NAS rears its head again

[squawk6969]

DNS

That may well be true, however believe me when I say that some political forces and face saving tactics may ensure this gets a go at BME & KTA.

As sad as it is, thats how these things happen. A bit like house insulation scheme's, water tank rebate scheme's and solar power........it sounds great and dandy, warm and fuzzy, but when some common sense gets applied its too late and its march on regardless, can't turn back now!

SQ

[squawk6969]

Dick
I dare the Class E doubters to answer this particular post in an objective way.

With all due respect, do you think it might be fair to all the folk who have asked you direct and fair questions to answer theirs first?

I am sure this would gain you the respectful answers you are seeking also.

Cheerio

SQ

[ARFOR]

LeadSled
by definition of the design principles, once the separation assurance standard is achieved, higher classes of airspace will not achieve a real reduction in risk, because the separation assurance standard is already so high. Whether you agree or not is immaterial, that is no more than your personal opinion.
ICAO Doc 9689 Chapters 5 and 6
5.2
Comparison with a reference system is a “relative” method, i.e. all the relevant characteristics of a reference system are compared with the corresponding characteristics of a reference system which has been judged to be safe. Provided that the proposed system can be demonstrated to be similar to or better than the reference system in all safety related aspects, then it also may be assumed to be safe. Clearly, the most important aspect of this approach lies in the identification of a suitable reference airspace which, for minor changes, may include the current system and the demonstration that the proposed system is sufficiently similar to justify the approach.

6.3 Whatever reference system is chosen, it must bear a sufficiently close resemblance to the proposed system for any comparison with regard to safety to be valid. The levels of air traffic service provided in the reference and proposed airspace, as defined by the ICAO airspace classifications, should be examined. The air traffic service in the proposed system should provide at least the same level of service as the reference system.
- Tower frequencies and operating positions?
- Approach and Departures frequencies and operating positions?
- Surveillance?
6.4 The minimum requirements for a reference system to be considered sufficiently similar to a proposed system are:
a) separation minima must not be less in the proposed system than in the reference system;
b) proposed means of communication and surveillance must be no worse in terms of accuracy, reliability, integrity and availability than those of the reference system;
c) frequency and duration of the application of minimum separation between aircraft must not be greater in the proposed system than in the reference system; and
d) navigation performance 9typical and non-typical) of the population of aircraft in the proposed system should be no worse in it effect on collision risk, in any dimension, than that of the aircraft in the reference system.
The previous comparisons in this thread of the US and Australian systems completely eliminates this option as a valid comparison.
Risk reduction measures
6.24 Risk reduction measures should be used when the overall risk estimate is above the predetermined threshold and when a particular element of the system is found to have a disproportionate influence on the risk, providing this can be achieved at an acceptable cost. The detailed process of risk reduction procedures by allowing the effect of changes to the various system parameters to e directly assessed.
Appendix 10 of ICAO Doc 9689 refers to the Australian Risk assessment processes.

Where are the risk assessments for YWLM, YMAV, YPKA and YBRM??

I would caution you LeadSled against quoting risk probabilities in this thread that are not reflected in the Australian and ICAO documents.
Indeed, several orders of magnitude higher ( lesser risk) than losing a complete aircraft on an auto-couples Cat II/III approach
Precision approach navigation, both ground based installations, calibration and airborne equipment installation, certification, and training is a COMPLETELY different ball park in so far as treatment of risk compared to airspace services risk assessment [MAC and NMAC mitigation].

ICAO Doc’s 9906 Vol 1 thru 3 set out in clear and concise term the Procedures Design and QA requirements [due the criticality of those operations close to the surface].
The risk treatments are completely different for obvious reasons, and moreover of no relevance to this discussion. Your arguments are approaching ‘the ridiculous’ when you have nothing left but to attempt to be ‘relevant’ by comparing ‘irrelevant’ structures in place to facilitate poor weather continuation of IFR flight with that of ATS and airspace services.

Seeing as you raised it, let’s explore the differences:-
or the probability of an aircraft CFIT (without regard to GPWS) during an approach (or departure) designed to current PANS/OPS standards ---- all the above have had a core element of risk management built in for many, many years.
Correct.

Procedure design and operation [ICAO Doc’s 8071, 9137, 9157, 9184]

- Expert designers, draft
- Expert Calibration pilots test fly [in VMC of course] to check accuracy and veracity
- Approach plates promulgated, procedure commissioned
- Real time ground monitoring of NAVAID signal accuracy and serviceability
- Real time redundant power supplies [Mains, Battery, and autostart GENSET’s]
- Regular [interval dependant on criticality] flight testing calibration [in VMC]
- Real time airborne monitoring of ‘correct’ NAVAID selection
- Real time airborne monitoring of signal serviceability [flags]

All of those ‘mitigations’ enable FULL AWARENESS AT ALL TIMES of the safe useability of the procedure and therefore safe flight to close proximities with the surface, surveyed as per PANS/OPS for obstacle clearances.

Airspace design risk assessment and operation

- See PPRuNe – [I]NAS raises it head again thread
- See ICAO Doc’s 4444, 7030, 9426, 9643, 9689, 9859, 9882, 9924, 9925, 9931 and others
- See The Act, The AAPS, The CRMF
- See the publically available volume specific Cost and Safety benefit Studies comparing Class E over D, D over D, and C over D

Red Flag – Nil Available for YWLM [RAAF N/A], YMAV, YBRM, YPKA

- See the publically available volume specific Risk Assessments comparing Class E over D, D over D, and C over D

Red Flag – Nil Available for YWLM [RAAF N/A], YMAV, YBRM, YPKA
Clearly, I am quite happy to accept the ICAO approach to risk management.
Fabulous, let’s remember that whilst we read on:-
That the basics of ICAO airspace design is not accepted by a range of pilots and ATC individuals in Australia says more about Australian aviation attitudes to modern risk management, than it says about the veracity of the basic ICAO risk management standards.
ICAO airspace design and procedure to validate is EXACTLY what pilots and air traffic controllers in Australia are demanding. It is unacceptable for you to continually misrepresent the discomfort being expressed by them. It is clear that it is not only not only being expressed by commercial aircrew and air traffic controllers, but also representatives of and individuals from within the general aviation sector. That in my book is pretty close to a full house. Does a pair of low spades then win the hand? You keep suggesting on this thread that the answer is yes, and solely because the ’slight of hand’ by the dealer at ‘Skull Casino’ is all that counts! WRONG!

Too many people have been duded for too many years to fall for that card trick anymore!
Strangely, pilots don't complain about the hazard levels in instrument procedure design, but the inherent hazards and the mitigators employed to reduce the final risk, still leave a level of risk that is not ALARP, as most of you interpret ALARP.
Strangely, as explained above, that is a load of cougar pellets. You continue to avoid the critical word within A.L.A.R.P, and that word is Reasonably. Pilots don’t complain about hazard levels in instrument procedure because the hazards are a mitigated to a point where it requires a series errors for the instrument approach flown to fail unsafe resulting in a hull loss. By contrast, as is demonstrated with regular monotony in Class E , it does not require an error or chain of errors to fail unsafe. It is inherently less safe that D, C, B and A in ‘normal’ operation.

The fact that the fail unsafe opportunity is reduced dramatically by having VFR operating within ‘the system’ [Class D or C] where climb and descent risk is greatest to passenger transport operations, the [I]‘reasonable’ test comes down to this:-

1. The cost difference is demonstrably nil [Current Australian C over D practices]
2. The impost to VFR is simply using a radio and complying with a clearance
3. The opportunity of un-alerted NOT see and therefore NOT avoid is removed where pilot error is not a factor [incorrect report of altitude or position.
Indeed, there is no such thing as a SID or IAP that would not be "safer" with a higher minima, but that is not the way such design works. In fact, if you employed the same logic applied here to C over D versus E over D, there would be no low weather minima approaches, and probably no 200' CAT 1 ILS.
Wrong. For all the reasons explained above. SID’s and IAP’s are designed to be safe and as far as ‘reasonably’ possible [safe guards as listed above], error/failure tolerant. If you cannot see the difference between Instrument procedure design and safety monitoring when compared to the ‘normal’ mode failure opportunity of Class E, then I fear to say, you prove what many here are saying. You have no idea!
Whether you like it or not, CASA is bound to use a risk management approach across the board, witness the work being done by Aerosafe as a consultant to CASA, putting the meat on the bones of the basic policy of risk management.
Aerosafe, lets see:-

Aerosafe // Minimise Risk...Maximise Opportunity... (http://www.aerosafe.com.au/)

Nice web page, sounds impressive, lots of Helicopter companies involved in their subscription ASN, can’t see to many ANSP, National Aviation Regulators though.

Aerosafe // Industry Case Studies (http://www.aerosafe.com.au/page/industry_case_studies.html)
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
Aerosafe has conducted risk culture analysis within one of the Force Element Groups of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), which manages the Air Traffic Control functions. Aerosafe developed a cultural survey, which was completed by over 85% of the organisation. The results were analysed and presented back to the senior manager of that Group to use as a basis for the development of their risk management program.
A great idea.

In the meantime, an invitational to reinvent the ARM and CRFM will be one to watch. True enough, the ARM needs a GA only tool, oh dear, wouldn’t that have saved some red faces over the ‘intolerable’ FAA D/GAAP matter.
Any bravado that might be envisaged with mitigation such as ACAS will have to take into account the vast differences between ACAS performance between two track/trajectory predictable aircraft in proper CTA and that of only half the collision pair being ACAS aware and the other using startled GA eyes to try and avoid an ACAS manoeuvring RPT. There are a whole dinner party full of these little details being compiled by various groups. Suitors will have to be full bottle on industry acceptable thresholds as well as ICAO rule compliant.

Not to worry, the ‘meat on the bones’ will have to be served up to the industry, you know the ones who will have to rely on the RMS DNA before it is given a CofA.
We simply must adopt the best risk management standards in aviation, will we ever?? I don't know, but I have been pushing such adoption since well (years) before AS/NZ 4360 Issue 1 was even published.
Have you now changed tack since you realised AS/NZ 4360 is current risk management practice that could NEVER deliver Class E above D zones? It has been a variable and flukey set of wind changes from you these last 30 odd pages.
For those of you who want to have a bit of fun with the statistical term, "vanishingly small", it may be the equivalent of zero in maths, but "vanishingly small" is never "nil", or in other words, risk can never be nil, short of abolishing the activity.
Many thanks for stating the obvious to anyone with a cranium larger than a mouse. That is the very point contributors have been arguing, the risk of un-alerted not see and not avoid in Class E is not zero, it is also not vanishingly small when considering the concentration of climbing and descending aircraft in and around terminal area airspace.
If you decline to understand/accept that, it is no skin of my nose, but it does make the probability of your arguments being accepted ( in a technical, not political sense) , dare I say it, vanishingly small.
Of the pontificating and sermon giving, you fail to understand that well read risk managers in non-aviation expert fields, but inexperienced [in aviation and ATS] omit the risk multipliers. It was blatantly obvious in the three ‘bash bidjii’ papers since called in to question.

Your friend who likes to coin your often used ‘vanishingly small’ catch cry consistently makes the same miscalculation. i.e. collision probability in 100sq miles of en-route Class E [where few if any VFR aircraft are climbing or descending through other VFR and IFR] is statistically light years away from that of every aircraft IFR and un-known VFR climbing and descending through tracks converging in the 100sq miles of airspace above and around an airport or NAVAID.

You show me ONE, just ONE risk modelling tool that properly considers the large [comparatively] and very real difference in risk exposure of no structural vertical segregation [as all are aircraft climbing and descending around airports] and I will retire from this debate.
That you might succeed at a political level, by scaring the beejesus out of politicians, does not invalidate ICAO airspace design principles, it just proves how hard modernization of anything to do with aviation is in Australia.
Political operatives/minders [and the vast majority of pilots and air traffic controllers] reading this discussion will not buy that poor attempt to twist reality. ICAO airspace design is not the issue. The issue is properly assessing and allocating the correct airspace classification. You can keep trying to spin the reality, but you must know by now there are an endless supply of us ready to stop your merry-go-round in its tracks, day in, day out.
I have also said, time and again, that aviation regulatory reform in Australia (and that includes proper risk analysis) has been blunted and reversed time and again, by sectional pressure groups, with the results for all to see.
Another Quotable quote

[ARFOR]

squawk 6969

His tired old VOR post has been answered.

Mr Smith, answered previously, here it is:-

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/396261-class-d-zones-broome-karratha-3.html#post5340338

All

This is the game they play. Duck and Weave, never answer with facts, data or evidence.

It is important at this time for all to resist the temptation to be drawn in to emotive or frustration driven responses that take the focus off the nuts and bolts. Keep it factual, and when they repeat rubbish that has been answered previously, find the link and post the answer again.

Just keep doing that :ok:

DNS I'm getting a sniff of the same ;)

Keep up the good work all :D

[Dick Smith]

squawk6969

It is a total waste of time answering the questions. I have said numerous times that experts have told me that Class C airspace IS safer than E if it is correctly manned and the proper tools are given to Air Traffic Controllers.

If the Class C is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, it is most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced.

The experts tell me that is because the risk close to a runway is greater than in the link airspace further away from the runway.

The experts say to me – and it seems to fit in with commonsense – that if an Air Traffic Controller’s concentration is taken away from where the collision risk is greatest, that an accident is more likely to happen.

The experts tell me that the only reason the US has Class E over D is so safety can be improved because of the facts stated above.

When I mention what the experts have told me and what reflects airspace design in many other countries, I am told by a small number of Air Traffic Controllers in Australia that in their case, they can handle the Class C airspace – at huge volumes – as well as the Class D airspace without any extra manning (normally just one Controller) and without any reduction in safety.

Well, of course, they would say that (to use the Mandy Rice-Davies defence), however I’d rather use commonsense and logic.

As I’ve said, I support Class C airspace if it has a proper approach radar facility and adequate Controllers.

It is quite clear - there is a Minister’s Directive telling Airservices where they are to have Class C airspace above D to provide an approach radar facility and the proper manning.

The very fact that this Directive still remains and has not been reversed shows that there are many people who know that if you are to provide Class C airspace and give a high level of safety, you cannot do it at no cost.

[squawk6969]

What the experts tell you sounds great in theory. However I am not convinced. And the questions that remain unanswered may well help me decide.

It seems to me from listening first hand to tower ops at a Class D location with C above it, that while your claim they are too busy to handle the C above it is in fact not that bad at all, and in fact handling the flow from higher up makes it safer up there and at the coal face.

I have sampled this from the other side of the fence and it seems to work smooth also, both VFR and IFR.

So unless the questions of others are addressed fairly, it seems your claims from what experts tell you, while very plausable indeed, do not stack up against what I have seen first hand as an observer and participant.

You could do the same if you asked them nicely.

SQ

[peuce]

Dick,

Well, you would say that ....:E

If the Class C is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, it is most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced.
By that logic ... If the Class E is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, is it also most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced?

The experts say to me – and it seems to fit in with commonsense – that if an Air Traffic Controller’s concentration is taken away from where the collision risk is greatest, that an accident is more likely to happen.

By that logic ...would it not also be the case for the Class E Controller? :oh:

I am told by a small number of Air Traffic Controllers in Australia that in their case, they can handle the Class C airspace – at huge volumes – as well as the Class D airspace without any extra manning (normally just one Controller) and without any reduction in safety.

Well, of course, they would say that (to use the Mandy Rice-Davies defence), however I’d rather use commonsense and logic.

So, you'll believe your "experts", but not Australian Controllers? :confused:
I hope your "experts" aren't lying Controllers also?:}

As I’ve said, I support Class C airspace if it has a proper approach radar facility and adequate Controllers.

Why don't you also put that caveat on Class E airspace? Doesn't it need Controllers or facilities?:confused:

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

You would remember when you were the Chairman of the then Civil Aviation Authority, there was much discussion regarding ICAO regulation, and Australian compliant legislation regarding the definition of:-

Air Traffic Control Service

Do you remember [you must] a letter to:-

ALL ATC STAFF,

[authored by the then Deputy Chief Executive A F Rainbird],

dated 18 June 1990.

The subject:- "SEE AND AVOID" - AMENDMENT OF REGULATIONS

CAR 98 (1) and CAR 163A featured.

Do you still maintain you are unaware of why Australian air traffic controllers cannot provide FAA style Air Traffic Services?

Moreover, do you also maintain that ‘preventing collisions’ [as per ICAO] is not the role of air traffic controllers in VMC, rather pilots [all] should 'see and avoid'?

As you [and your alter ego mjbow] would say:-

I look forward to your advice :suspect:

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

It’s clear that you simply don’t understand a proper, well-designed airspace system. You state

By that logic ... If the Class E is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, is it also most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced?

Absolutely not! Because in a properly designed system the Class E airspace is manned by Controllers in the Centre. That’s for obvious reasons – it’s there 24 hours per day, not just for the hours of the local tower.

Peuce, fascinating to find that you have absolutely no understanding of how the NAS airspace system works.

I’ll say it again.

In NAS, Class E is not operated by the local Controller in the tower. It is operated by the centre – yes, even in non-radar airspace.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith said:-
you have absolutely no understanding of how the NAS airspace system works

I’ll say it again.

In NAS, Class E is not operated by the local Controller in the tower. It is operated by the centre – yes, even in non-radar airspace.

So glad you said it again [for the record] Mr Smith :D

It is you who has no idea how the US NAS works. :=

Where are the assessments of high level en-route sector controllers ability to add terminal area procedural Class E to their already huge workload?

Yes, won't touch that will you :suspect:

[peuce]

Dick,

Well, it's no wonder I
simply don’t understand a proper, well-designed airspace system.

Where is it? We used to have one... but it's gone. Trying to keep up with the interminable changes is sapping.

However, putting your condescension aside, where what will be provided from is only conjecture at this stage ... unless I've missed something.

Please point me in the right direction please.

[Dick Smith]

ARFOR Yes I will touch it.

If the assessments have not been done in Australia that's not my responsibility.

I have alway's supported proper ATC staffing levels.

And if Aussie ATC's cannot provide the safer FAA style service with 24 hour approaches in E then update the rules so you can.

[rotorblades]

proper ATC staffing levels

What are they? Can someone please tell ASA (there's is a reason they've got the nickname airnoservices australia)
But more staff means more money, that will dent ASA profit.

You cant just dump more airspace, more traffic, more complicated procedures on the same amount of staff (or lack thereof). Thats not safe.

[ARFOR]

It only took a couple of hours to nail the state of play. Childs play :D

Mr Smith

Quite aside from the huge volume of unanswered discussion points, you never disappoint when the heat is on
If the assessments have not been done in Australia that's not my responsibility.
Disgraceful. YOU [and your 2.5 side kicks] have been informed of the systemic problems with adopting the US NAS. It is not about The rules [I note with interest you duck the CAR 'prevent collisions' issue] . The US rules are not needed in Australia. Imagine forcing pilots to 'see and avoid' in VMC when it is not necessary. That is why the CAR regulatory changes were knocked back in 1990, the same applies today, 20 years later.

With reagrd resourcing, YOU [and your 2.5 side kicks] also know that enforcing Centre E to low level in Australia is neither US NAS compliant, nor reasonable given the airspace structures in Australia.

The AIG and APG know, as do the CASA. There will be nowhere to hide for any of them, least of all the Minister.

One last question of you:-
I have alway's supported proper ATC staffing levels.

Will you lobby for proper assessments, and ensure the safest possible [subject to CBA and RA] system is put in place by CASA for Australian industry?

Can you live with whatever outcome that might be?

Once again, [B]I look forward to your advice :suspect:

[Howabout]

Dick, in reference to the following:

As I’ve said, I support Class C airspace if it has a proper approach radar facility and adequate Controllers.

It is quite clear - there is a Minister’s Directive telling Airservices where they are to have Class C airspace above D to provide an approach radar facility and the proper manning.

The very fact that this Directive still remains and has not been reversed shows that there are many people who know that if you are to provide Class C airspace and give a high level of safety, you cannot do it at no cost.The 'directive,' as I recall, was signed off by a Minister that I believe you may have described as being (not the exact words) 'the worst Transport Minister we've ever had.' I don't agree with that entirely; I just thought he was an amiable dolt.

In my opinion, he was conned because he was thick. The argument, in my view, would have gone something like this:
Minister, in the US there is no Class C airspace that is not serviced by radar.
Consequently, you can't have Class C without radar.
Therefore, Minister, if Airservices requires Class C airspace at those locations, it must install radar.Once again, my opinion, but the deception was in the second point, and the amiable dolt swallowed it; just as he was meant to.

From my perspective, Dick, the so-called 'radar direction' letter was a very neat piece of manoeuvring. I do admire the way it was done, but let's admit it; the amiable dolt could have been sold a bridge in Sydney 'going cheap.'

Radar with Class C was never the desired end-state from my perspective, despite the letter; and this is where the plot was extremely neat. The end-state was always E over D at places like Launy, Coffs and Alice. The 'radar direction' letter, that the amiable dolt signed off on, was designed (in my opinion) to put an additional cost impost on Airservices, thereby forcing them to reverse the reversal and reinstitute E after the NAS 2b rollback.

Radar Class C was never the end-state was it Dick? It was forcing Airservices to reinstitute E to avoid the 'mandatory' radar that the amiable dolt was convinced is necessary if you have Class C.

Once again Dick, I do admire the thought processes that went into that one. But it must have been like shooting the proverbial 'fish in the barrel.'

The last point I'd make is that, in a 'first-world' country, maybe we should spend the money and introduce radar services at some of these locations. However, that is not tied to what I regard as a duplicitous strategy to con an amiable dolt.

There is no connection between Class C and the need for radar services. If there is, please refer me to the appropriate reference in ICAO SARPS.

I suppose, Dick, that this will just be another question (conveniently) left unanswered.

[Capn Bloggs]

Nailed it in one, Howabout. :ok:

C needs radar. I don't think soooooo...

[Dick Smith]

Howa, my reasoning is slightly different.

If C is required to give the minimum required level of safety it is clear that VFR are required to be separated from IFR.

The only way of providing this separation safely when the aircraft are not visual to the controller is by using approach radar ie primary and secondary.

Class C under the US NAS requires approach radar. We have a similar standard of living to the USA and a similar high value of life - then we can afford a similar level of safety equipment.

Class C without radar is a sham as a VFR aircraft can transit the airspace without detection by ATC.

Why thinking controllers would want C without radar and adequate staffing is beyond me.

Maybe they consider their jobs as some type of charity position.

[ARFOR]

The only way of providing this separation safely when the aircraft are not visual to the controller is by using approach radar ie primary and secondary.

And the safety stats for Australian non-radar D/C towers would be?

In three groups:-

- ATC errors
- Pilot errors
- Violations of controlled airspace

I look forward to your advice again :suspect:

[Dick Smith]

This would most likely mean that C was not required in the link airspace - which would fit in with the safety studies.

And if C is required in the lower risk link airspace then B would be reqired in the higher risk terminal airspace below.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

You have gotta be joking?!

Class C without radar is a sham as a VFR aircraft can transit the airspace without detection by ATC.

You reckon a VFR not complying with one of THE most basic rules of the sky, not to enter controlled airspace without a clearance, is a sham, but requiring me to look out of the window in the same location to avoid the same VFR in E isn't? Your arguments become more farcical as time goes on, Dick.

So here we are, in a bugsmasher, in the middle of Australia (very complex airspace there and at KTA/BME...not), and we inadvertently fly through the C steps. I find that very unlikely. Much much more unlikely than a "Free in GE" pilot would deliberately fly through non-radar E talking to no-one and scaring the willys out of me when he (hopefully) pops up on TCAS.

Fortunately I think most pilots, VFR included, are responsible enough not to transit through C without a clearance, radar or not. Perhaps it is only the "Free in GE" brigade who think that scooting thru procedural C would be the norm.

C never has required a radar. Think outside the square, you fundamentalist. Non-radar C, totally ICAO compliant, provides a very cost-effective (dare I say it, affordable safety) airspace regime that protects the fare-paying passenger.

[le Pingouin]

I have alway's supported proper ATC staffing levels.

And if Aussie ATC's cannot provide the safer FAA style service with 24 hour approaches in E then update the rules so you can.Then why the hell aren't you flogging proper ATC staffing like there's no tomorrow?!? And kicking mjbow in the nads for saying CivilAir is feathering our nest?

There is no way we can handle vast extra swathes of E, let alone provide approach services in the vast low level sectors we now have. You can't introduce more services without having the controllers in place to match first. Nothing else is safe.:ugh:

Exactly what "rules" are you referring to changing? Time & space? If I could take that ability home with me I might agree......

[Howabout]

Nice Dick.

I'd ask you to also answer the previous questions, but your last comment totally intrigues me. As follows:

Class C without radar is a sham as a VFR aircraft can transit the airspace without detection by ATC.


Equally, isn't E a sham because a VFR aircraft can transit the airspace without detection by ATC.

By the way, I'd really appreciate, just once, an attempt to answer the questions that are put to you.

Do me a favour Dick; we joust in a good-natured way and I will not descend to invective - doesn't serve any purpose - but will you please address my comments at Post #603.

Finally, there are a lot of us that grew up in a (healthy) nationalistic environment where there was admiration. You cheapen that and disappoint by making statements about fellow Australians like:

Maybe they consider their jobs as some type of charity position.

[Dick Smith]

Post 605 is my answer to 603

E isn't a sham because that's the way it is designed to work.

And there is nothing wrong in doing work for charity.

[Howabout]

Dick, your post#605 came nowhere near answering my post #603!

One simple point, among all the others that remain unanswered - direct me to the authoritative reference whereby radar is mandatory for Class C airspace.

I'll ignore everything else that you refuse to answer on post #603 if you can just shed light on this really simple one.

It was, after all, the nub of the 'radar direction' letter. So, I'll repeat:

Where is the authoritative reference that mandates radar services for Class C airspace?

[Dick Smith]

The " authoritative reference" is as follows

The federal cabinet was presented with the NAS document by the Minister.

Cabinet approved this document as the basis for airspace change.

The document made one clear reference to class C viz para 2.4

"Class C airspace will exist in radar based controlled terminal areas"

You can't get much clearer than that.

See the real cabinet approved NAS document on the Dicksmithflyer site.

