NTSB Final Report on US Airways 1549

[aterpster]

http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2010/AAR1003.pdf

[deSitter]

I'm often amazed how a CO or FO's innocuous statement in the CVR transcript often presages the coming emergency. Sullenberger blithely states, 30 seconds before the bird strike - "uh beautiful view of the Hudson today.." - perhaps this view spring-loaded him for ditching and helped focus his energies. An attempt to return to LGA would surely have failed.

Fate is the hunter - often the prophetic remark has a darker ending. (UAL 585, AAL 587).

-drl

[infrequentflyer789]

Thanks for the link, some interesting weekend reading in there, and some wry smiles:


... an Evacuation checklist, which included the following procedures for the captain: select parking brake ON, turn engine master switches 1 and 2 to OFF
...
The captain stated that he considered completing his part of the checklist but that he realized that the items would not help the situation
I bet he deadpanned that statement in his interview too.

On a more serious note:
17% of pax watched the safety brief (or "most" of it)
8% of pax actually looked at the safety card
6% of pax got themselves a life jacketOuch. They were very very lucky to be in an EOW aircraft with the pilot they had, but that's really riding your luck.

[protectthehornet]

PilotS (plural)

[ehwatezedoing]

6% of pax got themselves a life jacket
Including one who didn't watched the safety brief and the safety card!

http://jetsmoke.com/crash.jpg

:}

[Capt Groper]

Three pages of checklist to be completed in 2,500' whilst manipulating switches and providing support to the PF. Also some procedural steps of the stand alone Ditching Checklist missing, i.e. switching off nuisance warnings, i.e. GPWS.

Also, one would hope that there will be a similar change like that that occurred after the SWR 111 fire. If at any stage a Ditching or Forced landing is imminent go straight to the BOXED PRIORITY PROCEDURAL ITEMS, only resume the original checklist if time avails.

[protectthehornet]

wetbehind the ear

I would use the term : maintain a flare reserve.

sadly, I can't open the PDF to read the report...but early on in the discussion, sully mentioned throughout that he just kept the stick back for optimum glide...but didn't have anything left in terms of energy to arrest the descent.

[SomeGuyOnTheDeck]

If a non-pilot might be permitted to make an observation, from what I've read, accurately judging height above water can be difficult, so maintaining excess speed to flare may be of doubtful benefit - a misjudgement could make the resulting impact worse than a steady rate of descent. Imagine the situation in poor visibility. I'd say an 'optimum glide' approach should be all that can reasonably be allowed for...

[protectthehornet]

someguyonthedeck

in the above post, the test pilot used the raido altimeter/radar altimeter to help judge his height above the water.

while on open water, away from other visual references, without the radio altimeter, it would be more difficult.

but in New York, with many common things nearby to compare heights, it shouldn't have been too hard.

[ehwatezedoing]

SomeGuyOnTheDeck,
And to second what protectthehornet wrote:
Basic floatplane skills (http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:ZEQj8MbBl6EJ:www.fortlangleyair.com/docs/Basic%2520Floatplane%2520Skills.pdf+glassy+water+float+plane&hl=en&gl=ca&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiO2yPbjThQDK4GvZRkRdD_rhr_ubKphxUa2zkzNAVHdMs3fb X01Ft1PEiWTMSmgIi49nhH18UqaJaemWSJyLk4miJKpnO7OJCB8NnkzCbux3 WpgzDjDBVkJrS8KIO-YzYGOeuq&sig=AHIEtbSbgVBEnGPb-cYC0qXYl597EW_17Q)
Calm conditions known as glassy water are the most deceptive phenomenon known to the float pilot. It is an
outright dangerous surface to land on if not completely comfortable with the procedures. The height above the
water surface is impossible to estimate correctly, making it extremely difficult to judge the final few feet. Many
experienced float pilots have been caught up in the deception. The most dangerous glassy water condition is
when the water surface is clear. The pilot will be looking at the bottom of the river or lake and not at the surface of
the water.

They had a lot of visual clues in the Hudson River to complete their water landing "adequately"

[SomeGuyOnTheDeck]

Protectthehornet, I can see the merit of using a radio altimeter if it is working, but is it necessarily wise to assume it will?

I'm not suggesting that in the case of flight 1549 allowing sufficient excess speed to flare would have been wrong - with hindsight it might have reduced damage and injuries - but as a more general observation, expecting an accurate flare might be unrealistic, and if a plane is to be expected to survive a ditching, a flare should not be assumed.

It can't be realistic to assume everything the pilots do in such circumstances is optimal, instead one should assume they are competent, and do what would be reasonably expected. I'd say that those on flight 1549 far exceeded this...

[protectthehornet]

some guyon the deck

why wouldn't the radio altimeter work? lack of electrical power? hitting the thing with a spanner?

the radio altimeter is probably as reliable as the radio (and they used it to call ATC), and the flight controls.

And of course, if they had been without a radio altimeter, and on a glassy surface, I too would just set up a min descent and hope for the best

but they weren't.

quite frankly, I might have gone for interstate 80...but I wonder what the bridge toll would have been.

;-)

[IcePack]

Wasn't Sully just holding the a/c on alpha prot? So the a/c was just flying it's own pitch. I guess it was also trying to action alpha floor to no avail. Amazing it stayed in normal law. Like others he was lucky & the flying technique was not found wanting.

[Teevee]

None of my business really because I'm SLF but I really prefer that the other way around ... the flying technique was not found wanting which gave him the chance to get lucky ....

[Huck]

About twice as important as sink rate: they hit wings level. The structure took the decel load straight down the fuselage.

One wingtip or nacelle hitting a wave first and it would have been massive yaw, impact loads to the side of the fuse and a broken up airplane, on the bottom in seconds...

[patrickal]

Protectthehornet said:
quite frankly, I might have gone for interstate 80...but I wonder what the bridge toll would have been.

Actually, the outbound George Washington Bridge has no tolls, so he would have escaped the city without any additional charges. :) But on the other hand, between the standard rush hour traffic on that route and the fact that there is hardly a straight line section of highway till you get out past Teteboro, any attempt to land there would have been a probable disaster. Although I am lowly SLF, I know the geography and terrain of the NYC area very well, having been both born and raised there and a resident for my 55+ years. He took the best option.


As far as luck goes, he was "lucky" in that


It was a clear day
There was no wind and the water was dead calm. (extremely rare in NY at that time of year)
Although there was plenty of boat traffic in the river to effect a rescue, none were in his way.


But given all of luck elements, both pilots still had decisions to make and actions to take that were all dependent upon their skill levels and years of experience. Would a CRJ jockey on a regional airline fared as well.?? Maybe, but I sort of doubt it.

[Huck]

Would a CRJ jockey on a regional airline fared as well.??


Pinnacle 3701. (http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2007/AAR0701.htm)

[protectthehornet]

patricakl
thanks for the info on the bridge toll. I'm on the other end of interstate 80 out west.

sully minizmied risk to those on the ground by landing on the river.

[Right Way Up]

Quote:
Would a CRJ jockey on a regional airline fared as well.??

Pinnacle 3701.

Thats a bit cheeky. :E Sully had the benefit of daylight. Although how the Pinnacle crew got there is another thing!!

Interesting seeing the transcript that they had a TCAS RA during the final descent. I somehow doubt they would have even heard it.

[Storminnorm]

i once heard that (especially) Canadian float plane pilots
carry a house brick to chuck out of the window when landing
on flat calm water.
Perhaps a future modification for the Airbus ??

[Robert Campbell]

PTH

Bridge toll wouldn't have been very high. They charge by axle:D

I flew floats in Canada for awhile. On glassy water, we set up a shallow descent in touchdown attitude and waited.

As for the brick, that only works if you have power to go around and make another approach to the newly disturbed water.

[SomeGuyOnTheDeck]

I flew floats in Canada for awhile. On glassy water, we set up a shallow descent in touchdown attitude and waited.
What would you have done engine off?

I cant help thinking that expecting a ditching aircraft to be able to accurately flare is unrealistic in most circumstances - that was the only point I was trying to make. Given the (fortunately) minor injuries received in this incident, it seems that a 'best glide' descent is entirely survivable, and working on this assumption has got to be the starting point for any changes sought as a result.

[Prawn2king4]

Think you make your own luck.

These guys had three and a half minutes in which to diagnose and attempt to rectify an emergency, select an area to land, run the checklist as far as it would take them, inform ATC and pax and then successfully ditch an aircraft at an almost MAUW of 150,000 lbs.

