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StuntPilot
6th Jun 2010, 20:20
An Air Maroc Boeing 737-400 (CN-RMF) made an emergency landing short before 22:00 local time at Schiphol airport, because of a left engine failure short after takeoff. Flight AT-685 left from Schiphol for Nador, experienced an engine fire/failure and after a slow climb and low turn above the city of Haarlem returned to land on the polder runway 18R. Crew and passengers (162) have left the plane safely.

Nvidiot
6th Jun 2010, 20:37
A firetruck tipped over on the way there too. There was a photo of it, but apparently that's from another accident a while ago. Media reports state that the people in the fire truck are fine.

From local news: the plane was able to taxi to the gate on its own. They also report birdstrike as a possible cause.

STC-8
6th Jun 2010, 20:59
Groot alarm op Schiphol - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6874721/__Groot_alarm_op_Schiphol__.html?p=1,1)


Mayday call. Engine fire shortly after takeoff. Plane flew low over Haarlem & returned to Schiphol. Major 'alarm' at Schiphol - full emergency response. In and outbound traffic delayed for several minutes during emergency landing. Sight of what appeared to be a 'burning' plane flying overhead caused some panic to break out among witnesses around Schiphol. Landing was without incident - no injuries. A fire truck toppled enroute to incident - no injuries.





Twitter photo: Inciden schiphol airport, plane on runway,5th runway ,pssngrs... on Twitpic (http://twitpic.com/1ul2vi)






AMSTERDAM - Bij de luchthaven Schiphol is een zondagavond even voor tien uur een vliegtuig in de problemen geraakt. Een toestel van Royal Air Maroc heeft na brand in een motor een noodlanding moeten maken. Na een 'mayday'-oproep van de piloten werd groot alarm geslagen en rukten de hulpdiensten met groot materieel uit.


http://images2-telegraaf.nl/multimedia/archive/00728/toestel_728402d.jpg (http://javascript%3Cb%3E%3C/b%3E:fotovenster%28"http://images2-telegraaf.nl/multimedia/archive/00728/toestel_728402d.jpg","Twitteraar%20%274wdtravel%27%20plaatst e%20deze%20foto%20op%20twitter,%20gemaakt%20vlak%20na%20de%2 0noodlanding%20","%3Ca%20href="http://twitpic.com/1ul2vi"%3E4wdtravel/Twitpic%3C/a%3E%20",200,150%29;) Twitteraar '4wdtravel' plaatste deze foto op twitter, gemaakt vlak na de noodlanding Foto: 4wdtravel/Twitpic (http://twitpic.com/1ul2vi)






Dat hebben bronnen rond Schiphol zondagavond gemeld. Het vliegverkeer heeft vanwege de noodlanding een aantal minuten stil gelegen.
De noodlanding op de Polderbaan is goed verlopen en het toestel staat veilig aan de grond. De Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland (LVNL) laat weten dat het toestel op eigen kracht naar de gate kon rijden. Er zijn geen gewonden gevallen door de noodlanding.
De Boeing 737-800, met bestemming Nador, raakte kort na opstijgen vanaf Schiphol in de problemen. Het toestel vloog vervolgens nog een laag rondje over Haarlem en keerde daarna terug naar Schiphol. Het is nog onduidelijk hoeveel mensen er in het vliegtuig zaten.
[B]Grote paniek
De noodlanding zorgde voor grote paniek in de omgeving van Schiphol, omdat meerdere mensen het brandende toestel over hebben zien vliegen.
Een brandweerwagen die op weg was naar de plek waar het toestel zou landen, kantelde onderweg. Dat gebeurde op het terrein van de luchthaven, liet het Korps landelijke politiediensten weten. Bij dit ongeval raakte niemand gewond.

olandese_volante
6th Jun 2010, 23:06
Of course, the a/c was reported to be "dumping fuel" on its way back to AMS :hmm:

Toestel Air Maroc met brandende motor terug naar Schiphol (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article1386769.ece/Noodlanding_toestel_Air_Maroc_op_Schiphol)

Omwonenden van Schiphol hebben het gevoel aan een ramp te zijn ontsnapt. Inwoners van Vijfhuizen stellen dat het toestel kerosine loosde boven hun woningen.

Quick translation:
Those residing in the area around Schiphol airport feel they have narrowly escaped disaster. Residents of the town of Vijfhuizen state the aircraft dumped kerosene while overhead.

Oh dear :}

STC-8
6th Jun 2010, 23:34
'According to eyewitnesses the plane was flying lower than 100 meters.'

Volgens ooggetuigen vloog het toestel niet hoger dan 100 meter.

Groot alarm op Schiphol - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6874721/__Groot_alarm_op_Schiphol__.html)

sleeper
7th Jun 2010, 07:04
Video

Video: Voorzorgslanding RAM-toestel Schiphol na botsing met vogels - Luchtvaart.tv (http://www.luchtvaart.tv/video.php?id=12554)

Birdstrike after take-off, engine failure and return.
No engine fire.
Looks like a job well done

ATCast
7th Jun 2010, 11:18
Volkskrant (http://www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article1386784.ece/Geen_fouten_gemaakt_bij_noodlanding_Schiphol):
Translation:
"The National Police Service Corps concludes after a first investigation that no errors have been made by the Flight Crew during the emergency at Schiphol airport last night. The emergency was caused by a birdstrike. The Dutch Safety Board investigates the incident.
According to a spokesman the collision with the birds caused major damage to one of the two engines, and the fuselage of the aircraft. The engine did not caught fire, but was shutdown according to standard procedures. There was a lot of smoke.
...
The captain reports a collision with 'many big birds, probably geese'
...
The emergency landing did not cause disruption in the air traffic. The aircraft of Royal Air Maroc will be on the ground for at least two weeks. The airline sents its technicians from Casablanca to the Netherlands to do the needed repairs on the aircraft. Based on the results of the National Police Service Corps research, the Public Prosecution Service decided not to further investigate this case."


The geese strike again...

lomapaseo
7th Jun 2010, 13:15
ATCast

Translation:
"The National Police Service Corps concludes after a first investigation that no errors have been made by the Flight Crew during the emergency at Schiphol airport last night. The emergency was caused by a birdstrike. The Dutch Safety Board investigates the incident. ..............


Thanks for this update. Sounds like a good balance of responsibilities between the two agencies :ok:

Wirbelsturm
7th Jun 2010, 13:17
Nicely done Royal Air Maroc Crew.

:ok:

vanHorck
7th Jun 2010, 13:25
If it was all so nicely done , why would many people in Haarlem comment that the plane was so low they thought it would crash well short of Schiphol?

I thought the clim rate on single engine was still good enough to achieve at least a thousand feet or more?

Surely height = additional safety in case of a flight in trouble?

Is there a reason for a plane on one engine to stay so low (some say maximum 100 metres, 300 ft) during the 180 turn back to Schiphol?

Surferboy
7th Jun 2010, 13:37
Ever tried to guess an altitude? I have, was never right. There is nothing as unreliable as an 'eyewitness'.

For instance some eyewitnesses said they saw the B734 dumping kerosine, wich is very interesting...as that type doesn't have the capabillity to do that!