If there is an accident in C without radar no doubt the cabinet decision will be referred to- not the anonymous rantings on a rumour site!

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

Just come a little closer to the microphone.

Who was responsible for the Australian NAS document presented to Cabinet?

If there is an accident in E with or without radar no doubt the cabinet decision will be referred to ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

Dear Sir Humphrey Smith,

The " authoritative reference" is as follows

The federal cabinet was presented with the NAS document by the Minister.

Cabinet approved this document as the basis for airspace change.

The document made one clear reference to class C viz para 2.4

"Class C airspace will exist in radar based controlled terminal areas"

Waddya ya reckon, we came down in the last shower?? http://www.smilies.our-local.co.uk/index_files/rain.gif

[ozineurope]

"Class C airspace will exist in radar based controlled terminal areas"

That is - if the TMA is controlled by radar then the airspace must be Class C. That statement does not mandate a radar for C it mandates C for radar.

So where there is no radar the airspace may still be classified as Class C but if there is a radar then it MUST be class C. See the difference?

[le Pingouin]

Very nicely put Oz:D

[Howabout]

No, Dick, that is not an authoritative reference in any way, shape or form. And you know it. Cabinet knows squat about airspace and is not an 'authority.' For the last time, it's the authority I'm after.

It's a nice argument, but my question related to 'authoritative' support for Class C requiring radar.

Cabinet considered a documnet presented by 'the worst transport minister we've ever had.' Those were your words I believe. Plus the document, I understand, was authored by you. Is that correct?

Once again, tell me where Class C requires radar in order to comply with ICAO SARPS. Hell, I'll even cut you some slack and ignore ICAO.

Give me a reference whereby Class C cannot be controlled without radar.

[ferris]

Leadsled TOTALLY dismantled by ARFOR.

Great thread!! :D

Dick, still trying to polish a turd. Give up.

[Howabout]

Dick,

I can still see your light on. I think you've had a fair while to reply if, indeed, you have any confidence in your position.

Mrs Howabout has just about lost patience and wants to play mahjong on the computer

File your disagreements and we'll take them up tomorrow.

[max1]

Dick,

A few of your experts quotes explained for you.

It is a total waste of time answering the questions. I have said numerous times that experts have told me that Class C airspace IS safer than E if it is correctly manned and the proper tools are given to Air Traffic Controllers.

If the Class C is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, it is most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced.

A controller can better regulate and positively separate in Class C. If the controller is overloaded in D it may be because they weren't planning further out in C.
You seem to have the impression that we can 'catch' any aircraft and fit them in somewhere. Ask yourself, why is the controller overloaded in D? How did they get to be overloaded? That is the real question. How would E help this?
Judging by your comments about how you think ATC is done,this may come as a shock but it's like flying, you need to be in front of events and planning for what you are doing, not just reacting to what is happening.

The experts tell me that is because the risk close to a runway is greater than in the link airspace further away from the runway.

The experts are correct but have you understood why that risk is greater? It is not 'just because'. From an ATC perspective you have less room to move aircraft about and pilot or controller errors /mistakes are more time critical. This is why the risk is greater.

This is the common sense part you missed,in actuality the further out you can start to deal with separation problems the less problems you will have closer in. The risk is only higher closer in because the aircraft are closer together.


The experts say to me – and it seems to fit in with commonsense – that if an Air Traffic Controller’s concentration is taken away from where the collision risk is greatest, that an accident is more likely to happen.

See last point. The Continental US, compared to Australia, has fantastic radar coverage and more than ten times the controllers. The US controllers can pass unknown and unverified level traffic due to their radar coverage and far greater controller numbers. What have we got? Due to our far less traffic, we would not need as many controllers as the US, but would still need an increase in some form of surveillance. ADS-B would have been great, but that puppy was still-born.

The experts tell me that the only reason the US has Class E over D is so safety can be improved because of the facts stated above.
See last two points.

When I mention what the experts have told me and what reflects airspace design in many other countries, I am told by a small number of Air Traffic Controllers in Australia that in their case, they can handle the Class C airspace – at huge volumes – as well as the Class D airspace without any extra manning (normally just one Controller) and without any reduction in safety.

The volume is not that important, it is the traffic in it. Australia controls a huge amount of the worlds airspace. Maybe you should listen to the controllers above. What they are telling you is that it is safer to deal with the knowns than the unknowns. If you remember, we have also debated on the Benalla thread. You were asking why controllers could not be responsible for monitoring outside CTA an aircrafts LSALT and instrument approach. You need to understand we are in Australia a country the size of the Continental USA with comparitively bugger all people in it.

Forewarned is forearmed. Dick, go back to your experts and ask them what ATC is about and then LISTEN to what they have to say. It is not just about reacting to what gets thrown at you, it is about incorporating that event into a safe , orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic. You keep yourself in front of the game.

[Blockla]

Why thinking controllers would want C without radar and adequate staffing is beyond me. For the same reasons they are able to provide Class A without radar.

Class C without radar is a sham as a VFR aircraft can transit the airspace without detection by ATC. The responsibilities to the individual ATC are clear in this case, the unknown, undetected aircraft is systemically at fault (for entering CTA without a clearance, same as D/B and A categories) in the event of the worst or a near worst event; change the category to Class E and suddenly everything is different. The PIC of the IFR in non radar will share a good deal of the blame, in a surveillance environment the ATC particularly if there is a hint of a 'paint' will be blamed for letting it happen and yet the result is exactly the same.

AFAIK controllers in the USA vector and restrict descents and climbs of IFRs to avoid the VFRs they see, this is a work around to avoid liabilities inherent with Class E airspace. Sure they don't need a 'standard' but they do need miles or visual contact to let the IFR 'loose'. How this approach works without surveillance is baffling.

The whole mantra of NAS is 'ICAO compliant', yet in reality it is USA NAS compliance that is sought; nowhere in ICAO docs is Class C described as terminal airspace (with radar surveillance required) and nowhere in ICAO does it link and level of surveillance with Airspace Category.

The Cabinet approved Ministers directive is political missive at best (by the previous government and ignored by this one at best) and undoubtably has no enforceability in law; otherwise, surely you must agree, the Minister his office or department should have sought that enforceability; after all this time.

In the event of some significant event happening in the current non (radar) surveillance/approach function Class C airspace the subsequent royal commission will demand many many buckets of popcorn.

The manner in which Class E has attempted to be implemented from the ATC perspective was and is a disgrace. All the additional duties were added to existing ATC sectors, not one new centre position was added under the pre roll-back structure; this is where it is/was fundamentally flawed. To provide the services attention and monitoring that Class E particularly in surveillance environment required is at times critical, but there is little justification for long term ATC positions given the density of VFR traffic. This is why Class E costs more from an ATC view point, but only if you do it properly; which Oz didn't do because of cost and lack of staff.

[Howabout]

Hi, Dick, has anything related to authoritative guidance turned up overnight in relation to C and compulsory radar?

Didn't think so.

[Dick Smith]

I can't do much better than a decision made by the Minister for Transport and Federal Cabinet. This decision was then acted upon and also supported by the rellevant management in AsA and CASA.

Also the travelling public would expect that if an airspace required Class C that they not be short changed because of profit a making drive by the provider and Radar be left out.

I find it strange that you support C without radar when blind freddy would know that Radar would improve safety.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith
I find it strange that you support C without radar when blind freddy would know that Radar would improve safety
I find it strange that you 'insist on' E with or without radar when blind freddy would know that Class C [or D] in any form would improve safety [and efficiency]. :=

[le Pingouin]

Snort, it's strange you think E without is better than C without.

C worked well at Launy without radar for a long time before the E abortion.

E failed miserably at Launy without radar - just ask the 737 crew.

Two questions: What do you think an RA means? What do you think AIRPROX means?

E is defective by design.

[peuce]

I was just re-reading CASA's 2009 Broome Aeronautical Study... as one does.

I got a bit confused ( or CASA is a bit confused) about what FIS is. Reading their table of "Australian Airspace Structure" (excerpt below) it appears that FIS to IFRs includes Traffic Information ... to VFRs ... it doesn't.

In my book, you either get FIS or you don't.

Perhaps if they substituted "Traffic Advisory Service" for FIS .. for IFRs in Class G, it would make sense.

Oh, no ...that would then make it identical to the definition of Class F. Ooopps.:=

Whatever they do, they need to clarify the situation. These are the guys deciding our fate :}




Class E

Controlled airspace not covered in classifications above (above 8,500ft or
FL180)
IFR separated from IFR by ATC, traffic information on known VFR. Speed limited to 250KTs IAS below 10,000 FT AMSL*,
continuous two-way radio required.
Clearance to enter airspace from ATC required.
VFR provided with Flight Information Service (FIS), search and rescue, weather update service, on request, within radar coverage and workload permitting.
Speed limited to 250KTs IAS below 10,000 FT AMSL*, continuous two-way radio required.
Clearance to enter airspace from ATC not required.
Transponder required for VFR aircraft with continuous electrical power

Class F


None in Australia. ( ha, ha, ha, ha) ... my laugh.


Class G


Non-controlled
IFR receives FIS on IFR and known VFR traffic
Speed limited to 250KTs IAS below 10,000 FT AMSL*
Continuous two-way radio required
Clearance to enter airspace from ATC not required
VFR provided with FIS, search and rescue, weather update service and Radar Information Service (RIS) subject to availability.Speed limited to 250KTs IAS below 10,000 FT AMSL*
Clearance to enter airspace from ATC not required. VHF radio
required above 5000 FT AMSL at aerodromes where carriage and use of radio is required and required for operations in reduced VMC.

[Howabout]

Dick, in reply to your comment at post #625, as follows:

I find it strange that you support C without radar when blind freddy would know that Radar would improve safety.
I refer you to my previous comments at Post #603, which contained the following extract:

The last point I'd make is that, in a 'first-world' country, maybe we should spend the money and introduce radar services at some of these locations. However, that is not tied to what I regard as a duplicitous strategy to con an amiable dolt.

There is no connection between Class C and the need for radar services. If there is, please refer me to the appropriate reference in ICAO SARPS.

I think my position is pretty clear. Radar is an 'enabler' that, in general, improves efficiency. And, as I said, maybe we should be looking at radar at some of those regional locations if we are, indeed, a 'first world country.'

However, radar is not a mandatory requirement for Class C, which is your argument - an argument that you have consistently failed to substantiate. That Cabinet 'signed off' is an irrelevance - are you seriously telling me that Cabinet had a clue in relation to the technical requirements of airspace architecture?

My question was straightforward and simple - what is the authoritative reference that mandates radar in Class C?

I'd also add my agreement to a previous poster's comments? Are you really keeping a straight face when you maintain that non-radar Class C (where all traffic is known to the system) is unsafe, but non-radar Class E (where all traffic is not known to the system) is perfectly safe and acceptable?

That sounds to me to be a bit of an 'upside-down' argument.

And, Lead, before you jump in and decry my use of the concept of 'safety' and give me another dissertation on 'risk,' I'd point out that Dick used the naughty word in reply to a previous post of mine.

As regards the statement:

I can't do much better than a decision made by the Minister for Transport and Federal Cabinet. This decision was then acted upon and also supported by the rellevant management in AsA and CASA.


In my view, a more accurate statement would be one to the effect that the decision was acted upon, supported and reversed when they realised they'd been sold a pup and could be held accountable in the event of an aluminium rain shower.

[Josh Cox]

There has been mention of "whats the point having C/E without RADAR ?".

Why not mandate ADSB for all aircraft, that will take the guess work out of it ?. Have ADSB units and FIS at all RPT ports.

Make it C or E, I do not believe it will really matter, ultimately IFR aircraft will be protected from the VFR weekend warrior on the wrong frequency, 30nm off track (no offence intended to weekend warriors).

[Dick Smith]

Howabout, why is this so important to you?

Why arn't you in a position where you can talk under your own name and be listened to?

Sounds to me as if you have a enormous chip on your shoulder! Very sad!

Do you really believe that cabinet decisions are not valid if each cabinet member does not understand every detail of the decision?

If you have a genuine belief that the proposed CASA/AsA decisions in relation to airspace are wrong why don't you phone Steve Creedy at the AUS. I guarantee he will give you a good hearing a write a good article.

I dare you.

[squawk6969]

Do you really believe that cabinet decisions are not valid if each cabinet member does not understand every detail of the decision?


:ugh:

Dick in most cases I doubt the majority do, especially with anything as knowledge specific as aviation.

They can't get insulation scheme's right without killing people, all in aid of what??:rolleyes:

SQ

[Howabout]

Dick, old fruit, I respectfully suggest that the chip is not on my shoulder.

Howabout, why is this so important to you?

Clearly, Dick, because it is so important to you.

I just don't happen to like what are, in my opinion, unsubstantiated arguments that are transmitted to gullible policy makers as fact.

Dick, if you can provide substantiation for your argument, I'll back off and, furthermore, provide an apology.

But mate, in my opinion, the stuff about going to Creedy etc is really grasping at straws. An argument stands or falls on its veracity - nothing else.

I will continue to keep this civil and only argue fact. I trust that in the spirit of what's best for aviation in this country you will agree and continue to do the same.

Regards

[LeadSled]

Ferris,
All our mate ARFOR has (yet again) proved, is that he is a champion "cut and paster", actually understanding what he has cut and pasted ( including all the context, the docs. not presented, because they might spoil his take on the subject) is another matter.

Have a look at my last post on the Willy thread.

Bloggs,
Re. a recent post, you could edit it to make it demonstrably more accurate:
Then it would read C needs radar. I don't think!

That I could believe.

Tootle pip!!

[peuce]

Geez, I hope this guy doesn't hold an important position within our Government or its Agencies.

He has no idea on how to debate an issue.

Full marks for childishness though.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
I find it strange that you support C without radar when blind freddy would know that Radar would improve safety.
Gee, I didn't know that. Could you explain it a bit more?

Ledsled,
Bloggs,
Re. a recent post, you could edit it to make it demonstrably more accurate:
Then it would read
Quote:
C needs radar. I don't think!

That I could believe.

That's the 5th or is it the 6th time you have tried to edit my posts. You're not doing a very good job, although this last one is close. I absolutely incredibly strongly agree that C does not need radar. Glad you have finally got the message, or were you just trying to put words into my mouth?

[ferris]

Leadsled, I'm fairly certain that anyone, ANY casual reader, who happened upon this thread, would agree that your attempts at obfuscation have been roundly put to rest. Facts, cut and pasted or not, are still facts.

I would ask any, ANY casual reader, to note the conspicuous absence of any support for the alleged transplant of the "US system" by any actual air traffic controllers. Think about that. Not one. Why would that be? The reasons offered by the Nastonauts are that ATCs are change resistant, troglodytes, or any number of spurious labels. The reason is that actual ATCs understand the infrastructure constraints in oz, and that, despite what Dick says, the under-resourcing of the services to the industry will continue. Oz does it best- with what it has. Dick blows long and hard about how much money he has saved the industry- but what he should be saying is how much money he has removed from the industry. Not one cent of any alleged savings has gone back into services etc.

FIX THAT PROBLEM, Dick. It's an actual problem that could use a transplant from the US- the US charging regime. The effort expended on this airspace BS really is astounding, and is looking quite self-interested.

[ARFOR]

LeadSled

You have lost the plot
actually understanding what he has cut and pasted ( including all the context, the docs. not presented, because they might spoil his take on the subject) is another matter.

Have a look at my last post on the Willy thread.
Your last post on the willy thread:- http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/412797-williamtown-class-e-stuff-up-5.html#post5655530
"NAStronaut". I'll wear the "T" shirt if someone prints them up.

I can see the reverse side..." I flew class E and survived".
I'll have two, where do I order??
I know you were referring to the one previous, but hey, accuracy counts eh! :D

I'll issue the same challange on this thread. If you feel anything I have quote only tells part of the story, please enlighten us with any missing bits. As your friend would say I dare you http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/src:www.pprune.org/get/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

[peuce]

Okay, in a final attempt to keep this real, I'm changing sides for a moment. (I've always wanted to pretend to be a Nastronaut!)
I'm going to try and put Leadsled's point across ... in a civil manner.. and see where we go from there.

Dear Fundamentalists,

The data has been gathered and the calculations have been made, using the most current Risk Management tools and processes.
The result shows that, using the Broome data, a Class D Tower with Class E steps up to the lower limit of current CTA will provide a residual risk value of x.
A value of x is consider extrememly low and well within the required residual risk.

Now, you guys say that you want to use Class C, so that the residual risk will be further lowered to a value of Y.
However, although Class C on the face of it, appears "safer", x is already so low that bringing it down to y will not provide any visible reduction in risk.
It's really like trying to reduce something that doesn't really exist (according to the research and modelling) in the first place ... that is the likelihood of a VFR/IFR MAC.

However, you say that ... for little, if any, cost ... we could add that extra level of risk reduction ... just in case the modelling is wrong.... which a lot of you feel.
Well, I can agree with you to some extent that, had you access to the modelling process, you might be more convinced that non-radar Class E will provide the required risk mitigation. But that is not currently available.

Well, dear Fundamentalists, your only option appears to be to convinve OAR to ... "add a bit for Mum", with Class C.

I'll leave it with you. I'm off to get ready for Anzac Day.

[rotorblades]

Why jump from E to C, D is a plausable mid-space class.
All traffic (IFR & VFR) is known - unless pilots breaking air law, but thats a different argument, all subject to clearances (thus workload can be managed on ATC side), safety is greater than E, Not as restrictive as C, greater situation awareness due to better & fuller TI, and still if an IFR cant get a clearance he can choose VFR and get a clearance to climb that way.

And work on some route segregation, so that inbounds/outbounds/overfliers arent always crossing-paths or flying head to head. may mean a few more miles to fly (not a great deal, though). What price safety?

[Frank Arouet]

Dear Fundamentalists,

And your mob; Dear Zealots.:suspect:

The NAStronauts must be winning if the plethora of new posters is logarithmatically proportional to your cut and paste arguements. Some, of previous note, are private VFR day pilots with an axe to grind over their previous failures.

Pathetic really.:(

[rotorblades]

Now Now children,

Name calling isnt getting anybody anywhere. We are just running round & round in ever decreasing circles. I'm not blameless. But Ive decided to take a step back and try to be a bit more objective. Call me a COSmonaut (Change Of System). It needs changing, whether NAS/E etc is the way to go. Who knows yet(be 100% honest if you decide to comment on this last sentence, please - no knee jerks from either side).

Why dont you put the proposals out formally to the likes of - the check pilots of the airlines & regular IFR chief pilots, ATC Line Checkers, ATC Sector Procedures (mostly current controllers as well) etc and see what feedback comes from them. And they are the ones who are gonna have to work with them. Not government ministers, CASA etcAfter all its their heads on the line if anything goes wrong with the new procedures.

Cause just like anywhere else in the world the majority of the blame wont be apportioned to the heads of the government departments or the chiefs on the upper floors of ASA/CASA etc. And they wont lose their jobs/life.

Lets all think of the passengers on these planes & their safety - thats what we are here for, rather than our pet loves/hates.

And anyway, theres more important matters - like air(no)services staffing. And if AnSA told the truth I think even Dick Smith would be shocked.
There's no point in over-burdening a creaking system under current procs.
Get the staff then get the airspace to match, not vice versa.

[Howabout]

Frank, read my previous posts and please respond. As I've said, many times, I want to keep it civil; let's argue the facts.

Invective doesn't cut it, from my side or yours. Let's just argue the facts Frank.

Missives, as per the following, don't promote your case:

The NAStronauts must be winning if the plethora of new posters is logarithmatically proportional to your cut and paste arguements. Some, of previous note, are private VFR day pilots with an axe to grind over their previous failures.

In all fairness to you, I read that several times to try and be even-handed Frank. After reading it multiple times, I don't have a clue as to the point you are trying to make

In fact, I don't actually know whether you're backing Dick or agin him.

[ferris]

Rotorblades,

I'm interested in this comment
It needs changing, whether NAS/E etc is the way to go. Could you expand on that- I think there are a lot of people scratching their heads at why? Do you mean that things need to change at Broome, or that the Australian system needs changing? If it's the latter- a lot of us would be interested in your reasoning.

I mean it would be terrible, wouldn't it, if this whole crusade was based on a false premise? I'm sure you will agree.

[rotorblades]

Broome?
I was under the impression, maybe wrongly, that this push was for Australia-wide. If its just Broome, then i got the wrong end of the stick.
I'm no Broome expert. If its just about Broome, I can still have an opinion, cant I, or can only people that fly into Broome & followers of NAS be allowed to speak?
I mean it would be terrible, wouldn't it, if this whole crusade was based on a false premise? I'm sure you will agree.
If this is just trying to rattle my cage, or try and prove your right and everyone else is wrong. It wont work. I'm past that now. Even if it is just Broome, how long before it would be pushed at other aerodromes?

As for the latter. I do think it needs an overhaul. There are patchwork quilts of random airspace for so many airfields that seem to have been put together on a knee twitch without a much larger plan being thought in.
I come from 7 years working in a country where the thought of having an RPT fly into an uncontrolled aerodrome would have the CAA/SRG having kittens.
I personally think, there needs to better ingress/egress routes into controlled airspace from the uncontrolled aerodromes, to give better protection to the IFR flights.

Take the E airspace at Williamtown, I am seeing an increasing level of IFR busting in or turning without clearance. i can only put this down to confusion as to the rules required in the new airspace or a distinct lack of airmanship from professional RPT pilots. I'm hoping its the previous.

Regardless of whether Ive got the wrong airport/airspace under the initial thread leader. The other 90% of my last post Is still valid.

[ferris]

I'm not saying you cant have an opinion- quite the opposite. I'm trying to find out what you think is wrong with the current australian system.
I personally think, there needs to better ingress/egress routes into controlled airspace from the uncontrolled aerodromes, to give better protection to the IFR flights. Protection from what? From other IFRs. From VFRs? From CFIT? Where is the problem that needs fixing? Is it just an opinion? Do you think the introduction of half of the "US system" will address this 'problem' (which is the actual topic of the thread)?

Your last post indicates that the introduction of E at Williamtown is the problem. Perhaps the problems arise when complexity is increased trying to pander to Dick's dreams.
I certainly agree that there are more important matters to address before ANY effort is wasted on NAS.

[rotorblades]

Hi Ferris,
I'm not trying to start a intra-nationality bum-fight here. I can just see from, previous experience, a few tweeks that could do a lot in improving the service.
Its not all airspace, internal ASA needs looking at. There is no staff, no morale, there is no communication between management & ATCOs. Procedures get forced on ASA & ATCOs from CASA/DAP despite the ASA safety case against it.
And no the UK isnt perfect, nor the US, Canada, Germany, UAE or any other country you care to pick.

I'll try and address your points/questions in turn...
Protection from what
Both VFR & IFR in the free for all airspace. CFIT I dont see as a major issue due to well published LSALT/RouteLS etc. Although the potential is always there, be it with self-separating from other traffic or TCAS RA's. but Im guessing that the terrain alarm would go off in turn (GPWS?, from memory)

Is it just an opinion
Of course. I have a different background to most/some. Where I spent the first 7 years controlling we had Controlled airspace protection for 99% of RPT traffic for their entire trip. (only exception I can think of without looking at maps is Newcastle, where they spend about 10track miles in G before entering D class CTZ - whilst in G they will be under Radar Advisory Service, so ATC provide vectors around traffic on radar (including primary paints)). So to see it here with a lot of RPT traffic mixing it in a free for all, is offputting (&scary) sometimes.
Anyway, I can only give opinions/advice. I have no policy making position
within ASA.

half of the "US system" will address this 'problem'
Honestly, No.
I dont see E as a big enough step up from G. It is not/does not seem to aid in the unknown traffic situation. or aiding the pilots of aircraft in situation awareness at all. As for climbing into it VFR until get IFR clearance, Once again I can see how it helps an aircraft get above the LSALT, but not with traffic separation. It will just cause more headaches for ATC, possibly more RAs/TAs, and probably a lot of ill will from ATCers. I know from WLM that most reasons a pilot doesnt get clearance immediately is because of conflicting traffic. And not on taxi because of how quickly traffic can change (weather avoidance in the summer for example).
My own, humble, opinion is that if you want to significantly increase the safety advantages then D would be a better option. All traffic is known (VFR & IFR), they are under clearances, you know level & routing/intentions. you can provide alternate clearances to the VFRs with less hassle. Yet you still have the flexibility of see & avoid for VFR (but with known TI). And yes if a pilot really wanted to climb in VFR as opposed to IFR, he can with a clearance & TI (once again known TI).

The UK had very little E. I think only Belfast & Glasgow(?). and although VFR didnt have to announce themselves, it was strongly recommended that they got themselves identified to the controlling ATSC. I dont know how this worked because I was London TMA.

Am I advocating a UK based system. No. The UKs is deisgned around a lot of major aerodromes tucked into little corners, with a lot less space & a lot more aircraft. But that doesnt stop me thinking that D is a fair compromise between safety, IFR flight, VFR flight & Controller Workload management. (If too busy VFRs have to go around).

complexity is increased trying to pander to Dick's dreams.

I was trying to get the thread away from the his & hers dreams and onto sensible discussion, so wont comment on that bit.
Complexity was increased. With it being E down to 4500' it squidges any conflictions in G into less space than they had before. Outbounds initially have to climb to a level below the LSALT (outside 25nm to the N/NW), please dont start on IFR pick-up, anyone I think we;ve done that to death!
Most RPT flights are only gonna climb IFR.
I dont think its done a huge amount to increase safety (most ATCOs agree), its forced the conflixtions into sfc-4500 rather than sfc-8500.
It has reduced flexibility of the RPTs as if there is a VFR at, i.e. 6000', on a crossing track to an inbound on descent from flight levels. ATC will clear the RPT to leave CAS descending, control service terminates passing 4500', traffic is (unknown VFR, etc etc). The pilot may/or may not sight this aircraft and where he'd maybe normally just turn around it, if he's above 4500' he has to get an amended route clearance from ATC. Or if he levels off it will set the CLAM (Cleared level adherence monitor) in ATSC off and as well as looking for the traffic he'd be answering our calls on confirming he's levelled off. Because we have to check in case he misheard the clearance. (Or like one RPT today didnt readback the clearance to leave CAS, except with just "Roger", twice - I was too busy and gave up)

Once again, my opinions....
i hope this answers your questions

[Rule3]

Rotorblades.... Are you Fair Dinkum.:confused:

Your last post states {intimates} that in a RAS area, controllers are vectoring acft to provide a separation or avoidance service from unknown Primary paints. You can't be serious. The implications are totally mindblowing.