[misd-agin]

This is not a "best glide" landing. L/D was over 200 kts(220 KIAS +/-?).

The report says they were 15-19 knots below 'V sub LS' (Vls) and at AOA limit and touchdown was at 750 FPM (12.6 fps).

Having some energy to flare might have reduced the impact damage.

[AirRabbit]

In 1 of these 12 runs, a -0.2° touchdown flightpath angle was achieved by an Airbus test pilot who used a technique that involved approaching the water at a high speed, leveling the airplane a few feet above the water with the help of the radar altimeter, and then bleeding off airspeed in ground effect until the airplane settled into the water. Nice one to note.( Can we call it a dive and drive mindset rather than continous descend ? )

Wasn't Sully just holding the a/c on alpha prot? So the a/c was just flying it's own pitch. I guess it was also trying to action alpha floor to no avail. Amazing it stayed in normal law. Like others he was lucky & the flying technique was not found wanting.

IcePack – you are correct. While one engine was inoperative, the other one was still operating although not producing much, if any, thrust. It was the continued operation of that engine that prevented reversion to direct law – and thereby prevented any last minute “flare” capability.

[protectthehornet]

air rabbit

wouldn't the plane allow a flare in a normal landing? is this change in law dependent upon gear down as well as radio altitude?????

[AirRabbit]

wouldn't the plane allow a flare in a normal landing? is this change in law dependent upon gear down as well as radio altitude?????

Of course a normal flare would be allowed under normal law - but as IcePack correctly notes - in normal law there is a maximum angle of attack that is allowed (called Alpha Floor) regardless of where the airplane is at the moment. This "protection function" is disabled in "direct law" and the pilot has complete authority over the pitch attitude of the airplane. Because in this situation, both engines were not shut down (i.e., even though the one engine running was producing very little, if any, viable thrust) the computers were still "in control," and alpha floor could not be exceeded. In other words, the pilot could have had (and I understand that Sully DID have) the side-stick controller at the full aft position, but the alpha floor protection would allow only the computed maximum angle of attack. In this case, had the airplane actually been in "direct law," the pilot would have had the ability to pull the nose up even farther than was allowed here, and that may have allowed a more shallow descent and thereby a less impacting touchdown. Of course that is speculative by any measure. Under most circumstances there would be little, if any, need to exceed a designated angle of attack very close to the ground. For example, landing an A-320 in a full stall cannot be accomplished under "normal law" - but it can be accomplished under "direct law." Why? Because there are precious few reasons why someone would want to land a commercial jetliner in a full stall, and limiting the angle of attack also protects from a tail strike (infrequent, but more frequent than other circumstances) - but it also prevents what would otherwise have been an "over rotation" in this case to, I believe in Sully's mind anyway, lessen the touchdown force for the inevitable water landing. However, loss of envelope protection means all loss of envelope protection; i.e., the bank angle protection would be lost as well.

The "law" that is operational at any given time is related to the status of the computers and the malfunctions or combination of malfunctions existing at any given time. Even though the aircraft OEM cites the probability of a complete computer failure being less than 10, raised to the -9 power, the FAA still requires the pilots to be trained on certain tasks when operating in Direct Law (i.e., without envelope protection), and the simulators used for training must be tested in a representative number of those conditions. There are several sets of circumstances that will put the airplane into operation without envelope protection - "direct law" - notice, I said "sets" of circumstances - that means a combination of circumstances - and I think there are about 10 - 12 such combinations. Unfortunately, some of those combinations can be reached quite quickly in some cases.

Sorry for the "ramble." But I think it important that those who are interested should know ALL the available facts. I think Sully and his FO did a wonderful job of maintaining control of the airplane - but, in my estimation, the most significant thing he did was, make a reasonable decision, and he stuck to it - even when others were offering other alternatives. My hat was off to him and his first officer - and will stay that way - particularly knowing the predilictions of the airplane under the conditions that crew was facing - and that just makes that hat position more appropriate.

[protectthehornet]

thanks rabbit

yes, the right thing to do is stick with your plan, as other options are constantly getting worse while the plan you are on increasingly becomes the only choice.

certainly, if a giant aircraft carrier with a mile long flight deck had risen from the hudson, sully could rightly have changed his mind. ;-)

I don't care for the airbus and its control laws. I actually could have been captain on the A320 series (for more money) but elected to fly the 737 instead ( also a POS).

but that's that.

I do think he would have been better off at speed plus 10 to give a better flare (note speed at stick full aft, add ten knots and hold that till flare regime)

[CONF iture]

While one engine was inoperative, the other one was still operating although not producing much, if any, thrust. It was the continued operation of that engine that prevented reversion to direct law – and thereby prevented any last minute “flare” capability.
Actually there is a time when both engines were shut down.
That's the early start of the APU by the captain that kept the aircraft in normal law.

I guess it was also trying to action alpha floor to no avail.
No way he was trying to do anything like it.

the computers were still "in control," and alpha floor could not be exceeded
Alpha Max could not be exceeded.
What is surprising is that absolutely no graph from the FDR has been published.
Technically speaking Alpha Max has not even been approached during the flare despite the full back stick action by the captain.

Finding 24 remains pretty vague :Training pilots that sidestick inputs may be attenuated when the airplane is in the alpha-protection mode would provide them with a better understanding of how entering the alpha-protection mode may affect the pitch response of the airplane.
I'd like to know more on that "may be attenuated"

[AirRabbit]

:oh:
Sorry about using the wrong term - I'm not a "bus" guy - just under the impression that AFloor was driven by an AoA that when approached disallowed any further increase in AoA and would command an increase in thrust (to TOGA - regardless of throttle position) and a retraction of any speed brake extended. In that there were no speed brakes deployed and (virtually) zero thrust available, the only thing that was accomplished was the disallowance to further increase AoA - regardless of the sidestick position.

[ChrisVJ]

A comment , if I may, from a private pilot. I fly an amphibian and note that being unable to flare more forcefully may have been a saving grace. Aircraft that land in water nose high and in stall tend to touch down tail first and then the nose drops suddenly and forcefully enough to submarine. Note that the fulcrum point for a stall on , U/c up is not around the main U/c position (just aft of the CG,) but further back at the tail. Aft end touch downs cause a strong rotational moment.

Float planes have narrow pontoons with pronounced V which penetrate the surface and act as a cushion. If I stall on my plane, a rather flat hull, it causes pronounced and rather scary porpoising even though the step is only about three feet behind the CG.

Just my very humble opinion but attitude is more important that 10 to 20 knots of speed at this point.

[lederhosen]

I just read 'Fly by Wire' by William Langewiesche, and can thoroughly recommend it. He describes in a very balanced way what happened not just during the flight but also during the hearings.

He makes clear his view that the crew did a great job and he argues compellingly that the design of the plane also helped. Interestingly there are very few differences between his version of events written last year and the official report just published.

[protectthehornet]

no one is advocating a full stall landing in this case, but a descent rate of less than 750 fpm would have been better.

lederhosen, as I mentioned a long time ago...other comparable airplanes have done better water landings without any electronic gadgets.

[BOAC]

Are we sure this '750fpm' is correct at 'touchdown'? What I recall of the actual video did not look like a full blown, no arrest ILS rate of descent!

[lederhosen]

Protectthehornet I gather we are both 'if its not Boeing I'm not going' captains. I have no axe to grind about Airbus aircraft. The gist of my post was to recommend Langewiesche's book.

Have you read it? It is available in e-book format. If I have any criticism it is that it is a little short. But then again I guess that shows I would have enjoyed reading more.

Not being funny but can you list some examples of more successful comparable aircraft ditchings?

[dvv]

lederhosen, check out Tu-124 on the Neva in 1963. The landing itself was even more successful than Sully's, but yeah — they had more time for pondering the situation. On the other hand, the Neva is more of a slalom course than the straight and wide Hudson.

Tupolev 124 ditching in Neva River - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tupolev_124_ditching_in_Neva_River)

[aguadalte]

Let's see:
PITCH ATTITUDE PROTECTION

Pitch attitude is limited to :

30° nose up in conf 0 to 3 (progressively reduced to 25° at low speed).


25° nose up in conf FULL (progressively reduced to 20° at low speed).


15° nose down (indicated by green symbols "=" on the PFD's pitch scale).


The flight director bars disappear from the PFD when the pitch attitude exceeds 25° up or 13° down. They return to the display when the pitch angle returns to the region between 22° up and 10° down.