Avman
7th Jun 2010, 13:38
vanHorck, you make the mistake of BELIEVING what you read. Non aviation people (and aviation people for that matter) may not be that skilled at calculating height over the ground. The public in that area are not used to see a relatively large airliner at "circuit height" over their houses. A B737-800 flying straight and level at a perfectly legal 1500-2000 feet may seem (to the eye) a lot lower than it actually is. Had the aircraft indeed strayed below minimum safe altitude you can rest assure that the authorities would have investigated the incident further.

JW411
7th Jun 2010, 13:40
van Horck:

I actually thought about trying to answer your questions and then I had a serious outbreak of common sense and realised that it would simply be a complete waste of time.

sleeper
7th Jun 2010, 14:27
If it was all so nicely done , why would many people in Haarlem comment that the plane was so low they thought it would crash well short of Schiphol?


Don't forget that people who live there are used to departures with all engines working. That means a certain altitude. In this case that altitude was probably half of what they normaly see or hear and therefore quite unusual.

ErwinS
7th Jun 2010, 15:46
Pictures here
http://www.scramble.nl/forum/viewtopic.php?f=14&t=27914&start=555

They were lucky that only eng#1 was hit. If the other also ingested a goose than she was doomed for sure.

Good job by the crew.

becap
7th Jun 2010, 16:00
The net path on a twin engine is minimum 2,4% on 1 engine,so at low speeds it is less then 1000 ft/min

vanHorck
7th Jun 2010, 17:55
Thank you for the nice mix of answers. Obviously any good landing in such a circumstance is an excellent landing, and fab that no one got injured. A dry Hudson landing on one engine it seems to have been.

I'm aware of the unreliability of non-pilot witnesses. Probably even pilots included. I was just surprised he may have been relatively low. As a PPL i intended the question as follows (sorry English not being my mother tongue):

Would a 737 with Engine Failure on Take Off (after a single engine birdstrike) be trained to continue the climb initially to an altitude of ..... (feet) or to level off initially and immediately initiate a return to the field?

Nvidiot
7th Jun 2010, 18:37
Pictures of the toppled-over firetruck that was on the way to the aircraft. :}
http://www.noordhollandsdagblad.nl/multimedia/dynamic/01713/IMG_9940_1713964j.jpg
http://www.noordhollandsdagblad.nl/multimedia/dynamic/01713/IMG_9942_1713965j.jpg

And plane damage pictures:
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoRMsxCUI/AAAAAAAAAG0/0dlU5SXwAcc/s640/IMG_0234.jpg
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoRN6psCI/AAAAAAAAAG4/BPVArpZX6Gc/s640/IMG_0235.jpg
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoRaawwUI/AAAAAAAAAG8/57j0gBAjrd8/s640/IMG_0236.jpg
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoRaUg_-I/AAAAAAAAAHA/E2dW5XA-iAQ/s640/IMG_0237.jpg
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoRXHMWYI/AAAAAAAAAHE/83H5bD25Io0/s640/IMG_0238.jpg
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_AGoOHDpGP_8/TAzoTzyKeEI/AAAAAAAAAHI/y_zShIr560o/s640/IMG_0239.jpg

golfyankeesierra
7th Jun 2010, 20:51
At least 4 hits, must have been scary.
All too understandable to choose for an immediate return. Well done Air Maroc!

Geese were not the biggest risk at AMS, I guess there will be some more focus on them.
If I were a goose I would avoid Schiphol, Foie Gras in high demand!

lomapaseo
7th Jun 2010, 20:56
Nice documentation pictures:ok:

About what is expected for an 8 lb bird fully ingested at takeoff RPMs

Quite a different outcome from the Hudson River event.

ImbracableCrunk
7th Jun 2010, 21:17
I wonder what part of the engine damage was from the birdstrike directly and what part was caused be the unbalanced engine wobbling away.

Good job.

EGMA
7th Jun 2010, 22:11
Isn't it about time geese were fitted with and trained in the use of TCAS?

Lobby your politicians and watch this fly ...

STC-8
8th Jun 2010, 00:01
Airbus Birdstrike Threat Awareness notes:

Powered by Google Docs (http://bit.ly/az1leK)

Tail strike in 1% of cases..

golfyankeesierra
8th Jun 2010, 07:07
I wonder what part of the engine damage was from the birdstrike directly and what part was caused be the unbalanced engine wobbling away
What does a wobbling engine have to do with a bird wrapped around the avionics door and a dent on the opposite site of the fuselage?
Looks like a flight of geese to me. Lucky the other engine didn't take any..

Pugilistic Animus
8th Jun 2010, 07:21
Tail strike in 1% of cases..

at first I thought you were making an Airbus joke---seriously:}

:ouch:

76-er
8th Jun 2010, 08:57
What puzzles me is why we still don't know at exactly what altitude they overflew Haarlem with all these live-flight trackers around nowadays. The MSA following a departure off 19L with an immediate right turn is 1700 feet. I assume the crew would at least try to reach that altitude. Overflying a city at 1700ft with one engine at MCT may be quite unsettling for people on the ground, especially with one engine spitting out feathers and engine parts.

From the route flown it looks like the crew didn't get/take the time to read any checklists..

Nvidiot
8th Jun 2010, 09:06
Schiphol komt met vogelradar | nu.nl/binnenland | Het laatste nieuws het eerst op nu.nl (http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/2264714/schiphol-komt-met-vogelradar.html)

Translation:
Airport Schiphol will start using a unique radar system which can recognize individual birds and predict their flight pattern, the newspaper Trouw reports.

The system is called Robin Lite and was designed by TNO. The number of birds at Schiphol has increased in the past few years and is a danger to aircraft.

With the radar the birds can be tracked better. Incidents, like with the Boeing 737 from Royal Air Maroc should become less common with this system.

Birdstrikes
The number of birdstrikes with planes around Schiphol has almost doubled in the last year. In 2008 there were four birdstrikes per 10000 aircraft movements in which birds entered the engine of a plane, in 2009 this number has risen to more than 7.

STC-8
8th Jun 2010, 10:15
Schiphol plans to introduce bird radar system this year for experimental trials.
It will be a version of the Robin (radar observation for bird intensity) system which was developed the Dutch innovation thinktank TNO http://www.tno.nl (http://www.tno.nl/) for the Dutch airforce & is supposed to be able to detect birds from a height of 1 meter and also supply information as to which sort (eg: small or large) by detecting wingspan.

Vogelradar op Schiphol - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6885935/__Vogelradar_op_Schiphol__.html?sn=binnenland,buitenland)


Use of ROBIN system cuts birdstrikes by 50% around Dutch military airports (In English) TNO - ROBIN: Radar Observation of Bird Intensity (http://www.tno.nl/content.cfm?context=markten&content=product&laag1=178&laag2=367&item_id=331&Taal=2)


Schiphol struggles with overflying geese problem - admits they do not have any control over the situation. Geese fly overhead in this area where there is much pasture for them to feed. Alarm bells already rung 18 months ago about hazards of rising bird population around the airport, primarily geese. Regional taskforce created to reduce numbers by culling birds & treating eggs to make them unhatchable. Birdstrike incidents rise to 7 per 10,000 aircraft movements in 2009 from 4 in 2008 - apparent increase could be result of Schiphol's increased attention to birdstrike incidents. The issue is a priority one & the airport has 16 employees working around the clock to deal with the problem of birds on and around the airport.