[Frank Arouet]

Howabout;

I have tried to be a spectator on this subject because, I will be the first to admit, I have no qualifications to speak on the subject. Indeed I am a Private owner/ pilot with lapsed Instrument rating who flies in class E probably three or four times times a year.

This fact doesn't seem to worry a few other posters even less qualified to try to fob themselves off as "experts" on the subject. They know who they are.

Given my situation, whenever I have flown E airspace as a responsible transponder equipped pilot would, I have always had good situational awareness of other traffic via Centre discussions with whatever aircraft are "in the system". Indeed on many occasions Centre have advised RPT of a 1200 VFR "paint" (me) at their o'clock and whatever altitude.

I therefor assume that RPT has similar situational awareness and most probably has the benefit of TCAS.

I can't believe there is a massive problem with non transponder aircraft that should influence this discussion.

What I note is a common theme of vested interests, some ATCO's and some Regional Pilots with a dead set against any "uncontrolled" or "out of the system" aircraft being in "their" airspace. I also note those with opposing opinions are treated like pariahs, sychopants or uninformed rabble despite some of these being very well informed.

As for assuming the NAStronaut's are winning, I base this observation on the length and veracity and multiples of posters.

"I think they doth protest too much".

I am backing Dick on this as he appears to be making more sense by supporting a well proven system. I also think rotorblades made some good observations with regard to the state of play at Airservices.

[Howabout]

Thanks Frank. I don't necessarily agree, but I respect your position.

As for:
What I note is a common theme of vested interests, some ATCO's and some Regional Pilots with a dead set against any "uncontrolled" or "out of the system" aircraft being in "their" airspace. I also note those with opposing opinions are treated like pariahs, sychopants or uninformed rabble despite some of these being very well informed.

I think you will find that our side of the fence comes in for some 'tough love' from the NAS proponents as well Frank. It's not one-way traffic.

From a personal perspective, I don't have too much difficulty with enroute E. Where it exists there was formerly Class G so, IMHO, that's an improvement. This debate, however, is about terminal E and the threat it poses in the climb and descent phases of flight. What I cannot understand is why someone would want airspace that relies a good deal on chance, when an alternative providing positive separation is available. We get called 'fundamentalists;' I'd classify adherence to the terminal E option as blind zealotry. I just see it as irrational.

In regard to TCAS, yes those RPTs above 19 seats and 15,000kgs (from memory) are required to have it. However, TCAS is not a separation tool; it's a system of last resort when all other safeguards have failed. In short, it is designed as the 'get out of jail card.' And, by the way, ICAO is quite explicit with regard to TCAS not being a factor in airspace classification and, hence, the level of associated control services. In short, TCAS cannot be used as a mitigator and justifier for Class E.

[Icarus2001]

Dick , i have just read the last three pages to catch up. Tell me why you say that...

The C airspace must be controlled by the (usually) single tower controller in the underlying D, which risks distracting them.
BUT

The E airspace would be controlled by centre.

BOTH can operate without radar. No one seems to be commenting on this major difference.

If you are worried about a VFR entering C without a clearance and not being "seen" due to lack of radar, then logically you must be worried about the same aircraft flying though E airspace unknown by anyone and not "seen" on radar.
It is the SAME AIRCRAFT in the SAME airspace, just labelled differently, C or E, either way tell me what stops the 737 hitting it?

Your answer would be...?

No really, you say SEE and AVOID. Heaven help us.

[Howabout]

Iccy,

You're using logic. It's not allowed.

This is a logic-free zone.

Get with the program Iccy!

[rotorblades]

Hi Rule 3

That what a RAS is, dont seem to provide it down here. Its giving RPTs that extra level of service. And dont forget rules are significantly different in the UK. IFRs staying in G dont have to speak to an ATSC, I dont think they even need to file a FPL.
The radar coverage is also much greater, NATS had more sectors (comparable) and more controllers so that there was enough time to give this service. Under a RAS, you just gave vectors to go behind the conflicting traffic. It only take 5 or 10 degrees.

Dont seem to have RAS down here, FIS & RIS.

[ARFOR]

Manual of Air Traffic Services - UK

http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/CAP493Part1.pdf
Chapter 4 Integration of VFR Flights with IFR Traffic in Class D CTR/CTA/TMA

1 Introduction

1.1 This Chapter provides advice and guidance to controllers on the safe integration of VFR flights with the IFR traffic flow within Class D CTA/CTR/TMA.

2 Flight Rules

2.1 The pilot is responsible for determining the flight rules (VFR or IFR) under which he wishes to conduct his flight, taking into account the prevailing flight meteorological conditions, airspace classification, and the limitations of his licence/qualifications. For aircraft taking off from or approaching to land at aerodromes in Class D airspace, flight visibility is deemed to be the visibility communicated by ATC. Controllers, therefore, must not declare control zones to be 'IFR' or 'IMC'.

3 Control of VFR Flights

3.1 The minimum services provided to VFR flights in Class D airspace are specified at Section 1, Chapter 2, paragraph 2. Separation standards are not prescribed for application by ATC between VFR flights or between VFR and IFR flights in Class D airspace. However, ATC has a responsibility to prevent collisions between known flights and to maintain a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic. This objective is met by passing sufficient traffic information and instructions to assist pilots to 'see and avoid' each other as specified at Section 3, Chapter 1, paragraph 2.

3.2 Instructions issued to VFR flights in Class D airspace are mandatory. These may comprise routeing instructions, visual holding instructions, level restrictions, and information on collision hazards, in order to establish a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic and to provide for the effective management of overall ATC workload.

3.3 Routeing instructions may be issued which will reduce or eliminate points of conflict with other flights, such as final approach tracks and circuit areas, with a consequent reduction in the workload associated with passing extensive traffic information. VRPs may be established to assist in the definition of frequently utilised routes and the avoidance of instrument approach and departure tracks. Where controllers require VFR aircraft to hold at a specific point pending further clearance, this is to be explicitly stated to the pilot.

3.4 When issuing instructions to VFR flights, controllers should be aware of the over-riding requirements for the pilot to remain in VMC, to avoid obstacles and to remain within the privileges of his licence. This may result in the pilot requesting an alternative clearance, particularly in marginal weather conditions.

3.5 Approach radar controllers in particular should exercise extreme caution in vectoring VFR flights – a geographical routeing instruction is preferable. Prior to vectoring, the controller must establish with the pilot the need to report if headings issued are not acceptable due to the requirements to remain in VMC, avoid obstacles, and comply with the low flying rules. Controllers should be aware that pilots of some VFR flights may not be sufficiently experienced to comply accurately with vectors, or to recover to visual navigation after vectoring.
Is this what you are suggesting instead of climb and descent [terminal area] Class E rotorblades?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Francis, you said-
whenever I have flown E airspace as a responsible transponder equipped pilot would, I have always had good situational awareness of other traffic via Centre discussions with whatever aircraft are "in the system". Indeed on many occasions Centre have advised RPT of a 1200 VFR "paint" (me) at their o'clock and whatever altitude.

And there lies the rub....There is nothing REALLY wrong with E when there IS radar surveillance. The flavour talked about for Broome does not have radar...so no calls from centre to IFR warning of a 1200 paint in their area.

No surveillance makes E the same as G wrt separation between IFR and VFR.

[Frank Arouet]

G'day to you Owen:ok:

I accept your definition of expert in "working" the airspace, but isn't Dick just supporting an existing and proven overseas system that looks likely to come to a town near you shortly. And if it does, your expertise will be needed to work "that" system.

Captain Sled has thousands of hours in command on International Transport and has sat on more Legislative and Regulatory committees than you could imagine. Doesn't this then make him expert enough to pass comment and have an opinion on how the various systems work from the pilot's perspective and how the Bureaucrats may act.

What do you do for quid Frank?

Self funded retiree mate, so I doubt anybody has any better qualifications to tell me how to drink beer or wine in a gentlemanly manner. But I am ex petrochemical and mining industry, Draughtsman before CAD, (remember the 2H pencil?), manufacturer and designer of pressure vessels, propane industry consultant, professional roo shooter, timber cutter, truck driver, one time security to a Sydney high roller, farmer, services rendered to the Military, chairman of several boards of directors, participant on others, and general dogsbody.

But I would always listen to constructive criticism (sometimes):ok:

EDIT TO ADD FOR OZBUSDRIVER;

I'm a spectator so I can evaluate all sides on this aspect. As so I haven't made up my mind whether G over D would be better than E over D at Broome.

Feel free to educate me from a VFR perspective so both of us are on even terms. I know what the RPT blokes want.

[Howabout]

Onya, Frank: I disagree with your position, but remain impressed with your CV!

As regards Lead, yes, he does have those hours and experience and he is not without respect. Far from it.

He is eminently qualified to sit on those committees and I've always admired his willingness to give up his own time to make a contribution.

But that does not make him infallible. And, in this particular case - terminal E over D - he's supporting a system that is designed to fail, rather than a system that is fail-safe.

Regardless Frank, the 'roo-shooting' and 'timber-cutting' part of the CV is the bit I liked. I've known many and they were all salt-of-the-earth.

Take care.

[Plazbot]

This is all essentialy about allocation of resources and rotorbaldes writes.....

because I was London TMA.

......and they stuck him on Macquarie group. Sigh.:ugh:

[Capn Bloggs]

He is eminently qualified to sit on those committees and I've always admired his willingness to give up his own time to make a contribution.

But that does not make him infallible. And, in this particular case - terminal E over D - he's supporting a system that is designed to fail, rather than a system that is fail-safe.

And as importantly, he

1/refuses to divulge any Cost-Benefit Analysis that supports E over D instead of C over D and

2/refuses to acknowledge that the 2 NMACs we had in E airspace in 2003-4 shoots holes in his assertion that NMACs in E are "vanishingly small" and

3/will not comment on the suggestion from MJBOW2 that, if ATC refuses to give an IFR a clearance into E after takeoff in a surveilled environment eg at Williamtown, that the aircraft just switch to VFR and blast off anyway without even considering what may be causing the controller to refuse the clearance.

He may have a position on E airspace (including calling some of us small-minded and never been out of the 12nm zone - the last time he was in a regional jet in Aus was ?), but his refusal to address the above concerns demonstrates to me that his reasons for demanding E over D has little to do with safety and more to do with a fundamentalist belief, also held by Dick Smith, that VFR have a right to go where they like, talking to no-one, even though that very same airspace is occupied by RPT jets who have no idea where the VFR is/are.

[rotorblades]

ARFOR

basically, yes

[Frank Arouet]

Owen;

Do you reckon Lead has ever gone into a centre and sat down and plugged in and listened and watched what has gone on?

I thought Dick and he were PNG at Airservices Centre. If you can arrange for the three of us to visit, sit, plug in, and listen, I'm 99.9% sure I can arrange the meeting at a mutually convenient time. Tea and bikkies your responsibility of course.

Over?;)

[rotorblades]

Francis
many occasions Centre have advised RPT of a 1200 VFR "paint"

But we(ATC) may not *always* see you. For many reasons including busy with something else in the airspace, (in the case of WLM E) whenever the military have decided they are going to turn off the radar feed from their radar to us (way too frequently). Its not a default safe airspace.

I have also known a lot of VFRs who dont listen out on the area frequency whilst trudging through E, let alone the CTAF/CTAF(r). So they arent even looking for an great aluminium tube doing 250k's straight at them, or from an oblique angle.

[ARFOR]

A look at a Class D tower with Class C steps might be a good idea!

Mr Smith says terminal area Class C should have radar [ICAO disagrees, but let's ignore than for a moment]!

He therefore must be comfortable with [have no argument against] Class C continuing above Class D towers where radar/or radar equivalent surveillance coverage exists? ;)

[superdimona]

By definition any ATC is an expert (for want of a better word) on airspace, you'd be a little worried if they weren't. I haven't ever walked into any Dick Smiths electronic superstore and told them they sell sh!t flux capacitors and then sat down at the till and designed them another one and insist on them throwing the old one out and selling my design.

Owen, I'm afraid that anyone with any electronics experience in Australia would tell you that this is a particularly terrible example :8

These days staff would be lucky to know what a capacitor is, let alone know where to find them in the store (assuming they have not been removed to make way for more mobile phones).

[Capn Bloggs]

ARFOR,
He therefore must be comfortable with [have no argument against] Class C continuing above Class D towers where radar/or radar equivalent surveillance coverage exists?
That's not playing by the rules. You're trying to set the poor bloke up! :=

[Frank Arouet]

rotorblades;

I'm not ignoring you, but need time to factor in a quantity for;

I have also known a lot of VFRs who dont listen out on the area frequency whilst trudging through E, let alone the CTAF/CTAF(r). So they arent even looking for an great aluminium tube doing 250k's straight at them, or from an oblique angle

Whilst this seems to any NAStronaut an alarmist statement, I am thinking of it.

Perhaps you can quantify it for me, particularly with regard how many don't have transponders or radio in class E viz quantified penetrations into controlled airspace by the same idiots?

[ARFOR]

Capitan Bloggs [I]esq :E I'm sure I have no idea what you are suggesting :E

[rotorblades]

NAStronaut an alarmist statement
I wouldnt say alarmist, but something everyone has to be aware of. And it proves the point. If even RPTs are getting it wrong then there are VFRs out there as well. I've had several reports from RPTs (not airmisses) asking "is that traffic just passing 500' below us on your radar", quite frequently responded with on the lines of "what traffic?".
quantified
There is no way to quantify it unless an aircraft has an airmiss or TA/RA. because if theres nothing in the way we dont try and contact them.
I dont see the non-transponder aircraft most of the time (due to poor radar coverage etc). As to how many will infringe if say it was D.
It is a different mindset for pilots who know they can fly through the airspace without a clearance, than if they know they are gonna need the clearance & call ATC.

I concur with what Owen says.

At WLM for example the area frequency split runs around the northern edge of the E airspace - the VFRs, can be switching between the two, or on the CTAF(r), if they are from the south could still be on the Sy Rdr freq (happens a lot of times & vice versa with them on our frequency when in Sy Radar area). Too many unknowns.

But then, you can say that with any class of airspace.
Saying you dont want the higher level of airspace coverage, & safety, just incase of penetrations is , as we say in the UK, arse-about-face. In that case why have C around Sydney, and not just E? VFRs can still penetrate without clearance.

And its not just about the VFRs, the IFRs cant always get it right. Like in the past couple of shifts Ive had an:
1/ IFR climb into E without clearance
2/ IFR-RPT turn direct to finals without clearance

[LeadSled]

That's the 5th or is it the 6th time you have tried to edit my posts.
Bloggs,
For your information, I have never attempted to edit one of your posts, it must be somebody else, if, in fact, it is happening at all, and not just a figment of your imagination.

I was merely suggesting an edit by you, to more accurately reflect a position taken by you.

1/refuses to divulge any Cost-Benefit Analysis that supports E over D instead of C over D and

Rubbish, I have told you where and how to find it, and why I will not provide the info.

2/refuses to acknowledge that the 2 NMACs we had in E airspace in 2003-4 shoots holes in his assertion that NMACs in E are "vanishingly small" and

Rubbish again. Despite your opinions on the subject, those opinions were not shared by the NAS assessment team, and did not invalidate NAS 2b. By the way, it is the probability of an actual hit that is vanishingly small, but the likelihood of you ever coming to terms with rational risk analysis is, might I suggest, also vanishingly small.

3/will not comment on the suggestion from MJBOW2 that, if ATC refuses to give an IFR a clearance into E after takeoff in a surveilled environment eg at Williamtown, that the aircraft just switch to VFR and blast off anyway without even considering what may be causing the controller to refuse the clearance.


You lot are all so tied up in your "Little Australia" world that you can't imagine an alternative way of doing business, there are many reasons why a pilot, having considered the implications, might decide to depart VFR.

Indeed, ARFOR has thoughtfully posted the FAA Ops. Spec. rules for incorporating such a process for Part 121 and 129 operators, rather than the Australian "one size fits all" "rule". I well remember the days when we couldn't descend out of the jetstreams over Australia in winter, because we would have been "outside controlled airspace", as soon as we were outside the Australian FIR, commonsense prevailed, the Captain was no longer constrained in operating the aircraft properly. Another example of mindless regulatory straighjackets.

his reasons for demanding E over D has little to do with safety


Arrant rubbish ( as opposed to you ordinary rubbish) as I have stated my position time and again. If the traffic levels justify a D tower, and E over the top, going to C does NOT increase safety, no matter how fondly so many of you believe it. All you produce is economic waste.

On one post, somebody referred to CASA/OAR impositions on ASA, despite the ASA Safety Management System indicating otherwise.

The short and sharp reason for this is that the ASA system is fundamentally flawed, in part because it seeks to distinguish between two "vanishingly small" results, a statistical nonsense. Then there is the little matter of the fact that ASA is no longer the airspace regulator, CASA/OAR is, and for a string of very good reasons.

Re. sitting in a centre and listening from the other end of the ATC system. I have sat in, in Sydney, in its various guises, quite a few times over the years. Since TAAAAAATS, Brisbane, (never in Melbourne), Singapore, Honolulu, the old New York "IFR Common Room" and before it moved, the old center in London. I might point out, none of these were "visitor tours" --- but generally in association with conferences on ATC services.

Tootle pip!!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

as soon as we were outside the Australian FIR, commonsense prevailed, the Captain was no longer constrained in operating the aircraft properly. Another example of mindless regulatory straighjackets.

One assumes you were still within your block clearance, Leadsled. Outside the Aus FIR is still controlled airspace, you strill have to request and get any changes to your plan...that was what FANS was all about, wasn't it...Giving Captains more disgression to choose the best routes because they were less constrained than the huge blocks of airspace required to keep your sorry arse safe from running into someone else under procedural airspace...but, then again. You know that...tell the punters why FANS is so much better for oceanic....

Give you a head start...explain ADS-C and how it makes for tighter tolerances for separation as opposed to full procedures...Surveillance as opposed to Procedures....that sounds like an argument for E

[Capn Bloggs]

Ledsled,
For your information, I have never attempted to edit one of your posts, it must be somebody else, if, in fact, it is happening at all, and not just a figment of your imagination.

I was merely suggesting an edit by you, to more accurately reflect a position taken by you.

Having a bit of fun, I was.

refuses to acknowledge that the 2 NMACs we had in E airspace in 2003-4 shoots holes in his assertion that NMACs in E are "vanishingly small"

Rubbish again. Despite your opinions on the subject, those opinions were not shared by the NAS assessment team, and did not invalidate NAS 2b. By the way, it is the probability of an actual hit that is vanishingly small, but the likelihood of you ever coming to terms with rational risk analysis is, might I suggest, also vanishingly small.

Oh, I get it. Provided the aircraft don't actually hit each other, there's no problem. In any other class of airspace, all hell breaks loose when the aircraft come within a few miles of each other, but because nobody is trying to actually keep aircraft apart in E, all's well. Got it.

refuses to divulge any Cost-Benefit Analysis that supports E over D instead of C over D and

Rubbish, I have told you where and how to find it, and why I will not provide the info.
I forgot. My day job takes up so much of my time I can't sit on this computer 24/7 looking for this stuff. Please provide again. Or is this schoolboy "It's a secret" stuff?

You might like to address Rotorblades comments about the cluster_uck that is Willy airspace at the moment in relation to E. Sounds like the big-sky theory is alive and well around there.

will not comment on the suggestion from MJBOW2 that, if ATC refuses to give an IFR a clearance into E after takeoff in a surveilled environment eg at Williamtown, that the aircraft just switch to VFR and blast off anyway without even considering what may be causing the controller to refuse the clearance.

You lot are all so tied up in your "Little Australia" world that you can't imagine an alternative way of doing business, there are many reasons why a pilot, having considered the implications, might decide to depart VFR.

So I'm a new IFR regional Hi-Cap captain. What would "implications" and the "many reasons" would you teach me when instructing me about departing into low-level E from a CTAF?

[ARFOR]

He is being cute with the truth Bloggs

He thinks that the 'design safety case' for NAS2b fits the bill. A CBA it is not. The safety case for rollback, he reckons was flawed, yet rollback occurred, the work on that remains on the Dept website, yet there were no volume specific safety cases. ;) FAA 'like' yeah right :D

He won't show you the work for this latest exercise, because it does not exist [unless a mad scramble of beer coaster bits has been put in a folder and labelled].

NAS is old hat, stomped flat, but their still wearing it :} and the polly cats are still admiring it [as a friend of mine would say] like floosies at Flemington. ;)

[Dick Smith]

Rule3, re your post 648 yes it is for real

In the UK CAA system non radar towers such as Plymouth are in G airspace with Controllers "controlling" IFR aircraft on to the approach and the ILS.

Controllers even "control" IFR aircraft in en-route radar G airspace when other aircraft in IMC are not reporting.

In practice they give a class E like service in G however they so resist change(the CAA) that no one is game to call it class E.

Tiny airports such as Gatwick are class D.

Heathrow is supposed to be class A however you can fly VFR in the airspace.

Yes, those in charge are incompetent.

[squawk6969]

The NAStronauts must be winning if the plethora of new posters is logarithmatically proportional to your cut and paste arguements. Some, of previous note, are private VFR day pilots with an axe to grind over their previous failures.


As one who has sat quietly observing, just like yourself Frank Arouet....I am confused by your statements and their relevance to this debate. Some day VFR pilots today are the fellow Captains of Leadsled who have retired.

I am not sure how many are posting or even reading, however a quiet discussion with one of them the other day (yes single digit just like Leadslead, few years younger) and this topic came up. The comment was along the lines of and I can not reapat word for word, but let us sum it up as....not qualified to comment. Perhaps those who work these places in Jets and ATC are best to answer that.

Interesting concept wouldn't you say.

SQ

[Capn Bloggs]

In the UK CAA system non radar towers such as Plymouth are in G airspace with Controllers "controlling" IFR aircraft on to the approach and the ILS.

Controllers even "control" IFR aircraft in en-route radar G airspace when other aircraft in IMC are not reporting.

In practice they give a class E like service in G however they so resist change(the CAA) that no one is game to call it class E.

Tiny airports such as Gatwick are class D.

Heathrow is supposed to be class A however you can fly VFR in the airspace.

Yes, those in charge are incompetent.
I submit that the poms are not incompetent, they are merely making the shamozzle that is alphabet-soup airspace work.

Let's just make all airspace occupied by RPT Class D (yes, you VFR fundamentalists can still go about your selfish "business" unhindered but at least I will know where you are so that I have a fighting chance of avoiding a Launy Tobago) and be done with it!

We don't even need ADS-B; Multilateration works great. How about showing some vision, Dick, and support it?

[ferris]

Rule 3- the airspace design that seems incredulous to you- where IFRs are vectored around VFR (?) 'paints' in the UK, is EXACTLY what happens in the US NAS class E. Ask one of your current colleagues.

This is the airspace design that the Nastonauts are proposing to introduce. The BIG DIFFERENCE in places like Broome, of course, is that there is no radar coverage to have to worry about vectoring IFRs around 'paints'!!

Incredible? Well, that's one word for it.

As for the UK- calling an airspace a letter, is different to mandating what actual service occurs in that airspace- a la class G in oz (class F). Dick, if you want to blame ATS administrations for using weasil words, blame their political masters who have made it an art form. eg. ministerial 'directions' that do nothing other than placate vocal constituents. ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

Found on the DICK Smith Flyer (in relation to Avalon):

The fourth paragraph of your letter indicates that Mr Smith has obtained advice from ‘experts’ supporting his opinion. Given the circumstances of your correspondence, we are surprised that these experts are not named, that their credentials are not provided and that we have not been provided with a copy of their assessments.
So much for anonymous posters...

oooh and further:

Dick:
4. “Acting inconsistently with the government’s 2007 Policy Statement”

OAR:
The summary points listed here are a mis-representation of the AAPS, namely:

a) the Policy statement directs a risk and cost benefit based approach to regulation: Not simply to copy the US NAS

[rotorblades]

Dick Smith,
hahahahahaha,
sorry, was your post not a joke?

Heathrow is supposed to be class A however you can fly VFR in the airspace
Why didnt you ask me (as someone who controlled the heathrow class A CTZ for 7 years)

Oh no you cant. You can fly IFR or SVFR, as its a class A control Zone.
Even the US mentions SVFR.

non radar towers
Very few 'radar towers' as you like to call them about.
The Approach service provided by approach controllers in the main ATSCs, Luton, Stansted, Heathrow, Thames (London City, Biggin Hill, Southend), Gatwick all in the NERC Centre plus others in SCOATC i.e. Manchester, Glasgow. People without a radar cant vector.
We are the ones who provide the radar vectoring to ILS finals. using appropriate R/V Charts, descent points, terrain clearance. Its called:
SAFELY, ORDERLY and EXPEDITIOUS.

Controllers even "control" IFR aircraft in en-route radar G airspace when other aircraft in IMC are not reporting
And thats less safe how???? its all above the LSALT.
Its safer then, under your ideas, to just pass traffic to the IFR and let him blast through it?
Its what radar is for, to deconflict traffic with as little hazard to mainstream RPT traffic. whilst still keeping class G (the open FIR) for pilots who dont need their hands held for their flight.
At anytime the pilot can say he doesnt want the RAS, and only wants RIS or FIS.

Tiny airports such as Gatwick are class D
Tiny, as opposed to what, Broome? Tamworth?
Sydney is tiny compared to places like Dallas or LA.
Other class D control zones are Stansted, Luton, London City, Birmingham, Manchester. Your point being?
It just proves that the UK can manage traffic better & integrate safely VFR
& IFR.

Yes, those in charge are incompetent
If you mean in the UK, you obviously havent got a clue - as you havent got a clue in all your statements on my post. You could've just asked me I would've told you .

In practice they give a class E like service in G
Im sorry but they are not providing e like in G. So dont bring your E class fetish into it. In E you dont give vectors or routings around VFR. So the UK actually super over-providing, almost a C service in G, wow! bonus points.
Surely thats not incompetency, surely thats service provision above & beyond the call of duty.