HIGH ANGLE OF ATTACK PROTECTION

Under normal law, when the angle of attack becomes greater than prot, the system switches elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode, in which the angle of attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. That is, in the prot range, from prot to max, the sidestick commands directly. However, the angle of attack will not exceed max, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick, the angle of attack returns to prot and stays there.

This protection against stall and windshear has priority over all other protections. The autopilot disconnects at prot + 1°.






V prot, V floor, V max vary according to the weight and the configuration.

To deactivate the angle of attack protection, the pilot must push the sidestick :

More than 8° forward, or


More than 0.5° forward for at least 0.5 seconds, when < max.


In addition, below 200 feet, the angle of attack protection is also deactivated, when :

Sidestick deflection is less than half nose-up, and


Actual is less than prot – 2°.


Note :
At takeoff, prot is equal to max for 5 seconds.

floor is activated through the A/THR system, when :

is greater than floor (9.5° in configuration 0; 15° in configuration 1, 2; 14° in configuration 3 ; 13° in configuration FULL), or


Sidestick deflection is greater than 14° nose up, with either the pitch attitude or the angle of attack protection active.

The floor function is available from lift-off to 100 feet RA before landing.
FLARE MODE

The flight mode changes to flare mode when the aircraft passes 50 feet RA as it descends to land.

The system memorizes the attitude at 50 feet, and that attitude becomes the initial reference for pitch attitude control.

As the aircraft descends through 30 feet, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to 2° nose down over a period of 8 seconds. This means that it takes gentle nose-up action by the pilot to flare the aircraft.


Since the aircraft was in "Normal Law" (one engine is enough to keep it in that mode) it should have behaved as designed, i.e., when crossing 50', it progressively must have changed into Flare Mode, therefore allowing a further increase of the AoA, during those few seconds from 100', (protections lost) till ditching.
IMHO - (and this is not to say that Sully made a bad landing, there is still room for proving that there is a better way to ditch an A320) - the best way to glide a FBW aircraft into a ditching, is to fly it stick neutral, once you were able to set-up a glide speed (as we usually do for a landing), in order to allow for (further stick movement) to flare.

[protectthehornet]

lederhosen

I am thinking of a JAL DC8 at San Francisco, CA USA late 1960's or so...landed in the bay...gear down! plane was recovered and started flying again after repairs.

[RegDep]

JAL DC-8 at San Francisco 1968

http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR70-02.pdf

[lederhosen]

Don't remember that one. But I can remember the JAL DC8 with the unstable captain who deliberately crashed into the bay short of Haneda. The poor flight engineer who was trying to restrain the suicidal captain was sadly killed. I don't think the airplane was reusable on that occasion, at least in part due to the interaction with the approach lights. However I think we can all agree that Douglas built strong airplanes.

The successful examples from nearly fifty years ago show this is an unusual enough occurance for airlines to have been seriously considering if they could save weight by ditching the survival gear. The regulators thank heavens saw things differently. I personally was unconvinced up to the Hudson event that a landing on water might be a survivable option, particular given that apart from a non normal checklist in the QRH this is not something normally covered in training. In open waters I still think a happy outcome is not very likely.

I was aware of the Russian ditching, again in sheltered waters, the Neva is actually pretty wide for at least a couple of kilometres either side of the Hermitage. You might want to avoid the bridges though! Again they built solid machines.

[protectthehornet]

Japan Airlines Flight 2 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japan_Airlines_Flight_2) -

might be some info on the DC8 I mentioned there.

they built them really well then. DC8 was taken supersonic during flight testing...boeing and airbus don't do that

[aterpster]

protectthehornet:
might be some info on the DC8 I mentioned there.

If memory serves me correctly they determine that he was following the flight director to the exclusion of raw data. The FD was tracking the localizer but the pitch mode was in vertical speed.

The brief NTSB statement of probable cause says he was auto-pilot coupled but, if so, it was vertical speed for the pitch mode.

[CONF iture]

I just read 'Fly by Wire' by William Langewiesche ... Interestingly there are very few differences between his version of events written last year and the official report just published.
Makes me wonder where he got this privileged information from ... ?
Would he be the messenger from Airbus to publicize how great is the technology ?

There is not much to be proud of as the protections prevented the pilot to flare the airplane as he would have loved. For a ditching, Airbus recommends a touchdown with approximately 11 degrees of pitch and minimum aircraft vertical speed, but despite the full backstick, the protections did not allow more than 9.5 degrees and the pilots could do nothing to decrease that impressive vertical speed of 750 feet a minute.

"The Truth About the Miracle on the Hudson" (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/11/books/11book.html?_r=4&scp=1&sq=pilot%20hudson%20river&st=cse) would have been an inappropriate subtitle as there was certainly no miracle due to the technology, but the positive outcome is entirely due to the experience of pilots who took the only viable option.
Despite what pretend Mister Langewiesche or the BEA in the Appendix D, I believe Sully would have obtained a better touchdown on his own without the protections interfering with his experience.

[CONF iture]

he stalled it in
Where are your data ekwhistleblower ?

[protectthehornet]

1. I don't think he stalled it in.

2. I do think additional speed for flare would have helped, but who cares if the plane ever flys again...I don't...as long as the people are ok.

3. I do think he made the following mistakes:

a. going back for the maintenance log book

b. not grabbing a portable PA system (bullhorn/powered megaphone)

C. not specifically warning cabin crew and passengers that the landing would be on water.

d. not using correct radio call sign...ATC made the same mistake.

e. not attempting evasive action for birds. pulling up or/and banking would have put the engines in a slightly different path of birds.

F. bidding the airbus ...I think an older jet like the DC9/md80 with aft mounted engines with smaller air intakes might have continued to produce meaningful thrust....the wings and fuselage would have intercepted a portion of the flock of birds.

G. not closing the outlfow valve/ditch switch.

if memory serves, an airbus pilot told me you could change laws by flicking a couple of switches or circuit breakers.

[BOAC]

Oh my God!:ugh:

[ekwhistleblower]

Conf,

Where are your data ekwhistleblower ?

The NTSB concludes that the captain’s difficulty maintaining his intended airspeed during the final approach resulted in high AOAs, which contributed to the difficulties in flaring the airplane, the high descent rate at touchdown, and the fuselage damage.

The airplane’s airspeed in the last 150 feet of the descent was low enough to activate the alpha-protection mode of the airplane’s fly-by-wire envelope protection features. The captain progressively pulled aft on the sidestick as the airplane descended below 100 feet, and he pulled the sidestick to its aft stop in the last 50 feet, indicating that he was attempting to raise the airplane nose to flare and soften the touchdown on the water.

Not criticising just looking at the facts. Because speed had not been maintained to allow for a flare, the aircraft effectively flew into the water without the pitch axis under control. In the bus if you back stick it with power it max performs, with no power it sets maximum AoA and goes splash! You can argue all you like that it is in controlled flight but effectively it is on the cusp of a stall with no opportunity to improve the situation, a bit like a carrier landing.

[CONF iture]

with no power it sets maximum AoA
So why it did not ?
Show me the data please.

[lederhosen]

Hang on a moment guys! How many of you have tried landing a jet deadstick? Everyone agrees (including Sullenberger who was apparently surprised by the flight recording) that the speed was lower than intended during the final part of the flight. He claims to have been aiming for a margin above VLS, (lowest selectable speed). The experts point out that green dot would have given a better glide.

But think about it, you flamed out over a big city and are trying a restart, max L/D is in this case pretty irrelevant compared to minimum sink. The fact that with hindsight the engines were too damaged for a restart to be possible cannot be held against him. In the final hundred feet he let the speed decay further making a flare difficult. As pointed out by earlier posters judging height above water can be tricky. He got it a bit wrong, but not so wrong (arguably with the help of Airbus) that the landing turned into a disaster.

He did the important bit right and selected the most suitable place to land. As Napoleon said 'give me lucky generals'. All in all he did a lot more right than wrong.

[NG_Kaptain]

Well said Lederhosen.

[vaneyck]

PTH: C. not specifically warning cabin crew and passengers that the landing would be on water.
Sully has spoken about this a few times. He says he spent some seconds thinking about what would be best and decided that, time being so short, it would be best to have passengers just brace for impact rather than have them unbelted and possibly standing when the impact occurred, as might well happen if they were told they were going to land on water. The last thing anyone needed was a lot of passengers wondering where the life preservers were and looking around for them.

[protectthehornet]

interesting...but when I heard the interview from the FA's they didn't know they were landing on water.

how many people would unbuckle their seatbelts with: Brace for impact/water landing. vs. brace for impact.????? Brace for impact/ditching??

life jackets were beneath the seats...when you are hugging your heels, you might see it>

[pattern_is_full]

What struck me was that target airspeeds on the Engine-dual-failure checklist were on the second page - AFTER the engine restart and other procedures.