'Geen grip op ganzen rond vliegveld' - Binnenland - Telegraaf.nl [24 uur actueel, ook mobiel] [binnenland] (http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/6879354/___Geen_grip_op_ganzen_rond_vliegveld___.html)

Avman
8th Jun 2010, 11:24
76-er, stick to playing with your Flight Simulator :rolleyes:

ImbracableCrunk
8th Jun 2010, 11:58
I wonder what part of the engine damage was from the birdstrike directly and what part was caused be the unbalanced engine wobbling away.


What does a wobbling engine have to do with a bird wrapped around the avionics door and a dent on the opposite site of the fuselage?

Uhhhh, nothing probably. . . see above.

76-er
8th Jun 2010, 12:08
@Avman: Nah, I prefer my 'own' left seat on the 747-400ERF if you don't mind and let my kids play FS-X..:E

Callsign Kilo
8th Jun 2010, 13:03
Would a 737 with Engine Failure on Take Off (after a single engine birdstrike) be trained to continue the climb initially to an altitude of ..... (feet) or to level off initially and immediately initiate a return to the field?

Keep climbing until you reach/exceed the related MSA. A shallow climb or even almost level segment (around 200fpm) can be expected at MFRA (minimum flap retraction alt - 1000' AGL usually) to allow for clean up. At airports such as EHAM, where terrain isn't a factor, this will involve climbing ahead on the extended runway centreline until reaching MSA. Once there, the usual steps are to devise a plan with the aid of the QRH (and other information available). In this case i.e severe damage, it will be to 'land at the nearest suitable airport.' Please also remember that ATC would be fully aware of their problem. It would be their decision to vector the aircraft over Haarlem (knowing that it was single engine) once the crew had accepted/requested radar vectors. At an airport such as AMS I would be very surprised that the crew would be wishing to navigate their a/c by any other means. Work load would have been high in the flightdeck (much checklist negotiation, system analysis, crew involvement) and ATC will always be there to help. My philosophy would be to allow them.

sleeper
8th Jun 2010, 13:22
In an emergency amsterdam ATC will provide you with a discreet frequency for subsequent communication with them. Once "able to manoevre" they will vector you for return to a runway of your choice.
So unless they were manoevring on their own, which I doubt, it was under radar vectors that they crossed the towns.

I suspect that this was at 2000 feet.

golfyankeesierra
8th Jun 2010, 13:31
Crunk, see what you mean now.. can't say. Engine is indeed as unbalanced as can be.
About the vectors over Haarlem: a left turn would have brought the plane over Amsterdam and Amstelveen, so even worse.
Time available a track to/over the coast would have been preferable, but in their situation I would have preferred to stay near the field as well.

Callsign Kilo
8th Jun 2010, 13:53
I would also consider the fact that ATC at EHAM were only too aware of previous analysis relating to decisions to vector aircraft over built up areas. The Bijlmer accident in 1992 where an El Al Cargo 747 crashed in to an appartment block in the eastern suburbs actually overflew central Amsterdam two times as it was postioned for an approach to RW27. As I recall from the report, ATC were not fully aware of the actual problems that the crew were experiencing (both engines on the right wing sheered off causing severe control problems - this led to the actual report concluding that recovery would have been virtually impossible). I believe that mis-communication from the El Al crew combined with ATC using varied assumptions were analysed in the report. I am certain that current controllers at AMS are all well briefed on this event.

olandese_volante
8th Jun 2010, 21:42
...actually overflew central Amsterdam two times as it was postioned for an approach to RW27

The first time though, was during the (uneventful) climb-out, before engines 3 & 4 fell off.

ATC were not fully aware of the actual problems that the crew were experiencing

Neither were the crew, probably, since they reported "engine on fire" while said engine was already on the bottom of a lake. Moments previously, they had reported "we lost engines 3 & 4" probably meaning to say they lost thrust (and interpreted as such by ATC) but most likely they were not aware they quite literally lost them.
The inboard engines on a 747 are not visible from the flight deck, the outboard engines just very barely, and being a cargo there were no reports from the passenger cabin...

Reader not a writer
9th Jun 2010, 00:46
Two Weeks Ago at AMS,

Taxied from Hotel stands with permission to cross 36C for 36L departure. Reported a flock of 12 swans (flying perfect vic formation) at 30 feet flying south-north right up the middle of 36C. Tried for 3 mins to talk ATCs eyes onto them with no success. Seemed to me a lack of concern to what I considered a major hazard.

Certification of our engines do not take into account, encounters with the likes of a single swan/goose never mind multiples of the buggers!

Had over 50 birdstrikes in flying career; little ones cause little or no damage thank God. However, have seen enough of what one medium-sized can do if it hits in the wrong place.

18 years military, 7 years airline and the risk assessment on the civil side is miles away from where it should be!!!

Willing to be shot down on this, but what the hell !!

Remember, we are told statiscally a double engine failure is impossible, well tell that to Sully and Im sure he won't buy you a beer!!

lomapaseo
9th Jun 2010, 03:15
Reader not a Writer

Remember, we are told statiscally a double engine failure is impossible,

You may have misunderstood :)

A double engine failure has a probability of 1 in a million for all causes and and 1 in 10 million for other than crew error causes. It's only statistically improbable against independent causes that a lot of pilots seem to worry about while dozing for dollars (tongue-in-cheek mode)

Sully demonstrated that it is entirely possible to survive with a double engine failure.

But back to the subject event.

After seeing the pics, this was an extremely close call. I'm afraid that a very bad result would occur if this gets repeated at V1+ You are correct in that the engines and aircraft are not designed to accomodate running into a flock of geese at V1+ whether twins or quads so a large ounce of prevention, avoidance etc. must be regulated.

The issue in this case appears to be an airport bird flock on the runway ala Elmendorf etc.

The pilots must report flocks of this type directly, if seen on the ground, and the airport authorities must take immediate action to close the runway until the birds are moved.

I'm not sure why this event happened or where the loophole is.

Did any crew actually see a flock of geese on the ground near this runway that day and did they report the same? I hestitate to get into the subjectivity of transient bird flocks on the move, but this flock appears to have been on the ground and on a runway.

golfyankeesierra
9th Jun 2010, 07:26
Taxied from Hotel stands with permission to cross 36C for 36L departure. Reported a flock of 12 swans (flying perfect vic formation) at 30 feet flying south-north right up the middle of 36C. Tried for 3 mins to talk ATCs eyes onto them with no success. Seemed to me a lack of concern to what I considered a major hazard.
Strange, bird control is a continuous ops at SPL and they are always eager to shoot some flares on the first opportunity.
You say they were going N-S along 36C. As you were crossing that runway it means it wasn't in use (at SPL crossing active is not allowed), maybe that's why they were less concerned

STC-8
9th Jun 2010, 13:27
After seeing the pics, this was an extremely close call. I'm afraid that a very bad result would occur if this gets repeated at V1+ You are correct in that the engines and aircraft are not designed to accomodate running into a flock of geese at V1+ whether twins or quads so a large ounce of prevention, avoidance etc. must be regulated.From reading the Dutch print media, this incident is being viewed as a very serious one which could have ended badly. Who knows how close the 2cnd engine was to being struck.