By your logic controllers should give the lowest amount of service possible in each airspace class rather than the highest or more than is required.

I think this has disproved your last post as complete horse faeces. And your whole narrow-minded approach is to prove that your idea is great and everyone elses' is crap(except the US - who we hope dont pull up their pants because the sun would disappear, cause thats obviously where it comes from in the world according to Dick)

The UKs not perfect, but it works for us(when I was there). It allows suitable access to all areas with adequate safeguards and backups.

One more touch on incompetency - Whos the more incompetent a company who when you highlight a safety deficiency/concer in the system:
a/ says thanks for highlighting it and investigates the matter (NATS)
or
b/ labels you a troublemaker, threatens you with remedial action and does nothing about it? (ASA)

[Dick Smith]

They Control aircraft in un -controlled airspace and you say that is not incompetent!

Our G is not ICAO F as we are obsessed with mandated radio and mandated VFR radio calls in our G wheras in ICAO F no radio is required fo VFR.

Are you suggesting we should have a non radar tower such as Broome the same way as Plymouth- with ATC actually controlling aircraft in G?

And dimensions of about 3nm X 2000'.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
Our G is not ICAO F as we are obsessed with mandated radio and mandated VFR radio calls in our G
Call it what you like, on several occasions over my flying career, that has ensured that I have got to where I am in my life ie still alive (here to annoy you ;)), by not running into a VFR because I actually found out about them before running into them. Good system, methinks. :ok:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

RE-read rotorblade's post, Mr Smith. He is saying even though the airspace is G, ATC OVERservice!

So the UK actually super over-providing, almost a C service in G, wow! bonus points.
Surely thats not incompetency, surely thats service provision above & beyond the call of duty.


C like services in G...can he be more clear than that?

It matters not if its G or whatever you wish to call "un-controlled airspace" The radar surveillance is in place, all VFR are visible and therefore a target and can be passed as traffic...If VFR choose a full service, a directed service or no service...it is their call...sounds simple enough...because there is a means of surveillance...:ugh:

[Dick Smith]

On weekends no radar surveillance at Plymouth but ATC in the tower still provide a control service in G and separate IFR from other IFR's they know about.

Their CAA clearly lacks the leadership to allocate an ICAO airspace classification to the airspace- no doubt scared of being attacked by anonymous dopes on PPRUNE.

They just go on calling it G. You don't get that type of incompetence in the USA.

Bloggs, our G is not F! There is in fact no ICAO airspace classification below D that includes VFR in the system. This is for good proven safety reasons- if a system relies on VFR calling in the blind, accidents will result because there is no proof that the radio is actually working, let alone on the correct frequency!

I will say it again - the UK CAA is the most incompetent aviation regulator in the world. The UK once had a viable GA and Airline aircraft manufacturing industry- all now destroyed by an out of touch regulator.

Their airspace system is clearly the worst in the world after one other.

[Capn Bloggs]

But their CAA clearly lacks the leadership to allocate an ICAO airspace classification to the airspace- no doubt scared of being attacked by anonymous dopes on PPRUNE.

I know who the dopes are, and they are not the pommy CAA. The POMs just do what is necessary to get the job done, much like what we would do if commonsense prevailed. They're not paranoid about making some bureaucratic "rule" work in the real world. The yanks never had alphabet soup airspace until it was invented by some bureaucrat in ICAO, and then they made it fit. When did ICAO say that transponder veils around class B were required? When did ICAO say that transponders were required in Class E? The alphabet soup classifications are becoming more of a farce as time goes on.

Yes, the more I see and think about all this, it's obvious that this has nothing to do with safety or service. It's all about being Free in GE. :=

[Dick Smith]

Bloggs ,why don,t you go flying in the UK

No transponder or radio requirement for VFR in G- mixing with IFR. There is not even a requirement for VFR to monitor an ATC frequency when en-route in G.

I am proud I introduced the mandatory transponder requirement for VFR in E. - it means when we upgrade G to E we introduce an extra safety mitigator.

[No Further Requirements]

The USA have their quirks too Dick - they vector and 'separate' IFR from VFR in Class E (as Jerricho has pointed out quite a few times) when ICAO clearly states that a separation service is not provided in that circumstance. Does that make the FAA incompetent too? How can you separate 2 aircraft if you can't verify one's level or tracking intentions?

[Capn Bloggs]

No transponder or radio requirement for VFR in G- mixing with IFR. There is not even a requirement for VFR to monitor an ATC frequency when en-route in G
No need. Too cold for me. Plenty of thrust though, I suppose. That'd be good. Besides, Rotorblades can tell me how their system really works. If I was flying over there, the first thing I'd do is hop onto a radar freq and ask for all the avoiding guidance they could give me. But my sense of self-preservation is probably a bit higher than yours.

I am proud I introduced the mandatory transponder requirement for VFR in E. - it means when we upgrade G to E we introduce an extra safety mitigator.
Pull the other one. := The brutal reality is that even you realised that unknown, off-freq VFRs in E airspace was so stupid it would never be accepted by anybody, except perhaps Sled (I'm sure he has a study somewhere that says it is totally safe based on a few hundred lives every 30 years). I suppose we should give you credit for that. :rolleyes:

[peuce]

Dick Smith,

You said:

our G is not F!

You can say it as many times as you like, but I will keep coming back to the Airspace Policy Statement 2010

Class F: IFR and VFR flights are permitted, all participating IFR flights receive an air traffic advisory service and all flights receive a flight information service if requested. This class is not used at present in Australian-administered airspace.

Class G: IFR and VFR flights are permitted. IFR and VFR flights receive a flight information service which includes directed traffic information to IFR flights on other IFR flights and known VFR flights.

Önce again, I say ... if it smells like F and it looks like F and it behaves like F ...

The current added radio requirements you allude to are a red herring.
If CASA bit the bullet and called it Class F ( or K, for that matter), I'm pretty sure they would still mandate the extra radio requirements ... so it's neither here nor there.



There is in fact no ICAO airspace classification below D that includes VFR in the system

Really?

All airspace categories include VFRs ... to some extent.
To quote from the Dick Smith Flyer website, your future airspace vision includes:

CLASS G: ATC based separation services are not provided in this airspace. In addition to the directed traffic information services prescribed below, a Radar Advisory Service (RAS) will be available on a workload permitting basis to all aircraft within radar coverage on request. A hazard alerting service will also available on request to ATC or FIS for aircraft which are not receiving an ATC directed hazard service. An FIS will be available on request through the dedicated FIS frequency or ATC. UNICOMs will offer a cost/effective service to RPT and other operations in terminal areas (see below).

Looks to me like VFRs are definite participants in your Vision System to me..

Don't be tempted to join the invisible man brigade ... as they ain't gunna go away!

http://i38.photobucket.com/albums/e115/sosvideo/hiding.gif

[Frank Arouet]

unknown, off-freq VFRs in E airspace

Grabbing at straws Bloggs.

If they are unknown, how do you quantify them except with extreme alarmist statements like that claiming that it is a known factor in risk management that you can't or won't quantify.

If VFR are mandated to have transponders in E,- It is LAW- LAW- LAW- isn't it?

How many of these criminals have been brought to justice Bloggs?

Perhaps the prosecutions will quantify your statements or at least make them relevant or comparable with known data about penetrations into say, controlled airspace.

VFR have a place in Australian airspace Bloggs despite your monastic attempts to rid this vermin from any sky you just happen to be flying in.

Get used to it. You don't own it!

I'm not going away because you don't like me. Get used to that too.

[Howabout]

Fellas,

This is a clear diversion; a red herring to divert attention from the main argument.

This UK thing is an irrelevance.

The argument is terminal E over D.

Dick's quite happy to engage you on this one because, in my opinion, it distracts from his inability to provide substantiation to the core argument here.

Terminal E over D! Don't be distracted!

You've been suckered for 24hrs.

Frank, I can't support your quote:

VFR have a place in Australian airspace Bloggs despite your monastic attempts to rid this vermin from any sky you just happen to be flying in.


VFR are an intrinsic part of the system. A necessary and valuable part; no less important, in the greater scheme, than IFR. VFR is not vermin, but we need a rational system whereby everyone gets to go to bed at night.

[LeadSled]

.not qualified to comment.squark6969,

I would be fascinated to know why you believe said alleged former colleague, if he or she exists, is him or herself qualified to comment or determine my qualification.

My qualifications are formal, what are his or hers? If anybody has a good enough memory, they will recall the work I did for the AFAP and later AIPA ---- and that has little to do with the last 15 or so years, where my involvement continues for other parties. Strange as it may seem to some of you, that includes for several different airlines.

I have had some "interesting" discussions, over the years, with my peers, all too often the "other" point of view is entirely without any acquaintance with the ICAO source documents -----(Ozbusdriver --- Classes of airspace outside Australia come to mind, as Chimbu understands. You sound like you are relatively new to the business) ----- never let the facts spoil a good argument. I have never had a problem confronting the "conventional wisdom" in aviation, when said conventional wisdom is untroubled by the facts---- which has often puts me in a minority.

As I have said, many times, aviation safety is not a democracy. As we have seen time and again (all to often after a fatal accident) the "conventional wisdom" was wrong, but people had to die for the majority to be proven wrong. Sadly, in all to many examples, the minority had pointed out why the conventional wisdom was wrong, only for the inevitable to prove the minority correct.

The oft voiced idea here, that two RAs invalidated the NAS 2b design, but multiple RAs in C in the same period can be disregarded as a symptom of anything, is an amazing example of the illogic of the defenders of the status quo.

I will back my list of formal publication, many on matters of airspace management, against any of my peers, whose average equivalent no. of papers would be so close to nil as to be vanishingly small --- including, to a 3Sigma probability, your "informant".

There is nothing wrong with that, it is not a necessity for the job of being a pilot (or ATC staff - being a controller does not make one an expert on airspace design, just a controller), and as we consistently see here, profound ignorance is no barrier to having strongly voiced opinions.

Am I going to list my publications all here --- no way I am going to put what would effectively be CV on pprune ---- which should be a good starting point for a whole new round of silly comments from the peanut gallery ---- whether I did or not.

However, the great majority are public documents ---- if you want to go look for them ---- very, very few would require a FOI application. Some will only become available under the 30 year rule. Some substantive papers will be found in Hansard, in the proceeding of several Senate or House Standing Committees. Have fun!!

Likewise, I am not aware that any more than one of my pilot peers has done an ICAO PANS/OPS course in procedure design, and that one is long since out of it. Even that course does not go into the detailed basis for the determination of the current procedure design standards, the risk management basis. As a matter of interest IFALPA was represented on the mid-80s ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel that gave rise, in part, to the present Doc.8168 procedures, he was an Australian ( not me, just so there is no misunderstanding).

Fortunately, thanks to the "computer age", procedure design standards have been reduced to (now) reasonably simple procedures (for the practitioner) and I am please to say that most NAAs in our part of the world (except AU) have adopted an Australian developed CAD design package for production or verification of proposed procedures, including GNSS approaches. The same organization provides NAAs, airlines and individuals with various training packages on the subject, if any of you are interested.

Bloggs,
A Hi-Cap Captain!! Wow, I am impressed, terrific, wonderful!!
EEEeeeRRrrrr? by the way, in AU, where does Hi-Cap start, maybe you could remind us? Just so we don't get too carried away about you "obvious" encyclopedic knowledge of aviation matters well beyond those that are (hopefully) defined by your pilot qualifications.

Bearing in mind that operating within the system doesn't make for any necessary qualifications in the design of the system ---- any more than flying a FAR/JAR 25 certified aircraft makes you an expert on design and certification of said aircraft.

Tootle pip!!

[LeadSled]

Folks,
In Rotorblades ( and Dick's) defense of what happens in the UK, it is a mismash, but it works, and nobody gives much of a thought to the class of airspace ---- as long as it's not EGLL.

I know of the matter of Heathrow that Dick alludes to ---- No, the aircraft did not have a SVFR clearance ---- maybe the rules said it should ----- but it didn't happen ----- and (unlike here) nobody got their knickers in a twist about it.

A long time ago now, but my favorite clearance ( in B707) going from EGKK ( Gatport Airwick to the great unwashed) to Lasham, was "Maintain 1500, Clear for T/O, call clear of the zone". Being a weekend, no LARS, no Farnborough Radar, just turn left at the M3, down to Camberly, turn right and look for a strip on top of a hill. If it's got helo's all over it, wrong hill. You need the one with the gliders all over it!!

Tootle pip!!

[Icarus2001]

Heathrow is supposed to be class A however you can fly VFR in the airspace.

Yes, those in charge are incompetent.

Well at least you are consistent in your criticism of authorities around the world. Or is it only those that disagree with YOUR vision?

They just go on calling it G. You don't get that type of incompetence in the USA. Really? What type do they have in the USA.

Now Dick, can you answer my question above...

Why does E have to be run by centre but C run by the single tower controller?

[peuce]

Leadsled,

Look, I think we can all agree that your dick is bigger than our dicks.
Now, that's settled.

However, in the words of that great philosopher, Tom Cruise, I would once again encourage you to "Put your manners back in "

Back to the fray ...

You say:

As we have seen time and again (all to often after a fatal accident) the "conventional wisdom" was wrong, but people had to die for the majority to be proven wrong. Sadly, in all to many examples, the minority had pointed out why the conventional wisdom was wrong, only for the inevitable to prove the minority correct

That's what we are trying to tell you. We believe the conventioanl wisdom is wrong, and we don't want to be proven right with a prang.

We have (or at least I have) conceeded that your figures are probably technically correct and E is "safe " ... however, we want to build in a bit of "tolerance", if you like, by using Class C ... so no one is tragically embarrassed.

Is that not a reasonable request and expectation?

[Dick Smith]

Under ICAO VFR do not require radio in E, F and G airspace. That's why I correctly state they are not part of the system.

If safety requires a traffic information service on VFR there is a perfectly satisfactory ICAO airspace classification for this - it is class D.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smtih
If safety requires a traffic information service on VFR there is a perfectly satisfactory ICAO airspace classification for this - it is class D.
ICAO says 'an air traffic control service' to IFR and VFR in Class D as a service 'minimum'. In principle I agree with your view on Class D. :D

Now we just need to ascertain:-
If safety requires
How might we do that? ;)

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Leadsled, please. No need for a clearance in Oceanic airspace ABV FL290???

Mr Smith,if a system relies on VFR calling in the blind, accidents will result because there is no proof that the radio is actually working, let alone on the correct frequency!


The mind Boggles, if this is what you believed to get VFR out of the system, you are sorely misguided...If this is what you think of GA VFR then how can you expect GA VFR to interact in Class E "Controlled" airspace if you cannot even expect GA VFR to be on the correct frequency. Maybe someone should ensure the correct frequency is on the appropriate map.

No one has even mentioned calling in the blind..the only need ever for calling in the blind was either MBZ, CTAF(R) and now CTAF..I do not know if there ever was a need to call in the blind by a GA VFR in any airspace controlled or un-controlled

[Dog One]

The simple solution - change the rules so that in E airspace outside of radar coverage, all aircraft require a airways clearance. I am sure that the VFR pilots are competent enough to be able to use their radio.

Without going to the power of what ever, if everyone has a clearance, safety has to be very much improved.

[Frank Arouet]

Leadsled, please. No need for a clearance in Oceanic airspace ABV FL290???

Mr Smith, Quote:
if a system relies on VFR calling in the blind, accidents will result because there is no proof that the radio is actually working, let alone on the correct frequency!
The mind Boggles, if this is what you believed to get VFR out of the system, you are sorely misguided...If this is what you think of GA VFR then how can you expect GA VFR to interact in Class E "Controlled" airspace if you cannot even expect GA VFR to be on the correct frequency. Maybe someone should ensure the correct frequency is on the appropriate map.

No one has even mentioned calling in the blind..the only need ever for calling in the blind was either MBZ, CTAF(R) and now CTAF..I do not know if there ever was a need to call in the blind by a GA VFR in any airspace controlled or un-controlled


Well mate, when did you last fly VFR at or above FL 290?

When, OZBUSDRIVER, did you ever reach the lofty heights of the flight levels? How are you qualified to offer any advice on a subject, where that example, to all intent apppears illegal for VFR?

And what is the statistical evidence that VFR are a threat at those lofty heights or in class E airspace where transponders are mandated, of which you are a vocal and irritating critic.

As for whether a radio/ transponder is working or not, it should manifest itself on the M/R. Shouldn't it?

Alterrnatively you, (from what I understand), a private day VFR pilot who hires aircraft, the question is are you qualified to even give an opinion on the subject and of more importance, do you write up owners MR's to reflect some U/S avionics that may contribute to the masses of idiots trangressing sacred airspace where only RPT eagles dare to tread?

Or do you just listen to disgraced dysfunctionaries of a world gone by?

Also, what gives the "looney left" like you the audacity to question experts in one field and obviously support the rank and file experts in another.

Of course we should exclude the "clear air" exponents of the AFAP RPT as convenient bedpartners.

I am sure that the VFR pilots are competent enough to be able to use their radio.

Aparantly not! According to this crew all VFR pilots are idiots so dysfunctional that they cannot turn a radio or transponder on, let alone comprehend what is being said or reply with any coherent advice as to their ability to know where they are in relation to a spinning planet.

God save us all, for they know not what they do, (despite paying thousands for the privelege of being trained to do so).

God save Australian aviation because these Crown Princes of airspace invested sancity are out to kill GA as we know it.

[Icarus2001]

As for whether a radio/ transponder is working or not, it should manifest itself on the M/R. Shouldn't it?
There is the point that those you scorn have been trying to make.

How does the pilot, owner or operator know that the Mode C is in error by 1800 feet when they operate out of say, Broome or Karratha where there is no radar and therefore no mechanism to check it?

Do YOU KNOW when a serviceability check is required for a transponder. on what schedule?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Gosh.....maybe I will take my bat and ball and retire to a more friendlier sandpit....NOT :mad: LIKELY...

Where do you guys get off? So now its play the man time...you have lost your argument so badly...to a lowly PPL that you must play the man????
If there is any one else (ATPL/ATC/PPL/RAAus or whatever) out there who wishes to say my small contribution is wrong either factually or whatever, say so and I will retire.

I can see where class E is heading, it didn't work Nov03 and will not work now. Until surveillance is put into place ala the US then class E linked to the tower or controlled by centre is..as others and myself have said..will fail- UNSAFE. Every study of ANY tower airspace with C over D do NOT recommend a change to E...why is that?

Francis, you know me VERY WELL. I study hard and I do not offer opinion lightly. Just because I have used a few pages of one logbook means nothing in this argument. If the case is flawed, it's FLAWED. No amount of cross-argument on what other countries do with their airspace matters to anything.

The movement figures are available..Broome needs a tower according to the formula..what the likes of Broome does not need is a class E experiment.

No E without Surveillance!

I am a simple man. Show me a reference that says it is safe to have uncontrolled VFR mixing with IFR in controlled airspace.

[Capn Bloggs]

Frank,
Ozbusdriver was not implying VFR flight at 290.

And what is the statistical evidence that VFR are a threat at those lofty heights or in class E airspace where transponders are mandated, of which you are a vocal and irritating critic.
Ask the two 737 crews during NAS 2b what statistical evidence there is now about VFR in E.

As for whether a radio/ transponder is working or not, it should manifest itself on the M/R. Shouldn't it?
Yes it will. But the whole point of E airspace is you don't need a radio, and given the continued opinings of Dick Smith over the years, the first opportunity to not use it will be grasped. Also, an aircraft could be flying around for months outside radar coverage with a dud transponder and nobody would be any the wiser.

let alone comprehend what is being said or reply with any coherent advice as to their ability to know where they are in relation to a spinning planet.
Amply demonstrated by the pilot in the Tobago. I don't criticise him for that; after all, he was just doing what he was told by the NAS Implementation team - "shut up unless you're about to get creamed". I think it is unreasonable to have the outcome of a confliction assessed only by one side of the conflict pair, the VFR. If I know about him then I too can check that what he is doing is not actually going to threaten me. Do you believe that in the Tobago incident things would have got to the point they did if the 737 crew had been aware earlier of where the Tobago was?

It takes two to have a midair. To have one of the two in the dark as to the whereabouts of the other, when one is RPT, is not acceptable.

The other issue is that in E, I very much doubt the ability of most VFR pilots to accurately work out what is going on simply from the transmissions between ATC and the IFR. Once again, that's not their fault: they are not given enough info to work out what is going on.

All these problems are created by the system. Now Captain Courageous, the mighty 7oh Sled, might say that the designers reckon "she'll be right" and the Big Sky theory will keep us apart, but that's not good enough for me, or my 115 punters, especially when there is no skin off the VFR's nose for being in the system.

[ARFOR]

D.N.S

Quite so. The standard play when all is not going well for the NAStronauts at 'The Cape' point of view. Witness the dross above your post.

Mr Arouet

Has anyone suggested:-

1. VFR Above FL290? The reference made was to Oceanic rules, and in that context 'a clearance' at Flight Levels
2. Statistical evidence of Class E 'problems' has been provided in this and the Broome Karratha thread. That you choose to ignore it is up to you
3. TXPDR's and radios do fail, and more relevantly are at times mismanipulated. Thats the point being made
4. The fact is that VFR pilots are more than capable of using a radio and TXPDR, and operating in CTA/R. The point of difference [which you seem incapable of discerning] is that having to initiate comms [clearance in C or D] confirms its correct selection and servicability for use before entering the area of conflict. In Class E there is no such 'check'. In CTA/R C or D, if you are on the wrong frequency, you won't get the clearance response. If surveillance exists, you will be notifed if your TXPDR is not outputting or is in error. If surveillance does not exist, in C or D you are being provided with an air traffic control service, so you won't hit anything anyway. Clear??

As for the rest of your personal invective towards other individuals and groups with a different view. Keep it up, it adds a nice level of insight. :ok:

[werbil]

For those that don't believe that statistical analysis is has any place airspace design, do you believe its use is appropriate for determining airworthiness (ie fatigue analysis, time lifed components etc)?

[ARFOR]

werbil

The only team that does not seem to want Open, Transparent, and Publically Available statisitcal analysis [Volume Specific Risk assessments and Cost/Benefit analysis] is the Class E brigade! ;)

[Dick Smith]

ARFOR

Sensible post from you #702. You ask how we need to ascertain if safety requires Class D.

I would use the US FAA establishment and disestablishment formula for Class D the same as I would use the US FAA formula for the establishment of Class C. We know that in the USA, with something like fifteen times the amount of traffic in a similar land mass, that the rate of accidents is acceptable by US citizens and also Australians – we are not warned as Australians not to go flying in the USA.

The formula works and results in a very high level of safety in the USA - with fifteen times the amount of traffic it’s reasonable to think that the formula would work here.

When I ask the FAA why they did not have a mandatory transponder requirement in non-radar E above the D towers – approximately 175 of them – they said there was no transponder requirement because they were not getting accidents in that class of airspace in those locations.

I always believed we need an objective and scientific formula for allocating ICAO airspace classifications, and that C over D clearly shows that the airspace is reversed, ie. the high risk airspace close to the runway should not be a lower category than the low risk link airspace above.

If an airspace is correctly designed in relation to risk, the categories will reflect the obvious risk levels. By looking at the FAA allocation of airspace, it’s obvious that this is done using a proper objective criteria.

By looking at the Australian airspace or the UK airspace, it’s obvious that a proper objective and scientific risk study has not been completed. It’s obvious that airspace is allocated on perception and “not wanting to change what we’ve done in the past”.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
with something like fifteen times the amount of traffic in a similar land mass
This is nonsense and you know it, as you have been told before. Even a most cursory glance at the activity levels in the US show that it is spread right across the states. Ours on the other hand is crammed into a very small percentage of our landmass, with 90% of it not even seeing a person, let alone an aeroplane. The "rate" of 15x (it used to be 20x a few years ago - that was BS, was it?) is therefore a furphy.

http://i521.photobucket.com/albums/w334/capnbloggs/USaccidentMap2005.gif

they said there was no transponder requirement because they were not getting accidents in that class of airspace in those locations.

How much radar-controlled E above D in the US has primary radar, making transponders less necessary?

that C over D clearly shows that the airspace is reversed, ie. the high risk airspace close to the runway should not be a lower category than the low risk link airspace above.
The difference in "effort" or "workload" for controllers and pilots alike does not equate to a "lower category" of airspace. A boffin at a desk studying the ICAO table might come to that conclusion, but practically speaking, while C "controls" VFR as opposed to D which theoretically "advises" VFR, there isn't much difference. It would be entirely logical to have D going right up to the base of high-level C, providing the best of both worlds: VFR are known-about but able to do their own thing. With transponders (already) being required above 10k in any airspace and multilateration, the system would rock. :ok:

How about you support it?

[peuce]

That's a worthy compromise .... "D up to C"... for Broome!:ok:

Afterall, the result we are looking for is a means to make VFRs "visible" . It doesn't have to be C link airspace.

[Dick Smith]

Owen Stanley

What I’m stating is totally consistent.

It was the GA representative body (AOPA) that agreed to the unique mandatory transponder requirement that I brokered. They did not introduce the requirement because they were not part of the regulatory system. I as Chairman did a deal with the Minister that we would introduce the mandatory transponder requirement in E without a regulatory impact statement because it would improve safety, and the GA organisations (not just AOPA) agreed that there would be advantages for their members.

I’ll say it again.

Just because the GA representative body “agreed” to a unique mandatory transponder requirement it doesn’t mean that they actually introduced the requirement. It doesn’t work like that.

To others, I would support D over D if a scientific and objective safety study showed that was the best way to spend our finite safety dollars. Seeing no other country has such a thing, I have a feeling that the science would not support the idea.

Airspace must be allocated using an objective criteria and science- not by some type of barter system based on ignorance!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

that the rate of accidents is acceptable by US citizens and also Australians

Dick, as an Australian citizen, I take exception to this statement!

I am also very sure that even the common folk that fly on our LCCs would also express the view that an acccident in class E between a non controlled VFR and an IFR RPT, an accident that could have easily been prevented by a higher class of airspace, is also unacceptable.