It was always drummed into me in primary that the very first thing you do with engine failure is nail best-glide speed - even climbing slightly to slow up if you are above best-glide. THEN you have the maximum amount of glide available to make restart attempts, landing-point decisions, the other checklist stuff.

Sully seems to have thought ahead of the checklist in this regard, as he did with the APU. Even if he picked a speed different than the NTSB would have liked.

I understand that engine restart is a much higher priority in a transport jet: pressurization, hydraulics, computer power, maintaining "normal law," etc. But it does seem as though a top-of-page-one headline

"IAS........below 10,000 ft. Green Dot, above 10,000 ft. 300 kts for re-light"

would not delay moving on to restart attempts by more than a couple of seconds - whereas following the checklist as written (spending 40 sec. on restart) meant this crew never even saw the recommended speed on page 2.

Comments?

[protectthehornet]

pattern is full makes a fine point.

and, in the older jets without ''glass'', on an ''all engines'' failure situation, you flew minimum clean maneuveing.

as we had the ''speeds'' on a nice little flip card kind of book, it was on top of the radar screen and available at all times.

So, we have taken a giant leap backwards with ''glass''.

We practiced ''dead sticking'' our DC9's in the simulator. Our speeds were fine and we made the field...with gear down on the runway.

relights/restarts were simple...as we took off with ignition "on'' ( actually over ride) if there was fuel and rotation, it would relight...if we were not going fast enough...it probably wouldn't relight...and while there might be assisted starts on some engines with APU air...well, as ''pattern" said...set up for a glide and if things don't work, you are in the best position to land.

Starting the apu is no major thinking...you lose ONE engine, you start the APU and it takes a minute or so to get rolling. The really nutty thing is, I would leave the APU running for takeoff till 10,000' except for bean counters wanting to save a few gallons of fuel.

[stepwilk]

Remember the Mohawk BAC One-Eleven that went in from altitude because they left the APU running and it started a fire? Late '60s, as I remember without doing a search. Irrelevant, but interesting...the CVR was horrifying, I was told by 'hawker who heard it.

[protectthehornet]

I remember the BAC111 that you mention.

but of course there are dozens of planes flying with the apu on for the whole flight to substitute for a generator problem or the like.

[Lonewolf_50]

What struck me was that target airspeeds on the Engine-dual-failure checklist were on the second page - AFTER the engine restart and other procedures.

It was always drummed into me in primary that the very first thing you do with engine failure is nail best-glide speed - even climbing slightly to slow up if you are above best-glide. THEN you have the maximum amount of glide available to make restart attempts, landing-point decisions, the other checklist stuff.
Taught the same for some years. Interesting to see in a previous post that the Airbus entering assumptions on dual failures were high altitude (>10,000). I wonder how they arrived at that.

We used to teach both High Alt Power Loss, and Low Alt power loss, but both began with getting your airspeed set to X first, then all else, depending on altitude (time) available.

[DozyWannabe]

PTH, I think you're being a little unfair to our modern engineers when you assert things like
they built them really well then. DC8 was taken supersonic during flight testing...boeing and airbus don't do that

So, we have taken a giant leap backwards with ''glass''.

For a start, the fact that the A320 survived an improvised water landing with no thrust is a testament to the fact that they still build 'em pretty damn well. The reason the old Diesel was taken to those kind of limits was largely down to manufacturers not having the technology in those days to simulate that kind of structural loading non-destructively as they can today, as well as knowing less about taking jet airframes to their extremes in general - the hardest lesson there being learned by De Havilland.

The electrical and hydraulic systems maintained by the RAT and APU meant that the ref speeds were quite happily displayed throughout the incident, and they're still available in dead tree format to hand if necessary. Capt. Sullenberger was improvising because he had the knowledge anyway. While the RAT and APU supplying power to the controls could be considered an inelegant workaround to a flameout, the mechanical flight controls of the DC-9 - and all jets of that era - had their own drawbacks, as evidenced by the dreadful ValuJet crash - same with all-hydraulic controls and the Sioux City DC-10.

It's pretty clear that you do prefer things the way they were when it came to aircraft technology, and you're not the only one - but the fact is that those days had their problems too.

[PAXboy]

As a pax, I am in no position to judge ANYTHING but the one certainty is in the luck factor. The Hudson was not just calm - but it was on the ebb tide. Those that have observed the river during the flood - when the rising tide is fighting the big flow of water downstream ... will know just how lucky they were.

If the tide had been on the flood - then I think that debates about how strong they build them would be irrelevant. It may be that the Captain would still have opted for the river - even if it was choppy - but he might not have known how smooth/choppy it was until long after his decision.

As to warning the cabin that it was going to be a ditching? I understand that it might have been good to have warned the senior CC who could then have phoned the other crew positions to warn them - but I doubt that many of the pax would have benefitted from the information. I would not be surprised to learn that some had taken their cabin baggage out with them (or tried to) because we are that stupid.

[protectthehornet]

Dozywannabe

why did I point to the DC8 in san francisco bay vs the airbus in the hudson? the airbus did not survive to fly again.

the DC8 did.

that's the difference.

hydraulics are useful in the DC8, DC9 and the airbus. and why you plucked the Valujet in the Everglades out of thin air (excuse the pun() I don't understand. The control failure there was due to heat exceeding the meltiing point of steel. I don't think the airbus ''wires' would have withstood that kind of heat.

Paxboy...passengers do the darndest things. One guy stripped down to his underwear and started swimming. Though everyone else was on the wing or in pseudo life rafts.

If I were a passenger, I would have wanted to know it was in the river. If I was a deadheading pilot, I would have wanted to know (thought I might have figured it out if I was near a window).

[glob99]

In the DC-8 accident, the jet never lost engine power! That makes it an apples to oranges comparison.

[ELAC]

why did I point to the DC8 in san francisco bay vs the airbus in the hudson? the airbus did not survive to fly again.

the DC8 did.

that's the difference.


Well that's about the most meaningless comparison that anyone could come up with ... congratulations!

Do you really think that if Sully had dunked a DC8 into the Hudson that it would be allowed to fly again in the current regulatory environment?

Do you really think that if semi-conductors were widely available when the DC8 was built that it wouldn't have had at least a few of them and associated wiring that would be trashed by water making repair more costly?

Do you really think that the potential for an aircraft to be restorable to flying condition after a ~700 fpm impact with water has much to do with anything but luck and then an owner with sufficent patience and resources to attempt the job?

Get real. No one designs an aircraft with the objective that it will fly again after after a forced landing on water. If it does, great, but that 's purely incidental, everyone else is satisfied if the passengers and crew emerge from the event uninjured, just as they did in this case.

ELAC

[protectthehornet]

glob 99

oh please...they both touched down at idle thrust. one by neccesity one by mistake.

the DC8 guys didn't even know they were landing on water...no pre planning...they even had their gear down and flaps set for landing.

ELAC

oh please...I think a DC8 in the late 1960's had semiconductors. Transistors have been around quite awhile...

and what of seaplanes making forced landings? someone thinks of everything...even the DC3 was designed to survive gear up landings by having the wheels stick out a bit.

The airbus didn't fly again because of regulations...it didn't fly again because it was wrecked beyond repair.

the DC8 was repairable and flew again.

[pattern_is_full]

Well, in defense of the glass cockpit, I'd note that the Green Dot (or F symbol in some configurations) on the airspeed tape do serve more or less the same function as PTHornet's flip-book of target speeds.

It was there - the checklist just didn't get around to mentioning it very quickly.

The other thing that struck me regards the simulations done to see if 1549 could have reached TEB or LGA. They did 20 runs with an IMMEDIATE turn towards the airports (with a 53% success rate) but only one (1) with a delayed turn to simulate real-world reaction time to an unexpected collision (35 seconds).

One wonders just how disastrously that one trial turned out - that they did not think it worthwhile trying it even one more time. Must have resulted in a heck of a (simulated) burning hole in the Bronx, Harlem or Weehawken.

[ELAC]

someone thinks of everything...even the DC3 was designed to survive gear up landings by having the wheels stick out a bit.


Now, why haven't Boeing and Airbus caught onto that one! We really should get in touch with them so that they can modify the 787 & A350 to take advantage of that idea. While we're at it we can go back and recreate DC3 level safety in all of the aircraft's systems. What a boon to aviation that will be.:ugh:

For Pete's sake pth, give it up. Your entire argument is a trivial irrelevance that simply illustrates that you have a bias that's got little to do with the actual level of safety and reliability of the particular equipment or the design principles involved.