I'm not sure why this event happened or where the loophole is.

Did any crew actually see a flock of geese on the ground near this runway that day and did they report the same? I hestitate to get into the subjectivity of transient bird flocks on the move, but this flock appears to have been on the ground and on a runway.The airport management already raised the alarm about the issue of birds nearly 2 years ago. According to statements made by Schiphol there are no resident birds on the airport grounds itself - the airport has measures in place to ensure this.

The problem is that the airport is located in a prime area for large birds such as geese where they can feed & rest. Thus, the issue is of birds & flocks originating from outside the Schiphol grounds, which overfly the airport as they move from one location to another.

I think its reasonable to assume this Air Maroc incident will have set off some major alarm bells at Schiphol, which will now be focusing even more energies & expertise into managing the problem than was previously the case (it was already high on their priority list apparently).

As it is, a version of the bird-detecting radar system developed for the Dutch air force 'ROBIN' is apparently set for introduction this year for experimental trials.

STC-8
9th Jun 2010, 13:36
Two Weeks Ago at AMS,

Taxied from Hotel stands with permission to cross 36C for 36L departure. Reported a flock of 12 swans (flying perfect vic formation) at 30 feet flying south-north right up the middle of 36C. Tried for 3 mins to talk ATCs eyes onto them with no success. Seemed to me a lack of concern to what I considered a major hazard.

Disconcerting!

bobwi
3rd Aug 2010, 14:14
I think the Hudson landing illustrates how serious the problem of large birds is. If you are unlucky enough to get a large bird in both engines after take off, you'll end up in the Dutch polder or worse!

We are being warned through "notams" of the bird risk. However, there is not much we can do with a warning like that. We are not going to cancel a flight because of the risk, and once you see them it will be almost impossible to avoid.

It is a serious problem and it needs to be addressed.

N.N.C
4th Aug 2010, 19:58
According to the Dutch "Onderzoeksraad" in their preliminary report a altitude of some 600 something ft was the maximum altitude during their ordeal.

lomapaseo
4th Aug 2010, 20:19
any translation available of the Dutch Prelim report?

mm43
4th Aug 2010, 20:28
Preliminary Report (http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporten/Prelimenary_report_Royal_Air_Maroc.pdf)

.... it only states the obvious!

mm43

delta3
4th Aug 2010, 21:15
Perhaps a consequence of the "anti" hunting laws that prohibited hunting in Holland up to the point that Geese overpopulation now creates all sorts of problems.

m2c, d3

songbird29
17th Aug 2010, 17:03
The preliminary report does state more than the obvious imho :
NARRATIVE
The aircraft had multiple bird strikes with geese during take-off from runway 18L. This resulted in heavy damage and loss of the left engine. The crew declared an emergency and the aircraft was vectored to runway 18R immediately. The aircraftís climb performance was degraded. The highest altitude during the flight was approximately 630 feet. The aircraft made an overweight landing and the tires of the right main landing gear were blown.

This leads me to the following observations:

1. The altitude of the aircraft being 630 feet is twice the altitude reported by ground observers but far below the required 1700 feet MSA.
2. I attended a presentation of the Robin system detecting bird migration some eight years ago at an aviation conference in the US. I am glad to see it has received fresh attention.
3. The aircraft was vectored, meaning that the low altitude route over the city of Haarlem was on the initiative of the controller and not the pilot.
4. The Bijlmer accident in 1992 where an El Al Cargo 747 crashed into an appartment block in the eastern suburbs of Amsterdam gave rise to a parliamentary recommendation to introduce city contours on the radar screens, in order to avoid reoccurrence of the Bijlmer tragedy.
5. I am looking forward to the full investigation report of this incident.

decurion
29th Nov 2011, 17:38
Here is the final report (in Dutch):

Noodlanding na vogelaanvaring, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, 6 juni 2010 - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid (http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/index.php/onderzoeken/noodlanding-royal-air-maroc-schiphol-airport/#rapporten)

English version will be published later this year.

In a nutshell:

A goose caused the left engine failure during the takeoff on rwy 18L. The pilots did not follow the standard operating procedure following the engine failure at high speed (above V1). The Capt. made a right turn at 280 ft at a bank angle of 37.5 degr. Normal procedure is to continue straight ahead. Also no turns should be made below 400 ft. The crew also lowered the gear again. The crew thought that both engines had failed and anticipated an emergency landing. However, the right engine was working just fine. The aircraft was heavily vibrating which made it difficult to read the instruments. The aircraft climbed and descended several times as the crew lowered and increased the thrust on the right engine. GPWS gave warnings several times. The left engine was still running at low rpm and was shut down some 5 min. after the engine failure. The crew did not use any emergency check list. Flaps remained at the same (incorrect) takeoff setting. ATC tried to get the aircraft to 18R. The aircraft flew at low altitude with constructions and buildings around it at the same altitude. The report states that the crew took unnecessary risks with their decision not to follow SOPs. N-1 Climb performance was degraded because of the lowering of the thrust on the right engine, use of flaps and lowering of the gear.

The report also discusses the problem of geese at Schiphol in length. It also mentions crew task saturation, poor CRM and training as factors.



Read the full report to get every detail that I didnít cover here.:O

eagleflier
30th Nov 2011, 11:52
Accident: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010, flock of birds, engine fire

The Dutch Onderzoeksraad (Dutch Safety Board DSB) released their final report in Dutch (the English version estimated to be released in the first week of December 2011) concluding the probable causes of the accident were:

1. Shortly after takeoff a collision with a bird caused damage to the left hand engine which reduced the available thrust from that engine by about 45%. The crew decided correctly to return to Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport.

2. The implementation of the return however were not in line with standard operating procedures, the deviations were:

- the execution of a right hand turn at 260 feet AGL with a bank angle of 37.5 degrees instead of continuing straight until minimum safe altitude has been reached and the gear has been retracted

- after the gear had retracted it was extended again at very low altitude

- the undamaged right hand engine was reduced from 94% to 83% N1 instead of utilising its maximum thrust available

These deviations from standard operating procedures meant the aircraft was not able to climb to minimum safe altitude, the crew had difficulty controlling the aircraft and was distracted by a number of audio and visual warnings that resulted from unfinished cockpit procedures.

3. Communication and interaction between the two pilots was not according to international standards established for airline pilots. The immediate right turn led to a marginal remaining flight performance, more difficult tasks and complications, so that both pilots did not execute their duties like handling procedures and checklists in the prescribed manner. This introduced new complications like unnecessary warnings and unstable flight.

4. Training of Royal Air Maroc and Atlas Blue did not prepare flight crew for multiple failures in flight.

- Prior to any refresher training the crew was told which failures were to expect. While this is not unusual, the training could not cater for surprise effects.

- Dealing with multiple faults was included only in the initial training for captains.

