you haven't got anything nice to say, and stop touching your brother's stuff or your face will freeze like that.
:)

[TBM-Legend]

Now back to the question. What's the latest on the MRH90's? How many delivered? Are they flying? etc.

Forget the inter-service stuff..

[Bushranger 71]

Hello again Emergov.

I was not implying any criticism of slow-n-low as he raised some interesting points, but we have perhaps got involved in a semantics discussion because I could have expressed myself better in post #281.

My main point was a now former pilot/engineer colleague, who was part of the team that addressed RAN warship maintenance, indicated a root cause was putting ships back to sea before scheduled maintenance/refits were completed which inevitably had serious downstream consequences. It apparently seemed that the Admirals had a 'can do' culture of bowing to political or other pressures to make it appear that the Navy was shipshape.

In his post # 263 reactivating this thread, slow-n-low mentions 4 different modification states for the Blackhawk fleet which is alarming and really points to a problem at higher command levels. The question begged is why have the Service Chiefs not been focusing on having their in-service platforms maintained at best state of preparedness, before DoD seeks acquisition of new hardware?

The ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan seems to have had overriding precedence causing multiple capability gaps. Had progressive upgrading of the ADF helo fleet been accomplished, then more comprehensive helo support for Afghanistan operations for example may have been possible, assuming of course the politicians and military hierarchy wanted to go down that track.

Emergov; some brief clarification re the Bushranger gunship project. Army requested Air Force to develop a gunship capability if possible because the US Army, who generally provided 1ATF with good gunship support, had difficulty with resources at times placing some Task Force elements in potentially perilous situations. There was no likelihood then of acquiring the Hueycobra as the US Army was beginning its operational introduction in Vietnam and Australian Government funding was being directed toward expanding/upgrading the RAAF Iroquois fleet to cope with increasing Army support and training requirements in Australia.

The year long project was sensibly originated and managed in an operational theatre because that is where the necessary resources were located, but higher agencies in Australia were kept well-informed of progress via the continual trickle of staff visits. Once we had created a prototype, a MinDef visit resulted in approval of the princely sum of $94,000 to acquire some weapons system kits, in addition to those we had bartered for project development purposes.

People give me credit just because I devised a different weaponry configuration on a newer versatile UH-1H utility platform equipped with suitable hard points and stores mounts; but it was the hangar and equipment guys that made it all happen as my primary very busy role was as a squadron pilot. Although the Bushranger with a reconfigured XM-21 weapons system was unique in the world, it could have easily been further enhanced if the UH-1H were upgraded to Huey II.

Regarding the MRH90; see the following links referring to it as a medium lift helicopter. Internal carriage of light vehicles differentiates it somewhat from other platforms recognised as utility helos.

NH90, NH90 TTH, NH90 NFH, NH90 helicopter - NHIndustries - NH90, The New Reference for the Armed Forces (http://www.nhindustries.com/site/en/ref/NH90-Multimission-Helicopter_47.html)
NH90 | AgustaWestland (http://www.agustawestland.com/product/nh90-0)
Army technology: Overview - Defence Jobs Australia (http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/army/technology/)
ADF receives new MRH90 helicopter - Army Technology (http://www.army-technology.com/news/newsadf-receives-new-mrh90-helicopter/)

Finally; I concur with your last sentiment in post #288.

[TBM-Legend]

B71.

All good and known points. We did order 11 x AH-1G's and cancelled them.

My question on the MRH90 project still remains. Your references are heading for a year old. There has been nothing that I'm aware of re deliveries or the project for months and months. Australian Aerospace still crows about delivering #15 last December!

[Bushranger 71]

Hi TBM-L. The references in post # 292 were only provided to show that the MRH90 is generally categorised worldwide as a medium lift helicopter, despite what may be otherwise implied in the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.

MRH90 seems potentially a disastrous project akin to the JSF and some hard decisions need to be taken to assure retention of vital utility helo capability intended to be forfeited, which the MRH90 will not provide. Not just an Army Aviation consideration but also Navy. The MH-60R will be so stuffed full of gear it will not have adequate versatility for boarding party operations; so if the MRH90 project falls over, the Navy will be in even more bother.

It seems there has been some soul-searching going on within DoD for a while regarding organisation of the ADF helo fleet, whatever that means!

[TBM-Legend]

B71.

The US Navy uses the MH-60S not the MH-60R for Vertrep and other stuff running around the fleet. The aircraft is a hybrid using the R cockpit etc and a a M model fuselage. Good enough for Uncle Sam, good enough for us.

One problem put to me by the Navy with the MRH90 was the comms and a few other things that aren't compatible with all fleet ops. Ah well those in the ivory towers know best....

[Like This - Do That]

Seems not all that many people are happy with the MRH90's external lift / underslung abilities either (lack thereof).

I'm sure that in time much will be ironed out, but really - how many years have we been hooking up a load beneath a RW aircraft? I know that the Brits do underslung - didn't the other NHIndustry partners value external lift?

[BluenGreen]

This aircraft was procured with a good external load capability (we thought) - up to 4000Kg on a very smart hook that would measure the load and use this weight to recalculate your performance. Like most helicopters, it is actually incapable of lifting this ultimate weight. All Up Mass - Basic Mass is less than 4000 ! Anyway, as it turns out the hook is a bit too smart - the articulations in roll and pitch (via axles / beams) mean that no only is the hook incompatible with the RAN standard load lifting equipment, it is also moving too much for the airframe strength. Back to the drawing board NHI !

[dat581]

Excuse the silly question but why was the Merlin not considered for the role? The RAF & RN seem to have no problems with them.

[BluenGreen]

While the MRH90 will eventually have a hook that works, the MH60R will never be a suitable utility aircraft. Another example of schedule and risk being more important than actual capability required.

[BluenGreen]

Too big (won't fit in RAN ship hangars) too expensive.

[TBM-Legend]

While the MRH90 will eventually have a hook that works, the MH60R will never be a suitable utility aircraft. Another example of schedule and risk being more important than actual capability required.


The MH-60R is a ASW plus surface warfare specialist combat asset the MH-60S is the utility helo.

[Andu]

You're 100% correct, TBM-L. But I think the point is: we can't afford two types - but for day to day ops, the Navy REALLY needs a utility helo that works.

[TBM-Legend]

We're getting two types. The MH-60R and MRH90...

Better if it was an MH-60S..:ok:

[Andu]

We're getting two types. The MH-60R and MRH90...Read again the last two words in my post.

And yes, as a compromise, the 'S' fitted with removable, modular ASW kit would probably be the better choice for the RAN with its very limited size (and budget), but I understand it has a few shortcomings like its tailwheel being a little long for the restricted decks of some of our ships.

[rjtjrt]

Bluengreen wrote
"This aircraft was procured with a good external load capability (we thought) - up to 4000Kg on a very smart hook that would measure the load and use this weight to recalculate your performance. Like most helicopters, it is actually incapable of lifting this ultimate weight. All Up Mass - Basic Mass is less than 4000 ! Anyway, as it turns out the hook is a bit too smart - the articulations in roll and pitch (via axles / beams) mean that no only is the hook incompatible with the RAN standard load lifting equipment, it is also moving too much for the airframe strength. Back to the drawing board NHI !"

To me this seems to parallel the tendency to design overly complex solutions to a requirement. Sounds very seductive, but complex, more to maintain, more to go wrong, and hard to get to work, more expensive in the final configuration, and in the end not really necessary.
Maybe I'm using hindsight too judgementally.

[Bushranger 71]

Some good discussion here and elsewhere on another PPRuNe thread re the MH-60R & S. Perhaps worth reviewing a bit of history re the Australian military helo fleet without digressing too much from the MRH90 theme.

Post-Vietnam, joint Army/RAAF planning determined there would be 3 utility helo squadrons, 1 MLH unit and some Hueycobras (11). Air Force aviators on the Air Board pushed for the very versatile CH-53, but 2 AVMs (an Engineer and EquipO) sided with Army who wanted the CH-47C. A bad mistake as it turned out and had the big Sikorsky been acquired, we might have then progressed to long range search and rescue and submarine support capabilities with C-130 flight refuelling. Army had also pushed for the Hueycobra; but when budgetary pressures emerged downstream, the Air Force rightly decided that the well-proven versatile Iroquois Bushranger concept was adequate for intimate close air support.

Navy subsequently removed the ASW kit from Sea Kings to make them more employable in utility roles; but that of course created a deficiency in dipping sonar capability not fitted to Seahawk, despite proven modular systems being in service elsewhere.

Unquestionably, the Howard/Rudd Force 2030 vision cemented in DWP2009 would never have been affordable and Australia is now facing a decade or so of austerity in defence due foreseeable shrinking government revenue. As General Peter Leahy (whom I respect) indicated yesterday, there is no point in trying to progress the Force 2030 structure – as intended by MinDef Smith for DWP2013 – if there will not be adequate funding available. So; all acquisition planning ought to be frozen pending a comprehensive review of what might be economically achievable.

Because helicopters are inherently versatile and flexible platforms, there is obviously scope for reshaping the ADF HSMP more on versatile concepts than airframes too specialised, like Tiger and MH-60R. Just how much the force structure could be untangled would require open-minded address including what types might be put in storage, if appropriate.

As outlined on the MH-60R thread, there will be differing helo restraint systems on some RAN warships and compatibility of some aircraft types may be an issue, also with hangars. The MRH90 in particular does not seem suited for smallish warship operations including boarding party functions, replenishment, etcetera. The Navy would have been better off acquiring some MH-60S (instead of MH-60R) and upgrading the existing Seahawk fleet as far as practicable toward Sierra standard. That would have enabled wide-ranging flexibility for fitment of modular weapons systems as required and retained capability for essential utility roles at sea.

[TBM-Legend]

Now that the Romeo is coming another option would be to strip out the existing S-70B's a la Sea Kings and use them as "hacks"...

[JSFfan]

talk is they're going to NZ

[dat581]

talk is they're going to NZ

Does that mean the Kiwi's will lease them back to us at three times the price we sell them just like the Skyhawks?

[TBM-Legend]

SH-2G[A] Seasprites stored machines are on offer to NZ...[by Kaman] US Govt approval sought.

[Not Long Here]

Point of fact - the SH2's no longer belong to the ADF, they are owned by Kaman

[BluenGreen]

"Now that the Romeo is coming another option would be to strip out the existing S-70B's a la Sea Kings and use them as "hacks"..."

The major schedule driver for replacement of the S-70B-2 under Project Air 9000 Phase 8 was the obsolescence of the CORE avionics systems - much of the heart of the S-70B-2 is unsustainable today, let alone in a couple of years time. A major upgrade would be required, and this is not cost effective.

Project Air 9000 was intended to rationalise the helicopter types operated by the ADF. The ADF fleet was to be based, where possible, on a single type (or family). CH47 and the basic trainer were "outriders", as arguably is the attack helicopter, but all utility and ASW aircraft were to be the same type. In practical terms today this really means a Hawk-based solution or a NH90-based solution. This was the competition.

For good or not, a decision was made to go MRH90 over Blackhawk for Air 9000 Phase 2 (Additional Trooplift Helicopters), and this was extended to Phase 4 and 6 (Blackhawk and Sea King replacement), in line with the Air 9000 concept. Where it has now gone pear-shaped is in selecting a Hawk-based aircraft for Phase 8 - an aircraft which is undoubtedly a great ASW aircraft but has ZERO utility capability - the capability which the RAN requires EVERY DAY. This decision was made based purely on a ZERO appetite for risk and a belief that the Romeo will come n on schedule (not an unreasonable belief).

The NH90 (NATO Frigate Helicopter version) offered a very good ASW platform whilst retaining a superior utility capability. It was more expensive per unit, somewhat more risky wrt schedule, but would have given the RAN the capability it needs (ASW and Utility) and maintained the commonality of type with NH90 (Tactical Trooplift Helicopter version) aka MRH90.

With the Romeo the RAN has compromised capability in order to avoid any more "embarrassing" schedule blowouts on a helicopter project - if I was the Navy dude in DMO making these calls, and I had been burnt by Seasprite, I would understand this position.

[BluenGreen]

The Sierra tailwheel (similar to Blackhawk) is problematic for operations from frigate size vessels - it will limit the ship motion envelope that can be accepted. The USN operates these aircraft from larger (i.e. more stable) ships.

Modular ASW systems sound good in theory, but they are always a compromise, and they never just "slip in and slip out" - plugs break, mounting feet get burred etc. Ask anyone who worked with the RAN S-70B-2s about pulling ASW gear in and out - not always a simple task.

What is needed is an aircraft which can do both ASW and utility.....wouldn't that be a great thing.......

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

What is needed is an aircraft which can do both ASW and utility.....wouldn't that be a great thing.......

A la NFH 90...would have been a very brave call though...something the current MINDEF isn't renowned for! :rolleyes:

[Bushranger 71]

Hi BluenGreen.

The RAN was removing/reinstalling gear in Sea Kings and Seahawks that was designed to remain permanently installed.

A huge range of modular systems is available worldwide for adaptation to many platforms. Consider the UH-60L DAP for example.

When we reconfigured the XM-21 weapon system for adaptation to Iroquois UH-1H airframes as required, it took us some months of searching in the US to find suitable cannon plugs, but we eventually acquired them.

The small ADF sure does need more versatility in its platforms and that only takes some outside the square thinking.

[dat581]

Forgive my ignorance, why was the Merlin not considered/eliminated for the RAN? The RN and RAF seem to have very little trouble with them.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Too big for our little ships...

[Andu]

Too big for our little ships...Unlike the MRH-90?

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Much bigger than an MRH

[BluenGreen]

The MRH90 fits into the hangars on the ANZACs, albeit encroaching on the margins around the aircraft (the S-70B-2 also encroached margins on the FFGs, but nobody worried about that for 20 odd years and it didn't prove to be an issue). Against much opposition a trial was conducted, the results were (unfortunately for many detractors) successful, and kept fairly quiet. Not quite sure of the Air Warfare Destroyers, but it may well fit there also. Won't fit in the FFGs.
Merlins are much, much bigger.

[dat581]

Merlin is 3.5m longer (unfolded), 1m higher and has a max weight 3600kg heavier. I wonder if it would have cost less in time and money to modify our little ships (if physically possible) and buy a proven off the shelf design that can do both jobs. Moot point now.

[Bushranger 71]

Although a bit dated (2007), the analysis at this link raises some following pertinent questions:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2007-03.htm



What is the MRH90’s embarked concept of operations?
What classes of ship is the MRH90 formally cleared to operate to and be embarked in?
Are powered blade folding/spreading, floatation equipment and a securing and traversing system intended to be fitted to the MRH90 for its embarked service?
Is it intended that the MRH90 be modified to operate with the RAST systems fitted to our FFG’s, Anzacs and USN air capable ships?
Another question; compatibility with the restraint system intended for the AWDs?

Perhaps somebody can offer enlightenment.

[tiger73]

What is the MRH90’s embarked concept of operations? For the RAN - Maritime Support ,pax tfrs, VERTREP, etc. For Army Avn - Amphib Troop Lift

What classes of ship is the MRH90 formally cleared to operate to and be embarked in? Embarked ops in LHD and LSD(A), Operate to all decks sufficiently big and strong enough once SHOL development complete.

Are powered blade folding/spreading (no, not required), floatation equipment (yes and already fitted) and a securing and traversing system (not required for ships it will embarking) intended to be fitted to the MRH90 for its embarked service?
Is it intended that the MRH90 be modified to operate with the RAST systems fitted to our FFG’s, Anzacs and USN air capable ships?No as not intended to embark in those platforms, if it was to embark in these classes appropriately hanlding equipment (Douglas MANTIS) would also be embarked or the aircraft would remain on deck

Another question; compatibility with the restraint system intended for the AWDs? See above

[Lonewolf_50]

Just a point to consider:

IF NRH 90 wasn't built with RAST in mind initially, you are looking at a non-trivial cost to backfit, since you are dealing in airframe structures in the heart of the aircraft.

I've operated with and without RAST, and am of the opinion that it is a luxury, not a necessity.

[Bushranger 71]

On-line availability of the MRH90 might realistically not be any better than 50 percent. If 6 of 46 are nominally for Navy, then only 3 would be available for fleet support roles. If the type can only be operated from the LHDs and LSD(A) (see post #323 by tiger73), then general fleet support and especially boarding party capabilities from other fleet warships will be forfeited because the MH-60R is not suited.

Broadening the discussion a bit. Amphibious operations involving large platforms have historically been sluggish activities necessitating very detailed planning, although perhaps to a lesser extent since the advent of helicopters than when landing craft were solely employed. Nevertheless, aircraft carrier platforms cannot be quickly put to sea as has been trumpeted by the politicians and DoD for natural disaster and humanitarian assistance purposes, nor especially for their primary military functions. They are not a quick reaction capability.

The MRH90 is presumed not to be air deployable by C-130 and any potential difficulties with preparation for airlift by C-17 and reconfiguration at destination seem not to have been publicly aired to date. Whereas the Iroquois could be prepared for C-130 airlift in less than one hour and flyable at destination within that time-frame, there will now be a diminished ADF quick reaction response capability if utility helos are totally shed and the medium lift MRH90 acquisition fully proceeds. Long range ferry of the MRH90 for regional operations will be pretty costly due to higher operating costs.

The smallish ADF would arguably have been better equipped for quick reaction amphibious support operations with several JHSV rather than LPD and LSD(A). See: The USA’s JHSV Fast Catamaran Ships (http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/jhsv-fast-catamaran-transport-program-moves-forward-updated-01535/). Maybe the hangar could accommodate 2 x MRH90 with manual blade fold!

[BluenGreen]

The MRH90 is deployable in the C-17. It can be carried intact with no disassembly - simply fold main and tail rotor. The OEM has not yet certified it to be carried in the C-17 in this condition (even though the ADF has done it a few times already for deliveries from France). A tech airworthiness decision to be made by the ADF, perhaps?

Of note, the RAN is about to receive the first of 2 LHDs - these will be the primary method of deploying MRH90's long distances, and supporting them once they get into theatre.

As for RAST etc, the MRH90 will not be fitted with RAST, nor will it be fitted with powered blade fold. The operating envelope has been demonstrated to be quite reasonable with the manual blade fold. MRH90 can be fitted with floats (BIG ones) and the RAN has already demonstrated that they work !

The NH90 (NFH) would have been compatible with RAST, ASIST and HARPOON.....

https://www.dropbox.com/s/xduiwwmb4up9521/MRH%20Floats.jpg

[Bushranger 71]

MinDef insists that the economically unattainable Force 2030 vision will still persist in DWP2013, despite a lot of faith being placed in warships and aircraft yet to be proved sufficiently capable.

If the Service Chiefs really want to ensure adequate and credible military preparedness (ongoing, not futuristic), then they must be prepared to take on the politicians and DoD Public Service hierarchy by recommending some difficult decisions. It is anathema to accept military capacity being further compromised by progressing flawed planning and a potentially bigger tin of worms may result from continued run-down of proven capabilities in service, like Blackhawk as outlined in post #263.

Considering the recently announced contract to maintain Blackhawk/Seahawk for another 4 years, with options to extend for a further 6 years, the Blackhawk fleet should be brought up to the same modification status as a priority. See: Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel – Joint Media Release – Black Hawk and Seahawk maintenance and engineering services contract (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/07/10/minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-joint-media-release-black-hawk-and-seahawk-maintenance-and-engineering-services-contract/).

Herewith some bold thoughts on other possible actions, not necessarily in any order of precedence:


Discard the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan, which has already been invalidated by excising from Defence Capability Plan 2012 the original intent of limiting the ADF helo fleet to just 4 types.
Freeze the MRH90 project.
Investigate the cost penalties involved with cancellation of remaining MRH90 deliveries (some other nations are opting out).
Analyse the effects of suspending any imprudent whole of life support/maintenance contracts.
Consider putting Tiger and any MRH90 into storage.
Seek variation of the MH-60R contract to acquisition of MH-60S in lieu.
Optimise Blackhawk, Seahawk, Kiowa and remaining Iroquois in storage via modest cost manufacturer approved upgrade programs.
Expand the CH-47F acquisition to 12 aircraft.
Shed the HATS twin-engined trainer/LUH notion, acquire more Kiowa for training/recce and dispose of Squirrel downstream as an offset.

Some might feel impractical options; but just think of possible adverse consequences downstream if present planning proceeds, not least being soaring ADF helo fleet operating costs. Some good old-fashioned leadership is required to admit shortcomings and pursue remedial action, albeit unpalatable in some quarters.

[ARRAKIS]

Two small questions.
How Sierra/Romeo compares to MRH90 regarding shipborne operations (seastate) and given the fact that those helicopters are having a similar MTOW, how Sierra/Romeo power train compares to MRH's (for example OEI)?

Arrakis

[Felix the Cat]

BR71, your obvious fondness for the Huey is understandable but continually banging on about bringing the aircraft back into service undermines the credibility of your more thoughtful contributions.

Both the Iroquois and Kiowa are aircraft from another, simpler era - neither are suited to the needs of today's ADF. The Kiowa is not currently fit for purpose even as a trainer because it cannot be legally flown in IF conditions. The ADF has clearly indicated a desire to move to multi-engine IFR aircraft, both for reasons of safety and to train their pilots in complex, multi-engine types from the outset. Whether that is a sensible policy or not is moot, however that's where things are going.

You aren't seriously suggesting that the Government should look at placing ARH & MRH-90 in storage are you?? :rolleyes: Personally I think both types were horrendous mistakes but no Government is going to park a billion-plus dollar (?) capability in the shed.

[TBM-Legend]

They binned the Sea Sprites after spending a billion plus.

Trouble is the plan is in motion so no amount of logic will stop it now.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

The Seasprites were not able to meet airworthiness standards.

Whether they are fit for purpose or not, the MRH & ARH are able to meet airworthiness standards - major distinction!

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Felix; re your post #329.

Many seem somewhat aligned with the DoD 'group think' mindset wherein Australia should just continue to cast aside useful platforms despite manufacturer upgrade programs enabling continuing operational application by other operators worldwide. Shedding capable proven hardware stems from the central plank of defence policy being support of largely foreign-parented defence industry through generating highly expensive projects for new dubious merit platforms and associated imprudent whole of life support contracts. Maybe $7billion or more has been/is being foolishly squandered on needless helo acquisitions when military requirements could have been adequately satisfied via cost-effective upgrade programs.

If platforms like C-130H, Caribou, Iroquois, Kiowa continue to provide adequate military capabilities in operational theatres, then why does Australia continue with its longstanding folly of virtually giving away such assets in lieu of optimising them at modest cost and/or putting them into dry climate storage, as happens in the US? And how can DoD justify shedding say Iroquois and then lease civil versions to do functions once performed by ADF assets?Both the Iroquois and Kiowa are aircraft from another, simpler era - neither are suited to the needs of today's ADF. The Kiowa is not currently fit for purpose even as a trainer because it cannot be legally flown in IF conditions.Worldwide utilisation of Iroquois and Kiowa platforms is very strong with service life expectancy forseeably unlimited due to long range supportability. Use of upgraded platforms is broadening around the world due to proven reliability and cost-effectiveness.

A year or so back, a MinDef Advisor (minder) informed me that the Huey II Iroquois would no longer meet DoD crashworthy standards. How absurd, when numbers in service are increasing and they are now being utilised by multiple law enforcement and emergency services agencies in the US. An overemphasis on OH&S requirements in military planning will become hugely costly and limit the flexibility of the ADF. See the overview at this link regarding enhancement features for the USAF TH-1H (Huey II) including the latest multi-function cockpit displays and avionics enhancements plus improved crashworthiness (all at unit cost of only $2million) - to remain in service until 2025 on present planning: TH-1H Iroquois (Huey) (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/th-1h.htm)
http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/HueyIICockpit.jpg


Regarding basic helo training, the Kiowa is widely utilised for this purpose with recce versions also operated at night by other armed forces. Seemingly, DoD now considers the ADF must conform with civil aviation IFR requirements. Intent to acquire an expensive twin-engined training aircraft/LUH for this purpose can only be considered needless extravagance.You aren't seriously suggesting that the Government should look at placing ARH & MRH-90 in storage are you?? Personally I think both types were horrendous mistakes but no Government is going to park a billion-plus dollar (?) capability in the shed.Yes; I certainly am suggesting putting ARH & MRH90 in storage. Operating costs for the ADF will soar and I foresee shrinking of some functions for all 3 arms. The ARH does not have the versatility/flexibility of the Bushranger platform which could be configured as required to conduct an occasional weapons camp, so the aircraft could still be mainly employed in utility roles. In a low threat scenario, boring costly holes in the sky with the ARH is going to be hard to justify.

Problems with the MRH90 seem far from resolved and even whether it would be justifiable accepting all 46 aircraft in such circumstances. Better to freeze the project, bring all the Blackhawk fleet up to the same modification status and perhaps put any MRH90 into storage. The alternative is to do nothing and keep on squandering funding allowing the utility helo capability to further diminish.

TBM-L contends no amount of logic will stop the plan in motion. Well; there will have to be some tough decisions made re ADF structuring as economic constraints tighten over the next decade and that will require some open-minded thinking. As General Peter Leahy recently intimated, there is no point in trying to progress extravagant planning if funding will not be available; so it remains to be seen what unfolds over the next year or so.

[Smackhawk]

First NH90 arrives in Afghanistan - News - Shephard (http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/rotorhub/first-nh90-arrives-afghanistan/)

Interesting to see how it works out.

[Tibbsy]

Did anyone hear something in the media in the last few days about the project being looked at again by Government? I caught the tail end of something on ABC radio but can't find anything on the web.

[Smackhawk]

It's on the projects of concern list and they are subject to annual review I think, which means MRH is up in Nov.

Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence Materiel – Defence and industry meet for Projects of Concern summit (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/04/23/minister-for-defence-materiel-defence-and-industry-meet-for-projects-of-concern-summit/)

[rjtjrt]

Report on NH90 deployment in Afghanistan. At least an operational deployment for real will advance the identifying and sorting out of problems with this aircraft.

Good on the Italians for doing this. They are reported to be generally pleased with the aircraft. Spares shortages shouldn't happen, but not unheard of with a new deployment, so hopefully all will learn lessons.

Italian NH90 Afghan deployment hampered by teething problems - News - Shephard (http://www.shephardmedia.com/news/rotorhub/italian-nh90-afghan-deployment-hampered-teething-p/)

John

[oldpinger]

Not to mention the latest embarkation on the good ship Tobruk!

Defence Materiel Organisation (http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/Newsitems/30Oct12_putting_equipment.cfm)
All Images - FotoWeb 7.0 (http://images.defence.gov.au/20121024ran8098578_033.jpg)

All Images - FotoWeb 7.0 (http://images.defence.gov.au/20121020ran8098578_058.jpg)

:ok::ok::D

Good effort to the boys and girls on 808 and Tobruk!

[Smackhawk]

Update on the AFG deployment containing some interesting information (which you wouldn't expect from an ongoing deployment). You have to register on the website to read it fully unfortunately.

IN FOCUS: Italy updates on NH90 service in Afghanistan (http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/in-focus-italy-updates-on-nh90-service-in-afghanistan-381067/)

[Felix the Cat]

Interesting article Smack Hawk.

Last year brought the NH90 rotorcraft's first deployment, by the Italian army in Afghanistan - and performance was flawless, says the service's aviation commander

By: Luca Peruzzi

In mid-2010, Italy began preparing for the first deployment of the NH Industries NH90 tactical transport helicopter (TTH). The effort was led initially by an NH90 task group at the Italian army's experimental aviation centre, and then by the service's 7 Regiment, "Vega".
A helicopter squadron called Task Unit Nemo was established, trained and certificated for the out-of-area mission. This comprises five NH90 TTHs - or UH-90As, to use the Italian defence ministry's designation - and some 45 personnel, including five crews and a team of 15 maintenance operators.


The original plan had been to deploy earlier in 2012, but between 18 August and 23 September the NH90s and unit personnel were flown aboard US Air Force Boeing C-17 strategic transports to Herat, Italy's main operating base in Afghanistan and the site at which the nation leads the Regional Command (RC) West element of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Each helicopter required about two days' work to be returned to flight status. Col Salvatore Annigliato, commander of the Italian army's aviation battalion in Afghanistan, says the first helicopters and personnel immediately began an acclimatisation period until the unit was declared fully operational on 26 September. This milestone was achieved after 90 sorties and 60 flight hours, including about 36h flown in operational conditions, he adds.
LOCAL REQUIREMENTS


Also called Task Force Fenice, the battalion counts among its rotary-wing assets 10 Agusta*Westland AW129C Mangusta attack helicopters and six Boeing CH-47C+ Chinook transports. To cope with Afghan theatre requirements, the service decided to deploy the ad hoc interim operational version of the TTH, the NH90 IOC+ Enhanced. This features stable mission software compared with the initial operating capability training version, as well as an almost complete avionics and mission systems suite.
The latter includes alert and de-icing equipment, a full electronic warfare suite and a reduced Selex ES communication package with two multiband VHF/UHF SRT-651/N-S sets and one high-frequency SRT 170/M6 radio equipped with cryptography, to allow for secure communications between air and land operators. However, the aircraft lacks a satellite communication terminal.
Earlier restrictions, including using the rear ramp, landing at an altitude above 6,000ft (1,830m), and flying in snow and icing conditions, have been lifted. Platform protection has also been enhanced, through the addition of ballistic protection and two Oto Melara pintle mounts for Dillon 7.62mm gatling guns.
"Since September 2012, Task Unit Nemo's five NH90s and personnel have flown 300h in more than 400 sorties, without a single mission having to be aborted for technical malfunctions, and assuring all missions assigned by RC West," says Annigliato.
"With two helicopters always available, two on maintenance cycle and one in attrition status, the unit was able to lodge the required 65 flying hours per month until 2012's end. This figure was then elevated to 80h, while aircraft availability allowed the unit to maintain four helicopters operational for limited periods," he adds.
WINTER SEASON


The most-used airframe accumulated 96 flying hours, operating in hot-and-high environmental conditions, with temperatures reaching above 40°C (104°F) during the earlier deployment stage, and conducting day and night missions from elevated forward operating sites such as at Chagcharan (7,850ft elevation) in brown-out conditions. With the arrival of the winter season, NH90s are flying in adverse weather conditions characterised by snow and ice, with temperatures often below -10°C.
"The capabilities being provided by Task Unit Nemo are in line with the operational requirements of Combat Support and Combat Service Support, forward medical evacuation and helicopter sniping in support of ISAF special force command expressed by RC West headquarters," says Annigliato.
Less than one month into the NH90 deployment, the Italian army's aviation battalion led a mixed ISAF and Afghan air assault mission to move an Afghan army battalion from Farah province capital to a forward operating base in Gulistan district - a distance of some 75nm (140km). Operation Grasshoppers made use of 15 helicopters, including two Afghan Mil Mi-17s, four Italian AW129Cs, six Chinooks (two each from Italian, Spanish and US units), two US Army Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and one NH90. Conducted in three phases during three days, the operation involved the movement of 700-plus personnel in more than 20 sorties and six main mixed helicopter formations, totalling about 100 flying hours. "Although mainly used for transportation and forward medevac missions, the single NH90 was employed to provide special forces with helicopter-sniping cover," says Annigliato.


n November, Task Unit Nemo assets participated in Operation Worker Ant, with the NH90 acting as airborne platform for the Joint Tactical Air Control to provide command and control functions and synchronise the aerial fire and intelligence support for ground troops. "Thanks to 'Rover 4' connectivity through onboard communication equipment, this allows up-to-date intelligence coverage and multinational co-ordination," says Annigliato.
The NH90 became the most requested platform for special forces operations, mainly conducted in night and reduced-light conditions with the Thales helmet mounted system and display, Selex ES navigation forward-looking infrared sensor and digital map generator. These enabled a range of missions, including helicopter sniping, thanks to the aircraft's fly-by-wire flight control system, which offers a smooth ride and platform stabilisation, air interdiction vehicle and mission controller capabilities. "The NH90 platform is so far responding well to the theatre's environmental and operational conditions and, in some areas such as propulsion power, exceeding expectations," says Annigliato.
"While operating in hot-and-high conditions, the engines offer at least a 10% increase each in available power compared with the flight manual. The boroscope inspection shows the integral particle separator to be working as requested. The airframe has not so far showed specific issues related to the theatre's flying environment and the wear conditions of rotor blades and powerplant are comparable to other aviation battalion rotary-wing assets."
He adds that issues such as windshield cracks, for which remedies have already been identified, have yet to show in operations; likewise the poor robustness of the cargo compartment floor. Light damage to tyres when landing on stony ground requires attention, he says, but the problem is "expected to be solved soon".
The NH90 maintenance team conducts safety inspections at 50h and 100h intervals in the first two years. The 300h maintenance stop on the first helicopter will be conducted in Italy, with similar activities on other NH90s performed locally. An AgustaWestland field service representative supports the unit at Herat.
Italian army aviation battalion assets are usually deployed at forward operating bases to better support ground troops. Such operational doctrine is not hurting the NH90's availability during the forward deployment, although a maintenance team of two to three operators accompanies the assets in case.
Italian army NH90s are flown in a heavily armed transport configuration, centred on a five-member crew including two pilots, a flight engineer and two gunner operators. Characterised by a stow position limiting the encumbrance in the cargo doors area, each of the two lightweight Oto Melara-sourced guns weighs 220kg (485lb) with a 4,400-round ammunition box. To conduct forward medical evacuation missions, the helicopter can also embark a fully equipped intensive care station for treating the wounded, managed by the Italian army's specialised medical team.
Although capable of carrying 11-12 soldiers in a basic configuration with a three-person crew, the installation of the pintle-mounted guns reduces the transportation capabilities of NH90 IOC+ Enhanced platforms to eight troops.
USEFUL LOAD


"In addition to the five-member crew, the standard payload for RC West area operations in summer season is based on six fully equipped soldiers of 130kg each, or around 800kg," says Annigliato.
"During winter season we can carry seven soldiers, while a maximum useful load of eight troops or 1,000kg of internal cargo is imposed by the cabin layout, operational conditions permitting," he adds.
"The latter also required new operational procedures to rapidly exit and board using the helicopter rear ramp, as the forward cabin area is dominated by the two pintle-mounted gun systems." However, he says, "together with ballistic protection, the latter are not limiting at all the emergency egress from the side-sliding doors."
With a Thales electronic warfare suite, including the same company's radar warning receiver, plus Cassidian MILDS II missile launch detector, Selex ES RALM 01/V2 laser warning receiver and MBDA chaff and flare dispensers, Task Unit Nemo's NH90s embody a modular composite ballistic protection kit. Weighting about 260kg, this protects the cargo cabin floor, while the cockpit features armoured seats for the two pilots.
"The avionics are responding well and so far have not shown problems. The digital map generator and the weather radar enhance navigation and ground separation capabilities, while the projected data on the helmet-mounted system and display in 'configuration 3', which offers a tangible improvement with night vision system compared to 'configuration 0', together with the fly-by-wire flight control system modes and the navigation FLIR, provide a significantly better situational awareness during landing operation in brown-out and white-out condition.
"Moreover, the Selex ES mission planning and analysis system significantly reduces crew workload during the mission, tangibly increasing flight safety," adds Annigliato. The icing alert and de-icing system on the aircraft's rotor, engine and horizontal stabiliser have also worked properly in the current winter season, expanding the flight envelope.


The French have managed to deploy ARH, and the Italians have managed to deploy MRH. Is Australia simply too cautious in regards to introduction into service?

[Andu]

Not totally unrelated to the subject of this thread. (Cut and pasted from the Oz politics thread.)

Former general turns firepower on Smith (http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/former-general-turns-firepower-on-smith-20121228-2bzop.html)

The ''cash-strapped'' Gillard government has put its own political risk ahead of Australia's national security, a highly respected former general says.

Major-General Jim Molan, the commander of the 300,000 strong coalition force in Iraq in 2004, says Labor's management of Defence since 2009 has been ''appalling'' and is having a ''terrifying'' effect on the Australian Defence Force.

General Molan, now a public speaker and defence commentator, is scathing in his criticism of Defence Minister Stephen Smith, who he says has gone beyond ineffectiveness to actively damaging his portfolio.

'Mr Smith does not seem to like the ADF, does not seem to trust it, apparently does not want to be its chief executive, shows no public interest in its ultimate operational effectiveness, does not know how to measure efficiency or effectiveness [and] is risk averse in a portfolio that is all about risk,'' he said. There's a bright side to the current bad floods in southern Queensland - the AAVN chopper drivers are getting some much-needed flying.

[Trackmaster]

Yes, in their Blackhawks

[emergov]

Andu says: "There's a bright side to the current bad floods in southern Queensland - the AAVN chopper drivers are getting some much-needed flying".

The inference is presumably that the only flying done by AAAvn is in support of disaster relief? Or that Avn aircrew are lucky to get the opportunity to fly when they otherwise wouldn't? Or that they should be glad whenever there's a flood so they can finally get airborne?

Not your most intelligent post, Andu and the competition is fierce. If ignorance is bliss, you must on cloud nine.

[Andu]

Jesu *** Christos, emergov, talk about going off half-cocked. As someone who has done exactly the type of flying the AAVN blokes (and, I'd assume, these days, bloke-ettes) are now doing, I know how (a) demanding, and (B) rewarding it can be. Far from inferring any of the criticisms you note, my inference was that I have heard from more than one source that, not just because of the recent swingeing defence cuts, the AAVN crews are averaging scandalously low monthly flying hours, and the flood work would be outside those restrictions.

Let's get back to the point of my post rather than my post script and Jim Molan's Canberra Times article.

[Subversive1]

It hasn't gone swimmingly for the AAvn crews in Bundaberg during the floods. It's not their fault, but the system and cost cutting is really starting to bite. They were short of fuel and unable to fly for much of the time they were there. Only one helicopter organisation was able to keep flying at night on NVG after bringing in their own fuel.

[TBM-Legend]

No MRH90's involved. Why not?

[rjtjrt]

Andu
That's General's Molan and Cantwell now on the record with scathing opinions of the good Mr Smith, who appears to think the Defence Portfolio is beneath him (much prefers to schmoos on the international diplomatic circuit, where he is provided with comforts and accoutrements more in keeping with his perceived status).
He thinks ADF stands for the "Australian Distaster Relief/humanitarian Force".
Every statement at any equipment announcement has "Humanitarian" repeated ad nauseum.
It would be interesting to hear what the brass say about him in private, but they are too honourable and have an appropraite sense of duty, to ever say anything in public (nor should they ever say anything in public).
Smith hates the ADF, and is condescending about the members, whom he seems to regard as serfs and beneath him.
John Faulkner seems to me was and is a much more decent human being, and dedicated to doing his job properly.
John

[500N]

"They were short of fuel and unable to fly for much of the time they were there."

Are you saying the Aust Gov't can't afford fuel for helos ?

Even in disaster relief.


Then again, with this Gov't, it doesn't surprise me.

[Joker89]

I don't think that cash would be the issue, more a supply problem getting the fuel to where the choppers need it with roads being blocked by the water.

[Bushranger 71]

Post #339 by Felix re Italian NH90 deployment to Afghanistan is very interesting.
"In addition to the five-member crew, the standard payload for RC West area operations in summer season is based on six fully equipped soldiers of 130kg each, or around 800kg," says Annigliato. "During winter season we can carry seven soldiers, while a maximum useful load of eight troops or 1,000kg of internal cargo is imposed by the cabin layout, operational conditions permitting," he adds. "The latter also required new operational procedures to rapidly exit and board using the helicopter rear ramp, as the forward cabin area is dominated by the two pintle-mounted gun systems." During RAAF UH-1H Iroquois operations in Vietnam with 4 crew, doorgun armaments and full fuel, 7 combat-equipped troops were routinely carried. The floor plans of Huey II (an enhanced UH-1H) and the UH-1Y Super Huey operated by the USMC (which has a 533mm fuselage stretch), do not have gunner stations and armaments encroaching on cabin volume capacity, as for some other helo types.

According to Bell performance information, the single-engined Huey II operated in forementioned configuration can hover IGE at about 12,000feet AMSL in ISA+20 conditions. Increased maximum internal operating AUW allows about 600Kg for niceties like lightweight armoured flooring, FLIR, defensive suites or whatever. The following image shows a Huey II being operated in Afghanistan on behalf of the US State Department and may have been chosen for its role due to better hot and high performance than the much heavier twin-engined Super Huey or Blackhawk. Note the device attached near the end of the tailboom:

http://i599.photobucket.com/albums/tt72/Bushranger71/USHuey2Afghanistan_zps0202248c.jpg


The Italian deployment reveals that there was no justifiable operational reason for acquisition of the MRH90 for the ADF and especially shedding of the Iroquois that were very cheaply upgradeable (there are presently still some in storage in Brisbane awaiting disposal).

There is much hype generated among the defence commentariat, including some politicians and military leaders, regarding the usability of new platforms being acquired for humanitarian purposes (including sluggish aircraft carriers). During 26 years of Air Force Iroquois operations, and a shorter period of Chinook employment, national commitment tasking and aid to civil powers became very frequent, but was largely viewed by those involved as a routine tertiary role - we were then mainly very actively involved in Army support. The ability to swiftly deploy Iroquois by C-130 to scenes of action in the SW Pacific region was an important capability for both the RAAF and RNZAF. Apparently, it takes about 2 hours to prepare an NH90 (MRH90) for C-17 embarkation and reconfiguration and the big airlifter cannot access many rudimentary airfields accessible by C-130. Both Australian and New Zealand ability to react to regional contingencies has been/will be substantially impacted and the operating costs of doing so enormously increased.

[TBM-Legend]

So how many MRH-90's have been actually delivered by the end of 2012 to the Army? Seems very secretive..

[Bushranger 71]

Re post # 348 by Joker 89.

When the RAAF operated Chinook, Army Aviation decided they were not necessary considering Blackhawk adequate for medium lift operations. Air Force advised that Chinook MLH were necessary to support Blackhawks, armour, engineer equipment, etcetera, especially regarding fuelling in remoter areas. Ultimately, after Army decided it did not then want Chinooks, the RAAF No. 12 Squadron was disbanded. Army subsequently decided it did need an MLH capability and took 4 mothballed Chinooks with another 2 being added, all subsequently of Delta model standard.

The question arises why Chinook were not used to deploy aviation fuel in recent flood relief operations, as Caribou/C-130 were used for that purpose in supporting Iroquois flood relief operations in the past?

[ARRAKIS]

Bushranger,
correct me if I'm wrong, but Italian NH90's in A'stan are powered by T700-T6E1, which are not the best performer in hot&high conditions.

Another question are windshield cracks and floor problems. Those problems were known for quite a long time (and solved?), so what's going on here?

IMHO, the ergonomics of the NH90 cabin is far from perfect with those doors in the middle. Would be better to have them just behind the cockpit. Was it a problem?

The entire article sounds a little bit like "we are are happy, but don't buy".
Anything to do with some tenders?

Arrakis

[thewhiterabbit]

"may have been chosen for its role due to better hot and high performance than the much heavier twin-engined Super Huey or Blackhawk."

The US State department uses the Huey as part of its arsenal against the poppy trade which is mostly limited to the plains south west of Kandahar in Helmand provence (about 3000' AMSL). They also operate clean skin most of the time with less than eight troops on board (about four in summer).

The Super transporters were able to operate at 6000' AMSL with eight passengers (not combat troops) with no armaments or protection systems on board. Hence they only operate to secure bases with a low threat level. They did perform better than the Puma's in country in the hot and high environment (not Super Pumas, EC 725s or the NH-90 and definitely not the S-70).

You can also hear them at ten miles (20 if the wind is blowing from the right direction). Might not have been a problem in the jungles of Vietnam but is a major problem in the sparse terrain of Afghanistan.

As for the importance of humanitarian or DACC work by the ADF. It is only done because the assets are there and is not a selection criteria for the platform. There are plenty of civil companies who can fill that role if needed and who would be more than happy for the work. The ADF gets called in because the tax payer has already paid for most of it so it gets better value for money than getting civil companies to fly half way across the country.

[Andu]

When I did flood relief many years ago, (and on more than one occasion), ground stocks of fuel were often contaminated by flood waters, so the very first thing Ronnie RAAF would do was to fly in a supply of AVTUR for the Hueys and Kiowas in their Caribous, (in 44 gal drums), quite frequently to quite small, outlying private fields as close as possible to the action.

I can recall finding a Caribou-capable field myself on one occasion on a farm property and having to fly a Caribou pilot out to it to have him confirm that it was, in fact, suitable.

The Hercs can bring in a lot more drums in one sortie, but they cannot operate into many of the flood-affected fields, particularly gravel or grass fields when those fields are wet.

If, as someone has stated above, the Blackhawks were (still are?) limited by lack of fuel, is this another "unforeseen circumstance" (unforeseen - only by some) of the ADF no longer having a Caribou type in its inventory? Even the C-27 would be far more limited in its capabilities than the Caribou in situations like this.

Let's not even go anywhere near asking why the MRH-90s were not considered suitable for use in these floods, where large numbers of people needed to me moved.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi White Rabbit.

If we are to get good gen on comparative helo capabilities, then manufacturer performance data needs scrutiny. A proper judgement cannot be made on what some operators are doing, but moreso on platform capability. As I recall, there has been low response to requests on threads in this and other forums for contributors to provide maker performance data for Tiger, MRH90 and Blackhawk UH-60M. I would wager a large quantity of beer that none of them have h&h performance comparable with the Huey II. Maybe you can provide us with some performance data for operations in ISA+20 conditions? You can also hear them at ten miles (20 if the wind is blowing from the right direction). Might not have been a problem in the jungles of Vietnam but is a major problem in the sparse terrain of Afghanistan. Respectfully; Vietnam is far from being wholly jungle clad. There are many areas of open or sparsely vegetated country, especially in Phuoc Tuy Province which was the 1ATF TAOR, and we operated lots in urban environments.

An Australian Army Captain operating with the US Army in 1965 correctly identified the problem with helicopter operations as 'Helos indicate your intentions to the enemy' , or like words. They just sat up on elevated features, observed helo movements and monitored radio traffic to get the big picture, which doubtless also happens in Afghanistan. There are records of us inserting our SAS to knock over such observation posts. The sound of air movements is really of little consequence, except if interfering with desired quietness for own troops if operating in vegetation for example.

[500N]

Andu

Instead of having to worry about getting fuel to the aircraft
and landing strips in the wet, why not get the fuel to the nearest
dry location and fly the choppers to that point for refueling ?

Don't they have Ordnance / Supply units doing refueling from
bladders anymore ?

Couldn't one of the supply units be called up to set up an operation
in some reasonably close location that would work for the Helo's ?

It used to be done on pet courses in the past - although a few years
ago now but surely we still have that capability.

[rjtjrt]

Andu
It is a problem of no longer having Caribou, and not having enough Chinooks since Caribou went.

[Andu]

500N, in a Huey at least, range and endurance were always critical, and I'd be guessing that that remains a problem with most of the more modern helicopters today.

Particularly if having to do a series of hovers/winches, fuel consumption can be high, so the closer you can have your fuel stocks to where you're working, and preferably in multiple locations, the better.

"The nearest dry location" to leave your fuel stocks can be a problem in flood relief. When we worked out of Wee Wah in the early 70s, the township and airport were considerably below flood level, but dry thanks to the levee bank, which the locals had to constantly patrol and shore up. (Or the pink-skinned locals at least - but let's not go there, for that would be wandering into politically incorrect territory.) However, every day, there was the real possibility of the levee bank breaching, which would have resulted in a situation as catastrophic for Wee Wah as we're currently seeing in Bundaberg.

The surrounding countryside was simply one huge inland sea. You had to see it to believe how big it was, (someone told me at the time that an area the size of Western Europe was under water, perhaps an exaggeration, but it will give you some idea of the scale of the floods), and in those days before GPS, navigation was a matter of heading and airspeed, for 90% of land features were under water. One of the few reliable pinpoints available was (were?) the very few wheat silos. If in doubt of our position, we'd go down to near water level and look to the horizon for the silo before pressing on.

Far from having Ordinance and Supply Units tasked with refuelling the Hueys, the system was very simple. A Caribou would drop off 'n' number of drums at locations 'x', 'y' and 'z', (which were sometimes a farmer's private airstrip), hopefully stand them on their ends (ideally, we weren't supposed to use a drum before it had stood undisturbed for I forget how many hours to allow the water and contaminants to settle), and we'd drop by to that and any other fuel site when and as required, keeping each other and the SES co-ordinators updated as to how many drums were left at each site.

No one stayed with the fuel. Sometimes we'd leave a hand pump or motorised rig at the site, but often as not, we'd carry a pump on the aircraft. Almost without exception, the chopper crews would do the refuelling themselves.

Rather than have supply units manning such sites, the poor bloody grunts, if they were involved, would be hard at work helping the locals with more pressing matters - and what thankless work that often was for the poor buggers.

By the comments made by some here, you'd be surprised to learn that the RAAF guys in their Caribous and Hueys got on very well with the AAVN blokes in their Kiowas. The smaller Kiowas had a slightly different job to do than the larger Hueys, but they complemented each others' operation when as as required. I saw very little rancour between the blokes of the two forces myself. There was always banter, but (as I saw it, at least), it was always in good spirit. The one incident where high emotions were involved and things almost came to blows that I do recall was in PNG, and I've since learned that one of the main players there was a bloke who had some serious issues and was just basically a pain in the arse - and that came from someone who was wearing the same uniform as he was - so I can't put that down totally to Army versus RAAF.

The C-27 should address some of the problems the Blackhawk crews are apparently encountering at the moment, but, as it's been said before here and elsewhere, as welcome as it will be, it won't provide anywhere near the operational flexibility of the Caribou, for it's just too big and too heavy to operate into many of the places a Caribou could go.

[Joker89]

My post regarding fuel issue was purely based on the rumor that the aavn ops were restricted. For all I know there is possibly no issue with fuel supply but it wouldn't surprise me if there was.

[Like This - Do That]

12-15 hours at a 20 deg from vertical, Andu, according to the pam.

A pic of an MRH90 carrying an underslung DFC (Drum Fuel Collapsible) during AMTDU's trials - looky here!

http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2009/nov/20091127/20090806raaf8540644_0020_lo.jpg

We should be flexible enough to set up FARPs - or at least the DACC equivalent to a FARP - with great ease. Should be. Plenty of ADF assets in Qld that can do that sort of thing.

[Delta_Foxtrot]

Drum stock settling time was (still is?): AVGAS 1 hr per foot; AVTUR 3 hrs per foot. 205 litre drum is about 3 ft tall, so 3 hours for AVGAS and 9 hrs for AVTUR. Caribou SOP/SI had a clause which read something like '...unless urgent operational circumstances prevail' but you had to have a very good reason.

[Trojan1981]

It was a fuel supply issue. The helo's and crews were ready to go (and yes, there were Chinooks there) but there was not enough fuel was brought in for them to operate effectively. Same issue also applied to EMQ. A civilian helicopter company picked up the slack by flying in their own fuel. As far as I can tell, the problem occurred because the RAAF did not have enough transport assets available (so much for the inter-service crap bollocks on this thread, the RAAF is no better) and when some fuel did arrive, it was little more than the total capacity of one Black Hawk with jugs. Indeed, a civilian company was even chartered to supply a C-130 when the RAAF couldn't.

[500N]

Andu

Thanks. Understand all that but I thought the military were taught to think outside the square and achieve a mission, not find reason why it can't be done.
I am famil with how large an area can go under, I spend a bit of time in NT during the wet season.


"We should be flexible enough to set up FARPs - or at least the DACC equivalent to a FARP - with great ease. Should be. Plenty of ADF assets in Qld that can do that sort of thing."

I agree, something obviously went wrong and hopefully it will be picked up net time.


Question for helo pilots.
I always remember when we refueled a helo out of Drums or Bladders,
before any was put in the helo, a glass jar of fuel was held up to the
windscreen of the pilot for him to check that no water / contaminants
were in it.

Is this still the practice ?

.

[Ian Corrigible]

So how many MRH-90's have been actually delivered by the end of 2012 to the Army?
Reportedly 19.

correct me if I'm wrong, but Italian NH90's in A'stan are powered by T700-T6E1, which are not the best performer in hot&high conditions
If the T6E1 really is delivering 100 shp over spec its performance will match that of the RTM322-01/9. Not as good as the CT7-8F5 in Spanish aircraft or the 01/9As in Omani, but better than previous gen types.

Another question are windshield cracks and floor problems
Windshield cracking seems to be a common issue with European models (AW139, EC130, etc.). Talking with a former program manager in Cascina Costa late last year the cabin floor issue turns out to be a superficial cracking/scuffing issue, nothing more. Maybe an operator on here can confirm? Interesting also that the tire degredation issue is raised (again in common with the AW139). This issue was also reported on the MRH-90 fleet last year.

The entire article sounds a little bit like "we are are happy, but don't buy". Anything to do with some tenders?
Didn't get that sense from the report. Just a matter of fact field report from a operator rather than another marketing spiel from a sales guy.

I/C

[Bushranger 71]

The Huey has a quite strong floor, but is still susceptible to denting/piercing by sharpish and heavy metal objects, like mortar baseplates, etcetera. This was remedied in the early days of RAAF Iroquois ops by manufacturing a plywood overlay (also a load-spreader) with cut-outs for all the floor tie-down and other attachment points. It was secured to the floor with just a few screws and easily removed to hose out the cabin when contaminated by highly corrosive body fluids (blood, etcetera). Maybe that would also work on other types!

[Trojan1981]

500N

A FARP was set up, but far too late.

[500N]

Trojan

Thanks :ok:

[500N]

It will be interesting to see if Mike Kelly can do anything in defence.

At least he should be interested in his portfolio !

[Andu]

He's just a bloody lawyer who happened to once wear khaki. I'd like to be told I'm wrong, (for the sakes of the "PBI"), but from what I've heard, I don't think there are many within the ADF who think highly of him.

[500N]

OK, thanks, but he can't be any worse than the one who has just left ??????

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Jason Clare was a good operator...Interested and did his research before visiting a project. :ok:

Unfortunately, he is let down by loyalties to the NSW Right and a REALLY bad staff... :hmm:

[emergov]

Fair call from Andu, perhaps I was looking too hard for an opportunity to bite.

To elaborate on my post, the pilots don't need exceptional circumstances to get the resources to go flying. In fact, Avn's support to disaster relief will not increase available flying hours. If the fleet overflies one year because of a set of disasters, then the next year's allocation will most likely be reduced. While there are enough hours available, the govt's demands for savings from Defence are hitting the DMO, diminishing their ability to manage contingencies.

So I actually agree with you Andu, there should be more money available to allow better sustainment - more hours - on all the ADF's fleets; RW, FW, Ships, tanks, subs, you name it. I don't agree with BR71's assertion that the ADF should redefine its capability requirements down to meet the current pitiful budget.

The dirty (not so) secret about Smith's tenure is that he and his cabinet colleagues have repeatedly deferred spending billions of dollars of allocated Defence funding and then claimed budget 'savings'. Anyone with a mortgage can tell you that deferring your house repayments in order to afford the school fees is going to end in tears.

[500N]

I've never understood why, when defence assets and people
get used for civilian emergency's it comes from defences budget.

Can't the head hincho's request that where defence are used in civilian
situations that it doesn't then crimp on ops and training ?

I am sure it has been asked but would like to know if anyone
knows more.

[BBadanov]

500N you are correct.

The Federal Govt (bless 'em) started a federal emergency services portfolio (wtf?) under Roxon the AG. This of course was handed over to the new guy at the weekend.

Presumably as they want to get involved in State issues to this extent, then they have a budget? And the funds could come from there...

But don't get me started, I'll just grab my coat :*

[500N]

BB

We were on limited training days for a period and then had
to help out on some civvy activity - only to be told it came
out of normal days !!! And they wondered why the lack of
enthusiasm !!!

Someone needs to cordon off trg / ops from everything else
and try and dump the cost onto someone else. It only needs
to be done once and then it will be set !

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Emergov;
So I actually agree with you Andu, there should be more money available to allow better sustainment - more hours - on all the ADF's fleets; RW, FW, Ships, tanks, subs, you name it. I don't agree with BR71's assertion that the ADF should redefine its capability requirements down to meet the current pitiful budget.This news text attributable to the Prime Minister:
In her speech last month, Ms Gillard said spending on national security needed to be examined. "National security absorbs some 8 per cent of what the federal government spends on behalf of the Australian people, and the priorities for that expenditure should be defined," she said. The shortcomings of DWP2009 and the capabilities planning it cemented are now being acknowledged more widely among the defence commentariat; although there are some like Major General Jim Molan (Ret'd) who thinks planning for a somewhat mythical futuristic Force 2030 structure is appropriate. He is of course ignoring how the very flawed Helicopter Strategic Master Plan has substantially weakened his own parent Corps capabilities (Army Aviation).

Defence cannot expect more funding considering the share of about 8 percent of national revenue it is presently receiving (approximately $24b of $300b) - see also this interesting table re how Australia really compares with the world for defence outlay: Comparison Defense Budgets & Military Spending Top Countries (http://www.comw.org/pda/120618-Military-Spending-Comparison.html). It behoves the whole organisation, both Public Service and military, to become much more efficient in managing defence planning and the conduct of operations.

The reality is unit acquisition and support costs of replacement hardware are soaring so streamlining of force structures will be essential to remain within publicly acceptable budgeting. As I see it, it would be best to freeze all ongoing defence planning and then review whether it is more economical to retain and optimize some assets intended for disposal to enable some aspects of operations to be conducted more cost-effectively.

If present planning proceeds and higher operating costs become overriding, there will simply not be enough flying in some air functions for aircrew to maintain adequate skills. This will probably become starkly obvious when the real costs of operating Tiger and MRH90 crystallize.

[ARRAKIS]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Ian Corrigible
Originally Posted by ARRAKIS
The entire article sounds a little bit like "we are are happy, but don't buy". Anything to do with some tenders?Didn't get that sense from the report. Just a matter of fact field report from a operator rather than another marketing spiel from a sales guy.I/C,
I may have now a slightly different perspective. Polish Air Force/Army/Navy are in the process of changing their helicopter assets. The tender is now for 70 medium multirole machines, but more to come in the future. AW was chosen as the representative of NHI to promote NH90. It ended up (French press point of view):
Pologne : comment Eurocopter s'est fait rouler par AgustaWestland (http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20121004trib000722997/pologne-comment-eurocopter-s-est-fait-rouler-par-agustawestland.html)

We are now with S-70 vs EC725 vs AW149.
This is why I am just carefull about what is being published, as there may be more than meets the eye.:suspect:

Regarding floor/windshield cracks, those problems were known for quite some time, and AFAIK solutions were found, so I was surprised that nothing was done on Italian NH90s before sending them to A'stan. Maybe I got it wrong.

Arrakis

[Bushranger 71]

Hello Arrakis. Dialogue in several forums has indicated a European leaning toward medium capacity helicopters; but past lessons of war-fighting are not being adequately heeded in my view.'The Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the"sizing" of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.' - Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army from the study Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971.The cabin layout of Iroquois from UH-1D onwards has not been bettered for platform battlefield support capability/flexibility. Regrettably, it was not emulated in the UTTAS competition so Blackhawk and other types also have internal obstruction problems with inboard armament stations, such as experienced by the Italians with the NH90.

General Tolson's reference to a light, agile machine is pertinent. The modernised Huey II is around half the weight of Blackhawks, NH90, UH-1Y and the like; acquisition costs of the heavier machines perhaps 10 times more than the Huey II and operating costs are many times higher.

Another lesson of the Vietnam conflict was the necessity for a 4 man crew in utility helos as the overwhelming majority of utility helicopter missions were conducted unescorted and usually as a single aircraft necessitating integral weapons capabilities. 'During this period of time, opinion varied on the necessity for door gunners on transport helicopters. Generally speaking, those not close to the action favoured elimination of the door gunner for the additional weight and space, while the transport helicopter pilots favoured the retention of the door gunner, without exception.' - Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971. It was simply not cost-effective then, and moreso now, to provide escort for all helo operations, yet several nations are envisaging unarmed so-called light utility helicopters (LUH) to perform the most essential of intimate battlefield support roles. Light observation helicopters (LOH) were extensively employed in Vietnam being mostly unarmed, but they fell far short of the versatile capabilities of the Huey.

An emergent big issue mentioned earlier is being able to sustain an adequate level of operations for both Tiger and MRH90 in ADF service to maintain aircrew currency, due to high operating costs per flying hour. This problem will doubtless be encountered by other nations.

My view is aircraft manufacturers have lost sight of true utility helo functions and are pricing their much heavier more complex substitutes beyond affordability for general intimate battlefield support. The Italian experience in Afghanistan indicates the NH90 has about the same payload capacity at altitude as the Huey II which prima facie beats it for hot and high performance. European manufacturers would have been far wiser had they more or less cloned the single-engined Huey II.

[BluenGreen]

The very simple reason that MRH-90's have not been used in any of the disaster relief efforts recently is that they had not been cleared by the ADF Airworthiness Authority to do so. The Introduction Into Service process is very laborious and rigorous, and if the re is not an Airworthiness Instrument in place to allow certain activities, then that aircraft will not do it.

The MRH90 received a recommendation last week from the Airworthiness Board for issue of an Australian Military Type Certificate (AMTC). This is a huge milestone and comes only after the ADF can demonstrate compliance with many safety, supportability and operational utility requirements. We will see a lot more of this aircraft now that the shackles have been removed.

Well done MRH-90 !

[oldpinger]

Bluengreen

Well said! Maybe the sight of these modern, and incredibly capable aircraft finally allowed to show what they are able to do will stop the endless "but it's not a Blackhawk,Huey, (insert any other old aircraft here)":ok:

[Arm out the window]

Yep, certainly don't want to rush things - first delivery 2007!

[500N]

Pity, the war is almost over !

[Brian Abraham]

The Introduction Into Service process is very laborious and rigorous, and if the re is not an Airworthiness Instrument in place to allow certain activities, then that aircraft will not do it.An Army unit wished to do a helicopter insertion from the carrier onto Beecroft range 25/3/72 and the RAAF were unable to provide support because the Huey didn't have clearance to operate from ships.

I spent 24/1/73 sailing in circles on the HMAS Moresby in Jervis Bay while Bob Treize of ARDU cleared the Kiowa for shipboard use. The only wind was that provided by the ship and pitch and roll never exceeded 0°. What a waste of time, but it ticked the boxes, and none of those that might interest a naval aviator. And none of it was Bobs fault, just the system.

We went on to learn on the job.

[Lonewolf_50]

Oldpinger, what't wrong with a Blackhawk?

What's wrong with the comparison? (Other than a tired Sikorsky versus Eurocopter wheeze which never wants for feeding ...)

Blackhawk has set a pretty good standard for what you want out of a helicopter in that class, don't you think?

[GreenKnight121]

He is mainly referring to BR71 who repeatedly insists (at great length, and with much repetition) that the ONLY fully-functional and sensible light troop helicopter is the 55-year-old UH-1 (Huey) design, and that a warmed-over slightly updated version of the early-1960s UH-1D (now called Huey II) is the best such helicopter in the world (much better than any H-60 or H-90 variant), and anyone who says different is either stupid, brainwashed, or in the pay of Sikorsky/EADS.

[SpazSinbad]

'Brian Abraham' said: "...I spent 24/1/73 sailing in circles on the HMAS Moresby in Jervis Bay..." Heheh. I was in Denver CO at Lowry AFB doing a useless Photo Interpreter course (our course security clearance changed at last minute making info less than useful compared to planned course - Labour invaded ASIO causing conniptions in the States!). :D Maybe why I'm so spazzy these days? :8 Never saw the A4G MiniPan Perkin Elmer once after that. Oh well.

[ozbiggles]

Agree with B71 or not, he argues his case in a reasonable way. You don't have to agree but it adds to the debate. Not always the case on PPrune.

[500N]

Re "first delivery 2007!", certificate 2013

Genuine question re could it have been done any faster ?

Why does it take so long to get these, even for aircraft already
flying in other juristictions ?

Is it a case of Australia always seeming to want to reinvent the
wheel ?

Could an aircraft have been purchased "off the shelf" to be used
solely for getting a certificate ?

Would be interested in the answers from those who know.

[busdriver02]

What supposed gunner positions blocking cabin space in the Blackhawk are you referring to? I've flown the H model Huey and the Pavehawk, I dont' really see any difference in cabin space, except that the space between the gunners is not blocked by the transmission in the hawk.

From what I can tell, the hawk is basically a duplicate of the huey, with improvements due to combat experience. Sure, it's heavier (about double in empty weight, both empty and max gross and it has about double the fuel burn as well as capacity) but one troop weighs about one troop weighs and all the extra equipment weighs what it weighs.

I'm more than impressed with what Bell has done to lengthen the lifeline of the Huey, but I just don't see how it offers any significant advantage unless you're currently operating an H model and are looking for a cost effective upgrade.

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

MRH 90 IS off the shelf - it is 99.?% common to the German TTH.

The delays in service acceptance and certification have been due in part to immaturity in the supply chain caused by having multiple versions being developed concurrently; a few technical issues which may be acceptable to other operators but are not to us, e.g. floor rating, rear ramp, ground clearance; and technical issues which are somewhat (but not wholly) unique to Australian operating conditions and requirements, e.g. cracking windscreens, door gun position.

What has also been discovered and which wasn't fully appreciated when the aircraft was ordered, is its unsuitability for conducting assault landings in dusty/dry environments where brown-outs can occur. This is the domain of the Black Hawk due to its tailwheel configuration and long-stroke main oleos!

So, in summary, as a pure point to point transport or maritime helo, the MRH is a ripper, and when mature, I'm sure will provide sterling and reliable service to the ADF. But if we want to maintain the battlefield assault capability, a small side order of UH-60Ms might be worth considering...

[500N]

Thanks, understood.

[busdriver02]

OK, if I assume a slick Huey weighs about 5k pounds and tops out at max gross weight at 10k, and a slick Blackhawk is about 12k empty and 22k max gross: The Huey 2 is hovering IGE at 12k msl at 11* C (ISA +20) typical Huey hover altitudes are 3ft. A slick Blackhawk (UH-60L) is hovering at 10 feet with a torque margin of 6% with the same load with the same fuel duration. In other words, the Blackhawk out performs the Huey 2 in high hot performance with the same conditions.

ETA: I boogered up the math, they end up having about the same performance at those high altitudes as far as hover performance is concerned.

The difference is that with expanded capability, we end up hauling around more new age gear, so our aircraft are just heavier than past aircraft both in real numbers and percentage wise.

[rjtjrt]

It seems to me the Blackhawks design is a result of real world war experience (ie Vietnam, etc), and NH90 design is a result of a university educational experience.
John

[Felix the Cat]

But if we want to maintain the battlefield assault capability, a small side order of UH-60Ms might be worth considering... :ok:

Hmm, any one know if it might be being considered?

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

Hmm, any one know if it might be being considered?

I believe the question has been asked at an unofficial level but has not been progressed to that of an LOR... ;)

But money being what it is and with the impending withdrawal from the sandpit, I doubt there'll be any movement on it in the short to medium term!

[Bushranger 71]

Hello BA; your post #382 is curious. I was HOPS at RAAF Headquarters Operational Command in 1972/73 and cannot recall any constraints re Iroquois operations from RAN aircraft carriers and Bravo model Iroquois were also operated by Navy. During the Vietnam era, we sometimes did troop moving to and from HMAS Sydney. Limitations began emerging later on, especially post-ADF creation in 1974.

GK121; I endeavour to offer logical debate, mostly from a cost-effective perspective. It seems a no-brainer that a virtually as new enhanced platform (with glass cockpit, contemporary avionics and other niceties) for about $2million and operable for less than $5,000 per hour is a more cost-effective asset than a $20million unit with operating cost maybe 3 to 4 times higher. Somebody might like to offer the specific unit cost of MRH90 (perhaps around $35million?) and its operating cost per hour, both much higher than both predecessor types. And; operational employment hitherto in high DA environs suggests there is no significant payload advantage for Blackhawk or MRH90 above Huey II.

busdriver02; the rear crew stations in the Huey are not corralled as in Blackhawk when cabin volume is fully utilized, such as with logistics stacked right up to the roof and to cargo door opening extremities. Rear crew members are better positioned to supervise loading/unloading, etcetera. Their external visibility is unrestricted compared with forward internal gun positions on other types and the door gunners have greater freedom of movement in their rear stations adjacent to the transmission, not taking up cabin volume like forward stations in Blackhawk. There are of course some configurations of Blackhawk with armaments positioned in rearward cabin space.

FA18; brown-out conditions were pretty common during dry season operations in Vietnam where land clearing had been effected and we could have been mistaken for North American Indians at times. Good forward and downward visibility enabled flying the bird right to ground level with only an occasional minor spreading of skids and rarely a dinged chin window. Regarding so-called combat assault; unlikely to be entertained by good ground commanders and ship to shore trooping is more likely to be streaming, after landing zones have been secured by special forces.

rjtjrtl; re your post #392. The UTTAS competition resulted in overly-protective design in my view, spawning a much heavier and more costly platform to do what the Huey had done. Battlefield survivability of the Huey proved to be very good as outlined in this extract from a comprehensive US Army analysis: ‘...Statistics on relative vulnerability (of helicopters) reveal that out of 1,147 sorties, one aircraft would be hit by enemy fire, one aircraft was shot down per 13,461 sorties, and only one aircraft was shot down and lost per 21,194 sorties. Used properly, the helicopter was not the fragile target some doom-forecasters had predicted...' - Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971 by Lieutenant General John J. Tolson. Battlefield survivability is arguably more about operating practices than anti-aircraft threat and I believe this aspect was under-recognized in the UTTAS requirement.


Harking back to my earlier posts; air platforms are being unaffordably priced, operating costs are soaring and defence budgets are being shrunk worldwide. In such circumstances, air forces will have to be tailored to what is affordable to assure adequate aircrew proficiency, a topic now emerging in other forums. Hard to see any other solution than consolidating force structures and maybe putting some costly assets in storage to assure enough money to continue operating some roles at a viable level. Maybe a parallel lessening need for as many military aircrew so a rather dim prospect.

[SpazSinbad]

For interest an RAN FAA Iroquois aboard HMAS Melbourne in the late 1960s to early 1970s (paint scheme on A4Gs):

+ SAR Helos with A4Gs: Wessex Iroquois SAR HMAS Melbourne A4Gs | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8646939569/in/photostream)

http://i1087.photobucket.com/albums/j466/eurocoast/Aircraft/MelbournesFlightdeck.jpg

http://i1087.photobucket.com/albums/j466/eurocoast/Aircraft/MelbournesFlightdeck.jpg

[Arm out the window]

Huey landings were also commonplace on the Tobruk fore and aft decks in the 80s and 90s, with day and night (unaided) training done whenever it happened to be around. A bit of a challenge on a dark night but certainly doable.

I never goggled onto it, but I'm sure that would have been OK too.

(Edit: Can't remember if we used the foredeck at night or not - I think I've still got all the good gen written down in a notebook somewhere).

[SpazSinbad]

HS 817 Linebook Page shows Iroquois Baggage to MELBOURNE also....

RAAF Huey No9 Sqdn Vung Tau HMAS Sydney | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8647125829/in/photostream)
&
895iroquoisMELBOURNE | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8648231834/in/photostream/)
&
895iroquoisBaggageMELBOURNE1971 | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8648293854/in/photostream)
&
HS817 Linebook 11sep1971 Drop VF805 Baggage | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8647205175/in/photostream)

[Delta_Foxtrot]

Chinook could land on the forward deck on Tobruk, and I did a battery lift from the forward deck while she was anchored off SWBTA.

[SpazSinbad]

Anyone here carry around a broke Wessex? HS-817 Line book page + TOUCHDOWN 2/98 story:

RAAF Chinook Wessex Lift Bowen Island JB | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8649247759/in/photostream)
&
WessexDunkHS817linebook | Flickr - Photo Sharing! (http://www.flickr.com/photos/92758306@N06/8650363426/in/photostream)

[Arm out the window]

Off track slightly, but reading back over the thread I saw this one:

The Kiowa is not currently fit for purpose even as a trainer because it cannot be legally flown in IF conditions.

State aircraft aren't subject to the Civil Aviation Act, except where particularly specified, so if it's operating as a state aircraft and flown by military crews it can do so if it complies with applicable military orders.

[Love Monkey]

." It seems a no-brainer that a virtually as new enhanced platform (with glass cockpit, contemporary avionics and other niceties) for about $2million and operable for less than $5,000 per hour"

Are you high?

[Brian Abraham]

Hello BA; your post #382 is curiousPart of the story B71.

The Army came to the Navy with a request to use the Wessex for a dawn insertion off the carrier onto Beecroft. They were to engage in other naval exercises such as launching kayaks from subs. It was explained to the Army that using the Wessex would require stripping the anti sub gear, and refitting later, so why not use the Huey? We were told that the RAAF had been approached, but declined due to the lack of shipboard clearance. When the RAAF found out that the Navy had committed to the task using Hueys, the RAAF then decided to participate.

Best to end the story there because the rest is not too edifying.

[BluenGreen]

The question has been asked, quite recently, and the decision was to stick with MRH90. This was a decision taken by Army and not just based on politics or financial considerations.

The NH90 has been introduced much quicker in other countries - I have dealt with these other customers, and whilst they all share similar frustrations with this aircraft, others have developed temporary fixes (Finns use plywood floor covers - who would have thought?), and others have a more liberal risk acceptance regime. Australia (read DMO) is so risk averse that they want a 100% solution prior to acceptance - no aircraft in the world, fixed or rotary, could satisfy the ridiculous standard being applied by DMO with regards to the MRH90. Yet DMO are happy to "subcontract" airworthiness oversight on the SH60R program to the USN and accept an exponentially lower safety standard than is being applied to the NH90. Go figure.

[Lonewolf_50]

Would you care to spell out your airworthiness concerns regarding NAVAIR and the SH-60R? "Exponentially lower" airworthiness? I smell something here, something like digested oats.
Yet DMO are happy to "subcontract" airworthiness oversight on the SH60R program to the USN and accept an exponentially lower safety standard than is being applied to the NH90. Go figure
Or did I misunderstand you? :confused:

[SpazSinbad]

MRH90 helicopter Project of Concern progress 09 May 2013

Defence Ministers » Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel ? MRH90 helicopter Project of Concern progress (http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2013/05/09/minister-for-defence-and-minister-for-defence-materiel-mrh90-helicopter-project-of-concern-progress-2/)

"...Included in today’s agreement is the delivery of a 47th aircraft, at no additional cost, to be used as a live training aid for Army and Navy aviation technicians who undergo MRH90 training at the Army’s Aviation Maintenance school at Oakey, Queensland...."

[Smackhawk]

I heard some good rumours about the MRH performance on CATA recently. Appears the fundamental strengths of the platform are finally being realised. Good speed, handling, operational payload and endurance led to the ability to keep trooping whilst the Black Hawks had to refuel.

Any other news from the lads?

[oldpinger]

Smackhawk,

Yeah, nearly 2 tonne of fuel will do that for you :ok:. Maybe finally someone will realise that this very capable aircraft could work. And before B71 launches off again, I do acknowledge that it was a rather expensive buy, however we have them now and there are a lot of very dedicated people :D trying to get the most out of this for the Aussie taxpayer.

I also heard lots of action with MRH's about to take place at sea as well:)

[Smackhawk]

Oldpinger, well said!

[BluenGreen]

LoneWolf - I am not suggesting it is in any way "un-airworthy". It is simply a case of there being very different standards that the MH60R and the MRH90 are certified to.
The Romeo must meet the "10 to the minus 6" standard inherent in MilSpec (and other standards) whilst the MRH90 is certified under FAR29, where the safety case is at the "10 to the minus 9" standard. MRH90 has exceeded the 10-6 standard in all cases, but was unable to meet the 10-9 case in some specific areas, thereby requiring dispensations, exceptions and some risk acceptance by the ADF Airworthiness Authority. Some of the Introduction Into Service heartache was due to this shortfall - it exceeded the standard by which the Romeo is being judged, but fell sort of FAR29 - a much more stringent standard. It is an interesting observation that there has been much focus on the shortfalls of the MRH90, but little discussion on the very concerning characteristics of the Romeo (e.g. No Floats - Navy helicopter? plus other capability shortcomings).

[SpazSinbad]

I'll guess this photo was taken recently? Cantabria here we come....

Click thumbnail for big pic: http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l261/SpazSinbad/NewerAlbum/th_MRH-90cantabriaSydneyGI.jpg (http://s98.photobucket.com/user/SpazSinbad/media/NewerAlbum/MRH-90cantabriaSydneyGI.jpg.html)

[oldpinger]

Ummm last week?

Also 2 on Choules apparently:D:D

[Smackhawk]

All Images - FotoWeb 7.0 (http://images.defence.gov.au/S20130220)

There are some good shots in the gallery above of CH47, S70 and MRH in a 12 Aircraft form, plus some nice M1A1 in action.

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks 'Smackhawk' - I guess the argybargy about using the olden revered RAN FAA / RANHFV callsign 'Taipan' has been won and lost - never mind - but this is just silly... One of the photo captions at above URL....

"Description/Caption: Aircraft from the 5th Aviation Regiment, including the MRH 90 Tapain, depart the airstrip with soldiers from 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR) on board at the conclusion of Exercise CATA.

The aircraft involved are three MRH 90 Tapains, eight S70 Blackhawks and one CH-47 Chinook."
All Images - FotoWeb 7.0 (http://images.defence.gov.au/fotoweb/grid.fwx?ArchiveID=5003&Search=S20130220#Preview15)

[TBM-Legend]

What's a Tapain??:hmm:

[SpazSinbad]

Polite greeting: Tapain sanchai hunuhuncha? = Are you well?
&
Tapainharulai bhetera khusi lagyo = I am glad to have met you!

Nepali Useful Phrases (http://www.phrasebase.com/archive2/nepali/useful-phrases.html)

[TBM-Legend]

I'm glad you cleared that up. I'm all for naming the MRH-90 after a Nepalese word. It fits in with the idea of buying something built by those who use another funny language.:D

[SpazSinbad]

Gurkhas....?

[oldpinger]

Spazsinbad-
Taipan isn't actually the aircraft Callsign it's the ADF name for it.:8 as in the EC655 "Tiger"
Probably because as Eurocopter call the MRH90 the TTH and that isn't a name as such.

723 Sqn of RANHFV fame at Nowra still use the "Taipan" callsign as in "Taipan 19 finals rwy 26" for the Squirrels.

Clear as mud??:ok:

I'm going to use that Nepalise in day to day conversation!

[SpazSinbad]

'oldpinger' G'day. You were probably not at the 'Tross when 'TAIPAN' was the callsign as shown below and also used by a former RANHFV pilot turned to A4Gs where he used 'TAIPAN' as his tactical (self-selected) callsign. His tactical callsign did not conflict with any others because as shown the callsign was used in Vietnam. By the time Rick Symons was flying A4Gs I think everyone was back from 'Nam.

In Vietnam RANHFV2 1968-9: Rick Symons on far left - Tom Supple mit beard, both went on to A4Gs later on VC-724 OFS No.4 & 5 late 1970 & early 1971 respectively, then together on VF-805. Click de thumbnail: http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l261/SpazSinbad/NewerAlbum/th_SymonsSuppleVietnamHeloPDF.jpg (http://s98.photobucket.com/user/SpazSinbad/media/NewerAlbum/SymonsSuppleVietnamHeloPDF.jpg.html)

Yes I understand about the 'Taipan' RAN Squirrel c/s - my reference was more about Vietnam but at the time of my offhand remark I did not want to go into details on this UK-centric forum. But anyway.... A lot of helo stuff of olden tymes is in the 4.4GB PDF online. I could make a helo specific PDF excerpt but that may take some time. Used to have a bunch of 'out of date' ones online at various now defunct places. If interested the most recent of these 'out of date' helo PDFs could be uploaded. Anyhoo... You will note the ARMY have referred to the 'TAIPAN' whilst the RAN perhaps use the 'COBRA' callsign. Is this the case today. Does Navy/ARMY refer collectively to the 'TAIPAN' as you say? I have no idea - I have not been in the RAN FAA for about 38 years now.

Are you going to be able to join the new 'dipgang subzappers'?
___________________________

“The 135th‘s call signs were EMU (an acronym for Experimental Military Unit and ironically also the name of a flightless Australian bird) and TAIPAN (a deadly Australian snake). As was common in most Assault Helicopter Companies throughout the war, the 135th differentiated its slicks and gunships by assigning one call sign (EMU) to the slick platoons and another (TAIPAN) to the gun platoon. Each aircraft commander was assigned a separate number to use with the call sign. These numbers would reflect the number of the platoon plus a second digit from 0-9. Call signs would therefore range from EMU 10 to 19 and EMU 20 to 29. Taipans used any free number. The company commander’s call sign (as throughout much of the Army) was always simply the company call sign plus 6 (EMU 6). Unit aircraft were always identified by their commander’s call sign when in the air. Only on the ground were aircraft known by their names, the last three digits of their tail number.”

Huey Vets - EMU, Inc. 135th AHC (http://hueyvets.com/history/135th/)
______________________________

5 Avn Regt hosts Defence families: http://www.defence.gov.au/news/armynews/editions/1246/1246.pdf

“DEFENCE families were given the opportunity to fly in a Black Hawk or Chinook at the 5 Avn Regt family day held on October 2, 2010 in Townsville. More than 500 visitors were able to inspect the unit’s helicopters and vehicles, handle unit weapons and meet RAAF military working dogs. They were also able to meet members of the RNZAF preparing to participate in Exercise Hamel & inspect the MRH-90 Taipan trooplift helicopter.”

NHIndustries NH90 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NHIndustries_NH90)

Operators - Australian Army: 40 MRH 90 (TTH), 8 delivered in 2009 with the remainder to be delivered by 2014.
MRH90 nickname : ‘Cobra’ Royal Australian Navy: 6 MRH 90 (TTH).
________________

http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2009/Nov/20091127a/20091102adf8144078_150.jpg
&
http://www.defence.gov.au/media/download/2009/Nov/20091127a/20091027adf8144078_210.jpg

"MRH 90 'Cobra 08' conducts serials during the First of Class Flight Trials, on HMAS Manoora, off the coast of Hobart, Tasmania (Australia) 02 Nov 2009"
&
"MRH 90 'Cobra 08' comes in to land on the flight deck of HMAS Manoora during the First of Class Flight Trials at sea.
(Date taken: 27 October 2009)"

[SpazSinbad]

On the Microsoft SkyDrive SpazSinbad Page in the folder:

Various RAN FAA Aircraft PDFs are various small PDFs about 'old' RAN FAA Helos (which info is part of the background info for the main topic A4G Skyhawks):

http://tinyurl.com/kv6m9y7
OR
https://skydrive.live.com/?cid=cbcd63d6340707e6&sa=822839791#cid=CBCD63D6340707E6&id=CBCD63D6340707E6%21438

[TBM-Legend]

No 3 Sqn RAAF used Taipan as a formation callsign in Butterworth when I was there. Sqn callsign Prison!

[Arm out the window]

Naming the thing 'Taipan' is just a bunch of advertising type spin, same as how the new F-18 magically became the 'Rhino'. Who dreams this crap up? Who knows.

I like a good aeroplane or helicopter name as much as the next person, but it's all too, I don't know, wanky these days. Or am I just getting old and grumpy? No, don't answer that!

[SpazSinbad]

Some 'arm' needs a hug.... If I was a helo pilot these days I would choose 'TREPAN' - for the necessary hole in the head. :}

[cattletruck]

Taipan is also a Cold Chisel song. Shoulda called the MRH90 a Barnsey.

[Delta_Foxtrot]

One flew low over Malanda at about 0630 this morning heading NNW. A few Blackhawk sorties around the Tablelands this week as well. AOTW, bringing back some memories? :)

[BluenGreen]

COBRA is the callsign used by the RAN Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). It can equally apply to a Seahawks as an MRH90. The callsign for 808 Squadron is "Poseidon" a reference to the Squadron crest - "Trident" was not available as it is a little used RAAF MPA formation callsign.
The name TAIPAN was not universally popular (who names an aircraft after a snake?) but was decided by a committee of senior Army personnel.

[SpazSinbad]

Thanks 'BluenGreen' - good to know.

[TBM-Legend]

(who names an aircraft after a snake?)

Ans: Bell [Huey Cobra/ Kingcobra/Airacobra] who has produced the largest number of attack choppers so far...

[GreenKnight121]

who names an aircraft after a snake?
Ans: Bell [Huey Cobra/ Kingcobra/Airacobra] who has produced the largest number of attack choppers so far...

Add "Viper" for the AH-1Z (and "Venom" for the UH-1Y).

[Arm out the window]

One flew low over Malanda at about 0630 this morning heading NNW. A few Blackhawk sorties around the Tablelands this week as well. AOTW, bringing back some memories?

Sorry DF, just a bit tardy on my reply! There has been a fair bit of rotary activity of late, including the welcome sound of a Chinook wokking around the place. Good to see.

Will be getting airborne tomorrow in something at least reminiscent of the old days, a Jet box ... don't freeze the arse off down south now!

Cheers mate

[Lonewolf_50]

BlueGreen: thanks for the points on airworthiness and certs.

I will also note that a lack of floats does not seem to have stopped the USN from operating Seahawks for about thirty years. ;) The idea is to operate from ships, not from the surface of the ocean. :cool::}:E

As to fuel, from a few posts back:

Blackhawk has less fuel than Seahawk. (~2600 pounds versus ~4000 pounds, roughly). One of the numerous cases of the "not quite the same" roots of Seahawk as a "common airframe" to Blackhawk.

MRH-90 comparisons, in the maritime milieu, need to take that into account when discussing the matter of "legs" on a given model of S-70 or the other.

Then again, since the Block 1(B) Seahawk, as well as the F and H, provision for external tank is built in. Likewise for the R (Operational choice to use it or not).

[Brian Abraham]

Multi-Role Helicopter Program audit report

http://anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit%20Reports/2013%202014/Audit%20Report%2052/AuditReport_2013-2014_52.pdf

[ryano]

Well that was an interesting read.... A rather stark and blunt assessment of the program to date, with not much good news for the future. MRH was doomed from the start because of poorly defined requirements, a poor comprehension of the level of development of the aircraft and even more poorly written contracts. The end result is that the Commonwealth took on far to much risk with few protections. Ever since then it has been trying to play catch up.

Not only that, but the Commonwealth even outsourced the purse strings for maintenance functions, resulting in maintenance costs exponentially exceeding fair value. Pages 179 onwards detail some of the outrageous prices being charged for parts and fleet running costs. Who would have thought????

Off the shelf purchases have their time and place, as do developmental purchases. The risks attributed to each though have to be thoroughly understood and protected against. MRH is a classic example of not knowing what you want, accepting a risk here, one there, one over there. Eventually you're over-exposed, having only hope to rely on, and then get taken to the cleaners.