ELAC

[maxrpm]

A passenger wrote:

As to warning the cabin that it was going to be a ditching? I understand that it might have been good to have warned the senior CC who could then have phoned the other crew positions to warn them - but I doubt that many of the pax would have benefitted from the information. I would not be surprised to learn that some had taken their cabin baggage out with them (or tried to) because we are that stupid

These comments are an example for a lot of vivid discussion about announcements to passengers and cabin of US 1549. The dicussion is interesting but due to - understandable - lack of practical experience it is missing the point.

If a pilot dead sticks a damaged 100.000ibs airliner to a crash landing he simply faces death starring in his very eyes. Under that gaze he must keep control over the plane and decide for the least deadly spot to crashland within barly a minute.

In the history of aviation many a crew froze and did not pass the ultimate test. Many pilots succeded staying in what was left of control of their plane. Transswede or Austrian 111 would be recent examples for that. The reports of surviving pilots show that everything they had was needed to keep the plane flying and the crash survivable.

No crew I ever heard of had the capacity left for a cabin announcement - and nobody ever blamed them.

When pilots first heard the braking news of the landing in the Hudson we knew that the crew must have been up to the task. But by chance we were able to tell just two hours later that a least the captain had been outstanding. A passenger of US1549 told CNN in an interview about the "brace for impact" command. (and by now we even learned that the crew did regular checklist work including standard challenge and response)

To have that extra capacity is really outstanding. You will never know if you are that good until the very moment of a similar challenge.
Hope I´ll never find out.

[protectthehornet]

elac, you missed the point.

I'm saying that people/engineers think of scenarios and how to deal with them and gave the example of how the DC3 dealt with one scenario.

it must frost people to actually consider that things could have been done better in this hudson landing.

it is not a sin to say that we could learn from the pluses and minuses of this event.

[DozyWannabe]

PTH : The JAL DC-8 was repaired because it was practically brand new, and because JAL didn't want a hull-loss on their record (especially one which had produced so little revenue so far) - not because of any inherent construction strength. Qantas did the same when their 744 went for a round of golf, despite being borderline economical to repair.

[vaneyck]

In this interview from last October The Leonard Lopate Show: Highest Duty - WNYC (http://beta.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/2009/oct/15/highest-duty/) Capt. Sullenberger describes his decision-making process. With only a minute to go before impact he "spent several seconds choosing my words carefully, which is a lot of time given how time-compressed our experience was", and said "This is the Captain, brace for impact." He says "I chose not to announce we were landing on water, because I didn't have time to give the full explanation, and the situation I wanted to avoid was where the passengers might be reaching under their seats for life vests, maybe even attempting to put them on, instead of bracing for landing, when they might have been injured during the touchdown."

The relevant passage starts 25:45 into the interview.

[protectthehornet]

dozywannabe

ok, let me put it this way. was the airbus in question capable of being repaired to fly another 20 years?

[DozyWannabe]

PTH : Does it really matter? This is a major tangent from the main thread - though if you look it up you'll find that a significant amount of the JAL DC-8's airframe was replaced, as well as all electrical systems. It's an apples-to-oranges comparison anyway as the A320 likely had a much heftier impact with the water.

[deSitter]

I would like to point out a parallel story with a different ending - Southern Airways outside Atlanta, 1977. A hailstorm had rendered both engines of a DC-9 inoperable. The crew spent considerable time in confusion trying to get a restart while vectoring to any suitable field. The results were bad. "We're putting it down on the highway..." Nine people on the ground died an awful fiery death at a destroyed gas station. Three fourths of those on the plane as well.

But Atlanta is fairly surrounded by large, calm bodies of water! My instincts certainly would have been - you're engines are dead, the airfields are beyond glide distance, it's still raining to beat the band - put it down on the water somewhere, anywhere, if for no other reason than to spare the passengers the ordeal of fire and those on the ground sudden death from above. It could have worked - Lake Altoona was easily in reach - but the PIC would have had to have a switch go off in his head as soon as the second engine failure happened - "put it on the water." That's what Sullenberger did - and regardless of how he flew in technical terms, he made absolutely the right decision.

I think survival must often be about these instantaneous decisions - procedures are fine but somehow you must recognize when the hand you've been dealt can't be played.

If the captain of Southern 242 had instantly decided - "My windshield's busted, my engines are dead, let's put it on Lake Altoona.." - the outcome could have been far different. But obviously, you can't train anyone for that sort of thinking.

In the end, I think what saved US Air was Sullenberger's casual glance at the Hudson on climb out - which fixed his mind on the solution even before there was any emergency.

-drl

[protectthehornet]

dozzy

you just said the airbus had a much heftier impact...and earlier in this thread I spoke of increasing airspeed early on in the glide in order to be sure you had enough speed to reduce descent rate just prior to touchdown (flare reserve as I call it).

you have made my case for me. the dc8 flew again because it touched down at a proper speed and normal descent rate and because it was a stronger air frame.

the airbus touched down at a greater descent rate and was really pretty badly torn up.

look, sully did fine, is that what you want me to say? but anyone of us in the future just might hold an extra 10 knots to cushion the flare...after all, he wasn't gliding to any point in particular, just to the hudson.

The DC9 / hail incident is a very good one to look at. I do remind the poster that the windshield was obliterated by hail and hard to see through. I doubt if they could have found a lake to set her down in.

also, weather conditions causing hail are more predictable and avoidable right now and way in the past, then bird enocounters.

right now, the best advice to all pilots is the same from a piper cherokee to a 747..

If you lose all engine power, trim for best glide and head for your PRE SELECTED FIELD for a power off landing. Always be thinking...where will I land right now if things go bad with the engines? Takeoff until over the fence for landing.


After you are trimmed for best glide (and in jets this is often near min clean maneuvering speed) and heading for your PRE SELECTED FIELD, THEN attempt a restart, advise atc and the cabin.

FLY the plane first and then do the checks.

Jet engines are very reliable. I honestly think most pilots don't consider the all engine out scenario on EVERY flight.

And, just as a reminder, you can glide ABOUT 2-3 nautical miles per 1000 feet above the terrain depending on wind.

For high altitude all engine failure, you may lose pressurization and don't forget your oxygen mask.

All of the above should be in your brain and not on a checklist. Just like the musicians of the US Marine Corps Band know the "Star Spangled Banner" by heart, a pilot better know the above by heart.

[DozyWannabe]

PTH:

1549's pre-selected field was Teterboro, and they worked out relatively quickly that they had neither the height nor the airspeed to make it there. My concern was that you were bashing modern airframes in comparison to your favoured Douglas jets - that's your opinion and you're welcome to it. From the article "The DC-8 That Was Too Young To Die" :

* Replacement of two engine pylons at a cost of $125,000 each, plus repairs to a third.
* Removal, reworking, and corrosion treatment of control surfaces. The left outboard flap was replaced at a cost of $52,500, as well as both inboard flaps, for $21,400.
* Replacement of left landing gear cylinder and bogie for $53,000.
* Replacement of aft galley units at a cost of $100,000.


In addition, all hydraulic units, as well as 90% of the pneumatic and air conditioning systems, were removed and repaired or replaced. All instrument panels were removed and instruments tested. Fuel valves and pumps were removed, fuel tanks were flushed and samples taken to make sure no salt was present.

It really wasn't a case of just dragging her out of the water and being able to use her again, she was pretty badly beat up! Also the situation was different in many more ways:

- In 1968, order books for jets were full, there were no boneyards for easy, cheap replacements as there are now.
- California in November is a very different prospect weather-wise from NYC in February (as I'm sure you're aware, being Bay Area-based yourself) - moving the A320 was a much more difficult operation.
- The A320 touched down in much deeper water, to the extent that she sank completely - far more damage to the cabin and hardware.
- Earlier jets tended to be designed to hold together around the engine pylons, whereas later jets are designed so that the pins shear to prevent a failed engine causing drag in the event of a catastrophic failure in the air. Even then, two engine pylons on the DC-8 needed replacing (see above).

Regarding the ditching plan:

- Airspace around the Hudson in 2008 was considerably busier than airspace around the Bay Area in 1968 - the crew had a major see-and-avoid problem on top of everything else.
- They couldn't trade altitude or airspeed earlier in the glide because they had to clear the George Washington Bridge, which they managed with approx. 900ft to spare.
- Capt. Sullenberger did weigh up the options regarding changing heading for Teterboro and came to the conclusion that landing on the Hudson was safer. He decided this because another major failure, or a miscalculation after changing heading would have left them low and slow over a built-up area.