- Although the flight crew training manual as well as flight crew operations manual contained procedures and checklists to appropriately address the faults, that occurred during this flight, the managers at Royal Air Maroc and Atlas Blue considered this occurrence a unique event that can not be trained for.

5. There was insufficient account of aircraft in distress below minimum vector altitude taken in studies of necessary actions following the recommendations of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission investigating the Bijlmer plane crash (editorial note: the crash of El Al's Boeing 747-200 4X-AXG into an apartment block at Bijlmermeer on Oct 4th 1992). Those aircraft will be in the local control zone of Schiphol, the controllers however are without information of high obstacles in the control zone creating an unnecessarily increased risk of collision. This is especially true if flown outside visual meteorologic conditions.

- Research of Dutch Traffic Control following the recommendations of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission into the Bijlmer crash led to a framework of policies to guide aircraft in distress while flying above the town. The policies establish that the aircraft commander is responsible for flight while air traffic control is responsible to grant all available assistance to the commander, while air traffic control should keep the aircraft as much as possible within the established departure and arrival routes into the runways to limit overflying built up areas. Although the Directorate General for Aviation and Marimite Affairs agreed with these policies, the radar screens of air traffic controller do not depict built up areas.

- Around Schiphol Airport high buildings are virtually everywhere in populated areas. It is therefore not feasable to maneouver in those areas avoiding the obstacles considering the speed and turn radii of aircraft. The aircraft reached a maximum altitude of 730 feet well below the minimum vectoring altitude of 1200 feet. Only two obstacles were depicted on the controller's radar screen, however, there is a high number of obstacles in the control zone that pose a risk to aircraft flying below minimum vectoring altitude, which is especially true if flown outside visual meteorological conditions.

6. The presence of one or more birds with a large mass in the flight trajectory of an aircraft pose a safety risk, especially true for geese because of their high mass and because of them flying in flocks. Most bird strikes occur during takeoff and landing.

7. Research has shown that the responsible parties to control wild life at Schiphol Airport have exhausted their options. Besides frequently closing runways it is necessary to further reduce the risk of bird strikes in the area of responsibilities of other parties.

8. All relevant aviation, agricultural, bird and nature parties recognize the risk of bird strikes and the need to reduce that risk. Despite the concensus on these necessities there is no concensus on the impact of those necessities resulting in different views on the (cost) effective implementation of these measures.

9. The urgency of a flight can not wait for the outcomes of studies of control measures that short term reduce populations of geese as most effective methode to reduce the risk of bird strikes and long term result in a habitat management, detection of birds and deterrence capabilities in view of structural reduction of bird strike risks.

10. Several Non-Government Organisations have joined in the "Geese-7" initiative to reduce and stabilize the populations of various types of geese at a certain size. The implementation of these recommendations is pending awaiting decision by the Ministry of Economy, Agriculture and Innovation.

11. The Ministry of Economy, Agriculture and Innovation, also responsible for flight safety, has not exercised adequate control of bird strike risks.

The Royal Air Maroc Boeing 737-400 CN-RMF with 156 passengers, 4 Royal Air Maroc cabin crew and 2 Atlas Blue pilots, the captain (36, ATPL, 7,540 hours total, 7,200 hours on type) being pilot flying and the first officer (28, ATPL, 2,730 hours total, 2,308 hours on type) being pilot monitoring, departed Schiphol Airport's runway 18L, flaps were set at 5 degrees, engines stabilized at 93.8 and 94.0% N1. The aircraft accelerated through 171 KIAS during rotation (nose up attitude of 6 degrees) and became airborne, at 16 feet AGL the gear was selected up at a speed of 175 KIAS. At that moment the aircraft collided with a flock of geese, which resulted in an immediate loss of all thrust from the left hand engine, the nose landing gear indicated unsafe because of the position of the nose gear did not agree with the selected position. 6 seconds later the aircraft climbed through 140 feet at engine thrust of 45.5% N1 and 93.8% N1, the left engine remained at 45% N1 for the next 4 minutes until shut down. The first officer called out engine #1 was damaged, the call was not responded to by the captain however. The captain remarked that the aircraft was shaking violently and was difficult to control. By himself, without sharing his thoughts with the first officer, he wondered whether both engines had been damaged so that insufficient thrust remained available to sustain flight, therefore he wanted to return immediately considering the decision to return was obvious. He instructed the first officer to select the landing gear down again and declare Mayday, the first officer selected the landing gear down without discussion, then declared emergency.

At a height of 280 feet the commander initiated a right hand turn. Despite the gear being selected down the nose gear continued to indicate unsafe. By the time the first officer completed the Mayday call the aircraft had already reached a bank angle of 21 degrees, the controller recognizing the right turn instructed the aircraft to roll out at 330 degrees and expect vectors for runway 18R. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 37.5 degrees (according to flight data recorder) at an airspeed that reduced from 179 to 156 KIAS. The right hand engine's thrust lever was manually reduced to 83% N1 despite autothrottle being engaged, autothrottle was subsequently disengaged. The aircraft continued to climb slowly reaching 498 feet AGL before descending again at low rate, the GPWS sounded "Don't sink! Don't sink!", the airspeed continued to decrease through 145 KIAS. 60 seconds after initiating the turn the aircraft finally rolled wings level at a heading of 344 degrees.

The captain then requested the first officer to repeat the instructions received from air traffic control and noticed that the nose gear indicated unsafe, the discussion however got interrupted by the purser who called the cockpit reporting the left hand engine was on fire. The captain ignored that message and instead instructed the first officer to tell the cabin crew they were returning to Schiphol. During the next 23 seconds the air traffic controller inquired with the first officer whether the aircraft was able to maintain altitude and whether they could accept vectors, the captain talked to the purser who repeated the left engine was on fire, the GPWS activated a number of times prompting the right thrust lever to be pushed forward until the engine reached 101% N1 and the aircraft began to climb again. After the first officer had finished the transmissions with ATC the captain requested the information to be repeated. The aircraft reached 352 feet and began to descend again, the GPWS again activated "Don't sink!" and "Too Low, Terrain!".

The purser entered the cockpit, the first officer asked him to verify through the peep hole whether the nose gear was extended, then responded to a radio transmission by ATC, which transferred the aircraft onto a discrete frequency (a frequency with no other aircraft on). The purser confirmed the nose gear was down and locked.

The captain increased the right hand thrust lever further to just below firewall, the aircraft began to climb again, the GPWS alerts ceased but nose landing gear warnings now sounded. While the two pilots discussed the new warning ATC issued a heading of 350 degrees to join the downwind for runway 18R and asked whether the aircraft was able to climb, which the crew replied in the negative to.