Dick, do you forget how easily you can sway the media with ANY aviation safety issue? How much impact do you think a statement like "Government approves an experiment in airspace control that will bring un-controlled general aviation aircraft into close proximity with controlled regulated public transport airliners without air traffic control radar" would have. Add a few lines about what happened in Brisbane, Melbourne and Launceston for colour and editors of the major mastheads have a pretty graby headline to sell. "Airliners head to head with uncontrolled light aircraft in controlled airspace" or "Airliner near miss imminent!" will look pretty nasty for ANY Transport Minister, Don't you think?

[peuce]

Is Class E Airspace really "controlled"?

Probably by ICAO definition, but how would the man on the street view an airspace in which ...

Jet Airliners were permitted to fly, and
Random, unknown aircraft were also permitted to fly


I use my previous analogy ... if it smells uncontrolled, if it looks uncontrolled and it operates like uncontrolled airspace ... then ...

How is non-surveillance Class E so different, and thus so much "safer" than Class G?


In Class G, all IFRs are advised of each other and self separate
In Class E, all IFRs are separated from each other by ATC



In Class G, random unknown VFR aircraft are permitted
In Class E, random unknown VFR aircraft are permitted


The only real difference is that ATC do the separating of IFRs in E.

Is that such a step up from G ?

Were IFRs having such a difficult time self separating over Broome?

And the big worry ... random, unknown targets are still there.

But, obviously, the boffins have calculated that ... that's not such a big deal.
But, as Dick says:

I would support D over D if a scientific and objective safety study showed that was the best way to spend our finite safety dollars.

As I would support Non-Surveillance Class E ... if the same studies could be provided.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Dick, finite safety dollars is a crock when the sole shareholder receives a huge dividend from the service provider every year, year in, year out! That can also come back and bite a government if money is not spent in a safety service but rather removed from it as cash into consolidated revenue.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

Perhaps our opinions/positions on these airspace allocation matters are really not that far apart.

We agree that Class D, if implemented properly, based on open, transparent and publically available process, will ensure that most everyone can have confidence that the correct methodology, input data and assumptions are ‘reasonable’. Posts on the last page or so indicate that we [and perhaps most others] agree on this issue.

Objectivity is the key to resolving these differences. With that in mind here are a few thoughts that I read you, I, and many others agree on.

CTA/R Operating premise [with equal importance]

- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the safety of the fare paying public and other airspace users, particularly where the two categories mix, as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the equality of access as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to mitigate risk exposure where the cost and/or impost [VFR using a radio and receiving a free air traffic control service] of doing so is small, and more particularly where a cost advantage [type of service infrastructures needed] is derived
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to provide the most efficient use of limited ATS resources for the maximum benefit to all industry participants
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to ensure systemic workload is considered adequately to protect service providers and airspace users alike

Can we all work forward from here to a solution that the vast majority are happy with? I am hopeful, and confident it can be done. :)

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Backpeddle a bit...Smith:eek: you have a different view? D over D?

Class D from the ground up to overlaying class C...thats a big class D zone! However, does it work. ICAO D, clearances required, separation IFR from IFR from VFR from VFR. Approaches protected...doesn't need radar to be effective. No need to retrain ATC to handle procedural E...and a lot less heartache

OK, what's the down side? My experience with EN tower charges has my wallet wincing...then again EN is a C tower.

All things equal radio and transponder requirment s the same...already trained up to handle procedures for ICAO D so thats a win...ARFOR, there must be a gotcha.

[Dick Smith]

ARFOR " can we all work forward"

You certainly can't because no one will take any notice of an anonymous PPRUNE poster.

Just look what is happening in practice!

If class E did not provide the required extremely high level of safety it is obvious that the experts in the FAA would have noticed this and changed the airspace.

OZ, a huge class D zone would clearly require more staffing than the FAA 4.3nm/2500'.

The key would whether that was the best way of allocating the limited safety dollars.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

Lets be frank.

The FAA can use surveilled Class E because of the number of ATC's operating small sector/TRACON with the time to watch for unseparated IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR conflicts. That is beside the fact that much of the Air carrier traffic operates within Class B and C

Australia will NEVER afford the cost of saturation surveillance where 'regional' Hi capacity RPT operate, nor the number of approach controllers required to be able to 'watch' 'unseparated' traffic in Class E terminal areas.

Australia can compensate for those huge differences by utilising class D i.e. separation in lue of the number of ATC eyes needed to look for unseparated collision opportunities.

Effective, cost efficient, safe and arguably a proper fit for the traffic densities, infrustructure and available funding.

Even if as Ozbusdriver mentioned, the government returned their profit from ATS, it would not go close to establishing terminal area sureveillance based approach and departures services [as per the US NAS] to facilitate Class E operations in terminal areas, which in reality would be necessary at YBRM, YPKA, YBAS, YMLT, YMHB, YMAY, YSTW, YSCH, YBMC, YBMK, YBRK, YBHM, and any others that met the establishment disestablishment criteria, which would be somewhere in the vicinity of 12+ X 10+ = 120++ approach rated controllers [as an absolute minimum, more likely 200+]. Add surveillance and VHF frequencies, approach room real estate etc on top of that, and for what reason? To necessitate Class E and VFR no-radio??

Impossible to justify in any 'reasonable' sense.

In reality, what are the viable options for Australia and Australian conditions? I think you [and others] have hit on it alreaDy.

[Dick Smith]

ARFOR you have been told the following many times however you ignore the facts,

The USA has 350 class D towers with over 50% not having any form of radar coverage in the E airspace directly above the D.

Even busy class D towers 140nm to the west of Washington DC do not have radar coverage in the E airspace at the lower and most busy levels.

As the VOR expert has stated class E does not require radar to operate safely.

[peuce]

Dick,

You say:

If class E did not provide the required extremely high level of safety it is obvious that the experts in the FAA would have noticed this and changed the airspace.

I say:

If the O Rings in the Shuttle Challeger did not provide the required extrememly high level of safety it is obvious that th experts at NASA would have noticed this and changed the specifications

[Dick Smith]

PEUCE you will have to better than that- space shuttle-say a dozen previous flights over a few years.

Class E over D ? Say tens of millions(or could it be hundreds of millions?) of flights over many decades. I know which statistics I would accept as most likely to give a true reflection on the resultant level of safety.

And they did fix the O ring problem after one accident. If the FAA considered non radar E link airspace as a safety problem surely they would have at least introduced a mandatory transponder requirement.

[peuce]

Dick,

I think you missed my toungue in cheek point ... so I'll spell it out.

NASA suposedly knew about the problems with the O Ring before the disaster.
So, don't necessarily take U.S. inaction as a sign of "everything's fine" :suspect:

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

It is you who ignores facts. The Australian airspace being discussed is utilised by large volumes of Hi capacity Air Carrier RPT/PTO aircraft. Stop trying to compare apples with spanners.

The following has been independently verified correct [FAA, AsA and CASA data]. I won't insult the other readers with repeats, I'll just staple these US/Australia comparision links to your rear end as you ride by on your merry-go-round of empty rhetoric.

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again.html#post5563937
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-3.html#post5576247
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-3.html#post5576481
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-4.html#post5576654
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-16.html#post5617507
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-17.html#post5621582
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-18.html#post5624192
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-19.html#post5624339
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-21.html#post5628708
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/408230-nas-rears-its-head-again-23.html#post5636914

Be reasonable and stop playing with circular platitudes :=

[peuce]

Dick,

As you are so fond of trotting out VOR's thoughts on Class E airspace ... which they do in fact support ... in principle, I thought I might extract a few more of their thoughts. I know some are dated, but they do bear some reflection, less we fall into similar traps:

On implementation:


That said, it has been evident through the last two years, that there is an aggressive campaign to “crash or crash through” the airspace reform agenda, with no regard for established safety and change management systems and practices.

Indeed over this period we have been supplied with large quantities of information that would indicate, if not a deliberate attempt to circumvent those processes, then at the very least a level of naïveté of the processes.

Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable. If further reform is to be achieved, not only must the risk associated with the changes be examined, but those associated with implementing the changes must be examined and carefully managed.


Relative risk in different Airspace classes:

It is absolutely correct to say that in any given volume the level of risk associated with Class C airspace is less than that associated with Class E.

Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc.

On radar requirements:

Perhaps you would like to find a reference in ANY global documentation that identifies a requirement for radar in Class E airspace. It is not a pre-requisite, and Class E - in fact Class A, B, C, D E, F and G can - and are - be operated satisfactorily with or without radar coverage.

On risk to the fare paying passengers:

Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels. So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.

On differening risk appetites:

We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.

On transplanting airspace systems:

What we have repeatedly stated is that you cannot simply pick up a set of procedures from one country – be it the United States or Mongolia – and apply them in another State, without addressing the potential safety issues [and by the way we have already stated that we don’t believe there is a significant safety issue associated with the proposed changes] – AND implementing the changes safely.
The United States has grown up with a culture of free access to airspace. You only have to spend time with US AOPA management to realize that the culture is GA focused, with air transport having to fight for access to – or retention of – controlled airspace. Type “Class E airspace” into your internet search engine, and you will find hundreds of references to legislative processes around simple matters such as establishing Class E surface areas. Being based in North America, you will also be aware that it is the States of the United States that request Class E airspace in excess of corridors associated with IFR routes – and that is why some States have blanket E, and some simply have corridors. Changing terminal area routing at major airports in the United States requires at least two years notice, and legislative change.

On using TCAS as a mitigator:

You CANNOT [yet], however, design a system that relies on aircraft-to-aircraft surveillance or separation based on the use of transponders – that is, the use of airborne collision avoidance systems, like TCAS and Mode A/C transponders, as an airspace design tool, is prohibited.
..... Effectively, ICAO – and the ANC specifically – has determined that ACAS MAY NOT be used as a risk mitigator under any circumstances in the design of airspace management procedures. ALL ICAO Technical Panels have been directed that they may not factor such systems in the development of separation standards, the design of procedures, or the development of future systems. ACAS is a “last line of defence” for pilots – NOT a system design tool.

ICAO ANNEX 11:
SECTION 2.4: DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

2.4.1 The need for the provision of air traffic services shall be determined by consideration of the following:

a. the types of air traffic involved;
b. the density of air traffic;
c. the meteorological conditions;
d. such other factors as may be relevant.

Note:- due to the number of elements involved, it has not been possible to develop specific data to determine the need for air traffic services in a given area or at a given location. For example:

a. a mixture of types of aircraft of varying speed (conventional jet, etc) might necessitate the provision of air traffic services, whereas a relatively greater density of traffic where only one type of operation is involved would not;
b. meteorological conditions might have considerable effect in areas where there is a constant flow of air traffic (e.g., scheduled traffic), whereas similar or worse meteorological conditions might be relatively unimportant in an area where air traffic would be discontinued is such conditions (e.g., local VFR flights);
c. open stretches of water, mountainous, uninhabited or desert areas might necessitate the provision of air traffic services even though the frequency of operations is extremely low.

2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.

On airspace upgrading:

So if you determine that you should have Class C in one area, Class D adjacent to that airspace, and then Class E adjacent to that airspace – AND it would cost you no more to make it all Class C – then that should be your decision.If there is no cost impact – and no demonstrable negative impact on amenity for a VFR flight – nothing in the “rule book” says you can’t exceed the “minimum requirement”.

On Class E workload differences:

Where the differences occur, of course, is the interaction between IFR and VFR flights. By that, we mean that an IFR aircraft may require services more urgently [i.e., tactically rather than in a planned fashion] in Class E airspace because of the proximity of VFR flights, or may not be able to comply with a planned ATC instruction. This adds a level of complexity to the model – for both pilots and providers of services – something that needs to be factored in the holistic airspace design. That is not to say Class E should not be used – far from it – but it must be appreciated that Class E operates in a fundamentally different way than Classes A through D.

On risk increases:

In any given volume of airspace, with the same number of IFR and VFR flights, the level of risk must increase when Class C airspace is changed to Class E [or Class D, or Class F or Class G for that matter]. Equally, a change upwards in classification, from Class C to Class B or Class A, for a given volume of airspace, with the same number of IFR and VFR flights, the level of risk is decreased.

On transponders in non-surveillance Class E:

As we have pointed out previously, the operation of transponders within Class E airspace is only of use as a design tool where there is secondary radar coverage – to allow enhanced provision of traffic information by a third party.Transponder carriage and operation outside of radar coverage cannot possibly be used as a tool to enhance airspace design.

[ozineurope]

Hmmm

So VOR does not actually support Class E if C is the available at the same cost?

Then again what would they know they posted with a nome d'plume and should be ignored! Or are they different because part of the posts part way support the theories espoused by the nastronauts.

[peuce]

Leadsled,

Note: This is a serious question.

As we don't have a transparent safety/cost/benefit analysis of Class E Aispace above Broome available, that I know of ... with your experience of such matters, could you offer a suggestion on how the risk of an IFR RPT Jet hitting a VFR, whilst on descent into Broome might have been mitigated against in the alledged analyses?

We know that Transponder useage can't be used as a mitigator, so what is left?

I can only see three possibile decisions:


There are no VFRs above Broome
The IFR will see them, or
The probability of an IFR and a VFR being in the same place over Broome is too small


I think we can discount No 1
I think No 2 has been proven to be unlikely
I would hate to back my decision on such a gamble as No 3

Have I missed something?
If not, then I can't see any assurance here ...:(

I know its what is happening in G now (except broadcasts are required around Broome), but E is supposed to be a better, safer alternative than what we have ... isn't it?

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

What is amazing about this VOR stuff is that no-one is stating this information under their own name. Why could this be? Surely they wouldn’t be scared of giving factual information which is so important for our aviation community?

I find the whole thing totally mysterious.

Yes, I understand that whistle blowers can post on PPRuNe to get important information across without prejudicing their jobs. But VOR – obviously a number of different people – has an excellent knowledge of airspace and airspace design but there is no equivalent person in Australia that I know of who actually has similar views and puts their name to their views.

By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?

It seems strange to me that CASA allows something as basic as a radio (which may not even be working) as a major safety mitigator for Class G, however ACAS is not similarly treated.

I particularly note the comment,

Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable.

One of the main reasons for this is that every time the NAS Implementation Group put forward the recommendation that we get someone who is an expert on the US NAS system to assist with the introduction, it was refused.

Imagine if you could get these VOR people educating Australian Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers into the advantages and disadvantages of the US NAS. I believe the level of understanding would be totally different.

Isn’t it interesting that even now, with the proposed introduction of more NAS airspace, that as far as I know no expert on the NAS system has been employed to communicate how it actually works.

This type of stubbornness and sheer bastardry has the potential to needlessly damage our industry.

[Capn Bloggs]

It seems strange to me that CASA allows something as basic as a radio (which may not even be working) as a major safety mitigator for Class G, however ACAS is not similarly treated.

A quick call to Centre will confirm it is. Alternatively, when on the CTAF, the AFRU will respond. You do have responsibilities when sharing the airspace with someone else, you know, just like driving on the road. TCAS, however, is a different kettle of fish. With no surveillance, there is no way to check whether it's working. Nor is it reliable. Sit at the Bravo HP of 21 at Perth and watch aeroplane after aeroplane go past with no TCAS return.

no expert on the NAS system has been employed to communicate how it actually works.
This is crazy. If a system is so complex that it needs some "expert" from the US to explain it ("E is supposed to work like this") then it shouldn't be introduced.

This type of stubbornness and sheer bastardry has the potential to needlessly damage our industry.
"Potential" and "needlessly". Not good enough. Let's see the CBA. The industry has been wrecked by incessant meddling, policy 180s, user pays and location specific pricing and almost constant rule changes driving people away, not by whether you have to use a radio or not.

No, this is just a continuation of the Dick Smith dream of Free in GE. Nothing more, nothing less. :=

[homeoftheblizzard]

Dick, stubbornness and sheer bastardry has already needlessly damaged our industry. What cost to roll out/roll back NAS MK II.

The cost was NAS-tronomical.

Now here we go with MK III. The same weak 'straw man' arguments, the same comparisons of apples with spanners, the same determination to crash through, same result will occur.

Fare paying passengers in RPT deserve the best protection we can provide/afford. Thats C (or possibly D)over D at Broome and Karratha. It works, its no more expensive than E over D. End of story.

The real reform that should take place is that VFR (including ultralights) should have the best access to airspace possible. That means a relaxation of some aspects of our regulations and airspace and greater surveillance. It works in places like Hobart and should be rolled out elsewhere.

Until you focus your efforts in this area, I believe you will continue to be frustrated.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith
By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?
Are you seriously suggesting that 'a group of air traffic controllers' in an ICAO meeting would succeed in having a rule [ratified by signatory nations] included in Annex 11
2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.
to protect jobs? :ugh: Is that your view on anything airspace that does not fit your ideology? :=

The limitations of ACAS target [including GA] detection and avoidance are well documented. Those are the reasons it is a 'last line of defence' ONLY, and agreed to as such by all signatory nations.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

I just got off the phone with my brother. He is an engineer with NEC..spends a lot of time transitting the planet in airliners. Anyway, I put this situation to him...

Would you feel comfortable sitting in an airliner that must share airspace with unknown VFR aircraft...he said," surely, you mean the VFR is segregated from my aircraft by an altitude limit."..I said "no, in exactly the same block of airspace".... I explained to him the situation how class E works. IFR need a clearance, ATC separate IFR from IFR and known VFR... VFR do not need a clearance, need not even talk to ATC or other aircraft unless the VFR considers they are in conflict, and are free to operate in that airspace as long as they maintain a listening watch and have their transponder turned on. I explained how in Broome there is no radar... my brother wanted to know how ATC "know" about VFR if they do not need to talk to ATC and ATC cannot see them....He was not very happy with that situation......

...a reasonable person would consider class E without a radar surveillance service as not safe....

How many other punters would be happy if the situation was explained to them....after all, the risk is acceptable:ugh:

[Dick Smith]

Yes, I know G without a transponder requirement is OK at places like Broome and Ballina - but upgrade the airspace to E and add a mandatory transponder requirement and it suddenly becomes unsafe.

Get Real!

[peuce]

Dick,

Reality check required again .....


Transponder use is NOT permitted to be used as a risk mitigator in this scenario ! So that is removed from the equation.

Therefore, in the proposed Class E airspace above Broome, there will be LESS protection from VFRs than is now the case ... FACT.


N.B: Remember, we currently have a mandatory broadcast requirement for VFRs near Broome.

[Dick Smith]

Rubbish, ICAO has not stated that transponders cannot be used as a risk mitigator in safety studies in relation to airspace.

ICAO makes it clear that radio is not required for VFR aircraft in E,F and G airspace. That's why they don't have to state radio can, or can not be used in a safety case- because it's not a requirement in the first place!

[homeoftheblizzard]

Rather than just talk about E or G - the more pertinent point is Dick,
that E over D is less safe than C (or D)over D and costs the same at Broome and Karratha, so therefore its required to be promulgated as such.

The argument keeps being presented as a choice between E and G. This just muddies the water. When it is really a choice between G,E,D (or C or A, for that matter). So why would you choose E? What is the cost benefit?

More importantly if there is no cost/benefit for the vast majority of airspace users - wouldnt it be a culpable act to mandate a level of airspace that is less than the highest affordable level of airspace?

There is nothing inherently wrong with E airspace (in the right spot) but if you are offering me E or C at the same price (at Broome and Karratha) - I'll take the C thanks.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

This is like pulling teeth.......

Dick, TCAS is not to be included! end of story! There are very sound mechanical reasons for this!

[peuce]

Dick,

Rubbish, ICAO has not stated that transponders cannot be used as a risk mitigator in safety studies in relation to airspace.

Wow ... we're really getting into semantics now....

You CANNOT [yet], however, design a system that relies on aircraft-to-aircraft surveillance or separation based on the use of transponders – that is, the use of airborne collision avoidance systems, like TCAS and Mode A/C transponders, as an airspace design tool, is prohibited.
..... Effectively, ICAO – and the ANC specifically – has determined that ACAS MAY NOT be used as a risk mitigator under any circumstances in the design of airspace management procedures. ALL ICAO Technical Panels have been directed that they may not factor such systems in the development of separation standards, the design of procedures, or the development of future systems. ACAS is a “last line of defence” for pilots – NOT a system design tool.

ICAO ANNEX 11:
SECTION 2.4: DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES

2.4.1 The need for the provision of air traffic services shall be determined by consideration of the following:

a. the types of air traffic involved;
b. the density of air traffic;
c. the meteorological conditions;
d. such other factors as may be relevant.

Note:- due to the number of elements involved, it has not been possible to develop specific data to determine the need for air traffic services in a given area or at a given location. For example:

a. a mixture of types of aircraft of varying speed (conventional jet, etc) might necessitate the provision of air traffic services, whereas a relatively greater density of traffic where only one type of operation is involved would not;
b. meteorological conditions might have considerable effect in areas where there is a constant flow of air traffic (e.g., scheduled traffic), whereas similar or worse meteorological conditions might be relatively unimportant in an area where air traffic would be discontinued is such conditions (e.g., local VFR flights);
c. open stretches of water, mountainous, uninhabited or desert areas might necessitate the provision of air traffic services even though the frequency of operations is extremely low.

2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.

I think the "spirit" of the Law is that ... if you can't use transponders as a design element, then you surely shouldn't be using them as an implementation element ... especially in non-surveillance airspace.

[Howabout]

Hi Dick,

As regards your Post #735, I admit to being a little confused. You stated that:

What is amazing about this VOR stuff is that no-one is stating this information under their own name. Why could this be? Surely they wouldn’t be scared of giving factual information which is so important for our aviation community?That was in response to Peuce.

Yet, at the same time you are perfectly willing to selectively quote the 'anonymous' VOR in support of your argument about Class E. And I emphasise 'selectively.'

'It doesn't compute Jim,'

Dick, Class E is a dog in the terminal environment and an accident waiting to happen.

What Class E does, in the terminal environment, is allow a situation where separation responsibility could rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours VFR pilot. Are you seriously telling me it's 'safe' and 'acceptable' for a VFR pilot with 5 hours under his belt to find, identify and self-separate from an aluminium tube doing 250 KIAS on descent? An aircraft that is not tracking by any feature the 5-hour VFR pilot is familiar with? An IFR aircraft that has 150 trusting, fare-paying punters down the back in the terminal area? And don't give me that stuff about the responsibility to 'look out the window.' Unalerted see-and-avoid,' in non-radar Class E terminal airspace, is dangerous and potentially fatal. In fact Class E terminal airspace in a surveilled environment isn't the duck's guts either. But that's a different argument.

I cannot believe what I see as your 'fundamentalist' views in relation to terminal Class E. It reminds me of those US born-again Christians. 'Hallelujah, praise the Lord and trust in God.'

That's about all the guarantee we have with non-radar Class E Dick - 'trust in God.'

Damn, he's gone again.

[squawk6969]

Yes, I know G without a transponder requirement is OK at places like Broome and Ballina - but upgrade the airspace to E and add a mandatory transponder requirement and it suddenly becomes unsafe.

Get Real!


Ok ...lets get real!

With respect to Broome at the moment yes it is Class G, and due to traffic density etc it has been declared in need of a Class D tower, so yes at the moment it is deemed NOT SAFE ENOUGH.

With Ballina it is clearly not reaching that level of Traffic, however if you wish to push the barrow for increased level of surveillence at many aerodromes (I recall an ADSB debate some time back) Class E to the ground would be welcome I am sure, and only then increased to D or C as the need arises.

E without radar/multilat/adsb is a waste of time.

If I get it.....why is it your friends do not get it.

SQ

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
Yes, I know G without a transponder requirement is OK at places like Broome and Ballina - but upgrade the airspace to E and add a mandatory transponder requirement and it suddenly becomes unsafe.

Get Real!
Get with the program, old chap. The mandatory CTAF is 30nm which covers VFR up to 10,000ft, pretty-well covering jet profiles inbound (even a nice man in the CAGRO there to talk to just like you've always wanted), then above it's mandatory transponders, just like in E. So yes, as much as you hate it, Australian G is safer than E because of the radio use requirement.

Your astounding lack of knowledge of the Aus NAS doesn't put you in a very credible position when you so vehemently want to change it. :cool:

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

In your opinion, should Air Carrier's be prohibited from operating [MEL op's] with ACAS U/S?

[max1]

Dick,
Another one of your I understand/I believe comments with nothing to actually back it up.

By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?

Where is your reference?
Do you seriously believe that actual ATCs turn up at these meetings? When you were in charge of the CAA how many WORKFACE ATCs were involved in your decision making processes? How many managers (the ones you were really talking to) would care if workforce numbers were cut. I would think that in Management 101 they teach get the least number of workers doing the most amount of work.
This may be the reason there is a worldwide shortage of ATCs. Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) and their organisation (CANSO) hope that the next 'latest piece of technology' will be the panacea to all their lack of recruiting.
Just maybe this ICAO decision you talk of was made on safety grounds. If you seriously think that ICAO decisions are made on such flimsy grounds how can you support ICAO Airspace Classifications?

Dick, you rabbit on about posting under ones own name and controllers only being interested in preserving their jobs. Yet on the Benalla thread you wanted controllers in Australia to provide a LSALT and Instrument Approach monitoring service under radar coverage. Do you still support this idea? We have less than 8% of the controllers they have in the States and vastly less surveillance coverage, yet you want us to provide a US style service. When will it sink in that you must compare apples with apples.

[Dick Smith]

Checking at the time it was shown that the majority on the panel were from ATC.

I no longer have the info- perhaps you can prove me wrong by listing the names and their professions.

If you are going to do a proper safety study of airspace you have to include all factors. If you leave out ACAS you do not get the correct result.

Nowhere in ICAO documentation does it state that ACAS must be left out of safety studies.

Yes, I still support that we move forward with safety and offer a MSA service to IFR when in IMC in radar covered airspace. Happens in the USA and Canada and we have a similar wealth so why not.

We will do it after a jet hits a mountain close to Proserpine - so why not do it before the accident.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

And here I was, trying to remember just who closed the facility at Proserpine.......

:sad:

[squawk6969]

C, D verses E

This took me a while to find, so please take the time to consider it, I am out west in NSW so not much internet access.

From the CASA OAR YMAV study
1.4.3 The cost of the provision of a Class C air traffic control service is the same as that of a Class D or E service. However, the Class C service provides significantly greater risk mitigation to passenger transport aircraft against VFR aircraft threats than that provided by Class D and Class E.
Point 7 The cost of provision of a Class C Aerodrome Control Service is the same as that of a Class D Aerodrome Control Service but the risk mitigation provided by a Class C service is significantly higher for IFR aircraft with respect to VFR aircraft. Similarly, the cost of provision of a Class C radar Approach Control Service is the same as that of a Class E service but the risk mitigation provided is significantly higher for IFR aircraft with respect to VFR aircraft.
Similar documentary evidence appears in all recent airspace studies.

Who needs to get real?

SQ

[peuce]

squawk6969,

Exactly. Talk of who was responsible for writing an ICAO rule is just a frivoulous red herring meal.

The status at the moment is:


Let's say the mathematicians have got it right, and Class E link airspace (at Broome) is "safe enough"

That then triggers the next level of enquiry... "can a higher level of risk mitigation be provided .. at the same cost?"

Most pundits ( including the quoted airspace reviews) say yes, C ( or D) could be provided at a similar cost.


That really only leaves one credible option ...

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
Yes, I still support that we move forward with safety and offer a MSA service to IFR when in IMC in radar covered airspace. Happens in the USA and Canada and we have a similar wealth so why not.

We will do it after a jet hits a mountain close to Proserpine - so why not do it before the accident.
If you didn't already know, the MSAWS is part of the FIS and can be provided by ATC in every type of airspace.

EGPWS is now fitted to all big machines. It does the job without human interference. If you are now going to tell the airlines they will have to fork out millions for extra ATC sectors to monitor and run the MSAWS as well, I expect they will not be happy. But hang on, that will be good for the ATC managers; more bonuses! :rolleyes:

AsA changed the airspace back after the Launy airprox. Why are you trying to go back to E when the message is clear?

Using your words, "when Bloggs has a near miss (or worse) at Broome with a VFR overflying, not talking to anyone in E, we will change the airspace to C or D - so why not do it before the accident?".

[Dick Smith]

Owen Stanley

All you are showing by your Post #757 is just how utterly fixed in concrete your thinking is. I can assure you, a radar in a centre only requires one paint of an altitude below the LSA/MSA and it will set off the alarm if the pilot has not cancelled IFR.

You do everything you can to show that there’s no way we can offer a safer service at a place like Benalla. Well, you are wrong.

It’s the reason people like you are not used when decisions need to be made laterally looking at how to make improvements and changes with existing systems.

By the way, I don’t want you to monitor the approach to 1,090 feet – that’s impossible, considering the coverage of the radar. However, if the radar coverage is below the legal minimum safe LSA, I would prefer the alarm system to be enabled.

At Proserpine, the radar coverage from the centre goes well below the mountain tops in the aerodrome vicinity. However, if I remember correctly, pilots change off the radar frequency at 4,500 feet on descent and the alarm system is not enabled at the centre anyway.

Owen Stanley – concrete, concrete, concrete. I’ve encountered people like you for years. They were the ones who said we couldn’t possibly use international airworthiness standards and accept foreign airworthiness certificates from five leading countries.

They were wrong. We have saved tens of millions of dollars, and safety has not decreased in any way.

[Stationair8]

Now Dick you can call me a sceptic, mind set in concrete individual, thickwit or whatever , but after seeing the cockup with E in the Appe Isle I really cannot see the advantage of it can you? If it didn't work in the Apple Isle is it going to work in Broome?

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

Airworthiness and Airspace regulation have nothing in common. Nor does CTA/R services at Proserpine or elsewhere when RPT have EGPWS. Does your jet have TAWS or E/GPWS?

ICAO Doc 9863 - ACAS Manual- [Apologies in advance to LeadSled for the troublesome fact quoting]. :p

The following are some 'relevant' quotes that point to why the direction exists in Annnex 11 [ACAS not a design mitigator] in the context of ACAS limitations in CTA, and its interactions with non-ACAS equipped transponding aircraft, which are pertinent to this Class E [particulalrly in VMC with Un-known VFR] airspace discussion.
3.2.4.1 When the pilot of an ACAS aircraft receives an RA and manoeuvres as advised, the ACAS aircraft will normally be able to avoid the intruding aircraft provided the intruder does not accelerate or manoeuvre so as to defeat the RA response of the ACAS aircraft.

3.2.4.2 If the intruding aircraft is equipped with ACAS, a coordination procedure is performed via the air-to-air Mode S data link to ensure that the ACAS RAs are compatible


3.17.3 Reduction in the risk of collision

3.17.3.1 Status of the logic risk ratio

3.17.3.1.1 The risk ratio calculated for the purposes of Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4 is a measure of the performance of the logic and not the ACAS as a whole. For example, ACAS can prevent a collision by prompting the pilot to carry out a successful visual search for the intruder and it can fail because a track is not established or the pilot ignores the RA; these are aspects of the total system that are not reflected in the calculations required for Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4.

3.17.3.1.2 When considering the relevance of the “logic risk ratio” figures calculated for Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4 to operations or policy decisions, it might be helpful to regard them as solely the reliability that can be attached to RAs. They express the effect that following an RA will have on the immediate risk of collision when, at the time it is issued, the pilot has no information other than the RA on which to base a decision whether to follow the RA or ignore it. As a rough guide, the collision risk created by ACAS arises from following the RA so the logic risk ratio overstates this “induced risk ratio”; on the other hand, it also overstates the capability of ACAS to prevent collisions because of the many other failure modes in the total system.

3.17.3.3 Induced and unresolved risk

3.17.3.3.1 It is not sufficient to demonstrate that ACAS will prevent collisions that might occur in its absence. The risk that ACAS logic could cause collisions in otherwise safe circumstances must be fully considered, not least because in managed airspace the number of encounters potentially facing an induced risk greatly exceeds the number of near collisions.

3.17.4 Compatibility with ATM

3.17.4.1 Nuisance alert rate

3.17.4.1.1 ACAS is required to diagnose a risk of imminent collision on the basis of incomplete information. Furthermore, this information has to be independent of that providing the primary basis for aircraft separation. It follows that there will be alerts in encounters where, from an operational perspective, there would seem to be no risk of collision. Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4 requires that these nuisance alerts be as infrequent as possible.

3.17.4.2 Compatible sense selection

The requirement in Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4 is not intended to constrain the manner in which dangerous encounters are resolved, but rather is based on an appreciation that the majority of RAs are likely to be generated in encounters where there is no danger of collision. It places a statistical limit on the frequency with which ACAS disrupts ATC or the normal operation of the aircraft by inverting the vertical separation of two aircraft.

3.17.4.3 Deviations caused by ACAS

The restrictions on the deviations that may be caused by following RAs (as per Annex 10, Volume IV, Chapter 4) limit the disruption to normal aircraft operation as well as to ATC. While deviations from altitude clearances are the most obviously disruptive to ATC, other deviations, such as that caused by an RA to climb when the aircraft is descending, could be viewed equally seriously by ATC.


4.1.2.2 ACAS is designed to minimize the unnecessary alert rate when the standard vertical separation is 1 000 ft below FL 420. When a smaller separation standard is used, unnecessary RAs may occur; for example, when providing 500 ft separation against VFR traffic or allowing visual clearances through the level of other traffic.

4.2 INDEPENDENCE OF ACAS THRESHOLDS FROM ATC SEPARATION STANDARDS

ACAS thresholds are independent from ATC separation standards because ACAS does not strive to ensure separation, which is ATC’s role, but tries to avoid collision as a last resort.


5.5.4 Encounter Type 3 — Manoeuvring based on visual acquisition

5.5.4.1 A B747 and a DC10 were flying on converging tracks and both were mistakenly cleared to FL 370. When the controller detected the mistake, he attempted to reclear the DC10 to FL 350. In attempting to resolve this conflict, the controller used an incorrect callsign/flight number for the DC10.

5.5.4.2 The B747 pilot wrongly took the clearance meant for the DC10 and initiated a descent. At the same time, the B747 ACAS issued a Climb RA. However, the B747 pilot decided to not follow the RA because the B747 had visually acquired the DC10 and the descent was continued.

5.5.4.3 The DC10 pilot, who also had the B747 in sight, received a Descend RA that was followed. At the last moment, the DC10 pilot arrested the descent upon perceiving that the B747 was at the same altitude and also descending. Also at the last moment, the B747 pilot performed a sudden and violent escape manoeuvre that injured a number of passengers and flight attendants.

5.5.4.4 Because of the inappropriate manoeuvre based on visual acquisition, the B747 passed 10 metres below the DC10 with no lateral separation.


8.1.4 Calculation of risk ratio

8.1.4.1 Unresolved and induced risk of collision

8.1.4.1.1 When simulating the ACAS II logic on the generated encounters, two cases can occur which have an adverse contribution to the risk ratio:

a) the encounter presents a risk of collision and the ACAS II resolution fails to avoid it. This is an unresolved risk of collision; and

b) the encounter does not present a risk of collision and the ACAS II resolution creates it. This is an induced risk of collision.

8.1.4.1.2 Note that the induced risk of collision may become an important factor in the residual risk of collision. In other words, in airspaces in which ACAS has substantially reduced the overall risk of collision, when a collision does occur, it is possible that ACAS will be a causal factor in that collision.


10.3.5 General aviation monitoring

10.3.5.1 General aviation aircraft equipped with Mode A/C transponders were monitored for altitude reporting accuracy. Twenty-one of 548 transponders reported altitudes that deviated by more than 200 ft from the correct altitude. This reinforces the need for ongoing maintenance of transponders and monitoring of transponder performance while operating in the airspace.Notwithstading the clear direction in Annex 11 [as quoted earlier], and considering the totality of Doc 9863, Aviation is far better off for having ACAS [particularly ACAS II and later variants] as a last line of defence in CTA/R. It is not designed to be [nor capable of being] the only line of defence against mode A/C TXPDR's in 'unknown' GA [VFR] aircraft.

[bushy]

You talk of "the lowest common denominator of unalerted se and avoid, GA."
Small aircraft in outback Australia have been using the unalerted see and avoid sucessfully for decades. I don't think they are the "lowest common denominator." 80% of the country depends on GA for essential transport and the real people who live out there do not consider them the "lowest common denominator." City slickers might.
There are thousands of aircraft out there doing what the airlines cannot do.
You have offended lots of valuable, competent aviators.

[ARFOR]

Bushy

I don't think there would be too many people around who underestimated nor appreciated the job performed by Australian bush pilots. However, what OverRun actually said was:-
There is no safety case for this, no modelling, no justification, and no cost saving. But a big step backwards as airline and RPT mix it up with the lowest common denominator of unalerted see-and-avoid GA.I read that to be a concern regarding the 'lowest common denominator procedure', rather than a reflection of the standard of the GA pilots concerned. :ok:

[Howabout]

Nice pick-up Squawk6969.

Unfortunately your observations are yet another 'inconvenient truth' that will just be ignored.

I get ignored as well. Why are people so unkind?

As regards the YMAV study, the subsequent one (2009) said this:

The potential conflict risk area identified in the previous Avalon Aeronautical Study remained. This area was identified as an area to the North of Avalon where VFR aircraft travelling East and West had the potential to conflict with IFR PT aircraft arriving and departing Avalon (approximately 8 to 12 NM North of the aerodrome). Airspace changes proposed in the ACP will assist in mitigating this conflict risk. Barriers to this threat include surveillance and monitoring of the airspace by air traffic control, airspace design measures to provide IFR/VFR segregation; and ACAS protection.

Given that the implementation of Class C, after the 2008 study, addressed the problem, all I can conclude in regard to the E over D is that this was a predetermined outcome, and that the facts have been manipulated to support that pre-determined outcome. In short, the 2009 report alleges that a problem still exists, whereas action, post the 2008 study (Class C), mitigated a risk that no longer exists.

From my perspective, to allege that the risk still exists (when it has already been mitigated by Class C) and that Class E over D will fix it, is a pre-meditated effort to support a pre-determined outcome - and a duplicitous exercise on the part of the OAR.

Just my opinion.

[Dog One]

Smith said

"We will do it after a jet hits a mountain close to Proserpine - so why not do it before the accident."

What about Broome/Karratha? Are we going to wait until a mid-air occurrs before the airspace is re-designed to protect the hundreds of pasengers being exposed to a high risk?

With TCAS as the last line of defense, we are still reliant on the VFR aircraft's transponder being within tolerance.

Will CASA as part of their safety management programs insist on VFR aircraft having their transponders checked each 100 hr inspection?

[rotorblades]

Dick
I will say it again - the UK CAA is the most incompetent aviation regulator in the world....Their airspace system is clearly the worst in the world after one other

You do make me laugh sometimes. The CAA is incompetent because they offer a RAS service to aircraft in G. SO they are incompetent for providing extra safety..hmmm....

They have G to allow routings for anyone who doesnt want their hand held by ATC, dont have a radio, dont have a transponder etc. F is pointless, E is controlled airspace.

ATC is all about flexibility, something you dont seem to have Dick.

Lets be clear, the G that is around is generally low, and away from most airports. The amount of RPT flights going through it is also minimal.

So basically what your saying Dick is anywhere in the world that doesnt align with your god-like view is incompetent. I'm not sure I'd want to be a passenger in airspace designed by someone so pig-headed that its his way or no way. (regardless of the issues against that system from so many).

With reference to Plymouth (what is it with this airport for you) The control service is run by PLYMOUTH APPROACH, as opposed to PLYMOUTH TOWER. If the controller is duly rated for both he can do both.
Im not sure in the case of Plymouth but a lot of aerodromes have their own radar or radar feed from NATS. i.e. Biggin Hill gets a feed off the NATS radar.

What has most of all this to do with NAS (ie Plymouth, CAA, UK Aircraft Industry), Dick?
So the Uk does it this way, the Gods do it that way, the swedes this. Who gives a flying ****. Look at the speciality needs of Australia & the operators, and design an airspace around that to best accommodate everyone. Dont just lift & shift from the US model (we all know how successful the Seasprites & Wedgetail have been)

[Howabout]

Dick,

Welcome back. I'd appreciate comment on my Post#746, and my current one (Post #766).

What do you think?

[Howabout]

Didn't think so.

The repetitive tactic seems to be one of allowing questions pertaining to 'inconvenient truths' to be buried by subsequent posts.

Surely, if one is so passionate in their convictions, that person would be willing to address genuine questions.

I am sure you will agree.

[squawk6969]

With limited time to access I am surprised none of the Nastro's have respended o my post #754.

Its like catching Al Gore out with the inconvenient truth.

Back to the bush I go!

SQ

[Dick Smith]

Rotorblades

Re the British CAA and Airspace.

Just about everyone raves about ICAO on this site – as if it’s some type of God-like organisation that must always be obeyed.

For example, when it’s mentioned that ACAS might be used as a safety mitigator, everyone leaps in and says, “ICAO does not allow ACAS to replace air traffic services” – or words to that effect.

Most posters would support the ICAO decision on classifications to assist in standardising flying all around the world – a bit like the internationalisation of road rules. In most places you can hire a car and as long as you understand which side of the road to drive on, you can pretty-well understand the signs and the procedures. This is important for safety in a globalised world where more and more people travel.

Let’s look at the British CAA. Over two decades ago, ICAO sensibly came up with a classification system for airspace – we all know this – A, B, C, D, E, F and G. The sole reason for this classification system was so that pilots flying in different countries would have a reasonable understanding of what particular service was provided and rules that existed in a particular category of airspace.

Wait for it … what does the UK do? Once again, I say they are so incompetent that even thought they have Class A, Class D, Class E and Class G, the classifications hardly reflect what ICAO intends.

For example, they actually control IFR airline aircraft in uncontrolled airspace.

Rotorblades, whether you like it or not, the last time I flew into Plymouth – and it’s just one example of many non-radar towers in the UK which service RPT aircraft – the airspace was Class G and they were actually controlling IFR aircraft in the G, ie. controlling aircraft in uncontrolled airspace. Doesn’t this mean something to you?

Many Australian ATCs will be amused to find that there’s a country which provides a full control service to flight planned aircraft in Class G airspace when IMC exists, and to other aircraft in the same airspace no control service is provided – in fact, IFR aircraft do not even require a radio!

The reason I mention Plymouth is that it is one of many non-radar towers in the UK that does not have a local radar unit, and when the nearby military unit closes for the weekend, you have IFR airline aircraft shooting an ILS in uncontrolled airspace while being controlled by Air Traffic Controllers in the tower.

When I last looked, the G airspace above Plymouth went to flight level 245, ie a huge amount of G airspace.

All it needed in the UK was leadership when the ICAO classifications were promulgated to change the British airspace so it reflected the ICAO classifications.

The British don’t completely ignore ICAO – the last time I looked they had actually notified ICAO that they do not require radio for IFR aircraft in G airspace. Amazing!

And Rotorblades, by the way, I don’t believe the CAA is incompetent because “they offer a RAS service to aircraft in G”. Such a service would be fully compliant with ICAO. However, when they actually offer an Air Traffic Control separation service in uncontrolled airspace, that’s incompetent.

[Dick Smith]

Howabout

Re your post #746 – you state
What Class E does, in the terminal environment, is allow a situation where separation responsibility could rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours VFR pilot.

Yes, you are correct. But this is only when VMC exists and there is the backup of “see and avoid”. What about Class G – that is where in the terminal environment, the separation responsibility – when in cloud – can rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours IFR pilot, ie. there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”. That’s what happened at Orange a couple of years ago, where an airline aircraft was attempting an approach from the east when in cloud and a bank run pilot was attempting an approach from the west – both estimating the circuit area at about the same time.

Re. your post #766
I understood the Avalon study had been totally discredited. I understood it was classed as simple rubbish, and there’d even been a thread about this. For example, to say that the greatest chance of a collision was approximately 8 to 12 nautical miles from an aerodrome is the opposite to what the experts say. The greatest chance of collision is on the runway or close in to the aerodrome.

[Jabawocky]

The greatest chance of collision is on the runway or close in to the aerodrome.

That may well be what they say.....however the last few have not happened on a runway and have been as was the case at YSBK....outside the GAAP.

As for the near hits....they were a fair way from the field. Acurate tracking! :ooh:

As for See and Avoid...I have excellent views out my windscreen and in a busy CTAF have had several close shaves from instructors who can't listen to their radio and instruct at the same time, and can not look out their window eiether.:mad:.

J

[peuce]

Dick,

I think many people are a bit ambivalent towards ICAO, HOWEVER, they do set the Rules and we do agree to follow them.

Alphabet Airspace is one of those rules. No matter what we think of the principle, it is a Rule and appears to be here to stay ... and I'm all for standardisation.

However, my problem sits with the implementation of ICAO Airspace ... which has nothing to do with ICAO, but is a function of the member States...in our case, Australia. If what you say is correct about the UK, then my hope is that we don't go down that road. I'm sure there's enough options within the Alphabet to suit most volumes in Australia ... without butchering them.

And, finally, down to specifics....

In the specific case of link airspace above Broome/Karattha ...taking all things ( models, studies, calculations, reality checks, reports, findings etc) into consideration, I don't believe that the implementation of non-surveillance Class E airspace is appropriate.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

I respect your view, however I believe it’s important that we know what the actual chance of an accident is in the two different airspaces, ie. if it was E and if it was C.

The latest figures I looked at showed there was about a 1 in 3,000,000 chance of dying in an airline accident if you purchase a ticket and fly. Obviously most people agree that this level of risk is acceptable.

Now, to keep things simple, surely the experts must have the figures on what chance there is likely to be with a mid-air collision above Broome/Karratha if it is E airspace and what the chance is if it’s C airspace, ie. is there a chance of a collision every 3,000 years or is it every 30 years if the airspace is a particular category?

These figures must be available. I am fascinated by the fact that they are not published. We only have a very limited experience with E airspace, ie. twelve months, and there were no mid-airs. Obviously, that means very little. However, in other countries there was enormous experience of E over D, both in radar covered airspace and non-radar covered. If I was involved in, or responsible for, a decision on what airspace to put above Broome/Karratha, I would want to know those figures.

For example, if I was told there was one a chance of a mid-air collision every 3,000 years with a particular airspace, I would probably find it acceptable. However if I was told there was a chance of a collision every 30 years, I definitely would not find it acceptable.

It’s interesting how the reports we read – completed by these so-called “independent contractors” – never bring the accident rate down to something which is easily understood.

For example, talking about ALARP – “as low as reasonably practical” – means very little to average people. But to say that you have “1 chance in 3,000,000 of losing your life” on a particular flight is very easily understood.

Now the figure of 1 in 3,000,000 has obviously come about by someone looking at the number of flights and then the number of accidents over a reasonably sensible period, whether it be 10, 20 or 30 years. Surely we can do the same with E airspace over D – ie. work out how often there is likely to be a mid-air accident based on the figures that are readily available from around the world.

Of course, figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.

Could it be that if you do simple figures for risk of E above D, that the risk is so small that it would be clearly acceptable by most people, and that’s why none of the scientific organisations and contractors who do these studies actually give the real figure?

And conversely, if the risk was high – say, as mentioned before, an accident every 30 years – why don’t they say that?

Food for thought.

[peuce]

Dick,

Most on here are also amazed that the figures used for the Broome/Karattha (one day I'll learn how to spell Karratha??) decision are not available ...that's what has caused all the rucus. At present, we're all relying on our own particular questimates.

However, unlike yourself, I would like to see the specific volume figures for the proposed link airspace ... not the US or Mongolian general figures for Class E airspace. That's of little use.

I want to see what the boffins calculate will be the chance of a prang in Broome Class E link Airspace. A comparison with C or D ( in the same volume) would then be worthwhile.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

I think you mean by stating,

However, unlike yourself, I would like to see the specific volume figures for the proposed link airspace

that you want to see the theoretical calculation of what the accident rate might be.

Peuce, the problem I see is quite often the theoretical rate is inaccurate. I am Patron of the Australian Skeptics and over the years I have seen even qualified scientific people come up with theoretical claims that, when checked in practice, are found to be quite wrong.

Let me give you an example of how theory can be so wrong.

When Airservices reversed the E over D airspace of NAS-2B, they did so because the Board was told that the correct process of safety analysis was not completed before Airservices agreed to change the airspace. It was not that the airspace was not safe, it was the fact that the processes had not been followed and this could leave the Board liable.

The Board made the decision to reverse the airspace, and then had their “experts” complete a safety study to support the Board decision.

The interesting point was that the safety study was very much a theoretical study – it never once looked at what safety levels had been obtained with proven E over D in other countries – and mainly based its statistics on a group of Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers who sat around a table and “guessed” what the chance of mistakes being made would be.

I remember they got answers like “a private pilot would make a 1 in 3 chance of not being on the correct frequency, whereas an IFR airline pilot would only make that mistake 1 in 1,000,000 times”.

But the most important point was that the resultant figures showed how many fatalities there were likely to be in the E over D airspace over a period of time in a place like Hobart. When these figures were interpolated into the US model using similar traffic densities, it showed that the USA would have had over 500 fatalities in a certain period if their resultant rate was to be similar to what was shown by the theoretical study. However, in the same period, the US had no fatalities, suggesting that the theoretical Australian study may have been 500 times “out” in terms of accuracy.

Let’s say you are going to take your family for a fly in a Boeing 747. You could get a group of people to look at the design of the 747 – no doubt cost a fortune – and then come up with their theoretical data of how safe it may be. But what happens if you were told that statistics from the past show that you would have a chance of 1 in 3,000,000 of having an accident and losing your life on a particular flight? If you were told that these figures were taken from actual flights over many years, you’d be far more likely to agree with this type of study.

Peuce, I have a feeling you want the theoretical study to exist so it can confirm what your “belief system” says the result should be. I would prefer to copy the results from the proven system, especially when you consider that the USA has used this type of airspace – once called “Visual Exempt” – over non-radar towers for over sixty years, with tens of millions of movements.

[Capn Bloggs]

Round and round the merrygoround, here we go again. We are back to square one, although with some interesting admissions:

These figures must be available
So you are basing your complete argument on the fact that you don't even have any statistics, and will simply use the US rates, even though the whole system is demonstrably different?

figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.
Open your eyes. Apart from an arcane airspace label, we have been using C over D for decades. It is mind-boggling that you can be so blinkered that you will ignore (maybe you didn't even know) what has been going on in your own backyard for years and years.

We only have a very limited experience with E airspace, ie. twelve months, and there were no mid-airs.
Your are joking, aren't you? The Tobago at Launy gave you the clearest message ever and you're ignoring it. Wake up.

What about Class G – that is where in the terminal environment, the separation responsibility – when in cloud – can rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours IFR pilot, ie. there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”. That’s what happened at Orange a couple of years ago, where an airline aircraft was attempting an approach from the east when in cloud and a bank run pilot was attempting an approach from the west – both estimating the circuit area at about the same time.

So? They didn't have a midair, did they? You can't have it both ways, Dick. You can't ignore one fact, that we almost had a midair in Launy almost immediately after you introduced non-radar E, and then pounce on an isolated event IFR pilots being unable to self-segregate? Be consistent and stop selectively quoting events to suit your argument.

The low-time VFR who is not talking poses a greater threat to me than an errant IFR pilot. I had encounter with a VFR at KTA the other day when he said "we should be well clear, we'll hold out of your way". He actually ended up holding at 6nm final, right where we were intending to go, which caused a significant amount of gnashing of teeth in our cockpit when we finally realised what was going on. And that was after numerous calls between us. In E, that same pilot will have even less information to base his actions (or indeed alerting radio calls) on.

there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”.
The same applies to VFR keeping away from a jet! You are hung-up on See and Avoid - it is generally too late to avoid me when (if) you finally see me. What occurs when we meet will be based entirely on what you and I had organised BEFORE you get a visual on me.

At last, J Mac/CASA has killed off Dick's favourite mantra:

"Be heard, Be Seen, Be Safe: carry and use your radio" and on the back:

"Use your radio. If in doubt, speak out".

:D :ok:

[peuce]

Dick,

I think you mean ..... that you want to see the theoretical calculation of what the accident rate might be.

You are correct.

But it's a little bit more complicated than that.

There is obviously a model produced that, when conflict pairs/actual traffic numbers/ actual traffic mix/ geography/airspace classification/ weather/ blah blah blah or whatnot are entered into it, produces the "estimated risk" ( for want of a better word) for that particular volume of airspace.

I also assume that this model was produced ... taking into account, amongst other things, experiences elsewhere... which would cover off your requirement.

I'm happy that the product of this process would be about as accurrate as us humans can be ... at the moment.