At the end of the day I'm not trying to get you to say anything, or change your mind - as I said, your opinions are perfectly valid. But it seems to me that the crew of 1549 *did* have the knowledge you're talking about in their heads. Capt. Sullenberger also made the decision very early on that his passengers took priority over the airframe - I happen to agree with him, not least because the economic reality is that the airframe was never likely to fly again even if she'd been pulled from the Hudson nearly pristine.

[protectthehornet]

your see and avoid argument is prretty weak.

once clear of the bridge, the airspeed could have been increased resulting in a touchdown slightly shorter than where it actually was...so,?

The DC8 was in salt water, and the amount of repairs is so small as to be insignificant.
It made sense to repair it. the Airbus was badly ripped up and may have had stress problems that didn't even show.

Teterboro was not his preselected field, as it was too far away...while it did occur to ask about it, a pre selected field is KNOWN to be reachable.

On a side note, ATC seemed to think that the airbus should be able to make a downwind, base and final to runway 1 at Teterboro...I would have thought that going direct to the nearest runway threshold would have been the thing to do.

you seem like a nice person...but the whole point of this forum is to do things better next time.

I also wonder if sully's choice to land witht he flaps set the way they were was the best choice...

but, it all worked out....everyone was a hero except the goose.

I also think evasive action should be part of pilot training...avoid birds

[DozyWannabe]

$4 million in 1968 dollars ain't exactly chump change!

I also recall from the documentary that the speed and flare angle he picked were chosen carefully to put the rear fuselage down in the water first and give the drag from the water enough of a chance to slow her down. This was to prevent the engines dragging the front of the fuselage underwater on contact, risking possible breakup.

You may consider his decision-making regarding an alternate deadstick airfield landing on the pessimistic side, but as you say, it all came out OK in the end.

[AirRabbit]

”…but anyone of us in the future just might hold an extra 10 knots to cushion the flare...after all, he wasn't gliding to any point in particular, just to the hudson.
Forgive me if this has been brought up before … but as I understand the situation, while neither engine was producing any thrust – only one engine was actually “shut down.” The other engine was still operating (producing no thrust, but still operating enough to keep the generator on-line), which prevented the computers from reverting to operation in “direct law.” I believe that Capt. Sullenberger mentioned that he was looking for an increase in pitch attitude just prior to “spash-”down, and he had the side stick in the full aft position. But, in either “normal law” or “degraded law” (sorry, I’m not exactly sure of the terms – I’m not a “bus” driver) the protection system was maintaining the airspeed, and therefore, without the availability of additional thrust to maintain that airspeed at a higher pitch attitude, the airplane was maintaining the pitch attitude that equated to the airspeed the computer calculated as the minimum acceptable. That’s not what Sullenberger wanted – he apparently wanted to increase the pitch, reduce the airspeed slightly, and get a slower rate of descent to contact the water with less momentum – both forward and downward. Unfortunately, the airplane was still doing its best to make the decisions.

[protectthehornet]

air rabbit

my whole point is this...if a pilot wants to stall a plane, he shouldn't have to say: pretty please let me stall.

and sully wanted to arrest the descent a bit...but couldn't because the plane thought he might get too close to the stall.

ok...you shouldn't be fULLY stalled in this situation, but a few knots closer to the stall and he could have cut his descent rate in half.

[p51guy]

Is it just me or didn't I see him do a full flare to a splash down with minimum descent when he touched down on the videos. I always bid Boeings so didn't have to compete with the computer on what we were going to do. He did the ditching like I would do manually in a Boeing. He did a great job and I think we all would think we could do the same..

[AirRabbit]

air rabbit
my whole point is this...if a pilot wants to stall a plane, he shouldn't have to say: pretty please let me stall.
and sully wanted to arrest the descent a bit...but couldn't because the plane thought he might get too close to the stall.
ok...you shouldn't be fULLY stalled in this situation, but a few knots closer to the stall and he could have cut his descent rate in half.
I agree with you! Of course, I'll probably never know for sure, but I'm under the impression that Sullenberger wanted to pull the nose up more, but the airplane was going to have no part of that.

The point I was making - not disagreeing with your comment - was that while Sullenberger was very likely trying to do just what you said - the computers on board were controlling AoA to maintain it where the computers thought was best. Had there been thrust available, the back pressure on the side stick would have had the computers adjust the pitch attitude UP, but the computers would have added thrust to maintain that AoA. In that there was NO thrust, the computers wouldn't allow an increase in pitch, as that would have allowed the airspeed to decrease, putting the airplane closer to the critical AoA -- apparently a "no-no" as programmed by the engineers.

Whether or not I think that is a mistake is probably not of interest to too many folks. However, there are tons of "bus drivers" out there who will extol the virtues of what the airplane's computers will do FOR the pilot, not TO the pilot. I have to agree with most of what they would be saying - but, while leaving the "driving" to a circuit board isn't terribly bad in general (I'm not as consistent as "George") -- leaving the decsion making to such an entity IS something I'm NOT very comfortable doing.

[protectthehornet]

rabbit

yes, I agree with you too.

p51 guy...to me it looked like there was no hesitation a foot or so off the water, the descent rate was constant from 1000feet or so to touchdown...sure we all hope that things would work out that way for us.

sully is thought of as a great guy. I flew with him about 20 years ago on the 146. i thought he was a bit arrogant.

and quite frankly, I think LGA was possible...but he was the guy on the spot and didn't kill anyone...so, good on him!

[p51guy]

He probably could have landed downwind at LGA but if he had been short it would have been bad. He was there and had the eyeball view out the window to judge it best. PTH's add 10 knots to guarantee a full flare is what what I would have done and he probably did too. It is only the last foot that hurts in a crash.

[error_401]

I guess the APU was running.

At least at some early point in the report it mentions so.
So they were good on power and hydraulics.

Btw. Question for the A320 guys: Total electrical loss in an A320 any chance to get at least the slats out?

[FlightDetent]

Question for the A320 guys: Total electrical loss in an A320 any chance to get at least the slats out? Both slats and flaps available in position 3, a normal certified landing configuration.

BTW: APU cannot supply any form of HYD pressure. Bleed air and elec yes, hyd no.

Sincerely,
FD (the un-real)

[OutOfRunWay]

Then what's the Blue ELEC PUMP and the Yellow ELEC PUMP PBs for?

[FlightDetent]

Blue ELEC pb - to manually override the pump and select it OFF.
Yellow ELEC pb - to engage the ELEC pump, mainly to pressurize the system on ground.

FD. (the un-real)

[OutOfRunWay]

My mistake, the Blue Button is indeed an Override Off switch - it's been a while.
However, as long as there is AC power, the Yellow ELEC PB will pressurize the Yellow system in-flight.
I think I remember the Blue auto pump is inhibited on the ground, but will automatically provide Blue pressure in flight, with green being pressured by the PTU from Yellow?

My point was, if you have APU, you have hydraulics and a flyable aircraft - except for the small fact that it's going down due to lack of engines....

-Edit- I ought to learn how to spell.

[FlightDetent]

True. My point - not that you need to be educated, simply for other's better understanding - is that you do not need APU to have a flyable aircraft.

Each of the engine driven pumps supplies 3000 psi down to about 7% N1 - under normal circumstances after engine shutdown at gate this corresponds to about 1% N1.

If either of Green/Yelow systems is pressurized the other system is pressurized as well through PTU.

Blue system is normally pressurized with the electric pump, which loses supply under EMERG ELEC. But, under EMERG ELEC, the ram air turbine comes out and pressurizes the blue system. The emergency electrical hydrogenerator is energized from the BLUE HYD pressure that had been provided by RAT.

APU cannot deliver any HYD pressure. What it can do is supply both AC busses, providing electricity to BLUE (and YELLOW if needed) ELEC pumps. The greatest benefit of having a running APU under dual failure scenario is the bleed air needed to attempt restarts and electricity to power all flightdeck instruments. The redundancy design of HYD system is such (good) that APU is not needed for flight controls.

Yours,
FD (the un-real)

PS: The BLUE ELEC will automatically run on ground (pre-takeoff) after engine start. No irk here, just to make sure nobody gets confused.

[noperf]

One thing not mentioned here is quite simple to put into practice.

Boeing, for instance, publishes a flight with un-reliable airspeed table.

The table gives pitch information for various phases of flight.

No green dot necessary.

I write the pitch and power down for each intended take-off, initial level flight, and power off descent condition.

