BA 747 Crew commended

[sooperfrank]

BA 747 crew commended for escaping near-stall on take-off
By David Kaminski-Morrow


South Africa's Civil Aviation Authority has praised the airmanship of British Airways Boeing 747-400 pilots who battled to prevent a low-altitude stall after the leading-edge slats unexpectedly retracted during lift-off from Johannesburg.
At 167kt on the take-off roll, fractionally below rotation speed, all the leading-edge slats inboard of the engines on each side automatically retracted, after receiving a spurious indication of thrust-reverser activation.
As the aircraft tried to climb out from Tambo International Airport, known for its 'hot and high' environment, the jet lost a "significant amount of lift", says the CAA, and the stick-shaker immediately engaged, warning of an approaching stall.
Instead of following the typical climb profile, the first officer - whose aerobatic experience meant he was familiar with buffet - controlled the aircraft through the stall warning and buffeting by executing a shallower climb, while the commander supported the manoeuvre by calling out heights above ground.
The slats stayed retracted for a total of 23s. They started to redeploy 7s after the jet became airborne - as the undercarriage was retracting, at a height of 56ft - and were fully extended 9s later. The stick-shaker, which had activated intermittently over a 15s interval, stopped as the airspeed rose to 186kt.
In its inquiry report into the 11 May 2009 incident, the CAA says the crew had "no notion" that the slats had retracted before rotation. There is no separate indication in the cockpit for leading-edge slat position.
"The flying crew should be commended for the professional way that they controlled the aircraft during a critical stage during take-off," it adds. "During [the incident] the flight-deck crew had no indication or understanding of what had caused the lack in performance of the aircraft."
After stabilising the 747's climb, the crew declared to air traffic control that they were experiencing problems with two engines and would be returning to the airport. The aircraft, which had been bound for London Heathrow with 265 passengers and 18 crew members, landed safely.
Investigators have concluded that, during the take-off roll, the slats retracted - as designed - in response to signals indicating deployment of thrust reversers on the two inboard Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. The right-hand reverser signal was triggered at 125kt and the left-hand at 160kt.
But neither reverser had been activated, and British Airways engineers examined the aircraft (G-BYGA) to trace the source of the false signals. The inquiry concluded that, although the reversers were stowed, their translating cowls were nevertheless seated relatively far rearwards.
As the 747's engines wound up to high power, and the aircraft accelerated, sensors monitoring the cowl positions transmitted incorrect 'reverser' signals. The slats retracted because of a logic process designed to prevent them being struck by efflux air from activated reversers.
Boeing subsequently developed a safety bulletin for Rolls-Royce-powered 747-400s to disable this reverser-based automated stowing.


SF

[Piper_Driver]

Good job. :DThat's why we put "pilots" in the pointy end. thank god they weren't button pushers.

[Huck]

Yeah - Antonov, tell us again about pilotless aircraft....

[lomapaseo]

I thought that the auto-restow thing on the thrust reversers was necessary to prevent in-flight deployment. So I wonder how they did the risk balance of robbing peter to pay paul:confused:

[Lonewolf_50]

Investigators have concluded that, during the take-off roll, the slats retracted - as designed - in response to signals indicating deployment of thrust reversers on the two inboard Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. The right-hand reverser signal was triggered at 125kt and the left-hand at 160kt.
But neither reverser had been activated, and British Airways engineers examined the aircraft (G-BYGA) to trace the source of the false signals. The inquiry concluded that, although the reversers were stowed, their translating cowls were nevertheless seated relatively far rearwards.
As the 747's engines wound up to high power, and the aircraft accelerated, sensors monitoring the cowl positions transmitted incorrect 'reverser' signals. The slats retracted because of a logic process designed to prevent them being struck by efflux air from activated reversers.
At risk of sounding vastly ignorant, might a design strategy for such a capability, thrust reversers, tie in to a weight-on-wheels switch?

I guess the risk there is the circuit goes bad, and you don't get them when you need them. One could design the circuit so that unless powered, it can't turn thrust reverser function off ... where are the holes in this idea?

For one, which wheel? :)

Am I right in guessing that an auto-thrust reverse function is very handy in some tight landing situations?

[TyroPicard]

Wake up at the back! It is reverser-based automated stowing of the leading-edge flaps.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Am I right in guessing that an auto-thrust reverse function is very handy in some tight landing situations?


I know of one fatal accident where the SOP for crew was to pre-select reverse on finals - KNOWING, FOR SURE - that the weight switch would prevent reverse thrust until touchdown.

Guess what ?

But as just stated - we're not talking about use of reverse in this incident.

[Piper_Driver]

My understanding of the incident was that the sensor on the thrust reversers caused the slats to retract. This has nothing to do with an interlock preventing the thrust reversers from deploying in flight, but instead would be related to braking efficiency once on the ground.

[Airclues]

The technical aspects were discussed on this thread;

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident.html

Dave

[Airbubba]

I know of one fatal accident where the SOP for crew was to pre-select reverse on finals - KNOWING, FOR SURE - that the weight switch would prevent reverse thrust until touchdown.


Old Piedmont crews used this unauthorized 'technique' on the classic 737's, weight on wheels would pop the buckets at touchdown to give best short field perfomance at places like Roanoke, Virginia.

Along came the 737-300 and 10 feet radar altitude was used to arm the reversers, inevitably a few very hard landings occured as the reversers deployed prior to touchdown.

[protectthehornet]

why?

why is the slat system hooked to the thrust reversers in any sense at all? I haven't flown the 747400.

The last jet I flew...if you wanted thrust reverse with slats deployed, you got it.

[Airbubba]

The last jet I flew...if you wanted thrust reverse with slats deployed, you got it.

In the BA incident, the autostow feature of the slats was triggered by false signals that the reversers were deployed. It is a little wacky and you would think this automatic leading edge retraction would be inhibited in the air. I suppose it gives the 744 better landing distance numbers somehow.

The claim that aerobatic experience helped with recovery from the improper leading edge configuration is remniscent of Captain 'Hoot' Gibson's high altitude TWA 841 upset years ago:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TWA_Flight_841_(1979)

Hoot said at the time that his aerobatic training allowed him to regain control of the aircraft.

[Airclues]

protectthehornet

The inboard and midspan leading edge flaps retract automatically when on the ground with reverse thrust deployed, so as to prevent the reverse thrust air damaging the flaps. It is inhibited in the air, which is why they redeployed when airborne.

http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/2009/0717.pdf

Dave

[Sir George Cayley]

Why were the false signals generated on two engines? As this is a rare occurrence for one engine, to have two in fault seems very curious.

What, if anything, occurred between landing and takeoff that might have contributed?

Sir George Cayley

[atakacs]

I know this will generate a lot of flack but these guys certainly the same type of medals and props as the BA038 chaps...

[Pugilistic Animus]

you mean they did not look at the QRH and actually thought for themselves and used excessive airmanship...bah sack'em;)
and a computer controlled [pilotless] plane would simply say "not in data bank does not compute...Crash"


:D

[AirRabbit]

The claim that aerobatic experience helped with recovery from the improper leading edge configuration is remniscent of Captain 'Hoot' Gibson's high altitude TWA 841 upset years ago:)

Hoot said at the time that his aerobatic training allowed him to regain control of the aircraft.
:hmm:
Had Capt. Hoot not been one to play around with trying to deploy trailing edge flaps (by pulling circuit breakers and repositioning the flap handle) to gain more altitude capability at the existing gross weight (which, by the way, was beyond the authorizations in the manual), he wouldn’t have had to rely on his aerobatic experience to save his backside and that of the rest of the airplane's occupants!
:*

[Airclues]

Sir George

See 1.16.2 in the report.

Dave

[FIRESYSOK]

Rigged by the same engineer, that's why.

[Huck]

Rigged by the same engineer, that's why.

My thoughts exactly.

[Pugilistic Animus]

isn't 'dual maintenance illegal., not ETOPS?

[protectthehornet]

dear airclues

my sincere thanks for explaning that the slats retract on landing and why.

I now have to say, we are simply making airplanes that are too complex for our own good. KISS.

PTH

[ExSp33db1rd]

Old Piedmont crews used this unauthorized 'technique' on the classic 737's


My reference referred to propellers on - I think - a Capitol Viscount, but I don't want to malign anyone, so I didn't say that !

My source was a solicitor acting for the insurers, I've never read the report, and some legal skullduggery ( Shock ! Horror ! Really ? ) was involved when it came to apportioning liability, which is why he was telling me - over a beer one day.

Hoot said at the time that his aerobatic training allowed him to regain control of the aircraft

It shouldn't be necessary to be an Aerobatic ace to be in command of a public transport a/c. I recall a Comet captain converting to, and maligning, our much loved 707 of the day because he reckoned it could turn around and bite you, he reckoned a public transport a/c should be capable of being flown by the companys' worst pilot - on a day when he felt poorly ! ( I know, I know, we shouldn't fly when we feel poorly, but you might not when you start the flight )

[DozyWannabe]

Lonewolf 50:
At risk of sounding vastly ignorant, might a design strategy for such a capability, thrust reversers, tie in to a weight-on-wheels switch?
Boeing's engineers went one level deeper. As I understand it, the logic as designed was :

WoW + Thrust reverser deployed -> Stow LE Flaps (to protect them from jet blast or foreign object damage)

No WoW for whatever reason -> Deploy LE Flaps as commanded

From the original post (emphasis mine):

The slats stayed retracted for a total of 23s. They started to redeploy 7s after the jet became airborne - as the undercarriage was retracting, at a height of 56ft - and were fully extended 9s later. The stick-shaker, which had activated intermittently over a 15s interval, stopped as the airspeed rose to 186kt.

Congrats to the crew, who kept a level head and did the right thing.

[Smilin_Ed]

Instead of following the typical climb profile, the first officer - whose aerobatic experience meant he was familiar with buffet - controlled the aircraft through the stall warning and buffeting by executing a shallower climb,

Too bad the guys at Madrid didn't try this. :ugh:

[protectthehornet]

I have a grand total of one hour of aerobatic training, about 35 years ago...but I assure you, and I am sure, that any ATP could handle buffet.

wondering why they didn't go to ''firewall '' power.

and extend more flaps, I know that is what I would do on my type.

[Huck]

I know in a freighter I'd have been thinking the weights were wrong. That means speed up, trading altitude until you get flyable. And dump.....

[Taildragger67]

Lonewolf 50,

The slats retracted whilst the aircraft was still on the ground - that is, with 'weight on wheels' - which I'd suggest would normally be the condition under which reversers would be deployed on landing. Hence an oleo-linked switch would not have prevented the slats from retracting in this instance (given that the slat retraction was based on the reverser indication).

Protectthehornet,

Maybe they didn't firewall as they believed they had a problem with the inboard engines; certainly, at least a (spurious, apparently) reverser deployment warning.

A previous inflight (actual) deployment (Lauda 767 out of Bangkok) resulted in the engine blasting itself off the wing and the loss of the aircraft; maybe the BAW056 pilots were mindful of this.

[protectthehornet]

taildragger...good point

but I know that if you have a reverser truly deployed, you would have YAW and you would reduce power on the affected engine/s

it is beyond me why we are making planes so complex that the added complexity actually works against us. if something can go wrong, it will...so don't put it on the darn thing in the first place.

don't get me wrong, the crew flew the plane and should be congratulated.

[crazyaviator]

"I have a grand total of one hour of aerobatic training, about 35 years ago...but I assure you, and I am sure, that any ATP could handle buffet"

Remember colgan at niagara falls ??

[Taildragger67]

Protectthehornet,

but I know that if you have a reverser truly deployed, you would have YAW and you would reduce power on the affected engine/s

my reading of this incident is that the spurious indication affected the two inboard engines - meaning that had it been an actual deployment, the effect would've been largely symmetrical.

I guess the point remains that these engines were at take-off power so if they were ever going to shear themselves off a la the Lauda 767, this would've been that time, but maybe the drivers took into account the fact that they appeared to still be working so worked with what they had.

Anyway... I think we agree the crew did some good flying using skills developed over years. Well done.

[sooperfrank]

All 4 engines were firewalled...

http://www.caa.co.za/resource%20center/accidents%20&%20incid/reports/2009/0717.pdf

[TheChitterneFlyer]

Protectthehornet; you'd "firewall" the power would you?

It's a hot and high airfield; probably max take-off weight en-route back to London; do you not think that all of the available thrust was being used anyway?

TCF

[L337]

wondering why they didn't go to ''firewall '' power.

JNB is hot and high. They were very close to MAX ToW and there would have been little or no extra left.

and extend more flaps, I know that is what I would do on my type.

Then they would have had "Land" Flap with no extra lift and a bucket full of drag, and then they definitely would have died.

The 744 takes off with Flap 20. Flap 25, one extra stage, is land flap.

[ProfEng]

Errr, excuse me interrupting....isn't lowering the nose to restore airspeed, aka controlling the aircraft through the stall warning and buffeting by executing a shallower climb, a basic flying skill, usually mastered prior to a first solo for good reasons, and not an aerobatic skill?

I accept readily that recognising the situation as one which may be resolved by doing that is the product of experience and knowledge, though. I hope that Easyjet takes note.

BTW, isn't "go to firewall power" either Top Gun or FlightSim territory?

[Mike Whiskey Romeo]

I do not want to take anything away from the excellent work of the crew on this flight, which without doubt prevented a serious incident becoming something worse.

BUT

Should the crew not have aborted take off as soon as the No.3 Engine TR ‘REV’ amber EICAS message displayed at
approximately 125.6kt i.e prior to V1?

Also, hats off to the SACAA for their safety recommendations especially

Operators should provide flight crews with more basic hand flying and
simulator flight training on new generation aircraft to address the
technological developments in aviation, inclusive of effective stall
training.and their observation:

The apparent increase in the number of software related incidents
involving various type certificated aircraft is becoming a cause of concern.
There is also a common thread through many recent accidents and it is time to
train for a new type of emergency that addresses the failure modes in highly
automated aircraft. The interface between pilots and aircraft automation, as well
as how this should be incorporated into aviation training, requires a review. This
includes addressing how automation fails, how pilots should cope with it and
how to get through the failures

[ETOPS]

Should the crew not have aborted take off as soon as the No.3 Engine TR ‘REV’ amber EICAS message displayed at
approximately 125.6kt i.e prior to V1?


We don't call stop above 100kts for a single amber caution as a general rule. At JNB stopping from around 130kts would have resulted in hot brakes and a nightstop. As the "rev" amber had no other symptoms such as vibration or thrust loss the decision to continue was correct. When the second "rev" came on they were above V1............

[autobrake3]

I wonder if the 200 hour cadet pilots that my company deem to be of acceptable experience would have handled such a frightening situation with such aplomb.

[protectthehornet]

sooperfrank

thanks for confirming that all engines were firewalled.

TheChitterneFlyer and profeng...see above. profeng...no, ''firewall power'' isn't top gun or fight sim. it is part of our flight ops and aircraft flight manuals. granted , we don't operate 747-400, but we have other modern jet transports.

crazyaviator, yes, I do.. your point is well taken...let me change my words to MOST atp's could handle buffet. I do wonder about fatigue in that one, the takeoff crew in the 747 was likely more rested at the start of their flight than at the end of it...as the colgan crew.

[protectthehornet]

while I've just read the PDF file report, I could not find any indication that the engines were firewalled. HOWEVER it states plainly that the takeoff was a REDUCED POWER TAKEOFF.

going to firewall power would have been a good thing to do...perhaps sooperfrank may have found the information saying that the crew firewalled the engines.

so TCF and L377 you might want to read the report...also some 31,000 kg below max to weight...or was it pounds? either way not at full weight.

[L337]

I have read the report thank you, and I did see that it used reduced power. And I see no evidence that they increased power once airborne.

However if you look at my post, I am suggesting that even had they firewalled it... as "JNB is hot and high. They were very close to MAX ToW and there would have been little or no extra left."

The report states:

The Maximum Certified Mass for the aircraft is 396 890 kg and the
Take-off Weight for the aircraft at the time was 365 000 kg. The
aircraft was thus 31 893 kg below the Maximum Certified Mass
during take off

However what it does not say is what the performance limiting weight was. It was probably below 396,890kg. The ATIS wind was light and variable so odds are that they used a tailwind in the take off performance calculation. If they did then they will have been very close to the performance limit.

I take your point, but having flown the 744 for a while and flown the exact departure at JNB in similar conditions, they will have had little extra performance available.

As a PS: The engines on the 744-436 can be safely firewalled. They have a fancy computer between the thrust levers and the engine and if you push the TLs fully forward the computer will give you maximum available power whatever phase of the flight.

[ExSp33db1rd]

that the crew firewalled the engines.


Long time ago now of course, but I don't recall the word " firewall " being an option, if take-off with reduced thrust i.e. Graduated Power was being applied, and more power needed, I recall the command " Go Around Power " being the appropriate call ? G .A. Power being a calculated figure, not just a B***s Out reaction. ( but then we had a Flt. Eng. !! )

Only nit-picking of course, in Extremis I guess the phrase " what the h**l " as the Thrust Levers are in fact firewalled is the way to go !!

Good show chaps.

Didn't we get a green LE flaps extended light added to the forward panel of the Classic 747 following an early accident out of Nairobi, when Lufthansa took off without the L.E. flaps extended ?

If that light wasn't illuminated, then the F/Eng. could interrogate his panel display to ascertain which sections weren't down, and an attempt to lower them manually could be made.

Not suggesting that any crew would have time to do that in a situation like this, but if a L.E. extended light had suddenly extinguished, then it might have given the crew a clue as to what was happening.

Haven't the faintest idea of the display / indications on the - 400, although an EICAS display is mentioned, along with the statement .....

There was no independent indication available to the crew that the applicable group of LE flaps had been retracted by the aircraft system

Is this another example of " progress " ?

[RVR800]

>the first officer - whose aerobatic experience

Enough said :ok:

[Yobbo]

The Boeing B747 classic flight crew training manual states there is extra power available from the P&W and GE but says there is very little from the Roller when "firewalled". I wonder if this also applies to the 400 powered Roller a/c?

[OD100]

"...
isn't 'dual maintenance illegal., not ETOPS?..."

The 74 is a four engine jet.

[Lonewolf_50]

@ tyro:
From the link Airclues provided us: Engines 2 + 3 gave spurious thrust reverser unlocked indications at rotate leading to an automatic slat retraction with associated loss of lift. The thrust reverse sub-system (and its relation to the movement of spoilers) is what appears to be in play, which is why I asked the question I did.
See also this post: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident-2.html#post4925602
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident-3.html#post4927933
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident-3.html#post4927367
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident-10.html#post5052472
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/373713-ba056-jnb-lhr-incident-10.html#post5385782

@ taildragger, Airclues, ExSP33db1rd, Airbubba, DozeyWannabe

Thank you for the education. :)
EDIT: "thrust reverse function" is probably more correct that "thrust reverse sub system" and in any case, more thanks for the education to all and sundry, and the Tip o' the Stetson to the crew. :ok:

[Castle Don]

Not to nit pick...but the Lauda Air crash wasn't caused by the engine ripping from the wing (I think that's what someone inferred)

It was the plume of turbulent air over the wing (caused by the deployed reverser) that led to the high speed upset and subsequent in-flight breakup.

Just clarifying

[protectthehornet]

L337

I too noticed the lack of specific reference to performance weight. But the wording indicated that some 31,000KG was from max allowable for that day...

and just to remind others of interesting takeoff problems, there was a TWA L1011 that got false stall warning out of KJFK and the copilot gave up flying and handed it to the captain who landed...and the plane burst into flames, but everyone got out.

always fly the plane!!!!

We also had a C5 Galaxy, USAF, with a thrust reverser deployed warning or actual, return for landing at Dover AFB...and they managed to get too slow on approach and bam...survivable crash...plane cracked in two.

Moral..always fly the friggin thing

[Basil]

Used to have a FE who was a bit meticulous about translating cowl rigging in the closed position.
Perhaps he had a point :ok:

[Tmbstory]

Well done to the Crew concerned and I enclose a quote from a previous post that I made in PPRune.

" A crew is expected to perform to the best of their ability when a problem occurs, either known or unknown. In the unknown case the crew have to attempt to control the aircraft flight path, so that they have time to solve the problem "

Once again well done and enjoy a beer or two or three!

Tmb

[B-HKD]

Well done to the crew :ok:


4.1.2 The aircraft manufacturer Boeing Aircraft Company on 08 June 2009
issued an Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) no. 747-78A2181 titled, Exhaust -
Thrust Reverser Control System – Automatic Leading Edge Flap
Retraction System Wiring Change, in order to change the signal to the
FCU.

Implementation of this change allowed for the Group ‘A’ LE flaps to auto-
retract only when the thrust reversers are commanded by lifting the
reverse thrust handle. The change given in this ASB was to be
implemented within 90 days after the issue date.

The ASB also stated that the FAA will possibly release an AD related to
this service bulletin. The AD will make the compliance tasks given in this
service bulletin mandatory.

[Icare9]

I can only say "Fabulous job" to the flight deck crew.
Extraordinary situation coped with, thanks to training and developed skills.

If this crew is typical of BA, then sort out the strike issues pronto.

This is AT LEAST the second occasion when flight deck crew have avoided a major catastrophe. That why they are the British flag carrier and are worth their pay.

Cabin crew - well, the guys up front are ensuring you still have jobs (and lives).
Sort it, please, without any more strikes.

I'd also suggest that any "armchair pilots" carry on their "discussion" in the BA Airline thread, not post bl@@@dy stupid opinions, theories etc here. Keep your mental problems hidden from our viewing.

[Airbubba]

Long time ago now of course, but I don't recall the word " firewall " being an option, if take-off with reduced thrust i.e. Graduated Power was being applied, and more power needed, I recall the command " Go Around Power " being the appropriate call ? G .A. Power being a calculated figure, not just a B***s Out reaction. ( but then we had a Flt. Eng. !! )

On Rolls RB211 engines you can push the throttles (or thrust levers or whatever they are called in these enlightened times) to the stop and the engine will not exceed limitations as long as the EEC, ELC, TMC, and whatever other boxes are working.

And, even with the older motors, if you're about to crash, I think an exceedance would be a secondary consideration. Air Florida 90 at DCA may have had a better outcome if they had pushed the throttles all the way up when they realized that the takeoff performance was less than normal.

[protectthehornet]

airbubba...right on!

the air florida crash is a prime example of saving the engines and losing the plane.

someone even made a TV movie of the week about that crash...and in it, the grizzled old American Airlines pilot of a 727 said: IF WE GET IN TROUBLE BEND THE THROTTLES AROUND THE STOP.
(you would have to see the movie)
and of course the young, less than gifted air florida pilot didn't do jack.

IF anything comes out of this thread, I hope new pilots will know what to do when the plane ain't flying right...especially near the ground!

[lomapaseo]

And, even with the older motors, if you're about to crash, I think an exceedance would be a secondary consideration. Air Florida 90 at DCA may have had a better outcome if they had pushed the throttles all the way up when they realized that the takeoff performance was less than normal.

Just to add some more balance to this discussion :

With these computer controlled engines (FADECs etc.) commanded exceedances have been taken out of the pilots domain. The pilot can of course command computerized functions like TOGA etc. and still firewall the throttles until they bend (sic), but the engines will obey the logic designed in their computers.

Thus I wouldn't rely very much on machoism in descision making today :)

[DozyWannabe]

MWR - I suspect that with the acceleration the thinking time required to call for RTO would have meant they'd have been on or past V1 by the time the call was made and the action started.

PTH - As someone pointed out, the Spanair Madrid accident shows that even in a simpler aircraft (an MD-80), sometimes things can be misdiagnosed or not diagnosed in time - with tragic results

[AirRabbit]

the air florida crash is a prime example of saving the engines and losing the plane.

someone even made a TV movie of the week about that crash...and in it, the grizzled old American Airlines pilot of a 727 said: IF WE GET IN TROUBLE BEND THE THROTTLES AROUND THE STOP.
(you would have to see the movie)
and of course the young, less than gifted air florida pilot didn't do jack.

IF anything comes out of this thread, I hope new pilots will know what to do when the plane ain't flying right...especially near the ground!
:ugh:
I truly wish that folks would cease with the criticisms of the Air Florida crew regarding the tragic January 1982 crash at Washington, DC. without a better understanding of the facts. Please understand, I'm not trying to be argumentative - although my passion could easily be read that way. However, there obviously seems to be a continuing gross misunderstanding of the facts regarding that particular accident … let me, once again, try to set the record straight.

I have said many times, the power setting used by the B-737 crew had nothing – uh, that is NOTHING – to do with the crash. Airplanes fly on airspeed – not power settings. Additionally, this was most assuredly NOT a situation where there was a decision that resulted in “saving the engines and losing the airplane.” There are a couple of points specific to this particular issue:

1) There was no outward decision made to keep the throttles where they were – or to “not advance” the throttles. The engine indications (primarily EPR indications – as was the routine and primary engine production indication at that time) were that the engines were producing the planned thrust.
2) Because of the location of the engines (under the wing) adding thrust would have exacerbated the pitch problem both pilots were engrossed in resolving. (please, continue to read)

It is true that because of this accident, there have been some additional discussions regarding the use of engine power on a turbojet powered airplane - to wit … when in doubt – push them forward. However, I still hear the periodic comment about “ we don’t want to over-boost the engines.” It’s taken a good part of the last 28 years to put the “urban legend” about “over-boosting” a jet engine to bed. Over-speeding … yes. Over-temping … sure. But over-boosting? Come on. Additionally, for years after this particular accident, there were many in the industry (and some who had considerable credentials) who steadfastly argued that adding power (e.g., “shove ‘em to the firewall”) would not gain any appreciable thrust. Again, through the last 28 years, there is generally now an opinion that, at the bare minimum, pushing all the throttles forward, while they may or may not produce any additional thrust, at least all the engines would be producing maximum thrust – and (save an engine failure of some sort) likely doing so in a symmetrical manner. However, that particular remedy would not have prevented the Air Florida crash, regardless of when it was applied.

As for the “young, less than gifted air florida pilot” … it might surprise many who simply do not know that the pilot flying (the first officer) WAS, in fact, a rather gifted young aviator … who had recently completed a tour of active duty with the Air Force at Minot AFB, North Dakota, where he was an F-15 pilot (and if memory serves, an instructor pilot) attached to the Air Defense Command Squadron at that location.

As far is this young pilot’s not doing “jack” is concerned … there simply wasn’t much “jack” that could be done. Not that the two pilots weren’t trying. They certainly were. You can read the CVR transcript where the Captain was intoning that “we only want 500 feet,” “barely climb,” “forward,” “come on, forward.” The airplane had uncontrollably pitched up, well beyond the angle of attack (AoA) required to generate the stall warning stick shaker. In fact, the pitch attitude was estimated to have been 24 degrees. The airplane was buffeting substantially in an aerodynamic stall while at an airspeed that was well above the stall speed for an airplane at that gross weight and configuration (i.e., V2 was computed to be 144 knots – the airplane reached approximately 149 knots, slowed to approximately 135 knots, and then accelerated to between 142 and 145 knots until impact). The rotation from the 3-point, on-ground condition to the stall buffet was a scant 2 seconds. That means, where the pilot had indicated he was “going to takeoff the nose gear and just let the airplane fly off” (surely a much less aggressive takeoff than the normal 3-degrees per second rotation rate), the airplane actually rotated at 4 times that rate – 12 degrees per second – from zero to 24 degrees in 2 seconds! Surprise! … and now you have less than 20 seconds to figure it out before you crash! The airplane staggered the approximately 4000 feet from the runway to the 14th street bridge. Probably not climbing to an altitude of greater than 50 – 60 feet; with its nose 24 degrees up and an airspeed at or above V2 the entire time. The crew could NOT get the nose down. Should they have pushed the throttles forward? What happens to a B-737 when you push forward on the throttles? Right ... the nose pitches UP.
:=
No. This was not a situation where someone (the crew) decided to “save the engines and lost the airplane.” This was not a situation where the crew simply sat there … not doing “jack.” I won't go into the gory details here - because discussing them takes a lot of space - space that perhaps the readers of this thread may not be interested in using to take the discussion in a new direction.

[Airbubba]

Again, through the last 28 years, there is generally now an opinion that, at the bare minimum, pushing all the throttles forward, while they may or may not produce any additional thrust, at least all the engines would be producing maximum thrust – and (save an engine failure of some sort) likely doing so in a symmetrical manner. However, that particular remedy would not have prevented the Air Florida crash, regardless of when it was applied.

Well, they only had about 1.70 actual EPR set instead of 2.04, there was plenty of power left in those JT8D's. Remember, you can MEL the EPR gauges and go with N1 for power setting on this engine. As the NTSB comments on page 81 of its report:

The aircraft could not sustain flight because of the combined effects of airframe snow or ice contamination which degraded lift and increased
drag and the lower than normal thrust set by reference to the erroneous EPR indications. Either condition alone should not have prevented continued flight.

[Checkboard]

I truly wish that folks would cease with the criticisms of the Air Florida crew regarding the tragic January 1982 crash at Washington, DC. without a better understanding of the facts.

Indeed. :hmm:

Had Capt. Hoot not been one to play around with trying to deploy trailing edge flaps (by pulling circuit breakers and repositioning the flap handle)

It was a theory in the subsequent investigation, but has been vigorously disputed over the years. Perhaps an "alleged" or two might be seen as following your own advice?

As to the Air Florida - take-off power was never set, as the P2 sensors were iced up, giving an erroneous EPR reading. The FO made several comments about the engine indications at the start of the take-off roll, if I recall correctly.

[punkalouver]

:ugh:
No. This was not a situation where someone (the crew) decided to “save the engines and lost the airplane.” This was not a situation where the crew simply sat there … not doing “jack.” I won't go into the gory details here - because discussing them takes a lot of space - space that perhaps the readers of this thread may not be interested in using to take the discussion in a new direction.

I should think that if the Air Florida guys had not taken off with a bunch of wet snow on the wings, they would not have had their pitch-up. If they had bothered to turn the engine anti-ice on, they would have had their proper power setting for takeoff and there would not have been a need to add a bunch of thrust just to get to takeoff thrust. Somehow, I think they would have been in a better position if a normal thrust setting was used for takeoff. Doing a powerback from the gate on a heavy snow day in a 737 seems to be a strange decision as well.

[p51guy]

The Air Florida crash was caused because the engine anti ice was not turned on and the epr probes gave eroneous readings. If they had just advanced the power beyond the max epr they would not have crashed. The epr reading was wrong because engine anti ice was turned off. Florida guys are not that familiar with icing conditions. I for one. They made a terrible mistake that morning. I felt it in my gut when they crashed because I was flying a 737 also in California and knew something went wrong. The heroes that jumped in to save the passengers are still in my mind. I agree with pushing the thrust levers to the limit when things go south. Years ago during Air Florida times they didn't have thrust limiters but they do now. The computer would have probably not given them the power they needed today either if the engine anti ice was turned off.

[protectthehornet]

dozzywannabe:

Anyone who has flown 737's or anything with underwing mounted engines notices the first flight that if you add power the nose goes up...conversely reducing power makes the nose go down.

A basic concept of holding pitch would be...throttles forward, yoke forward, throttle back, yoke back.

The pitch up you mentioned was also caused by the way the leading edge devices were set back in those days...the british had even noticed that in icing conditions with flaps less than 15degrees, the pitch up could be bad.

The first officer/copilot did notice something wrong and called it out...the young pilot, who didn't know jack, could have looked at N1 which should have been in the high 90's%. There seems to have been a lack of checklist discipline, whether by poor design or misunderstanding. Firewalling the engines and pushing forward on the Yoke might have saved them...but they didn't try.

I made mention of a TV movie depicting the events, and even with dramatic license, the point should be well made.

AS to the modern engines, protected with computers and dippers and limiters, it is too bad. But, as Iunderstand it, a reduced power takeoff has procedures associated with it. One of them demands full power if an engine fails (two engine plane), of course the 747 is a 4 engine plane and if a simple engine failure had happened little required.

However, any time you are not performing as expected on takeoff, one might want to check the flap position (including leading edge) and throttles forward...and if that ain't working, what the hell, push the throttles to the stop.

I haven't flown the 747 which I mentioned earlier, but I have flown enough planes to know that if the power is right and the performance isn't right...you have a few seconds to figure things out.

I suggest to boeing, that some sort of takeoff over ride switch be fitted to command the slats/leading edge devices to remain extended on takeoff. Pilot presses button prior to takeoff...hey plane, I'm going to takeoff so don't retract the slats no matter what!!!

[p51guy]

I don't think adding one more thing to the takeoff checklist is good. It happened once so just be aware of it. Stick shaker on take off is an automatic reduction of pitch to stop it. Staying close to or on the runway while accelerating is good so you don't pull it up into a stall. We normally rotate with over 6,000 ft of runway in front of us so why should we be concerned with climb at this point. Just fly. Don't stall.

[fjordviking]

In Joburg with a fully loaded 747 you don`t have more than 6000 ft of runway
left when you rotate.

[Mike Whiskey Romeo]

ETOPS,

Thanks for clarifying that

Mike

[DozyWannabe]

Err... PTH, I don't think I was part of the Palm 90 tangent! Though I'd say that incident was probably one of the most fascinating examples of poor CRM (at a company level as well as in the flight deck) I know of. Also, I think p51guy is right. Having an "override" in effect actually increases system complexity in an engineering sense as well as in terms of the checklists.

[Checkboard]

But, as Iunderstand it, a reduced power takeoff has procedures associated with it. One of them demands full power if an engine fails (two engine plane)

No - the reduced thrust calculations ensure that the engines are providing all of the required thrust for that take off - including enough for single engine performance. There is no requirement to increase thrust after an engine failure in a reduced thrust take off.

I suggest to boeing, that some sort of takeoff over ride switch be fitted to command the slats/leading edge devices to remain extended on takeoff. Pilot presses button prior to takeoff...hey plane, I'm going to takeoff so don't retract the slats no matter what!!!

The pilot already presses a switch for take off - the "TOGA" switch - to set power.

[protectthehornet]

dozzywannabe...so sorry...intended for air rabbit...pilot error.

for reduced power takeoffs, we had the option of powering up to full power if an engine failure happened...but certainly adequate power for the segments of engine out climb existed.

good point about the toga switch...simply wire it into the equation to make sure the slats don't retract in critical situations.

[AirRabbit]

Part 1 of 5:

I see that there have been several responses to my post regarding the tragic Air Florida accident in Washington, DC in January of 1982. In order to do any justice at all to those who were kind enough to offer comments, and the length such responses would require, I have elected to split my response into 5 parts; and I will try to load those 5 parts as close to one another as the system will allow.

I cannot fault many of the conclusions voiced on this thread, because much of what has been posted is an understanding taken directly from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) official accident report. The point is that this report is flawed. Sorry … but that is a true statement. The NTSB doesn’t often make the mistakes that are present in this report – and I’m not at all impugning the very fine reputation of the many fine men and women that work at the NTSB. But, that does not change the fact that some of the conclusions reached in this report do not “square” with other information contained in the same report. In some cases conclusions were reached with no substantiation of facts … in other cases conclusions were reached in direct opposition to known facts to the contrary. As is true in most accident reviews, we have learned a lot about a lot of things. Were the accident scenario presented to a flight crew today, knowing what we know today, and how we’ve changed our training and training requirements today, there is an excellent probability that the accident would not occur today. But 28 years ago is not today. We did not know then, what we know now. Again, my responses here are not designed to be accusatory or sarcastic … but I am passionate about this business and sometimes (shoot, probably most of the time) that passion is easily misunderstood to be an “in-your-face” response. If any of my responses sound that way, let me apologize in advance – that is not my intent.

Well, they only had about 1.70 actual EPR set instead of 2.04, there was plenty of power left in those JT8D's. Remember, you can MEL the EPR gauges and go with N1 for power setting on this engine. As the NTSB comments on page 81 of its report:
A couple of points: It is interesting to recognize that: “hindsight” usually provides a much better understanding than “foresight;” humans are prone to develop habit patterns; habit patterns can be an aid in accomplishing routing functions … and they can be a silent enemy, waiting to pounce.

In regards to the habit patterns … anyone who flew jet airplanes 28 years ago would immediately recognize that the primary power indicating instrument used by flight crews was the EPR gauge (and that is likely still true today). However, BECAUSE of this particular accident, it has been drilled into the heads of today’s flight crews that the remaining engine instruments must be observed – not merely to recognize that they are “symmetrically” aligned – but to recognize what those other instruments are indicating. The routine training issues 28 years ago included monitoring the engine instruments – and they primarily were looking for fluctuations on an individual gauge or obvious non-alignment with the adjacently located instrument for (the/an) other engine. Also typical was to have the EPR gauge located at the top of the “instrument stack” – i.e., from top to bottom they were usually arranged something like EPR, N1 tachometer, EGT, N2 tachometer, and Fuel Flow. The point is that the top of the stack was almost always the EPR indications. However, as many of you recognize, this was not always this way. In fact, the B-737 that crashed had an instrument stack that was arranged as follows: N1 tachometer at the top, followed by EPR, EGT, N2 tachometer, and then Fuel Flow.

Following “routine, habit generated” engine instrument checks, the flight crew on the accident airplane would likely have looked first at the EPR indication – as it was deemed to be the primary indication for that purpose, and found that it was indicating 2.04 – the computed EPR for takeoff. And then, following the habit pattern, their gaze likely moved down the stack from that point, glancing at the EGT, N2, and Fuel Flow. Again, following the habit pattern, not noticing any indication being asymmetrical (i.e., one EGT indicator wasn’t at 9 o’clock and the other EGT indicator at 11 o’clock), and not having any indicator fluctuating, they likely concluded that the engine power was, indeed, “set for takeoff.”

As I said above, hindsight is valuable for accident review. The actual thrust being produced by each engine was approximately 75% of maximum – calculated by a sound spectral analysis of the engine sounds recorded on the CVR. Had the crew been trained differently and had they been admonished during that training and their subsequent operations to identify the individual values being indicated by the other engine instruments on every takeoff (as pilots do today) – they likely would have recognized that there was a problem. However, this was not the traditional training regimen at that time – not just for this airline, but for the airline industry in general. Why? Because engines were very reliable and when they malfunctioned, that malfunction was rather easily identified. The reason we do things differently today is BECAUSE of this accident.

The reason that the engines were producing only about 75% power was because the PT2 probes were blocked – likely with ice, but of course that could not be confirmed – and the flight crew set engine power in accordance with the EPR gauges. An indication of 2.04 would have resulted in the engines producing 75% power.

Here are a couple of points that will be important later in this post:
1) If the PT2 probes were blocked with ice (and I think they likely were) had nothing to do with the fact that it was snowing at the time of the accident.
2) The fact that the engines were not producing 100% thrust had nothing to do with the accident – in fact, had the crew pushed forward on the throttles, ignoring any engine indicating instrument – even at the initiation of the takeoff roll – the accident would have occurred exactly the way it occurred.
3) The airplane was certificated to accelerate to V1, lose an engine (a complete failure) and then continue the takeoff with the one remaining engine operating at takeoff power. The accident airplane had 75% of the power that should have been available under normal circumstances. Clearly, that is 50% more power than what the airplane had been certificated as requiring – and, that power was symmetrical between the two engines, not asymmetrical, where all of the available power would have been coming from only one of the two engines.
4) Airplanes fly on airspeed … not on engine power settings.

[AirRabbit]

Part 2 of 5:

As to the Air Florida – take-off power was never set, as the P2 sensors were iced up, giving an erroneous EPR reading. The FO made several comments about the engine indications at the start of the take-off roll, if I recall correctly.
While it is true that the PT2 probes were likely blocked (see the above section of this post) there is nothing in the CVR that indicates either pilot recognized any engine anomaly or any curiosity about the engine indications. Here is a partial transcript of the CVR …
1558:55 LC “Palm ninety taxi into position and hold, be ready for an immediate”
1558:58 RDO2 “Palm ninety position and hold.”
(several entries completing Before TO checklists, Pax announcements, etc.)
1559:24 LC “Palm ninety cleared for takeoff
1559:26 RDO2 “Palm ninety cleared for takeoff”
1559:28 LC “No delay on departure if you will, traffic’s two and half out for the runway”
1559:32 CAM1 “Okay”
1559:32 RDO2 “Okay”
1559:45 CAM1 “Your throttles”
1559:48 CAM (sound of engine spool-up)
1559:51 CAM1 “It’s spooled.”
1559:55 CAM2 “Got ‘em?”
1559:57 CAM1 “Real cold.”
1559:58 CAM2 “God, look at that thing.”
1600:02 CAM2 “That don’t seem right … does it?”
1600:05 CAM2 “Ah, that’s not right.”
1600:07 CAM2 “Well…”
1600:09 CAM1 “Yes it is ... there’s eighty.”
1600:10 CAM2 “Naw, I don’t think that’s right.”
1600:11 E451 “Fourteen fifty-one cleared to land over the lights”
1600:19 CAM2 “Ah … maybe it is…”
1600:21 CAM1 “Hundred and twenty”
1600:23 CAM2 “I don’t know”
1600:31 CAM1 “Vee one.”
1600:33 CAM1 “Easy”
1600:36 LC “Six eight gulf taxi into position and hold … be ready”
1600:37 CAM1 “Vee two”
1600:38 68G “Position and hold six eight gulf”
1600:39 CAM (Sound of stickshaker starts and continues to impact)

As you can see, there was never an indication as to what it was that generated the exchange between the pilots. And, significantly, it seems as though whatever it was that was causing the F/O some consternation wasn’t clear, even to him, as he seems to be vacillating about his concern – and voiced that vacillation almost immediately. Surely it can be seen that whatever it was, certainly was not recognized by the Capt. The conclusion reached by the NTSB regarding “engine anomalies” was a post-accident decision – after reviewing what other situations could possibly have caused such comments from the F/O (“That don’t seem right … does it?”). Was it the position of the control wheel – perhaps being positioned with a slight “wing down” position when neither pilot was holding it? Was it the column position? Was it the position of the trim indicator? Was it the cabin pressure indication with the advancement of throttles for takeoff? Why was the conclusion reached that it was “engine anomalies?” What anomaly would it have been? My personal opinion, having been involved in many accident investigations and having considerable experience in training and human factors, I think it was the “muscle memory” the F/O recognized – the position of his arm was likely not where he expected it to be with the EPR indication showing takeoff power position. But, because it was something that wasn’t immediately identifiable (like an engine anomaly) he was unable to identify what it was that was making him “concerned.”

[BOAC]

Before you get too far down the 5 parts, think again about Part 1 para 3) and how you get to V1?

[AirRabbit]

Part 3 of 5:

The Air Florida crash was caused because the engine anti ice was not turned on and the epr probes gave eroneous readings. If they had just advanced the power beyond the max epr they would not have crashed. The epr reading was wrong because engine anti ice was turned off. Florida guys are not that familiar with icing conditions. I for one. They made a terrible mistake that morning. I felt it in my gut when they crashed because I was flying a 737 also in California and knew something went wrong. The heroes that jumped in to save the passengers are still in my mind. I agree with pushing the thrust levers to the limit when things go south. Years ago during Air Florida times they didn't have thrust limiters but they do now. The computer would have probably not given them the power they needed today either if the engine anti ice was turned off.
I should think that if the Air Florida guys had not taken off with a bunch of wet snow on the wings, they would not have had their pitch-up. If they had bothered to turn the engine anti-ice on, they would have had their proper power setting for takeoff and there would not have been a need to add a bunch of thrust just to get to takeoff thrust. Somehow, I think they would have been in a better position if a normal thrust setting was used for takeoff. Doing a powerback from the gate on a heavy snow day in a 737 seems to be a strange decision as well.
A couple of comments here …
The critical mistake that was made was not made by the company or the flight crew. The critical mistake was improperly deicing/anti-icing the airplane (more later). There is no indication that the crew elected to attempt a takeoff with “a bunch of wet snow on the wings.” That certainly was the allegation made … but what was the reasoning behind that allegation?

This position was generated primarily from the interview of, and a picture taken by, a passenger on board an aircraft taxiing past the accident B-737 when it was still at the departure gate. The records of that particular flight (i.e., “block-in” time) would strongly suggest that the photo was taken just minutes prior to the accident airplane pushing back. While the black and white copy of the photo is accurate, it doesn’t do the justice to the scene content that the original color photo does; and FYI, the black and white version can be seen in the Accident Report copy. The photo clearly shows the B-737 with significant snow and ice all over the airplane. Conclusion … the flight crew departed with all that snow and ice covering the airplane.

Support for that position (if one is inclined to need it) can be “read into” some of the comments made by the flight crew on the CVR. For example, the F/O statement, “…this one’s got a quarter to half an inch on it all the way.” However, this comment simply cannot be referencing his aircraft. From the cockpit it is impossible to see the wing “all the way.” In fact, only the wing tip and about 6 feet inboard from that point would have been able to be seen from the cockpit. Recall as well, the visibility was quite poor – down to 1500 – 1800 RVR, and it was snowing. The light level was more likely equivalent to dusk than mid-day under a clear-sky. The distance from the cockpit window to the wing tip is something on the order of 65 – 70 feet. Someone would have to believe that the F/O could see ¼ inch of ice under those conditions. Additionally, the statement made by the F/O immediately following clearly shows that his comment is directed toward the airplane they are following (“Look how the ice is just hanging on his, ah, back, back there, see that?”). Besides, the purpose of the deicing/anti-icing procedure is to eliminate all snow or ice that may have been adhering to the aircraft, and the crew was likely of the understanding (now, understood to be untrue in all cases – but not then) that any falling snow would have fallen on a “protected” wing or fallen on a wing that had been cleaned, and then dried … allowing any snow to have been swept off the wing during the first portion of the acceleration – as was the understood and accepted practice at the time.

But, I digress … back to the photograph “evidence.” The photograph clearly shows a line of baggage carts parked in front of the right wing, with the forward cargo door clearly open. Testimony of the baggage loaders, those who actually conducted the deicing/anti-icing process, those that pushed the aircraft, and the gate personnel verify that no baggage was loaded on the airplane at any time after the deicing/anti-icing had been completed. It isn’t rocket science to understand that the snow and ice on the airplane seen in the photograph was not on the aircraft after the deicing/anti-icing process. Therefore, the flight did not taxi out with the snow/ice on the airplane that is indicated in the photograph. They taxied out after being deiced/anti-iced in accordance with what they thought was proper procedures.

Regarding the allegation that “Doing a powerback from the gate on a heavy snow day in a 737 seems to be a strange decision as well” … The crew did not “powerback” from the gate. Initially, after starting engines at the gate, the tug originally used was slipping on the ramp and was unable to push the airplane (more about that below…). As a result, the Capt elected to open the thrust reversers to negate the residual forward thrust on engines at idle in the hope (apparently) that the tug would then be able to successfully push the airplane. It was not successful. The engines were shut down and a much larger tug was brought in to do the push. Engines were started on the ramp after being pushed back.

Regarding the allegation that “…if the Air Florida guys had not taken off with a bunch of wet snow on the wings, they would not have had their pitch-up.” … The pitch up was, indeed, due to ice accumulation on the wings – not the wing lifting surface as much as on the leading edge of the wing … and it did not come from the snow/ice as seen in the photographic evidence (as described above) and it did not come from the falling snow during the taxi out operation. The aircraft immediately in front of the B-737 (“Apple fifty-eight”) and the aircraft immediately following the B-737 (“six eight gulf”) both took off successfully – after being exposed to the identical inclement conditions. Where did the ice come from then?

The accident airplane was deiced before push-back. However, as indicated in the NTSB report, there was an earlier malfunction in the de-icing truck and the ground crew made improper repairs. This resulted in drawing only from the water tank when the volume of the spray was anything above the “ON” position dribble out of the nozzle. When the water/glycol mix was determined at the mix station, the mixture at the hose-end was correct; but, and its worth saying again … whenever any increase in volume flow was needed (by pulling harder on the “trigger”) ALL of the increase in fluid came from the water tank – NONE came from the glycol tank. Essentially the airplane was deiced with hot water. Subsequently, when a top coating of 30% glycol would have been evenly sprayed over the entire airplane – it was sprayed with water … which promptly froze in the 22-degree weather. The crew believed they had no ice on the airplane. Not very many airplanes are deiced with water – carefully, all over the airplane, with particular attention given to the lifting surfaces, when its way below freezing outside. The fact that the deicing/anti-icing process was carried out essentially with water, it is little wonder that when a tug attempted to push the airplane back, it was slipping on the ice that had accumulated on the ramp … after the ramp was sprayed with water. Should we be surprised in that?

If you will allow me, I’d like to look at simple, straightforward aerodynamics, and what role those aerodynamics played in what happened. We know that during the initial portion of any acceleration for takeoff, the wing is beginning to develop lift. But it is not until the pilot rotates the airplane, getting the wing to an AoA that generates enough lift that the airplane gets into the air. I’m sure that it isn’t any super revelation to state that the wing does not generate lift uniformly and the entire wing doesn’t generate lift simultaneously. You and I know that you can get an airplane into the air, in ground effect, before it is really ready to fly outside of ground effect. We know that Vmu tests are done where the controls are essentially held back from early in the acceleration run, forcing the tail onto the ground (or very close to it) at a speed well below what is necessary to fly – to see what the minimum lift off speed will be. The reason pilots don’t rotate the airplane prior to reaching “rotate speed” is that they don’t want the airplane getting into the air until the wings support the airplane properly and controllably. This is what they learn. This is what they expect.

But, what would happen if we changed the equation a bit – right at that critical moment – when the pilot moves the control column to a “neutral position, or slightly aft of the neutral position, in preparation to rotate” (a quote from the Boeing manual). What if, at that moment, the pilot realized that pulling further back on the controls would not get the airplane rotated? The pilot, pulling like crazy on the controls, gets no rotation. I know that Air Force KC-135 instructors and evaluators are (or, at least were) trained on the unique use of the spoiler panels. Under the glare shield were 2 guarded switches that controlled 2 valves to open (or shut off) hydraulic pressure to either the inboard spoilers (L) or the outboard spoilers (R) on each wing. In this case (no rotation – and you had to know that the KC-135 had p*ss poor brakes and no reverse thrust – quick stops were not made with any regularity) and you wanted to get into the air, you would turn off the inboard spoilers, grab the speed brake lever, and gradually, very gradually, raise the speed brakes. With the inboard panels shut off, the only spoiler panels being raised were the outboard panels, creating differential lift – lift on the inboard portion (forward) and no lift on the outboard portion (aft). The airplane would rotate just like “normal” and when you got the pitch attitude you needed, you lowered the speed brakes, just as gradually. If you yanked the spoiler handle up quickly, you would very likely smack the tail on the ground. Differential lift at takeoff can be very interesting, to say the least.

In the accident B-737 situation, a very similar circumstance was handed to an unsuspecting crew. Recall the F/O had indicated that he intended to just get the nose gear into the air and then let the airplane "fly off the runway." Is that what happened? No, it wasn’t. When the F/O moved the control column to the neutral position, the inboard portion of the wing was generating lift – and the outboard portion was not. Presto. Rotation. Very quick rotation. All the way into the stall buffet. In approximately 2 seconds. Normal rotation rate is 3 degrees per second. Stall buffet is beyond "stick shaker," and estimates were that to get the buffet the pitch attitude would have to be approximately 24 degrees - that would require a 12-degree per second rotation rate. Does that sound like getting the nose gear into the air and then just letting the airplane fly off the runway, as the F/O indicated he was going to do? Once rotated and airborne, the crew couldn’t get rid of the differential lift. They couldn’t get the nose down. Straightforward aerodynamics. The only thing they could have done was to run the horizontal stabilizer to a more nose down position, and that may have allowed them to lower the nose; maybe. Or, they could have attempted to roll the airplane to help get the nose down. But the portion of the wing in front of the ailerons was aerodynamically crippled.

Regarding the allegation that “… there would not have been a need to add a bunch of thrust just to get to takeoff thrust. Somehow, I think they would have been in a better position if a normal thrust setting was used for takeoff” … if the airplane had been kept on the ground long enough to accelerate to a speed that would have allowed the outboard portion of the wing to generate enough lift to counter act the rotational moment, they probably would have recognized a “sluggish” airplane – with only 75% power. But they didn’t know to do that. They wouldn’t have been able to do that – even if they had shoved the throttles to the firewall at brake release. They had always planned to rotate at the computed speed. They got ready to rotate at the computed speed. They expected the airplane to fly at the computed speed. What they didn’t expect was a wing deiced with water; a wing that now had a thin coating of ice that deformed the leading edges; deformed just enough to cause this very unique aerodynamic problem – from which they were incapable of recovering.

Additionally, as I indicated earlier, the F/O had been an F-15 ADC pilot operating out of Minot, North Dakota. It probably won't surprise many that most people recognize that it does snow in Minot, North Dakota.

[AirRabbit]

Part 4 of 5:

Anyone who has flown 737's or anything with underwing mounted engines notices the first flight that if you add power the nose goes up...conversely reducing power makes the nose go down. A basic concept of holding pitch would be...throttles forward, yoke forward, throttle back, yoke back.
Essentially, I agree with your premise … but it is wholly dependent on the control authority retained by the elevator surface(s). If that(those) surface(s) does(do) not have sufficient authority, the airplane will not respond as you indicate regardless of what the flight crew does with the controls in the cockpit.
The pitch up you mentioned was also caused by the way the leading edge devices were set back in those days...the british had even noticed that in icing conditions with flaps less than 15degrees, the pitch up could be bad.
On January 13, 1982, (yes, this was the same day as the Washington, DC accident) in Scandinavia, another B737 was subjected to a rather fierce snow/freezing rain scenario while taxiing out and awaiting takeoff clearance. As the crew initiated the takeoff and brought the control column “to neutral or slightly aft of neutral to prepare for the rotation” (quote from the Boeing manual), that B737 auto-rotated just like the B737 in Washington. However, because this airplane was subjected to a crosswind, the deformation on the wings was asymmetrical. The airplane pitched up to about the same pitch attitude as in Washington (in the neighborhood of 24 degrees) but because of the asymmetrical deformation, the pitch was asymmetrical as well, and resulted in a pitch up and roll. The crew had the control column against the forward stops. They slammed the throttles to the firewall, went to full opposite aileron, full opposite rudder – all to no avail. Please note … additional thrust was not beneficial. The crew was along for the ride. However, as the roll continued over toward 90-degrees, the nose began to fall. As the nose began to come down toward the horizon (because of the bank - not because of the forward control position), the airplane began to accelerate. As it accelerated, the outboard portion of the affected wing began to produce lift and the aileron became effective. The crew rolled level less than 100 feet above the ground. When advised of the existence of this circumstance, the NTSB chose not to look into it.
The first officer/copilot did notice something wrong and called it out...the young pilot, who didn't know jack, could have looked at N1 which should have been in the high 90's%. There seems to have been a lack of checklist discipline, whether by poor design or misunderstanding. Firewalling the engines and pushing forward on the Yoke might have saved them...but they didn't try.
Of course there will always be the “coulda, woulda, shoulda” comments on almost anything … post-incident. The F/O did express concern over something – but, while the NTSB is convinced it was an “engine anomaly,” I am of the opinion that we don’t know what it was that garnered his interest. I gave my opinion above. But, clearly there was nothing said … and it would make sense that, if there was something that was identifiable, the F/O would have indicated what it was that was bothering him. Therefore, I maintain that is wasn’t an “engine anomaly” that was recognizable by reference to the engine indicating instruments. Additionally, he was vacillating over whatever was bothering him.

Again, from the CVR transcript:
1600:02 CAM2 “That don’t seem right … does it?”
1600:05 CAM2 “Ah, that’s not right.”
1600:07 CAM2 “Well…”

Clearly there is the following sequence: concern – possible resolution of that concern – concern – possible resolution of that concern.

Adding thrust would not have made any difference – and it did not make any difference to the crew in Scandinavia. Pushing forward on the control column had little, if any effect. If we can believe the CVR transcripts, both pilots were pushing forward on the controls. Again, from the CVR transcript:
1600:31 CAM1 “Vee one”
1600:33 CAM1 “Easy”
1600:37 CAM1 “Vee two”
1600:39 CAM (Sound of stickshaker starts and continues to impact - there is also a noticeable sound of the stall buffet).
1600:45 CAM1 “Forward, forward”
1600:47 CAM? “Easy”
1600:48 CAM1 “We only want five hundred”
1600:50 CAM1 “Come on, forward”
1600:53 CAM1 “Forward”
1600:55 CAM1 “Just barely climb”

[AirRabbit]

Part 5 of 5:

… any time you are not performing as expected on takeoff, one might want to check the flap position (including leading edge) and throttles forward...and if that ain't working, what the hell, push the throttles to the stop.
It’s hard to argue with this premise. Of course, that makes sense – but, I would hasten to point out that it makes sense in light of reviewing this particular accident. And, I would remind everyone, that, as it was not the engine thrust that caused or contributed to the accident, shoving the throttles forward in this particular situation, would not have changed the outcome. Again, it was heavily overcast and the light conditions were more like dusk. The visibility was between 1500 and 1800 feet. It was snowing. The runway surface was being obliterated by the collecting snow. In this particular situation, it would have been exceptionally difficult to recognize that the airplane “was not performing as expected.”
Though I'd say that (this) incident was probably one of the most fascinating examples of poor CRM (at a company level as well as in the flight deck) I know of.
Again, CRM was a concept that grew out the review of this particular accident. The crew was, to the best of their understanding, managing the resources that were available to them. They relied on others to do the jobs they each were responsible for doing. They were relying on the ground crew to do their jobs. They were relying on ATC to do their jobs. They were relying on what and how they had been trained and what they were expecting.

One other point: the NSTB report indicated the Capt. elected to not use engine anti-ice during ground operations. Actually, if you look at the CVR transcript, during the “after start checklist” challenge and response – as read by the F/O and responded to by the Capt – the challenge “Engine Anti-ice” – is indicated in the CVR as “(Off).” Please note the parentheses around the word, “off.” That is NTSB-speak to indicate the clarity of the CVR was poor enough to not be sure of what the response actually was. Since there are only 2 responses to such a checklist challenge – either “On,” or “Off,” while it is true that the NTSB chose to publish the transcript with “(Off),” it would have been equally as logical and just as defensible to have published, “(On).” There are two switches in the cockpit and three valves in each engine for the functioning of engine anti-ice. When the wreckage was recovered, the condition of the cockpit overhead was such that the switch position for these particular switches was not able to be determined. Of the engine valves (6 of them), 2 were found to be motored closed, 2 were found to be motored open, and 2 were found to be broken and “free-wheeling.”

Additionally, the choice to use or not use the engine anti-ice after engine start, under the conditions that existed at the time, was completely up to the Captain – and either choice was perfectly in alignment with the operating procedures as provided by the Boeing Airplane Flight Manual. The decision to not use that system was no more correct and no more incorrect than a decision to use that system.

[AirRabbit]

Before you get too far down the 5 parts, think again about Part 1 para 3) and how you get to V1?
I am presuming that you believe I’m not considering the requirement that you accelerate to V1 with all engines operating? As you can see … I do remember. However, my point is that as long as you get to V1 it makes little difference as to how you got there, how much runway you used getting there or anything else. Once you are there, you are there – and from that point forward, the only relevant aspect is that you have takeoff thrust on the remaining engines; i.e., 1 engine on a 2-engine airplane; 2 engines on a 3-engine airplane, or 3 engines on a 4-engine airplane.

[JW411]

This is pprune at its very best for thread drift.

A BA crew gets commended for dealing with a difficult take-off problem in a 744 in JNB, South Africa which is several thousand feet above sea level and, now, within a couple of pages, we are about to be immersed in a freezing river in Washington D.C. in a 732 just off the end of DCA.

Those of you who remember anything about the Air Florida disaster and have any interest in crews being put under enormous pressure to get the job done by the management might also remember the graffiti sprayed inside one of the jetways at MIA.

As best as I can recall it said "Dick Skully before Skully Dicks You". Whatever that might have meant I simply cannot imagine.

Isn't thread drift wonderful?

By the way, well done to the BA crew.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Back to leading edge flaps ........


I don't think adding one more thing to the takeoff checklist is good. It happened once so just be aware of it.


akcherly .......... more than once.

Lufthansa 747, Flight 540, 20th Nov. 1974, Nairobi .......

from the accident report Quote .......

............ the lack of adequate warning systems which could have alerted the crew to the problem. Two previous occurrences of this error had been reported.

I freely admit that I have no experience of EICAS messaging, but the BA report suggests that an 'amber' i.e. low level, warning, appeared on the EICAS screen about the L.E. flaps, and 'may not ' have been noticed - can't comment, but the Classic 747 had a bright green / amber light above the flap angle indicators, and had that light extinguished, and turned amber as the flaps started to retract, I might suggest that it would have been more noticeable than a 'tap on the shoulder' from a computer ?

That doesn't mean that it was more likely that the crew might have abandoned take-off anymore than they did on this occasion, rightly or wrongly, but it would appear that they didn't notice the EICAS message - if I've interpreted the report correctly (?)

There has been a recent PPRuNe thread asking if we rely too much on computers - QED (?) Bells and whistles and flashing lights do tend to concentrate the mind, but maybe a definitive essay in plain language of precisely what is the problem is really the way to go ?

Perhaps a 747 -400 driver might comment ?

[By George]

Standard Boeing procedure: EICAS msg before 80 knots abort, above 80knots ...Go. This does not mean you are not allowed to think, just better be right, or you'll be nailed to a cross with blunt sticks.

[L337]

but the BA report suggests that an 'amber' i.e. low level, warning, appeared on the EICAS screen about the L.E. flaps, and 'may not ' have been noticed

There was no low level warning on the EICAS screen about the L.E. flaps. The warning was a "Dual ‘REV’ amber EICAS message."

That caused the LE flaps to retract. That retraction was not annunciated because the aeroplane thought it was doing the correct thing...

[wiggy]

but the BA report suggests that an 'amber' i.e. low level, warning, appeared on the EICAS screen about the L.E. flaps,

As I understand the report they got a amber "REV" annunctiation for one engine below V one, followed by another REV annunctiation above V one. Those are not warning messages, as in a "Caution" or "Advisory" EICAS message, they simply appear as an indication of reverser status above the appropriate engine's EPR strip gauge at the top of the EICAS screen. In addition the Flap indication would have turned magenta since the actual flap position no longer agreed with that commanded by the Flap lever - because the LE's had in part started to retract.

Edited to add: In agreement with L337's post - these are in part the normal indications you see on the -400 landing roll. With the weight on wheels switch made, and the reversers indicating unlocked the aircraft "thought" it was in the landing roll, so you wouldn't get any knobs bells or whistles about the config.....

[protectthehornet]

wondering if anyone has the published stall recovery procedure is for this plane?

[Coireall]

Well done to the crew and clearly the handling pilot in particular. Eyes on the ball or what?! Simply brilliant. Delighted you were there at the right time and place and in the top of your form to give of your best.
............................................................ ......................................................
Request to the Pprune moderators: Please stop the divergence on this thread. The thread's label is about a B744 technical failure at JNB (a hot and high and RTOW limited airfield) which was brilliantly handled by the flightcrew. :rolleyes:

[protectthehornet]

if you don't allow for divergence, the thread would be: nice job...and would have been over three pages ago.

divergence is interesting, tangental knowledge that just might come in handy one day.

[david1300]

One of the times where the divergence has been useful and well contained (IMO). I suggest that the self-moderation that seems to have limited the divergent angles has been adequate, and thank the mods fo allowing the discussion.

[ExSp33db1rd]

L337 and Wiggy

Thank you for correcting me, I'm not at all familiar with EICAS or even FMS displays, but my point was that from old memory I think that not only would the Classic 747 have had a REV unlock light, but also a LE flap out of sync. light - even tho' the aircraft might have ' thought' it was in a landing roll and therefore all was well - which I was suggesting might have been more obvious than EICAS messages, and that so called 'progress' isn't always a plus ?

Cheers,

ExS.

[protectthehornet]

exspeedbird

I think you make a good point. While I haven't flown the 747 in any of its forms, the planes I have flown both had reverser unlocked, reverser ready lights. also a simple light indicating slats were properly extended.

either of these lights on or off as the case may be during takeoff would have gotten my attention.

[ExSp33db1rd]

protectthe hornet,

Yes, although the BA crew did a good job they appear not to have been aware of the LE flaps, that's not to suggest that they might, or should, or even could, have done anything differently of course, but knowledge is power !

[Airclues]

From 1.6.4 of the report;

"The retraction of Group 'A' LE flaps is shown as a color change on the flap indicator EICAS display which is hardly visible on the display."

I don't see what difference it would have made if they had known about the LE flaps, as it occured after V1, and there was no way of extending Group 'A' except automatically when airborne.

Was it rather irresponsible of the SACAA to commend the crew without having consulted the experts on PPRuNe to see how it could have been done better?

Dave

[protectthehornet]

airclues

how snide. every word on this forum, might just help someone in the future...we are pilots who are talking...and maybe there might be one or two pearls of wisdom.

I didn't know that the LED's retracted automatically on this type. I've learned something. But I think someone else might have learned something by at least thinking of firewalling the throttles. Or consider the concepts of the importance of knowing where your slats are and your reversers...whether it is on a flat screen display or old fashioned lights.

I sure know what I would do if the reverser unlock lights illuminated during takeoff on my type.

[dozing4dollars]

Thanks Air Rabbit

Barry

[AirRabbit]

Thanks Air Rabbit
Barry - you are most certainly welcome.

Additionally, I want to express my sincere thanks to the moderators here as well ... for putting up with my extended response to questions and positions that were presented.
:D
The threads started and the subjects discussed on this forum provide an exceptional opportunity to exchange views and provide an opportunity to express one's concerns and provide answers and explanations to clarify and help further understand areas that may not have been recognized or understood previously. Each of the participants deserves a "thank you" as well - constructive criticisms, legitimate questions, and honest expressions without personal attacks are a hallmark of this forum - and all involved should be justifiably proud of the service provided to the aviation industry.

[james ozzie]

Please, someone correct me if in error but I thought I saw somewhere on this website that the B747-400s did not come standard with a stickshaker but BA requested it as as an extra when they ordered them. If so, then that decision has contributed to a life saving outcome.

[Flight Detent]

jo...

I think you may be confusing the 'stick shaker' and the 'stick pusher' systems.

Cheers...FD...:)

[DozyWannabe]

james ozzie:

Stick shakers are pretty much standard fitting on all transport category aircraft. Many years ago, there was a mandate for UK registered jets to have stick pushers, which are an entirely separate matter, related to deep stall in aircraft with a T-tail configuration. That's probably where the confusion started.

PTH :
I think he was joking. :)

[protectthehornet]

I'm wondering if the stall recovery training for this type includes firewall power?

[Right Engine]

I wonder if the 200 hour cadet pilots that my company deem to be of acceptable experience would have handled such a frightening situation with such aplomb?
The handling pilot started life in BA with exactly 200 hours, having graduated from from Oxford Air Training School.
*

[suninmyeyes]

Right Engine said:

The handling pilot started life in BA with exactly 200 hours, having graduated from from Oxford Air Training School.
*

No doubt a fair and accurate comment. However this might give the erroneous impression to some readers that BA jumbos have copilots with 200 hours total flying them. When I joined BA the requirement for flying a 747 was a minimum of 500 hours jet time.

[kwateow]

You said: "Stick shakers are pretty much standard fitting on all transport category aircraft".

That's a bold statement, since Airbus has been delivering more planes than Boeing for many years now, and no new Airbus has a stick shaker.

No stick to shake.

[Right Engine]

Suninmyeyes,

A clarification I gladly welcome. I merely aimed to point out the paradox of getting someone as steely eyed as James B at the controls of a 747, to do such a remarkable job, that he started quite ironically on a 737 with the aforementioned total time. We all start with not many hours and it is the job of those who have a few more to pass on their wisdom, not as in the case I quoted, our disdain.

[Basil]

PTH,
Last time I flew the 744, stall recovery was:
Max thrust
Reduce pitch attitude to +5deg
Level wings

At high altitude then clearly, a shallow descent may be necessary to regain speed.

Caveat to above: if in unusual position roll wings level then adjust attitude.

The foregoing applies if ground contact is not a factor.
If it is, then it's still max thrust and don't hit the ground:ok:
Smooth inputs, don't allow a g-stall pitch-up.

p.s. I think Airclues is aware of the value of positive discussion - ees joke, señor :)

[ExSp33db1rd]

The handling pilot started life in BA with exactly 200 hours, having graduated from from Oxford Air Training School.



I started in BOAC with 312 hours, ex-RAF trained N.S. pilot, and it was over 3 years before I even got near a pilots' seat again - aircraft had radio operators, flight engineers, navigators, as well as co-pilots in those days, and although I would have wished it differently at the time, in retrospect I was eventually well pleased that I had chance to 'learn my trade' watching all the other professionals as I quietly beavered away being employed as a navigator.

[protectthehornet]

thanks basil

I was wondering if the term ''firewall power/thrust" was used. but I dont' know how to get max power without pushing them full forward to the stop.

[Basil]

IIRC, on the 744 but not the Classic you can push the thrust levers fully forward. On the Classic you could, e.g., have an N2 overspeed or overtemp.

[DozyWannabe]

That's a bold statement, since Airbus has been delivering more planes than Boeing for many years now, and no new Airbus has a stick shaker.

No stick to shake.
I gave myself some wiggle room with the qualifier "pretty much". ;)

AI made up for the lack of a stick shaker by making stall warnings very clearly audible, and by making it much harder to stall the aircraft in the first place (unless you dump autothrottle below 100ft, before some bugger brings up Habsheim again!).

[bean]

I've read the South African report and nowhere does it say that the crew firewalled the throttles but, nowhere does it say they didn't firewall them!

Out of curiosity could someone post what sort of assumed temperature they would have been using at a 5558 feet airfield with a temperature 8 degrees above standard for the height. a 14mb qnh above standard and a light and variable wind. 9the conditions at the time) also what sort of rtow would have been used

I suspect that there wasn't a huge amount of extra thrust around to play with.

[Airclues]

Maximum thrust can be obtained by either a double press of the TOGA switches, or pushing the thrust levers forward, although in the latter case one must also disconnect the autothrottle or they will roll back when you release them.

The EEC calculates the maximum thrust, taking into account the maximum EPR, EGT, N1, N2 and N3, together with the ambient conditions.

The engines are operating very close to their maximum rating out of JNB and there is very little more available. It looks as though the thrust was increased at 18:36:51 to what is probably the maximum available, although the thrust increase would have been small.

The crew were faced with an unknown problem which had not been anticipated by the manufacturer and for which there was no QRH item or procedure. It was only the handling skills of the F/O, together with the support of the captain that saved this aircraft.

I don't know the F/O but I have observed the captain for many hours on the simulator. I always came away from our sim sessions wishing that I had half of his ability.

Dave

[28L]

or pushing the thrust levers forward, although in the latter case one must also disconnect the autothrottle or they will roll back when you release them.
Without getting overly technical, wouldn't the thrust be in 'Hold' mode, so you can firewall the levers and they'll stay there?

[Airbubba]

Without getting overly technical, wouldn't the thrust be in 'Hold' mode, so you can firewall the levers and they'll stay there?

Yep, they should be in 'HOLD' from 65 knots on the takeoff roll until VNAV is engaged or another thrust mode is selected.

[Airclues]

28L and Airbubba.

Thanks. You have jogged my memory ( perhaps I shouldn't have ditched those manuals?). My answer re advancing the thrust levers only applies after VNAV engaged (400ft????).

Dave

[L337]

For the technically minded, and for myself as I am old and easily confused. From the 744 Tech manual or as it is now known... B747 FCOM Vol 2.

During takeoff prior to lift–off:
• with speed less than 50 KIAS, pushing a TO/GA switch activates the
autothrottle in thrust reference (THR REF) and advances thrust levers to
the selected reference thrust limit. If the autothrottle is not active by 50
knots, it cannot be activated until above 400 feet
• at 65 knots, autothrottle annunciation changes to HOLD

After lift–off:
• if an engine failure occurs, the pitch command target speed is:
• V2, if airspeed is below V2
• existing speed, if airspeed is between V2 and V2 + 10
• V2 + 10, if airspeed is above V2 + 10
• if a TO/GA switch is pushed before the reference thrust limit changes to
climb:
• takeoff derates are removed
• A/T in HOLD, autothrottle annunciation is THR REF
• at 50 feet, LNAV activates when armed. Roll commands bank to track the
active route
• at 400 feet, VNAV activates when armed. Pitch commands the current
airspeed. Autothrottle sets the selected reference thrust and annunciates
THR REF

[paull]

General discussion, not wishing in any was to distract from crew's achievements but let us assume that something happens, you do something, you get a happy outcome. Do you get a medal because you survived?

How about saying you get a medal if you got a happy outcome and 80% of the guys in the sim afterwards did not. Or, perhaps the 80% did what you were trained to do and deserve a medal, you did something different, that happened to fit this occasion but was actually against the odds. Right result, wrong action. No medal?

Of course we all admire the true masters who take actions that cover all the most likely causes AND a few unlikely ones as well without having to guess. When playing bridge sometimes you have to "take a view" as to how the cards, lie, I always admire those who manage to delay their decisions until they they have the facts. I guess it is the same for you guys, but you do not always have the luxury of time.

Yes, I think my conclusion is 'Anyone who survives the scrutiny of a pprune thread gets a medal whatever they did!' Well done!

[heavy.airbourne]

As an old and long retired safety pilot once said to me: As long as you do not have any better ideas, follow the procedures. For incidences not covered by procedures, you have to come up with ideas, and the list gets larger the longer you fly.

[Fliegenderflieger]

That´s basic standard, if there is any evidence that the AC is close to a stall.
Less pitch and max PWR.
They did it, fine.
(My time on controls: 10.000hrs)

[Captain-Crunch]

First, may I salute the fine airmanship of the BA 74 crew in SA. Firewall power (thrust lever position) was the right choice in response to stick shaker. Perhaps there was no steady amber LED indication because in-transit amber is really a "disagreement" "light", right?, (with the commanded position)? The LED's were doing what they were commanded/programed to do: on ground, see reverse and retract? Thus, no LED amber airborne until the reversers shook out their unlocked indications?

Next, the attempt by airrabbit to defend the Air Florida Crew who did not "firewall" is passionate for some reason but not correct imho. I disagree with most of his points entirely. Also, I have a direct unknown connection with that accident. Let me elaborate.

First the background. Air Florida was primarily a prop operation with little airplanes that was allowed to blossom rapidly under deregulation into jet operations that it had no experience with. Thusly, they hired Western Airlines to do their FAA manuals and training in LAX in the B-737 simulators IIRC. (I don't think they were in-house at that point). I had been through that program a year before, and was back getting a 727 rating (sorry, was nearly 30 years ago, remembered it wrong yesterday.) The instructors in the program were shell-shocked, knowing that fingers might point back to them in their extremely crowded out-sourced training offerings. Many times the older sim would break disrupting airlines sim schedules, throwing every airline into chaos, requiring them to break the training up into chunks separated by weeks of idle time waiting for a cancelation or adequate period to come up.

So, there was, in my mind, a training question. Western's training was first rate, and most of their instructors were excellent. But many times, an airline could get a box period, but no instructor, so they would put in their own guys to run a mysterious box. Was it quality training? I dunno....:=

But let's examine rabbit's argument from authority: i.e; the F/O was a former F-15 pilot with the Air Farce bla bla bla. Who cares? Are we flying F-15's here? No. Many fighters didn't even have anti-ice I was told by my co-pilots who flew em. But it's possible, that the first officer was the only one with any appreciable jet time at all in that cockpit.

Noise doesn't equal power (ref: the CAM analysis). If you forget to turn on the engine heat, as Air Florida did, and you've been taxiing along in clutter, getting blasted by the aircraft ahead of you for take off, not only is your PT2 sensor going to ice up, but also fan blades will turn into baseball bats. They certainly weren't clean fans and rotors anymore. Saying they had 75 percent power based on noise is highly speculative. I becha they didn't even have 50 percent. How do I know this?

Because it happened to me one night in a bizjet. I had a knot-head for a captain on a dereg operation, who refused to turn on the engine heat in moderate snowfall situation with a long taxi to t/o. He told me: "Don't turn them on till we hit the clouds." I protested: "That's not right" pointing at the engine instruments. Both EPRs started bouncing all over the place from the snow being blasted up by the taxiing aircraft we were following. But his Airworthiness wouldn't budge, having only a prop background previously, so he didn't know the significance of it, and since CRM hadn't been invented yet, the trip was "Bossman/Boy" the whole month.

So, trying to keep my crappy job, I obeyed, and told him, "O.K, I'll just set them to N1, since the EPRs are frozen." (Flight 90 was firmly in my mind.) But in hindsight, I should have mutinied and walked off and quit, because we lost an engine due to broken N1 blades and 275,000 dollars later, he got fired, and I got a checkride from hell. But we could've been killed.

Rabbit makes a conclusion that the Air Florida F/O was looking at the wing talking about 1/4 inch of ice, etc. Anyone who's flown -200 Boeings knows he's probably talking about the windshield wiper and it's visible bolt on his side of the aircraft. You can't determine ice thickness on the wingtips from that distance.

And most people in the industry fully agree with the NTSB accident board findings. Especially the part where the F/O doesn't see nine o'clock on the N1's and repeatedly questions the Captain on the power he's applied for takeoff. The Captain, having no real jet experience, and no CRM training to draw on, creates the Captain Blye Cardinal Sin: "

"My I.Q. goes right up with my seniority number!"

Conclusion: There is just no excuse for making a FUBAR this big. If your F/O is unhappy, you should defer to his paranoia if you don't have experience in the particular operation. Go ahead and push them up guys! You can't damage the JT8D-9 Pratt unless you exceed RPM or EGT!

Note: They did push them up shortly before impact; too little too late. But on the runway, after the PNF (Pilot Not Flying) "80 kt" call, at WAL the training was to say: "Check", then "power's good" by the non-flying pilot, IIRC. This was what the F/O was looking at and pointing at, not flight controls that he was handling! If there was a flight control problem they would have aborted. But if there was a disagreement on where the power was set it could have been rectified if the Captain knew to look at N1. He didn't, despite the F/O pointing, saying, "look at that thing".

I am repeating the off-the-record assessment of the men who trained these guys to the best of my memory. They marched upstairs while I was there, in a briefing room and checked their version of the Air Florida AFM Vol 1, cold weather ops and confirmed that Flight 90 was directed to have engine heat on takeoff with visible moisture and temp under 10 degrees TAT on the Rosemont Probe. But even the crew failing to do this right, the instructors were incredulous that the F/O said: "We're going down, Larry", and the Capt said: "I know".

"Push the power up dummies!" was the critique of their sim instructors at LAX.
And if you accidentally overboost, who cares? Those old buckets will warp before the rotables fly apart (engine casings will warp slowly before failure). Never sit there with a negative rate of climb.

Do something! :ugh:

Crunch

Air Florida Flight 90 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Florida_Flight_90)

[protectthehornet]

Crunch. ditto

sadly, the DC9 crash at CLT in microburst showed a go around, but not at full go around thrust. firewall power wasn't applied till too late...even full power (toga) wasn't applied...then there were the visual illusions.

the business about nine o'clock is so darn interesting. so many people haven't figured out the great wisdom in the design of our instruments and no one told them. it is the thing that is out of place that will kill you...don't read when you can scan. I still remember looking at the engine instruments of a B36 (movie "Strategic Air Comman") but one gauge out of place caught attention.

maybe we are all alive, due to air florida screwing up so badly. but where do we get the idiots out there? I flew with one guy...atis said: freezing rain. he wanted to go saying he couldn't see it. I opened my side window (direct vision window) and stuck my hand out (we were on the ground of course) and I showed him the little ice crystals on my hand.

idiot.

just as we all mentioned in the kentucky crashand the madrida crash about ''killer items", pilots need some "save my ass'' actions that almost always work.

firewall power is one of them...or at least on older jets it would save your ass...as the JT8D would produce firewall power for 8 minutes without damage...after that...oh well.

[stiffnuts]

I believe the auto slat retraction is to prevent damage from forward thrust, to the inboard leading edge flaps after reverse thrust is selected. In this case, it would suggest that the rigging on the thrust reversers sleeves may have been incorrect; allowing retraction of the leading edge inboard flaps as the
aerodynamic loads increased on the reverser cowls.