I have serious reservations about DMOs ability to handle developmental acquisitions (or basically any acquisition). How do you think designing and building our own subs will go? Between DMO and our 'fantastic' ship building industry, there is no hope in hell of ever being able to pull it off.

[500N]

Yes, could be a blue print for reforming DMO ???

As much as jobs are important here, why not get things done at the main factory when things are built ?

And as you say re the Subs, just another money pit to pour Gold into.

[The Sultan]

Ryano

The Canadians would love this program compared to the S-92. $200m per for not one in service seven years late.

The Sultan

[500N]

You have to wonder if Australia will ever sort out Defence purchasing and learn from the good one's - C-17 etc.

Hopefully the CAS and CDF can over haul the system.

[ryano]

I'm not biased either way towards developmental or off the shelf. There are pros and cons to both, however developmental is incredibly more complex, difficult and risky. A small country such as Australia cannot afford an unprotected developmental purchase.

I'm not biased towards Black Hawks or MRH. They're two different types of aircraft with different capabilities. Each do some things well, others poorly.

There was a fundamental shift in the direction of the ADF in the early/mid 2000s and (potentially) MRH (on paper) supported that new direction better. There were also the extra political sweetners that followed (or were supposed to). The Commonwealth only has itself to blame for the mess it is in today. It ultimately was the one that signed away its protections. Australia should have been far more rigorous and self-protective in this transaction. Although that would have increased the price for us, or made it unacceptable to the seller, we would have a far better outcome. We now have an aircraft that although may perform in accordance with the contract, is not fit for purpose. It is significantly late and costs significantly more. To cap it off, the transition from S70 to MRH has been a horror show that has destroyed significant operational experience - something that you cannot put a price on.

[500N]

ryano

I do wonder whether not having the Tiger or the MRH available or willing to be sent to Afghanistan hasn't cost us some operational experience.

Was any real reason given for not using Tiger to support Aussie troops
or was it that it really was not ready ?

[Doors Off]

The ARH Tiger was more than ready and should have gone to support ADF soldiers. You will hear all kinds of bleating and excuses as to "sustainability", training gaps etc :zzz:My response is "grow a set of balls!" The hierarchy were unwilling to take the risk for their careers and their mindset of "how many people" was way too many!

The French took theirs (a less capable version) to Afghanistan, Libya and Mali, the Australian Army took theirs to Shoalwater bay.:ugh: The drivers, maintainers and ops support were/are more than capable. The commanders were more worried about their pay checks for Fifi and Crispin's private school fees and getting their next promotion or a job with the manufacturer or an affiliate. :=

The Tiger is an incredible capable aircraft. It is robust, reliable and somewhat worrying for the bad guys. It is such a shame that the risk to Australian soldiers was increased as a result of them not having the required level of organic aviation support in theatre.

[SpazSinbad]

For a change of pace - Well for the 'Romeo' innit - go here:

Commodore checks out navy?s new helicopters | South Coast Register (http://www.southcoastregister.com.au/story/2379205/commodore-checks-out-navys-new-helicopters/?cs=203#slide=1)

[Bushranger 71]

The whole of the subject document downloadable via this link is an indictment of military hardware capabilities and acquisition planning in Canberra: Multi-Role Helicopter Program (http://anao.gov.au/Publications/Audit-Reports/2013-2014/Multi-Role-Helicopter-Program)

It seems the Dutch have just opted out of taking the remainder of their order for this platform and intend suing the manufacturer.

Simply no justification for Australia replacing utility helicopters with a medium lift platform at unit cost around $65million and operating cost north of $31K per flying hour.

The further the absurd ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan progresses, the more options for cost-effective military helo operations become diminished. Go see some of my arguments this thread over the past year.

Australia already ranks about 12th in the world for dollars spent on defence and ADF operating costs will soar exponentially.

It seems to me that all 3 Australia military arms will of necessity have to be rationalized in the near term to keep defence expenditure within economic affordability considering overall national imperatives.

[500N]

operating cost north of $31K per flying hour.

That seems extraordinarily high.

[TBM-Legend]

The Swedes got so frustrated with their NH90 order that they bought 15 MH-60M's to cover their combat needs in A/Stan...

It is interesting to read how the muppets in charge of this program created a deceitful model [leaving out simulators and other support stuff] in the first MRH90 order knowing that they would fudge them through later. We the taxpayers and the ADF would be hundreds of millions better off with the Sikorsky proposals [and on-time!]. Also why didn't Defence ask about the MH-60S Knighthawk for Navy???

[500N]

It's interesting reading the C-130 thread and a couple of examples where an aircraft has gone U/S and luckily for the crew they have US C-130 also on the airfield so have popped over and managed to get the part required and got the aircraft going again.

Now we, as in Aus, work almost 100% with the US or they are likely to be at least close by so why do we go for 2 Euro helicopters with a completely separate supply chain to our neck of the woods when even in Aus we operate with the US.

No helo could be that much better that the other factors outweigh the benefits of using what the US use.

And jobs in Aus does not count !!!

[TBM-Legend]

The jobs bit is a con as well. Total number employed was 100 or so. Nothing in the scheme of things but a political statement .

The USA is our ally and for combat and combat support machines etc we are best served with using the same gear for the reasons stated .

[500N]

I think it was 200 jobs but hell, that's peanuts.


TBM

And of course one of the Helo's, ammo is another important variable.


The other "skeleton in the closet" is the fact that what if the country / EU refuse to issue and export permit
for said ammo, parts etc on the basis they disagree with the XYZ war we are fighting ?

Shades of Vietnam all over again in regards to the RAAF Aircraft ?

Then where will we be ?

At least being almost at the top of the tree in terms of what the US will ship us (after Israel)
means we are almost certain to get what we ask for, F-22 excluded.

[Bushranger 71]

Hi 500N,

These figures from the Year 2013-14 Federal Budget:

ADF cost per flying hour 2013-2014

Aircraft / Cost per aircraft / Cost per flight hour

Classic Hornet / $2.22M / $13,620
Super Hornet / $5.12M / $26,739
C-17 / $9.66M / $11,153
C-130J / $7.9M / $12,925
E-7A / $27.16M / $54,333
MRH-90 / ? / $30250 (1)
ARH Tiger / ? / $33548 (2)

The 'Cost per aircraft' figure is for operation of one aircraft per annum.

According to Page 61 of the ANAO Audit Report, unit cost of one MRH90 is a scandalous $65million!

The full picture re helicopter operating costs, including the now forfeited Iroquois at about $5K per flying hour, would reinforce what I have been trying to convey that the ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan is an absolute disaster.

The costs of optimizing Kiowa, Iroquois, Blackhawk, Sea King, Seahawk and keeping Seasprite, but fully refurbished and restored to original manufacture configuration (the Kiwis are laughing), would have been very cost-effective compared with acquisition and operating costs for Tiger, MRH90, MH-60R and who knows what next?

Multiple proven and essential capabilities for near region operations have been shed without rigorous objective analysis before embarking on the absurd HSMP, which in my guesstimate has hitherto needlessly squandered around $10billion.

[500N]

That shows it in glaring detail.

[TBM-Legend]

The ADF bought this piece of crap in part because it would be corrosion resistant. Well the Dutch have found the naval, fully marinised version NFH90 wanting. See below:
Dutch defence ministerJeanine Hennis-Plasschaert has sent a letter to the nation’s parliament regarding a decision to postpone acceptance of the country’s final seven NH Industries (NHI) NH90s in the NFH naval variant, until a suitable solution for corrosion problems found on its earlier examples and financial compensation for additional costs have been agreed.

The problems were first noted when two helicopters returned from missions in a maritime environment in 2013 and underwent regular inspection. One was operating an anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, while the other had been on patrol in the Caribbean Sea on board a Royal Netherlands Navy frigate. Both assignments lasted around five to six months.

The helicopters were rinsed after each flight in an operational state, with rotor blades and tail unfolded. However, in some sea state conditions the rotor blades and tail had to be folded within 20min, with washing performed in this configuration.

Tasked by the defence ministry, the Dutch National Aerospace Laboratory in May reported its findings from an investigation into 92 corrosion occurrences.The laboratory concluded the design of the helicopter made it possible for water to collect without the possibility for draining, that the NFH had not been built as designed and that protective coatings and insulation intended to prevent galvanic corrosion had been improperly used.


Anno Gravemaker

Its findings wereshared with the NATO Helicopter Management Agency (NAHEMA), which asked NHI to recommend a corrosion prevention programme to be adopted by the Royal Netherlands Air Force. At a meeting of the steering committee of NH90 partner nations in April, France indicated it had also experienced the same type of corrosion problems.

NHI says it has developed technical solutions for around 60% of the problems identified following the prolonged use of the embarked NFH, and that these are being incorporated in helicopters currently under construction. The consortium says it has told NAHEMA it expects to be able to provide a roadmap with the solution for all problems in September 2014.

While it is still waiting for a final agreement, the RNAF will continue to use the NH90 in support of NATO-led anti-piracy missions off the coast of Africa. However, the type is not expected to be used in the Caribbean again before 2017.

[500N]

TBM or others

Sounds like someone said one thing to get the order !

How come the US used a heap of other helos, variants of Blackhawks
in a Maritime environment but they aren't suitable for what we do ?

Surely they have their helos protected ?

[Thomas coupling]

Bushranger: To put it all in perspective, the latest Cost of the standard F35: £126million each airframe...WITHOUT its engine, which is either £16 million for the stock F35 or £31 million for the STVOL version.:eek::eek::eek::eek:

[TBM-Legend]

The S70B Seahawks have performed very well todate in a corrosive environment.

[Lonewolf_50]

Yes, they would, IF your maintenance crew have a sound corrosion control program.

(And let's not mention the slip rings ... ) :mad:

[TBM-Legend]

Bit different from the ADF MRH90 and Tiger programs:


Boeing has delivered its 15th and final CH-47F Chinook transport helicopter to the Royal Canadian Air Force.

“This was a complex aircraft programme, yet the partnership and collaboration between Boeing, the Canadian customer and our industry partners enabled us to deliver all 15 aircraft on or ahead of schedule,” says Steve Parker, Boeing vice-president cargo helicopters and H-47 programme manager. The last delivery was marked during a 30 June ceremony held at the manufacturer’s Ridley Township site in Philadelphia.

[Hempy]

The decision not to go with the M model Blackhawk was an absolute howler...

In May 2003, the Department of Defence (Defence) released a Request for Proposal (RFP) for AIR 9000 Phase 2 to three prospective suppliers. In response to the RFP, AgustaWestland offered the EH101 Merlin, Australian Aerospace Limited offered the NH90 (to be developed for Australia as the MRH90) and Sikorsky Aircraft Australia Limited offered the S‐70M Black Hawk.6 Following evaluation of the bids, the AgustaWestland EH101 offer was set aside and Defence pursued an Offer Development and Refinement Process (ODRP) for a combined Phases 2 and 4 with the two remaining bidders. This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
7.

In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only. In August 2004, government formally approved the acquisition of 12 MRH90 aircraft for Phase 2 on the basis that strategic and other government considerations outweighed the cost advantage of the Sikorsky proposal.

Why do politicians even bother to ask for opinions? :rolleyes:

[TBM-Legend]

Talking to one who knows this past week and he tells me that Army is beside itself now that operating costs including inflated Frog parts pricing [sole source - no competition] has found there way into the books. The new gravel truck costs more than twice per flight hour than the Blackhawk its replacing. Other news is that the Blackhawk costs have blown out due to the uniqueness of our one off models..

[FoxtrotAlpha18]

TBM - Black Hawk costs have also blown out because they were supposed to have been retired by now and we're extending them beyond their life of type...

[500N]

If we hadn't purchased the MRH then the likelihood is that whatever we did purchase would be in operation and therefore the old Blackhawks would not be being used " beyond their life of type...".

[rjtjrt]

Post 325 The MRH90 is deployable in the C-17. It can be carried intact with no disassembly - simply fold main and tail rotor.
I note MRH90 has been deployed by C-17 to Fiji post Cyclone Winston. Said to be tomorrow before first one ready.
Re "MRH90 is deployable in the C-17. It can be carried intact with no disassembly - simply fold main and tail rotor." - it turns out it is not as simple as unfold main rotor and tail rotor on arrival - there is there more reassembly and test flying required than above statement suggests.
Article here indicates MRH90 prep fo C-17.

http://news.navy.gov.au/en/May2015/Fleet/2064/A-bird-within-a-bird.htm#.Vs08UfA8arU