The gear warning ceased when the aircraft overflew the villages of Vijfhuizen and Haarlem at heights of 380 to 500 feet. When the aircraft was north of these villages ATC issued a new heading of 100 degrees and advised they were 4 miles from touchdown. The captain initiated the turn but rolled out at 065 degrees, the left hand engine was shut down following the memory checklist "Engine Fire or severe damage or separation", while the memory checklist was executed ATC issued heading 160, the instruction was not responded to and was not followed. ATC issued a heading of 210 degrees, the instruction was again not followed, only a minor right turn followed. By that time the crew had completed the memory checklist and found the aircraft north of the aerodrome passing through the extended centerline of runway 18L. ATC issued a heading of 270 to return the aircraft to runway 18R, the crew completed the rest of the checklists concerning the left engine and completed programming of the flight management computer, the aircraft turned through 110 degrees, the first officer inquired with ATC for vectors and was again instructed to turn onto a heading of 270. The crew inquired whether a landing on runway 18L was possible, the approach controller declined because of obstacle clearance (Sony Building) just north of runway 18L. The crew discussed the aircraft was difficult to control, although the engine thrust was constant the airspeed was fluctuating between 160 and 170 knots, the first officer called speed when the airspeed decrased to 156 KIAS. The captain attempted to adjust the right hand thrust lever but noticed it was already at maximum thrust and instructed to firewall the engine for 5 seconds (103.9% N1).

The crew, seeing runway 18C, inquired whether a landing on 18C was possible, which was approved, however, the crew reconsidered and decided to go ahead with the original plan to land on runway 18R, the aircraft was heading at 310 degrees. ATC issued a heading to 215 degrees, the first officer called the instruction out aloud and assisted the captain performing the turn with verbal callouts. The captain captured the localizer manually and flew the ILS with flaps still at 5 degrees. On final approach the captain instructed the first officer to advise cabin crew to not evacuate but prepare for a hard landing. The first officer did not pass that message because the aircraft was already on short final and the first officer called out speeds and sinkrates in order to assist the captain. After main wheel touch down at 175 KIAS the first officer announced the automatic wheel brakes did not engage, the captain instructed to turn the system off, the first officer suggested to keep those nose up as long as possible, followed by a safe touchdown of the nose gear. While the aircraft rolled out the captain again instructed that no evacuation would be done unless there was fire. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway, the right hand engine was shut down.

Emergency services reported no smoke or fire. The right main gear tyres deflated. The passenger disembarked via mobile stairs.

The remains of 24 geese were found in the left main landing gear, the nose landing gear and the electronic compartment.

Examination of the aircraft revealed:

- dents in the underside of the fuselage near the nose of the aircraft
- a dent in the leading edge of the vertical fin
- dents and cracks at the leading edge of the left hand engine's inlet and dents inside the engine
- three fanblades fractured at about midspan damaging all the rest of the fan blades
- the left engine's low and high pressure compressor, the combustion chamber, high pressure turbine guide vanes, high pressure turbine blades, low pressure turbine outlet guide vanes, and first to fourth low pressure turbine stages were all damaged
- on the left side of the left hand engine was soot and oil
- on the fuselage were traces of oil
- the right main gear brakes were jammed

Pollution with engine oil was reported from the village of Harleem, the investigation however could not establish the source of the oil spill stating that the aircraft did not overfly the specific area in question.

Immediately after departure of the Boeing Schiphol operations were advised of a possible bird strike on runway 18L and recovered the remains of 7 dead Canada Geese, weights between 3 and 5 kg (6.6 to 11 lbs) from runway 18L around about the extended centerline of runway 06/24.

MathFox
30th Nov 2011, 14:09
The story from Eagleflier above is also available at Accident: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010, flock of birds, engine fire (http://avherald.com/h?article=42c90189/0000&opt=0)
The Aviation Herald version comes with pictures though.

Right Way Up
30th Nov 2011, 14:48
So those eyewitnesses were correct about the low flying. :eek::eek:

lomapaseo
30th Nov 2011, 15:06
There is a significant difference between the report of a 45% thrust loss and the report of a 45% reduction in N1.

The rest of the report seems OK

AN2 Driver
30th Nov 2011, 15:24
The story from Eagleflier above is also available at Accident: Royal Air Maroc B734 at Amsterdam on Jun 6th 2010, flock of birds, engine fire
The Aviation Herald version comes with pictures though.

WELL OBSERVED.

Eagleflier, if you already copy paste the whole story from AVHERALD, please at least have the curtesy to declare it such and put the link yourself, before somone else finds you out and does it for you. It's not your work and you don't deserve credit for it. :=


Rearding the report itself, the airmanship described in this report is sufficiently appalling that I do hope this gentleman is kept out of a cockpit for the future, or if not, at least out of European airspace.

MathFox
30th Nov 2011, 16:51
After reading the report I have some questions about the effectivity of the training of the pilots

The pilots were of Spanish nationality, hired via temp agencies,
Official RAM course material was in French,
Some non-official materials in English were available,
Neither French nor English was the native tongue for the pilots.

Was there sufficient comprehension of the material presented during the recurrent training by the pilots involved?

The pilots knew what situations to expect during their simulator check rides.

So there was no effective verification of what the pilots retained from their training.
I think that the DSB failed to make this point to RAM... although the reactions from RAM seem to indicate that they realize the issue.

The question "Why did CRM break down?" remains however. The pilots should have had CRM training before their stint at RAM. Why weren't basic CRM principles applied in the cockpit?

decurion
30th Nov 2011, 18:08
It is not clear to me if RAM is completely responsible for the captainís poor skills and CRM. He had over 7000 hrs on the 737 and only started to work recently for RAM. You would expect that he had already sufficient skills in flying a B737 including basic CRM. The report doesnít mention his flying history in detail. I wonder for which operators he had flown the B737 before joining RAM (or actually Atlas Blue). His statements to the DSB were also somewhat strange and in conflict with the data on the CVR (strangely enough the report doesnít provide the CVR!). He also mentioned that the aircraft was uncontrollable and he therefore did not change the flap setting. The FDR shows that the aircraft was flying as expected with a failed engine. There were no control problems. There was only vibration due to the failed engine that was still running. The aircraft reacted to power and roll inputs. Unfortunately a lot of attention in the report is given to the geese problem. Which is important, however it has nothing to do what the captain did after the engine failure. I believe he would have done the same if the engine had failed due to another reason.

eagleflier
30th Nov 2011, 19:07
Dude,
I did not copy and paste from avherald. The title says DSB final report and is available from the DSB website in dutch as well as a other sources in English.
At no time did I try to claim credit for the report.
Get a grip and don't jump at the opportunity to bash.

Callsign Kilo
30th Nov 2011, 19:22
7200hrs on type - really??? Bloody embarrassing performance to be honest with potentially grave consequences. It doesn't bare thinking about what could have happened if this had occurred elsewhere.

A complete and utter breakdown of S.A - turning below 300' with the gear re-extended on the command of the PIC!! :eek: Bank angle over 37.5 degrees with the good engine producing less than MCT. No confirmation of the failure - The captain thought to himself that there had been loss of thrust to both engines. No query as part of a crew with regards to his opinion or reasoning behind his decision to put the gear down! No teamwork, little to no task management. It all culminated by what appeared to be a flap 5 single engine landing. Completely rushed, completely non standard! Lucky that 18C is 3300m long then!

So 7200 hours on a 737! Makes me wonder. I would be interested to see his training records.

exeng
30th Nov 2011, 20:57
A litany of shame to be honest.

We all wonder how we would perform on that day when it it all went wrong - but I just hope I would hang on to numerous years of simulator checks where you were required to follow SOP's.