Then, I assume, that "estimated risk" would have to be put to the "cost benefit" sword ... to get a final outcome.

Trouble is, the cupboard is bare ... so we are left to thrust and counter thrust ... round and round in circles.

[Dick Smith]

Bloggsy

Would you like to talk to the Pilot of the Tobago that was involved in the Launceston incident? He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision, that he listened and heard the airline’s pilot’s calls on both the area frequency and the tower frequency; he sighted the aircraft and was not at any time going to run into the aircraft.

He did say it appeared strange that when the airline pilot was given the option of going to right base – which would have been shorter – or left base – which would have been longer but taken the airline into the track of the Tobago, the airline pilot did not confirm with the tower where he was going, and then headed towards left base.

Now Bloggsy, what would you do in similar circumstances? Wouldn’t you make it clear where you were going, knowing that there could be other aircraft in the airspace which needed this vital information? Let’s say you’re in G and you decide to do a straight in approach – do you tell anyone, or just leave that a secret?

Don’t keep pushing the Launceston issue too much because one day the truth will come out on how the safety case was written to support a pre-conceived conclusion.

For example, the ATSB prepared two different pages of the final report, and then only published the page which removed the criticism of the Virgin pilots for not stating clearly whether they were going to left or right base. Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?

By the way, Bloggs, I was the person who consistently pushed for the FAA system in CTAFs of the seven calls rather than our two – I wanted more announcements so there is less jamming of the frequency with dialogue.

I’m glad to see that’s happening.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

But you will not mention the obvious. If we had C airspace provided with the proper tools and staffing, it would indeed be safer. However, we use large amounts of C airspace controlled by a single Controller in the D airspace below. This is the reason other countries have E above D. They wish to allocate their safety resources effectively, and don’t want the concentration of a Controller in D airspace close to the runway to be affected by having to provide a Class C service at the same time when the risk of collision is far less.


and wait for it;

Of course, figures for C over D are going to be very hard to get from experience, as we are the only country who has this type of airspace – and we hardly have any traffic movements in it.


Couldn't help myself;

Let’s say you are going to take your family for a fly in a Boeing 747.

Guess who would be sitting in the left hand seat?:p

Who wouldn't be sitting down the back?:eek:

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision, that he listened and heard the airline’s pilot’s calls on both the area frequency and the tower frequency; he sighted the aircraft and was not at any time going to run into the aircraft.
You're losing your memory. I covered this nonsense in detail in a previous post.

Now Bloggsy, what would you do in similar circumstances? Wouldn’t you make it clear where you were going, knowing that there could be other aircraft in the airspace which needed this vital information? Let’s say you’re in G and you decide to do a straight in approach – do you tell anyone, or just leave that a secret?

Knowing that there may be VFR aircraft who think they are God's gift to self separation that they do not need to pipe up? How much would it have cost to have that Tobago, the one that caused a TCAS RA because he lost the plot, on freq and communicating?

If you now want me to make enough broadcasts on the E freq to ensure that any unknown VFR will get a good-enough picture about where I am and what I am doing, I'll be jamming the freq.

That's the beauty of Class G and especially CASA's new rules - pilots, especially VFR, are encouraged to pipe up and talk, so that those who are in the best position to solve any conflicting, the RPT driver, can at least be alerted to what might happen.

By the way, Bloggs, I was the person who consistently pushed for the FAA system in CTAFs of the seven calls rather than our two – I wanted more announcements so there is less jamming of the frequency with dialogue.

I’m glad to see that’s happening.
Read your mailout, Dick. := Your famous seven calls have been chucked in the bin.

Any more questions?

[CrazyMTOWDog]

He has said to everyone including the ATSB that there was never, ever any chance of a collision

And what separation tools was he using Dick?

Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?


Why don't you paste it here Dick and then everyone can make their own conclusion?

[Capn Bloggs]

Thanks Crazy, I missed that bit.

Dick,
Don’t keep pushing the Launceston issue too much because one day the truth will come out on how the safety case was written to support a pre-conceived conclusion.

For example, the ATSB prepared two different pages of the final report, and then only published the page which removed the criticism of the Virgin pilots for not stating clearly whether they were going to left or right base. Would you like me to get you a copy of the page which was changed?

So, we've got the whole pathetic situation turned around so that it is the RPT crew's fault? Where does it say in AIP that IFR aircraft are to broadcast their intentions in enough detail that a VFR aircraft in E can take appropriate self-segregation action? This is exactly what some of us are saying about E airspace, for goodness sake!

Any criticism should obviously be directed at your VFR pilot who decided not to say anything when he later admitted that "it appeared strange...". Did he know what energy state the 737 was in? Did he know who the PF was and what side of the cockpit he was on? Did he know what was going through the minds of the 737 crew as they were presented with the option? No.

I see the RA occurred at about 12nm from Launy; you're trying to tell me that your ace Tobago pilot could tell that a left base, as opposed to a right base, was going to cause a confliction? Come on! That bloke's ego is writing cheques his body can't cash!

That's why having a system that relies solely on the lowest common denominator being responsible for separation is stupid. When will you ever get the message?

The more you mention Launy, the bigger the hole you dig for your beloved E airspace. But keep it coming. I'm enjoying this.

The alarm bells are ringing, the red lights are flashing. Hopefully OAR will see right through the furphy that E airspace is.

[Dick Smith]

Peuce

You state,

I also assume that this model was produced ... taking into account, amongst other things, experiences elsewhere... which would cover off your requirement.

Unfortunately, this did not happen. There was nothing in the model which used data from similar airspace – even as a reference point.

Most of the studies I’ve seen are based on perception, not on fact and certainly not on science that could be supported by objective data.

[peuce]

Dick,

Unfortunately, this did not happen. There was nothing in the model which used data from similar airspace – even as a reference point

So then, presumably, you've seen the Broome assessment?

Would you like to share it?

[Howabout]

Dick,

As regards your following comment, I actually agree with you; but for different reasons:

When Airservices reversed the E over D airspace of NAS-2B, they did so because the Board was told that the correct process of safety analysis was not completed before Airservices agreed to change the airspace. It was not that the airspace was not safe, it was the fact that the processes had not been followed and this could leave the Board liable.

The Board made the decision to reverse the airspace, and then had their “experts” complete a safety study to support the Board decision.I'd say that what actually happened was that the Board was horrified when they were confronted by, and finally realised, the risk level generated by terminal Class E. After all, these guys were just suits with no understanding of airspace. The penny finally dropped, and they were petrified that they could be held responsible (and liable - maybe personally so) in the event of a Tobago and B737 digging a joint hole in the landscape. They needed an excuse to reverse a dumb decision and present a plausible reason to the 'amiable dolt' of a Minister. I agree that the excuse of 'lack of due process' was a smokescreen. But when the realisation hit, with respect to personal responsibility (Airservices was the airspace regulator then, which means the Board would have been fried), they had a case of serious, communal diarrhoea.

To add to Blogg's quote, as follows:

The alarm bells are ringing, the red lights are flashing.When it came to Launy, from the perspective of the Board, I think that the blue lights were a'sh*ttin' as well. In short, 'get us out of this disaster - any way you can - just make it plausible.'

In respect of your other statement on UK airspace, Dick old fruit, I feel there is a level of inconsistency in your statements. You say:

For example, they actually control IFR airline aircraft in uncontrolled airspace.I could be wrong, but I seem to remember a statement of yours during the great NAS debate that actually supported aircraft being on the control frequency, when passing from E/C into G and back to E/C, as efficient and sensible.

ARFOR, the memory is dimming, but do you recall that one?

[ARFOR]

I do indeed Howabout.

Effectively a RAS service in Australian G - ICAO F:-
ICAO Annex 11

2.6 Classification of airspaces

Class F. IFR and VFR flights are permitted, all participating IFR flights receive an air traffic advisory service and all flights receive flight information service if requested.which I have to be honest, I think is the optimum service for OCTA areas [not where Hi-Cap Air Carrier operate though]

Mr Smith

Interesting admissions in the last page or so.
I have a feeling you want the theoretical study to exist so it can confirm what your “belief system” says the result should be.Could it be that if you do simple figures for risk of E above D, that the risk is so small that it would be clearly acceptable by most people, and that’s why none of the scientific organisations and contractors who do these studies actually give the real figure?The Real figures? As opposed to what?

NO FIGURES, just a belief in an incompatible reference system?

No Assessments and/or CBA's that take in to account all of the 'specific' factors [differences and nuances] apparent that [if considered properly] would rule out the 'reference system approach'? := You well know this. Hiding behind your 'skeptic assoc' does not wash I'm afraid. If you were a true and impartial 'skeptic' you would INSIST on open, transparent and honest assessment processes rather than a 'cut and paste' [hello LeadSled] from the US that does not fit on the Broome or Karratha or Avalon or Williamtown pages.

Have there been Volume Specific Scientifically based Risk Assessments AND Cost Benefit Analysis conducted on Broome and Karratha, that follow the legislated 'required' process, and that support the current CASA ACP's for E over D?

Just a yes or no answer to the last para/question thankyou.

[Dick Smith]

Crazy, the pilot was using radio alerted see and avoid. Remember that was the one that the old BASI loved so much.

[Howabout]

Sorry, Dick, it's just not worth responding right now. It's the eve of Sat/Sun and I don't have the energy left to debate illogical argument.

Haveagoodweegend.

No doubt, we will engage foils again sometime over the next couple of days.

[Biggles_in_Oz]

Mr Smith. the pilot was using radio alerted see and avoid. Remember that was the one that the old BASI loved so much.
Alerted 'see and avoid' is a heck of a lot better than unalerted 'see and avoid', but it does not guarantee that paint will not be swapped, or britches filled.

Now why would anyone make airspace E rather than G ?
As I see it, it is because the traffic warrants an increase in protection to IFRs, but unsurveilled E is effectively the same as G, except that the risk to IFR has increased.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

Crazy, the pilot was using radio alerted see and avoid. Remember that was the one that the old BASI loved so much.

Then you would agree that a separation standard would be more economical than radio alerted see and avoid?

Still waiting for that copy..............

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
What about Class G – that is where in the terminal environment, the separation responsibility – when in cloud – can rest on the shoulders of a minimum hours IFR pilot, ie. there is no separation standard for when in IMC and there is nothing to stop a low-time pilot – or even high time pilot - setting a risky separation “standard”. That’s what happened at Orange a couple of years ago, where an airline aircraft was attempting an approach from the east when in cloud and a bank run pilot was attempting an approach from the west – both estimating the circuit area at about the same time.
On the other hand you and Ledsled are quite happy to have me blast off in busy E airspace, VFR because a clearance is not available, all on the pretext of avoiding a midair by looking out the window. Crazy. What separation standard would you suggest I use in this situation? You see (well, obviously you don't) just because I know exactly where to look (so-called Alerted See and Avoid) I must Avoid first whilst looking, because there's a good chance I'll never see him, or pick him up too late to do anything about dodging him.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Dick,

Re; "Crazy, the pilot was using radio alerted see and avoid. Remember that was the one that the old BASI loved so much."

AAhhhh - That would have been 'the one' provided by that old 'Flight Service' thingy...???

When same aircraft were not in CTA that is.......:}

and tks again for the ........:ok:

[Dick Smith]

Talk to me if you really want any of this info.

I get great enjoyment baiting people who do not even have the self confidence to openly talk about these important safety issues.

Yes, I know, you "might lose your job if you linked your real name with your views on public safety".

That's rubbish and I reckon you all know it.

For others, please phone me if you do have a genuine interest in these matters.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith
For others, please phone me if you do have a genuine interest in these matters
An A typical cop out :D :=

If you had answers to support your position [that would stand up to scrutiny] you would post them in an instant. ;)

You have said on this thread
Yes, I understand that whistle blowers can post on PPRuNe to get important information across without prejudicing their jobs.
Yes, I know, you "might lose your job if you linked your real name with your views on public safety".

That's rubbish and I reckon you all know it.
Is this your exit strategy? Dismiss, Attack, Get banned?? :=

That's alright, we will carry on in your absence ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

That's rubbish and I reckon you all know it.

Couldn't have said it better myself, old chap. :ok:

So what was the separation standard I would use to rocket off into J curve E, VFR, without a clearance?

[Howabout]

Dick,

A remarkable statement! You say:

I get great enjoyment baiting people who do not even have the self confidence to openly talk about these important safety issues.


Dick, these people have no problems with talking about 'these important safety issues.' Your problem, IMHO, is that you can't answer legitimate questions. It doesn't matter, Dick, if this is an anonymous forum. The substance of the debate is fact, nothing more, nothing less - respond with fact and you will be given due respect; respond with obfuscation and, well...

As for 'baiting,' that's a hoot. I doubt anyone thinks you are capable of 'baiting' Dick. Your 'baiting,' in my opinion, is nothing more than a frustrated effort to discredit people who actually know what they are talking about.

Once again, I will keep it civil; but, in my opinion, you really don't cut the mustard as an 'aviation expert.'

Notwithstanding, Dick, I appreciate the opportunity to engage. I am taking Mrs Howabout to an Ethiopian restaurant this evening and have a few garden chores to do beforehand. I've timed it so we get back in time to watch the Reds. At least the second half.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

Dick,

So there is no copy?

You do want separation over see and avoid.

I guess we will wait for Leady...........

Tootle pop!!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Has anyone ever been involved in setting up a desktop simulation?

Been studying this subject and it would appear the basis is listing all outcomes, assigning a random number to each event, then plugging in a random number generator and keep running the generator until a pattern starts to emerge. The pattern is your statistical model...highly scentific..:eek:

Basic premise is to plug in what HAS HAPPENED before in a certain time period with a specific number of movements then calculate the outcome as a percentage of the total and then assign a random number...could be very large number...ASIR reports say that there are 18 VCAs a year..there are 300,000 movements...sooo...assign 18 numbers randomly from 1 to 300,000 and then run a random number generator and see how many times these numbers come up..keep running until a pattern emerges...say over ten years and 3,000,000 events...the percentage of that outcome is the risk...sounds pretty basic.

However, in the case of VCAs very rarely is a VCA occurance enacted exactly the same way...each VCA would then have individual descriptions of how each pilot came to break into the zone...different spot on the boundary different conditions different destinations, different pilots and differing pressures or distractions and you can see the number starts looking very random.

Also, what has happened before has no bearing on what will happen again...these are all random events...hard to model for this type of thing...

Now, looking at RPT on the exact same track and the exact same timetable, going from point A to point B with differing effects for weather alone and aircraft weight and you start to see a pattern that could just about detect how each individual pilot flying actually handles the aircraft..

Does this sound about right?

If I am right then you CAN predict what an RPT will do most all the time...you cannot predict with ANY certainty what a GA PPL will do if left to their own devices...so...the outcome that would be safest is to include some amount of directional control or even knowledge of direction to keep all the wheels spinning and the outcome of swapping paint will be "vanishingly small"

A GA VFR on a random track through non-controlled airspace also habituated by controlled IFR RPT...did someone say install VFR lanes?

[Pera]

The VFR pilot was sure there was no chance of a collision but the 737 had an RA! The computer says no.... :ugh:

[Capn Bloggs]

Class C airspace isn't destroying GA, this is (http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/413966-anyone-visited-mildura-lately.html). :hmm:

[rotorblades]

Dick
I don’t believe the CAA is incompetent because “they offer a RAS service to aircraft in G”. Such a service would be fully compliant with ICAO. However, when they actually offer an Air Traffic Control separation service in uncontrolled airspace, that’s incompetent

I dont believe incompetency is quite the right word for it. Are they bang on ICAO rules, no. Is any country - no, not even Australia & the USA.
You say a RAS service in is compliant with ICAO & the next line say separation standard in uncontrolled airspace is incompetent. I believe they dont call ita RAS anymore a deconfliction service instead:

Deconfliction Service:

A Deconfliction Service is an air traffic radar service in which the controller shall provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between aircraft participating in the advisory service, and in which he shall pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and, if known, level of conflicting non-participating traffic, together with advice on action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller shall pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic. Even though the service is an advisory one, controllers shall pass the 'advice' in the form of instructions. Under a Deconfliction Service the following conditions apply:

The service may be requested under any flight rules or meteorological conditions.
Controllers can expect the pilot to accept vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Controllers should be aware that pilots may not be qualified to fly in IMC. Should this situation arise the controller will be informed by the pilot.
There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside controlled airspace to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, should a pilot choose not to comply with advisory avoiding action then he will become responsible for his own separation and any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.
The controller will be advised before a pilot changes heading or level.
Controllers shall pass avoiding action instructions to resolve a confliction with nonparticipating traffic and, wherever possible, shall seek to achieve separation which is not less than 5 nm or 3000 feet, except when specified otherwise by the CAA. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, and when unknown aircraft make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.
Controllers shall continue to provide information on conflicting traffic until the confliction is resolved.

And saying international pilots need to know the there are the same rules wherever you go. Do most international pilots flying in oz airspace know what TIBA is, unlikely.

Most aircraft going into airports in the UK (IFR ) are radar-vectored to an ILS, for separation, sequencing etc. Dont have too many RNAV approaches etc. Unfortunately, sometimes the vectoring has to be conducted through G airspace. It is all above LSALT and within published RVAs, but none of the majors airports have the need for vectoring in G and the few exceptions like Plymouth have little RPT traffic. Once again if PLymouth have no radar feed they cant radarvector (its in the name!). An approach service can be done from the tower, by plymouth APPROACH. If the tower controller is approach trained & plymouth approach rated he can do both tasks from the same desk.

Rotorblades, whether you like it or not, the last time I flew into Plymouth I quite honestly couldnt care at flying rats testicle, plymouth means nothing to me nor in the context of NAS. Neither does a RAS or anything done in UK airspace. They elected to go the way they did because of the traffic situation, the availability of radar & numbers of controllers. PIlots can opt out of the deconfliction service, it is just available for use if pilots want that extra level of service & protection.

ICAO is designed for the lowest common denominator not the highest. Every country picks & chooses which bits they like & dont, or ammend, the others.

If you are flying in another country then you have to be aware of their local rules, wherever you go not just the UK.

And Dick, a little less of the anti-pom bigotry on your comments of the state of UK Aviation industry, has nothing to do with the CAA, more of the UK government. This isnt the place for racism or xenophobia.

Now, bring it back to NAS & what Australia needs for its traffic situation, vs just inplementing what someone else does. And whatever is decided upon, ATC numbers need increasing. They are low & only getting worse.

[LeadSled]

but unsurveilled E is effectively the same as G, except that the risk to IFR has increased.

Biggles in Oz,

Old mate, by just what convoluted line of total ill-logic did you come to the conclusion that risk to IFR in E increases, compared to G. Whatever your are smoking, it must be strong stuff.

On a serious note, it is this kind of unsupportable ill-logical thinking that lies behind the hard core objections to any change in the old Australian airspace arrangements. As for most of you, all I see is a string of assertions about "safety", without any qualified support, no data, just more than personal opinions, howling down anything that doesn't conform to your opinions -- that Australia does it best ----- when it is rather obvious that Australia doesn't.

It is a great pity that most of you are unable to even read the published ATSB reports without a pre-bias that the VFR was wrong, and the RPT Captain could do no wrong, therefor a very careful consideration of the Captain's actions (particularly in the Brisbane case) is not something you have been able to do.

Bloggs,
Please tell me you are not really an RPT Captain, some of your statements really are "so interesting" ---- I find it more than somewhat difficult that such statements could come from a real life airline pilot.

Owen Stanley,
I will back Dick's experience as a pilot, across a variety of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and his knowledge of matters airspace design, acquired over many years of study of the subject, including being Chairman of the CAA Board, and his time on the CASA Board.

That you are a controller does not make you an expert on CNS/ATM design, any more than you (or Bloggs) being a pilot (with a current medical) flying in the airspace make you an expert on the subject. Dick has had some of the world's preeminent experts, both organizations and individuals, to guide him in his acquisition of knowledge in the field.

Owen, if you think you can match that sort of background and experience, please tell us why you think you can.

Tootle pip!!

[ferris]

As for most of you, all I see is a string of assertions about "safety", without any qualified support, no data, just more than personal opinions, howling down anything that doesn't conform to your opinions Bwahaha! Anyone reading the thread will have no doubt who is using assertions based on no data!!
read the published ATSB reports without a pre-bias that the VFR was wrong You mean like in the tobago, where the pilot thought that the jet would pass down one side of him, and was surprised when it passed down the other? And these type of events are going to be deconflicted by the VFR pilot???? What a great basis for system design :rolleyes:
Dick has had some of the world's preeminent experts, both organizations and individuals, to guide him in his acquisition of knowledge in the field. Yet they remain anonymous, and Dick cannot name them or have them post under their own names- which, according to Dick himself, invalidates their opinion. Fascinating.
That you are a controller does not make you an expert on CNS/ATM design, any more than you (or Bloggs) being a pilot (with a current medical) flying in the airspace make you an expert on the subject. And yet Dick, who is neither, nor ever been, a commercial pilot or an air traffic controller, is qualified to dream up dirt road airspace experiments and perpetrate them on a system which doesnt need fixing? So, an absence of qualifications does qualify you for airspace design? You really are outdoing yourself in this post.

Once again, in reply to legitimate questions about how Dick's dream will actually work; the lack of infrastructure and other differences to the 'US system', etc. etc. readers will note the silence. A silence punctuated by whining like the above, lacking any fact or insight other than to resort to personal attack and to belittle anyone "not on side". You've been done like a dinner, again Leadsled. For all to see.

Argue the facts if you want any respect- or just live with the contempt you so richly deserve, turd polisher.

[Dog One]

Lead

You or your master have yet to detail why E airspace benefits jet RPT aircraft against C airspace?

Why do you believe that C airspace has a higer risk factor than E. Is this because you believe the VFR operators will not request a clearance and treat C as E?

[ARFOR]

rotorblades

Great post. A deconfliction service [OCTA] in surveillance coverage is a fine addition [compatible] to Class F type services.

LeadSled
but unsurveilled E is effectively the same as G, except that the risk to IFR has increased.
Biggles in Oz,

Old mate, by just what convoluted line of total ill-logic did you come to the conclusion that risk to IFR in E increases, compared to G.
Biggles is but one of many posters who have raised these actualities. In brief summary:-

Class G [really Class F]

- IFR given a DTI/advisory service on IFR
- VFR are 'required' to broadcast in the terminal area CTAF within 30nm [northwest airports being discussed]
- No surveillance coverage
- TXPDR's mandatory Above A100
- VFR Radio carriage and use cross checks against accuracy or non-use of TXPDR's
- ACAS not carried by most aircraft [except IFR RPT]

[B]Class E

- IFR separated from IFR
- VFR no radio transmission use required
- No surveillance coverage
- TXPDR's mandatory
- No cross checks [VFR radio use] against accuracy or non-use of TXPDR's
- ACAS not carried by most aircraft [except IFR RPT]

You tell us:-

- Which rule set is [on balance] less safe [we know which one is more expensive] to all airspace users [IFR & VFR]
- Which is the higher risk to all airspace users i.e. is it the IFR/IFR conflicts, or IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR conflicts that are the greatest risk exposure in the terminal area?

Or perhaps, better still, open, transparent and publically available Risk Analysis and Cost Benefit Analysis processes would answer these very important unanswered questions. WOULDN'T THEY! ;)

[rotorblades]

Dick has had some of the world's preeminent expertsExperts ehhh.
Quotes:

"An ordinary man away from home giving advice." - Oscar Wilde

"An expert is a person who avoids the small errors while sweeping on to the grand fallacy." - Steven Weinberg

"Consultants are people who borrow your watch and tell you what time it is, and then walk off with the watch." - Robert Townsend

"No man can be a pure specialist without being in the strict sense an idiot." - George Bernard Shaw

"Even when the experts all agree, they may well be mistaken." - Bertrand Russell:D

"Experts often possess more data than judgment." - Colin Powell:oh:

"One who limits himself to his chosen mode of ignorance." - Elbert Hubbard

Lead:
I will back Dick's experience as a pilot
Under what authority?

lead, why do you continually insist on telling everyone they cant have an opinion or voice their concerns because they, perceivably, dont have as much 'experience' as Dick, or yourself?
That is exactly the petty, beaurocratic, narrow-mindedness that is prevalent in the industry and causing all the problems & woes. If someone is high enough up the foodchain and thinks its a good idea all the 'yes-men' jump onboard to try and grab the share of basking in the golden glow. But its rarely them who have to deal with the fallout.

Anybody can have an opinion, no matter of experience or how many experts they've got in their back pocket. And the decision makers need to take it on board. The time you start thinking that someone with 'less experience' has no valid points to make is the time to be thrown out of the industry. Its just pure egotistical, one-upmanship.

The biggest problem led & dick have is not listening to others who dont agree, immediately slamming them as having not enough 'experience'. They put across arguments at a tangent to the issue to try and befuggle the issues.

Dick - Start listening, and respond with sensible answers & less personal attacks. You may find that people start to understand you better.

On the substantiating of the points, just saying an expert has told you this, word of mouth isnt confirming the validity. Post the reports or point people in the dircetion so they can read it for themeselves.

[Dog One]

The way I see it, is that Dicky and Leady won't be operating in this so called safe airspace in command of a RPT jet with 200 pax. The phrase "all care and no responsibility springs to mind" as well as the definition of an expert.

[Howabout]

Precisely Bloggs:

Class C airspace isn't destroying GA, http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/413966-anyone-visited-mildura-lately.html (http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/413966-anyone-visited-mildura-lately.html)

Sorry, I'm not good at manipulating links (right-click to open), but your comment was 'this is.'

Agree entirely. And I wonder who championed 'user pays' and the attendant disaster that resulted in 'airport owners' racking up fees and charges to the extent that GA is not viable at many locations. Jeez, didn't 'user-pays' sound so logical to the unwashed? 'User-pays' was not thought through in reference to GA and the industry in general.

The demise of YHOX, the closure of the crossing runway at YSBK, and many other examples, from where I sit, can be put down to 'business models' that have little regard for GA viability. 'User pays,' IMHO, championed (I believe) by the 'free in G brigade,' has brought GA to its knees.

Once we had a system that tacitly acknowledged that GA benefited everyone in the population. Whether it was the newsagent in Tennant, the pharmacist in St George, the RFDS, or the local flying school that contributed to the supply of future commercial pilots. Consequently, we federally funded aviation, particularly regional and GA, because the benefits extended to the entire population, albeit indirectly in some areas.

'User-pays' canned all that. A vital sector of the industry, that was funded out of government revenue, for the benefit of all Australians (and I mean all), atrophied because of the 'user-pays model.'

Take a bow, those supporters of 'user-pays' and 'free in G.' From my perspective, you undermined a viable industry.

Only my take, but Class E over D is a molehill in comparison to the irreversible damage that's been done by blinkered zealots.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Rotorblades-
Deconfliction Service:

A Deconfliction Service is an air traffic radar service in which the controller shall provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between aircraft participating in the advisory service, and in which he shall pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and, if known, level of conflicting non-participating traffic, together with advice on action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller shall pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic. Even though the service is an advisory one, controllers shall pass the 'advice' in the form of instructions. Under a Deconfliction Service the following conditions apply:

The service may be requested under any flight rules or meteorological conditions.
Controllers can expect the pilot to accept vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Controllers should be aware that pilots may not be qualified to fly in IMC. Should this situation arise the controller will be informed by the pilot.
There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside controlled airspace to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, should a pilot choose not to comply with advisory avoiding action then he will become responsible for his own separation and any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.
The controller will be advised before a pilot changes heading or level.
Controllers shall pass avoiding action instructions to resolve a confliction with nonparticipating traffic and, wherever possible, shall seek to achieve separation which is not less than 5 nm or 3000 feet, except when specified otherwise by the CAA. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, and when unknown aircraft make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.
Controllers shall continue to provide information on conflicting traffic until the confliction is resolved.

A Deconfliction Service is an air traffic radar service in which the controller shall provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between aircraft participating in the advisory service, and in which he shall pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and, if known, level of conflicting non-participating traffic, together with advice on action necessary to resolve the confliction

this almost sounds like our current "snapshot" procedures..excepting the words "radar service Terminated" to ensure no implied continued service.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Howabout....the most precise post to date!

And here I was thinking I was the only one who saw such machinations:ugh:

[rotorblades]

Ozbus,
It is very similar. Although, from my experience, there is less advice given here on avoiding the traffic. Its more a TI and let the pilots sort themselves out.
In the UK the advice is given as an instruction and the pilot can then either take it or not. Control/Radar service terminated is also used in the UK.

It just shows how similar the two are.

And as for vectoring in G (for the ILS, for example), if all the 'uncontrolled' aerodromes in G here had a tower & approach service, then the same procedure would probably occur here also.

Any & every country decides how best to adapt the ICAO rules to fit its traffic patterns. Saying one is worse than the other isn't applicable because you cant compare traffic numbers/density, airspace sizes, density of airfields between such different countries as Australia & UK. The UK allows anybody who wants to fly in G do so without being on an ATSC frequency or filing FPLs(whether they are IFR or VFR), but the ones that do want a service can call the local approach control or, for example, around London the LONDON LARS, London Lower Airspace Radar Service. Which is purely there for G and providing Alerting Svc/FIS/RIS/RAS(Deconfl.Svc.). So its upto to the pilots to opt in or opt out. I believe its similar to what Australia had with the FISOs {this may not bee the correct term, I wasnt here for it} (non-radar) before the tasking was amalgamated onto current ATC sectors.

And for all the others out there who like jumping on me for being an ex-Englander..Im not advocating bringing the UK system to Australia wholesale.
CASA/DAP/ASA need to sit down & think long & hard about access for everyone - IFR, VFR, RPT, AWK, Weekend Warrior etc. Everyone has a part to play in the industry and although I agree that VFRs shouldnt impede RPT traffic they cant be disposed of entirely.

But thats another discussion:O

[CaptainMidnight]

Any & every country decides how best to adapt the ICAO rules to fit its traffic patterns.Correct.

I suspect that the U.K. & the U.S. provide separation and other services in G & E in various situations in order to make their existing airspace work.

Australia on the other hand is effectively starting with a clean sheet of paper, doing traffic, risk, safety etc. analysis exercises to determine what ICAO class of airspace is appropriate to a particular situation, and - importantly - having to take into account the real rules applicable to those classes of airspace under ICAO, not what other countries may do in theirs.

[Howabout]

Hi Dick,

Any comment on post #820?

By the way, the Ethiopian was sensational!

[Capn Bloggs]

So Dick,

Confirm or deny this (from the AFAP report on the field trip to the US to study the USNAS circa 2003) :

Class G airspace.
In the US NAS IFR aircraft receive an IFR/IFR separation service in Class G airspace. This Service is not dependent on radar coverage, and indeed most Class G airspace lies beyond radar coverage. This is in stark contrast to the proposal in AUSNAS to have IFR aircraft operate without an en-route traffic information service in Class G.

When the question of IFR in Class G airspace was raised at the FAA headquarters in Washington, Mr Reggie Matthews, Manager Airspace and Rules Division, who is the FAA executive with policy authority to make an interpretation on ATC regulations, stated that FAA policy requires IFR aircraft in Class G airspace to operate on a clearance. This policy is not documented, however Mr Matthews advised that it is current custom and practice,
both for industry and FAA, to function in this manner, and that if an interpretation was required it would come to him for decision.

Incompetents! :ok:

[rotorblades]

Midnight,
Australia on the other hand is effectively starting with a clean sheet of paper

I agree, As it should, and what Ive been advocating all along. But it seems some just want to lift the US model and move it into Australia.

...existing airspace work
I'm not entirely sure of this statement, myself.
I cant speak for the US, but in the UK its been part of the integrated airspace design for a long time. It was the best adaptation that could be made to allow continual access to arispace by GA traffic who didnt want a service & to give the IFRs (&other aircraft wanting to aprticipate in the service) an extra level, I suppose you could call it Class G+ or G.5.

By the time the arguments have finished, ICAO will have changed it letterings & designations to just the three its planning. - N, K & U (basically corresponding to current C, E & G). Whether various countries will take this, I personally, think not, but depends on how they write the 'rules' for the new letters.
here are links to the three:

http://www.eurocontrol.int/eatm/gallery/content/public/events/ecac%20Category%20N.pdf
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eatm/gallery/content/public/events/ecacCategory%20K.pdf
http://www.eurocontrol.int/eatm/gallery/content/public/events/ecac%20Category%20U.pdf

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Rotorblades...I like the K version-
Known Traffic Environment is an environment within which all traffic is known to ATS, either with position only or with flight intentions as well

and-

Not all traffic is subject to an ATC clearance

If we are still supposed to be ICAO compliant, then E is not possible without surveillance. Why push for the current iteration if the future iteration requires what we all know it needs in the first place.

No E without surveillance!

[Howabout]

I'd go one further OZ - no E, in any environment, if C can be provided within the resources available.

I don't know, but suspect, that C can be provided at all of the locations debated on this post. If there is an increased cost factor, then I've seen absolutely no evidence to that effect.

Where is the CBA? Anyone? Where is the CBA that justifies E over D at any location?

Dick/Lead, I will get back in my box if you can provide solid, quantitative data, and analysis, that justifies E over D in respect of BME, KTA and YMAV. Where is the cost/benefit analysis, required by the Minister, that justifies a sub-optimal 'solution' that exposes RPT to avoidable risk?

The Australian Airspace Policy Statement clearly enunciates the requirement for risk analysis and cost/benefit. I have seen neither in credible form.

[Jabawocky]

Howabout

you might as well burn that box........

Have a look at the study at YBRK for example, but the others seem to ignore that when ever its brought up......for some strange reason.

[Icarus2001]

Dick has had a little dummy spit and gone away.

Dick still has not answered my question from a couple of pages ago...

Dick, why do you always refer to E as "controlled" from the tower BUT then talk about the C as being controlled by centre?

[Dick Smith]

Howabout, user pays came in before I was involved in any way (Bosch Report?).

I was involved in the "Review of Resources" which reduced staff from about 7000 to 3500 so that the "user pays" only cost the industry about half as much.

Icarus, no I don't ! I think you may have it the wrong way around!

[Capn Bloggs]

user pays came in before I was involved in any way (Bosch Report?).

You were certainly "around" though...
The Department of Aviation's released a Review of the Future Role of the Flight Service Officer in the Provision of Air Traffic Services that envisaged the integration of air traffic control functions. With a booklet titled Two Years in the Aviation Hall of Doom aviator and entrepreneur Mr Dick Smith declared that the department had 'had its day' and was 'totally stupid' with regulations that 'reduced safety'. The Minister for Aviation endorsed the safety regime showing Australia having a low accident rate.
:cool:

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Onya Mr Bloggs......

Re " Review of the Future Role of the Flight Service Officer in the Provision of Air Traffic Services that envisaged the integration of air traffic control functions."

The 'Future Role' was to 'Foxtrot Oscar' them orf...........

And the 'integration' was 'As workload permits' = not much service at all really.....

But......thanks for the........ :sad: :ok:

[Capn Bloggs]

And here I was thinkin it twas Mista XXXXX who wuz trying to shaft yous guys! It wuz sombodi in tha Department! Hang on, maybe he gave the department the idea. Now there's an idea... :E :=

Those were the days...:}:D

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Dick, do you remember the big table full of "ammendments"?

I do.....:ugh:

[Icarus2001]

Dick is right. I transposed my E and C. Whoops.

See your quotes below..

If the Class C is manned by an already overloaded Controller for the Class D airspace below, it is most likely that the safety of the total system will be reduced.

Because in a properly designed system the Class E airspace is manned by Controllers in the Centre. That’s for obvious reasons – it’s there 24hours per day, not just for the hours of the local tower.


You sidestepped my question Dick..

Why can't the C be run by centre. Why do you say it is run from the "overworked" tower controller? When you do not place that limitation on E by running it from centre?

[konstantin]

AS is C over D (the latter being up to A045) during TWR hours, centre controls above A085. Below F180 it all reverts to G when TWR is not there, with an associated CTAF-R. Seems to work well day and night. And hey, both the enroute and tower controllers get busy on a daily basis BTW.

So "we", ahem, as a generic model for the brave new future want to maybe lower the sector/tower boundary, introduce E vice C, possibly lower the top of D and retain (or should that be "extend"?) E steps at night (great, one in - one out) down to the circuit...because...?

My Bad! In relation to the last one I forgot that E steps will give CTA protection (should I have said "containment"?) for instrument approaches...hang on, I am now confused...during the day a VFR in E doesn`t need a clearance reference an opposite direction burner just departed...but then that means the jet has no actual CTA protection in the E "controlled" airspace other than reliance on correct radio procedures by VFRs and the resultant self-announce safety net. Right? Say it ain`t so...

And staffing wise there is still a controller on the sector console talking to a controller in the tower regardless of whether it`s E/D or C/D. True story.

[Capn Bloggs]

Konstantin,
the jet has no actual CTA protection in the E "controlled" airspace other than reliance on correct radio procedures by VFRs and the resultant self-announce safety net. Right?
Almost. There is no requirement for VFR to use, or even have, a radio in E. They must have a TCAS (which of course has not been checked on the day to either be on or working properly).

[konstantin]

Captain B

I hope we`re not talking at cross-purposes here, but it was my understanding that a VHF-equipped VFR aircraft may operate in Class E without an Air Traffic Clearance as long as they maintain listening watch and have a serviceable transponder activated with 1200 selected?

In Class G a radio is not compulsory albeit "strongly recommended"?

[Capn Bloggs]

WRT radio, you're arse-about there, old chap. :ok:

[Frank Arouet]

How so? I thought he gave an accurate account of what is required.

[konstantin]

Bloggsy

Restating what I said before - are we talking about American E or Australian E? I was addressing the latter with my previous comments.

[Capn Bloggs]

Kon,

I was too. Radio is not required in Oz E; transponders are. Radio is required in Oz G above 5k, and also at any level in reduced VMC. In Oz G (any Oz airpsace, actually), transponders are required above at or 10k.
:ok:

[LeadSled]

---- any level in reduced VMC

Bloggs,
And where might that apply?
Tootle pip!!

[Capn Bloggs]

The answer is in AIP.

[Frank Arouet]

Below 3000 clear of cloud or special VFR clearance in CTR perhaps? But what would I know.

and also at any level in reduced VMC

Can you point me to the AIP reference. I may be breaking the law through ignorance. I wouldn't want to be in sacred RPT airspace uninvited.:rolleyes:

[FL400]

Maybe I'm missing something :/

Scenario 1:

Aircraft departs D TWR and enters overlying procedural E steps. Finds conflicting VFR traffic:
Aircraft: "request deviations right of route"
ATC is separating using radials with other IFR aircraft: "not available due traffic"


Scenario 2:

Aircraft into D TWR descending through procedural E steps. Finds conflicting VFR traffic:
Aircraft: "request deviations right of route"
ATC is running distance standard and this aircraft is the lead aircraft: "not available due traffic"

So now what? Unless I'm missing something, the aircraft in question either remains on track to remain separated from the IFR and ploughs into the VFR or it violates its clearance to self-separate from the VFR and in doing so causes a breakdown of separation with the other IFR.

[peuce]

I don't think you've missed anything at all ...

[konstantin]

Okay, here we go, I`d really like to know if I`m missing something myself. I will make a statement and, if any part of it is in error could I please have a specific document reference which shows me to be incorrect. Whereupon I will humbly stand admonished...

"When operating in Australian Class E airspace, a VFR aircraft must be VHF-equipped and must maintain a listening watch on the appropriate frequency, however there is no requirement to communicate with ATC".

No opinions, no hearsay, no end-state policy preferred positions - doc reference(s) thanks.

[Hornet306]

AIP ENR 17.3 Specifically 17.3.2 :}

[LeadSled]

Radio is not required in Oz E

Bloggs,
My dear chap, how did you come to that conclusion?

Just quoting the current AIP (and this will not change after 3 June) ENR 1.4, the table following 4.2.8 states "continuous two way" in the Radio COM RQMNTS column. Recall that such a notification in the AIP has regulatory support, it is not "advisory".

On that basis, konstantin is correct, and in my view, he is correct.

And now to something called "reduced VMC".

There is no definition, (that I can find) in any Australian aviation regulatory document, that defines something called "reduced VMC".

For Class G airspace, there are certainly two ( of equal legal standing) VMC criteria for VFR flight, the less restrictive only applying below 3000' AMSL or 1000' AGL, whichever is higher. If you take advantage of the less restrictive, radio is, indeed, mandatory.

The only time something called "reduced VMC" appears, that I am aware of ( do you know elsewhere??) is also in the table mentioned above,(last entry in the Radio COM RQMNTS column) but nowhere that I am aware of defines, in a regulatory sense, "reduced VMC".

There are some changes for 3 July on.

Tootle pip!!

[Capn Bloggs]

Ledsled,
Recall that such a notification in the AIP has regulatory support, it is not "advisory".

So you have been reading pages and pages of this thread where we have asserted that radio in E is not required and you have not said a word. You didn't even know the statement in the airspace table existed, did you? :cool:

FWIW, I think that table is wrong. Elsewhere in the AIP it says that VFR "should" monitor the ATC frequency. I'll leave you to find it. :cool:

If, however, Australia not only has a mandatory requirement for transponders and radio carriage and use, I am pleasantly surprised. :cool:

[LeadSled]

Bloggs,
If anything is wrong, it is to use an undefined description "reduced VMC", when there is, legally, no such thing as "reduced VMC". But that is far from the only ill-defined stuff around.

As I previously stated, there is no legal difference in standing of the alternative VMC criteria ------ and you and I both know that table (with minor amendments) has been around for years.

As for radio in E, so much for the AFAP blather about "no radio" in E.

Tootle pip!!

[ferris]

So what if the a/c are radio equipped.
[URL="http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1995/a95h0008/a95h0008.asp"[/URL]
I especially like the very good information about the limitations of see and avoid (alerted and unalerted).
And you want to design in the requirement for see and avoid involving RPT a/c (which is what class E does)?
Keep polishing that turd.

[Capn Bloggs]

Ledsled,

If anything is wrong, it is to use an undefined description "reduced VMC", when there is, legally, no such thing as "reduced VMC". But that is far from the only ill-defined stuff around.

Talk to the people who wrote AIP, not me. Quite frankly, I don't give a rats about reduced VMC.

I want safe skies for me and my pax, which means C or D over D.

You didn't even know the statement in the airspace table existed, did you?
Answer?

[konstantin]

All

As an aside (for anyone who may be interested) there`s another pretty little table on p.28 in the Jan 2010 Aeronautical Study of Alice Springs .pdf by OAR, fairly certain it`s a standard addendum/appendix to all their studies. The E airspace section seems to be quite specific about radio and transponder carriage requirements for all aircraft.

But what would the parent regulatory document be where they have sourced this from? Hidden away in the bowels of a CAO somewhere I suppose...?

Anyways, moving right along, etc...

[LeadSled]

You didn't even know the statement in the airspace table existed, did you? Bloggs,
Any attempt at subtlety is entirely lost on you, isn't it! Go re-read my original post.

I love it, you criticize me, because I didn't bring your lack of knowledge of radio requirements in E, to your attention sooner. Priceless.

I have long since lost count of the hours and days at such as the CASA Operations Procedures Sub-Committee, Airspace 2000, NAS and similar bodies over the last almost 20 years, many years on union tec. committees before that. You should read some of my public papers on the carriage and use of radio. I am happy to say that most of my views are reflected in the 3 June amendments. It didn't just "happen".

But we have never had any positive contribution from you, have we?

Lots of demands, lots of negatives, generally along the lines of your last post here, in my opinion all of which can be summarized as: "Everybody else can get stuffed, I get my way, and nobody gets in my way"

Remember a letter about the problems of seeing other aircraft when "somebody" (you, by any chance?) was doing 250kt in the circuit, therefor everybody else had to clear off, because to slow up and fit in was going to cost 2 minutes, and time was money.

Proposals for something called "commercial airspace" in G, with all but "RPT" to be excluded, remember that one?

Actually, there is a rather good book by a long time MacRobertson-Miller Captain, you might even have known him, who deals rather well with the kinds of attitudes that, in my opinion, you and all too many other present generation Australian domestic pilots display, to those they regard as their inferiors.

Maybe that's why I enjoy flying in US, CA, NZ or UK so much, I never hear on the radio what I hear in Australia, including the consequences, all to often. And by the way, it's not just me, have a good look at the PCH and Ambidjii raw data on radio usage and problems.

Tootle pip!!

[Jabawocky]

Maybe that's why I enjoy flying in US, CA, NZ or UK so much, I never hear on the radio what I hear in Australia, including the consequences, all to often. And by the way, it's not just me, have a good look at the PCH and Ambidjii raw data on radio usage and problems.


Up until now perhaps.....should that now be CA,NZ or UK :E

Pilots Pull Rank, Declare Emergency At JFK (With Audio) (http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/jkf_construction_crosswind_American_pilots_clearance_crosswi nd_emergency_202510-1.html)

[LeadSled]

Jabawoky,
No, hasn't changed my opinion, but I must admit that operating in that area does present some challenges, some of the demands of ATC in the New York area certainly sort out the men from the boys. Over LaGuardia @FL210, then down to 2500' heading for a Carnasi VOR can be "really interesting".

What I was really referring to was the behavior of all too many Regional and similar pilots, and their assumption of:
(1) Anybody who is not IFR is a "blundering big smasher/Terry Toweling hatted low time and/or incompetent PPL"
(2) RPT has some form of absolute priority, and the demands to other traffic to accept the "rpt directions" to get out of the way --- aircraft to aircraft "ATC".

Have a close look at the CAAPs for 3 June changes, it's all there, in a very muted fashion, but nonetheless spelled out.

Some of the incidents on file, that I have, are really quite funny, in a macabre sort of way, from the offenders point of view, they never (very obviously) ever gave a moments thought to who might have been on the other end of the conversation.

The other end(s) has variously been: A very senior flying CASA executive, a very senior officer of (then) DoTARS, handling aviation policy, the crew's boss, their airline DFO, a very senior Treasury official, a very senior executive of Environment, handling aviation matters, a string of cases of pilots for the same airline on a day off ----- and so it goes on.

One that just about takes the biscuit was an "RPT" landing straight in downwind, contrary to much existing traffic, it was an airshow, with a suitable AIC & NOTAM. When questioned as to his blatant disregard for CAR 166 and the AIC/NOTAM, his reply was "but I'm RPT". That all in front of a very very senior CASA executive.

Always be very polite on the radio, you never know who is on the frequency.

As to the legislative power behind the enforceable bits of the AIP, various CARs or CASRs will state, re. a particular matter, such as VMC criteria, that CASA publishing the criteria in AIP establishes the legal basis of the criteria.

This was not always the case. For many years the status of much of the AIP was in legal limbo. The changes so far have helped a little, but (other than for a lawyer, and even for many of them) the regulations in their present state are a serious challenge to pilots and engineers --- and their continued careers.

The number of cases of becoming "an inadvertent criminal" (first mentioned in the "Lane" report of the mid 1980s) are all to many.

And, since 9/11, any such inadvertent "crime" will seriously limit your international travel, as one LAME found out when he wanted to take his children to Disneyland, and too many pilots have found out, when they thought they were going to US for training - and were denied a visa.

Tootle pip!!

PS: One of my favorites is a crew from a well known east coast regional, advising me that my estimates for Willy were all wrong, a PA 28 couldn't go that fast, and why was I flying at all, if I couldn't get something so simple correct.

Actually I had a GS of about 200kt at 2000, this mob didn't know the difference between a PA 28 and what I was flying, even the special callsign didn't trigger anything in their tiny minds.

[peuce]

Leadsled,

Very facinating ... but, your point?

Yes, in general, RPT jokeys believe they have a priority over bugsmashers. I don't really see any problem with that. A multi-tonned aluminium tube carrying 120 fare paying passengers, versus a bugsmasher that can turn on a dime ... logic says ...all other things having being considered, let the RPT through.

Do we give way to buses as they leave the curb?

Do you move your ski boat out of the way of the Queen Mary?

And, as you are so keen on the books, does the Australian Airspace Policy Statement state: "The Government considers the safety of passenger transport services as the first priority in airspace administration..."

[Capn Bloggs]

More warries form Ledsled about those dastardly RPT pilots who think they own the skies. Keep it up, son. I find it entertaining.

So now we have yet another deviation from ICAO AND the US NAS; mandatory radio for VFR in E. Ledsled and Dick et al must be seething with rage. Or is this simply another example of not "complying" with anything in particular, but creating rules as we need them to suit our situation? What?! Commonsense? Wash your mouth out, Bloggs! :ok:

Ledsled,

I have long since lost count of the hours and days at such as the CASA Operations Procedures Sub-Committee, Airspace 2000, NAS and similar bodies over the last almost 20 years, many years on union tec. committees before that. You should read some of my public papers on the carriage and use of radio. I am happy to say that most of my views are reflected in the 3 June amendments. It didn't just "happen".

And I am happy to say that the rubbish from a previous couple of NAStronauts (one a very, very senior CASA executive) that compulsory radio actually detracted from safety because naughty/slack/incompetent/lazy pilots were lulled into a false sense of security and therefore were not looking out was comprehensively dismissed by CASA in the upcoming 3 June changes. :cool:

Further, if you had any hand in what has been in the AIP for the last 10 years regarding carriage and use of radio you should be ashamed of yourself. When people like Frank (and yourself) have to ask about radio requirements or what they mean (eg Reduced VMC), it plainly indicates that the text is inadequate.

But we have never had any positive contribution from you, have we?
Well, for a start, I don't consider you any policymaker, just another person on Prune stating his position, which I have countered with reasons. If you don't consider that "positive" then that's your problem, not mine. I have generally refrained from personal abuse and telling warries, which is more than I can say about most of your posts. Besides, as Dick continually says, nobody would ever pay any attention to what anybody says here because they are anonymous, including you. :rolleyes:

Actually, I (and others) have been waiting for just one positive contribution from you: the CBA and Risk assessment from VFR in E verses C. I guess we still have 7 months until Christmas...

I and the organisations I have been involved with have made significant inputs to the airspace debate and I am quite proud of what has been achieved so far in the face of blantant self-interest and politicking. I will say that in general, the NAStronauts have failed in their mission to turn our efficient airspace system on it's head to suit the selfish Free in GE brigade, only because commonsense has prevailed over that self-interest.

I love it, you criticize me, because I didn't bring your lack of knowledge of radio requirements in E, to your attention sooner. Priceless.

Maybe you think differently to me. I would have pointed out your lack of knowledge as soon as it became apparent. Oh well.

Since I'm a bit slow and you are on top of all this comms stuff, precisely what is meant by VFR requiring "continuous two way comms" in E, apart from my previously quoted "should maintain a listening watch on the ATC freq and advise when in conflict"? Continuous with who and saying what?

[LeadSled]

Yes, in general, RPT jokeys believe they have a priority over bugsmashers.Peuce,
But it is not a legal right. I am all in favor of co-operative arrangements, but what I hear, all too often, is what amounts to verbal abuse over the radio, when the RPT's idea of what any other aircraft in the area (which might be quite a large aircraft, it's not confined to light aircraft) decline to "accept orders" from the RPT, or the "larger" aircraft.

Bloggs,

The incidents I allude to were not "warries", they were all incidents that were subject to some form of subsequent action. Sadly, I could add many more. Been to Olympic Dam recently?

As to your comments about radio procedures, most of the problems of recent years, and some of the confusion in many minds, has come about almost entirely from the recalcitrant and change averse of just one small group of domestic pilots, who want to cling onto the past, and can't get their minds around the fact that the magic word "mandatory" does not, in fact, increase compliance.

Who prefer "do it yourself ATC", rather than proper alerted see and avoid.

Would you be one of these, by any chance??

As to my views on the use of radio communication, I invited you to read some of my public submissions on the subject, but you obviously prefer to treat your rather off-beam assumptions as an established fact.

Do you even understand what the slogan "free in G" actually meant?? By the sound of it, and the GE reference, it would seem the answer is no.

Tootle pip!!

[Capn Bloggs]

Ledsled,
Since I'm a bit slow and you are on top of all this comms stuff, precisely what is meant by VFR requiring "continuous two way comms" in E, apart from my previously quoted "should maintain a listening watch on the ATC freq and advise when in conflict"? Continuous with who and saying what?
Answer? Or don't you know?