Shakespeare would have loved simulators

[Tee Emm]

It must have been thirty years ago when an article published in the UK BALPA magazine made cynical criticism of those responsible for flight simulator training. The author had a distaste for simulators because (he said) to make the grade, one had to be an accomplished actor. And he had no acting qualifications. He found it impossible to pretend he was a captain listening to a check captain simulator instructor, inside a pretend aeroplane. The check captain at various stages of the session, would pretend to be a ground engineer, a flight attendant, an ATC, a tug driver and company flight planning clerk. In other words, all the people who would talk to the pilot from start up to shut down. One man playing different roles. The author of the BALPA article compared the simulator session to a Shakespeare play acting - except neither he or the instructor had ever received professional acting coaching. .

Recently a pilot was failed by two check captains in the simulator. One was a senior check captain observing the performance of the second check captain who in turn was testing a first officer for not only an instrument rating renewal but his first command.

The exercise included a take off for flight from A to B a distance of 300 miles. The aircraft was a well known Boeing jet. The departure airport happened to be only 30 miles from another large well serviced airport which we shall call C. The weather at C was good while the weather at the departure airport was marginal. An engine fire was given shortly after lift off and the crew shut down the engine. The check captain running the show had already switched hats several times from start up to airborne and was now ATC. The “captain” under test elected to return for landing but was told by “ATC” the weather was below landing minima. So the left seater checked the wx at airport C was OK and advised “ATC” he would go there.

“ATC” said this was not acceptable to ATC and that the pilot must fly to his destination 300 miles away with one engine inoperative. The pilot said no, and repeated his requirement to head for the nearest suitable airport at C. Again “ATC” said no and demanded the aircraft fly to B 300 miles away.

At this stage the captain undergoing the test was puzzled and wasn’t sure whether the “ATC” in the back of the simulator was serious or semi-joking in order to test the captains reaction to this unusual demand. At that point the “ATC”changed hats again and became the simulator check captain. In that traditional role he now gave the aircraft an uncontrollable fire in the engine that had been shut down. The second check pilot in the back of the simulator nodded his head in approval. The captain under test advised ATC that there was an uncontrollable fire in one engine and requested latest wx at the departure airport for emergency return and was informed by “ATC” miraculously the cloud base had improved to the NDB minima.

The captain pressed the cabin attendant call button and after a quick change of uniform a high pitched female voice answered acted by the check captain. The cabin was appraised of the problem. That task completed the captain under test (actually a first officer but acting as a pretend captain) requested immediate radar vectors for final NDB straight in instrument approach. A quick change of hats from cross-dressing FA to check captain back to being ATC, denied the aircraft a straight-in approach as (he said) ATC were too busy with other traffic and the aircraft with uncontrollable fire was told to hold over the NDB until traffic separation was organized.

The captain under test demanded radar vectors again and, with the fire still burning in one engine, despite the action of two fire bottles, was again told to hold. Eventually “ATC” again switched roles and pressing the right button arranged for the burning engine to separate and fall free. Oh the pent up relief that the fire had vanished. The captain once more requested immediate landing but was denied by ATC until the captain had completed one hold and it was 45 minutes for the whole exercise.

At the debriefing, the two check captains went into a huddle outside the room and later came back inside to inform the now thoroughly demoralized captain he had passed the instrument rating part of the test - but had failed the command test. Reason given by the two check captains was the captain under test had forgotten to update the cabin attendants of the progress of the emergency and that moreover the captain should have used more forceful language in a commanding voice when ATC had refused his requests to divert to airport C the alternate 30 miles away. The “captain” under test was then told he would remain as F/O for another 12 months before being considered for a command.

This was a blatant case of double or even triple jeopardy brutalizing by the two check captains in the simulator and their Shakespearean play acting left the hapless command trainee quite unsure of exactly these fools were trying to achieve. Were they attempting to trick him into making an arguable decision and how likely would it ever be that a real ATC would demand a certain course of action such as continuance of flight on one engine after a fire warning to an airport 300 miles way?

Nowadays, recurrent training on Human Factors is mandated by some regulators as a requirement during initial and recurrent pilot training. Included in the training package are the subjects of CRM and TEM. Pushed ad nauseum down the throats of pilots are countless books, SOP’s, videos and Power Point presentations that form a large part of the training of airline pilots. Most of this guff is useless repetition regurgitated twice a year during recurrent training. There is no shortage of cashed up practitioners in these black arts who do quite well thank you very much, in terms of monetary gain from captive audiences herded into airless class rooms, to gaze in resigned boredom at the bullet points of CRM perceived wisdom.

And then some poor bloke on the other side of the world fails his command check because he couldn’t act a pretend part in a pretend aeroplane in a pretend flying exercise with a multi-hatted pretender in the check captain’s seat. A check captain who, if he has ever read up on Human Factors, has clear disdain for its principals. These types are a blight on the training department of so many airlines. Little wonder the Horror Box earns it's name.

Obviously, as far as Human Factors knowledge is concerned, things haven’t changed much in the thirty years since BALPA first published the article.

[piratepete]

Absolutely brilliant John, I agree 100% with you, what a joke.Even Shakespeare would laugh at this sillyness.

[GlueBall]

Even as a joke, this unrealistic simulator scenario is over dramatized if not totally ridiculous. . . because when you're on fire and report as such, no competent ATC will direct you into a hold, and no competent PIC would enter a hold.

[safetypee]

I recall an excellent simulator session where the simulator instructor (an experience pilot nursing a broken leg) was also an accomplished actor. All of the roles as above were played to perfection by the instructor; voice cadence, tone, temperament, etc; this aided the realism of what was an old-style ‘box’ simulation.

Soon after (but still a long time ago) I ‘flew’ in a research simulator which used taped messages to run the scenario – very realistic as many clips were taken from real RT.

These aspects are essential in simulation, but often overlooked. Simulation rarely generates the human emotions necessary for evaluation and learning the higher mental skills.
Again I recall the surprise of an FAA inspector when the instructors Jepp bag was dropped on the sim floor at V1, just as an engine was failed.

[john_tullamarine]

I think we are all agreed that the checkie in question probably would have a better calling as a bank clerk.

I recall a similar scenario where the pilot under check was a bit more forceful .. with a suitable level of frustrated anger (no play acting involved at all) he threatened to snot the checkie there and then, get out of the box and take the complaint directly to the Regulator's inspector with responsibility for the operator.

That sim went back to commonsense very promptly. My view of the particular checkie involved was that he would not have made the grade as a bank clerk in any case.

[The Heff]

Deviating slightly from the argument of whether the pilot in question should have failed his command aspect; I'm curious as to people's opinions on this scenario whether it would have been appropriate to have made a MAYDAY call?

Strikes me that if all attempts to extinguish the engine fire had failed, then the aircraft is in grave and imminent danger and it would have been the correct course of action to make a distress call.

[Caboclo]

Heff got it right. The wanna-be captain was quite correctly denied his command because he did not have command ability. That is, the ability to recognize an emergency, treat it as such, and ignore any barking mad orders from ATC or anyone else. The initial engine failure alone merited a declaration of emergency and diversion to point C, even before the fire re-ignited. The situation as presented by the check captain became progressively more ridiculous because the upgrade did not take the correct action at the first opportunity; the check captain then continued to pile on the problems, waiting to see at what point the upgrade would break down and say Mayday. Some people seem to have an aversion to declaring an emergency; possibly due to a fear of the resulting paperwork, possibly for some other reason. Regardless of the cause of this phenomenon, it's a bad thing, and something that is addressed in any PIC checkride, from the Private level all the way up.

The complaint about play-acting is absurd. Sims are not perfect, and I support some degree of training in the real plane; but sims are a very useful tool, and the role of the instructor in assuming the roles of all the different people who talk to the pilot is perfectly acceptable. What do you want? A different hired actor for each role, all sitting in the back of the sim waiting to give you their single line? Training is expensive enough as it is.

[Centaurus]

In my day, the type of scenario initiated by the check captains was known as "Brutalising". It served no useful purpose and leads inevitably to a tense and hostile atmosphere in the simulator. Any pilot will fail a simulator set up like that described. It goes to prove that some check pilots are often selected for that position not on instructional skill or ability - but more on their ability to climb the management ladder.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

A fantastic sim operator, sim builder, and a great mimic.

I had many sim sessions with him, in Stansted and later Gatwick.

The old HS was a pleasure to fly, except for the occasional person walking accross the sky with a mug of coffee in hand, was suprisingly realistic, due to his involvement, no level D here.
Even the CAA ITE sessions were (with 20/20) a learning experience.

He made sim learning a pleasurable and regarding experience.

Nothing more to add.:)

glf