I also would be interested to see the Captain's training record. How do these people land a job in the LH seat?


Regards
Exeng

lomapaseo
30th Nov 2011, 22:01
Did the report provide a transcript of the CVR?

I agree about a balanced concern both from the geese problem and the crew actions. I don't measure this as much by discussion in the report as I do by the recommendations flowing from the report.

A mention was made of high vibration. It sure would have been with that many blades missing and still running at 45% I would look to the CVR and debrief of the crew to tell me what capability they had to determine the usefulness of the other engine. They may have felt that they had a dual failure.

OK in hindsight they made some wrong choices, but it was successful, so let's go slowly about judging what would be appropriate remidial action.

Callsign Kilo
1st Dec 2011, 09:04
Did the report provide a transcript of the CVR?

No, and a poster has already stated a plausible reason why. There is massive contradiction between what has been recorded and what was debriefed after the event. Conflict of interest here? I'd usually be all in favour with allowing the dust to settle before 'remedial action' is determined; however in the case of this crew all too many things have started to piece together. The preliminary report paints an all too scathing picture. Yes it was 'successful' however it would have been contrary to everything a crew would have been trained to do in relation to this type of scenario. The captain, in particular, doesn't have an answer for any of it. Everything, bar the completion of the relative memory items for 'engine fire, severe damage or separation' appears to be completely non standard. I still maintain that if this had happened anywhere elsewhere (I'm considering the fact that EHAM has one of the lowest MSA's in Europe) then the report wouldn't have been an incident report.

1. Shortly after takeoff a collision with a bird caused damage to the left hand engine which reduced the available thrust from that engine by about 45%. The crew decided correctly to return to Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport.

The yaw would have been quite notable, regardless of the thrust decrease being instantaneous or graduated. The vibration would have been both distracting and disconcerting, however the yaw and the engine indications would have been conclusive, surely? Why concern yourself with anything else other than keeping the aircraft straight and climbing away from the ground? After all, we are talking about someone with 7200hrs of 737 time here!

Here is where it all falls apart for me

2. The implementation of the return however were not in line with standard operating procedures, the deviations were:

I would add that this is not only relative to RAM's or Atlas Blue's SOPs, but any ever published and trained in relation to a Boeing!!

- the execution of a right hand turn at 260 feet AGL with a bank angle of 37.5 degrees instead of continuing straight until minimum safe altitude has been reached and the gear has been retracted

This is just ludicrous and wouldn't correspond with anything that the crew had been trained before. The captain 'believed' but neither verbalised or sought confirmation that he was dealing with loss of thrust to both engines. So he or she acted on impulse or panic? 37.5 degrees of bank would have induced 'Bank Angle' and increased load factor reducing manouvring margin.

- after the gear had retracted it was extended again at very low altitude

This really baffles me. Why did the FO not consider this command to be contrary to the overall objective here. Why did he or she not voice their concerns about any of the actions of the captain. Inquiry and advocation? Analysis and information processing? He had called that engine number one was damaged. Why was he not left aghast by the Captain's actions? Many would have now been screaming at the guy in the fear that he was about to kill them!

- the undamaged right hand engine was reduced from 94% to 83% N1 instead of utilising its maximum thrust available

No one knows the reason why, it was probably inadvertent due to the stress of the situation.

These deviations from standard operating procedures meant the aircraft was not able to climb to minimum safe altitude, the crew had difficulty controlling the aircraft and was distracted by a number of audio and visual warnings that resulted from unfinished cockpit procedures.

The report's fairly conclusive here.

And here.....

These deviations from standard operating procedures meant the aircraft was not able to climb to minimum safe altitude, the crew had difficulty controlling the aircraft and was distracted by a number of audio and visual warnings that resulted from unfinished cockpit procedures.


- Although the flight crew training manual as well as flight crew operations manual contained procedures and checklists to appropriately address the faults, that occurred during this flight, the managers at Royal Air Maroc and Atlas Blue considered this occurrence a unique event that can not be trained for.

I don't know how they came to this conclusion. Given the increasing level of bird strikes that occur on an annual basis and the recent massive publication of Sully's encounter with the Hudson, how can the event be considered unique? It could also be easily simulated. In fact, the majority of this event is; every 6 months! All you need to do is add 'Gear Disagree' due to the damage with the nose wheel gear. The EGPWS warnings were induced by the crew due to their decision to turn at 260' and re-extend the gear. They also removed the aircraft from the protection assured when climbing straight ahead when single engine. This again is surely contrary to everything the crew were trained to do in the event of a EFATO, unless they were dealing with an engine out or emergency turn procedure.

The remainder of the incident involved:
1. The aircraft not climbing above 500' and the aircraft sinking to 352'
2. No QRH checklists completed
3. Little to no CRM techniques utilised. No decision making discussed.
4. A series of distracting EGPWS aural messages along with master caution indications and engine alerts prior to shutdown
5. Speed dropping to as low as 145KIAS whilst in the turn.
6. A manual Flap 5 landing at 175KIAS. Single Engine landings on the 737 are usually Flap 15.

So who's the Captain contracting for now then? :mad:

RAT 5
1st Dec 2011, 12:30
Everyone is correct in so many ways. I'm also curious that he banked 37.5 INTO the LIVE engine. That takes a lot off very deliberate control input. The fact that N1% was reduced made it easier. At 100% it would have been extremely difficult. As for the F/O, was he sitting there waiting to be toast? The questions arise as to where these guys were trained? They must have flown for an airline before they became contractors. What background checks did the agency carry out, and what checks/tests/training did RAM conduct? The latter should be very interesting and necessary to their local CAA.

Microburst2002
1st Dec 2011, 12:53
So it is true: nowadays loss of control is the public enemy number one of aviation safety.

So much for the CFIT reign.

All those years bombarding us with CRM... OK, there was lack of crew communication and lack of first officer assertivenes, but the main problem here was inability to control the aircraft.

What has to be analyzed is: why was the pilot unable to control the airplane? the only explanation is that the captain saw the large flock of birds, felt the impacts and thought that he had lost or could lose both engines. Hence the cracy turn, and lowering the landing gear. I can't explain the thrust reduction, though.

Again, everything seems easy from my chair. Keep wings level, keep climbing, may day, checklists, vectors, landing. Only and engine fire with vibration.

And the nose gear warning.

And not knowing exactly what was going on, who knows maybe you lost two engines...

damn, not so simple!

decurion
1st Dec 2011, 12:59
The F/O had 2308 hrs on the B737 of which 2147 hrs at Atlas Blue (RAM). He got most of his hrs/training at Atlas Blue. The Capt. had 7200 hrs on the B737 of which 1218 hrs flying for Atlas Blue. For which operators the Capt. worked before Atlas Blue isn't clear.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.

Callsign Kilo
1st Dec 2011, 13:01
Very true RAT 5, however the decision to turn into the knackered engine undoubtably wasn't a conscious decision. I think capacity had been completely strained here. The reason for the left turn was probably something along the lines departing from 18L ( in order to keep the runway on the captains side ) or something as simple as the captain sitting on the left of the aircraft! Who knows. Yes, the manouvre would be very difficult to control, especially with the gear down. I don't believe the thrust was decreased on number 2 due to this. I don't think the guy displays the necessary capacity. I may be wrong.

As for their training records, these may be difficult to track. I have flown with many contractors. The vast majority have flown for airlines across the globe; many now defunct. From their stories, recurrent training and checking standards vary widely. However can you really accumulate 7200hrs on type with a command without displaying some degree of awareness. That's baffling

Hotel Tango
1st Dec 2011, 13:02
I can't help wondering how many of those 7,200 hours was real time to start with?

Tropical Update
1st Dec 2011, 13:08
According to page 28 of the report they both flew for Futura International Airways before they started with Atlas Blue.

hawker750
1st Dec 2011, 13:32
Quote:
and completed programming of the flight management computer,

Give me strength, who needs an FMS when a vector to final is needed. Can no modern Jet been flown without a computer being involved or is it just that the pilots do not know how to do it?

MathFox
1st Dec 2011, 15:06
I think it's fair that the DSB spends quite some paper on the topic of goose control, because implementing measures will mean a structural safety improvement for EHAM.

On the incident flight, it looks like the captain lost his cool, made several bad decisions and seemed to have forgotten all he was trained to do in this situation, I don't think that a CVR transcript will show more than "panic in the cockpit".
We all agree that a pilot who panics because of an incident is likely to make the already bad situation worse. The big question is how to get cool heads in the cockpit so that we don't depend on luck to get the plane safely on the ground. In my opinion simulator training plays a big role in this.
But to asses whether a pilot will "break" it is important that the situation of an incident is simulated as good as possible, and that includes the aspect of surprise. It is not too difficult to include that in a simulator session...
On the other hand, pilots in a simulator know that they'll walk away from a "crash"; creating the true fear of death will be impossible in a sim.

flyburg
1st Dec 2011, 16:02
RAT 5, sorry, I'm cooking and enjoying a beer with it, but it seems to me that banking into the dead engine does not require any decisive control input! Just let go of the controls and every airplane will bank into the dead engine!! Like I said, I'm enjoying a nice beer but did I read your comment correctly or is my brain really failing me?

CONF iture
1st Dec 2011, 16:14
Don't be sorry vanHorck, eyewitnesses (http://www.pprune.org/5739915-post10.html) can be reliable as well ...

MathFox
1st Dec 2011, 17:21
It is pretty disconcerting (to put it mildly) to think, when boarding a commercial flight, that such an inept pilot may be at the controls.
On the other hand, this captain completed 7000 hours of routine flights and you would most likely have enjoyed a safe flight with him. Who could tell beforehand that a dozen of geese would make him lose his mind?

captplaystation
1st Dec 2011, 18:23
Following the Hudson incident, Ryanair in Ciampino, and for those of us with longer memories, Dan Air in Newcastle, it is reasonable to be afraid in any major strike that you have buggered both engines, but. . . . . if (for some reason we cannot fathom) he was convinced this was the case,regardless of the evidence available, why didn't he simply request a visual teardrop & immediate reland on the reciprocal runway, & then maximise the performance available to gain enough height to make a 180 (yes yes I know , more like a 220/230 I have played in the Sim with this scenario) & reland in some sort of controlled fashion ? This guy seems to have panicked completely, resulting in. . . A -Failed to ascertain he had no particular problem with the good engine & /or B - decided the severe vibration he was feeling was due to the good engine , ignoring the fact the duff one was still running C - seems to have really panicked himself into taking precipitous action , at very low altitude, without even telling the guy next to him what he had decided & why (never mind involving ATC in the secret) + D - having made this decision, compounded the cock-up by pretty poor flying & bizarre actions (lowering the gear/ decreasing power on the good engine.)
Totally agree with previous posters, they were very lucky this didn't happen anywhere involving terrain or weather, or we would be discussing an accident report.
One has to ask " WHAT WERE THEY DOING ? ? ? " it doesn't really appear they had an answer to this question.
Totally lost the plot, is how it sadly appears.

sitigeltfel
1st Dec 2011, 21:10
I'm also curious that he banked 37.5 INTO the dead engine.

1. Shortly after takeoff a collision with a bird caused damage to the left hand engine which reduced the available thrust from that engine by about 45%. The crew decided correctly to return to Amsterdam's Schiphol Airport.

2. The implementation of the return however were not in line with standard operating procedures, the deviations were:

- the execution of a right hand turn at 260 feet AGL with a bank angle of 37.5 degrees instead of continuing straight until minimum safe altitude has been reached and the gear has been retracted:confused:

rvblyky7
1st Dec 2011, 23:20
The F/O had 2308 hrs on the B737 of which 2147 hrs at Atlas Blue (RAM). He got most of his hrs/training at Atlas Blue. The Capt. had 7200 hrs on the B737 of which 1218 hrs flying for Atlas Blue. For which operators the Capt. worked before Atlas Blue isn't clear.
Note Atlas Blue was joined with RAM in March of 2011.

Not only did he have 7200 hrs, he was also TRI on type...

McBruce
1st Dec 2011, 23:52
Not to mention that he was single engine, gear down, flaps out and if I remember correctly, it was a landing over MLW, so it was a heavy bird. Its sluggish enough on single engine with gear up. Lack of performance created by his actions made him to question the aircrafts performance?

Microburst2002
2nd Dec 2011, 06:55
The fact that thrust lever reached the firewall makes me think they were in a "slow flight", inside the reverse command region. Small increments of thrust will not suffice, and more and more thurst is required to maintain an airspeed, until you are almost in TOGA. It takes a large overpower to get out of that situation.

sean maxwell
3rd Dec 2011, 13:53
Only an SLF, but have a keen interest in Boeing aircraft. I understood that the 737 series doesn't have fuel dumping capability. I don't mind being proved wrong, just interested to know.

Can any of real pilots confirm / disagree?

Callsign Kilo
3rd Dec 2011, 14:04
No fuel dumping capabilities on the 737:ok:

sean maxwell
3rd Dec 2011, 14:16
Thanks! I'll go back to armchair flying now. :)

RAT 5
5th Dec 2011, 10:29
To all who noticed my deliberate mistake about Dead & Live engine I award you an early Christmas present and a Prune Pen. I've amended my error, but you all knew what I meant, not what I said. Brain and finger disconnect. Ah, there comes another source of an incident when you did what you thought I meant and not what I said.

Liftdumper
7th Dec 2011, 06:17
In the end of the report, some comments from the pilots can be found. Basically what they do is blaiming RAM for the poor training and lack of accesability to manuals.
A bit cheap for a TRI who was not able to fly his 737 on 1 engine in an acceptable way.

MathFox
7th Dec 2011, 11:00
FYI: the English translation of the DSB report is available now via Emergency landing Royal Air Maroc, Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, 6 June 2010 - De Onderzoeksraad voor veiligheid (http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/index.php/onderzoeken/noodlanding-royal-air-maroc-schiphol-airport/#rapporten)
Direct link to the 152 page pdf: http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/rapporten/Rapport_Emergency_Landing_after_bird_strike_EN_web_06122011. pdf

Right Way Up
7th Dec 2011, 16:19
Info suggests a TRI (A) which would be a base trainer. :eek: