NAS rears its head again

[OverRun]

It seems like NAS has come back again, or maybe it never really left us.

In accordance with CASA policy the ultimate model should emulate identified best practice in the United States National Airspace System design

There has been spirited discussion about this in DG&P General Aviation & Questions forum over the last few months in the thread Class D Zones for Broome & Karratha. The latest move affects airline and RPT operations, which is why I'm raising it here.

What has emerged from the woodwork is the new NAS vision for control zones at regional airports. The first cabs off the rank are Karratha and Broome. Looking at the Airspace Change Proposal (thanks Capn Bloggs for the link), the airspace redesign elements associated with the upcoming towers there are:

smaller than the normal Australian control zone. With a D boundary @ A025, that'll make the zone about a 8NM radius. It is a lot smaller than the A045 and 22NM radius found at regional control towers elsewhere in Australia.
E over D airspace
no surveillance radar

Reading back through the GA thread, there is:

no cost saving with the small control zone
a big backward step to unalerted see-and-avoid as the only line of defence in the zone between the current 30nm radius CAGR/S at Broome and the proposed 8nm radius zone for the control tower at Broome.

This is a DOUBLE Airspace Change Proposal – the "new" NAS airspace has been hidden (or should that be buried?) in the Airspace Change Proposal to put towers at Karratha and Broome. The tower issue was generally accepted by all. But this NAS Airspace Change Proposal is something else again. There is no safety case for this, no modelling, no justification, and no cost saving. But a big step backwards as airline and RPT mix it up with the lowest common denominator of unalerted see-and-avoid GA.

In the absense of a safety case, what I could find was in the minutes of the local GA industry consultation at Broome last month which have just come out:
asked for each chief pilot present to advise which option for the size of control area they considered safer. While the Chief Pilots raised other issues, they, when asked in turn, advised that a control area of 8nm and 2500’ at Broome was inadequate, and was less safe than 22nm and 4500’ option for class D. All stated that the CASA model would not work at Broome due to communication traffic, it was not safe, and would cause delays.

CASA have asked for comments, so here is everyone's chance:
The OAR is sympathetic to this view, but input from the wider aviation community is sought before the final airspace structure at these locations is decided upon by CASA. Stakeholders are therefore requested to provide feedback on this issue

The details and email address are here at CASA (http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/lib100008/consult-airspace-change-broome-karratha.pdf) and closing date is 31st March 2010.

This has broad implications for airline and RPT operations in regional airspace. I'm posting this short summary in DG&P Reporting Points because the sneaky way that these changes are being tried on will have kept them from view of many.

[Howabout]

Good post OverRun. You are right of course - this seems to be NAS by stealth.

As with the original bastard child, no clear justification. I'd go further and add that my take is that the outcomes are preordained - make the arguments fit a pre-detrmined end-state. If this is, indeed, the case, then any 'consultation' will be little more than window dressing.

One wonders who's got hold of whose goolies. NAS created such animosity, waste and division that to revisit that dog defies logic.

But I expect it will play out like this: BME and KTA get their NAS zones and Class E. The same happens at GAAP. Now we have some regional centres, plus Avalon and the secondaries, with US airspace and others with 'non-standard' airspace (Coffs, Launy etc). The cry will go up that we need 'standardisation' and that for this reason all regional aerodromes must conform, otherwise it will be 'confusing.' So it's essential that all those other airfields (Alice included) get E over D and minuscule US-style zones.

Just a personal observation, but given the importance of NAS to some well-known aviation luminaries, they have been surprisingly quiet. I can't help wondering if the 'fix' is already in and that any comment would be seen as potentially stirring up the natives. Better to let them wake up one morning and find out they've been done over.

So, for those of you far removed from the KTAs and BMEs of this world, a word of warning. This is my own impression but KTA and BME, along with YMAV, may well be the foot in the door that will be used to justify the inevitable NAS changes to the airspace you operate in. I'm sure the regionals on the east coast will be thrilled with that outcome, but it'll be too late if what's happening in the west is ignored.

[ARFOR]

What is even worse, this sham is not reflective of US practice in terminal areas [above US Part 139 Class 1 airports] where significant volumes of large 'Air Carrier' aircraft operate!

Lazy, gross ineptitude on the part of those who are paid to protect the travelling public!

[apache]

hmmmm..... NAS groups been working undercover.
A certain prolific exponent of NAS has NOT been seen on this site for a while.

NAS rears its ugly head again.....

methinks we will soon hear who has been working behind the scenes.

[PLovett]

After the last round of hyperbole and unpleasantness I had occasion to speak to one of the people connected to NAS. He confirmed that it had not gone away and was still on the agenda for future implementation.

[peuce]

Support: I guess KRudd does ... it's Government Policy still ... I assume?
Pay: Us

And do you know how much it costs to establish a bunch of Controllers, and their equipment, in remote WA?

Not to mention the costs of constructing a Tinny Club;)

[Howabout]

DNS, unfortunately 'who will be paying' is a fact of life; left to us by the great benefactor. Free in G, manual telephone exchanges and dirt-road airspace come to mind. We then progress to a time when we had a malleable, idiot transport minister, who couldn't find his ass with both hands. Subsequently we got NAS - Swahili for 'gigantic f*ck up.'

That's done. The real issue, in the contemporary environment that we've been stuck with, involves accepting the current mad-woman's breakfast, accepting that we have to pay, but asking why we should agree to a dog of a system when we can have guaranteed separation between IFR and VFR for the same cost?

[zoics88]

aahh... tinny club Port Hedland, late 80's, friday night, emu bitter.... there was a copper moonlighting as a flying instructor, owned a cessna, would check on RBT patrol location so we could go home (party on!) 'safely' in convoy (or to the Nard!)

those were the days, my friend...

went through there a year or so ago: missus wanted to stay, nostalgia attack: lunch at the Nard soon cured that!!
on to a quiet camp at Milstream :ok:

latest within Lipservices: tower job apps for BME & KTA closed last week: around 20 applied for 3 BME positions, less for KTA. (all those young folk wanting to get off sectors, i suppose)
start date is supposedly 18 Nov 2010
Training to be done in ML, with rating check in twr simulator - WTF?:confused:

Initial BME control will be from CAGRO facility, KTA TWR may be ready in time.

BME TWR not yet passed design stage, no construction tenders pending - mooted to be first glass tower: I.E: all virtual & screen based with no paper strips.. that's some tech investment for a remote area.
don't expect miracles.... after all this is Lipservices, how may i help you?

[LeadSled]

Folks,
NAS never went away, have a look at successive Airspace Directives** in the legislation. Whether it was the Howard or present Rudd government, the basics have not changed.

CASA/OAR has to administer the legislation they are presented with, not what pprune posters think it should be.

In short --- ICAO airspace classification, with the US NAS being the prime example, as ICAO classification is based on US NAS anyway.

Perhaps it's all got a lot less to do with one Richard Harold Smith than many of you thought.

Tootle pip!!

** See the Airspace Act 2007.

[Capn Bloggs]

Oh Leadsled spare me. You do write brainwashed nonsense. Dick was THE architect of Airspace 2000, which was swallowed by the gummint of the time, and HE co-wrote NAS with Walter Dollman, I believe. That was in turn swallowed by the gummint of the day.

In short --- ICAO airspace classification, with the US NAS being the prime example, as ICAO classification is based on US NAS anyway.

Love it!

So once and for all (or have I already asked you?) why do you think that hundreds of thousands of fare-paying pax should be subjected to the unalerted See and Avoid threat of middle-level, unsurveilled E airspace?

[LeadSled]

Bloggs,
My dear chap, Dick had extremely limited influence on the contents of the original "Airspace Policy Statement" in the Airspace Act 2007, and I rather suspect, even less on the present Minister.

Quite apart from the Airspace Act, the Civil Aviation Act and the Air Navigation Act all refer to ICAO compliance, rightly or wrongly ( in my opinion a bit both, depending on the subject, but that is just opinion) Australia has had a long history of Government policy directed at meeting its obligations under the Chicago and the many other ICAO conventions.

That Australia has been out of step with ICAO on airspace matters, and is slowly being brought into step (far too slowly, in my opinion, because I accept, understand and support the risk management underpinnings of ICAO CNS/ATM --- directing the resources at the areas of greatest demonstrated risk) really should not be a surprise.

Credit should go to Dick for championing rational use of resources for CNS/ATM for so long, but it is now part of the legislative framework, which binds CASA.

Of course, it does "the cause" no harm that CASA Director of Aviation Safety John McCormick understands that the ICAO system works, and why it works, and equally understands that the many local claims of great potential danger in Australia following the ICAO/US model are just that --- unsubstantiated claims.

As for "un-alerted see and avoid", please read the history of the development of CAR 166, use of a serviceable comms radio never was optional (in law --- if not in the minds of too many pilots), but the revised CAR 166 make it quite explicit.

Tootle pip!!

[Capn Bloggs]

Good pollie answer Leddie. ICAO airpsace it is; WHAT ICAO airspace is the issue.

As for "un-alerted see and avoid", please read the history of the development of CAR 166, use of a serviceable comms radio never was optional (in law --- if not in the minds of too many pilots), but the revised CAR 166 make it quite explicit.

And the relevance of CAR 166 to E link airspace is??

[LeadSled]

Capn Bloggs,

Quite simply, the fear/probability of un-alerted see and avoid is greatly exaggerated.

This has been established by every on-the-ground survey done in recent years ---- that the claims of significant numbers of aircraft (always blamed on PPLs, but where in the few cases it happens, "professionals" are almost always the culprits) are not using radio, when operating VFR in G or E, is simply not true.

However, the revised CAR 166 spells it out so there is no "ambiguity" (not that there ever was) about use of radio for communications ----- if its serviceable, it must be used.

Tootle pip!!

PS: What ICAO Airspace? The first class of airspace that meets the design separation assurance standards, and which, by definition, proceeding beyond (ie C instead of E) provides no additional benefit for the additional CNS/ATM resources and other associated costs expended ---- in other words, "economic waste".

[ARFOR]

The first class of airspace that meets the design separation assurance standards, and which, by definition, proceeding beyond (ie C instead of E) provides no additional benefit for the additional CNS/ATM resources and other associated costs expended ---- in other words, "economic waste".
Correct!

That is the fundamental issue you and Mr Smith refuse to acknoledge, that is:-

Australian Class C, and 'full' ICAO Class D and D/C are operated 'efficiently', when compared to US practice [where similar levels of RPT traffic with a pax seat capacity >30] at airports with similar numbers that are class C

WHY?

Lets spell it out so there are NO misunderstandings:-

1. Australian Class D and D/C towers service similar numbers of 'large RPT' aircraft as many of the US class C TMA serviced airports
2. Australian Class D and D/C towers on average service less numbers of VFR than US class C services
3. All class C terminal areas in the US are radar covered
4. Australia has no such radar saturation [except at the primaries]
5. Because of the comparatively less VFR activity at Class D and D/C locations in Australia, ATC can provide non-radar ICAO D and C services without saturation

The bottom line:-

A. Australia does not need US Class C, radar equipped, Tower and separate Approach and Departures staffing [average 30+ per terminal in the US] at regional [non-primary] ports
B. Australia does not need to force pilots [both IFR and VFR] in VMC to be 'primarily' responsible for 'see and avoid' as is the case in the US
C. Australia does not have the traffic/frequency saturation to necessitate the use of Class E [surveillance based or otherwise]
D. Australian industry cannot afford to use US Class D and C terminal area rules [due the associated ATM infrastructure required]
E. Without a similar investment in terminal area ATM infrastructure, the same radar based safety net [which Australia offsets by utilising third party active collision mitigation through [B]ICAO D rules] used in the US would be absent in Australia, where [as already pointed out] large numbers of large RPT's operate
F. Australian industry can afford [for no extra cost above class E] to run regional tower based non-radar ICAO D and D/C instead

Both countries may claim ICAO compliance, the difference is the level and type of CTA/R service assets needed to achieve the desired sovereign legislated safety outcomes.

With those realities in mind, which of the two countries 'system safety' outcomes would you consider superior? and why?

[Dog One]

Leadie

Why did Airservices put a portable radar in at Launceston after the near miss between the Virgin 737 and Tobago in E outside of radar. Why is it still there? The education process must be complete, you understand how it works, and by the sounds of it, you would be happy operating high capacity RPT aircraft in this environment.

In the Broome case, the 30nm CTAF(R) is replaced by a 8nm radius CTR, with the tower controller handling both the CTR and surrounding E airspace. If that is the US way of doing things, let them do it, and let us design the airspace in accordance with ICAO, providing a mantle of safety to Australian fare paying passengers. History shows that the US way has dented lots of metal and killed many passengers.

[89 steps to heaven]

Leadsled and all.

Lets clear up a misconception. There is no such thing as ICAO airspace. There is an ICAO classification of airspace in which certain levels of ATS are provided. It is up to each countries regulator to determine where each classification is used.

Each country has requirements that suit the number of users, amount of airspace available, geography, infrastructure, political restraints, culture and training. What works here is not necessarily suitable for another country. Same applies, what works in the USA may not work here, but if it was to work, the whole system needs to be implemented, starting with culture and training. Changing airspace should be the last step.

[Howabout]

Bloggs? Are you an idiot, man? - talk about a fundamentalist, backward looking Neanderthal. Can't you see the connection? We are talking a dog called controlled E over controlled D and the fact that controlled C can be provided at the same cost. And you obfuscate and claim that CAR 166 has no relevance.

Well, for my money, Leady is right on the beam. In reference to controlled airspace, controlled terminal areas, and control zones, Leady rightly quotes CAR 166.

Off the CASA website, in case you want to check about radio procedures in controlled airspace:

166 Operating in vicinity of a non-controlled aerodrome

Jeez, get it right will ya!

DUH-OH!

Furthermore, in addition to some previous digging we've done, here's a stringing together of a few quotes (some previously posted) that will give the lawyers a field day if it ever comes to a class action.

A. The CASA Avalon 2008 study:

1.4.3 The cost of the provision of a Class C air traffic control service is the same as that of a Class D or E service. However, the Class C service provides significantly greater risk mitigation to passenger transport aircraft against VFR aircraft threats than that provided by Class D and Class E.

B. The Alice study in 2010, in reference to the maintenance of the current airspace architecture:

It is important to note that the study may make recommendations based on existing and projected data. The following comment as summarised by Justice Gibbs of the High Court of Australia has been considered while conducting the study:

Where it is possible to guard against a foreseeable risk which, though perhaps not
great, nevertheless cannot be called remote or fanciful, by adopting a means which
involves little difficulty or expense, the failure to adopt such means will in general be
negligent.

C. The Launceston study of 2009:

Just mysteriously disappeared off the CASA website, but I've saved the point I wanted to make - will post that one tomorrow.

And, like the famous raffle for a block of flats in Tasmania, a set of steak knives and the K-TEL record stacker, there's more.

[LeadSled]

89 steps,
Lets clear up a misconception. There is no such thing as ICAO airspace. There is an ICAO classification of airspace in which certain levels of ATS are provided. It is up to each countries regulator to determine where each classification is used.Please reread my posts, I have referred to ICAO airspace classifications, not "ICAO airspace".

As for a few more misconceptions, perhaps we should have given the airspace classifications colour names or something other than anything that implies (in ICAO risk management terms) different "levels of safety". ie that A is safer than B etc.

The whole intent of the separation assurance standard is that all airspace is equally safe, with the level of CNS/ATM and airspace classification matched to the traffic levels. A smart country will not provide services more than needed to satisfy the risk management criteria --- and don't come the furfy that C is no more costly to run than E ---- it doesn't come out that way when ALL costs are included.

Perhaps that is why E airspace is so common around the world??

Would I be happy to operate HCap RPT in E, of course I would, and did for many years, and not limited to US/Canada, either.

Nor was much of the E radar, is is claimed by so many of you to be necessary. And by the way, in somewhat bigger aircraft than B737. Likewise, extensive operations, over many years, of the same aircraft in G and F (yes, F, used to be some around).

As to the Gibbs HC decision on "duty of care", which has been a staple of Civilair for years.

There is a most useful later HC decision which contains the best definition of "safe" of all the "legal" definitions I have read, which make it clear there is no such thing as "absolutely safety". Further that safe cannot mean "absolutely safe", but this case defines "safe" in very sensible risk management terms ----- and which make it quite clear that Government risk management policies (not limited to matters airspace) are lawful, when a bush lawyer's reading of the Gibbs decision suggests otherwise.

Without this latter decision, and some subsequent supporting decisions, the application of such as AS/NZ 4360 Risk Management standards in Australian industry, including the aviation industry, would be legally fraught.

Tootle pip!!

PS: Suggested reading --- the four elements that must be satisfied for a "duty of care" to exist, and the legal effect of statute law modifying whether a duty of care exists in a particular circumstances ----- and in particular, whether a controller has a duty of care to provide positive separation to all "known traffic" --- as claimed by Civilair ---- contrary to the provisions of the airspace regulations, which may not require all known traffic to be separated in a particular classification of airspace.

[ferris]

Arefor. An excellent post.
Leadsled- Im interested to know why you think providing a procedural C service is more costly than E? Why is that a furphy? Furthermore, unless you are a true Dycophant and believe that C, instead of E, is overservicing- what possible reason could you have for wanting E instead of C?

E does, indeed, cost the same as C (in the Australian environment). Read Arfor's post. E requires a controller, radio equipment, and a console. These are the only elements you need to provide a C service in a low density environment such as oz. What am I missing? I know Smith keeps trying to run the argument that you need radar to provide C- but that simply isnt the case (in a low density environment).

Im sorry, but a "freedom of the skies" argument for VFRs is not sensible or justifiable in a low density environment. C does not provide a burden large enough to VFRs to outweigh the increased risk to the paying public. Dick-o-fy all you want, but thats it.

[ARFOR]

Howabout

Interesting regarding the 'disappearance' of the YMLT report on the OAR site. Good thing many had downloaded a copy :E

Leadsled
and don't come the furfy that C is no more costly to run than E ---- it doesn't come out that way when ALL costs are included.

In the Australian regional airport context, what are the cost of provision differences between C and E?
Without this latter decision, and some subsequent supporting decisions, the application of such as AS/NZ 4360 Risk Management standards in Australian industry, including the aviation industry, would be legally fraught.
Has AS/NZ 4360 been applied to recent regional airspace 'directions'?
but this case defines "safe" in very sensible risk management terms ----- and which make it quite clear that Government risk management policies (not limited to matters airspace) are lawful
Correct! Perhaps you might point us towards copies of the 'very sensible risk management' processes in these regional airspace cases?whether a controller has a duty of care to provide positive separation to all "known traffic" --- as claimed by Civilair ---- contrary to the provisions of the airspace regulations, which may not require all known traffic to be separated in a particular classification of airspace.
I am not aware that Civilair Australia is saying:-
a controller has a duty of care to provide positive separation to all "known traffic"
The airspace rules in Australia entrust controllers operating class D airspace with preventing collisions. That does not by definition always require a 'Separation Standard', nor does it imply a see and avoid open slather. As has been explained numerous times!

Ferris

Apologies, posted my response before reading yours. Doubled up :)

[ARFOR]

Howabout

Regarding the YMLT Airspace review report. The Mackay [published around the same time as YMLT] report is also no longer there.

I suspect the cutoff date for feedback has expired for those two reports, and as per the Alice Springs report, will reappear soon with the feedback incorporated.

Lets keep an eye on it though! ;)

[CaptainMidnight]

Some interesting background:

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/239143-anderson-puppeteer-puppet.html#post2782339

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting-points/150895-minister-stands-150m-radar-bid.html#post1591839

[Howabout]

The intent of ICAO airspace classifications may well be to apply equal risk levels to all airspace, whether it be G, A, or anything in between. But we all know that there's theory and there's practice. Some things look great 'in theory' and are absolute dogs 'in practice.' I'm sure Leyland thought the P76 was a dead-set winner.

As for Class E and NAS, I'd put the following: If the intent of the ICAO airspace classification system is to apportion equal levels of risk across all airspace, based on traffic densities, I'd really appreciate a steer to the definitive, quantitative study that was done when the decision was made to reclassify large swathes of Class C as Class E under that dog otherwise known as NAS.

Surely this must have been done if the underlying principle of airspace classification involves assessing traffic levels to ensure equal risk. Didn't think so. It was a 'suck it and see' judgement that resulted in potentially fatal NMACs. If it looks like a dog, cocks its leg like a dog and barks like a dog, it is a dog - I just got a dirty look from man's best friend, who's parked at my feet.

I also proffer the following from the CASA commissioned Launy study:

Given that Class E presents a higher risk profile than Class C, without a marked changed in efficiency, it is reasonable to maintain the status quo at Launceston. Moving from Class C to Class E classification removes a significant safeguard against a MAC. It also moves away from the premise of risk being maintained to ALARP principals.
The study goes on to say:

With the scenario of high capacity jet PT operations in mind, the reviewers could not endorse the use of Class E over Class D airspace as enhancing efficiency or safety.

As to the slavish adherence to ICAO principles, there's one further thing I'd like to add in reference to the Avalon PIR . If we are going to insist that we follow ICAO, then we don't cherry-pick. One of the more disturbing conclusions from the recent Avalon PIR was as follows:

The potential conflict risk area identified in the previous Avalon Aeronautical Study remained. This area was identified as an area to the North of Avalon where VFR aircraft travelling East and West had the potential to conflict with IFR PT aircraft arriving and departing Avalon (approximately 8 to 12 NM North of the aerodrome). Airspace changes proposed in the ACP will assist in mitigating this conflict risk. Barriers to this threat include surveillance and monitoring of the airspace by air traffic control, airspace design measures to provide IFR/VFR segregation; and ACAS protection.
Jeez, this program has no consistency when trying to cut-and-paste

It seems to me that ACAS/TCAS is being used as a partial justifier for downgrading Class C to Class E. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.

Given that the level of air traffic services is inextricably linked to airspace classification, ICAO states the following:

The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.


To quote Paul Keating, "these guys couldn't raffle a chook in a pub."

[AerocatS2A]

I could be wrong but I seem to remember the upside being more freedom for VFR aircraft. The thing is, freedom for VFR aircraft isn't going to be a big issue up in the North West Kimberly.

[zoics88]

so what airspace do you throw over a virtual control tower?

Saab - Airservices Australia teams up with Saab (http://www.saabgroup.com/en/MediaRelations/News/2010/airservices_australia_teams_up_with_saab.htm)

It's called ROT : remotely operated tower


Safe and economic, remote air traffic control
The reasons for controlling air traffic at several airports from a common control centre relate both to economy and safety. At small and mid-sized airports, traffic is unevenly distributed over the day, with occasional peaks when the workload is higher. Instead of keeping several air control towers open, resources can be co-located.

In regard to safety, there are several advantages:

Cameras can register changes to images, which enables hazards such as forgotten tools on runways to be more easily detected.


A camera with automatic tracking that can zoom in up to 36 times replaces binoculars in a conventional tower.


A video tracking feature automatically detects incoming aircraft and marks them, making it easier for air traffic controllers to follow their progress, even when visibility is poor.


With cameras, everything that occurs in air spaces and at airports can be recorded for later viewing in the event of an incident.


Runway contours, structures and other objects at airports can be marked on screens so that they can be seen even when there is limited visibility.


The camera zoom feature, information from radars as well as information about weather and wind are integrated into a 360-degree view – corresponding to a modern jet pilot's head-up display – that is monitored by air traffic controllers so that they don't have to shift their attention and focus.

[CaptainMidnight]

I had to check it wasn't April 1 ...........

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,
Quite simply, the fear/probability of un-alerted see and avoid is greatly exaggerated.

This has been established by every on-the-ground survey done in recent years ---- that the claims of significant numbers of aircraft (always blamed on PPLs, but where in the few cases it happens, "professionals" are almost always the culprits) are not using radio, when operating VFR in G or E, is simply not true.
If that is the case, then we should err on the side of caution and implement C instead of E, given the "insignificant" numbers of VFR who will be disadvantaged by C as opposed to E. The fact is that there is NO logical reason for E airspace. Too many VFRs that will be dicked around by C? Then the traffic density is so high that E is dangerous. Very few VFRs? Then the airspace may as well be C as very few will be inconvenienced! The term "Mutual Inconvenience" comes to mind.

However, the revised CAR 166 spells it out so there is no "ambiguity" (not that there ever was) about use of radio for communications ----- if its serviceable, it must be used.
In E airspace? Nonsense!:=

[peuce]

...so what airspace do you throw over a virtual control tower?

Great ... there's a heap of money we can save by not having to build that Tinny Club!

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,

The Government‟s airspace strategy recognises that international airspace systems (such as the National Airspace System of the United States of America) include a range of characteristics that should be considered, and implemented as appropriate, by CASA.
You're on another planet if you can't see that has Dick all over it.

That Australia has been out of step with ICAO on airspace matters, and is slowly being brought into step (far too slowly, in my opinion, because I accept, understand and support the risk management underpinnings of ICAO CNS/ATM --- directing the resources at the areas of greatest demonstrated risk) really should not be a surprise.
What, E instead of C? What IS the increased cost/resources needed of C verses E?

"Demonstrated Risk": let's have a few NMACs to demonstrate that the airspace category is risky and then change it (eg radar E in the J curve in 2003). Good plan.:D

[Howabout]

Bloggs, we just don't seem to learn. When the inconvenient questions get asked (as per my query on the - non existent - study that justified E, based on traffic levels under NAS), there is silence. The 'inconvenient truths' are ignored, because they can't be rebutted and are just that; inconvenient.

'Fundamentalism' comes to mind.

So, once again NAS crusaders, if ICAO airspace classifications are meant to deliver an equal risk outcome across all airspace classifications based on traffic levels - as alleged on here - please point me in the direction of the study that definitively established the facts regarding relative traffic levels when a large amount of airspace was re-classified from Class C to Class E under the dog otherwise known as NAS 2b.

Anyone?? Was the judgement to reclassify C as E based on sound empirical analysis, or was it grounded in nothing more than fundamentalist ideology and arbitrary (flawed) judgement??

I'd bet my house on the latter, but the invitation remains open on this specific question - without irrelevant obfuscation. It's a pretty simple question. Anyone?? Anyone??

[KittyKatKaper]

To those who love to change things, I would suggest a read of ;
Pondering the Precautionary Principle Praxis Foundation (http://praxisfound.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/pondering-the-precautionary-principle/)

He also has a series of articles about the creepingness of 'virtual towers' in the USofA.
Staffed Virtual Towers (SVT) Praxis Foundation (http://praxisfound.wordpress.com/2010/01/19/staffed-virtual-towers-svt)

(somehow, I just don't, feel secure and comfortable about being given terminal instructions from a tower controller who isn't actually near where I am, and who could be simultaneously controlling several aircraft at other dispersed locations.
Multitasking is all very well, but it does have it's limits and costs).

[Howabout]

K3, with all due respect, this thread is not about 'remote towers.' Please start another thread.'

I've asked a question twice of the NAS crusaders, and I'm yet to receive an answer. While I appreciate that your post was well intentioned, those that don't have an answer to the questions on NAS get relief through posts that are thread-drift.

No offence.

And, once again NAS crusaders, will you please answer my very simple question above. To remind you; the empirical study that justified C to E under NAS 2b based on 'ICAO principles' that relate to traffic volumes.

Didn't think so, but I am going to keep asking.

[ARFOR]

Howabout

Apologies, posted before reading yours. But just quickly :}

Kx3

Quite apart from the 'traffic management' inefficiencies of a remote Air traffic Control service. It would be seriously 'unfunny' if:-

- the cleaner kicked the 'plug' in the wall at the:-

a. Camera/s
b. Comm's
c. lights
d. anemometer feeds
e. Equipment room/s
f. sat ground station
g. satellite
h. other end sat ground station
i. ML/BN equipment room/s
j. surveillance system/s and links
k. equipment running the virtual tower display/s

Or, a CB sparked up terra firma around cabling and/or structures, and part or all of this 'picture and sound' show

FAILED?

The poor bloody Controller in Melbourne or Brisbane, wishing they could grab a handheld radio and keep on rockin' [not from a thousand + miles away they ain't], and the nearest local tech staff is half an hour, to an hour away :ooh: at best

The pilots operating on or around the airport would do what?

Now that would be a deafening silence :mad: for the first few seconds at least, until all [self separating] hell broke loose!

Lets see the [proper] C.B.A and risk assessments!

Now back to normal programming :E

[Howabout]

Thanks ARFOR; I am not trying to give anyone the sh@ts. I am just asking what I think is a reasonable question. I know there are other issues, but side-ways diversions just let the NAS crusaders and fundamentalists off the hook. So, to the annoyance of everybody, and as an invitation to the crusaders, I repeat the following and request a reply (modified to take out some irrelevant comment):

The intent of ICAO airspace classifications may well be to apply equal risk levels to all airspace, whether it be G, A, or anything in between. But we all know that there's theory and there's practice. Some things look great 'in theory' and are absolute dogs 'in practice.' I'm sure Leyland thought the P76 was a dead-set winner.

As for Class E and NAS, I'd put the following: If the intent of the ICAO airspace classification system is to apportion equal levels of risk across all airspace, based on traffic densities, I'd really appreciate a steer to the definitive, quantitative study that was done when the decision was made to reclassify large swathes of Class C as Class E under that dog otherwise known as NAS.

Surely this must have been done if the underlying principle of airspace classification involves assessing traffic levels to ensure equal risk. Didn't think so. It was a 'suck it and see' judgement that resulted in potentially fatal NMACs. If it looks like a dog, cocks its leg like a dog and barks like a dog, it is a dog.

I also proffer the following from the CASA commissioned Launy study:

Given that Class E presents a higher risk profile than Class C, without a marked changed in efficiency, it is reasonable to maintain the status quo at Launceston. Moving from Class C to Class E classification removes a significant safeguard against a MAC. It also moves away from the premise of risk being maintained to ALARP principals.

The study goes on to say:

With the scenario of high capacity jet PT operations in mind, the reviewers could not endorse the use of Class E over Class D airspace as enhancing efficiency or safety.

As to the slavish adherence to ICAO principles, there's one further thing I'd like to add in reference to the Avalon PIR . If we are going to insist that we follow ICAO, then we don't cherry-pick. One of the more disturbing conclusions from the recent Avalon PIR was as follows:

The potential conflict risk area identified in the previous Avalon Aeronautical Study remained. This area was identified as an area to the North of Avalon where VFR aircraft travelling East and West had the potential to conflict with IFR PT aircraft arriving and departing Avalon (approximately 8 to 12 NM North of the aerodrome). Airspace changes proposed in the ACP will assist in mitigating this conflict risk. Barriers to this threat include surveillance and monitoring of the airspace by air traffic control, airspace design measures to provide IFR/VFR segregation; and ACAS protection.

It seems to me that ACAS/TCAS is being used as a partial justifier for downgrading Class C to Class E. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.

Given that the level of air traffic services is inextricably linked to airspace classification, ICAO states the following:

The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.

Will one of the NAS crusaders please respond on either the empirical study on Class C to E, the use of TCAS as justification for Class E, or, preferably both.

Given the preceding silence, I won't hold my breath.

[Howabout]

Hi NAS Crusaders,

At the risk of being annoying, and I'm sure I am, can the only one of you who has credibility (Lead) give your take on the previous posts.

Leady, I do not agree with you, but at least you keep it civil.

To remind you:

The intent of ICAO airspace classifications may well be to apply equal risk levels to all airspace, whether it be G, A, or anything in between. But we all know that there's theory and there's practice. Some things look great 'in theory' and are absolute dogs 'in practice.' I'm sure Leyland thought the P76 was a dead-set winner.

As for Class E and NAS, I'd put the following: If the intent of the ICAO airspace classification system is to apportion equal levels of risk across all airspace, based on traffic densities, I'd really appreciate a steer to the definitive, quantitative study that was done when the decision was made to reclassify large swathes of Class C as Class E under that dog otherwise known as NAS.

Surely this must have been done if the underlying principle of airspace classification involves assessing traffic levels to ensure equal risk. Didn't think so. It was a 'suck it and see' judgement that resulted in potentially fatal NMACs. If it looks like a dog, cocks its leg like a dog and barks like a dog, it is a dog.

I also proffer the following from the CASA commissioned Launy study:

Given that Class E presents a higher risk profile than Class C, without a marked changed in efficiency, it is reasonable to maintain the status quo at Launceston. Moving from Class C to Class E classification removes a significant safeguard against a MAC. It also moves away from the premise of risk being maintained to ALARP principals.The study goes on to say:

With the scenario of high capacity jet PT operations in mind, the reviewers could not endorse the use of Class E over Class D airspace as enhancing efficiency or safety. As to the slavish adherence to ICAO principles, there's one further thing I'd like to add in reference to the Avalon PIR . If we are going to insist that we follow ICAO, then we don't cherry-pick. One of the more disturbing conclusions from the recent Avalon PIR was as follows:

The potential conflict risk area identified in the previous Avalon Aeronautical Study remained. This area was identified as an area to the North of Avalon where VFR aircraft travelling East and West had the potential to conflict with IFR PT aircraft arriving and departing Avalon (approximately 8 to 12 NM North of the aerodrome). Airspace changes proposed in the ACP will assist in mitigating this conflict risk. Barriers to this threat include surveillance and monitoring of the airspace by air traffic control, airspace design measures to provide IFR/VFR segregation; and ACAS protection. It seems to me that ACAS/TCAS is being used as a partial justifier for downgrading Class C to Class E. If anyone disagrees, please speak up.

Given that the level of air traffic services is inextricably linked to airspace classification, ICAO states the following:

The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.

Leady, I look forward to your response, given that you, at least, have cred and debate the issues.

[Dick Smith]

The CASA Launy study is clearly claptrap

I bet no individual put a name to it.

If class C can be operated at the same cost as E every country would replace E with C !

Why not! Please give a reason here and put your real name on such a basic issue.

I won't hold my breath.

[Capn Bloggs]

If class C can be operated at the same cost as E every country would replace E with C !

Why not! Please give a reason here
Because the VFR fraternity wants E rather than C. Der.

[ARFOR]

Bloggs
Because the VFR fraternity wants E rather than C.
I would not be too sure about that ;)

Mr Smith

And your single word assessment of the other D an D/C towers airspace reviews?

In answer to your question, traffic densities and mix

[Howabout]

Jeez Dick, I thought it would take a bit more effort to draw you out.

However, I'll do you a deal. You answer my questions first, seeing I registered them before your bite on the line, then I'll have a go at answering yours.

Fair deal?

Oh, by the way, the real name argument is really getting a bit tiresome. Broken record comes to mind.

[Howabout]

Ho, hum,

Half hour later and.....nothing.

Bedtime.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Wow...I bet the Argus guys are quaking in their boots.

[LeadSled]

Folks,

Most (all??) of you seem to have forgotten all the risk analysis carried out by the NAS Implementation Team, a joint DoT/Military group. The NAS ITeam co-opted subject matter experts as required, and many, many simulations were done by Airservices, and the ASA ARM model got a serious workout.

None, repeat none of the decisions were plucked out of the air (or anywhere else). For everything which was a variation to the US NAS, just about every technique available for quantitive and qualitive risk assessment was employed.
If you understand the ICAO risk assessment methods, you will understand why the basic US NAS did not have to be justified in risk management terms.

Along the way, the NAS team had the benefit of assistance and advice from both UK NATS and FAA.

The real fundamentalists here are the group of pilots who want no change, and want to "fundamentally" keep Australia mired in Australian unique standards.

Anybody who thinks that Australia has "special" problems that require "fundamentally different" solutions to the rest of the aviation universe is kidding themselves.

Just like our aviation safety regulation in general, the airspace management rules are quite unnecessarily complex, convoluted and contradictory ---- particularly contradictory is the "demand" for CNS/ATM services that are inverse to the risk ---- ie: as the risk decreases, the CNS/ATM resources increases.

In a sane (ICAO) world, the CNS/ATM resources are proportional to the traffic levels.

Or maybe I imagined all those day I spent, along with other industry/military representatives, working our way through volumes of delineated and documented hazards, the available mitigators, the mitigators to be applied, and the assessment and disposition of the final quantitative and qualitative risks ---- in each and every individual case.

Tootle pip!!

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Or even a 'HF' system that works like it 'used to'.................

There's LOTS of places and spaces in WA, for example, where HF is ALL we got.....when one can actually get a response......

:rolleyes:

[ferris]

Anybody who thinks that Australia has "special" problems that require "fundamentally different" solutions to the rest of the aviation universe is kidding themselves.
Right back at you. Anyone who thinks that oz is the same as the US with its traffic density, available services (such as, oh, I don't know...radar coverage...flight service.. minor stuff like that) is kidding themselves.

Please, continue to ignore the important questions put to you on this thread, Leadsled. As uncomfortable as they may be. Inconvenient truths?

[ARFOR]

Leadsled
None, repeat none of the decisions were plucked out of the air (or anywhere else). For everything which was a variation to the US NAS,
Nice to see one of you admit that NAS2b was not the US NAS :ok:
just about every technique available for quantitive and qualitive risk assessment was employed.
Lets see these assessments! From my recollection, the only substantive assessment made was for return to ALARP airspace
If you understand the ICAO risk assessment methods, you will understand why the basic US NAS did not have to be justified in risk management terms.
This is the fundamental/ist issue. The 'basic' NAS as you call it, was/is not US practice transplanted in to like type environments. The same is occuring now!

A deflated inner tube by itself does not make a racing bike ;) or a wheelchair :hmm:

[Capn Bloggs]

NAS Implementation Team
The chief of which who wrote that radio would reduce safety in CTAFs because pilots relied on it. Credibility=0!

The real fundamentalists here are the group of pilots who want no change, and want to "fundamentally" keep Australia mired in Australian unique standards.

What a load of rubbish. We want ICAO C, not ICAO E, that's all. ICAO D would be nice too. :}

working our way through volumes of delineated and documented hazards, the available mitigators, the mitigators to be applied, and the assessment and disposition of the final quantitative and qualitative risks
Well then, you'd clearly remember the mitigators that you relied on to stop HiCap IFR jets running into VFRs in non-radar E. What are they?

I also assume you did a cost-benefit analysis on C verse E. Please post the results or provide a link.

[Howabout]

It's a dead-set shame. Leady and I may have fundamental differences but he, at least, does not descend to personal vilification. He argues from personal conviction and I respect that.

However, I never saw any quantitative study that justified the reclassification of airspace. I remember lots of claims that because we were replicating the 'US system' a 'system' safety case was not required, only an 'implementation' safety case.

So, from my perspective, my two fundamental questions remain unanswered - where's the study that justified Class C being reclassified as Class E based on traffic volumes, and what is the rationale for using TCAS as a mitigator at YMAV when such a course is clearly at variance with ICAO principles.

You see Leady, on the one hand you state that we should not have anything unique, and that we should be 'ICAO compliant' in regard to airspace allocation. However, you do not seem to be equally concerned that TCAS is being used as partial justification for changing C to E at Avalon. With all due respect (and I do respect your firmly held beliefs), you can't have it both ways.

One of the fundamental problems with NAS, IMHO, is that the things that suited a particular agenda were cherry-picked. 'We like that, but we don't want that.'

Ultimately, and this is my real concern, the arguments with respect to risk management seem to be pre-empting a defence in the case of a MAC in reclassified Class E. In short, 'we did everything reasonable Your Honour.' It just worries me Lead that everything 'reasonable' is not being done.

[konstantin]

I vaguely recall a cost-benefit (cum safety?) analysis being carried out a few years ago in Tasmania in relation to non-radar Class E, my recollection is that it used the methodology of a Tobago getting a rather close look at a burner.

Mitigators? - I think there were a couple of (subsequent) mitigators. One could have been E airspace being mitigated back to Class C, and the other was a strangely coincident mitigation of a "relocatable" radar down to Tasland. Scuttlebut had it the latter was the fastest go-to-whoa radar commissioning in the history of Australian ATS.

In that individual case.

Avalon - won`t go there, but I suspect because the location is notionally in a "surveillance" environment, etc, etc...don`t forget TCAS...

Broome and Karratha - probably will get away with E over D without too many near-heart attacks. There is (was?) a suggestion for the E steps to remain active outside TWR hours, not exactly sure as to the rationale there - a convoluted perception of CTA "protection" through E steps for IFR is the only inane thing I can remotely think of.

Just for the hell of it - Alice - E over D - not going there at all

2c inserted

[Dick Smith]

Fortunately I didn't hold my breath.

The CASA Launy study is clearly claptrap

I bet no individual put a name to it.

If class C can be operated at the same cost as E every country would replace E with C !

Why not! Please give a reason here and put your real name on such a basic issue.

I won't hold my breath.



Surely that's quite a simple question. Why doesn't someone dare answer it - even if it is under their cowardly pseudonym.

[Capn Bloggs]

I gave you a cowardly answer, Dick. I'll say it again: Because VFR likes E.

Now how about you answer the question about how much extra C costs over E?

[le Pingouin]

Dick,why are you assuming it's all about cost? Surely as has been so clearly demonstrated here, politics & vocal individuals have far more influence.

A bum in a seat to provide a service costs the same whether it's E or C. VFR are effectively invisible to me in E from a service perspective. If I don't want a VFR in C, "clearance not available". Again, nothing there other than IFR & I have to provide the same service. Assuming IFRs will use VFR procedures in E doesn't cut it from a workload assessment perspective.

Now tell me where the cost savings are to be had. Your turn to answer a question.

[Frank Arouet]

If I don't want a VFR in C, "clearance not available".

And that just about sums it all up.

More powers to the workers!

[Howabout]

OK, Dick, I'll answer under my 'cowardly pseudonym' - I am so ashamed. This is, in my view, the personal vilification bit that Leady doesn't stoop to.

I'll take the lead from professional controllers Dick. You're not one and, personally, I have a bit of a laugh when you are rolled out as Australia's resident expert on aviation matters by a callow and pimply bunch of journalists.

The consensus on this forum from professional controllers is that they can provide a C service with no more cost than E, given the traffic levels, equipment and surveillance (or lack thereof). I'll take their word over yours any day. Mate, from my perspective, your legacy has been nothing more than a trail of destruction and division.

As to your assertion that The CASA Launy study is clearly claptrap, Why??

You cannot make unsubstantiated assertions and expect to get away with it. You need to justify those assertions. It's a credibility issue!

Furthermore, professional RPT pilots don't want a bar of your vision. And, surprise, surprise, you're not one of those either.

So what's your claim to 'expertise' other than being a good (and where credit is due, a pretty accomplished) media performer?

Now, to disregard the inevitable insults, I asked you some pretty simple stuff. I challenged you to respond to my original questions and, in my opinion, you failed to do so in any credible manner.

Let's keep it civil. Talk to Lead. He knows how to conduct an argument.

[ARFOR]

Mr Smith

Many contributors have answered your question, both before your post, and since, myself included.
In answer to your question, traffic densities and mix
You apparently support the US NAS, and strongly support its injection into Australia. You would also therefore support the airspace arrangements at the following:-

- Georgia Columbus Metro [KCSG] Part 139 Class I
2008 IFR Air Carrier 2,458 Total 35,381

- North Carolina Fayetteville Reg/Grannis Fl [KFAY] Part 139 Class I
2008 IFR Air Carrier 969 Total 51,814

- West Virginia Yeager Charleston [KCRW] Part 139 Class I
2008 IFR Air Carrier 113 Total 70,307

- Illinois Abraham Lincoln Mem Springfield [KSPI] Part 139 Class I
2008 IFR Air Carrier 46 Total 36,898

To name but a few. How do you reconcile the movement rates, ATS infrustructure, and cost of provision?

I'll help you:-

1. The movement rates listed above are below most Australian ICAO D and D/C tower/approach locations
2. The four examples above are Class C airspace
3. The US do not charge via 'user pays' fee's [you championed the introduction of 'User Pays' for General Aviation in Australia]!

The US NAS is constantly 'evolving'. Are you aware of Class D TRSA? No problem if you are not, they are being reclassified Class C or B

Do you really support the US NAS being adopted in Australia Mr Smith? Or is the US NAS 'Claptrap' ;)

Frank Arouet re-read le Pingouin's post!

[Howabout]

ARFOR,

Once again, an excellent, factual post. Of course, you are nothing more than a 'ground based radio operator,' so what would you know? Your contribution is, therefore, disregarded because:

1) You hide behind that cowardly anonymous guise.

2) You don't have the courage to post under your real name.

3) I can't find any counter argument, but see 1 and 2 above.

4) I still can't find any credible argument but it's all just rubbish and see 1, 2 and 3 above.

5) So, after all that logical argument, it's obvious that you are a subversive.

In short ARFOR you have absolutely no credibility because..because..

Sorry, had a flashback....and it's Dorothy and Toto.. "Toto, I've a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."

[ARFOR]

Who said I am a 'ground based radio operator' :E

As Mr Smith once said in the midst of a 'turn' :}, I be a 'traitor' :D

Only in 'blinkered' eyes ;) Speaking of which:-

Here are some comparators to the previous figures:-

- Queensland Rockhampton Int'l [YBRK] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 16,604 Total 39,906

- Tasmania Hobart Int'l [YMHB] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 14,880 Total 45,414

- Queensland Mackay Int'l [YBMK] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 14,006 Total 49,732

- Tasmania Launceston Int'l [YMLT] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 11,416 Total 20,972

- Queensland Sunshine Coast Regional Maroochydore [YBMC] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 9,532 Total 89,748

- Northern Territory Alice Springs Int'l [YBAS] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 9,204 Total 26,188

- Victoria Avalon Int'l [YMAV] Equivalent to US Part139 Class 1
2008 IFR>7t 7,768 Total 9,192

Should they be Class C [as per US NAS] Mr Smith? ;)

[le Pingouin]

And that just about sums it all up.

More powers to the workers!Frank, I'm an ATC. Controlling aircraft is what I do. Not everyone gets what they want all the time, not even captain four bars in his A380. I say "no" many times a day.

In C a VFR may get knocked back occasionally or have to do something other than planned, but the contra is you are positively separated from IFR. Many would see that as a reasonable exchange.

Most of the time you'll get a reasonable facsimile what you want and be separated.

[Jabawocky]

They are so kind they keep giving me track shortening.......and I can't reprogram quick enough :}

[ARFOR]

To be thorough, lets include the NW coast of Australia! ;)

From the Alice Springs [YBAS] Airspace review report http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/lib100008/alice_springs_study.pdf [page 34]:-

- Karratha Western Australia [YPKA] Equivalent to US Part 139 Class 1
12 months to June 09' Air Transport 10,928 Total 29,901

- Broome Western Australia [YBRM] Equivalent to US Part 139 Class 1
12 months to June 09' Air Transport 13,300 Total 36,800

The data capture is slightly different to the previous figures, notwithstanding, note the 'rankings' on page 34 of the 'Alice' report, and extrapolate for a relative comparison!

US NAS, Class C is it Mr Smith??? ;)

[ferris]

Ahahahaha!!!

You can just picture Dick and Leadsled screaming "f*ck f*ck f*ck" at their computers, foaming at the mouth and shaking their fists at the ANONYMOUS Arfor etc.

It must be so galling to have such facts, such inconvenient truths, presented to dispel "the vision".


Ahahahaha!

[Howabout]

Keep it coming ARFOR, you font of inconvenient truth you.

I have to correct a gross error that I made previously, otherwise I lose all cred - we must be fastidiously accurate. The entry on the last page has been amended, but in all conscience I must also post it in 'real time' and apologise to all. Mea Culpa.

In reference to NAS, the quote should have read:

"Toto, I've a feeling we're not in Kansas anymore."

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

G'Day 'Jaba',

I feel that might be just to get you out of the way of everybody else, and so make the skies 'safer for all'......

(Hat, coat, door..........) :):)

[Jabawocky]

The truth hurts Griffo.....:{ Ouch!

J:ok:

[Dick Smith]

direct.no.speed

You ask what is the upside to your plan Dick

The “upside” of the plan (not my plan) is that we follow international airspace which allows the Controller to concentrate on the airspace where the accident is most likely to happen, ie. not upside down or reversed airspace.

Pretty simple – C over D is upside down. If indeed you need C in the link airspace where the risk of collision is less, you would then need B in the terminal airspace below.

The order that you people want is akin to building a large jet with the thick part of the wing outboard and the thin part of the wing, where it connects with the fuselage, inboard.

Of course when people pointed out this was “reversed”, you would say “oh well, it works, so why worry?”

But you will not mention the obvious. If we had C airspace provided with the proper tools and staffing, it would indeed be safer. However, we use large amounts of C airspace controlled by a single Controller in the D airspace below. This is the reason other countries have E above D. They wish to allocate their safety resources effectively, and don’t want the concentration of a Controller in D airspace close to the runway to be affected by having to provide a Class C service at the same time when the risk of collision is far less.

It’s what we call common sense, and it happens to comply with science. So why wouldn’t you act on it?

No, I know the answer. “We have done it upside down in the past, and that’s the way we’re gunna keep doing it”.

The change CASA is proposing is better because it will reduce the chance of mid air's by moving resources to where the risk is greater

[CrazyMTOWDog]

Pretty simple – C over D is upside down. If indeed you need C in the link airspace where the risk of collision is less, you would then need B in the terminal airspace below.


Please state factual evidence to support your statement.

[Howabout]

So, Dick, it's all about 'upside down airspace.' Now I get it! That's probably the explanation as to why we have Class A on top of Class C or Class E.

Silly me.

[Freedom7]

But you will not mention the obvious. If we had C airspace provided with the proper tools and staffing, it would indeed be safer. However, we use large amounts of C airspace controlled by a single Controller in the D airspace below. This is the reason other countries have E above D. They wish to allocate their safety resources effectively, and don’t want the concentration of a Controller in D airspace close to the runway to be affected by having to provide a Class C service at the same time when the risk of collision is far less.


Are you saying that the service currently being provided in C/D Airspace is not safe?

Would you prefer that current Ds become C?

[Dick Smith]

CrazyMTOWDog

You state Please state factual evidence to support your statement

I can see why you don’t reveal your real name. Why aren’t you asking for factual evidence to substantiate that in a large jet, the thick part of the wing should be close to the fuselage and the thin part of the wing should be outboard?

The reason you are not asking this is that it is just plain common sense.

In relation to airspace, there are Airservices studies which show that the risk of collision in the terminal area is about 100 times greater than the risk of collision in the approach to that terminal area.

It stands to reason then that if you require C airspace where the risk is one 100th of what it is below, you would then need to step up to a higher category of airspace, ie. B, where the risk is higher.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

Why aren’t you asking for factual evidence to substantiate that in a large jet, the thick part of the wing should be close to the fuselage and the thin part of the wing should be outboard?

:confused:

Why is the sky blue?:8

Answer the question please

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,
However, we use large amounts of C airspace controlled by a single Controller in the D airspace below. This is the reason other countries have E above D. They wish to allocate their safety resources effectively, and don’t want the concentration of a Controller in D airspace close to the runway to be affected by having to provide a Class C service at the same time when the risk of collision is far less.

When are you going to get it into your head that ATCs say there is no extra workload running C as opposed to E?

So let's run with your theory for a minute. We have E airspace running happily (with IFR jet pilots peering out the window looking for those un-alerted VFRs). Then we change the airspace to C:

1. Now the controller is overloaded and the system grinds to a halt. What does that tell me? There is so much VFR traffic (posing a threat to fare-paying passengers) that we needed that separation service in the first place!

or

2. The system still runs nicely and the controller is not overloaded. That tells me that there is not that much VFR activity. SO WHY NOT JUST USE C? It doesn't cost any more and it provides better safety! You have to talk to an ATC for a clearance, but surely that is better that endangering the lives of fare-paying pax or are you so selfish that you don't want to do that?

If there are controller workload issues in the terminal area, then that has very little to do with C verses E and more to do with the size of the volume being managed.

As for your persistent mentioning of C and B, do you really understand the difference between the two? Effectively there is NONE. Your continued harping on ICAO airspace only serves to highlight that basically, all the ICAO controlled airspaces are just that - controlled airspace; with the exception of Class E, where you are quite happy to allow BIG jets to "mix it" with no-radio VFRs, and at places like BME and KTA, with no radar or ADS-B! You must be off your rocker or extremely selfish.

The brutal fact is that, just like we had in Australia 30 years ago, effectively there are only two types of airspace: controlled and uncontrolled. Except for the lemon, Class E.

The “upside” of the plan (not my plan)
"Not my plan"? Oh come on, pull the other one!

Would you prefer that current Ds become C?
Yes, Freedom7, that would be logical. But then Dick wouldn't be able to get his fabled "implied clearance" into the zone.

And yes, Howa, I wonder when Dick will give us A above 180 like the yanks. Then I could operate in a block from 230-250 as is my want occasionally.

[Capn Bloggs]

The farce that is E airspace...

This, from Wikipedia, sums it up nicely:

For example, consider Class E airspace. An aircraft operating under VFR may not be in communication with ATC, so it is imperative that its pilot be able to see and avoid other aircraft (and vice versa). That includes IFR flights emerging from a cloud, so the VFR flight must keep a designated distance from the edges of clouds above, below, and laterally, and must maintain at least a designated visibility, to give the two aircraft time to observe and avoid each other. The low-level speed limit of 250 knots does not apply above 10,000 feet (3,000 m), so the visibility requirements are higher.

So VFR needs to stay in VMC so they can spot and avoid me as I come barrelling out of a cloud on descent at 250KIAS. Please. Talk about wings being thicker on the ends...

[Howabout]

Hi Dick, I refer you to my previous post. Based on your argument, deductive logic states the following, if we extend your hypothesis.
Class C over Class D is 'upside down airspace,' and counter to sound airspace management and scientific principles.
If the 'threat level' in overlying terminal airspace is less, it should be a lower classification than that in the vicinity of the runway (correct so far??).
Hence Class A airspace over Class E, which is across the continent, is also 'upside down' and must also be counter to sound airspace management and scientific principles.
Clearly, if the risk is less in the 'outer terminal area,' then the risk must be so much more reduced in an enroute cruise environment.
So, your argument, taken to it's most obvious conclusion, is that enroute Class E, which extends up to F245 so someone can fly a jet VFR up there where RPTs operate, should have an overlying airspace construct of a lower category - otherwise it's 'upside down.'
Ergo, airspace above F245 should be either F or G, otherwise it's 'upside down'.Discuss.

Make sense to you Bloggs?

[Dick Smith]

Capn Bloggs you state

When are you going to get it into your head that ATCs say there is no extra workload running C as opposed to E?

Okay Capn Bloggs, I issue you a challenge. Get ONE practising ATC to state this point under his or her own name.

I have spoken to literally dozens and dozens of ATCs and they have said that there is absolutely no doubt that C requires extra workload and extra responsibility when compared to E. They have said only fools would say otherwise.

By the way, if you think typical ATCs are so frightened of talking about safety issues that they can’t sign their real name, why don’t you get Civil Air to issue a statement stating that Civil Air believes that there is “no extra workload running C as opposed to E”.

I will tell you what – you will never get Civil Air to say such a thing because it’s not truthful.

And, Capn Bloggs, the US “implied clearance” (as you call it) is exactly the same in D or C. So there would be no change.

[Capn Bloggs]

Howa,

Make sense to you Bloggs?
Absolutely! :ok:

But I must pick you up on a point of technicality:

enroute Class E, which extends up to F245 so someone can fly a jet VFR up there where RPTs operate,
CAR (1988) 173 prohibits VFR above FL200 without CASA approval. At last count, I heard that 2 (TWO) aircraft on the Australian register had this approval. E airspace above FL200 is therefore a nonsense and obviously only put in place to placate Dick. Objective science at work...

[Howabout]

Well, Bloggs, I hope you are recovering from that wet lettuce flogging.

Dick, since you say it isn't so, howabout getting one of these myriad of ATCs that you are so friendly with to use their own name on here and tell us that E is 'cheaper' than C.

After all, if this is their true conviction then surely they would be willing to post under their real names.

I mean, if they really, really believe in what they are telling you, 'dozens and dozens' of them, then one of them must be willing to post under his/her real name.

I'm sure you will agree.

By the way; can you please answer the question in my two previous posts. I feel a sense of rejection when you ignore me.

[Capn Bloggs]

Dick,

I have spoken to literally dozens and dozens of ATCs and they have said that there is absolutely no doubt that C requires extra workload and extra responsibility when compared to E.
That is my point! The (VFR) aircraft are there, it's just that you "hide" them in E. They will still hit me with the same result if they are not talking to the ATC or me. It's just that nobody will be able to blame the system; it will be silly old (dead) me for not keeping a good lookout IAW CAR 166. :yuk:

the US “implied clearance” (as you call it) is exactly the same in D or C. So there would be no change.

So you are not introducing "internationally proven" airspace at all, are you? From the same outfit that allows citizens to walk around with guns, not wear seatbelts for years after we had mandated them, and who drive on the wrong side of the road, you're introducing implied clearances into C CTRs. Hardly international or commonsense.

[Howabout]

I feel shunned. You get so much attention Bloggs, and what do I get? Ignored. Ignored. Do you know how that feels??

Listen Leady, disregard the frivolity above, but because you're one of the few rational contenders around these parts, that come from the counter-side of the argument , don't do a Dick on me.

I asked you a question on ICAO compliance and use of TCAS as a mitigator. It was a genuine question and talked about having it both ways. I won't bore everybody, but here's an extract that I posted 3 days ago, to which you have not responded:

So, from my perspective, my two fundamental questions remain unanswered - where's the study that justified Class C being reclassified as Class E based on traffic volumes, and what is the rationale for using TCAS as a mitigator at YMAV when such a course is clearly at variance with ICAO principles.

You see Leady, on the one hand you state that we should not have anything unique, and that we should be 'ICAO compliant' in regard to airspace allocation. However, you do not seem to be equally concerned that TCAS is being used as partial justification for changing C to E at Avalon. With all due respect (and I do respect your firmly held beliefs), you can't have it both ways.


Oh, by the way Dick, I notice that you're still on.

Are any of those controllers willing to put their real names on here regarding the overwhelming opinion that E is 'cheaper' than C. Surely there must be, if those beliefs are so strongly held. Why wouldn't someone be willing to put their real name on here?? It's the 'Australian' thing to do, isn't it?

[Howabout]

To quote Horace Lee Hogan (look it up) "Please, young people... Dick has left the building."

[LeadSled]

Ergo, airspace above F245 should be either F or G, otherwise it's 'upside down'.

Howabout et al,

Herein lies a problem of giving classes of airspace "letter" names.

As a matter of fact, when I started serious flying in Europe, Qantas used to flog around in 707's at FL250 or below, in all the worst of the weather, turbulence, icing etc, because the "FIRs" were "controlled", the UIRs, FL250 to FL600 were only "advisory airspace" --- close to F, as India used to operate F.

And they were largely NDB to NDB below FL250, only the "upper airways" were VOR to VOR. QF 707s at M0.81, mixing it with the Viscounts, Electras, Vanguards etc. made for some interesting ATC problems, not to mention the huge waste of fuel. However, BOAC, which came from a country that wasn't so totally anal about "controlled airspace", tootled along in the clear at somewhere between FL350 and FL410.

Then, as jet traffic increased, ICAO/FAA decided that VFR was not a good idea above FL XXX (sometimes FL200, usually FL250) and that was adopted widely, with military aircraft exempt.

As the years rolled on, and we got to "Alphabet Soup" airspace, high level airspace became A, NOT because risk levels required A, but because it was the only class that prohibited VFR.

Dick is right about inverted airspace, I have already referred to this at some length previously, and I am not going to repeat it. Suffice to say that the principle has been re-confirmed, again and again, by every consultant ever hired by AsA and CASA.

What some/all of you should dig up is the extensive C v. E analysis done by Airservices for the mid levels. Very interesting, and accurate. Then the results were ignored.

Follow that by the same organization's analysis for the NAS 2b windback. In my opinion and many others the "risk assessment" was a disgrace, (after 12 months of successful operation) including assumptions that ALL pilots will make a mistake with ATC instructions between 1 in 2 and 1in 1 times ----- how many of you actually routinely even make a mistake in any interaction with ATC 50% of the time, let alone 100% of the time (OK!, I'll make an exception for several on this thread, who probably could get it wrong 50% of the time, but they are insignificant, statistically speaking, of course) --- but that nonsense is what was fed into the model.

But never mind, compared to the pilot error rate, we are saved by the world's most perfect human beings, ASA ATC staff, with an error rate of 1E6, only one error per million actions, compared to dopey pilots (assumed) 50% to 100%.

In my opinion, such figures used made the risk analysis for the 2b windback a travesty of proper risk analysis. and published external analysis, including that paid for by CASA, agrees with me.

A at high level does not disprove the validity of E over D etc. Nor does using C where E is all that is required by analysis, produce "safer" results, because the collision risk (if E is the analysis result) in E is already so low, that C does not/cannot lower the risk, because it is already close to "vanishingly small", the statistical equivalent of zero (See ASNZ 4360).

Maybe is is time to re-institute the "Alwyn Awards", last awarded in the late 1990s.

Tootle pip!!

[Dick Smith]

Yes, but what about C without radar- how do you get a positive ident!

Remember I am talking about non radar rated class D controllers operating class C.

[Capn Bloggs]

And the first Alwyn Award should be awarded to Leady, who claims that the NAS 2b Class E airspace was a success:

Follow that by the same organization's analysis for the NAS 2b windback. In my opinion and many others the "risk assessment" was a disgrace, (after 12 months of successful operation)

3 RAs involving RPT IFRs and no-radio VFRs = success. :D

Those three incidents were correctly read by AsA as ringing alarm bells about the fundamental flaws of E airspace.

the UIRs, FL250 to FL600 were only "advisory airspace" --- close to F, as India used to operate F.
Is that so? I didn't know QF still operated 707s in 1990, when ICAO created Alphabet airspace. Advisory airspace it may have been. It certainly wasn't F.

I ask yet again: what is the benefit of E airspace?

Dick,
what about C without radar- how do you get a positive ident!
What about it? Who needs a positive ident? Break free of your fundamentalist views and do some lateral thinking: aircraft control can be done without surveillance!

[Howabout]

Thanks Lead, I am not blinkered and am always willing to listen.

At least your responses are measured. I will read your response again. It needs some considered time, given the effort you've made.

I certainly envy you the B707 days. My Dad used to look after you guys as an AWA LAME in the mid-sixties. I can remember sitting up in the old Darwin terminal and watching the jets taxying in, sweeping in a right turn and parking right below his workshop - he was one floor up, so we looked down on the 'monsters.' QANTAS 707s and BOAC 707s and Comets were the highlight of a young kid's week.

OK, let's kick nostalgia in to touch. You still have not justified TCAS as a mitigator if we are going to be truly 'ICAO compliant.' Lead, this was a CASA study not a 'commissioned one.'

[konstantin]

Of course C generates extra workload and requires a higher level of responsibility than E, that is self-evident.

However (and it is an important "however") it is very much a matter of degree in terms of impact on cost. Given the amount of VFR traffic in/out of Alice for instance there would be no change required in terms of staffing the enroute airspace (above A085) for a C vs E airspace steps designation. And the tower airspace D component would still be processing the same aircraft in and out, as they currently do with C over D.

Let us consider what the case with E steps (vice C) at YBAS would be in terms of processing VFRs;

Enroute and Tower Controllers - a little less separation workload overall but potentially less notice given of the aircrafts presence to the tower ATC inbound (particularly above A085 from the Sector airspace), possibly a more "reactive" working environment than in the case of an overlying C, eg sequence planning considerations for a start?

Pilots (VFR and IFR)
- No VFR/IFR separation assurance provided to them in the CTA steps above D

Self-separating gabfest taking up A/G time, reliance on radio procedures, slightly increased pilot situational awareness workload...would I be drawing too long a bow in daring to assert a diminution of safety in absolute terms?

No impact on ATS staffing or cost either way - in this location-specific case. So the aviation industry would prefer E...because...? Other than the people who would consider it a God-given right to fly where and when they want, of course.

Yours Sincerely

Mortimer Konstantin Papadopolous

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Don't worry Mr 'Howabout'....I too read yr thoughtful posts.

But, alas, I feel now that I am tooo faar removed from the ' at the workface' situation to render suitable / sensible responses / suggestions to the 'cause'.

(Thanks Dick......)

However, rest assured Mr Bloggs, I shall NOT be the one who causes you a problem in 'E'.....I don't particularly want to GET RUNOVER by a 'Fast Mover',
so, I will simply descend early, if required, take the 'scenic route' in, and leave the collision 'risk' areas close to destination AD's to those silly enuf to believe in 'E' for all......(IMHO)

I am of the opinion, that one day maybe, after a few 'incidents', that the wheel will turn full circle.....and we will have CTA and OCTA ag'in......in some form or another...:uhoh:

Cheers;)

P.S. VERY well stated Mr Papadopolous...a candid view and sensible view.

[Howabout]

Griffo, don't ever worry about being 'redundant.'

The problem in the modern environment is that memories are too short. Opportunistic individuals will raise seemingly logical arguments about airspace. As time goes on, who's there to rebut 'upside down airspace?'

You'll notice there's been no reply to my 'upside down' question, or using TCAS as a mitigator.

The inconvenient questions are just ignored in the hope that subsequent posts bury them.

You might have been out of the game for a while, but the basic arguments have not changed in 20 years. What your views were when we lost that service (and 'saved' an unsubstantiated 10 mil was it?) hold true today.

From where I sit, you are eminently qualified to provide cogent comment on the issues.

Don't hold back Mate. You've done the time and, from my perspective, you're no less entitled than the rest of us to address the dodgy arguments that keep getting repeated.

I must wind this up now and get back to the main thread. I'm sure, by now, that Dick will have a controller posting under his/her real name to confirm that E can be done cheaper than C.

As Dick says, one cannot be believed if one does not have the courage to post under a real name. I'm hugely confident that he's arranged for just that. Given that Dick places so much emphasis on real names, otherwise you're not believable, I don't doubt for an instant that Dick has got one of those 'dozens and dozens' to post under their own name.

[ARFOR]

Leadsled
A at high level does not disprove the validity of E over D etc. Nor does using C where E is all that is required by analysis
Where is the analysis? and the reference system ATM infrastructure?
produce "safer" results, because the collision risk (if E is the analysis result)
Where is the volume specific analysis result?
in E is already so low, that C does not/cannot lower the risk, because it is already close to "vanishingly small",
That is incorrect. Even if the risk exposure were assessed as 'low', an ATC service to both IFR and VFR [D, C or higher] further removes said risk, otherwise the scaled classifications of airspace have no relative significance, which we all know is not the case.
the statistical equivalent of zero (See ASNZ 4360).
Collisions and NMAC's in E [in the US and elsewhere] disprove the 'vanishingly small' argument, in terminal [climb and descent] areas.

Are you supporting Australia 'rolling the dice' with E in terminal areas where turbo-jet RPT operate in significant numbers? Why would you? Other coutries have had to reconsider/reclassify 'after' the fire tenders have hosed down the remains, why not learn from O/S mistakes?

Most reclassification of 'previously assessed' class E in other coutries has followed serious incidents and accidents. What in your mind is wrong with that approach to risk management? lots in my mind! That is why ALARP principals have been appended to risk management practices. Lessons learned from others 'mistakes'.

If the above is not accurate, and [as you and Mr Smith suggest], the risk is reduced to vanishingly small away from the circuit areas [but still within aircraft climb and descent trajectories] why then are speeds restricted to 250kts?

That goes to the crux of airspace classifications and the management of risk. The higher the speed [normally a product of profile and altitude/flight level] the larger the protection margins become with increasing closing/crossing speeds. That is why A is used in high level enroute airspace where see and avoid is impractical, and visual track keeping [tolerances for separation purposes] also becomes impractical [due altitude].

The offset consideration at lower level [below A100] is traffic mix and density. The service levels and equipment needed to address the risk to ALARP [as already discussed in this and other like type threads] vary from those in 'clean configured' climb/descent and cruise airspace away from circuit areas.

Mr Smith
but what about C without radar- how do you get a positive ident!
If the above question is indicative of your understanding of Air Traffic Control, then please do everyone a service by refraining from comment or involvement until you have had someone download you a copy of an ATC manual [pick any country], and learn a bit about how ATC operate separation standards [there are many, many non-surveillance separation standards] and procedures in ALL countries, including the USA.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Tks for that Mr 'H',.....

And although DICKmay not remember me personally, he certainly had no qualms in using FS to 'prove his point' against ATC.....

BK to CB wasn't it?? Went OCTA to avoid 'unnecessary delays'....and got FULL service ALL the way....Then wrote to the ATC Head Honcho of the time complaining about 'His' organisation's lack of service.....
But, he GOT IT from good ole' FS......

As an aside.....I believe the new tower complex at BRM will be built as a joint RFF/TWR building on the opposite side of the rwy to the present CAGRO site - can't call that a 'shudder'...'tower' - so that the controllers will be facing SOUTH across the runway, and be reasonably well away from the RPT parking bays.....
And the majority of the traffic goes/comes from the N / NE to E...
The jets from PH via NWN come in from the S, and depart to intercept the 200deg track out, so the poor controllers will be 'flat out' looking over their shoulders to spot inbound /outbound VFRs, and Jet tfc from ports to / from the north, ...MOST of the time.
For what 'they' the workers need - IMHO - is that the new TWR should be next to the present site to give them a better 'overall' picture with 'minimum fuss'....
(Yeah...I know they 'do it' procedurely....CNCE not avbl, remain OCTA...do they still say that...stay N of Willies creek...go away, I've got a JET...)
And, yes I've worked there so I have the experience and the knowledge to say so....

Oh, and the 'original' sum to be saved was $80M! Mike Smith lectures refer...
This was subsequently shot down to ....not much at all.

And even less when one considers wot we 'ave now....

Ah well!!.......:confused:

Tks for the indulgence...normal program resumes....:ok:

[Icarus2001]

A rational discussion between people with opposing views, what is PPRUNE coming to.

Keep it up people.

[Freedom7]

Okay Capn Bloggs, I issue you a challenge. Get ONE practising ATC to state this point under his or her own name.


I'll give you mine.

On one condition.

[LeadSled]

ARFOR,

As to the various analysis, to which I have referred, all in Airservices and (hopefully) CASA records.

"Low" and "vanishingly small" are far from the same thing.

Further on, as far as I am concerned, you have made a number of assertions about E safety elsewhere, but that is all they are, assertions.

Several Airservices "analysis" of US MAC/NMAC in E have been "interesting", one neglected the fact that much of the mid west is 6/7000 ft, and claims a number of en-route problems. When the geographical position and height was examined, it was clear that ALL to alleged en-route MAC/NMAC were, in fact, in circuit areas or the boundaries of circuit areas, they might have been 7/8000' AMSL, but they were only 1000/1500' AGL.

If you believe the Airservices "risk analysis" for the windback of 2B was kosher, you obviously haven't read the three analysis by eminent risk management experts, including one paid for by CASA. Or maybe you really believe the error rate for pilots dealing with ATC instructions really is 50 to 100%, but for ATC person, only one in a million.

As to NAS 2b, and three RAs, do YOU know how many RAs there were, during that period in C. Dig out the records and have a look. Do you understand that you can have an RA ---- without separation being infringed.

As you fundamentally do not accept the basis of ICAO airspace classification, there is really little point debating with you.

Howabout,
re. TCAS as a mitigator, we both know ICAO does not permit its use, but I know how well TCAS II works, there are plenty of places where I believe TCAS (long before any warnings) rather than ATC. I must re-read the Avalon study, I didn't realise (missed/forgotten) that ACAS/TCAS had been raised as a mitigator, but I have no objection to it ---- as long as a difference is filed with ICAO.

Don't forget, both Ansett and TAA fitted TCAS long before it was mandated in Australia, because of the number of ATC errors ---- and that is all a matter of record.

As for the poster who thinks I was claiming the existence of Class F in the 1960's, wake up and smell the roses --- and re-read what I said about the development of airspace classifications with an open mind ---- as long as it is not open at both ends.

Tootle pip!!

PS: How well I remember the AWA "radio man" at each station in Australia, and at Bankstown. Indeed, the last AWA sign only disappeared from YSBK in the last year. A good mate of mine, and near neighbor, now nearly 90, spent most of his career with AWA, starting with flying boats at Rose Bay.

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,

As to NAS 2b, and three RAs, do YOU know how many RAs there were, during that period in C. Dig out the records and have a look. Do you understand that you can have an RA ---- without separation being infringed.

That is no reason to imply "oh well, we get more RAs in C so who cares if we get them in E". If that is the standard of your comparative analysis, then you don't have much credibility in my eyes. Where were they? What aircraft types and what operations were involved? Were both aircraft safe anyway?
And quite frankly, I don't care how many RAs occurred in C, because I assume that the system would look at them and attempt to improve to stop them. All the RAs in E were caused by only one thing: the VFR was either unknown or not under the control of ATC. Launy was very very close to one hundred-odd killed. You are very lucky it didn't happen, because you and all your scientific studies would have been thrown out the door.

It is becoming painfully obvious that you and Dick really couldn't give two hoots about the RAs we had in E in 12 short months and don't propose that we do anything about preventing them in the future. That is unacceptable, when the cost of upgrading the airspace is "vanishingly small" whilst protecting RPT. The only issue is unhindered access to the airspace, isn't it?

[89 steps to heaven]

All this measured discussion is terrific, but don't forget to make submissions to CASA, they will not base any decisions on PPrune discussions. From memory, comments on Broome close end of the month.

:ok:

[CaptainMidnight]

Does the U.S. allow no radio no transponder light sport types access to Class E airspace as we do?

Class C requires all aircraft to be in contact with ATC and have a clearance.

Class E does not.

Therefore to me, Class C provides a higher level of safety than E.

A number of aeronautical studies by CASA have stated that a Class C service can be provided v.s. Class R for no additional cost. Neither Airservices or Civilair have come out and disputed it, and I suspect the reason is the opinion came from ATCs and ASA in the first place.

[Dick Smith]

No , just not game to be open about basic safety fundamentals because they will be undermined if it looks as if they have a different view or agree with DS.

What other reason could there be for not having all ATC"s posting under their real names for genuine safety issues?

And why are these anonymous ATC,s ( if they are ATC,s) so dopey to say that they will take on the responsibilities of C for the same cost as E.

In all other countries I know of ATC,s are not expected to operate C without radar and extra manning.

[Frank Arouet]

CaptainMidnight;

Does the U.S. allow no radio no transponder light sport types access to Class E airspace as we do?

When did this arrangement come into being?

I'm not even sure if RAA aircraft are allowed above 5000ft yet.

[ftrplt]

There is a lot of talk about workload changes for the controller between C and E; how about the SUM of the workload of the controller AND the cockpit crew between the two categories?

[Jabawocky]

Captain Midnight
Does the U.S. allow no radio no transponder light sport types access to Class E airspace as we do?

That does not seem to be the idea of AIP GEN 1.5(1) and (6.1.2) :hmm:

[LeadSled]

Dear Captain Midnight,

Perhaps it is a problem with your night vision, but a Mode C transponder is mandatory in Class E airspace in Australia --- for all aircraft with a suitable power supply, which means about ~98% of all powered aircraft.

In US, below 10,000ft, there is NO transponder requirement generally in E, beyond the 30nm transponder veil from the centre of Class B airspace, and from memory, not even a requirement for VFR to have VHF comms, but don't quote me on the latter.

Given the prevalence of Class E airspace in the US, operations of any category of civil aircraft, avoiding E or higher airspace, are not practical, and therefor, yes, LSA operate in E to the same rules as other VFR.

As for the Australian "5000'" rule, that is a hangover from the days of mandatory position reporting for all aircraft above 5000, and another example of Australian "inverted risk management", as the risk decrease, the CNS/ATM resources increase ---- quite illogical. And, of course, incomplete reforms.

And, largely, the reason for the conditional 5000' cap on "ultralight" aircraft ---- but not hang-gliders.

Finally, I love the logic that says that RAs area serious safety problem in E, but can effectively be disregarded as a safety problem in C. The mind boggles at such logic being used to support Australia's "inverted risk management".

Tootle pip!!

PS There are serious and legitimate divisions of opinion about the seriousness of the NAS 2b events in both Tasmania and Brisbane. I suggest you all reacquaint yourselves with the facts in each case --- and I do mean facts, as in the ATSB analysis in each case.

While you are at it, perhaps you should look at the disposition of every incident report filed by RPT crews during the "2B year", particularly Regionals, and see what the ATSB thought of the quality of each "complaint".

As to the one north of Melbourne, I would suggest a very close reading by everybody ---- the situation (with all concerned having comms with ATC) should never have developed the way it did, and shares some critical characteristics with the Brisbane event.

In both the latter, high time professional pilots were in command of the GA aircraft. The actions of the RPT Captains, in both cases, is worthy of close study and consideration ----- but, rather what we see here is the virtually automatic assumption the the GA aircraft is in the wrong, flown by somebody who doesn't know what they are on about.

[CaptainMidnight]

When did this arrangement come into being?

I'm not even sure if RAA aircraft are allowed above 5000ft yet.I posted a detailed answer to this question some time ago:

http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-general-aviation-questions/386673-merged-ambidji-report-casa-should-get-their-money-back-10.html#post5164366

As to how many such sports aviation aircraft there are around the country, I wouldn't have a clue.

So is the situation different here from the U.S., where they have mandatory transponder requirement for ALL aircraft within 30NM from the centre of Class B airspace - which we don't have??

[le Pingouin]

Dick, correct me if I'm wrong, but last time I checked PPRune isn't a recognised way of notifying anyone of anything.

Better a dopey controller than a dopey pilot because I won't die when it goes horribly wrong. Just like it so nearly did at LT :ugh::ugh::ugh:

[Frank Arouet]

As to how many such sports aviation aircraft there are around the country, I wouldn't have a clue.

Latest RAA magazine quotes 3077 aircraft at Feb 2010 and 10,136 members at Feb 10 2010.

I don't believe they are going to just go away. Probably best to factor them into the discussion.

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,
The actions of the RPT Captains, in both cases, is worthy of close study and consideration
No it's not. Unless you are privy to something the ATSB hasn't put on the public record, there is nothing untoward in the actions of either RPT crew.

What is questionable is:

1/the decision by a "high time professional" GA crew (your words) to fly a high performance Lancair through busy terminal airspace VFR. That is just plain dumb, as the subsequent near-miss showed;

2/the insistence by you and Dick Smith that this situation was AOK.

I love the logic that says that RAs area serious safety problem in E, but can effectively be disregarded as a safety problem in C.
Put your reading glasses on. I said or implied nothing of the sort.

what we see here is the virtually automatic assumption the the GA aircraft is in the wrong, flown by somebody who doesn't know what they are on about.
Amply confirmed by the Tobago PIC.

For the newbies in this discussion, here are the links to the three Class E NMAC reports:

737 v Lancair Brisbane (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2004/aair/aair200401273.aspx#tab_2)

737 v C421 Canty (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2003/aair/aair200304963.aspx#tab_1)

Tobago v 737 Launy (http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2003/aair/aair200305235.aspx)

Arr, the virtues of E airspace.

[ARFOR]

Lets bore the audience with some history and clarity:-
If you believe the Airservices "risk analysis" for the windback of 2B was kosher, you obviously haven't read the three analysis by eminent risk management experts, including one paid for by CASA. Or maybe you really believe the error rate for pilots dealing with ATC instructions really is 50 to 100%, but for ATC person, only one in a million.
If one were to accept what you say as being the case, and apply a correction factor, the net effect [difference in outcome] of the collision modelling [ARM] [and ALARP] would amount to an amplitude difference of how much? I would suggest ‘nil’ in terms of scaled collision mitigation options that are available, particularly where surveillance is not available to offset the lack of an Air Traffic Control Service to both IFR [on conflicting but unknown VFR] and other conflicting VFR with VFR in Class E!

Whilst we are at it, we need to clarify the use of the word ‘analysis’. In the context of these ‘safety’ related discussions, the two main groupings within the ‘defined’ aviation processes are ‘HazID’, and of course separately ‘Aeronautical Studies’.

HazID’s

I have seen some of those for NAS2b, and know some of those directly involved. The HazID’s did not support the retention of a specific class of airspace above class D zones, rather, identified the hazards that needed mitigation. We should discuss how these were then applied [or not] to the non-existent volume specific assessments and ALARP? Which of course brings us on to the ‘governance’ trigger for the return to class C?

Mr Jeff Griffith [whom I have met] from the US, was first involved in Airspace in Australia in 1996, through 2004 [NAS2b]. In 1996, he was contracted by the then Australian NAS Implementation Group to provide technical input into each of the NAS characteristics. Previous to NAS2b commencement, industry raised concerns regarding the lack of volume specific safety assessments. None the less, NAS2b went ahead.
After several safety issues, and subsequent BASI/ATSB reports, moves were made by industry to address the inherent inadequacy of Australian NAS2b Class E.

The reports you mention

In 2004, Mr Griffith was again called on this time by CASA to assess the Airservices case for return to Class C over D. In August of 2004 Mr Griffith submitted the following:-

http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/publications/pdf/aviation_Griffith_Report.pdf

- He suggests that the US NAS is safe and efficient [see the NTSB data below]
- He makes no mention of the difference between Australia and the US in terms of surveillance, ATC sector size, traffic density comparisons.
- He makes no mention of the disparity between US D/E and Australian D/C Air Carrier movements.
- He seems unaware [or omits] that the US NAS operates Class C where similar levels of RPT/Air Carrier aircraft operate in Australia.

It was put to Mr Griffith at the time, that the absence of commonality between the two systems made transplanting one into the other necessitous of volume specific safety cases, which before rollout, had been rejected by the NAS people he had been working with.

In addition to the Griffith report commissioned by Mr Dolan at CASA, was of course Professor Terry O’Neill’s report, whom CASA also retained to assess the Airservices safety case for return to class C

http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/publications/pdf/aviation_ONeill_Review_AAs_NAS_2b.pdf

With regard to method, Professor O’Neill said:-
The other approach is to recognize that there is a wealth of relevant data available in other countries, for example the United States. Nevertheless there is considerable disagreement about whether the use of this data would be appropriate [8].

[8] It is noted that in previous modelling exercises, the accuracy of the ARM was tested when its risk profiles were compared with risk levels predicted by the US FAA’s collision probability formulae for uncontrolled and controlled non radar terminal areas – the formula used in air traffic control tower cost-benefit reviews in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
Here are some other extracts relevant to our discussion:-
The argument revolves around the comparability of the two countries. For example, Airservices argues that a comparison with the US is not appropriate due to differences in weather, topography, pilot behavior and culture and ATC systems. Some of these factors may increase while others may lower the rate of collisions. The following two points can be made about this controversy:
• It may be possible to estimate and formally characterize the size of any such differences and control for them statistically in the modeling process
• No two situations will ever be exactly similar. What is important is the relative importance of these differences compared with the size of the effect being estimated. The larger the apparent effects noted, the more confidence there would be that these were not entirely due to extraneous factors.
Correct. Which in hindsight is exactly why industry at the time were vigorously asking for volume specific assessments prior to the NAS2b roll out. They did not happen.

He goes on to say:-
Reasonable agreement of the model with the US data would be reassuring. On the other hand, dramatic differences would suggest that all is not well with the modeling exercise. The comparison would need to allow for the differences, but the differences should not prevent the comparison being made.
Again correct. Why was it not done?
Alternatively, rather than checking the Australian estimated risks against the United States, the whole modeling process could be tested directly on United States system. United States traffic data from comparable locations could be fed into the TAAM software and a United States expert panel could be convened to populate a fault tree with probabilities. If this exercise produced estimated risks in reasonable agreement with observed empirical risks in the United States, then it would supportive of the modeling exercise in Australia.
An expert panel from the US? great idea! Why was it not done before roll out?
Does any of this sound familiar? :=

It strikes me as foolhardy to remake similar errors of process. :ugh:
"Low" and "vanishingly small" are far from the same thing.
The difference of course is that ‘low’ is part of the scaled outcome terms used when reporting considered risk/s. Where does ‘vanishingly small’ feature in defined aviation [airspace] risk assessment processes?

On that theme:-
Several Airservices "analysis" of US MAC/NMAC in E have been "interesting", one neglected the fact that much of the mid west is 6/7000 ft, and claims a number of en-route problems. When the geographical position and height was examined, it was clear that ALL to alleged en-route MAC/NMAC were, in fact, in circuit areas or the boundaries of circuit areas, they might have been 7/8000' AMSL, but they were only 1000/1500' AGL.
The class of airspace involved with these MAC and NMAC’s was? Remembering of course the practical differences between US D rules and ICAO D application such as Australia and the UK! Or were they plain old Class E accidents and incidents?

Have you a reference?

From the Broome ’Aeronautical study’, may 09’
In addition it must be stated that the ARM equates MBZs to CTAF(R) procedures and assumes that pilots are 99% procedurally compliant.
Clearly the ARM does not equate the error rate for pilots dealing with ATC instructions to be 50 to 100%. I’m not sure the Airservices case [2004 rollback] using TAAM came to that conclusion either.

And;
5. Modelling
The OAR used the Airspace Risk Model (ARM) to model the airspace affecting the Broome aerodrome. The Airspace Risk Model (ARM) and an F(N) curve was developed by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and utilised by the OAR.
CASA has developed ‘acceptable risk criteria’ with regard to the risk of midair conflicts within regional aerodrome terminal areas. The collision risk model developed by CASA, in 1996, is focused on a non-radar controlled terminal area model and no significant changes have been made since its development and presentation to the Review of the General Concept of Separation Panel (RGCSP), now the Separation and Airspace Safety Panel, of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
This aviation risk assessment tool is internationally recognised, and has been used for many years. Funny thing though, where is the modelling calculations for the options within the Broome report, including the E over D, and C over D options?

Sound familiar? :ugh:

In general terms regarding risk in class E:-

Aviation Accident Database Query (http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/Query.asp) There is plenty in there to sober up with!

More specifically, Class E, and the limitations of see-and avoid, I commend the following TSB Canada report to the interested reader:-

http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2006/a06o0206/a06o0206.pdf
The collision occurred in Class E airspace (see Appendix A) where there is no requirement for an air traffic control (ATC) clearance or radio contact with air traffic services. In this type of airspace, there is no requirement for position reports, traffic advisory calls, or for aircraft to be on a common very high frequency (VHF) radio frequency. Aircraft are not required to have a communication radio, a radar transponder, or collision-avoidance equipment on board. It is unlikely that there was any communication between the two aircraft.
There is considerable guidance and research material on this subject (see Appendix F for endnotes), salient aspects of which are as follows:
• Conspicuity characteristics
- Specific paint schemes and patterns may have an advantage in certain conditions but none has an overall advantage over another.
- Anti-collision/strobe lights do not have a significant effect in bright daylight.
- Landing lights are useful when the opposing aeroplane is in the direct beam.
• Pilot scanning technique
- The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recommends that pilots spend 75 per cent of the time scanning a 180° by 30° field of view outside the cockpit.
- Estimates vary from 54 seconds to 9 minutes to perform the scan.
- A total of 12.5 seconds is required after first detection for pilot recognition and reaction to avert a collision.
- In practice, pilots spend 33 per cent of the time scanning outside mainly within 10° of the direction of flight.
• Effect of traffic alerting
- Proportion of time spent scanning outside the cockpit tends to increase.
- Attention is focussed on known location of conflict.
- Probability and range of detection increase.
• Probability of detection for this collision geometry and closure rate
- Maximum discernable range for 6/6 visual acuity: 8.5 km.
- Earliest likely detection range and time: 3.2 km, 28 seconds.
- Probability of detection for 33 per cent outside scan time: 25 per cent.
TSB records indicate that 16 mid-air collisions occurred in Canada during the preceding 10-year period resulting in 27 fatalities and 5 serious injuries. Of these accidents, 4 involved some form of formation flight or gliders operating in thermals, and the remainder involved aircraft that were not associated with each other. None were within Class D or higher airspace, and none occurred under ATC or advisory service. A total of 6 accidents occurred within the traffic zone of an uncontrolled airport and 6 involved flight beneath controlled airspace associated with a major airport. One of these occurrences led to a Transport Canada safety review in 2001-2002 of VFR operations in the vicinity of Toronto, Ontario,1 significant aspects of which are as follows:
• Routing restrictions and confined vertical dimensions contribute to traffic congestion.
• Two system deficiencies were identified concerning availability and quality of aeronautical information and lack of standard operating procedures for VFR operations.
This is what concerns me [and apparently many others] with Class E and not properly utilising/applying A.L.A.R.P :-
• A number of risk scenarios were identified in which a mid-air collision was a potential outcome that was considered unlikely within the five-year time horizon of the study.
Yet ‘vanishingly small’ came home to roost! :=
• Several recommendations were made to address the deficiencies and risks.

There has been little progress in implementing the recommendations.

Another of the occurrences took place approximately 5 miles west of the location of this accident and in similar weather conditions. It involved a Cessna 172 aeroplane on an instructional flight and an ultralight aeroplane on a pleasure flight. The right main wheel of the Cessna 172 rolled along the top surface of the left wing of the ultralight. The ultralight was damaged but was able to land safely. The Cessna 172 was undamaged. Neither aeroplane saw the other before the collision.
Make that came home to roost twice! := :=
A number of international studies (see Appendix F) have addressed the overall issue of risk of collision and effectiveness of the see-and-avoid principle. All acknowledged the underlying physiological limitations at play and that, when mid-air collisions occur, “failure to see-and-avoid is due almost entirely to the failure to see.”
One study stated that “our data suggest that the relatively low (though unacceptable) rate of mid-air collisions in general aviation aircraft not equipped with TCAS is as much a function of the ‘big sky’ as it is of effective visual scanning.” Specific results relevant to this occurrence are as follows:
• A French study of mid-air collisions in a 10-year period found that the see-and-avoid principle was becoming no longer adequate as the sole means of averting collisions.
• An Australian study concluded that the see-and-avoid principle, in the absence of traffic alerts, has serious limitations and that the historically small number of mid-air collisions is as much due to low traffic density and chance as it is to the successful operation of see-and-avoid. The most effective response to the many flaws of see-and-avoid is to minimize the reliance on it.
• A German study on the detection of gliders and small motorized aircraft found that passive conspicuity measures did not overcome the underlying limitations of the see-and-avoid principle. It recommended further development and promotion of GNSS and Mode S transponder technology, noting that there is already on the market a GNSS–based system that is ADS-B compatible, called FLARM. That system is in use on gliders and provides collision-avoidance information.
• Eurocontrol examined risk of collision scenarios between uncontrolled VFR general aviation aircraft and both other uncontrolled VFR traffic and IFR commercial air traffic and found that see-and-avoid was ineffective as the sole means of averting collisions. It preferred technological solutions, specifically increased use of Mode S transponders to function with secondary surveillance radars (SSRs), aircraft collision-avoidance systems (ACAS)/TCAS, TIS, and ADS-B, and to that end endorsed continued development of the Light Aviation SSR Transponder (LAST) including low-powered variants. It found that systems such as FLARM could reduce the risk of collision between VFR aircraft.
• A British Royal Air Force study into mid-air collisions deemed to be random found that the probability of conflict is proportional to the square of the traffic density and recommended avoiding altitude restrictions that concentrate traffic.
Common theme!
Analysis
There was no indication that crew performance played a role in this accident or that either aeroplane was ill-equipped as to conspicuity devices or that those devices were not used appropriately. A realistic probability of either aeroplane detecting the other was 25 per cent, and without detection, the collision was unavoidable. The two aeroplanes were on a constant collision course; therefore, there was no relative angular movement that could be detected by peripheral vision to aid in detection. There was no other means of alerting either aeroplane as to the presence of the other. ATC does not provide traffic advisories in that airspace.
This about sums it up for me:-
Measures such as improving aircraft conspicuity, pilot scanning technique, and pilot traffic awareness can reduce risk, but they do not overcome the underlying physiological limitations that create the residual risk associated with unalerted see-and-avoid. There is only limited potential to further reduce risk by fine-tuning the unalerted see-and-avoid concept, and such an approach does little to address the risk of collision between VFR light aircraft and IFR commercial traffic in congested areas.
A meaningful improvement to the ability to see-and-avoid between uncontrolled VFR aircraft requires a practicable, affordable method of alerting pilots to the proximity of conflicting traffic. Reduction of conflicts between VFR aircraft and IFR traffic depends on making aircraft that are presently not transponder-equipped visible to ATC or to the IFR traffic.
Learn from others who know from bitter experience, the bitter experience is world-wide!

[Howabout]

Lead, you remain a gentleman and debate on merit. Unfortunately, not everyone does.

As regards your point on TCAS II; sorry, but it just doesn't wash. You have been most vociferous about not registering differences. All of a sudden you maintain that such a course is OK. Once again, you can't have it both ways old sport.

NAS was plagued by cherry-picking. TCAS is the last line of defence, as recognised by ICAO, and should never be used as mitigation in the classification of airspace..period.

Dick, I'm still waiting for that controller out of the 'dozens and dozens' that has put his/her real name to the assertion that E is cheaper than C.

Surely they would use their real name on something so important.

I am sure you will agree.

Lead, you're on the wrong sled. Unfortunately, for you, your genuine attempts to inject objectivity are destroyed by infantile obfuscation from a direction that's sometimes referred to as 'friendly fire.'

[Capn Bloggs]

An interesting post, ARFOR. Thank you.

A meaningful improvement to the ability to see-and-avoid between uncontrolled VFR aircraft requires a practicable, affordable method of alerting pilots to the proximity of conflicting traffic.
Get them to call ATC for a clearance...in C airspace. It doesn't cost anyone a cent. :ok:

[Howabout]

Holy Ghost ARFOR, is that copyright?

I'd like to print and frame.

OK, where's the ATC that is so passionately committed and is one of Dick's 'dozens and dozens' that will tell us under his/her real name that E is cheaper than C.

After all, Dick asserts that if you are unwilling to use your real name then you don't have the courage of your convictions.

Guys like ARFOR, DNS, the penguin, and a host of others, can be shot down by only one of those 'dozens' posting under their real name.

It's simple: All you have to say is that 'E is cheaper than C and my real name is (for example, something like) Dick Smythe'

How hard is that in the interests of credibility??

[Jabawocky]

Going to play devils advocate here.... :ooh: IF and I say IF we had the 100% ADSB fitment, E over D in the regional areas, with the local ADSB feeds to ATC and ADSBin/TCAS for RPT or anyone who wanted it, how would that stand up?

At least the IFR heavy metal would have a chance against any VFR's who may be out of the system and bending the rules (yes there are lots that do, the reason Bloggs and co are concerned) when lots of IMC is around the approach to regional airports.

That would beat class G any day, and be better all round for all concerned I think.

Only problem I see is the other side of the fence debated against the proposed scheme. Could have helped their cause I reckon.

Over to you pro folk to debate if you think its relevant. (If not ignore and back to normal viewing)

J:ok:

[Howabout]

Jab, with all due respect, don't put yourself down. You are perfectly entitled to throw in your thoughts.

I'm no expert when it comes to ADS-B, but I think that as a solution it's a long way off.

The immediate question is 'what can we do with what we have?'

From my perspective, and in light of the deafening silence from the 'dozens,' if a Class C service can be provided, with no extra resource implications, then it should be.

Anything less, with fare-paying, trusting punters down the back is culpable negligence.

God help the poor sod that sticks his moniker on a piece of paper that says E when C could be done for the same price.

In the event of a prang there'll be nowhere to hide.

[Jabawocky]

Howabout

Thanks, just food for thought given those that want the greater freedom of E for VFR, yet seemed to put arguments against a proposal that would have made there current agenda more warm and fuzzy. Some of them were not ANTI ADSB as such, but argued against its 100% scheme and as such have denied a way of achieving their current ideals while at the same time satisfying the ............
Anything less, with fare-paying, trusting punters down the back is culpable negligence.In my mind in the remote places, especially when the wx has been like it has of late over the interior E over CTAF's and E down to very low levels like in the USA would be a better thing than IFR bashing around in G with no service at all (Mt Isa for example). In good weather well its pretty much the same as G for both IFR and VFR really, but in bad wweather it should help the IFR.

For the busier terminal areas (Launie, Alice, Maroochy etc) C over D actually makes sense for the climb / descent zones, and E elsewhere, say around Hervy Bay Bundy, Ballina etc.

From what I can see E in place of G would be a good thing when weather is a problem. But without Radar maybe the RPT folk would rather self seperate until up into C. I will leave that to the pro's to comment on. Mind you the other day all in class G we had a Rex, a Virgin and a Jaba all in IMC plus a meat bomber (assume in VMC) and Class G, BNE CEN was working hard at keeping all informed but it would have been nice to have had the one bloke who could see all of us at once to do the seperating rather than all of us trying to get it right. We almost had E in G there .....minus the official seperation. Now the cost of that must have been the same as G=E=C.... :confused:

Anyway......back to my fencepost.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Jaba...your on the money wrt ADS-B Rx, one piece of kit changes the entire outcome of NAS airspace issues.

ARFOR, that is a top post. You have distilled years of argument wrt the fallacy of UNALERTEDSee and Avoid, and the folly of cherry picking the US system without also the facilities and procedures accorded to movement levels as well as all the links to relevant articles.:ok::ok::ok:

Leadsled, mea culpa:ugh:

[Mike Barry]

Quote:
When are you going to get it into your head that ATCs say there is no extra workload running C as opposed to E?
Okay Capn Bloggs, I issue you a challenge. Get ONE practising ATC to state this point under his or her own name.

Ok Dick, I'll bite...there is no extra workload running C as opposed to E.
There is also no extra workload from A to C...
Happy now?

You can quote me if you like.
For the record...ex FSO multiple stations, ATC in Perth, Brisbane, Muscat, Abu Dhabi and Shannon.

[CaptainMidnight]

ARFOR - great post ......... thank you.

Jaba - re 100% ADS-B fitement. I don't know to what extent the ABIT proposal went to fitting the sports aviation fleet e.g. to hang-gliders. They might have been included. You would also have to have ADS-B in gear fitted to powered aircraft so they can see the traffic of course.

FWIW one H/G pilot told me he regularly operates in NE Victoria up to A100, and that he has on occasions had powered aircraft pass underneath him. I suspect those aircraft never sighted him. You wouldn't intentionally fly under a H/G - you'd give one a wide berth.

[Frank Arouet]

the captain of the fairies is loose in the bottom the midnight garden.:eek:

Who can forget the ABIT (ADSB Implementation Team) and all their broken promises and lies!

Credibility about the same as a "rock spider's" court testimony having been caught at a "Wiggles" concert.

BTW, was it a hang glider thermalling up to 10,000 feet or a powered trike.

You wouldn't intentionally fly under a H/G

Someone should throw a net over you.:hmm:

[CaptainMidnight]

Frank

Sorry, none of your post makes any sense to me.

I was not offerring support for the ABIT or otherwise, merely stating I wasn't sure if the proposed fitment covered all SPA types.

And hang gliders in NE Vic operate up to 10,000 feet (A100) not 1000 feet (your A010) - that make any more sense to you?

[Frank Arouet]

There you go Captain. (Another pedant), :*I have amended my last post. (But why then would you think anybody is so blind as to fly under a hang glider when it was at 1,000 feet)?

As for ABIT. It was a gathering of fairies with magical promises that anybody could be excused from knowing what was proposed and what wasn't. It was a sham by confidence tricksters and a disgraceful waste of money.

You would also have to have ADS-B in gear fitted to powered aircraft so they can see the traffic of course

Really?

I asked whether it was a hang glider or a powered trike for a reason. I take it this would have been in class E airspace?

[Dick Smith]

Mike, are you refering to class C over D at place like Broome with no terminal radar?

Let's say there is a VFR aircraft at 6500' going from south to north about 20 miles to the east of Broome at the closest point. At about the same time you have an IFR Kingair on descent from the east, inbound to Broome as well as local flights and circuit traffic. It's sky clear.

Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?

Pull my other leg!

[LeadSled]

Howabout,

You have been most vociferous about not registering differencesI have no idea where you got this idea.

On the contrary, in several formal appointments in the past, I pushed hard for Australia to clean up its act in notifying differences to ICAO --- an area where Australia had been very slack, with some quite serious consequences, particularly NMACs, brought about by differences between Australia and ICAO ATC terminology.

At least all those terminologies have been harmonized now, but Australia's (or at least, some Australian pilots) determination to be an aviation Galapagos, with all sorts or wild and wonderful mutations of aviation developing in splendid isolation, seems to be as strong as ever.

Unfortunately, a predictable result was the Australia section in the Jepp. WW Text becoming as big as it, sadly, is.

I see we have a new term invented by the naysayers:Unassisted See and Avoid,However, many of the posts here refer to "un-alerted see and avoid", and nobody has seriously advocated "un-alerted" see and avoid, quite the contrary, as I have pointed out in writing, on many occasions.

Nevertheless, all the usual suspects trot out "un-alerted see and avoid" right on que as a straw man to shoot down!!Bbut wait, there's more, now we have something new --- Unassisted see and avoid.Back to the NAS 2b windback, anybody who believes a 1 in 1 to a 2 in 1 error rate for pilots executing ATC instructions is a reasonable error rate must have two willies, you can't get that stupid playing with one. Just as much as ascribing an error rate of (by remarkable contrast) 1 in 1,000,000 to ATC persons.**

To further suggest that such figures do not materially alter the outcome of the analysis is (at best) revealing the writer has no in-depth knowledge of the various qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment.

As usual, we have some wonderful examples of selective quoting, on the entirely reasonable assumption that most readers will not bother to read the whole of a very lengthy document.

However, to suggest that Prof.O'Neill's report on the NAS 2b windback supports the process is taking self delusion to a new high. On any reasonable reading of the O'Neill report for CASA, or the reports done by three other highly qualified persons, can only be described as scathing of the analysis, including such ridiculous "data" as the above mentioned error rates for pilots and ATC.

IF Australia had an outstanding safety record (using ICAO standard terms, not selective reporting) there might be some logic in rejecting the US approach, but as US/FAA has better safety outcomes in all categories except gliders, I see no reason to not learn from the US. This is comparing US with everybody else, not just Australia.

Indeed, even in the narrow area of actual collisions (again excluding gliders) the Australian record is inferior to the US, as anybody can see by an examination of published figures.

Tootle pip!!

PS: The excellent safety record for gliders in AU, (and almost as good in UK) is quite reasonably ascribed to the quality of community administration of gliding by GFA. This is the one single area of air safety outcomes where we are head and shoulders above the US.

** Maybe this is reflective of true level of respect many controllers have for pilots, a suggestion not entirely without "foundation". In about 2002/3 or thereabouts, the Flight Safety Foundation did a most interesting study of Australian pilots, ATC persons and maintenance engineers, and their attitude to each groups contribution to Australian air safety.
Go look for it on the net, and read it, in summary, each group regarded their contribution to air safety as the most valuable, and the other two groups as threats to air safety. A psychological analysis of the individual and group answers was fascinating.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Leadsled...post changed..100 times UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ugh:..UNALERTED:ug h:
unassisted, I can make the most monumentaly epic fails......regardless!

[Freedom7]

Let's say there is a VFR aircraft at 6500' going from south to north about 20 miles to the east of Broome at the closest point. At about the same time you have an IFR Kingair on descent from the east, inbound to Broome as well as local flights and circuit traffic. It's sky clear.

Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?


Give me the exact senario, ie you make it up, and ill give the action response for both classes of airspace.

I dare you:ok:

[Howabout]

Leady, I'll take a hit. In retrospect, my post was ambiguous. My point was that in the interests of 'uniformity' you believe that we should not be in a position where we have to lodge differences or, at the very least, the differences should be minimal.

I also accept that your position has been one of stating that where differences exist they should be lodged. What I said was clearly ambiguous.

The thrust of the post was that, on the one hand, you appear to support the use of TCAS for airspace allocation, provided a difference is lodged; yet on the other, this appears to be at variance with your belief in 'uniformity' and avoiding differences.

That was my point regarding the apparent inconsistencies in your argument.

Regardless, this debate is really about the provision of an 'inferior' service, when a 'superior' service can be provided for the same resource expenditure. Once again, it goes to the 'negligence' argument. Why in hell would one commit to an airspace construct that can have unknown VFR, when the alternative of positive separation for the fare-paying punters is available for the same cost?

That's where I cannot understand, or accept, the logic behind E over D. For my money it should be all C, given that the controllers themselves have consistently stated that they can provide positive separation at no extra cost and a lot less grief.

It just doesn't make sense Lead.

Thank you Mr Barry. Nice list of credentials. Hope you are enjoying my west-coast ancestral home, although we come from a bit north (Galway/Castlebar). Great pubs!

Lead, in the interests of keeping it civil, thanks for the reminder about Rose Bay. My old man, before we went north with AWA (1964), used to regularly visit the Sunderlands down that neck of the woods to sort out the 'snags' - that was always his term.

He had a couple of flights to Lord Howe, compliments of the crew, after sorting out a few particularly difficult problems. Nice: In those days it was 'Thanks, come for a ride. We'll tell the company that the snag was so bloody repetitive and difficult that we wanted the tech expertise along in case there was a repeat.'

Dick, I'm still waiting for that one controller to post under his/her real name and state, unequivocally, that E is cheaper that C.

After all, how difficult can it be if 'dozens and dozens' have told you that E can be done easier (cheaper) than C? If one of the 'dozens and dozens' really does believe that E is cheaper than C, then they must be willing to post under their real name. If they have told you that E is cheaper than C, and can substantiate it, then why would they be afraid to post under their real name?

Hasn't that has been one of your consistent points?

The phrase 'I am sure you will agree' comes to mind.

Just one Dick! One out of the 'dozens and dozens!' Just one!

[ARFOR]

However, many of the posts here refer to "un-alerted see and avoid", and nobody has seriously advocated "un-alerted" see and avoid, quite the contrary, as I have pointed out in writing, on many occasions.

Do you support Class E over Class D at Broome and Karratha?

- How do IFR and VFR receive ‘alerting’ in non-radar Class E?
- How do ATC [in a non-radar environment] confirm aircraft departing Class D [in to Class E] have the TXPDR selected ON for operation in Class E?

To briefly answer your ‘assertion/s’. Also from the O’Neill report:-
The NAS 2b safety case conducted prior to the implementation of these changes seems to have consisted primarily of subjecting those aspects of the 2b changes that were not consistent with the system in use in the United States, to examination by a panel of experts who discussed their likely safety acceptability.
Remember, this was a ‘design’ safety case, not the volume specific safety cases that were being asked for by industry that would have highlighted the deficiencies.

And, the nub of this discussion:-
There is no evidence that there was any attempt to subject proposed changes to formal quantitative analysis.
On the one hand, you support the introduction of NAS2b without ANY quantitative analysis, and on the other, you whine about AsA’s safety work to return system safety [previously utilised and demonstrated safety of Class C above D] as promptly as safely possible following the unfolding of the NAS2b Class E inadequacies? I find that to be the height of hypocrisy.
CASA provided input to the safety case
The ‘general design safety case’ prior to NAS2b
most notably in a minute of 12 September 2003. Extracts from that document stated:
• “CASA believes the US FAA NAS to be safer than the existing Australian airspace management system based on a simple comparative analysis of mid air collision statistics between the two countries”
• “The detailed evaluation of the presented design safety case evidences that the Stage 2b implementation will bring about an increase in risk beyond that which exists in Australia today.”
• “If the NASIG claim that it is necessary to the full implementation of NAS that Australia transition through this higher risk stage is valid, then clearly
the sooner NAS Stage Four is implemented and the potential safety benefits realised, the sooner this risk is removed”.
Shall we further the discussion and have a look at the merits [or otherwise] of the NAS stage 4 changes Leadsled?

Back to the ‘rollback’
One issue that should be addressed is why more empirically based data modeling procedures were not examined in more detail. Thus an examination could have been made of the relationship between traffic flows and types of aircraft in various types of airspace and resultant incidents both in Australia and internationally. While it is by no means clear that this approach would definitely have been successful in producing highly accurate estimates, given the well-known difficulties associated with pure modeling approaches, a significant attempt to explore this option would seem to have been warranted.
It seems Professor O’Neill agrees with concerns raised, then, and most notably today!
You said: anybody who believes a 1 in 1 to a 2 in 1 error rate for pilots executing ATC instructions is a reasonable error rate must have two willies, you can't get that stupid playing with one.
Who is saying that?
Just as much as ascribing an error rate of (by remarkable contrast) 1 in 1,000,000 to ATC persons.
Table 2 [page 28] of the O’Neill report
Error estimates for 2 VFR scenarios in E and C airspaces under Radar 45 Conditions
Generally the probabilities appear to show convincingly that VFR pilots are much less likely to make errors in Class C airspace.
A reasonable conclusion given the requirement for a ‘clearance’, and third party ‘error catch’ as part of those interactions in Class C.
In fact the table seems to show that VFR pilot errors are in some instances almost 85,000 times more likely in Class E airspace, a difference that is likely to have had very significant effects on the estimates of the relative safety of the two classes of airspace.
The problem with this conclusion is that the probabilities in the shaded cells, although entered into the fault tree, were not in fact estimated by the panel but directly assigned by AA staff. In other words, in these cases AA merely decided that these probabilities were remote and arbitrarily assigned them a value of 1 in 1,000,000.
Are you agreeing that the expert panel estimate of 85,000 times greater chance of VFR error in Class E was reflective of reality? Or are you questioning the expert [pilot and ATC] panellist responses?

Perhaps the data capture of that particular question was displayed in a potentially confusing way which resulted in an anomalous scoring by expert panellist?

You also say:
To further suggest that such figures do not materially alter the outcome of the analysis is (at best) revealing the writer has no in-depth knowledge of the various qualitative and quantitative methods of risk assessment.
From the O'Neill report:
AA expressed confidence that although the absolute values of the risk estimates may not be reliable, the relative results (i.e. between airspace types) were.
Clearly, this is reasonable, and correct. Were it [and more generally the AsA case for rollback] not, it would not have occured given the 'political' pressure cooker of the time!

That same political pressure cooker might well be on the heat today ;)

[Howabout]

ARFOR, I am kicking it into touch.

Dick won't come back because I don't think he can.

However, despite some of the emotion, Lead remains a credible jouster.

We can, at least, have a rational debate with Lead and keep it civil.

Before I go, would one of you guys who belong to the 'dozens and dozens' please put your hand/s up and back Dick's assertion that E is cheaper than C. With your real name, of course, because without that you wouldn't have any credibility.

I am sure you will agree Dick.

[konstantin]

Freedom7

May I take a stab in the dark without stealing too much of your thunder in relation to the hypothetical Broome scenario?

E airspace
- IFR aircraft happily chugging along enjoying the view
- VFR aircraft happily chugging along enjoying the view
- Tower controller happily processing the known IFR inbound

C airspace
- The controller gives the VFR aircraft the option of tracking either via overhead Broome or remaining laterally OCTA for the purpose of separation assurance between ALL aircraft operating or proposing to operate within the controlled airspace volume. Not hard, either the VFR stays OCTA or the IFR is given a technical requirement to be through a level below the VFR by a certain distance from Broome. It`s called procedural (non-radar) separation. Happens every day, guys and gals, believe it or not.

Oh, I`m sorry, my bad, I apologise for the fact that I forgot some people want to fly where they want when they want...like, hypothetically , someone flying from Lord Howe to the Australian mainland in a single engined aircraft and then complaining about not receiving direct tracking to destination within the Sydney basin touting the possibility of an engine failure as justification. Just hypothetically...

[Mike Barry]

Mike, are you refering to class C over D at place like Broome with no terminal radar?

Let's say there is a VFR aircraft at 6500' going from south to north about 20 miles to the east of Broome at the closest point. At about the same time you have an IFR Kingair on descent from the east, inbound to Broome as well as local flights and circuit traffic. It's sky clear.

Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?

Pull my other leg!Nope, I'd call the tower and have him separate visually,,that's why he has binos in the tower cab.
Or... I could get the VFR guy to report a position, not sure if they are allowed to use composite sep standards in OZ at the present time, and have the IFR guy lock onto a radial , play unders and overs etc etc...not really additional work for me, a bit more for the pilot but that's life. There are a multitude of sep standards that can be used, I haven't used them for a very long time and I don't have a copy of MATS in front of me...but you can look them up and get someone here to give you a rundown of them.
Or I could use what Konstantin said...remain OCTA to the bugshmasher, job done!
BTW passing traffic and then having them bleat on at each other whilst the VFR guy tries to work out where north is far more stressful and R/T time consuming, not to mention the IFR guy requesting separation from the VFR guy. I could spend that time doing something far more productive, like reading the paper or working out what 5 letter word 26 across is:E
I hate to break the news to you, but separating traffic is far easier and quicker than telling them about each other, many years of bitter experience have shown this to be true...whether or not you like to hear it.

So, you now have your ATC who named himself give you an answer...will you now answer the questions given to you above, no equivocation, no "I heard from someones brothers cousin", and especially no "I believe", or "they do it that way in the states" Just answer the questions that have been put to you.


Howabout!! G'day from the Emerald Isle! I had lunch in Galway this very afternoon, actually had lunch in Doolin, just up the coast from Galway, but then spent an enjoyable arvo wandering around the streets:ok:

[Freedom7]

konstatin

There is no thunder to steel.

You have provided an incomplete scenario. I will not second guess your scenario to have others state I have orchestrated it for my benefit.

The controller gives the VFR aircraft the option of tracking either via overhead Broome or remaining laterally OCTA

Why?

for the purpose of separation assurance between ALL aircraft operating or proposing to operate within the controlled airspace volume.

For the purpose of Separation maybe?

Oh, I`m sorry, my bad, I apologise for the fact that I forgot some people want to fly where they want when they want...like, hypothetically , someone flying from Lord Howe to the Australian mainland in a single engined aircraft and then complaining about not receiving direct tracking to destination within the Sydney basin touting the possibility of an engine failure as justification. Just hypothetically...

:confused:

Hypothetically,

E airspace

- IFR aircraft happily chugging along enjoying the view
- VFR aircraft happily chugging along enjoying the view
- Tower controller happily processing the known IFR inbound


BANG

C airspace

Aircraft Separated or 'assured' for the SAME COST, no delays, less transmissions and as an added bonus no Bang.

I can understand individuals own experience but, There is a misconception out there that procedural and/or C airspace is restrictive and should be abolished for the purpose and gain of what exactly???

[Jabawocky]

I hate to break the news to you, but separating traffic is far easier and quicker than telling them about each other, many years of bitter experience have shown this to be true...whether or not you like to hear it.

From a bugsmasher pilots point of view I would agree.

To add to the argument however, the scenario I described in G a few posts back would have been far better for all concerned if it was E, so is there a case for more E to lower levels in the busier regional areas? At least then we would all have been positively told where to go;).

[konstantin]

Freedom7, hope we are not talking at cross purposes, please allow me to clarify;

- I was basing my discussion on the scenario as posed at Broome by Dick a few posts above, nothing inferred towards yourself - "stealing thunder" was merely an acknowledgement that you had yourself offered to respond to that scenario (or a more specific version thereof?)

- In my E airspace example I left out what I thought was a self evident inference of a potential "bang"

- Tracking via overhead Broome vs OCTA were just two means of how to solve that particular conflict in C

- My last para alluded to the expectation of some people to being able to proceed A DCT B (eg 20 miles abeam Broome) without accepting that this could adversely impact on the processing of other aircraft - whether complicating the situation in C or potentially generating a near miss or worse in E

I am in full agreement with your concluding statements, of course.

Cheers "k"

[Dick Smith]

Mike Barry

You may be an ATC who has named yourself, but it’s quite clear you don’t have a clue.

For example, you state

I'd call the tower and have him separate visually,,that's why he has binos in the tower cab

Mike, they would have to be pretty amazing “binos” that you could see a small aircraft twenty miles away.

Then you go on to state,

not sure if they are allowed to use composite sep standards in OZ at the present time

If you’re not sure of such a basic issue, how can you say that there is no more workload in Class C – where you have to separate IFR and VFR and Class E where you do not have to?

You go on to say

There are a multitude of sep standards that can be used, I haven't used them for a very long time and I don't have a copy of MATS in front of me

In fact, I think you will find that ATCs who do have a copy of MATS in front of them are the ones telling me that Class C without radar is far more complex to control than Class E.

You state

Or I could use what Konstantin said...remain OCTA to the bugshmasher, job done!

Oh, Mike, now I understand what you are saying! Class C has no extra workload if you tell the VFR aircraft to remain OCTA!

Anyway, Mike, I admire you for using your own name. Now we simply need to get an ATC who is familiar with Australian standards in both Class E and Class C non-radar airspace to answer the question.

And by the way, telling the VFR aircraft to track from twenty miles out to overhead Broome does add to costs. So forget this claim that Class C costs the same as Class E. This may be to ATCs who tell the VFR to keep out of controlled airspace, but certainly not to all the aircraft that are given extra tracking distances.

I confirm again that I cannot get any ATCs to come on this site with their true beliefs about the workload of C compared to E because they will risk losing their jobs by doing so.

[CrazyMTOWDog]

To add to the argument however, the scenario I described in G a few posts back would have been far better for all concerned if it was E, so is there a case for more E to lower levels in the busier regional areas? At least then we would all have been positively told where to go

Is it safe because there was no prang?

If the ablity to be in a controlled environment is there, why not have it?

If the ATC is in the Tower providing a service, why not have it?

ps.

I'm still waiting (so is everyone else) Dick.................its great to see you ask for professional ATCs to coment and then slam their credibility:\

[Freedom7]

Mike, they would have to be pretty amazing “binos” that you could see a small aircraft twenty miles away.

STEINER Binoculars 7x50 Marine | OZScopes (http://www.ozscopes.com.au/steiner-binoculars-marine-7x50.html)

Personal weapon of choice, better than 20 nm

In fact, I think you will find that ATCs who do have a copy of MATS in front of them are the ones telling me that Class C without radar is far more complex to control than Class E.


Who?




konstantin,

Thanks, after some trivial imput I now understand the AIRP#NIS incident. I don't get out much:cool:

[Howabout]

I confirm again that I cannot get any ATCs to come on this site with their true beliefs about the workload of C compared to E because they will risk losing their jobs by doing so.

To paraphrase Basil, 'Brilliant Sybil, just brilliant; Mastermind - special category - stating the bleeding obvious.'

How does that sit, Dick, with your previous comments to the effect that those that disagree with your views are not credible 'because you will not reveal your real names?' And other previous statements that imply that if these guys really believed in something, then surely they would post 'under their real names' if it was the truth.

It seems to be OK to bag someone when they disagree with you, but not OK to do the same to someone who (allegedly) agrees with you.

Plus Mr Barry just did it!! And confirmed, under his real name, that it's not cheaper to provide an E service in comparison to full IFR to VFR separation under C procedures.

Mr Barry, thanks for your comments. Indeed an impressive CV. OS beat me to the punch! Please stay engaged.

Glad you enjoyed your lunch! I don't know if you know the Railway Hotel in Galway, or what it's like these days (now known as the Meryck - I think), but my uncle was the head wine honcho there for years, years ago. Had the 'pleasure' of being delivered to Normandy on D-Day via glider.

Anyway, sorry guys, that's thread drift; I know.

[Dick Smith]

This is all incredibly pathetically childish.

Why is it that such as important issue as the air safety of Australians is presented by people who hide their real names?

Because they think the whole issue is a joke - that's why !

If they were genuine they would not only put their real names on Pprune- they would also contact the media to get their views across.

They don't because it is all a con!

[CaptainMidnight]

Frank

You started your post with an insult, then finished with a comment re throwing a net over me. From the latter I wondered if you had interpreted the incident as 1000ft.

Anyway lets not argue minor points. I agree the ABIT was a bit pie in the sky. The aircraft involved was a straight hang glider, not a powered trike. I was simply trying to make the point that in Class E airspace, there can be no radio no transponder traffic, particularly in NE Victoria, where they operate up to 10k. Large numbers during the Summer months in particular.

I think you mentioned earlier a guesstimate re the numbers, and said they needed to be factored into any risk assessment. I agree :ok:

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

And, I'll bite......

Why is it that almost 20 years 'down the track' from your first 'cuts', that we are still in an unfinished limbo in which NO service is now 'the norm' in many areas where a FIS was once provided?

(e.g. Try rather LARGE portions of WA... as well as other states)

"Your Safety Will Be Unhanced And It Will Cost You Less".......

What a Mantra.....and wot a load of.......

You took away something that we had - and have given us nothing in return!
And none of it is overall cheaper......


Your last words....about a 'con' seem to really ring true....now.

Rant over.......:ugh:

[Much Ado]

Mr Smith can you really be as stupid as your last post indicates?

I think not which leaves me wondering at your agenda when you repeatedly bash this same drum. Ppruners have been sacked and suffered significant financial hardship as a result of posting their opinion on Pprune - and on FAR LESS controversial subjects than this.

Last warning - Leave the subject of peoples real identities alone - or I will bin you AGAIN:mad:

[ARFOR]

Let's ensure readers understand that 'the scenario' Mr Smith put forward for Broome [per below] is not difficult for procedural D/C controller/s, rather 'explaining' in written terms the way these separation/workload issues are managed is the difficult part.
Let's say there is a VFR aircraft at 6500' going from south to north about 20 miles to the east of Broome at the closest point. At about the same time you have an IFR Kingair on descent from the east, inbound to Broome as well as local flights and circuit traffic. It's sky clear.

Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?

It’s a fair question!

Let’s see if we can work through the scenario’s:-

Assumptions [worst case]

1. The crossing VFR [let’s call it VH-V.F.R]
- No flight plan lodged with ATC
- No navaid’s receivers on-board
- No PCAS, ACAS or ADS-B OUT or IN
2. The arriving IFR [let’s call it VH-M.S.U]
- VOR, LOC, DME, GPS
- No PCAS, ACAS or ADS-B OUT or IN

Broome

Airservices Australia - Aeronautical Information Package (AIP) (http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/publications/aip.asp)

is equipped with:-
- 25NM MSA A022
- 10NM MSA A015

Lets assume Tower operate D/C up to A085, Centre C above

Conditions

- Information ‘Delta’ current, Runway 28 in use [worse case profile for the Beech, straight in approach], CAVOK
- + Two Cessna’s in the circuit
- + Two helicopters [one outbound, one inbound] to/from the NW

Difficult to display without terminal area maps [which both pilots and ATC will have in towered airspace], but let try to build the picture.

Google map will do for this purpose: -

Google Maps (http://maps.google.com.au/maps?hl=en&ie=UTF8&ll=-18.03881,122.351303&spn=0.402182,0.718918&z=11) - may have to zoom out/in and centre so you are able to see Broome and the Great Northern Highway to the East :E

Broome International Airport is on the peninsula to the west of centre, scale 40 ish’ miles

Hypothetical transcript

0400z
CEN – TWR “estimate MSU, Broome 0430, inbound on the 090 bearing, assigned A090”
TWR – CEN “MSU, A090”

0410z
E.L.C “Broome tower, Helicopter E.L.C is Willies Creek A015, inbound received ‘Delta’”
TWR “Helicopter E.L.C, Broome tower, track direct Broome, maintain A015, report at Cable Beach”
E.L.C [reads back]

0412z
A.B.B “A.B.B Base, touch and go”
TWR “A.B.B, clear touch and go”
A.B.B [reads back]

0414
E.L.L “Broome tower, Helicopter E.L.L is ready at the Helipad, for a NW departure”
TWR “Helicopter E.L.L Broome tower, traffic upwind, a Cessna remaining in the left circuit, climb to A055, depart on track, clear for take-off”
E.L.L [reads back]

0415z
V.F.R “Broome tower gidday, Cessna 206, V.F.R is 35NM to the south east, tracking northbound, maintaining A065, received delta, request clearance”
TWR “V.F.R Broome tower afternoon, cross control area tracking northbound remaining at least 1NM east of the Great Northern Highway at all times, maintain A065”
V.F.R [reads back]
A.B.B “A.B.B base, touch and go”
TWR “A.B.B clear touch and go”
A.B.B [reads back]

0417z
A.B.C “Broome tower, A.B.C Ready runway 28 for circuits”
TWR “A.B.C Broome tower, follow the company Cessna early left downwind, clear for take-off make left turn”
A.B.C [reads back clearance]
E.L.C “E.L.C approaching Cable beach”
TWR “E.L.C, clear visual approach, join circuit close right base for the helipad”
E.L.C [reads Back]

0418z
A.B.B “A.B.B, base touch and go”
TWR “A.B.B, follow the company Cessna on crosswind, clear touch and go”
A.B.B [reads back]

0420z
E.L.C “E.L.C Right base”
TWR “ E.L.C, at the Helipad, clear to land”
E.L.C [reads back]
A.B.C “A.B.C Base, touch and go”
TWR “A.B.C, helicopter traffic on opposite base is for the helipad, runway 28 clear touch and go”
A.B.C [reads back]

0421z
M.S.U “Broome tower afternoon, MSU, 31DME inbound 090, approaching A090 visual, received delta [ATIS]”
TWR “MSU Broome tower, afternoon, descend 075, report established west of the Great Northern Highway for further descent”
M.S.U “MSU, A075, wilco”

0421z til 0424z [more circuit calls]

0425z
M.S.U “M.S.U is west of the Great Northern Highway, maintaining A075”
TWR “M.S.U descent A025 visual, report approaching”
M.S.U “M.S.U A025”
TWR “V.F.R, established clear of Broome controlled airspace, frequency change approved”
V.F.R “V.F.R Frequency changed approved once OCTA, seeya”
TWR “ Cheers”, break A.B.B clear touch and go”

Etc Etc

In the illustration above, the two aircraft that conflict at 20nm East are resolved using only those transmissions above in red. Easy ;) and SAFE :ok:

Worthy of note, controllers have published separation diagrams at the ready that provide them quick reference to VFR geographical verses IFR route and distance separation options.

Add to that the fact that the local controllers develop in-depth knowledge of the topography, and the ‘solutions to most tracking and separation problems.
Do you still believe that there would be no extra workload for the controller at Broome if C was allocated rather than E?
Far better to have a local controller know what they are doing is right, apply the solution with a minimum of frequency use, rather than a non-local [but competent] pilot’s trying to work it out on the fly at short notice, broadcasting over the top of ATC trying to work out how to miss each other.

If I have got this little scenario wrong, ATC contributors will correct my mistakes. ;)

[le Pingouin]

C has been established to be safer than E, so why are you wanting it so desperately?

Why do you resort to using inflammatory language? Is it because you have nothing further to say? Is it your way of saying I won't answer your questions because I don't actually have any evidence?

"Incredibly pathetically childish". What a fabulous contribution to the discussion.

I confirm again that I cannot get any ATCs to come on this site with their true beliefs about the workload of C compared to E because they will risk losing their jobs by doing soYou're perfectly willing to accept this from controllers who you claim support you, yet taunt those of us who post here using pseudonyms for the very same reason. Feel free to call them "cowards", I know you want to.

[Howabout]

This is all incredibly pathetically childish.

Why is it that such as important issue as the air safety of Australians is presented by people who hide their real names?

Because they think the whole issue is a joke - that's why !

If they were genuine they would not only put their real names on PPRuNe- they would also contact the media to get their views across.

They don't because it is all a con!Hell, pretty radical Dick!

You see, old mate, posts like that do you no favours. The people that post here are concerned with aviation safety; otherwise they wouldn't make the effort.

As for the comment that 'the whole issue is a joke,' it seems to me that you are demeaning yourself unnecessarily by making such a gratuitous observation

Nobody, me included, wants to see an Australian icon embarrassing himself with what appears to be a dummy-spit. What I regard as the emotive stuff should be beneath you. I am consistently disappointed that emotion seems to overtake practicality, given your substantial achievements.

Regretfully, I suppose we just keep arguing the toss.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Food for thought.......

PSA Flight 182 vs a C-172 in California........

PSA Flight 182 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PSA_Flight_182)

At around 9am local time on a clear day.....

Could this happen in 'E'..?
Would this happen in 'C'..?

Which is 'safer', and, from what we are told, costs the same to administer???

Why would anyone 'bother' with 'E'..???

[Frank Arouet]

CaptainMidnight;

We seem to be minor players in this thread so I won't labour the point. The fact is that many gliders can and do operate up to FL350, (as in 35,000ft), winter soaring in class E airspace. Most I imagine are radio equipped but having no means of generating electricity are limited to activities which are generally mentioned in NOTAMS.

You mention,

I think you mentioned earlier a guesstimate re the numbers, and said they needed to be factored into any risk assessment. I agree

The thing is it is not a guesstimate but actual figures quoted from the latest RAA magazine.

They like gliders (under the self adminsitration of GFA, HGF, etc), need to be factored into this debate because they are a fact of life. They are additional to RAA figures.

I am an ardent supporter of "alerted see and avoid" so have misgivings about people flying where radio or a TXP are mandatory and would be sensible for safe flight.

Again, at great risk of showing my age, I was of the belief that radio was mandatory for flight above A050 (5,000ft). But I owned an Auster with no electrics then, so perhaps I am a dinoursaur. But do people have to make me extinct before I'm even dead.

If I were a frog I would be a protected species.

Sorry if I offended.

[Dick Smith]

Direct .thanks for reminding me.

It explains this thread - but not good in a democracy where professionals cannot state their true beliefs openly to the media.

Imagine if an accident takes place because of the current CASA decision re Broome and ATC's come out of the woodwork saying they could not state their true beliefs on safety openly to the media and traveling public because they did not have an independent income.

I don't believe the public would accept such a claim.

Australians risked their lives in war so, among other things,we could speak up and say the truth when it was important to do so.

Public safety is surely a time when there should be no fear in openly stating the truth.

Much Ado , surely this is an important issue to canvas in public and on Pprune -the fact that professionals can't , without fear or favour, speak out about aviation safety.

[Howabout]

Sorry Lead, and you know I respect your objective approach; notwithstanding that we disagree.

However, some of the comments that are coming from your side of the fence are doing damage to rational debate.

We had a forum here where there was a degree of mutual respect. Yep, a little testy at times, but still worthwhile. I learned a bit too from your posts!

Unfortunately, it's degenerated to the usual emotive rubbish that's historically been fuelled by 'if you won't post your name, you're not believable.'

Sorry, Lead; I sincerely regret that you get pigeon-holed in that domain. I know you argue from conviction and always try to be objective; as much as I regard your arguments as being flawed.

You're dead-set wrong on E airspace, but at least there's a degree of civility in the debate.

[ozineurope]

I worked Hedland tower in the 80s when there was even less good gear around than today. Nothing but VOR/DME/NDB and we owned from the SFC up to FL250 in the despised (by some) upside down wedding cake of CTA and OCTA. All positive control and everyone was separated from everyone.

In the time I was there I cannot remember (and remember Alzheimers improves long term memory) ever denying a VFR aircraft a clearance through/into/across the CTA or CTR. Because, as others have mentioned, I had local knowledge and I devised clearances that allowed all the IFR and VFR to share the airspace and get where they wanted to go.

The coast, railway lines, roads, rivers (even when they were dry), the crushers to name a few were used in conjunction with the radials and DME to establish procedural separation between the aircraft. Then inside 10 miles we used the binos and our eyes. That posting enabled me to use those same things in a radar environment when 3nm was just too much when I could still use north and south of the river or the road or the railway line.

It costs the same for a controller to do A,B,C,D,E,F and G airspace. There is no difference to us, only the rules and protection that is afforded to those using the airspace.

Now I work in Germany and it costs the same for a controller to do the work independant of the airspace classification. Get it there is no lesser charge just because the letter changes. There is only a change in the service you receive- positive separation or see and be seen. That is the choice.

Ideology has no place in aviation safety. If you want my name use the PM function and I will gladly supply it.

[LeadSled]

You're dead-set wrong on E airspace, but at least there's a degree of civility in the debate.Howabout,

Izzzatso!!! Only if many organizations and authorities around the world are wrong, starting with ICAO.

I have never ceased to be amazed at the vociferous objection to change in matters aviation in Australia, my first realization of this being the domestic pilots campaign against the use of weather radar. There are just so many other examples, over the years. In fact, there have been few technological advances that have nor been objected to by a particular group of domestic pilots.

In the main it is only domestic pilots, and then largely only members of the AFAP, who have long resisted harmonizations with the rest of the world. AIPA had little to say about NAS, how could they, working in all varieties of airspace, including the dreaded E, around the world on a daily basis.

As Dick Smith continually tries to point out, ATC direct costs are not the only costs attributable to airspace categorization, the Airservices practice of giving absolute priority over VFR also presents serious problems ---- very little VFR traffic is "private flight". So one category of commercial operations suffers unnecessary costs. No such discrimination exists in US, as one example. That Airservices only derives revenue from one has only added to the blatant discrimination against VFR.

The extract from a letter in a previous post, about the savage enforcement within Airservices may well be true as part of th explanation ( in DCA days the trappers were referred to as the Airstapo) ----- as is the Australian practice of all aviation law (and not just major offenses)--- right down to inadvertent clerical errors -- being criminal law ----- with widespread "strict liability", meaning there is only an extremely limited defense.

However, on matters of airspace categorization, it is fundamentally untenable to suggest that Australia is the only soldier in the battalion in step. That the rest of the world had got it wrong.

Perhaps some of you should read the views of CASA's John McCormick, about Australian aviation, viz-a-vie the rest of the world, and our real place in "the big picture". It's all on the CASA web site. I agree with his remarks.

Tootle pip!!

PS: OAR is part CASA, not "the Department", the Civil Aviation Act is not the only legislation administered by CASA.

[ozineurope]

So why in Europe does C overly D CTRs where the traffic mix is such that it warrants? To protect the passengers is my guess. Dont believe me - then check out the Luftraumstruktur/Sichtflugregeln in Deutschland as an example.

The airspace is a lot busier than Oz but they seem to cope with the impost.

[Mike Barry]

You may be an ATC who has named yourself, but it’s quite clear you don’t have a clue.

For example, you state

Quote:
I'd call the tower and have him separate visually,,that's why he has binos in the tower cab
Mike, they would have to be pretty amazing “binos” that you could see a small aircraft twenty miles away.
Gee Dick, don't sit on the fence:rolleyes: I must have been pretty slick to have got away with being clueless all these years. It strikes me that when ever you have started losing a rational argument, you lash out into personal attacks. A pity, but there you go...look up Zealot in your dictionary, then look in the mirror. What do you see?

BTW I used to work in Perth Tower once upon a time, and watched by the naked eye a B767 to 67nm on the GEL track, as someone posted before, those Steiner glasses are the bees knees and obviously even better than the MK 1 eyeball.

As for the rest of your post, others have already pointed out the error of your ways, so now I'm off back to work, moving traffic both ways across the Atlantic and sequencing a/c into the London terminal area, that's if I can find a clue somewhere:E

ps I do note with interest that if an anti NAS poster doesn't name him/herself, they are a "Coward" but if they are pro NAS and don't identify themselves, then they are good people worried about their jobs...can't really have it both ways old son:ugh:

[TrafficTraffic]

http://www.motifake.com/image/demotivational-poster/0904/trolling-trolling-troll-internet-likes-to-fight-fail-jerk-pu-demotivational-poster-1239308887.jpg

Mike don't let Dick get you...

found this when I GOOGLEd 'Dick Smith"



TT

PSL: hope your greenhouse is ok!

[Mike Barry]

No worries mate...I just got tired of the incessant whining about identities...

the greenhouse has survived it's first real test...thunderstorms and squall lines, happily no hail!

Take care:ok:

[Dick Smith]

Mike , I apologise but do you really expect me to believe a real ATC would use bino's to separate an IFR from a VFR 20 miles east of Broome tower?

If not why did you make such a claim ?.

I bet you don't have any class C without radar in Europe.

- thats because without radar you have no way of verifying where the VFR is if out of site.

[peuce]

Leadsled & Dick,

You are always trying to bring the argument around to "resistence to change" on the part of a nasty group within the Industry.

You naughty boys know that is just being mischievious. Unless I'm mistaken, we have been discussing whether the steps into Broome and Karattha should be either "C" or "E" ... not whether they shouldn't be changed. I think most have accepted that both locations will become controlled. The only question is, what type of control?

You also talk of the cost to VFRs in being re-routed in C. The reality is, wherever there is a conflict between two aircraft (and they know about it) there will be a cost to either one , or both, re-routing to some degree. Whether it's self separation, or Controller separation. So that cost is irrelevant to this discussion.

So now we only have the debateable issues of safety and controller cost. Leadsled has said that both C and E are equally safe ... in the right place. Leadsled says E is the appropriate safety net at Broome , others think otherwise. It's a very thin line ... could go either way.

So, let's decide on Controller cost. Dick says C is more expensive, the Controllers have said bollocks. Leadsled, I think, has been quite on the issue.

So, it's marginal ... whichever way you look at it.

Considering the recent "comments/rulings" on what constitutes Negligence, and he marginal differences in the arguments, I say, would it not be safer(in all respects) to err towards C?

[TrafficTraffic]

VFR is if out of site


Do you mean out of sight - as in you cannot see it?

.....


What can you say?


TT

[ARFOR]

but do you really expect me to believe a real ATC would use bino's to separate an IFR from a VFR 20 miles east of Broome tower
If the aircraft are being visually separated by the tower controller [lateral diverging using azimuth], larger aircraft [Kingair and bigger] are regularly sighted [ATC's using their weapon/s of choice :}] 30+nm out. Happens everyday. At night with lights, they will 'see' inbound' [larger] aircraft at 100nm out. Mind you, at that distance, I guess they look pretty low on the horizon initially :E

Again, I am sure I will be corrected if wrong, but there are occasions where visual [controller applied] separation can be achieved by sighting one of the two aircraft concerned. i.e. visual observation [azimuth] outside the procedural tolerances [+1nm] of the other conflicting aircraft. I think that would normally apply between an arriving and departing conflict ;)

[LeadSled]

Considering the recent "comments/rulings" on what constitutes Negligence,

Folks,
The High Court judgment referred to was 1982, hardly recent.

Particularly in light of other judgments subsequent to 1982, and the "legal" emergence of decisions that have validated policies and practices based on risk management standards, as opposed to the rather absolutist position stated in the 1982 Gibbs decision --- ie: the progressive recognition by the High Court that there is no such thing as "absolute safety", and not striving to institute "absolute safety" does not constitute negligence.

Put another way, accepting a risk exists, which is quite foreseeable and can be potentially eliminated --- but deciding to live with a risk ---- is not negligence, per se.

Indeed, may I quote the Chief Justice of NSW: "Negligence is the last refuge of the scoundrel".

That quote far more recent than 1982. The various State and Federal court's approach to "negligence" has changed markedly since the era of the Gibbs HCA.

Tootle pip!!

PS1: The oft quoted BASI report that recommended to CASA positive air traffic control for all RPT services was acquitted on the basis that "risk management" of air safety, as opposed to absolute air safety, was now Government policy.

PS2: If Broome had the same level of overflying traffic as almost any airfield in Germany, and given the nature of the overflying traffic, it would probably be C, even if the D airfield wasn't there at all. In other words, the existence of the D airfield is not related to the decision as to classification of the overlaying airspace. Have a look for the E over D in Germany.

Eurocontrol application of risk management processes in CNS/ATM resourcing, and the publication of risk management targets, and regularly publishing actually achieved performance, against the published planning benchmarks is really worth a little study ---- in ensuring they do not have resources inversely proportional to the risk, as we continually see here.

[ARFOR]

ie: the progressive recognition by the High Court that there is no such thing as "absolute safety", and not striving to institute "absolute safety" does not constitute negligence.
No one is arguing that point, nor is that what is being argued here.

What is being argued is As Low As Reasonably Practicable i.e. Safer C for the cost of E, not as you wrongly suggest, 'absolute safety'. :=

You well know the difference Leadsled!

In this context, Justice Gibbs pronouncement is valid, and dare I say it, any contemporary Justice would find the same in this airspace context.

Its a very simple concept :ok:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

not striving to institute "absolute safety" does not constitute negligence.

COP OUT! until soemone gets an eye poked out:ugh:

So, the CASR is only guidelines? Strict Liability does not apply?..I WAS managing the risk, your honour.

So class E costing is a risk managment exercise as opposed to absolute safety implied by class C?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

So class E costing is a risk managment exercise as opposed to absolute safety implied by class C?

OR...

The State is betting the farm that because of the low perceived risk of a mid air collision in the environs of terminal airspace there is only a need for class E rules.

Accidents WILL happen but to allow an accident to happen because of managing a risk?????

Better hope the insurance is paid up...because a even small risk is too much.

Why the hell did you think 2B was wound back the first time...RISK!

[LeadSled]

Geeeze, fellas, what would the High Court of Australia (HCA) know, compared with the views on the law as expressed by some of you here.

Just for a start, there is no such thing as "absolute safety", and that has been recognized by the HCA. Risk Management standards such as (but not limited to) ASNZ 4360 only go back to 1999 or so. Long after 1982.

Amendments to the Trade Practices Act, to recognize the legitimacy of high risk commercial activities is far more recent than 1982. The whole thrust of HCA judgments, and considerable bodies of legislation, have changed radically (and for the better -- reintroducing personal responsibility for personal behavior, as but one example) since 1982. Although in an entirely different area, recent HCA judgments effectively disallowing certain aspects of NSW OH&S legislation ---- legislation that implied absolute safety is achievable ---- are relevant.

In short, a decision by CASA, based on current legislation, that E over D is what is required in Broome or Karratha, in that it satisfies the risk management criteria as embodies in the airspace regulation,ie: the minimum classification that meets the separation assurance criteria, is a lawful decision.

Such a decision (if the processes have been correctly applied) would not be found to be negligent, because of claims by some that "C over D is safer". If you understand the legislation, (remember it is no longer up to Airservices and their rather strange internal risk management system, as it was with the NAS 2b rollback) all OAR is doing is as required by the Parliament --- they are not making personal judgments about airspace classification ---- but complying with the Airspace Act 2007.

In this respect, it is very similar to the "new" Design, Certification and Manufacturing Rules, where and unlike pre. 1998 rules there is no "----- and CASA is satisfied". Neither CASA nor its employees can be found negligent for following processes laid down by Parliament --- if they have properly followed the processes.

If you want to sue Parliament for alleged negligent regulation --- good luck.

Tootle pip!!

What is being argued is As Low As Reasonably Practicable i.e. Safer C for the cost of E, not as you wrongly suggest, 'absolute safety'. ARFOR,
I rather think you are referring to ALARP as embodied in the Airservices SMS as per the NAS 2b era, that no longer applies ---- ALARP as a concept is still with us, but in proper risk analysis, it does not mean quite the same thing as during the period prior to the Airspace Act, and as applied by Airservices.

[Howabout]

The State is betting the farm that because of the low perceived risk of a mid air collision in the environs of terminal airspace there is only a need for class E rules.Well put OZ, my argument entirely.

We can talk all we like about 'risk management,' but it will not wash in court, before a jury, in the event of a MAC. 'So, Mr OAR, are you telling me you took a risk that was avoidable and, as a result of taking that avoidable risk, people died? Is this what you're telling the court?'

Yeah, right. A smart lawyer, and I'm sure there are some that are following this very thread, would go straight to the BITRE website - a Government agency (all I did was Google 'value of life+aviation'). They'd extract the 'value of life' figure for aviation accidents ($2.17m), multiply that by the number of fatalities, ask for clarification as to exactly how much was saved by giving VFR open slather, and whoever signs off on this garbage would be finding an open window on a very tall building.

'Well Your Honour, there was this C182 that had to remain OCTA, and that cost him an extra $35 in AVGAS and then there was a PA28 that was forced to track overhead, instead of direct, and that accrued an extra $15 to his fuel bill and then there was.....'

There'll be no running and no hiding.

Clinton, just read your post afterwards. What's your opinion?

[LeadSled]

Clinton,

I will have to try and find my copy of the speech, just to satisfy you, I actuall went to the trouble of printing it off.

As I recall, it was in the context of legislative change in NSW, that substantially reduced the avenues for negligence actions in accident cases in NSW, particularly motor vehicle accidents. Changes that had certain factions of the local bar in uproar.

It was/is obviously a favorite topic, I have personally listened to him on the subject.

I am sure you would agree that the tone of court judgments in the area, whilst not entirely consistent, have certainly changed since the Gibbs High Court.

As a related matter, have a look at Jones v. Bartlett [2000] HCA 56 at 23.

As good a definition of Safe/Safety as I have seen, given that "safe" or "safety" are rather useless terms --- despite the great majority "knowing what is safe/safety" it is an emotive term without dimension. I can measure risk, I can't measure "safe", and as the saying goes: "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it".

Tootle pip!!

[ozineurope]

Nope - radar coverage in DE is not absolute, there are many gaps in coverage due terrain. There are also areas where there is no primary coverage, much the same as no radar if you do not have a working TPDR.

The amount of traffic is not the only consideration wehn discussing airspace classes, it is a combination of the mix and the amount.

Eurocontrol only 'own' airspace down to FL285 so probably not a real good guide as to the type of airspace they would have over a D zone.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Leadsled, your argument proves that "Airmanship" does not exist.

[LeadSled]

OZ,

How do you work that out??

"airmanship" is certainly not part of the process for airspace classification embodied within the Airspace Act and Regulation, including the Airspace Policy Statement.

Tootle pip!!

PS: I will admit that I continuously witness quite appalling lapses in what I regard as expected standards of airmanship ---- applied common sense ----- but it is probably all to true of common sense is that it is not all that common.

[Howabout]

I was quite impressed with ozineurope's previous response. It's worth re-posting as others come on line in the evening, otherwise it'll be lost - no doubt to the satisfaction of the E protagonists. I'm keeping it civil Lead.


I worked Hedland tower in the 80s when there was even less good gear around than today. Nothing but VOR/DME/NDB and we owned from the SFC up to FL250 in the despised (by some) upside down wedding cake of CTA and OCTA. All positive control and everyone was separated from everyone.

In the time I was there I cannot remember (and remember Alzheimers improves long term memory) ever denying a VFR aircraft a clearance through/into/across the CTA or CTR. Because, as others have mentioned, I had local knowledge and I devised clearances that allowed all the IFR and VFR to share the airspace and get where they wanted to go.

The coast, railway lines, roads, rivers (even when they were dry), the crushers to name a few were used in conjunction with the radials and DME to establish procedural separation between the aircraft. Then inside 10 miles we used the binos and our eyes. That posting enabled me to use those same things in a radar environment when 3nm was just too much when I could still use north and south of the river or the road or the railway line.

It costs the same for a controller to do A,B,C,D,E,F and G airspace. There is no difference to us, only the rules and protection that is afforded to those using the airspace.

Now I work in Germany and it costs the same for a controller to do the work independant of the airspace classification. Get it there is no lesser charge just because the letter changes. There is only a change in the service you receive- positive separation or see and be seen. That is the choice.

[konstantin]

Arfor, you rock! Nice scenario and "transcript"...even though your impressive effort was unfortunately just preaching to the converted I suspect. Many ways to skin the feline whilst avoiding the alternative of A/G self-separation chit-chats on a control frequency in a terminal environment.

In relation to the more recent safety/risk/accountability discussion above, for the sake of the argument imagine the following situation, coming from a botom-of-the-food-chain grass roots level;

- A VFR makes a broadcast out of the blue on centre frequency (inbound to Broken Hill in non-radar G)
- A few minutes later a BE20 IFR gives a taxi call BHI-AD

Many of my ex-colleagues (subject to workload and complexity of course) would append to "no reported IFR traffic" the additional comment "and just confirming have you copied the VFR inbound from the West?" Most of the time the IFR responds with "ta centre, spoken to him" but when they haven`t it is muchos gracias for the heads-up...yeah, it`s supposed to work a certain way but the point is that sometimes it doesn`t.

Overservicing? Professional courtesy? Inferred Duty of Care? Potential court of law, "Litigation American style" modern day arse-guarding?

You guys tell me...

[OZBUSDRIVER]

I can measure risk, I can't measure "safe", and as the saying goes: "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it".


By inference. "An emotive term without dimension." Airmanship does not exist because it cannot be measured.

Risk is also not a good term..You can only identify the probability of an event occuring. Probability is not a risk, it is the outcome of an event occuring. Risk is the act of IGNORING that probability.

When I was studying engineering at QIT. Materials Testing 101. Probability of detecting a faulty part can be calculated. A random number can be generated that will result in samples being taken, proving that testing a batch run can be classified as meeting specifications. This specification changes according to the level of safety required in the manufactured part being free of defects. The ultimate level of safety lies with manufacture of aviation components...all parts are tested and certified for aviation use.

In current terms, the probability of the software for Toyota vehicle controls , failing in service would be a defined figure. Testing would be set according to a random list. If those random samples passed then the software would be cleared as safe....In a run of millions, the probability, although very small, proves that a signifcant number of cars will be defective and, ultimately, DANGEROUS. In aviation that level of failure is set at ZERO! and we now have bean counters RISKING against the probability of a failure????(Affordable SAFETY:eek:)

As an engineer, I understand, very clearly, the implications of managed risk. Bean counters have pushed the level of design with its inherant levels of safety within the margins of error of what used to be a factor of 5 to 10% overdesigned because of the limits of testing, to a couple of points of a percent...and we are now seeing extraordinary failures of structures that, previously, were over designed...just to save a few bucks...which team are you barracking for, Leadsled?

[CrazyMTOWDog]

Lead/Dick

Do you wish to see existing class C terminal airspace converted to E?

eg YMHB YMLT YMAY.

[peuce]

Leadsled,

I've left my wig and gown somewhere, so I won't try to debate those critical law issues with you.... as I'd surely loose.

HOWEVER, as an aviation tragic, whose seen probably more Australian and International aviation operations than you realise ... I can't help but feel that, even if us fundamentalists have got it wrong, and E is just as "safe" as C in the discussed areas ... and if we've got it wrong, and it does cost more to man C than E ....what is the magnitude of the difference?

Is it SO great that you wouldn't support Class C ... just in case? Are you so sure of your precise calculations and risk management formulas ( wherever they are) that you'd bet OUR arses on your ability to get the risk/benefit figures (where ever they are) correct down to the 5th decimal place?

If so, you certainly have a lot of faith in yourself and the OAR?

[Howabout]

Nice post OZ.

I hope Clinton comes back on. I'd really appreciate his take on liability.

[ARFOR]

Leadsled

Let's put the written words of, The Act, The AAPS, and CASA's CRMF on the table for interested readers!
I rather think you are referring to ALARP as embodied in the Airservices SMS as per the NAS 2b era, that no longer applies
I am reliably informed that your claim is incorrect!
ALARP as a concept is still with us
A 'legislated' and well understood concept!
but in proper risk analysis it does not mean quite the same thing as during the period prior to the Airspace Act, and as applied by Airservices
Incorrect!

The Airspace Act 2007
ComLaw Management - Series- Airspace Act 2007 (http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Management.nsf/lookupindexpagesbyid/IP200730484?OpenDocument)
8 Minister must make Australian Airspace Policy Statement

(2) (c) describe the processes to be followed for changing the classifications or designations of particular volumes of Australian-administered airspace

(4) The statement must be consistent with the Chicago Convention. However, if Australia has notified differences under Article 38 of that Convention, the statement must be consistent with those differences.
Australian Airspace Policy Statement 2010
Release of the Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) 2010 (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airspace_reform/aaps.aspx)
Process for Changing the Class or Designation of a Volume of Airspace

15 [B]Changes to an existing airspace classification or designation should be the consequence of a clear and consistent risk management process.
16 CASA‟s risk management process should be consistent with published Australian Standards for risk management as updated.
17 The process for change will commence with CASA identifying the volumes of airspace it will be reviewing in accordance with section 13 of the Airspace Act 2007.
18 The review process will then lead to the completion of a risk assessment of the particular volume of airspace under review.
19 The risk assessment should take into account the types of aircraft involved, the density of air traffic, the meteorological conditions, and such other factors as may be relevant.
20 On completion of the risk assessment process, CASA shall outline its proposals on the overall safety requirement for a particular airspace classification or designation.
21 These proposals will be to (a) change the classification or designation of airspace, (b) not change a classification or designation, but make other proposals to improve airspace arrangements, or (c) recommend a continuation of current airspace arrangements without any other proposals.
22 CASA will provide these proposals for public comment and, after considering these comments, then make a determination to be implemented as directed by CASA, by the relevant parties.
And;
Government’s Policy Objectives

25 The Government considers the safety of passenger transport services as the first priority in airspace administration and CASA should respond quickly to emerging changes in risk levels for passenger transport operations. Airspace administration should also seek to deliver good safety outcomes to all aviation participants.
26 The Government expects that CASA will continue the reform of Australia‟s airspace and move towards closer alignment with the ICAO system and adoption of proven international best practice.
27 The Government has also identified three specific airspace policy objectives in relation to the administration and use of Australian-administered airspace which are detailed in paragraphs 28 to 34 and outlined below:
 support for ICAO‟ Global Air Traffic Management (ATM) Operational Plan and use of ICAO airspace classifications;
 enhanced ATM services at regional aerodromes regularly served by passenger transport services, as determined by CASA; and
 effective cooperation between CASA and Australia's air navigation service providers, including Airservices and Defence.

Support for ICAO’s Global Air Traffic Management Operational Plan and Use of ICAO Airspace Classifications

28 The undertaking of airspace administration will reflect the Australian Government‟ commitment to the ICAO Global ATM Operational Plan.
29 The ICAO Global ATM Operational Plan is the international vision for an integrated, harmonised and globally interoperable ATM system and includes a component on airspace management and organisation‟
30 The Government fully supports the use of the internationally-recognised ICAO airspace classification system (Class A to G airspace) in airspace administration.

Regional Aerodromes

31 The Government is committed to ensuring that effective ATM infrastructure and systems are used to protect and enhance air safety, with ATM services being extended to more regional areas as appropriate, where there has been or is likely to be growing passenger transport services.
32 CASA should ensure that appropriate airspace arrangements are in place at major regional aerodromes regularly served by passenger transport services which respond to changes in aviation activity over time such as changes in traffic density, the mix of aircraft types and increases in passenger transport services.

Cooperation with Australia’s Air Navigation Service Providers

33 The Government is committed to the continuing development of a seamless, harmonised national ATM system. The classification and designation of airspace is seen as an essential component of that system.
34 CASA is to work closely with Australia‟s air navigation service providers to ensure that the needs of all airspace users are properly considered; the provision of ATM services are properly coordinated; and the administration of Australia‟s airspace is both safe and efficient.
And;
Airspace Strategy

35 The Government requires CASA to carry out its responsibilities as the airspace regulator in accordance with the Airspace Act 2007 and the Airspace Regulations 2007.
36 This legislative framework enables CASA to examine and determine future Australian airspace requirements and has established that safety of air navigation is the most important consideration.
37 The Government‟s airspace strategy, to be implemented by CASA, involves the adoption of a risk-based approach to determining Australia‟s future airspace needs.
38 The implementation of this strategy requires the identification of risks to aviation safety using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, and ultimately the safety judgment of CASA as the airspace regulator.
39 The Government expects CASA to adopt international best practice in airspace administration. This includes adopting proven international systems that meet our airspace requirements. The Government‟s airspace strategy recognises that international airspace systems (such as the National Airspace System of the United States of America) include a range of characteristics that should be considered, and implemented as appropriate, by CASA.
40 ICAO standards and recommended practices (SARPs) also provide an important basis for airspace administration. The airspace strategy requires any deviations from ICAO SARPs to be well justified, documented, and formally notified to ICAO as a difference.
And;
41 The airspace strategy requires transparency so that the aviation industry has clear insight into the way in which airspace administrative decisions will be developed, taken and implemented including industry and agency consultation. The strategy does however recognise there will be times when urgent decisions are required to meet a safety imperative.
42 The airspace strategy is a proactive one based on a dedicated CASA work program, identifying priority locations where airspace should be reviewed, and consistent with the review requirements of the Airspace Act 2007 and Airspace Regulations 2007.
43 The strategy does not pre-determine the adoption of a particular class of airspace before airspace risk reviews are completed, but rather requires that the determination of the class of airspace reflects the most appropriate safety outcome as determined by CASA after completion of these reviews and consistent with the Government‟s policy objectives.
Common Risk Management Framework for Airspace and Air Traffic Management
Release of the Australian Airspace Policy Statement (AAPS) 2010 (http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airspace_reform/aaps.aspx)
6.0 Framework Structure

Outline

6.1 Each agency will maintain a risk management system which is in conformance with published Australian/New Zealand Risk Management Standards as updated - currently AS/NZS ISO31000:2009 (see Appendix 2 for an outline of the risk management process).
6.2 As indicated in the standards mentioned above, [B]all risk management systems will be premised on the concept of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

There are however limits to the extent to which the government, industry and the community will pay, to reduce adverse risksThe nub of the discussion Leadsled!

E costs verses C costs [at volume specific locations]! Reducing adverse risk for NO COST!

The concerned experts here are calling for exactly what the Gov't, The Act, The Minister [AAPS], and the CASA [CRMF] all require!
6.3 The Defence Aviation Risk Management process conforms to the standards that apply to the civil risk management regimes. These civil risk management systems are to be accessible to the public.
And;
Analyse Risks

9.4 To facilitate risk analysis an appropriate data exchange should take place between agencies. Most risk identification and analysis methods are dependent on data to drive underlying assumptions. The results of the analysis must then be assessed against appropriate criteria to determine if the risk levels are intolerable.
9.5 This agreement embraces the notion that the magnitude of the change proposal under consideration will drive the level of analysis (and reporting). Determination of magnitude will be driven by the internal protocols within each agency’s risk management system. However the following principles will need to be incorporated within the individual systems:
a. scale of the proposal, e.g. users, airframes, geographic region impacted;
b. complexity of proposal, e.g. interaction with other systems, services;
c. duration, i.e. temporary or ongoing;
d. originality, i.e. has it been proven anywhere else in Australia or overseas or there is already established knowledge about the topic e.g. ICAO standards or requirements.
How long has D with overlying C operated safety and efficiently in Australia? A very long time!
And;
Evaluate Risks

9.7 The qualitative criteria used by agencies, which are usually expressed in terms of consequence and likelihood matrix, may be specific to the agency given their differing roles. However, safety criteria must be premised on the basis of the effect on aircrew, other safety critical staff, the travelling public and the community.
9.8 Large scale assessments will embrace formal Cost Benefit Analysis including full economic, social and environmental impacts.

Treat Risks

9.9 In identifying risk treatments, the agencies will identify a hierarchy of preference for treatment. The highest priority will be given to solutions which seek to eliminate the negative risk.
And;
12 Conflict Resolution

12.1 The Aviation Implementation Group will oversight the application of this agreement.
It is abundantly clear the processes that need to be followed, and ultimately who is responsible for 'negligent' non-compliance! :=

Where is the 'proper', 'publiclly available' safety analysis work for YMAV, YWLM, YBRM and YPKA that transparently compares [as per the reg's above] options such as E or D or C in specific airspace volumes?

[ozineurope]

And every day in Australia procedural towers are applying the same standards that were applied 30 years ago in Hedland, why? Because they work and they allow the most efficient use of the airspace whilst affording protection to the airspace users.

When you've sat on APP (radar) and called traffic 3 or 4 times to the VFR so that he hopefully wont hit the other Baron/C441/C310/Dash8/etc etc and he still cant see him at 1nm at 11o'clock at the same level, you realise how flawed see and avoid airspace actually is.

So you give up passing traffic- put 500ft between them and no one dies.

[Mike Barry]

Mike , I apologise but do you really expect me to believe a real ATC would use bino's to separate an IFR from a VFR 20 miles east of Broome tower?

If not why did you make such a claim ?

Dick, apology accepted.

With regard to the above quote, yes indeed I do, it is called visual separation...as I and many others have done in the past, unlike some, I don't actually espouse here what I don't believe:E

Anyway, your question has been answered, read ozineuropes posts for more info about separation in non radar locations.
You could actually try listening to the guys/gals that have actually been doing the controlling, they actually know what they are talking about, whether you like it or not.

ciao all, going nocom...

[LeadSled]

ARFOR,
Wonderful demonstration of your dexterity in cut and paste, but there is nothing there that is inconsistent with what I have said, on this or previous occasions. And the results for Broome and Karatha are (obviously) consistent with everything you have cut and pasted from the Airspace legislation.

I love one of the posts that says "risk" is not a good word, then goes on to "probability ----" ------ exactly, in the simplest possible terms, that is what we are talking about.

And I say again, ALARP as was(is?) applied by Airservices in their SMS manual is NOT the same as a "conventional" ALARP, they had their own version that did not recognize (as some of you blokes don't) "vanishingly small" (a statistical zero) as the cutoff for a calculated probability of collision. You cannot have "less than zero" probability ---- except in Science Fiction.

A short course in cost/benefit analysis wouldn't go astray either, see the Productivity Commission web site, there is plenty of info around. In particular, you should note carefully how "proponent bias" is factored in a proper CBA assessment, not to mention the full range of costs to be taken into consideration.

We all genuinely look forward to Clinton's views on liability for negligence, as it concerns public servants properly applying the law that they administer.

You should all go and look up Jones v. Bartlett ----- that will tell you what the High Court thinks "safe" means, for public policy purposes. It is a very interesting read, stated far more clearly than some of the new draft CASA regs.

Tootle pip!!

OZ,
You are falling into the common trap that techniques for measuring quality control effectiveness in mass production (reliability engineering) is essentially the same as ASNZ 4360 Risk Management, and it ain't so. An ex-CSIRO chap, who opposes ICAO cruising levels, and wants us to go back 20 years or so falls into the same trap. I, too, started life as some kind of an engineer.

[ARFOR]

Leadsled Thank you.

One of us needs to provide context via quote, lest it would be nothing more than uninformed pontification ;)
there is nothing there that is inconsistent with what I have said, on this or previous occasions
You therefore are in support of the so called 'process' used to date for YBRM and YPKA! :D
And the results for Broome and Karatha are (obviously) consistent with everything you have cut and pasted from the Airspace legislation
Are you really that blind? :hmm:

[peuce]

And really, that is all any of us have provided on PPRUNE, our opinions. No matter how pretty the wrapping has been, the content has just been opinion.

The final arbiter on "truth" might end up being 12 random men and women, selected from the great unwashed. If that occurrs, then I have a feeling that their personal view of what's right and what's wrong might have greater sway than all the empirical formulae placed end to end across Australia.... no matter what a Judge's direction may be... the "vibe"if you like.

Although none of us wish things to go that far.

In all probability, there won't be any near misses, despite allowing Class E to be installed ... but I can't help feeling that we are just leaving that door a little bit ajar ... when we needn't.

[Capn Bloggs]

Peuce,

I agree. The scientists can hide all they like behind the numbers and the "vanishing-small" probability of a midair in E. In the end though, nobody has put forward a cost-benefit analysis that overwhelming supports E in preference to C and therefore there is no valid argument for it. The Launy and Brisbane Airproxs provided a wakeup call for the E supporters. Wake Up!

[Howabout]

CrazyMTOWDog

Lead/Dick
Do you wish to see existing class C terminal airspace converted to E?
eg YMHB YMLT YMAY.

Sorry mate, that is the end game, period.

This has always been the agenda. And, regrettably, right now, the cabal that wants to mix high capacity IFR with VFR, with no separation, will probably get their way.

Unfortunately, professional pilots, and their crews and pax, will be condemned to operating in 'Russian Roulette airspace' because a few squeaky wheels, with political pull, got the oil.

[ARFOR]

I would not be too sure they will 'get their way' ;)

Lets see what the 'process' ends with :)

[konstantin]

peuce:ok:

Your last post - in all likelyhood the big sky theory and TCAS will save the day, but I think both sides of the microphone (one more than the other!) can do without that extra Class E "Reason hole" lining up.

Well said.

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,
As Dick Smith continually tries to point out, ATC direct costs are not the only costs attributable to airspace categorization, the Airservices practice of giving absolute priority over VFR also presents serious problems ---- very little VFR traffic is "private flight". So one category of commercial operations suffers unnecessary costs. No such discrimination exists in US, as one example. That Airservices only derives revenue from one has only added to the blatant discrimination against VFR.

You and Dick have raved on for years about the conspiracy against VFR, AsA managers lining their pockets yada yada yada, but what evidence of blatant discrimination do you have? And I assume that because it appears to be such a major issue for you, hundreds of VFRs are continually blocked from C? Is this what actually occurs?

Had it ever occurred to you that, especially in a surveillance environment, if ATC aren't prepared to allow a VFR into C, it is because there is so much heavy metal in there already and to do so would be foolhardy? Oh, that's right, you think it is the undeniable right of a little VFR to barge in and make a 500-pax A380 take avoiding action. Get real. :=

[Stationair8]

Wonder if Dick got an invite to the meeting next week, between a number of Chief Pilots who operate into Broome and Karratha?

[ozineurope]

Wonder if any real ATCs got an invite?

I can just see the line up from my former employer - Manager Regional Services, Manager Tea and Biscuits, Manager Frequent Flyer Points and a secretary.

My bet is not one coal face controller below level 4 will be there, you know someone who actually talks to aircraft and has the brains to point out the good and bad for industry rather than some contract bod who is selling the package.

We shall see.

[OverRun]

Stationair8,

I wonder if the meeting(s) between Chief Pilots who operate into Broome and Karratha may have already taken place. The Broome Airspace Forum in mid-Feb was such a meeting, and a number of Chief Pilots attended. The Karratha airspace meeting preceded that. :ok:

[ozineurope]

And Dick, DNS and I both know the answer, do you?

Oh and by the way if anyone is interested no one PM'd for my name so obviously the anonymity angst bit is just a smokescreen for when things are not going your way!

[konstantin]

Two simple rhetorical questions:

- Is Class E designated as being "controlled airspace"?

- Are Oz ATCs indemnified at law in relation to an IFR/VFR MAC in Class E (assuming all due diligence actions were effected)?

Just sayin`...

[Capn Bloggs]

Is Class E designated as being "controlled airspace"?
Yep. AIP ENR 1.4 section 1.1.2.

[ARFOR]

Readers might be interested in knowing the 'policy direction' hierarchy sitting above CASA's OAR ;)

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - Stakeholder liaison (http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_93468) [halfway down the page]
Intergovernmental engagement

Aviation Implementation Group and Aviation Policy Group

The Aviation Policy Group (APG) is a CEO-level interagency group that includes the Department of Infrastructure, Airservices Australia, CASA and the RAAF. The APG was formed to establish better working relationships across the four agencies involved in aviation policy, regulation and service provision and consists of the CASA Director of Aviation Safety, the Chief Executive Officer of Airservices Australia, the Chief of Air Force and the Secretary of the Department of Infrastructure. The APG met seven times during 2008–09.

The Aviation Implementation Group (AIG) is an interagency forum chaired by the Department of Infrastructure that involves high-level representation from CASA, Airservices Australia and the RAAF. It is an important forum for identifying cross-portfolio aviation issues and maintaining regular communication between the four agencies, and for identifying higher-level issues to pass on to the APG. The AIG met five times during 2008–09.
Illuminating, in the current circumstances! :hmm:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

I can see the solution to this...but it's a very old idea:}

[konstantin]

I have an old one that says "CAA"...:ugh:

[Howabout]

Hi OZ,

That wouldn't involve the words 'controlled and 'uncontrolled,' from a far simpler time when the concept of Russian Roulette airspace was unheard of, by any chance? That's the problem with 'experts' in any walk of life. They inevitably have to 'fix' something that isn't broken.

Like NAS, the 'problem' that the 'solution' was supposed to be addressing was never identified or quantified. Opinion won out over fact.

I still shudder when I re-read the 2008 CASA Aeronautical Study on Avalon and do a comparison with the 2009 PIR recommending E over D. I keep finding what I regard to be inexplicable inconsistencies between the Avalon documents themselves and then the Launy and Alice studies in a wider context. I'd opine that it's a total bugger's muddle.

Ultimately, and the argument has been put before, Russian Roulette airspace can place the responsibility for safe separation on the LCD. It's conceivable, and likely, that a brand new PPL will be responsible for separating himself/herself from an IFR RPT, with a full load of pax, on decent into YMAV - with tracks at right angles.

And, NAS protagonists, don't give me that rubbish about the 'obligation' of the IFR to 'see and avoid.' We've got a kid, who's just got a PPL, doesn't have much of a clue with respect to RPT, and has prime responsibility to avoid a jet with multiple pax under this stupid system.

While it doesn't apply at YMAV, Bloggs' example is apposite. In this crazy system, theoretically, the crew of an A380 are supposed to see-and-avoid a VFR C150. I don't think we live on the same planet.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

In one, Howabout:ok:

Leadsled, I know exactly the argument your CSIRO mate would have used. After changing the quadrantal heights to hemispherical heights with IFR on 1000's and VFR on 500's there is a situation where you can have near collision course from 180deg opposite directions, where quadrantly, opposing traffic was always from your quarter so always posed a profile...easier to see.

And why did the hemispherical come in? Not because of ICAO alone..Oh no, it was because VFR no longer was under FPR so we had to separate IFR from VFR so the two would never meet...shame about the head on stuff.

Howabout, it would be so simple to impliment. ADS-B is now 100% of airspace ABV FL300 and huge amounts A010. Regional towered aerodromes with an ADS-B receiver and a feed, complete with an en-route qualed FSO to look after the airspace from the bottom of C/A to the terminal area.

I just hope those guys from the CASA are still paying attention to these threads. Guys, have a study of Flight Services and see the synergy that could apply with ADS-B equippage.

If you do, you will see that the wheel is about to turn all the way around to the exact same track. Excepting, if the dillitants had kept out of it, evolution would have done the same thing without the millions wasted on a silly experiment.

Some hints, remote VHF outlets, Virtual TAAATS tracks, basing in ML BN SY and PH. Maybe at the new towered aerodromes. Virtual tracks replaced by ADS-B derived "real" tracks. Once tracks are real, dropping of the need for FPR. FSOs rated up to en-route standard. Career progression due to TAAATS experience, elimination of the dreaded TIBA. It's all in place and could have easily progressed from the eighties right to now without AIRSPACE2000 the NASdebate and the outright decimation of a very experienced workforce that could esily adapt. All it would have took was a couple of unions to kiss and make up.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Re " All it would have took was a couple of unions to kiss and make up."

Sorry OZ, but I recall 'it' went a lot deeper than just that.

Despite several 'suggestions' over the years, the ATC 'heirarchy' of the time had no regard for FSO's....like they were the 'officers' and we were the 'lower ranks', the 'smellies'....came from B.O....as in Briefing Officer, which we were in many locations....

So, they refused to allow us to have RADAR training, on the grounds of....
whatever. It was made out to be so 'specialised'.
(Didn't matter that a boat I used to drive occasionally had a radar, and it wasn't THAT hard to understand and be proficient in its use....)

At one time we were scheduled to get VHF direction equipment for SAR purposes.....but.....

However, during the 'downsizing' period, post 12/12/91, 'our mob' then stuck to their guns and despite some strong opposition, actually gained access to and passed ATC training courses, and 'broke the impasse' of the times. The rest is history, as now there are many ex FSO's employed as ATC's....formerly referred to as 'The Dark Side'....
tongue in cheek....

The ATS services provided were seen by most, as the supply of specialised services for which 'ratings' were / still are required.

The commonality of the courses meant in reality, that there were a some 'bridging' ratings / subjects in both disciplines to effect a 'full rating' in either service.

So, you are quite correct in one sense, there should have been an 'integration' of ATS Personnel! Period! And let the various 'ratings' system dictate which job / task was performed by any individual.

However, the Politics were 'agin' us, and Dick wanted to get rid of us, so he did!
No foresight...IMHO!

However several of our mostly younger members now enjoy a career as an ATC, and not only here in OZ, but many are serving o/seas as well, as these pages will confirm.....and GOOD LUCK to them all!!!

So, these ex FSO's, now licensed ATC's, use RADAR and ADSB etc for their job functions. So again, you are correct, except that the SERVICE has been conveniently been 'dropped' to 'when workload permits' for us bug smashers, and virtually no 'discrete' VHF to use without interrupting traffic separation services....

Nice idea OZ, but you'd have to work real hard to 'sell it' now.......

Cheers:ok::)

(Forgive the 'ramble'....):)
Cheers
And REGARDS to ALL..!!:ok::ok:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Thanks for that Griffo, the history needs to be said. 'Tis a shame but a whole ocean has gone under that bridge. The problems of now just remind me of what could have been done as a simple evolution rather than wholesale change and change and change to get back to exactly the same pre-tech problems of providing a service for a sparsly populated country.

For the ATC guys, don't misunderstand me...this is all very ancient history. It's just the place where the NAS story began. I just hope I do not sound harsh on present company. You guys are fantastic:ok:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Don't forget! The submission date is fast approaching. 31st March.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

That the Class E airspace under the jurisdiction of the Tower shall be on a different frequency to the Class E airspace controlled by Brisbane (BN) Centre (CEN), and may be the Tower frequency as used in the Class D
CTR),

Still cracks me up...Here we have THE argument for FAA D tower zones being smaller so the controller can better manage the airspace where there is the most conflict AND then we add a huge expanse of airspace on the same frequency???? Different rules for different players AND all monitored from the tower cab? Is this going to be less stressful?

[Frank Arouet]

I'm confused Is Class E designated as being "controlled airspace"? Yep. AIP ENR 1.4 section 1.1.2.

As a recent convert to RAA LSA who may have wanted to access this airspace for flight above 5,000ft in the "J" curve, I now find my need for a transponder redundant. I am happy to have saved the cash. Thanks a lot for telling me.

The 10,000 RAA pilots being not allowed into "controlled airspace" makes one wonder what this thread is really about if it is all "controlled airspace" anyway.

Obviously it's about "squark 1200" GA Student/Private, Pilots and not the "Recreational" sector so often blamed for transgressions. Possibly the same mob who supported mandatory radio for flight into Goodooga.:*

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

G'Day 'Owen',

And I appreciate your response. The 'politics' were always against us 'integrating' in 'dem good ole' days...' - which was proposed by some, to be simply 'Air Traffic Services' many years ago, with the various ratings at the various locations describing your job.

However....all under the bridge now, and ALL the VERY best in your new career!!

Just one thing, the 'FULL SAR', i.e. VFR Full Reporting was largely optional as I remember, - except if you were CHTR, or operating in a 'Designated Remote Area' and did not carry an EPIRB.

For AWK, training flights, unless you were in CTA where Full Position Reporting was required, for the obvious reasons, then the choice was 'Full SAR' or SARTIME.

This was at a time when a Flight Plan was required for flights over 50nm from DEP AD...then it wasn't....then it was..again...this time reinstituted I think when a C310 dep Griffith in NSW for BK, and never arrived....the wreckage was found some time later on the reverse slope of a hill not too far from GTH, despite a big search around the Blue Mountains area....so it was brought back in again...if my memory bank is correct...

Anyway, I do recall that the 'Full SAR' option and requirements were removed from VFR flights WEF 12/12/1991, with a view to requiring less staff to enable FSO's to be made redundant.....and so to 'cost the industry less...and your safety will be enhanced'....B/S B/S wonk wonk..!!!....and eventually, CTAF and MBZ replaced AFIZ...etc etc...ALL in the name of 'Self Help' and 'cost cutting'....GOT TO get rid of thse 'pesky FSO's'......

Oddly enough, at the time I did hear that Canada actually preferred our 'AFIZ system', and was supposed to have closed some remote Towers, and introduced the 'FS operated AFIZ' - whether by that or another name , I do not know...anyhow can't vouch for it...its only what we heard...and we heard MANY 'things' in those days...

And, Yep! I see it from 'both sides' as well, Still have my CPL, although don't use it much no-more...

OOOps sorry, 'Rambling again'....
ALL the best:ok::ok:

[Howabout]

Frank,

You confuse some of the sentiments on here with illogical CASA rulings.

It's only my personal take, but I cannot figure why restrictions are placed on perfectly airworthy aircraft from the RAA side of the house. I, for one, support access provided some basic provisions are met.

Years ago, I met a lovely bloke by the name of Eugene Reid and visited his operation north of Launy. All he wanted was access to the Launy zone, to get quick access to the south. He could have been separated from airfield activity by being south of the highway, which was no big deal (ATC confirmed this when I visited for a chat - I have to get a life on holidays). It could have been done safely with no detriment to other operations.

The blunt CASA ruling was that 'sports aircraft' could not fly in control zones..period. I think, but don't know, that the attitude is the same today. One size fits all.

I was totally impressed by Eugene's operation. He told me at the time that there was no way he'd ever operate without a radio or teach his students anything other than radio carriage and compliance. And he operated/operates trikes.

His summation was that if he was downwind at YDPO, there's no way he wouldn't be listening out and transmitting. He had no desire to be run over by a Dash-8 in the same piece of airspace downwind.

I still don't see a single piece of solid evidence that supports the exclusion of RAA aircraft from controlled airspace, provided they can communicate and are visible within the system.

Just my take.

[peuce]

Yes, we've been "touched" by some strange rules over the years, haven't we.

Along the lines of Griffo's tales, one of the strangest was the building and positioning of Flight Service Units ... so the FSOs couldn't see the aerodrome from the window ... less they actually advised an aircraft where another aircraft actually was.

And yes, Canada was actually (don't know if they still are) operating Towers, manned by FSOs ... providing an Aerodrome Advisory Service. However, even during "fact finding missions" overseas, Australian FSOs weren't allowed to inspect these facilities ... only Australian ATCs. What that means, I don't know ... but it's just the facts.

All these bits of historical "ramblings" may appear off topic, but I think they certainly add to the jigsaw puzzle of why and how we are where we are.

[Howabout]

Last sentence peuce, is spot on.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Yep, it all helps understand how we were all robbed of a system that actually worked for our limited resources and sparse polulation.

Smith, you have a mental block with Class E. If there is no radar or radar like surveillence, you cannot guarantee separation for anyone and certainly not IFR. In the clag you have a chance, in CAVOK you want IFR to practice see and avoid because of conflicts with VFR trundling through CONTROLLED AIRSPACE unannounced.

Everything else about NAS from FAA D to CTAF is just procedure and can be ..begrudgingly for some...relearned. However, Class E is inherantly DANGEROUS. You are mixing non-controlled traffic with controlled traffic IN THE BLIND! Until surveillence is put in place AND VFR is required to REPORT a position regardless of receiving a service is the day Class E will be safer.

The experiment with FAA D and adjoining Class E...what are you guys thinking! We may as well have our old D and adjoining class C and be safer in the procedure.

Smith your previous example. the B200 will be in conflict with a non-controlled aircraft who is UNKNOWN to the tower, in your words he is too far away to see. Depending how big the envelope of Tower controlled Class E is opposed to the Class E supplied by BN, your B200 could be just changing frequency as the conflict occurs...getting messy out there...Once again, change for change sake with changes to the changes to attempt to make it as safe as possible.

The REAL OLD SYSTEM was that VFR if was going more than 50nm would have had a plan and would have reported to the PTH FS with an estimate for their destination. The B200 would have already be talking to FS from when they popped out of class C over 100nm away with an estimate for PTH. there is no tower because the local traffic practices the basic calls and is also on the same frequency as FS..guess what, they are known too..That old dirt road with its "Drive on the Left" rules still stands up today with passing DTI

The trick is not actually SEEING the traffic, its knowing the traffic. If you know there is traffic you will see it before there is a problem. What's it called...oh yes...ALLERTED SEE AND AVOID

From a previous forum. Dick, YOU'RE WRONG!

[peuce]

Some interesting reading in the latest, and previous, minutes of the AIRSPACE CONSULTATIVE FORUM on 11 August 2009

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - ACF meeting papers (http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_90461)

Some selected excerpts of Members' feedback:

...Class E is not particularly useful. It leads to a false sense of security and inefficiency....
... Don’t exclude VFR from solutions...

The latest list of ACF Members:

Civil Aviation Safety Authority - ACF membership (http://www.casa.gov.au/scripts/nc.dll?WCMS:STANDARD::pc=PC_90460)

Why is it, that from what I hear and read, the overall majority of Airspace Users appear to frown upon Class E Airspace and the overall majority of the Bureaucracy are in favour of it?

Are we missing something, or has a form of "Corporate Stubborn Pride" taken over and the Bureaucracy are unwilling/unable to review their idealogy?

No matter what the reasons, the reality is that the Bureaucracy is tasked with making the decisions ... less there be anarchy.... and we will just have to adapt. :(

[peuce]

While I was in my Sunday morning reading mood, I came across some other interesting in formation. The first is an extract from the OAR's Broome Aeronautical Study Report. Sorry it's so long, but I didn't want to be selective.

http://agencysearch.australia.gov.au/search/click.cgi?rank=1&collection=agencies&component=0&docnum=650644&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.casa.gov.au%2Fwcmswr%2F_assets%2Fmain%2 Foar%2Fpapers%2Fbroome_may09.pdf&search_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.casa.gov.au%2F


Incident Reports
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) incident data for the period 1st
July 2005 to 10th November 2008 was analysed as part of this study. 151
incident reports were submitted as having occurred within 30 NM of Broome
aerodrome with no accident or serious incidents recorded. This compares to
a total of 436 accidents, 129 serious incidents, and 23,103 incident reports
received over all of Australia for the three years 2006 to 200813.
Of the 151 reported incidents, only a small proportion (12%) of these
identified failures in following published procedures and/or communicative
errors. A summary of the ATSB reports for the period are held on file by the
OAR and are available upon request. A breakdown of the incidents revealed the following:


11 (7%) involved failure to follow published procedures, including failure
to broadcast and nil carriage of mandatory radio;
7 (5%) involved some form of non-effective radio communications:
o Position report not made correctly,
o Calls made but not heard by other aircraft,
o Frequency congestion, and
o Incorrect frequency selection;
65 (43%) involved bird or animal strikes; and
68 (45%) involved miscellaneous reports not considered within the
scope of this report, such as engineering malfunctions or component
failures, loading of dangerous goods, etc.

One TCAS incident was reported for the above period (ATSB 200701231 on
20th February 2007) between a Pilatus PC-12 and a Cessna 210 which was
tracking in the opposite direction to the circuit without broadcasting
intentions.

On the bare face of it, is the expense of a Tower really justified?

Silly me, I should have looked further, as I found a quote from the WA Today paper, assuming it is correct:

Broome International Airport | Control Tower (http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/control-tower-at-last-for-broome-airport-20091109-i51c.html)

The control tower has been the centre of a concerted campaign by businessman and aviator Dick Smith over the years.
In 2003, he pushed for Broome to get its own tower and for legislative changes to allow the airport to operate it.
A year later he claimed the tower would improve safety by "at least 20 per cent... at very little cost"

My point?

It just doesn't add up !

[Dick Smith]

Could it be that they take no notice of people who never link their real name to their views and they take notice of people who do?

Just a chance.

[peuce]

Yep, you're probably right Dick, although the ACF members might have a different opinion ...

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

GEE....THAT's a rather 'smug' response Dick.......

p.s. Did I say 'thanks' for the redundo...??

Now a serious question for you....
Will some unannounced 'bugsmasher' in E someday cause a BIG problem for an IFR acft...????

'Just a chance....'

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Could it be that they take no notice of people who never link their real name to their views and they take notice of people who do?


As opposed to those who will wish they never heard of you when they realise the pup you have been trying to sell for over two decades.

Hey, its quite possible you may have one or two ATC who agree with you...bet they will not be tasked to take responsibility for a huge swath of Class E up at BRM...without any surveillence tools other than a set of binoes and a supply of worrybeads..as well as that FAA D tower that faces the wrong way:}

[Robbovic]

After TFNs latest bit of retail therapy in Scandenavia, don't be surprised if binos not needed in Broome. Has to have somewhere to try out his new toy - becoming known as "ATC on a stick". That will really make E over D interesting!

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

ATC on a stick...???

The mind boggles.

Bit more info please Robbo....if ya can...

[peuce]

I daresay such a toy has it's place .... possibly at an aerodrome which has had no human intervention ... eg Hervey Bay?

But Broome, where the CAGRO can already advise what aircraft is where on the aerodrome ... ????

Can it provide the ability to visually separate airbone?... or within, say, about 5 -10 miles? I can just see the Controller in Brisbane swizzling that camera on a stick around ... untill he gets sea sick:O

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

MAYDAY......

'Holy Shat Batman...There's a seagull crapping on my lens.....'

ATC BN rings the 'groundie' at BRM..."There's a seagull shat on my lens, get some toilet paper will ya?"
Groundie... - "Bloody idiot - by the time I get back, that bloody seagull will be miles away".......:yuk::yuk:

Or as happens almost every day at Broome, usually about mid-day,
BOTH windsocks are pointing at each other......Now let me see....
Which runway will I instruct the acft to approach for....:confused::confused:

Wot's all that 'purple stuff' over there near the approach....can't HEAR the rumbles over a camera....:uhoh::uhoh:

Ad Infinitum.................

(Old FS Lament........I can't see 'the picture' boss.....)

I know...they WOULDN'T REALLY do that ...would they???:ugh::ugh:

(Just a chance....)

OVAH.....
HO HO HO HO.....HaHaHa!!! That's almost as 'good' as........E over D..Ha Ha Ha

[ARFOR]

Leadsled
That's the point, speed limits in A/C (have a think about the new D, maybe another legislative change coming up) can clearly be waived, but it is a statutory limit in E and G.
Therefor, only the pilot in command can, on legitimate safety grounds, can determine that 250 kt below 10,000 can be exceeded.
Agreed. That’s what I was saying, in so far as E climb and descent areas below A100. If it is E, 250kts is it unless the PIC has some other issue that requires higher speed. That has nothing to do with discretionary cancellation by ATC, which will not happen in E. It can in C (and should continue in Oz ICAO D)
§ 91.117 Aircraft speed.
(a) Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, no person may operate an aircraft below 10,000 feet MSL at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots (288 m.p.h.).
Ever asked yourself why? It is simply because of the possibility of un-alerted VFR in E and US D /GAAP) below A100. Thus another efficiency reason to continue operations with ICAO D and/or C.
(b) Unless otherwise authorized or required by ATC, no person may operate an aircraft at or below 2,500 feet above the surface within 4 nautical miles of the primary airport of a Class C or Class D airspace area at an indicated airspeed of more than 200 knots (230 mph.). This paragraph (b) does not apply to any operations within a Class B airspace area. Such operations shall comply with paragraph (a) of this section.
It is my understanding that the first part of this rule has been omitted from the proposed MoS changes. In the new ‘CASA’ Class D, 200KT IAS – at or below 2,500FT AAL within 4 NM of the primary Class D aerodrome. If traffic conditions permit, ATC may approve a pilot's request to exceed the 200 KT speed limit to a maximum limit of 250 KT unless the pilot informs ATC a higher minimum speed is an operational requirement. Another non-US NAS [or any other country] change. Did anyone at the CASA consider that they have effectively removed ATC's [and Pilots] ability to utilise best speed control [cancelling speed restrictions] to avoid holding etc?

I agree with you that there needs to be provision for aircraft commanders to operate above 250KT’s, but what about the poor ATC who has a smaller jet/fast turbo-prop aircraft in front that could easily help out with MAX from prior to ToD all the way down to well below A100 with speeds up to 310KT’s. Does he/she have to wait for the preceding aircraft pilot to ask for a waiver? :rolleyes:
The question of course is why? Why would the CASA ‘cherry pick’ when those cherries are important tools available to ATC in the context of efficient sequencing, and minimising delays such as avoidable holding. A cynical mind might suggest that the cherry picking is to try and reduce the incentives available in ICAO D when compared with Class E. You know, a bit like the Radar C directive, cost loading CBA comparisons between C and E.
For example, "FAA D", there is no such thing. FAA D is ICAO, and by notifying a difference for VFR weather minima, FAA remains ICAO compliant.
Let’s put this in to clear perspective.
FAA Airspace rules A.I.M
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/ATpubs/AIM/Chap3/aim0302.html

Note the differences between the Services provided within Class B, Class C and then read the context of the services provided in Class D i.e. no separation provided to VFR.

The US version of 'separation' is actually what Australia describe within the 'air traffic control service' definition. Read on.
The FAA Order JO 7110.65T Air Traffic Control
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/ATC.pdf
[The US equivalent of the Australian MATS]

Note, The US does not have a separate section for Class D services!
Also, have a good look at the ‘JO definitions’ for the ‘differences’ between US and ICAO practice.

The US:-
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE-
(See AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.)

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL- A service operated by appropriate authority to promote the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic.
Then separately defines ICAO [in brackets]:-
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICE [ICAO]- A service provided for the purpose of:
a. Preventing collisions:
1. Between aircraft; and
2. On the maneuvering area between aircraft and obstructions.
b. Expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.
Here is how the US JO caveats ‘preventing collisions’
2-1-1. ATC SERVICE
The primary purpose of the ATC system is to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system and to organize and expedite the flow of traffic, and to provide support for National Security and Homeland Defense. In addition to its primary function, the ATC system has the capability to provide (with certain limitations)[U] additional services. The ability to provide additional services is limited by many factors, such as the [U]volume of traffic, frequency congestion, quality of radar, controller workload, higher priority duties, and the pure physical inability to scan and detect those situations that fall in this category. It is recognized that these services cannot be provided in cases in which the provision of services is precluded by the above factors. Consistent with the aforementioned conditions, controllers shall provide additional service procedures to the extent permitted by higher priority duties and other circumstances. The provision of additional services is not optional on the part of the controller, but rather is required when the work situation permits.
The US ‘interpretation’ of services and additional services varies from Australia in so far as all of the US ATS system is predicated on IFR services. VFR and IFR in VMC in all classes of airspace [except Class B] pilots are [primarily] responsible for see and avoid.
Primary collision avoidance responsibility in VMC
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/nas_redesign/regional_guidance/eastern_reg/nynjphl_redesign/documentation/feis/appendix/media/Appendix_A-National_Airspace_System_Overview.pdf
During VMC, aircraft may operate under VFR, and the pilot is primarily responsible for seeing other aircraft and maintaining safe separation.
And;
Aircraft may elect to operate IFR in VMC; however, the pilot, and not ATC, is primarily responsible for seeing and avoiding other aircraft.
Back to The FAA A.I.M
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/Aim/Chap5/aim0505.html
5-5-8. See and Avoid
a. Pilot. When meteorological conditions permit, regardless of type of flight plan or whether or not under control of a radar facility, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic, terrain, or obstacles.
b. Controller.
1. Provides radar traffic information to radar identified aircraft operating outside positive control airspace on a workload permitting basis.
2. Issues safety alerts to aircraft under their control if aware the aircraft is at an altitude believed to place the aircraft in unsafe proximity to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft.
Note the totality of the substantial differences between the base line ICAO ATC Service definition, and the FAA ATC Service definitions!.

As far as ease of reading, there are advantages to some forms of US regulation. But to say that the US Airspace system is simple to understand is just not correct. It takes some effort to draw the various requirements from various documents to get the full picture of what is required, expected and available to pilots and ATC's in the US.

Without wanting to labour the point, Australia does not have the volume of VFR traffic [with the exception of the GAAP’s] to warrant the application of FAA D [including the substantial differences in roles and responsibilities for pilots and Air Traffic Controllers].

Surely you can see the wood for the trees on this. There are so many reasons why existing Australian C or D over D is better for all concerned. Safety, costs of provision [tower verses en-route], efficiency, workload for both ATC and Pilots [IFR and VFR]. Lets not forget [as quoted earlier] the Airspace process ‘requirements’ within Australian Airspace legislation and policy.
However, safety criteria must be premised on the basis of the effect on aircrew, other safety critical staff, the travelling public and the community.
[B]The highest priority will be given to solutions which seek to eliminate the negative risk.
It is simply not fair to saddle Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers with inappropriate rulesand procedures, with incompatible ATS infrustructure, when they are not ‘necessary’!

This aspect of the changes goes to the very point of those two maxims above.

Are pilots who will fly the system, and Air Traffic Controllers and Flight Service Officers who will provide it being properly served?

One wonders!

To pick you up on a previous point regarding equity of priority.
Give priority for use of the manoeuvring area or airspace to:
a. an aircraft in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference
b. a mutli-engined aircraft which has suffered the loss of an engine and has not been subjected to an emergency phase
c. an aircraft known to have suffered failure of radio communication
d. an aircraft that has declared itself a MERCY flight
e. an aircraft participating in Search and Rescue (SAR), Medical (MED 1), Flood or Fire Relief (FFR) flights or is operating as a Hospital Aircraft (HOSP)
f. an aircraft operating under police callsign POLAIR RED (or
FEDPOL RED) and engaged in operations where life is at risk
g. an aircraft engaged in the personal transport of:
1. Heads of State or of Government; or
2. other selected dignitaries on official visits to Australia; or
3. the personal transport of the Governor-General or the Prime
Minister.
Apply the following priorities under normal circumstances:
a. A landing aircraft, in the normal course of operation, has priority for the use of the landing area over a departing aircraft if the departing aircraft cannot take-off with the prescribed separation standard.
b. Landing and taking-off aircraft have priority for the use of the landing area over taxiing aircraft.
c. An aircraft which is first able to use the manoeuvring area or desired airspace in the normal course of operation has priority.
In Australia there is no priority delineation between IFR, VFR, Commercial or Private. The only point of difference occurs when VFR ‘pop-up’ on the edge of CTA/R with no ‘planning’ warning.

[ARFOR]

Another gentle reminder. Get those submissions in.

info_oar @ casa.gov.au [<--- take out the spaces either side of the @]

The clock is ticking!

[LeadSled]

ARFOR,
Ever asked yourself why? It is simply because of the possibility of un-alerted VFR in E and US D /GAAP) below A100.

The answer is no, because I know where the "250kt" rule came from ---- the early days of jets, when the majority of airline traffic in the US were big pistons. The limit was imposed to reduce ATC problems with the huge speed disparity between the new fangled jets and 049/749/1049/DC-4,6,7/Convair 240/340/Martin202 etc and B707/DC-8.

Please understand that the US "250 kt" rule is a statutory rule, ATC has no legal power to vary it, only the PIC on genuine safety grounds.

As for the rest of the humongous post, with all due respect, to suggest that separation and safety are not primary functions of US ATC, is playing word games with selected definitions and quotes.

The formal US position is that US D is ICAO D, with the earlier mentioned difference. CASA (rightly or wrongly) takes the same view.

Your could raise similar "differences" with ICAO by looking at other FAA legislation (the "difference" between "air commerce" and "air navigation" as in the Civil Aviation Act 1988) --- but anybody who doesn't think "safety" is right at the top of FAA priorities should read again.

Tootle pip!!

PS: The facts, as opposed to fiction, is IFR gets absolute priority over VFR --- regardless of the "nominal" position --- and the situation is getting worse, not better, in my on-the -ground (should that be In-the-air) experience.

[Capn Bloggs]

Found on the internet, written by a pommie ATC:

Class E Airspace
Class E airspace is rather a white elephant and is the least-common active classification of airspace in the UK. The reason for this is most likely a nonsensical rule included in its specification, which is that while IFR flights have to get a clearance from ATC before entering Class E airspace, VFR flights do not!

Although higher classes of airspace impose increasing requirements on the controller for keeping aircraft apart, the controller is still free to refuse entry to an aircraft that may come into conflict with others. This provision/get-out is partially absent in Class E airspace. VFR flights can come and go as they please. Thankfully, controllers only have to give IFR flights traffic information about these unruly VFR interlopers. They are only required to actually separate IFR flights from each other.

There are only three small areas of Class E airspace in the UK. The areas of other classifications number in the dozens or hundreds.

:ok::ok:

[ARFOR]

Leadsled
Apologies for the ‘humongous’ previous post, but we do need to put these theories in to ‘proper’ context rather than ramble on with a load of hot air :ok:

In contrast, you will be relieved that this post will be short and blunt.

I know 250kts in the US is a statutory rule, ATC has no legal power to vary it, only the PIC on genuine safety grounds. That is the point, why would you employ US ‘airspace’ and ‘rules’ when Australia can continue to utilise ICAO [in the same fashion it has for years], and classifications D through A where speed limits are not necessary.
to suggest that separation and safety are not primary functions of US ATC, is playing word games with selected definitions and quotes.
I suggested no such thing. Read the rules, and understand why the US have those rules, i.e. VFR densities in VMC.
but anybody who doesn't think "safety" is right at the top of FAA priorities should read again.
See previous. No one is saying safety is not top of priorities for FAA. The difference is how they manage that safety, and why. Read the legislation.

Re: Priorities
The facts, as opposed to fiction, is IFR gets absolute priority over VFR --- regardless of the "nominal" position
No, IFR are known about well before they enter a specific volume of airspace:-
- Flight plan
- Point to point ATC SAR co-ordination

Most VFR are not until they call approaching the CTA/R steps.
and the situation is getting worse, not better, in my on-the -ground (should that be In-the-air) experience.
Given the way this discussion has progressed, of course you are going to try that on, otherwise you would have nothing at all to say! ;)

[Capn Bloggs]

Leadsled,
The answer is no, because I know where the "250kt" rule came from ---- the early days of jets, when the majority of airline traffic in the US were big pistons. The limit was imposed to reduce ATC problems with the huge speed disparity between the new fangled jets and 049/749/1049/DC-4,6,7/Convair 240/340/Martin202 etc and B707/DC-8.

Wrong. It was exactly as ARFOR suggested: introduced by the FAA to help See and Avoid after the midair between DC-9 N1063T and a Beech Baron at 4500ft. :=

Mixing jets and bugsmashers, relying on See and Avoid is just plain DUMB.

[KittyKatKaper]

For a long time I thought that the 250kt limit below A100 was due to problems that old radar-heads had in resolving targets above around that speed.
However the hazards of shortened conflict-resolution times and bird strikes below A100 are also valid. (damage is proportional to kinetic energy, which equals mass times velocity squared) (old thread Origin of the 250 knots below 10,000 ft rule [Archive] - PPRuNe Forums (http://www.pprune.org/archive/index.php/t-134138.html))

I suspect that the original reason has been lost in the mists of time, but why? would anyone wants lots of high-speed traffic in a terminal (sic) zone ? shudder

[werbil]

I've had one classic experience of the priority of IFR over VFR. On a 12 minute sector (VFR charter) I was held for just under 20 minutes so that two IFR jets could land even though I was the first aircraft to enter the zone and there was no other conflicting traffic. I watched both of them land whilst being held in the left base position as they completed visual right circuits - I must admit it is was quite enjoyable watching the approaches and landings from that position.

So why such a long hold for just two jets to land - there is no parallel taxiway so they both had to go to the end of the runway, turn and taxi back to the beginning of the runway to exit. The controller was relatively new to the tower. IMO there was plenty of time to land before the first jet or in between the first and second without delaying either jet as I would have been able to exit on one of the taxiways without backtracking. I doubt that ATC would have appreciated the effect on profitability for my company for that sector as a result of the holding.

[Hornet306]

Just to remind you what else you can hit that's not controlled or self announcing, have a read of this: http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/1996/aair/pdf/aair199601590_001.pdf
NB Aircraft design limits.:eek:

[divingduck]

Do they still have the old chestnut "significant economic benefit" to more than one following aircraft in the docs in OZ?

That could explain why you were moved for two a/c...

[ARFOR]

Good discussion :D

KKK
why? would anyone wants lots of high-speed traffic in a terminal (sic) zone ? shudder
Sequencing. Tactical planning early can and does avoid circuit area problems such as having to fly wider or extra legs of the circuit to follow other traffic. An aircraft in the air less time, is less likely to conflict with other traffic. Granted, this really only applies to the approach airspace sequencing, by the time the aircraft reaches the circuit area and surrounds, the speed profile is well back. Fitting circuit traffic around arrivals [even higher speed ones] is relatively easy by comparison.

Early sequencing [speed control] in IMC conditions can mean the difference between no delay passing the IAF [as opposed to a pattern] for following traffic.

In general terms these timings can amount to between 2 [in VMC] -10 [in IMC] mins difference in flight time savings per flight, particularlly where an Instrument approach [say ILS] is to be flown. The speed reductions necessary from the IAF onwards are a given, however, If enough longitudinal spacing can be obtained prior to the IAF, well you get the picture.

That said, the bird strike issue is a valid part of the discussion. Migratory birds often cruise below A050, Raptors are often into the flight levels. Whilst not in anyway diminishing this very important issue, perhaps the reality speaks that 270kts below A050 might be more realistic given that even 'hoons' :E will be slowing up by this point.

Regarding the higher flying feathered friends. Until an onboard radar can detect these beasties, it remains a risk, including Above A100 where aircraft are not limited to 250kts.

In recent years, a turbo-prop operator in Australia [DHC8's] has been using landing lights set to alternate flashing during lower level day op's.

Have they suffered any strikes since adopting this procedure?

I understand the flashing attracts the attention of our feathered cousins, who then pay attention, and get the hell outa dodge in time. :ok:

It probably makes them more visible to the unfeathered traffic as well.

[SGT Schulz]

Werbil,
The lack of low level radar coverage at HM doesnt allow the use of TSAD to fine tune an inbound sequence. The tower has to rely on your position report and estimate. And a lot of VFR pilots estimates can be a little bit optimistic. And only being able to see half the circuit area hinders the sequencing process.
Although a small extension of downwind for one of the jets could have allowed you in. Wake turbulence is also an issue. The list of variables goes on and on.
On that day you were obviously the Statue..and not the pidgeon!!!:}:}

[Dick N. Cider]

As posted last night on Civil Air's website

Tuesday, March 30 2010

Operations Manager, Office of Airspace Regulation
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
GPO Box 2005
CANBERRA ACT 2601

CC: Executive Manager, Airspace and Aerodrome Regulation

Re: Proposed Airspace Classification – Broome (OAR 192/09) and Karratha (193/09)


Dear Graeme,

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the airspace classification proposals for Karratha and Broome. As the professional organisation representing Australian Air Traffic Controllers, Civil Air has a number of points we would like to raise with respect to the proposed airspace models:

Class D to A025 with E Airspace Above

In Civil Air's view, this model is the least desirable for Broome and Karratha. The restriction of Class D airspace is such that it will not encapsulate all instrument approaches and thus ensure separation with VFR aircraft while aircraft are in the critical final stages of flight. IFR aircraft may also be required to monitor multiple frequencies during a period of high cockpit workload during their approach. With the small lateral boundaries of the Class D zone, VFR aircraft will be quite close to the aerodrome before they will be required to call for a clearance to enter control area. This gives the controller less time to evaluate, plan and implement a sequence, and ensure separation from other arriving and departing aircraft. VFR aircraft will be able to operate directly over the aerodrome at relatively a low level without requiring a clearance, giving faster moving traffic less time to "See and Avoid". This is a particular issue for high performance departures.

Class D to A045 with E Airspace Above

This solution provides increased margin as the Class D portion of the airspace will encapsulate aircraft manoeuvring for instrument approaches, and VFR aircraft will be required to call the tower earlier for a clearance to enter the control zone. This provides the tower controller increased time to arrange their sequence of aircraft, and more room to achieve the required separation but is still limited in the same manner as the proposal for D to A025, albeit with increased margins.

Class E above D - General Comments

Civil Air has concerns regarding the use of Class E airspace above Class D. The premise of E above D at Broome and Karratha is predicated upon an improvement in service level over existing Class G. Whilst demonstrably an improvement, it ignores practicalities of actual airspace management and, in our view, ignores the “As Low As Reasonably Practical” (ALARP) principle of risk management applied almost universally in aviation studies nationally.

In terms of airspace management, the modelling of C over D, as currently provided at all regional towers, offers improved separation integrity and virtually no additional operational costs to either the services provider or airspace users. Under ALARP it is impossible to justify E over D on either cost or safety basis when measured against the current C over D. It would be an untenable position for the Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) to mandate a lower level of airspace, when a higher level of airspace is available for no additional cost. OAR would then risk being accused of putting ideology ahead of safety.

E over D introduces a new airspace model not in use elsewhere in Australia. This departure from accepted practice introduces a variation upon the standard operating procedures at all regional towers across Australia. It is also contrary to the provision of services under US NAS (Part 139 Class 1 Airports licensed for Scheduled Air Carrier with >30 pax seat capacity) in respect of airspace modelling. In most scenarios these operations are conducted under a C over D model.

VFR aircraft operating in Class E airspace will be unknown to both the controllers in the local tower, and Enroute centres in Brisbane and Melbourne. Separation between VFR aircraft in the Class E airspace and IFR aircraft arriving and departing from these locations will rely upon "Unalerted See and Avoid" procedures, which greatly increases collision risk, particularly considering the different operating speeds of typical VFR aircraft and the jet or high capacity/performance RPT turbo-prop aircraft which typically operate into Broome and Karratha. Whilst ACAS will provide some defence it is Civil Air’s view that ACAS should not be considered a mitigator in airspace design as it is intended as a last line of defence. Alerted “See and Avoid” is predicated upon surveillance availability. In the case of Broome and Karratha the only prospect of surveillance is that of ADS-B and unfortunately penetration of ADS-B Out fitment in the GA fleet is limited at best.

E over D arrangements during Tower Closure

Operations in Class E require continuous two-way communications and, for aircraft descending into deactive tower airspace (Class G services), there is often pressure to make the change to CTAF at an early stage. For single VHF aircraft this means either non-compliance with maintaining comms on the appropriate Area VHF or, in the case of low level transition to G, obtaining CTAF traffic either during the approach or with limited reaction time.

Class D to A085 controlled by D Tower

An alternative that may produce a better cost/benefit result than E over D is establishing Class D airspace up to A085 controlled from the tower. This also has benefits for pilot and ATC workload management. The tower controller can utilise visual and geographic standards not available to Enroute controllers to separate VFR traffic from IFR, and allows for a more efficient movement of aircraft to and from the aerodrome. VFR aircraft within a reasonable distance of the aerodrome will be "known" to the Tower controller, and their separation ensured from IFR aircraft. This model could then be considered at other locations across Australia.

Civil Air's preference remains the use of Class C airspace above Class D towers as currently used at all D towers in Australia. Outside tower hours of operations the Class C steps below A085 should be deactivated. This provides standardisation of airspace architecture across Australia. Civil Air believes that this model of airspace represents the best mix between efficiency, equity of airspace, and safety.

Please do not hesitate to contact us for further information or expansion of any issues raised herein.

Sincerely,

Civil Air

[Capn Bloggs]

Nastronauts
:ok::ok::ok:

[Jabawocky]

So what is all the fuss about.........works here!

1.5 Findings
In general, all airspace users consulted indicated that the airspace design and classification is suitable for its current use. This is also confirmed by the results of the simulation model constructed for Rockhampton.
The study revealed: ASIR and ESIR reports as discussed in chapter 6 indicate that failure to observe ATC instructions and VCAs are the most observed airspace related safety incidents. As summarised in chapter 6.3, these incidents cannot directly be linked with the design and classification of airspace provided at Rockhampton. The results of the fast time simulation of the airspace around Rockhampton lead to the conclusion that the Class D airspace with the relevant procedures applied will provide sufficient defences against the closest potential conflict pairs identified. Details are explained in chapters 7.12.3 and 7.12.4. The dimensions of Class D and Class C airspace around and above Rockhampton are deemed to be adequate by the airspace users and ATC (see chapter 5.5). The results of the fast time simulation did not provide any other evidence to the contrary and no documentation was found during the study indicating otherwise. All airspace users consulted indicated that the airspace classification utilised is suitable for its current use (chapter 5.5). The fast time simulation results did not show any conflict pairs for operations outside the tower hours. This can partially explained by the fact that the only data available for this time period were the Airservices EUROCAT records (see chapters 7.9 and 7.11.1). The airspace classification of Rockhampton can be considered to be appropriate for its use.
It is recommended that: CASA continue monitoring the airspace around Rockhampton with particular focus on changes in IFR and VFR numbers and traffic mix. CASA seek movement data for operations outside tower hours. Class C airspace overhead the Class D airspace at Rockhampton be maintained unless an aeronautical study using an appropriate airspace risk analysis methodology and cost benefit analysis can prove significant benefits for Class E. It is recommended that the OAR maintain a watch of activity at Rockhampton airport during the bi-annual review of movement data, and, if total aircraft movements significantly increase, or after five years, whichever occurs first, further airspace review or an aeronautical study will be conducted to reassess the risk to RPT operations.

I like the bit about unless there is a significant benefot for E ..........about summs it up!

So why are we wasting all this time and money? :rolleyes:

[werbil]

Re the economic cost between lighties and the 'heavier' metal. My sector time was increased by 150% over the 'no traffic situation'. For the purpose of the exercise if we assume that either jet had been 'held' for 2 minutes the sector time would have been increased by around 2% over a 'no traffic delay' situation. In this case the relative economic impact was over an order of magnitude higher to the 'lightie' than the 'heavier'.

As to estimates - some of the IFR drivers need a few lessons too. I've heard estimates given for the circuit when the tower was closed that turned out to be estimates to commence the approach. On the flight referred to in my earlier post I would have have been visible from the tower with binos before the first jet entered the zone.

If I was a different person I could always do the 'holding in a single engine aircraft over water' claim - but at the time I was in an amphib and if I'd realised how long the hold was going to be I would have requested a clearance to land on the water anyway.:)

PS I've also been offered number 1 on times that I wouldn't have expected it (and I haven't always accepted the offer).

[Capn Bloggs]

Not able to accept that he is wrong, Leadsled is now trawling Prune so that he can make personal attacks on posters who don't hold his views:

Here's what he wrote in Rumours and News on the http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/410646-near-midair-over-sfo.html thread:

Folks,
Note the posts of one "Captain Bloggs", who is doing his best to inject an "Australian Perspective" into the comments.

Basically, the "Australian" approach, as preferred by "Bloggs", to any but IFR/RPT is "clearance not available, remain clear of controlled airspace" on the basis that even sighting a GA aircraft in the distance, from a heavy, is close to an emergency--- but, I hasten to add, a view confined to a small group who have been trying frantically for years, to prevent Australia adopting FAA style ICAO airspace management.

As another Australian pilot (LSA thro' B744), well familiar with operations around KSFO and the bay area, I support the view of those of you who believe this has been blown out of all proportion by the media.

In fact it could be viewed as an example of the system working, not the system failing.

Tootle pip!!


That's pretty pathetic form, Sled. May I suggest you grow up.:cool:

BTW, it's an interesting thread. A lighty doing a "hard turn" just avoids a 777, which is at...less than 1000ft AFTO (and doing a Descend RA to boot), all ticked off by the Sled as ops normal and AOK. :yuk:

[Capn Bloggs]

Well, it seems the mighty Sled has hit another nerve. Check out the post below his. Puts the basic issue in focus.

http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/410646-near-midair-over-sfo-3.html#post5609470

[LeadSled]

Blogs,
I think you better do your homework re. the 250kt rule.
I don't think the DC-9 even existed when the first 250kt rule came in about early 1960s.
However, it could have had something to do with a collision between a Connie and a B707 east of New York.
I was flying around there in that period, by 1967, it was there then.
Tootle pip!!

Correction, it was a DC-8.

[Capn Bloggs]

Sled,

Given that the midair you refer to was between two IFR jets, I hardly think that even the FAA would mandate lower speeds to help prevent such midairs unless they had no confidence in the system they set up. Maybe the same loonies are still running the asylum?

Unlike you, I'll do you the courtesy of providing a link to backup my claims:

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR68-AI.pdf

Page 47, second paragraph.

We are all still waiting for a link from you to the reports/studies that prove an overwhelming case to support E over D (or E anywhere, for that matter). Based on previous form, I think we'll be a long time waiting.

[Dog One]

I understand that there has been several responses to the OAR with a similar theme to the Civilair response. Keep the responses coming!

[Capn Bloggs]

CLEARLY American Pilots think their airspace system is garbage as well Who would've thought?
RHS must be apoplectic. ;)

a fundamental ideologue, or and ideological fundamentalist!
I know one of those; his office is in Terry Hills! :}

[Capn Bloggs]

And another (May 2004):

Close calls place airspace system under close scrutiny (http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1116709.htm)

[Dog One]

Extract from

Australian Broadcasting Corporation

TV PROGRAM TRANSCRIPT

LOCATION: 7.30 Report - 26/05/2004: Close calls place airspace system under close scrutiny (http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1116709.htm)

Broadcast: 26/05/2004

MIKE CAPLEHORN, BROOME INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT GROUP: They're going way back to the square one.

The aircraft don't even need a radio and you can come into an airport any time you want.

Now, if that happens at the same time that a large jet is going down and coming into that airport, then you have a very, very serious chance of a major crash.

It's not just Broome -- we're talking about Karratha, we're talking about Kalgoorlie, we talking about Ayres Rock, we're talking about a lot of our major regional airports and, quite frankly, it's crazy.

The wheel turns a full circle!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

That's the problem with history, Dick. You have a lot of it!

Without emotion. these changes are not safe. Unless radar or equivalent is supplied, class E is more dangerous than flying in dirt road G.

IFR in E is supplied with a clearance and a separation service yet must also practice see and avoid...in controlled airspace???? Why???? It mustn't be controlled and someone is being charged for a service they are not receiving.

Before there is an accident and the finger pointing starts...In aviation there are no short cuts. It is black or white...it is safe or it isn't! If I was a bureaucrat (or politician) with no aviation experience I would avail myself of EVERY advice from as many views as possible before I take the advice of ONE person and put my name to it!

There will always be accidents, just hope your name isn't attributed to one that could have been avoided...No E without surveillance!

[OZBUSDRIVER]

To add further-

A simple rule, every pilot must have a map and a radio. If you cross this line on the map you must be known to the people monitoring this frequency. Provided you follow the instructions given by those people and maintain your aircraft within the limits of those instructions...no harm will come to you. This is called "CONTROLLED AIRSPACE" it matters not if it is A,B,C or ICAO D.

There are those who wish to remove themselves from these rules and fly as they see fit. They are not professional pilots Do you wish to make rules that favour these people..or..professional pilots?

In all simplicity, this is what it comes down to! A line on a map, being able to talk on a radio and follow instructions.

[superdimona]

Before there is an accident and the finger pointing starts...In aviation there are no short cuts. It is black or white...it is safe or it isn't!

Um, no. The world isn't black and white at all. Every single time you fly, there is some kind of risk involved. Someone, somewhere, has to decide if any given choice is "safe enough"

It obviously isn't a great idea to fly paying passengers overwater in an aircraft with a single engine - if that engine quits, things get ugly. Two engines are better. Four engines are better still. However there are diminishing returns, and an aircraft with 10 engines would not be economical. So we end up approving ETOPS operations and consider it "safe enough".

You _have_ to compromise somewhere. You just have to decide where to draw the line. We could, for instance, ban all VFR flights from entering controlled airspace at all. This would lower the risk of midairs but hurt a lot of people. We could go further, ground anything without a transponder or with a piston engine, ban all private flying, then charge all aircraft a $5000 tax and use the money to make all of Australia class C. This would be a lot safer for RPT with the cost of virtually killing GA.

If we ended up insisting on absolute 100% safety then aircraft would never leave the ground.

[Dog One]

No E without surveillance!

Great catch cry OzBusDriver.

Perhaps its the time for professional pilots to make some noise about E airspace. I remember the noise AOPA and its leader made about wanting freedom to fly.

Perhaps it time to get polictical and ask those in power will they accept responsibility if a mid air occurs?

Perhaps its time that the media were told the dangers fare paying passengers face operating in E without surveillance. I am sure the tourist operators would be knocking their respective member's doors down to get support for C airspace protection.

No E without surveillance!

No E without surveillance!

[Howabout]

superdimona,

If you go back through this thread, nobody is calling for '100% safety' or 10-engined aircraft. Your argument is as simplistic, and as misleading as the arguments pertaining to 'dirt-road-airspace,' 'manual telephone exchanges' and 'turning off the radar' during the Class G airspace trial.

The thrust of this thread is that a superior separation service can be provided that will not expose passenger carrying RPT aircraft, unneccesarily, to Russian Roulette airspace in the terminal area. And it can be provided from within the same resource base needed to provide terminal E.

What idiot would support an E service, that allows VFRs to mix it with IFRs with no separation, when a C service can be provided from the same resource base?

I eagerly wait your reply.

[superdimona]

I was responding to the blanket statement "In aviation there are no short cuts. It is black or white...it is safe or it isn't!" - which is wrong.

I didn't once say if I supported or opposed the proposed new airspace. Since you're interested in my opinion, I'd love to see E, only because as a mere RAA pilot John McCormick considers me not fit to undertake training to transit class C (and I don't want to pay inflated PPL prices, but thats a topic for another forum).

However that is my own selfish point of view and _if_ C can truly be brought in for the same cost of E, then why not do it. But please leave enough E lying around so that us unworthy RAA types aren't locked out of the sky.

[Howabout]

Super,

Read my previous comments on this thread regarding RAA access to zones.

I stand by those comments and have had the same opinion for several years. Trawl back and see my comments on the Launy zone and ultra-light operations.

You may find that we are violently in agreement.

There is a huge difference between the potential for RAA access and the rules preventing RAA access.

Don't confuse the two.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

From the 'Land of The Long White Cloud'.....which could be called
'The Land of Sensible Aviation'....relatively speaking.....
i.e. Am Enjoying the hospitality of Wanaka at the moment....:ok::ok:

There are 2 'E's in NZ.....The first is between the N & the W, and the second is just after the Z......

The remainder of the airspace is classed as A, C, D, or G, respectively!And,yes, the 'Below 10,000ft - 250kts max' rule is prominently displayed on the posters etc.

So why oh why, do we have this discussion re 'E' in OZ, even happening AT ALL????

If the Kiwis can get it right - in alignment with 'World's Best Practice'....

WTF??? do WE need to go looking for trouble for??? :eek: :eek:

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Ask yourself, SD. Which rule doesn't warrant your standard.

Meteorological conditions perhaps?

Howabout, access to airspace?

A simple thing like enough fuel?

Aeroplane correctly and legally loaded?

I am talking about rules and procedures, man! Black or White!

You either obey a rule or you break it!

In this case, we have bean-counters that judge the risk of reducing a service to a certain level that will increase the probability of an incident. The RISK is applying a level of service that will be ENOUGH to mitigate that event.

The bean counters are wishing to put a set of rules in place that will not prevented an event from happening...even though you follow the rules there is now a risk of a certain event happening...because of that risk you must now perform a procedure that is used in a lower level of airspace managment (Read this as NO MANAGMENT) to prevent that event from happening.....Statisticly and experimentally tested, this procedure has been proven to be not totally effective to prevent such an event.

Without equipping your RAA rego'd aircraft with the correct equipment and train yourself to an equivalent standard of professionalism you can give ANY chance of entering airspace higher than CTAF a long kiss goodnight!

The perceived STANDARD of RAA is not high enough to be allowed into higher levels of service...there is a real risk to other users because of this. Until this perception is changed by example of standard achieved then RAA has bucklys!

Don't come on here and try and hijack an argument about cutting a level of service equating to locking out of perceived cowboys. Black or White, sunshine...either you can do it or you can't!

NO E WITHOUT SURVEILLANCE!

[peuce]

Griffo,

You had me stumped there for a while ... but I finally worked it out :}

I, for one, would also like to join the "No E Without Surveillance" campaign:ok:
I would even go so far as to say that I would probably consider supporting Class E above Broome, IF:


There was a surveillance facility in place
Every aircraft entering the airspace had a black box that allowed it to be surveilled ... by ATS


How we would deal with aircraft that couldn't carry a black box ... I'm not sure. But I'd support attempts to try and find a way.

So, in summary, I'm not against change. I support careful and appropriate change. I don't even think ICAO had envisaged, nor encouraged, the use of Non-surveillance Class E airspace.

[Howabout]

Sorry OZ,

I suppose we beg to differ.

I take some of your points, but I do not believe that RAA drivers are a bunch of 'cowboys.' The reverse in fact.

The aircraft I have seen are well maintained, airworthy and equipped, and their pilots are not a bunch of dunces.

What I said before still applies - if they can communicate and are visible to the system, why not give them a go?

It does not mean flying over KSA! It might mean the development of a few 'special procedures' - through the Launy zone south of the highway only, for example. But these guys are not twits.

Class E airspace is an atrocity; but let's not confuse an atrocity with people who want a decent level of access and are willing to be responsible about it.

I'd far prefer a responsible RAA dude, listening out and broadcasting, than some idiot who reckons that in G all you have to do is listen to your CD player.

[superdimona]

I am talking about rules and procedures, man! Black or White!

You either obey a rule or you break it!

Really? I thought we were actually talking about _changing_ the rules or the possibility thereof, and debating if the change was safe enough.

For instance, let's take a look at your examples:

Meteorological conditions perhaps?

Do you believe that that lightning struck a rock somewhere, and the legal defination of VMC appeared? Some people got together and decided on a compromise that didn't ground planes for no good reason but was still pretty safe. Hardly black & white.

A simple thing like enough fuel?

How do you decide what the fixed and variable reserves should be? More fuel could be safer but might cost an operator valuable payload. Not black & white.

Aeroplane correctly and legally loaded?

How do you decide the minimum climb angle? And you can bet your aircraft won't instantly crash if the CoG is 1mm outside the limits. There are margins involved. How do you calculate the acceptable margin?

I would respond to your anti-RAA rhetoric but I don't want to derail the thread. Besides, I doubt either of us are going to change our opinions, so let's just agree to disagree.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

OK..too aggressive...

Howabout...nothing wrong at all with your position. In fact, I agree!
The RAAus guys do have some hoops chucked in front of them. Makes it hard for individuals to prove their worth when there is a perception to the contrary.

SD, We could lob hand grenades at each other all day and see no change. Funnily enough, you may find I am on your side wrt the RAAus. I am not anti-RAAus. Why would I be? If an RAAus aircraft is equipped then why not access class E.

The proposed changes to put E over D are not safe.

SD, it would seem you take offence to my position on rules. It's what pees me orf about RAA. I cannot legally fly a J230 two up under the 540kg (its a bit better under LSA600kg rule:ugh:)...even if I lose weight I still cannot get a legal load to fly more than an hour. Thats rules for you!:}

[Howabout]

Thanks OZ,

I suppose the point I was trying to make is that us 'fundamentalists' who 'resist change' are probably more positive about giving a fair go, where it can be done safely, than the 'true believers.' The 'true believers' just think about themselves - VH/VFR going anywhere and bugger the IFR. Before anyone jumps, that ain't all VH operators, just the protagonists of Russian Roulette airspace (Class E terminal).

The RAA folk that I've met would bend over backwards to comply with reasonable conditions that would allow them to have some access. As I said before:

I'd far prefer a responsible RAA dude, listening out and broadcasting, than some idiot who reckons that in G all you have to do is listen to your CD player.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Sri Peuce.....

I know I was a bit 'obtuse', but then I figured that this WHOLE F#^kin argument about "E" is 'F&^kin OBTUSE..........:eek::confused::eek::yuk:

But, I know that U being the Guy U is, would fully understand ........

Cheers...:ok::ok:

[Howabout]

Nice observation DNS. I've also wondered where those 'dozens and dozens' of ATC who reckon that E is easier than C hang out in their spare time.

Mountain climbing is a possibility. Maybe, this time of year, they've gone all religious and are on some sort of pilgrimage sponsored by beloved Chairman Two.