This is technique only and not an Airbus vs. Boeing wind up.

It 's also a great pitch vs. power table for sim rides.

[PJ2]

I always bid Boeings so didn't have to compete with the computer on what we were going to do.
Well sorry p51guy but that's a statement of plain ignorance from someone who's never flown the type. Upon what knowledge can you base such an opinion? From commentary on the Airbus here?

Some prefer steam and have the opportunity to choose it. I thoroughly enjoyed my many years on the DC9, DC8, & B727, and found the transition to glass on the L1011, B767 and to autoflight on the A320, A330 and A340 to be transparent to the task of flying the machine. One learned one's airplane as thoroughly as possible and one flies it in all regimes.

I fully realize and understand the many legitimate critiques surrounding automation; part of it is training, (when management thinks the airplane will "fly itself"), part of it is our own fault for handing over our responsibilities to the autopilot and not practising manual flight, part of it lies with pilot associations for ineffectively resisting such trends and part of it has its origins in ergonomics.

But the "automation" issue is a far, far different kettle of fish than "competing with the computer".

When you enter test-pilot territory in any machine, you are far beyond those boundaries which all airline pilots cannot expect to be and unexpected things can occur. The Airbus is not unique. These are facts about any airplane, not just the aircraft you and PTH are, quite frankly, strongly prejudiced against.

Boeing is building an aircraft far more sophisticated than the 25-year old Airbus entries and I expect the B777 uses the same C* laws, necessarily, as any fbw design would. You're free to bid whatever airplane makes your day and we all have our favourites, but if you're going to make critical statements about a design you need to back them up with knowledge substantiated in reality of the airplane itself and not outlandish hyperbole such as "competing with the computer". Such a view is unfounded, and, for example, is unsupported in the outcome of the Hudson ditching.

If debate is desired, the final report should provide information on how close to Vs the aircraft was, not an estimate from a distant video of what the descent rate was, (PTH: " the descent rate was constant from 1000feet or so to touchdown").

I suspect the outcome with a B737 or DC9/MD80 would have been the same with a similarly experienced crew who kept their heads and cockpit discipline and kept flying the airplane as deep into the touchdown as they could.

If you're making the broader observation, now about twenty years old, claiming that pilots are losing their abilities, thinking and handling skills, that is an entirely different conversation and one with which I concur, but that is stating the bluntly obvious -this fact was apparrent in the late 90's. It is time for solutions from us, as a pilot group, and not merely tut-tutting the Airbus yet again. While perhaps not a reality in the MD80 design, automation is indeed a reality which all future entrants must come to terms and it is up to us, with our experience, to find ways to intervene in the present trends.

Besides, where has it been demonstrated that the ability to stall the airplane at will has prevented an accident? Cali may come close, but the B757 design at the time did not retract the speed-brakes when full thrust was applied and that, not the ability to fly the airplane "to the stall", was, once the airplane was up against the hills, a factor in that accident. The design has since been modified.

Contrarily, in the latest CFIT at Islamabad, it is my contention, based upon nothing more than my understanding of the A321 autoflight system (none of us have seen the data), that this CFIT may not have occurred had the crew executed a maximum-effort escape maneuver upon first EGPWS warning.

Such a maneuver permits full back-stick and a bank angle of 60deg while climbing at TOGA thrust. The escape rate-of-climb would be nothing short of spectacular; indeed it needn't be, given the design specs of EGPWS systems, but the airplane will stay a few knots above the stall and adjust pitch accordingly to do so, regardless of the full back stick pressure; the MD80/B737 series will not, not without risk of stalling and instead the QRH escape drill directs the crew to "respect the stick shaker", but in truth you will never know how close you are/were until the airplane flicks. While perhaps not a panacea, the design is at least an improvement in the trade.

So...a question for you:

Yes, the control laws do not permit actually stalling the airplane (beyond AlphaMax) in AlphaProt, but then your argument becomes, "How much more energy can one extract from the machine if one were permitted to take the airplane into the stall?, and What difference would such difference make?, and finally, How do you train for such a maneuver?" If you and PTH are going to have any credibility when critiquing the Airbus design (while leaving the Boeing solutions aside), you can start with that question.

I am neither pro-Airbus, nor pro-Boeing, (but I'll admit to being a bit "pro-Lockheed, :)) . I don't care what non-fliers think about either design. But pilots should be open to discussion and not merely feel free to make statements about designs they don't have direct experience on or knowledge of, not, at least, without being open to challenge.

As a pilot speaking to other pilots I think it is important to understand designs from a basis of wide comprehension, from which critical judgements may then be offered. Anything else is mere prejudice and we all know where that gets us.

FWIW.

PJ2

noperf;
One thing not mentioned here is quite simple to put into practice.

Boeing, for instance, publishes a flight with un-reliable airspeed table.

The table gives pitch information for various phases of flight.

No green dot necessary.
Before making such statements, I think a bit wider knowledge based upon some research is in order. Airbus has had such tables and drills in place since early 1997. I am unsure of when Boeing brought them out as I was off the B727/B767 by then.

"Green dot" speed is Best L/D and has nothing to do with "unreliable airspeed".

Airbus published in the A320 QRH the Unreliable Airspeed memorized items, checklists and pitch-power tables shortly after the second unreliable airspeed accident, (Aeroperu 608; Birgenair 301 was the first, both in 1996). Both accidents occurred darkness - no visible horizon.

PJ2

[DC-ATE]

PJ2 -
These are facts about any airplane, not just the aircraft you and PTH are, quite frankly, strongly prejudiced against.

Hey! You can add my name to that list !!

[bearfoil]

PJ2

I don't know about anyone else, but I have learned alot here re: AB and fbw. Mostly from you. I've tempered my attitude and actually see the deal in a much different light.This is a philosophy of controlled flight I still don't ken, but that is not the aircraft's responsibility. I was projecting my ignorance onto the airframe and computers. Sully didn't make a big deal out of skipping the flare part; I too saw the vid and said to myself, pull, turkey. From a survivability standpoint, I am not convinced the flatter entry didn't save some lives. Better a skip than a plant sometimes, no?

PTH

Howdy. I used to live in the little town next to Sullenberger's. I thought maybe I might buy the Groceries at the Danville Raleys this weekend, figured I might run into the man, shake his hand or something, you know? I've met Yeager, what a letdown. I think Sully has to be more personable, and I'd have the Exacta. Then it's Hoover. Alameda is right on the way. Want to go with?

bear

[PJ2]

DC-ATE;

I KNOW that!...LOL. Were you feeling left out? :)

The fact is, autoflight and its interventions is here to stay. Our aircraft are far safer for it - that is a fact, not an opinion, but there are warts on it, just like there are on all airplane designs including our beloved "cable-and-pulleyed elevators" DC8.

If we're going to alter the trend that automation and software interventions may be causing...I say, "may"..., then we have to know, and not just offer opinions which are just so much talk-no-action. You can disagree all you wish, but relevancy and the ability to effect change then becomes an issue and the goal is awareness and change, not winning the debate, whether such is perceived as A vs B or whatever.

There is a problem. We are still crashing airplanes. Why? It is hopelessly irrelevant to claim that it is "automation" that is doing it, first because such a claim is merely the mirror we are gazing into when we talk, for are we not all pilots first?

The case for "automation taking control away from pilots" is specious and, in itself, unworthy of serious discussion. But the effects of autoflight upon those who fly is a serious discussion which ought not to be clouded with ignorance.

I know, DC-ATE...Don Quixote all over again. :} But the key is, a pilot is a pilot is a pilot, period; do your job and stop excusing ourselves or confusing competence with lack of operational authority.

The present autoflight solutions do not take that away such authority and to think it does is a very important misunderstanding in the discussion.

Our collective informed input into the design process is critical, for if we don't do so, we hand over even more of our pilot heritage to the software designers.

That is the entire point here.

PJ2

[DC-ATE]

But the key is, a pilot is a pilot is a pilot, period; do your job and stop excusing ourselves or confusing competence with lack of operational authority.

One of the problems I see nowadays, is that "pilots" don't get a chance to be pilots with all the automation thrown at them. They don't get the chance to find out what "piloting" really is. It's just a sign of the times unfortunately. Just another example of "change" that is not, IMHO, better.

As I've often written here.....I'm glad I'm retired !!:)

Edit: forgot to add re. Were you feeling left out...YES!!

[PJ2]

bear;
This is a philosophy of controlled flight I still don't ken
Frankly, when I first stepped into the A320 cockpit in 1992 I felt as though a "muslin veil" was between me and my airplane. I was experienced at glass and FMS use from the B767 and L1011, (brilliant airplane, perfect blend of automation and bread-and-butter solutions) but this was really different. The training was pretty tattered around the edges - good but not deeply knowledgable. When I got to fly the airplane, it was a non-event. I really liked the solutions to the problems of daily operation, (ILS intercepts, too high on the approach, flight-path-angle solutions, warnings and especially the ECAM which I thought was exceptionally well-considered but not perfect). I always thought there was too much programming of the FMS for good SA and that there was far too much talking and "process" when dealing with a complicated failure, (dual hydraulic, emergency electrical config, etc) and I know very well that with a rapidly degrading Airbus, the circumstances can be extremely demanding, perhaps too much so. Self-diagnosis was still in its infancy - perhaps the B787 will be better, leaving the crew to "bread and butter flight", just as it should be.

The key, at least for me, was to disconnect the airplane when up against one of those (at the time, frequent) moments when we didn't know what the autoflight was doing. We didn't call her Capricious Christine for nothing. Handflying the airplane including manual thrust was like flying the DC9 or any other B&B airplane...it was a non-event and entirely transparent to the task at hand.

The area you may be struggling with may be those black swan areas of software and airplane design where airline pilots almost never-in-a-career may find themselves. The boundaries of controlled flight are not areas where airline pilots ever expect to be; since the jet-age began in the late '50's, it has been a By-the-book industry and those who go beyond for whatever reasons and sometimes not through their own hand, pay the price whether it is turning off the yaw damper at high altitude, (a form of automated intervention which no one seems to claim "interferes with the pilot's control of his/her airplane) and watching dutch roll unfold, to climbing their aircraft to its absolute service ceiling and watching as the speed bleeds back and the engines flame out and suffer core-lock, to ignoring perfectly serviceable cockpit warnings from tested systems such as EGPWS and TCAS.

Put succinctly, the boundaries of software-initiated interventions do not limit the pilot from doing what she or he can do with his/her airplane until the very limits of controlled flight are reached. Why then, is that so unusual? Why is it even controversial? In philosophy, the argument resembles the "how many angels on the head of a pin?" argument. I say this not in debate but in recognition of the millions of hours of successful, unremarkable flight that all designs have amassed without incident or fatal accident.

I have experienced enough failures, one or two quite serious, in operation in the Airbus product to know it performs very well providing one knows one's airplane, just like any other aircraft. Of course, my experience is only that and cannot claim by itself to reify a trend, but it does somewhat mirror industry experience.

I believe that skills and familiarity with autoflight's operation and handling, in and of itself, can (and should) be placed within a different cognitive category than the cognitive skills required in manually flying an aircraft. This isn't the place to pursue that discussion, but I believe this is not a technical matter but a psychological one. I think we are examining the wrong areas using the wrong tools in search of a solution to "automation's interventions" and the sense that we are competing with the computers when flying our airplanes. I have been wondering if the Islamabad accident may be the very case in point which may best illustrate this, but we will have to wait for the data before theorizing further.

If however, as the article states as it 'quotes' those who have listened to the CVR, that heading was used to turn left and nothing further was done in terms of disconnecting everybody and flying the airplane in an escape maneuver, then they may have been stuck in frame of mind where "automation solves all problems" and not "psychologically" sitting in an airplane with a mountain ahead of them. If so, I think this may be a key to delineating some solutions to the human factors issues which are often expressed regarding automation's veil.

Just wondering...

PJ2

[bearfoil]

PJ2

Part of ignorance is fear, who wants to cop to that? That should be mitigated by a thorough knowledge of the a/c, as you say, and why Sully was so cool on the Radio.

"we'll be in the Hudson". Crap, that sounded like he was talking to a friend, "Meet you at the Pool Hall." Not trying to keep everyone alive when something happened that had not happened to anyone before, (in an Airbus).

It didn't hurt that he flew and instructed in F-4's and owned a business consulting re: Airline safety (isn't that what you do?).

The Pinnacle RJ was two immature idiots trying to climb to a risky and prohibited height. They fell 40,000 feet with engines frozen for the same reason 737's did with Frozen Rudder jacks. What did they know of core-lock? They were too brilliant for that. I've a new respect for AirBus, I still wish they wouldn't just plant the Tail on the fuselage with parts from "generic stores". Oh well, they don't answer my calls. I'll have adjusted to fbw just in time for the Dreamliner, but already I don't like those wings. I've designed and used Two Phase materials for fifty years, and Resin, not even elastomer/Carbon, is meant to be that "structural". And the rippling that FAA accepted as a repair? AirBus will be well rid of me, I'm thinking about changing rides.

respect, bear

[PJ2]

bear;
Oh well, they don't answer my calls.
No, they didn't answer mine either. When I had the opportunity during my 1992 course to ask why the FMGEC did something, the response was, "Thaht eez the way the ahrplane is designed", - literally. I could see what was coming.

kindest,

PJ2

[bearfoil]

"Your understanding of the aircraft is not required, but your compliance is to be desired". Many French in my very large family. Don't question a Frenchmen when he is doing his work, and if he senses criticism, you may never speak with him again. It is their way, and I am used to it. It has not stood in the way of wonderful relationships, and complete acceptance. One nephew was initially impossible. Once I dropped my stubbornness, he dropped his, but mine dropped further, oh well. He is a brilliant businessman, You may know him, or he you, eet eez a petit petit Monde, mon ami.

take care

[noperf]

PJ2

As I stated my post was not a Boeing vs. Airbus wind up.

Pitch and power or pitch and no power tables are available.

I was just pointing out a possible use for them.

[PJ2]

bear;
eet eez a petit petit Monde, mon ami.Indeed. And yes, experienced, to a much lesser extent, those aspects of French life primarily through this airplane, and, curiously, philosophy; I love Derrida's work. What more can one say without being declared "slightly off", (or much more...) by the analytical philosophers? More could be said, but...
I was just pointing out a possible use for them.
Fair enough. For me that's not the way the post read but then, no "reading" by another is innocent. Thanks for the response.

PJ2

[DozyWannabe]

One of the problems I see nowadays, is that "pilots" don't get a chance to be pilots with all the automation thrown at them. They don't get the chance to find out what "piloting" really is.

I know you're just joshing for the most part - but if you're referring to the trend these days for pilots to go almost directly from training - where they are communicating directly with the flight surfaces - to commuter or short-haul jet transports which contain degrees of automation all the way up to full FMS control from gear up to decision height, then I think your aim is a little off. Your ire should not be directed at the tool that makes it possible to do so, but at the companies who do not promote the understanding that despite all the automation, knowledge of your machine is a very important thing to have. Arguing that the advent of automation is itself a direct cause of a drop in perceived piloting ability would be like saying that the invention of the seatbelt or airbag was a direct cause of a fall in driving ability.

That said, economic reality is that newly-qualified pilots by-and-large need to convert that training into a way of making a living as quickly and effectively as possible - they don't really get to choose. Commercial aviation is about getting freight and passengers from one place to another as effectively as possible. Automation aids that goal and has empirically improved safety as a side-effect. If a pilot really feels the need to enjoy the rush of feeling a direct connection between themselves and their machine, would joining a flying club and batting a high-performance single-engined fireball around the sky not be a more appropriate outlet?

[misd-agin]

DC-ATE - One of the problems I see nowadays, is that "pilots" don't get a chance to be pilots with all the automation thrown at them. They don't get the chance to find out what "piloting" really is. It's just a sign of the times unfortunately. Just another example of "change" that is not, IMHO, better.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Guys choose not to learn. The airplane, or FMC, doesn't prevent them from learning. The key is learning when automation is your friend, and when it isn't.

I don't put any generation on a pedestal, there have been amazingly good, and bad, pilots from each generation.

And then there are guys that have to be dragging into the future - FO flying raw data on a 767 across the U.S. because he thought the FMC/map would cost him situation awareness. :{

[DC-ATE]

Well.....I'm not on here to argue. If you're [DozyWannabe, misd-agin and others] happy with the way things are going in aviation, fine. I'm not and that's why I choose not to fly any more. No need. Enjoy your career. Glad mine's over.:)

[MountainBear]

"and not "psychologically" sitting in an airplane with a mountain ahead of them."

I think that is correct. The bothersome question is why. I think that automation has nothing to do with it. There is no characteristic of metal or silicon circuits (that I know of anyway) that speaks to a pilot's mind and says, "pay attention to me even unto death."

The flaw is in the pilot's mind. :uhoh: