NH-90 problems

[KiwiNedNZ]

Great bunch of ladies - flew with them down to Dip Flat for Ex Blackbird. Nix is married to another NH90 captain and Hayley Vincent comes from a family who is well known in Kiwi aviation.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Didn't expect to be able to see pics of amazing NZ scenery in this thread - lovely shots, Ned. Any sandflies in that part of the world?

Back on topic: does anyone know how the Omanis have been getting on with their NH90s? Must be someone with Loan Service experience lurking somewhere near this thread - or do they not have any Brits on those Sqns any more?

[casper64]

They look happy enough..nice pics KiwiNedNZ

https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-01-trailblazing-military-aviation-an-all-female-team-onboard-the-nh90?fbclid=IwAR3ZDQfxqXHslRLeTaGUodlEc4PzQoaVZmOp5JuDFiMdX_ aK-xWUlFJdaPo


https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/a266c199_d842_4cc3_ba94_f6a85daf360d_9ebfef39b99eae4639318da ff8021a070fb072dc.jpeg
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cheers
Seems they DO know how to operate them…. Maybe sell the Austrian NH and Tigers to them? 🤔

[minigundiplomat]

I note all those pictures are on the ground.........

[Blackhawk9]

Didn't expect to be able to see pics of amazing NZ scenery in this thread - lovely shots, Ned. Any sandflies in that part of the world?

Back on topic: does anyone know how the Omanis have been getting on with their NH90s? Must be someone with Loan Service experience lurking somewhere near this thread - or do they not have any Brits on those Sqns any more?
Not sure now but Airbus had a very large maintenance team for the 20 x NH-90's in Oman to keep them flying .

[KiwiNedNZ]

I note all those pictures are on the ground.........

I shot the pics before we took off for the south island. During the flight I was sitting in one of the seats in the back so couldn't just get up and wander around.

[Nescafe]

What a moron with your insinuations.

Or he has what is quite common in aviation circles, and that is a robust sense of humour? You should try it.

[chopper2004]

x 11 Spanish FAMET in formation carrying 253 troops

https://twitter.com/airbusheli/status/1620735734775947265?s=61&t=HbwLXZxRL4ZNap7Xed1yuA

cheers

[SASless]

Or he has what is quite common in aviation circles, and that is a robust sense of humour? You should try it.

Sadly, far too. many folks try their absolute best to take the fun and humor out of helicopter flying.....as they seem to be the ones that seem to think far more of themselves than they should.

Somehow I find myself smiling as I think of Ned in an airborne helicopter and NOT being able to shoot any photos....that is a very unusual and uncomfortable experience for him I am t thinking.

He does truly outstanding work that takes him all over this Blue and Green Orb we inhabit.

[Blackhawk9]

Sadly, far too. many folks try their absolute best to take the fun and humor out of helicopter flying.....as they seem to be the ones that seem to think far more of themselves than they should.

Somehow I find myself smiling as I think of Ned in an airborne helicopter and NOT being able to shoot any photos....that is a very unusual and uncomfortable experience for him I am t thinking.

He does truly outstanding work that takes him all over this Blue and Green Orb we inhabit.

Yes Mil loadmasters get a bit anal now with rules, and it doesn't matter who you are or your background, common sense ain't so common. Couple of years ago C Sqn 5 Avn the Chinook Sqn was taking a group of ex12 Sqn RAAF (ex chinook sqn) reunion members for a ride , the ex RAAFies after take off all gut up and started moving around the back of Chinook when Army loadmaster told them to sit down and strap in they told him to go far away! , Loady complained to Pilot who said leave them alone they have more Chinook time than all them combined.

[KiwiNedNZ]

SASLess - Only reason I didnt shoot any pics on the way down south was because it was a transit flight. Bunch of bags stacked in the cabin as well as all the maintainers and other flightcrew. Wasnt an air to air shoot or anything else. Jen was in one of the crewies seats and I was in the other. I ended up doing bunch of other air to air shoots when we were in Dip Flat.

Blackhawk9 - All the mil loadmasters I have got to fly with, either Kiwi, Aussie or American have been awesome. Yes there are rules and we abide by them. If I am shooting air to air then always have a harness on and secured in. Keeps everyone happy :)

[212man]

x 11 Spanish FAMET in formation carrying 253 troops

https://twitter.com/airbusheli/status/1620735734775947265?s=61&t=HbwLXZxRL4ZNap7Xed1yuA

cheers
I think they mean 220 troops, 22 pilots and 11 loadmasters!

[minigundiplomat]

I think they mean 220 troops, 22 pilots and 11 loadmasters!

Or a Chinook 5 ship...........

[Self loading bear]

Belgium wants to sell 4 of the NH90 TTH
Buy 1 additional NH90 NFH
and 15 AH 145.
NFH to be moved from SAR to frigates only.

Who will do the SAR??
I guess outsourcing NHV

Scramble (https://www.scramble.nl/military-news/belgian-armed-forces-nh90-tth-replacement)

[casper64]

Or a Chinook 5 ship...........
but if 1 of a 5 ship gets downed 20% of your force is gone… if 1 of the 11 gets downed less than 10% is lost. But clearly you need a bigger LZ 😉

[minigundiplomat]

but if 1 of a 5 ship gets downed 20% of your force is gone… if 1 of the 11 gets downed less than 10% is lost. But clearly you need a bigger LZ 😉

Yep, because all militaries want a huge number of aircraft to deliver small numbers of troops, just in case. Makes complete sense - are you an AH employee?

[casper64]

Yep, because all militaries want a huge number of aircraft to deliver small numbers of troops, just in case. Makes complete sense - are you an AH employee?
No…. But it is an NH90 thread and you throw in a comment regarding (the great) Chinook. I also gave you the “😉“ so don’t take it too seriously. 😄

[megan]

Yep, because all militaries want a huge number of aircraft to deliver small numbers of troops, just in case. Makes complete senseYou mean like this? ;) Where serious troop lift all started.


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1107x722/huey_9d69e4b20a3e0aeabebbed6778f6f4e39016bbb1.jpg

[minigundiplomat]

That is an awesome picture Megan, but it was 50-60 years ago. Recent conflicts have been less aircraft doing more - pity, in some way when you see images like that.

[GenuineHoverBug]

It was announced today that the government proposes to buy six MH-60R Seahawks for the coastguard. Three slots on the production line have been obtained from the US Navy for early deliveries in 2025 and the remaining three will be delivered within 2027.
Helicopters for the ASW role would also be of the same type, but the need is to be further evaluated before a final decision.

[ericferret]

A couple of interesting quotes from the new president of manufacturer NH Industries Alex Aloccio in the latest issue of Helicopter International.

Currently availability figures are averaging 40 percent but are expected to increase further over the next six months. Aloccio points out that on deployments overseas in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali and at sea off the Somali coast, availability has been between 70-80 percent.

I would say that on an active deployment 70/80 is poor in this situation. These aircraft would have top priority for spares and support.
When the Gazelle was deployed in N.I in the mid 70's serviceability which was not great in Germany rose rapidly to the high 90's.
This was an aircraft in it's second year of squadron service. The operational aircraft were backed up by a complete aircraft supplied as a christmas tree.
and highest priority for spares.
This brings us to the second quote.

Aloccio also points out that the NH90 is not just a 10-15 year programme, but will be in service for at least the next 50 years and is thus still in its service entry phase.

Still in its service entry phase. First aircraft were delivered to the Germans in 2006.
17 years in service and it's still in it's entry phase, amazing.

Never mind the quality feel the width!!!

[Bengo]

Availability is fine, but if you are not attaining it through reliability and maintainability you are going to need A1 spares and rotables repair support, backed up by deep, deep pockets.

At the moment it seems NH 90 isn't doing the spares and repair bit well, so the deep pockets are not yet needed.
N

[Cyclic Hotline]

https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/airbus-to-take-lessons-from-nh90-retrofits-to-ensure-future-upgrades-do-not-impact-availability-and-customer-satisfaction20 MARCH 2023
Airbus to take lessons from NH90 retrofits to ensure future upgrades do not impact availability and customer satisfactionby Gareth Jennings

NH90 retrofits being carried out at Airbus' Marignane facility in southern France. The NHI consortium intends to learn the lessons of the IOC to FOC upgrade process to ensure that adverse effects on availability do not happen with future efforts. (Janes/Gareth Jennings)

Airbus accepts that it must learn the lessons of the previous retrofit efforts that adversely affected the NHIndustries (NHI) NH90 helicopter programme, as it prepares to roll out further block enhancements in the coming years.

Speaking at the handover of the 500th NH90 to the international programme on 17 March, Matthieu Louvot, Airbus Helicopters executive vice-president, said that the NHI consortium that also includes Leonardo Helicopters and Fokker Aerostructures could not afford to repeat the same mistakes of the ongoing initial operating capability (IOC) to full operating capability (FOC) retrofits that have severely impacted fleet availability rates for some customers.

“We have to take lessons from the IOC to FOC retrofits,” Louvot said at the company's Marignane facility, where NH90 retrofits are taking place. “For [Software Release] SR2 and SR3 [to follow], there will be a different set up in terms of spare parts management, and the organisation will be stronger. We have already proposed SR3 lead times to customers.”

With 14 international customers signed up to the programme and 597 NH90 helicopters ordered, Louvot's comments came in the same week that Norway announced it has selected the Lockheed Martin MH-60R Seahawk to replace its NH90s. Australia had previously announced it was axing its MRH-90 Taipans, while Sweden and Belgium have both suggested they may do the same.

While the reasons for each country's decision vary, poor availability caused in large part to aircraft being withdrawn from service for lengthy retrofits has been an almost universal concern.

[EESDL]

"French officials said prime targets for the midlife update include an upgrade of the NH90’s avionics, perhaps using the Thales-developed Flyt’X suite being adopted for both the French H160M Guepard and the Tiger attack helicopter Mk. 3 upgrade"
I thought the 160M was Helionix - or is FlytX the same?. I'd be surprised if Helionix was being replaced already.

[HeliHenri]

I thought the 160M was Helionix - or is FlytX the same?. I'd be surprised if Helionix was being replaced already.

Helionix is from Elbit
FlytX is from Thales.
the French forces are paranoid, they prefer to use French avionics rather than Israeli, who knows why …
.

[Mee3]

Helionix is from Elbit
FlytX is from Thales.
the French forces are paranoid, they prefer to use French avionics rather than Israeli, who knows why …
.
Helionix is not just the hardware but the also the philosophy and know how of an effective cockpit. While the display just the display.
Main reason for the Thales is to buy french for french.

[Cyclic Hotline]

I guess this is recognition that they do have a problem? Some might suggest that the acquisition price is somewhat irrelevant if the platform fails to perform its mission, and the operating costs might consume any variation in acquisition price or fleet size?
https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/nhi-offers-to-fix-norways-nh90-issues-at-no-cost21 MARCH 2023
NHI offers to fix Norway's NH90 issues ‘at no cost'by Gareth Jennings



Despite Norway saying it is axing its NH90 programme in favour of the MH-60R Seahawk, NHI says that it will fix the outstanding problems at no cost to the country. (Royal Norwegian Air Force)

NHIndustries (NHI) has offered to fix for free the issues that have caused Norway to cancel its NH90 helicopter programme, a senior official told Janes and other defence media on 17 March.

Speaking at the handover of the 500th NH90 to the international programme in Marignane, southern France, NHI president Axel Aloccio said the consortium that comprises Airbus Helicopters, Leonardo Helicopters, and Fokker Aerostructures was still trying to address the problems that had caused Norway to cancel the NH90 in favour of the Lockheed Martin MH-60R Seahawk.

“We continue to discuss with Norway. We have offered to fix all of the technical issues at no cost to them, and to increase support with more man-hours,” Aloccio said. “The cost of the recent MH-60R contract [NOK12 billion (USD1.12 billion) for six helicopters] puts the NH90 offer into perspective, I think [Norway paid NOK5 billion for 14 NH90 helicopters]. Also, it would cost EUR3–4 billion (USD3.2–4.2 billion) to change from the NH90 in terms of training, tooling, infrastructure, etc,” he added.

Aloccio's comments came in the same week that the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said it had selected the MH-60R to replace the NH90 that was grounded in June 2022.

[Cyclic Hotline]

This is an interesting counter-view on the actions taken with the Australian fleet, and a potentially identifiable source of some of the logistical issues. It is an interesting comparison between the experience of New Zealand and Australia, which has been discussed here in detail, but doesn't fully recognize the dissatisfaction expressed by other operators outside Australia, which is also discussed here.

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logisticsAn Australian Army MRH90 Taipan helicopter from 6th Aviation Regiment conducts reconnaissance at Shepparton, Victoria. Credit: CoA / Carolyn Barnett
By
Kym Bergmann / Canberra (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/)
-
28/02/2023
513
68 (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/#comments)
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Helicopters-2-scaled.jpg





This startling conclusion is the culmination of several years of effort to find out why Australia has had disproportionate problems keeping our 22 Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) and 47 Taipan Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH) flying. Other countries have nowhere near the same level of difficulty as has been experienced here.

Just about all the blame has been heaped on the manufacturer Airbus Helicopters and both classes are being retired and replaced about 20 years ahead of schedule. All the helicopters have plenty of structural life remaining. Instead, we will spend an extra $10 billion dollars on 29 Apache AH-64E attack helicopters and 40 UH-60M Blackhawks. Added to this is mix are 12 MH-60R Seahawks to replace the RAN’s six MHRs at a cost of $1.4 billion.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Helicopters-1-scaled.jpgHMAS Anzac’s MH-60R helicopter launches from HMAS Adelaide’s flight deck to assist in a hellfire missile firing with Australian Army ARH Tiger helicopters during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2022.To put it more bluntly, all this might be based on an incorrect premise – namely that the ARH and MRH fleets are chronically unreliable because of spare parts shortages, and they therefore must be retired in the national interest. This is not correct, with the major culprit being the Defence / CASG support process – a major element of which is a software package called CAMM2. It looks as if this is at the heart of the problem and not the helicopters themselves.

Many readers will be surprised because of the repeated vitriol directed at the MRH and ARH for more than a decade – some of it seemingly orchestrated – that has created the false impression that the helicopters are unreliable. Everyone has piled on – politicians of all backgrounds; large sections of the media; think tanks; and Defence itself. Airbus has not publicly defended itself – and wanted nothing to do with this article – which might be a combination of management fatigue battling the Australian system and having bigger fish to fry in the shape of bids such as JP 9102 for communications satellites.

This article should have been written five years ago when it might have made a difference to the series of decisions leading to the recent Apache and Blackhawk purchases. However, getting detailed information from Defence has been impossible and events such as Senate Estimates have only provided fragments of disconnected data.

Some retired Army staff who know what has been going on remain loyal to their former service and while confirming facts about CAMM2 will not go on the record. Additionally, few people are interested in the detail of Defence logistics when it is much easier to blame the French in general and Airbus Helicopters in particular.

Today, both the ARH and MRH fleets have an availability rate of about 70%. This is likely to be better than most – if not all – RAAF platforms and for the future Apache and Blackhawk fleets. The 30% of time when they are unavailable is not necessarily because of a problem but instead they are offline for routine, preventative maintenance. This is standard on complex machines such as military aircraft – and it takes up an unavoidable chunk of time.

However, getting to this 70% figure has involved a struggle going back at least a decade, much of which has involved discussions between the manufacturer and CASG about streamlining support processes. The reality is that there have always been plenty of spare parts available. What has stopped them getting from the warehouse to multiple workshops has been burdensome bureaucracy caused mainly by outdated Defence software.

Consider the case of New Zealand. Their air force operates eight MRHs almost identical to Australia’s – and they could not be happier, flying a reliable modern helicopter with one of the highest usage rates of the global fleet. The contrast with Australia is stark and worth examining. How can one customer have no problems with maintenance – yet the other is retiring its fleet 20 years early?

New Zealand has all their helicopters at one facility; Australia’s are scattered across five bases. They have a streamlined approach to logistics with a single point of contact and modern, interconnected data bases. The difference with Australia was illustrated during Talisman Sabre in 2019 when the Australian MRH fleet was grounded because of a tail rotor issue – but the New Zealanders were able to keep flying theirs because they had already installed the fix according to the OEM’s recommendations well in advance of the exercise.

Instead, the Australian CAMM-2 (Computer Aided Maintenance Management) system was fielded in 2005 to address deficiencies in CAMM-1, which was an earlier attempt to digitise logistics. Very few organisations continue to use a logistics software package from 20 years ago – certainly none in the commercial world – and CAMM-2 has been described as labour intensive and costly to maintain.

It was designed to support military aircraft – though it is not being universally applied, with exceptions including the RAAF C-17 fleet with software from the manufacturer, Boeing, via the USAF. The F-35s come with their own separate Automatic Logistics Information System (ALIS) supplied by Lockheed Martin that supports the global fleet of aircraft.

CAMM-2 was meant to integrate seamlessly with several other databases such as Army’s separate, orphan, Weapons System Data Base (WSDB) but that has not proven to be the case. Apart from being old, CAMM-2 has several limits, for example not doing inventory management. There is a veritable alphabet soup of other unconnected logistic packages such as MRI, LSAR, MILIS, ADAASS and WFD that are all part of the Australian military support structure – in additional to local uncontrolled databases and spreadsheets.

This means that for one of the simplest tasks that frequently occurs – a part number change on an engineer-approved basis from the OEM – must be manually entered into about eight different systems, potentially by eight different people. This lack of integration and a labour-intensive approach to updating documentation is why the Australian system is such a mess. That is neither the fault of the helicopters nor the company making them.

Another issue in play is the figure being used by Army that retiring the MRH early rather than in 2037 will result in a $2.7 billion saving. The problem is that this improbably large number of $200 million per year can only be achieved if things are included that have no factual basis – such as equipment that isn’t needed or upgrades that don’t exist. It feels like someone has been given the job of finding a scary number and they have worked backwards to come up with the desired result. Defence has not responded to a request for a breakdown of the figure.

As part of the process of demonising both Tiger and Taipan, the Canberra bubble has been awash with commentary that neither aircraft was wanted by Army in the first place, and they were imposed from above by politicians. These claims are incorrect.

The situation with Tiger is clear: it was preferred by Defence (Army) because it met all the key performance requirements, was the most modern of the helicopters offered, the price was attractive – and it had a high level of Australian content. In procurement terms it was a slam dunk. Apache was fourth on the list after the Mangusta and the Cobra. After these came the Rooivalk from South Africa.

The situation with the MRH is more complex. Both it and the Blackhawk met performance requirements and since Defence could live with either, it was finally selected for a range of reasons. These included a high level of local content and that it was a better fit with the overall AIR 9000 objective of rationalising the ADF helicopter fleet.

This masterplan was based in part on the assumption that the naval version of the MRH – the NFH90 – would be mature enough to replace RAN Seahawks around 2016. However, that fell apart with the cancellation of the Seasprite project in 2008 – Defence did not cover itself in glory after spending $1.5 billion on that failed undertaking – and that led to the subsequent selection of the MH-60R.

A further claim is that other MRH customers are also unhappy, and the prime example is Norway. Indeed, Norway is threatening to scrap their helicopter fleet. The only problem is that the Norwegians purchased the ASW version of the helicopter – the NFH90 referred to above, not the MRH – and then decided to fit their own dipping sonar and indigenous lightweight torpedo, guaranteeing that it would be a program manager’s nightmare.

This has no relevance to Australia. Nor does the Swedish case of their MEDEVAC helicopters. The cabin size of the MRH is one of its attractive features – being more spacious than a Blackhawk – but for reasons known only to themselves the Swedes insisted on raising the cabin height by 20cm. Despite the resultant delays they remain an important part of the program.

If the fundamentals of APDR’s research are correct – that there’s basically nothing wrong with the helicopters – something has gone badly awry with Defence’s processes. The result is that people from Ministers all the way through to the media have been misinformed for years.

External agencies such as the ANAO that have been critical of Tiger and Taipan – but have relied on information supplied to them by Defence. An independent review of the Tiger program conducted in 2016 was quickly classified as SECRET and consequently has never seen the light of day.

All this needs to be checked out – urgently.

There has already been far too much selective use of information to support a particular pre-determined outcome, and someone needs to objectively evaluate and report on the situation – preferably publicly. Australians are entitled to know where their money is going.

It looks too late to stop the purchase of Apache and Blackhawk – which are fine helicopters of an older design – but it might be possible to achieve billions of dollars of savings by slowing down the delivery schedule and keeping Tiger and Taipan in service for longer.

The problem is that a lot of powerful people – on both sides of politics and at high levels in Defence – run the risk of looking like fools for not doing their homework. All the matters detailed in this article are not the result of espionage, they are the product of asking a lot of questions and not being fobbed off with simple explanations.

For anyone who remains unconvinced: how else is it possible to explain the vast difference between the Australian and New Zealand experiences with the MRH?

Unfortunately, this might all be swept under the carpet because the embarrassment caused by revealing the facts will be too great – which should never be a factor when taking decisions in the security interests of Australia.

[Cyclic Hotline]

This is an interesting article on the experience of Greece with the NH-90.

https://defencereview.gr/nh-90-ta-diadochika-pligmata-apotis-proore/NH-90: The successive blows with the early withdrawals and the Greek case
Home (https://defencereview.gr/) / Defense (https://defencereview.gr/category/amina/) , Greece (https://defencereview.gr/category/amina/ellada-amina/) , Central (https://defencereview.gr/category/kentrika/) , Recommended (https://defencereview.gr/category/proteinomena/) /NH-90: The consecutive blows with the early withdrawals and the Greek caseEfthymios Lazos (https://defencereview.gr/author/lazos/) Defense (https://defencereview.gr/category/amina/) , Greece (https://defencereview.gr/category/amina/ellada-amina/) , Central (https://defencereview.gr/category/kentrika/) , Featured (https://defencereview.gr/category/proteinomena/)|
March 22, 2023 4:54 p.mThe reason for this particular article was given by the news that on March 17 Airbus Helicopters delivered the 500th NH -90 helicopter. It is a tactical transport helicopter (TTH: Tactical Transport Helicopter), numbered "1486", which was delivered to the French Air Force. NH-90 has recorded significant commercial successes, but in the last two years it has also suffered serious setbacks, with early withdrawals, mainly due to low availability. It is natural that such developments directly concern Greece, which uses the NH-90. During the handover ceremony of the 500th helicopter, Bruno Even, CEO of Airbus Helicopters, spoke about the issue of NH-90 support.

As Bruno Even stated, Airbus Helicopters " is convinced that it has the structures in place to deal with the availability problem " and that " there are measures that we have worked out, to improve availability, but they have not yet been implemented ". In 2021 NH Industries launched the " New Horizons " program with the aim of increasing the low availability rates of helicopters to almost all users. The " New Horizons " program includes 22 initiatives to improve the helicopter support chain, from the first to the last level. " I know the disappointment and the expectations, but I am convinced that the initiatives we started two years ago, and others we will take, will bear fruit ," said Bruno Even.

Today, 14 countries have chosen the NH-90, either in the TTH tactical transport version, or in the NFH (NATO Frigate Helicopter) naval cooperation version. These are Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Qatar, Spain, Sweden and Norway. Of these 14 countries, Australia, Belgium, Sweden and Norway have decided and announced their decision to retire and replace the helicopters early. The beginning was made with Belgium, when in June 2020, reports in the Belgian press reported the country's intention to proceed with the procurement of 18 new helicopters, to replace four (4) NH-90 TTI and 13 light A-109ABi (in service since 1992).

In 2007, Belgium signed a contract for the supply of eight (8) NH-90s, of which four (4) NH-90 TTHs and an equal number of NH-90 NFHs, with an option for two (2) more NH-90 TTHs. The first Belgian NH-90 TTH flew for the first time in September 2012, while the first helicopter, an NH-90 NFH, was delivered in August 2013. The first NH-90 TTH was delivered in October 2013, while all eight ( 8) helicopters had been delivered by the beginning of 2015. The reason for the Belgian decision to retire the helicopters (the four TTHs, not the same number of NFHs) early is their high operational costs and low availability. According to the current planning the Belgian NH-90 TTH will be retired by 2025.

Belgium was followed by Australia , which, in May 2022, announced its decision to replace 69 Airbus Helicopters helicopters with American ones. In particular, Australia decided to replace 22 Tiger attack helicopters, with 29 AH-64E Guardian Apache, and 47 NH-90 (MRH-90 Taipan in Australian service) from 40 UH-60M Black Hawk (for the Army) and six (6 ) MH-60R Sea Hawk (for the Navy). The story of the Australian Tiger began in December 2001 with the signing of a relevant contract for the supply of 22 helicopters. In 2016 Australia announced its intention to replace the Tigers, due to the high cost of maintaining the engines and the long time required to repair the systems sent to Europe.

In 2004 the country proceeded to purchase 12 MRH-90s, while in June 2006 it proceeded to purchase another 34 helicopters of the type to replace the Army's S-70A-9 Black Hawk and the Navy's Sea Kings. In April 2010 one (1) MRH-90 experienced engine failure and the fleet was temporarily grounded. In July 2014 Australia issued a report stating procurement errors and development failures resulting in the MRH-90 Full Operational Capability being achieved in April 2019, five (5) years late. As compensation Australia received one (1) additional helicopter. In June 2021 there was another incident of the helicopters getting stuck, and on December 9 the early retirement and replacement of the MRH-90s was announced.

In June 2022, Norway was added to the list of countries that decided to retire NH-90 helicopters early. In particular, the country's Minister of Defense announced the cancellation of the program of 14 NH-90 NFH helicopters, that he will return to NH Industries the 13 helicopters that have already been delivered and will demand the return of the $500 million that the country has spent on the procurement . " It is a serious decision, but no matter how hard the staff works, no matter how many spare parts we order, the NH-90 will never be able to meet the needs of our Armed Forces", the Norwegian Minister of Defense had stated. Norway made this decision for four (4) main reasons: Severe delays in delivery of the helicopters, reliability issue, support issues and age of sub-systems.

In 2001 Norway proceeded to procure 14 NH-90s for use by the Navy and Coast Guard. Deliveries were scheduled for 2005-2008. However, the first helicopter was delivered in December 2011, while by January 2016 six (6) of the 14 helicopters had been delivered. In February 2018, a report by the country's Armed Forces said the helicopters were not providing sufficient flight hours for their role. According to the final schedule, all 14 helicopters would be delivered within 2022, but ultimately this schedule was also not met and the last helicopter would be delivered in 2024.

This, as it turned out, was also the final straw for Norway, who proceeded to cancel the program. Regarding the reliability of the helicopter, Norway announced that the failure rate was 40 times higher than predicted. This, combined with problems with maintenance and support, sometimes resulted in only one (1) helicopter being available or none at all. According to the country's Ministry of Defense the helicopters were supposed to fly 3,900 hours a year, but they only flew 700 hours during that time. In addition, subsystems related to the anti-submarine capability of the helicopters are now technologically obsolete.

After Belgium, Australia and Norway, in November 2022, Sweden announced that as part of the new design it will prematurely retire the 18 in service NH-90 TTH/NFH and replace them with new ones. The first public peak for the NH-90 was in July 2022, when the Chief of the Swedish Air Force revealed that he is evaluating the effectiveness and performance of the NH-90 NFH and that so far the helicopter is not performing according to the intended capabilities. In 2001 Sweden proceeded to procure 18 NH-90, nine (9) TTH and nine (9) NFH. The first NH-90 was delivered in 2015, the last in 2019. The helicopters were supposed to achieve Full Operational Capability in 2008. However, the first NH-90 achieved Initial Operational Capability in April 2011. This long delay led Sweden to expedited supply of 15 UH-60M Black Hawk;

As for Greece, at the beginning of April 2021 the GDAEE (General Directorate of Defense Equipment and Investments) announced that the 6th amendment to contract 034A/03 was signed , which governs the supply program of 16 NH-90 transport helicopters, four (4) of special operations helicopters of the same type and four (4) medical collections for converting the helicopters into casualty transport (MEDEVAC). With the signing of this amendment, the way was opened for the receipt of the last six (6) helicopters (in November 2022 it arrived in Greece on the 15th helicopter). As for the support of the helicopters, in October 2021, the Parliament approved the signing of the relevant technical support contract, although the contract has not yet been signed. The latest development is the signing, on November 24, 2022, of contract 006A/2022 for the supply of spare parts for the NH-90.

The history of the Greek NH-90s begins in August 2003 when the contract, totaling $657,523,069, was signed for the supply of 20 NH-90s. According to the original schedule, the first helicopter was to be delivered in December 2005, six (6) helicopters were to be delivered in 2006, five (5) in 2007, six (6) in 2008 and two (2) in 2009. However, during the acceptance tests of the first helicopter, many technical observations and problems arose (about 200 according to GES) that judged the helicopters to be unacceptable from the Greek side. After a series of negotiations, the manufacturing company committed to resolving the technical observations and problems, but the delay in deliveries included a penalty clause of €34,000,000, which was included as a related term in the original contract.

The issue was finally resolved in August 2010 with the signing of a relevant amendment to the original contract. According to the terms of the amendment, the manufacturing company assumed responsibility for the delay, paid compensation of €70,030,540, granted a credit of €20,000,000 for materials and services for subsequent support, provided additional materials and services of an estimated amount of €30,000,000, withheld an amount of € 4,800,000 (€ 1,200,000 for each of the four helicopters until the completion of their repair work), while a penalty clause of € 120,000,000 was foreseen in case of derailment of the program again.

Until then, i.e. in August 2010, Greece had paid the advance of € 263,009,227.60 (ie 40% of the contract value). Therefore, the amount of € 394,513,841.40 – € 70,030,540 (agreed compensation) = € 324,483,301.40 remained to be paid. Thus, the first two (2) helicopters were delivered in June 2011, while by October 2013 seven (7) helicopters had been delivered. This was followed by the delivery of the 8th helicopter in April 2014, the 9th helicopter in July 2014, the 10th helicopter in November 2014 and the 11th helicopter in December 2014.

In February 2015, while the 12th helicopter was to be delivered, Greece raised the issue of a lack of technical support. The issue caused reactions when the Minister of National Defence, Pannos Kammenos, stated that the 12th helicopter would not be received, that the last installment (approximately €110,000,000) would not be paid and that the contract would not be signed continued support in the amount of €75,500,000, approved by the competent parliamentary committee in July 2014 (by then the Greek State had already repaid approximately 70% of the total price). Finally, when it was established, from the Greek side, that the refusal to receive the helicopters burdened the Greek State with additional costs for their custody, the issue was re-examined, resulting in the 12th helicopter to be delivered in April 2017, the 13th helicopter in June 2017 and the 14th helicopter in October 2017.

[golder]

This is an interesting counter-view on the actions taken with the Australian fleet, and a potentially identifiable source of some of the logistical issues. It is an interesting comparison between the experience of New Zealand and Australia, which has been discussed here in detail, but doesn't fully recognize the dissatisfaction expressed by other operators outside Australia, which is also discussed here.

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logisticsAn Australian Army MRH90 Taipan helicopter from 6th Aviation Regiment conducts reconnaissance at Shepparton, Victoria. Credit: CoA / Carolyn Barnett
By
Kym Bergmann / Canberra (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/)
-

It's good to see Airbus, supporting one-man comedy shows in Australia. As you can see, Kym is very appreciative.

Airbus also thanks Kym for supporting the Mklll upgrade. Which has the very low cost, of 60 million euro a tail. That will be for 15 years, before retirement. Even though a new Apache costs under 40 million euro, flyaway.
https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/france-and-spain-launch-tiger-mkiii-programme/

[megan]

Does the RAAF have any role to play in Army aviation support? Not unknown for inter service rivalry to have a part to play, particularly as the RAAF lost the helos to the Army could there be knives out?

[pitchlink1]

This is an interesting counter-view on the actions taken with the Australian fleet, and a potentially identifiable source of some of the logistical issues. It is an interesting comparison between the experience of New Zealand and Australia, which has been discussed here in detail, but doesn't fully recognize the dissatisfaction expressed by other operators outside Australia, which is also discussed here.

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/Helicopters-There is nothing wrong with Tiger and Taipan – the problem is Defence logisticsAn Australian Army MRH90 Taipan helicopter from 6th Aviation Regiment conducts reconnaissance at Shepparton, Victoria. Credit: CoA / Carolyn Barnett
By
Kym Bergmann / Canberra (https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/helicopters-there-is-nothing-wrong-with-tiger-and-taipan-the-problem-is-defence-logistics/)

(…)

Another issue in play is the figure being used by Army that retiring the MRH early rather than in 2037 will result in a $2.7 billion saving. The problem is that this improbably large number of $200 million per year can only be achieved if things are included that have no factual basis – such as equipment that isn’t needed or upgrades that don’t exist. It feels like someone has been given the job of finding a scary number and they have worked backwards to come up with the desired result. Defence has not responded to a request for a breakdown of the figure.

(…)
.

With 47 MRH90 each flying 300 hours per year and retirement is cut short with 30 years that equals 423 000 FH. The proposed saving of $2,7 billion divided by the FH gives a saving of $6k per FH. With a reported hourly cost of MRH90 of $50k per FH (which resonates well with other 90 users) and the FH cost of Hawks is $4-6k a saving of $6k/FH seems very conservative. Hence, the saving from early retirement is not $2,7 billion but three or four times that number. Possibly higher than $15 billion. Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new helicopters of $2,5 billion the saving is very substantial. Add better availability and less frustration and you have a extremely good case.

[noooby]

With 47 MRH90 each flying 300 hours per year and retirement is cut short with 30 years that equals 423 000 FH. The proposed saving of $2,7 billion divided by the FH gives a saving of $6k per FH. With a reported hourly cost of MRH90 of $50k per FH (which resonates well with other 90 users) and the FH cost of Hawks is $4-6k a saving of $6k/FH seems very conservative. Hence, the saving from early retirement is not $2,7 billion but three or four times that number. Possibly higher that $15 billion. Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new helicopters of $2,5 billion the saving is very substantial. Add better availability and less frustration and you have a extremely good case.

I'm sorry, why 30 years early? Isn't expected retirement, at least in the article you reference, set at 2037? That is 14 years away. That would be 197,400 hours.

I remember he Seasprite fiasco in RAN and how well they same airframe was operating in NZ. Looks to the same again with the -90.

[pitchlink1]

I'm sorry, why 30 years early? Isn't expected retirement, at least in the article you reference, set at 2037? That is 14 years away. That would be 197,400 hours.

I remember he Seasprite fiasco in RAN and how well they same airframe was operating in NZ. Looks to the same again with the -90.

ADF orders for 12 MRH90 in 2005 and 34 in 2006 were not completed on time and not considered at FOC until 2015. A retirement in 2037 would leave only 22 operational years which is far less than expected when the system was purchased in 2005 and 2006. Hence planned retirement time must be calculated from FOC, not delivery. Regardless of whether retirement is cut short of 14 or 30 years the cost saving estimate of 2,6bn seems very conservative. If we use your 14 years and 300 FH per year the saving is 13k per FH which still seems very low compared to the reported actual difference in cost (6k vs 50k). Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new AC the numbers are greatly in favor of a swap.

[helispotter]

ADF orders for 12 MRH90 in 2005 and 34 in 2006 were not completed on time and not considered at FOC until 2015. A retirement in 2037 would leave only 22 operational years which is far less than expected when the system was purchased in 2005 and 2006. Hence planned retirement time must be calculated from FOC, not delivery. Regardless of whether retirement is cut short of 14 or 30 years the cost saving estimate of 2,6bn seems very conservative. If we use your 14 years and 300 FH per year the saving is 13k per FH which still seems very low compared to the reported actual difference in cost (6k vs 50k). Even if you add in the procurement cost of the new AC the numbers are greatly in favor of a swap.

I find it staggering that cost per flying hour of a UH-60M could be $4-6k while it is $50k for an MRH-90. Is this really comparing apples with apples? What is included in these figures? maintenance?, fuel?, crew costs?, other nominally fixed annual sustainment costs?

In an interview with Defence Connect, MAJGEN Jeremy King is indicating cost per flying hour of UH-60M will be around $10-14k per hour (presumably AUD), so those are already quite different figures, and he also says this is "a third of what we’re paying now” [for MRH-90] hence implying $30-42k per hour for MRH-90, so lower than the $50k:

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/land-amphibious/11580-exclusive-majgen-king-sets-record-straight-on-black-hawk-acquisition

But regardless, even a 3x difference in operating cost per hour seems a lot for what otherwise seem broadly similar helicopters. So what is the explanation for this? Inconsistent accounting? Some or multiple elements of maintenance or spares for the MRH-90 being incredibly expensive (to the point of being a rip-off)? Is there anything on the public record that explains this in more detail than just the overall figures? Equally informative would be to see how these figures may have varied over the years and whether they have been reducing, remained steady, or perhaps even increased (in real terms) as the capability 'matured'.

The cost of the 40 UH-60M has been reported as US$1.95B. Not sure what this includes apart from the helicopters themselves, but this equates to ~US$50M per aircraft. If we factor this cost up from 40 to 47 helicopters (to compare to the number of MRH-90's we had), it would still amount to a significant AUD 3.5B now having to be invested earlier than previously intended.

Lets hope the capability and cost benefit assessment for the UH-60M is more robust than the acquisition process for the MRH-90 seems to have been based on the ANAO's audit of the project, some of which I have skimmed through to try to understand what had gone wrong:

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/AuditReport_2013-2014_52.pdf

Part of it says:

...This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
...In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only...

How interesting it would be to be a fly on the wall for some of the meetings.

[pitchlink1]

I find it staggering that cost per flying hour of a UH-60M could be $4-6k while it is $50k for an MRH-90. Is this really comparing apples with apples? What is included in these figures? maintenance?, fuel?, crew costs?, other nominally fixed annual sustainment costs?

In an interview with Defence Connect, MAJGEN Jeremy King is indicating cost per flying hour of UH-60M will be around $10-14k per hour (presumably AUD), so those are already quite different figures, and he also says this is "a third of what we’re paying now” [for MRH-90] hence implying $30-42k per hour for MRH-90, so lower than the $50k:

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/land-amphibious/11580-exclusive-majgen-king-sets-record-straight-on-black-hawk-acquisition

But regardless, even a 3x difference in operating cost per hour seems a lot for what otherwise seem broadly similar helicopters. So what is the explanation for this? Inconsistent accounting? Some or multiple elements of maintenance or spares for the MRH-90 being incredibly expensive (to the point of being a rip-off)? Is there anything on the public record that explains this in more detail than just the overall figures? Equally informative would be to see how these figures may have varied over the years and whether they have been reducing, remained steady, or perhaps even increased (in real terms) as the capability 'matured'.

The cost of the 40 UH-60M has been reported as US$1.95B. Not sure what this includes apart from the helicopters themselves, but this equates to ~US$50M per aircraft. If we factor this cost up from 40 to 47 helicopters (to compare to the number of MRH-90's we had), it would still amount to a significant AUD 3.5B now having to be invested earlier than previously intended.

Lets hope the capability and cost benefit assessment for the UH-60M is more robust than the acquisition process for the MRH-90 seems to have been based on the ANAO's audit of the project, some of which I have skimmed through to try to understand what had gone wrong:

https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/AuditReport_2013-2014_52.pdf

Part of it says:

...This led to a Defence recommendation to the Minister for Defence in June 2004 that the S‐70M Black Hawk be selected as the preferred aircraft for Phases 2 and 4.
...In accordance with direction provided by the Minister for Defence and government, Defence developed alternate draft submissions, initially to ask ministers to choose between the two aircraft options—the MRH90 and S‐70M Black Hawk—and later recommending acquisition of the MRH90 for Phase 2 only...

How interesting it would be to be a fly on the wall for some of the meetings.Yes - it is astonishing the price difference should be so high, but if you count in the MGB comes of the NH90 and into overhaul ten-times as often as on a Hawk, parts are not manufactured, extreme long lead times, corrosion on the airframe due to questionable design and everything takes time leading to 45 maintenance hours/flight hour and you sum up all this, yes then you explain much.

One must assume the MAJGEN Jeremy King compares apples to apples. However, the Aussies has not operated the UH-60M before, and he might be comparing to the older S-70s which are more expensive in operation. The Swedes have operated the UH-60M for over ten years and with a much smaller fleet than what Aussies are planning, and they have operated the NH90 for equally long: They should be in a perfect position to make comparable analysis: They claim FH cost of SEK 40 000, approx. USD 4 000 for UH-60M and close to USD 25 000 for the NH90. https://www.svt.se/nyheter/lokalt/blekinge/forsvarets-helikopter-kostar-242-000-per-flygtimme

https://www.svd.se/a/1kOo8M/forsvarets-nya-helikopter-kostar-200000-i-timmen

In Norway the CHOD reported an hourly cost of NOK 600 000 (approx. USD 60 000) per flight hours with the NH90. In addition to cost of sourcing new pilots to replace the ones that left the armed forces because they could not get enough flight hours to stay current and motivated. https://www.finansavisen.no/nyheter/politikk/2022/06/10/7880640/600.000-kroner-per-flytime?zephr_sso_ott=7sqsBn

With regards to the cost of acquiring the Black Hawk you are basing your comment on the public figure of USD 1,98bn as reported by DCSA for a FMS case. That number is not necessarily accurate or could not be allocated to only accusation of the helicopters but also a lot of spares, support, training, tools, and ground support. The baseline price of a fly-away M is approx. +/- MUSD 20.

Wit 40 aircraft flying 300 hrs. each over 30 years the total number of flight hours is 360 000 and if you split the probably very high estimate of procurement on those flight hours you get USD 5 500 per flight hour in procurement cost. With a saving of USD 20 000 per flight hour a swap from the one to the other will save Australian taxpayers USD 7,2bn with procurement of the new system included. Even if you chop the saving per flight hour in half – you still see a USD 3,6bn saving by swapping fleet rather than continuing with what you have. And a positive side effect is that the aircraft will deliver the flight hours you need without needing 20 technicians for each airframe – being a scare resource around qualified technicians should not be used as patches for an aircraft that does not deliver.

[60FltMech]

The last figure I heard for cost per flight hour for the US Army H-60M was $10,000US, was in reference to how much someone would have to reimburse the govt for for a check ride. Still far below NH-90 it appears. Would be interesting to know what CH-47F runs per hour.
FltMech

[ARRAKIS]

A full list of FY 2023 reimbursement rates can be found below. Around 4 k$ for a UH-60M. Approximately 8 k$ for a CH-47F.

https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2023/2023_b_c.pdf

EDIT
I'm just wondering, what would be, within the same organization, the rate for an AW101 comparing to a CH-47F?

[KiwiNedNZ]

The make of Army helicopter involved in a fatal training exercise will be pulled from service more than a year before its intended withdrawal date.

Defence Minister Richard Marles on Friday confirmed the MRH-90 Taipan helicopters would not return to flying as part of Australian Defence Force operations.

The helicopters were scheduled to be withdrawn from service in December 2024.

The early phasing out of the Taipans follows a crash off the Queensland coast in July, which killed four people on board during military drills.

Mr Marles said the decision did not indicate the outcome of investigations into the crash.

"The MRH-90 has been an important capability for our country and defence force and I recognise the hard work of the hundreds of people who dedicated themselves to acquiring, operating and sustaining the aircraft," he said in a statement.

"The government's highest priority is the safety and wellbeing of our people. We continue to support the families of the four soldiers who lost their lives earlier this year and the broader defence community."

Mr Marles told Nine's Today program the decision to ground the Taipans was the "only decision that makes sense" given they wouldn't have been flown until investigations into the fatal crash have wrapped up.

That is expected to take a year to complete.

"There is no world in which we should be flying these helicopters again. Given that, what we really need to do is to be moving as quickly as we can to our new capability, the Black Hawks, as soon as possible," Mr Marles said.

The federal government has been looking at speeding up the rollout of Black Hawk helicopters following the Taipan crash, with the first of the 40 aircraft already having arrived in the country.

Opposition MP Phillip Thompson, who served with the defence force, said the grounding of the Taipans was overdue.

"The inquiry into the tragic helicopter crash, which saw four of our Australian Army soldiers killed is ongoing. Their families, their mates and the wider ADF community want answers and the government needs to be honest and transparent," he said.

"I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk."

Nationals MP Barnaby Joyce said the government had been too slow on the Black Hawk rollout, adding both Australia's allies and enemies would be taking note.

"What we're seeing overall is a weakening of our defence force ... the fact we're not spending any new money on defence, and now we've got the Taipans, which are a central platform, all grounded," he told Sky News.

"We've really got to sharpen up defence because our nation has to come as strong as possible as quickly as possible, and this sort of reshuffling the deck chairs and removing one every now and then is not helping us at all."

[FloaterNorthWest]

It’s a good job Blackhawks never crash.

Don’t you love politicians!

[KiwiNedNZ]

“Assistant Opposition defence spokesperson Phillip Thompson has praised the transition to Black Hawks following Defence Minister Richard Marles’ decision to decommission Australia’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopter fleet 15 months ahead of schedule.

“I look forward to the chronically underperforming and dangerous MRH-90 being fully replaced by the proven and reliable Black Hawk,” Mr Thompson said in a statement.”



ouch…Airbus will not be pleased with that statement.

[helispotter]

This item, while subscriber only, allows anyone to view part of an interview between Channel 9 presenter Karl Stefanovic and the Defence Minister this morning:

https://www.couriermail.com.au/news/national/problem-plagued-mrh90-taipan-helicopter-retired-early-from-adf/news-story/26d0afb2adeb390da8f2bd79430e482b

Not sure why Stefanovic was acting like an attack dog, but Richard Marles didn't bite back. Perhaps Stefanovic should next interview Defence Ministers in other countries that continue to operate the NH-90. Heck, why not also interview the US Defense Secretary on why Osprey is still operating... and so on, and so on...

As for Barnaby Joyce, thankfully not our Defence Minister.

[Lonewolf_50]

why Osprey is still operating.. Because it (1) works and (2) is fit for purpose and (3) in the last 10 years has a mishap rate of about 3 per 100,000 hours. You might want to pay attention to the customer satisfaction expressed by the USMC, the prime user.
I agree, though, with your disappointment in how journos go about this.
The insufferable David Ax went out of his way to write hatchet jobs on a variety of platforms.

[helispotter]

Lonewolf 50: Sorry, I shouldn't have listed any other specific rotorcraft in my message. Osprey simple selected due to the loss of one in Australia soon after the loss of the Army MRH-90 hence both had local media attention. My point was that if Armed Forces withdrew a fleet of aircraft each time there was an accident, and so far in this case without any public clarity whether for technical reasons, then there would be next to no military aviation. We should learn from accidents and not repeat causes, but I don't like aircraft being tagged as “dangerous” without any real substance.

[helispotter]

NH Industries statement related to ADF grounding and withdrawal of MRH-90 available at:

http://www.nhindustries.com/website/en/press/NHIndustries-statement-on-Commonwealth-of-Australia%E2%80%99s-decision-on-MRH90-program_180.html

This release indicates they have "not identified any information from the initial flight data that relates to a failure, malfunction or defect linked to aircraft design".

That isn't to say this might not still be the case, just that it is in contrast to the "dangerous" tag the type has attracted in our local media and by some politicians.

Given NHI also list worldwide operating hours at 380,000+ in this statement, accident rate can be calculated: Searching Aviation Safety Network database for "NHIndustries" reveals 11 incidents for type (all variants) worldwide of which 2 were minor damage, but 4 fatal with 8 deaths in total. So a mishap rate of about 2.9 in 100,000 hours or fatal accident rate of about 1in 100,000 hours. Of the earlier 3 fatal accidents, unclear from the ASN descriptions whether any were due to any design or production flaws of this helicopter type.

[Doors Off]

The plot thickens.

[60FltMech]

I think arguments made about safety regarding NH-90 by politicians are an attempt to cover up the more relevant issues of reliability apparently faced by the ADF, which may be part because of the ADF maintenance system. From what I’ve seen, in US Army systems at least, serviceability issues are more often supply shortages and maintenance enterprise systems than the airframe or its components.

In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.

Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?

If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.

And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.

As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”

FltMech

[Doors Off]

I think arguments made about safety regarding NH-90 by politicians are an attempt to cover up the more relevant issues of reliability apparently faced by the ADF, which may be part because of the ADF maintenance system. From what I’ve seen, in US Army systems at least, serviceability issues are more often supply shortages and maintenance enterprise systems than the airframe or its components.

In other words, if you have no parts in your system(supply) or you do, but can’t order them (enterprise) that’s a problem.

Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?

If that were to happen for UH-60 I think you would find a period where mechanical failure played more of a role than pilot error but I think that was a relatively short period, recent history shows pilot error being far more frequent. V-22 currently seems to show a design defect (Hard Clutch Engagement) that has caused fatalities, but other accidents historically were pilot error.

And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue.

As I said, I don’t know much of anything about NH-90 and have only spoken to one person directly that had operational experience with it in ADF service. He was a senior Loadmaster here stateside doing crew member training for UH-60M and when I asked him what he thought about NH-90 he said “I reckon I love it, it’s a good aircraft.”

FltMech
Flt Mech, good post. The “problems” with both the ARH and MRH within the Australian Army, speak more about the organization than the aircraft.

I wonder what excuses they will roll out when their serviceability for 60M and 64E fails to meet the promises?

[Blackhawk9]

Flt Mech, good post. The “problems” with both the ARH and MRH within the Australian Army, speak more about the organization than the aircraft.

I wonder what excuses they will roll out when their serviceability for 60M and 64E fails to meet the promises?

True , much of the problem with the MRH and ARH is Army originated but the difference with the 60M and 64E is they will be tied into the US Mil supply chain which has worked extremely well with the CH-47's with excellent serviceability and availability over the years which is a very complicated helo with high manpower requirements , the supply and tech support system for the ARH and MRH are unique with their tie in with Airbus, the same tie in with the 60M and 64E as the 47 should ease the whole spares and support system, and with the aircraft based where OEM support is rather than strategic/tactical reasons should help serviceability. (all Boeing products 47F and 64E based in Townsville with large Boeing support facility there and all Lockheed Martin (Sikorsky) products based down south, Oakey and Holsworthy for 60M and just down the road from Holsworthy at Nowra for the Navy's MH-60R's. We have very good serviceability rates with the MH-60R (Sik)so should carry over to the 60M (Sik)and the same with the 47F (Boeing) should work with the 64E (Boeing)

[helispotter]

...Accident rates can only tell part of the story for particular airframes. Has anyone tried breaking down the accident rate by pilot error vs mechanical failure?...

FltMech

Well, based on the sometimes scant descriptions of NH-90 incidents on the ASN Wikibase, of the 11 listed to date 5 are essentially for unknown reasons, 3 human error, 2 mechanical (engine fire or catastrophic failure) and 1 was a jeep colliding with a parked helicopter (so not really related to helicopter operation as such). Hard to get an accurate picture of causes with military aircraft accidents as investigation reports don't routinely get released publicly. Don't know if reports will ever be released for 3 Australian MRH-90 incidents. Perhaps will take FOI request by an interested party?

[helispotter]

...And just for clarity in this discussion, by mechanical failure I mean defective in design, which is really what is being argued regarding the NH-90(which seems to lack evidence), not accidents related to improper maintenance action, which is it’s own human factors issue...

This is a further complication in analysis of root cause of aircraft accidents. Some months back I started compiling a list of Australian Defence Force helicopter accidents by helicopter type and cause. It all became "too hard". Australia lost a lot of Westland Seaking helicopters in RAN service. Many ditched due to apparent mechanical issues. However the last and most notable loss at Nias was finally found to be due to the installation of an incorrectly sized split pin. So while a mechanical failure, it was due to human error in maintenance. Investigation found more systemic issues existed with maintenance activities at the time, so not an isolated error.

[Lonewolf_50]

My point was that if Armed Forces withdrew a fleet of aircraft each time there was an accident, and so far in this case without any public clarity whether for technical reasons, then there would be next to no military aviation. We should learn from accidents and not repeat causes, but I don't like aircraft being tagged as “dangerous” without any real substance. We appear to be in violent agreement. :ok:

[chopper2004]

In positive news, Italian Marina has taken delivery of its last SH90 NFH and a full motion sim.

https://www.leonardo.com/en/press-release-detail/-/detail/02-10-2023-italian-navy-s-nh90-helicopter-deliveries-complete-as-state-of-the-art-mission-simulation-centre-is-established-at-maristaeli-luni-base

https://www.leonardo.com/o/adaptive-media/image/26963080/w_1120/Luni+CR3_5933+lr.jpg

https://www.leonardo.com/o/adaptive-media/image/26963157/w_1120/Luni+AA9A5507+lr.jpg

cheers

[Doors Off]

True , much of the problem with the MRH and ARH is Army originated but the difference with the 60M and 64E is they will be tied into the US Mil supply chain which has worked extremely well with the CH-47's with excellent serviceability and availability over the years which is a very complicated helo with high manpower requirements , the supply and tech support system for the ARH and MRH are unique with their tie in with Airbus, the same tie in with the 60M and 64E as the 47 should ease the whole spares and support system, and with the aircraft based where OEM support is rather than strategic/tactical reasons should help serviceability. (all Boeing products 47F and 64E based in Townsville with large Boeing support facility there and all Lockheed Martin (Sikorsky) products based down south, Oakey and Holsworthy for 60M and just down the road from Holsworthy at Nowra for the Navy's MH-60R's. We have very good serviceability rates with the MH-60R (Sik)so should carry over to the 60M (Sik)and the same with the 47F (Boeing) should work with the 64E (Boeing)

Here is hoping that the logistical co-location potential is realised. The "green" workforce impacts will be interesting. As for Romeo serviceability, it is not as good as you think. They are struggling and have been for a while. Training is taking far longer than it should and hours are low.

[60FltMech]

Will be interesting to see how integrating with US Army supply system will work out. It seems that every iteration of modernization in regards to Army maintenance management and supply systems the promised efficiencies never seem to materialize.

Anecdotally, we we far more efficient when we were scanning through a paper log book, clearing deficiencies was faster and the biggest “crash” of the system was if you accidentally opened the binder rings on a windy day! 🤣 Then you would have to spend a bit reassembling the book, hopefully will all the pages intact.

Of course, the insanity of that system was the Army flew with that book actually on the aircraft, so a fair bit of information could be lost in an accident if it hadn’t been transcribed in a timely manner.

The new electronic systems allow more visibility in aircraft records and supply information, which means more people want to take advantage of that visibility(whether they REALLY need access or not) which creates layers of additional information security, thereby slowing network access.

FltMech

[SLXOwft]

My apologies for intruding into this forum/thread but I am confused how, if the '90 is such a dog to keep serviceable, is the RNZAF is getting 75% availablity on its fleet with a reported average 23 flying hours per aircraft last February? Cost per flying hour reportedly NZD1400 (USD826/GBP684 at today's rates)

“Our NH90 fleet availability rates are largely due to our deliberate maintenance planning and forecasting, which in turn delivers serviceable aircraft to meet outputs. This maintenance team includes NZDF military, civilian and Airbus contractor staff. The RNZAF has the highest availability rates across the NH90 user community globally.” RNZAF Logistics Commander (Air) Group Captain Susie Barns

[admikar]

Stop asking questions like that

[60FltMech]

Probably opening a big can of worms here, but I’m genuinely curious, What is the RNZAF fleet size?

23 hours a month for every aircraft, or 23 hours/month for certain aircraft, on a rotating basis?

Don’t want to dismiss what RNZAF is doing as they have a different operational environment than other militaries, but that doesn’t seem like a lot of flying hours. I think a lot of aircraft could have that level of availability with that amount of usage.

And as discussed previously, the amount of manufacturer support available, and the structure of the maintenance system makes a huge difference.

FltMech

[SLXOwft]

Thanks, 60FltMech. It's a (very) small fleet, eight were purchased plus 'one for spares'. NZ deliberately bought the virtually the same config as Oz, to provide commonality in maintenance etc. with its closest operating partner. I understand NHI states worldwide availability is about 40%.

[Blackhawk9]

the operating cost of $1400 hr is direct operating cost , fuel etc (450 l/hr x $2.00+ per L) not total operating cost , that cost doesn't include wages, maintenance etc. NZ and other countries like Oman are getting 60% + serv rates but at a substantially higher manning requirement. (combined Mil, Civil and Airbus personnel)

[60FltMech]

“operating cost of $1400 hr is direct operating cost , fuel etc (450 l/hr x $2.00+ per L) not total operating cost , that cost doesn't include wages, maintenance etc”

So once those costs are added I would predict a similar operating cost per hour as other medium helicopters. I’d love to support a fleet of 9 or less helicopters…oh wait I have! 🤣

The 8 UH-60L aircraft of the Air Ambulance Detachment I was a contract maintainer/crewman on had to have at least 75% availability, below that someone had some explaining to do. Approximately 50 contractors directly supported that fleet initially then some of the major scheduled maintenance was done by another group.

it’s nice to be able to know in depth the condition of every aircraft, it’s little nuances etc. probably the most fun working I’ve had in 22 years in maintenance.

How is the maintenance structured in the Australian army? I’m always curious how others approach things.

FltMech

[NutLoose]

:ok:
Things got so bad and NH90 availability got so low, that the Australians were able to pool unspent funding earmarked for NH90 flying hours to buy four additional CH-47F Chinooks from the U.S. Army to get their soldiers back in the air, with two delivered in 2021 and another two delivered in 2022.

Don't think this has been posted.

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australias-nh90-helicopter-nightmare-is-finally-ending

[helispotter]

Tributes given today in Australian Parliament House for the four lost aircrew of the Australian Army MRH-90 which crashed off the Queensland coast. The Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, Defence Minister and Shadow Defence Minister all spoke. A moment of bipartisanship.

[casper64]

Do we already know the cause of the crash? I guess it’s not technical as otherwise this would be put wide in the open to state: see the NH90 is dangerous, a terrible machine we’re grounding it and so should the rest of the world. As the rest of the world continues to fly “happily” I guess something else is going on?

[212man]

Do we already know the cause of the crash? I guess it’s not technical as otherwise this would be put wide in the open to state: see the NH90 is dangerous, a terrible machine we’re grounding it and so should the rest of the world. As the rest of the world continues to fly “happily” I guess something else is going on?

The dedicated thread had some rumours, that resulted in the posters being flamed! But, I suspect time will show them to be true.

[helispotter]

Do we already know the cause of the crash? I guess it’s not technical as otherwise this would be put wide in the open to state...

Not that I am aware from any public reports. My post #295 links to an NH Industries statement indicating no data so far suggesting accident relates to "aircraft design". However to be complete, NHI should also have included comment on the circumstances of the earlier two major, but fortunately not fatal, Australian MRH-90 incidents. Then again, if the ADF was more open with disclosure regarding such incidents, a manufacturer wouldn't feel compelled to publicly defend their product, at least from a safety perspective.

The opposition leader had an indirect dig at the MRH-90 as part of his tribute statement in parliament yesterday. He could be reminded that the decision to acquire this type in 2004 was made by the then Liberal Defence Minister Robert Hill, seemingly at odds with an earlier recommendation from the department (see my post #285). Hill also put us on the track of the much delayed JSF in what came across like an 'overnight decision' at the time.

[mickjoebill]

Tributes given today in Australian Parliament House for the four lost aircrew of the Australian Army MRH-90 which crashed off the Queensland coast. The Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, Defence Minister and Shadow Defence Minister all spoke. A moment of bipartisanship.
We were in the public gallery on Monday and if you wish, consider that we represented Ppruners when the entire house
​​stood for a moments silence.
Lest we forget

[PhlyingGuy]

I heard at the Global Defence Helicopter show today that many of the operators (especially Sweden) were ranting about how unreliable and expensive the NH90 is and how they're all planning on moving to Black Hawks.

[helispotter]

I heard at the Global Defence Helicopter show today that many of the operators (especially Sweden) were ranting about how unreliable and expensive the NH90 is and how they're all planning on moving to Black Hawks.

...well contrast that with the plans of NH Industries outlined in this article:

https://www.flightglobal.com/helicopters/armed-nh90-troop-transport-helicopter-could-form-part-of-block-2-upgrade/155235.article

A few extracts:

"NH Industries (NHI) is for the first time considering arming the NH90 transport, potentially offering a range of weapons – including rockets and guided missiles – as part of a future mid-life upgrade for the helicopter... the naval NFH variant carries torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare missions, options on the TTH troop transport variant have been largely limited to door guns, albeit Middle Eastern customer Oman has equipped some of its fleet with podded 20mm cannons..."

"Underpinning the upgrade plan are two key developments, however. First is an extension to the helicopter’s lifespan, taking it to 50 years from 30 currently... Feasibility studies supporting the lifetime extension (LTE) were completed earlier this year and revealed that no modifications would be required to achieve the longer service life... [The LTE] doesn’t come with a caveat or a pre-requisite: you take the aircraft as they are, and the lifetime can be extended without any particular intervention or retrofit.”

"NHI... has around 90 helicopters still in its backlog, having delivered the 500th example in March this year... Aloccio sees potential to add another 50-100 helicopters to the orderbook by 2028".

[Lonewolf_50]

A Service Life Extension Program ... without actually doing anything? That's an odd claim. This may be a case of less-than-thorough reporting.

[helispotter]

A Service Life Extension Program ... without actually doing anything? That's an odd claim...

I did wonder how the original 30 year lifespan was arrived at and in turn, how NHI are now instead contemplating a 50 year lifespan. I think they might be saying no major re-working of the airframe would be needed?? They are also probably not saying any individual aircraft are necessarily expected to last 50 years of service, rather the basic design. That has certainly been the case for many other aircraft types, including some helicopters.

To put 50 years into perspective, consider the currently active thread "For Wessex fans". G-WSEX was built in October 1966 so is now 57 years old and still flying (though with some pauses through life by the look of it: https://www.helis.com/database/cn/792/ ). Not sure what forms of significant upgrades the Wessex had through its life. In the meantime it would simply be a case of managing to get hold of airworthy spare parts for the type to keep it flying!

[helispotter]

A full list of FY 2023 reimbursement rates can be found below. Around 4 k$ for a UH-60M. Approximately 8 k$ for a CH-47F.

https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2023/2023_b_c.pdf

EDIT
I'm just wondering, what would be, within the same organization, the rate for an AW101 comparing to a CH-47F?

Having studied the informative document at the link provided by ARRAKIS some weeks back, particularly the last two pages giving rates for rotary wing fleet, I have some questions regarding the rates listed as there are some curious features. Hopefully ARRAKIS or others might have some explanation:

(1) I assume O&M means "Operation and Maintenance" including fuel, parts and maintenance personnel costs but excluding aircrew costs?

(2) It looks like charge-out rates for "Other DoD components" waive the "MilPers" costs, however such costs are included when aircraft provided for other 'clients'. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 'clients' are charged a somewhat higher rate for "MilPers" ranging between about 3-10% more than others, depending on the helicopter type. In any event, "MilPers" percentage of total rate for "All Other Users" remains as low as 0.7% to 10.7% so isn't particularly significant.

(3) I wasn't sure what "Asset Utl" account was about under the "All Other Users" category of 'client', but it turns out this is consistently about a 4% addition to the total charge-out rate beyond "O&M" + "MilPers".

(4) ARRAKIS noted the reimbursement rates for UH-60M was around 4 k$, or US$3,956 per hour to be precise. This is for the "O&M" component so excludes at least aircrew salaries. But looking across the range of UH-60 variants shown in the list, this "O&M" rate varies significantly from only US$2,697 for the Army MH-60K & L (special ops) variants to as much as US$6666 for the Air Force HH-60G (Pave Hawk) variant. That is almost a 4.3x difference. There is even a stark difference between the UH-60A (at US$6266) and the UH-60M (at US$3956). What could explain these significant differences? In contrast, there is no difference in reimbursable rate for CH-47D vs CH-47F versions of Chinook.

(5) How is it that reimbursable rate for HH-60G could be around 1.6x times that for the Chinook? Is it perhaps related to this being a limited fleet with a lack of 'economy of scale' for operation of the Air Force Pave Hawk?

I had originally intended to try to correlate costs against parameters such as installed power, MTOW etc, but given the broad spread of UH-60 variant rates there is obviously more to it than a narrow scatter about some basic cost trendlines!

[Doors Off]

The dedicated thread had some rumours, that resulted in the posters being flamed! But, I suspect time will show them to be true.

Rumor is…..allegedly, possibly could be true, or could not be true, the current cheese of 16 Bde Svn has said that the investigation won’t be released and anybody who leaks info will have their careers ended.

One does wonder what was the cause of the accident. It would appear from the lack of Maintenance bulletins, restrictions etc on the global fleet, plus the rumored “shush” request, that the aircraft wasn’t the issue?

[60FltMech]

“There is even a stark difference between the UH-60A (at US$6266) and the UH-60M (at US$3956). What could explain these significant differences? In contrast, there is no difference in reimbursable rate for CH-47D vs CH-47F versions of Chinook.”

Those are indeed pretty significant differences, not sure why that would be, other than the UH-60A May have more significant costs associated with airframe condition due to age? Those numbers could be possibly be inflated depending on the timeframe that the information was gathered.

For example, the 9 aircraft (UH-60A) that were initially assigned to the Air Ambulance Detachment I worked at were pulled out of long term storage from bases in Germany, they were all veterans of multiple tours of duty (Iraq or Afghanistan) and required a significant amount of time and cost to bring them up to a reliable fleet.

This kind of effort was repeated across a number of bases State Side as all UH-72A were pulled out of Air Ambulance service and sent to Ft. Rucker to become part of the training fleet there, in around the 2015-17 timeframe.

I think we spent over $1.5 million USD on parts alone on those aircraft the first (partial) year we had them, If memory serves. I don’t know if maintenance man hours counts towards this cost per hour number but that would have been a significant cost in our case due to overtime pay.

At any rate, would be very interesting to know exactly how the cost is actually computed. Of course, there may be a significant amount of smoke and or mirrors involved in these calculations, as anyone dealing with any government entity for any amount of time would know….

FltMech

[helispotter]

...not sure why that would be, other than the UH-60A May have more significant costs associated with airframe condition due to age?...

...At any rate, would be very interesting to know exactly how the cost is actually computed. Of course, there may be a significant amount of smoke and or mirrors involved in these calculations, as anyone dealing with any government entity for any amount of time would know….

FltMech

Thanks for your insights.

A summary of Black Hawk variants is provided by Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_UH-60_Black_Hawk

If I interpret it correctly, MH-60L is based on UH-60L which in turn seem to be upgraded UH-60A's with T700-GE-701C originally fitted (to the L's) in place of T700-GE-700 (for A's). Yet MH-60L, of which only 37 produced and with all its 'extras', is one of the pair with the lowest listed O&M rate of all the variants. So if they are built from refurbished UH-60A's, perhaps cost of refurbishment of the older airframes and renewal of engines was absorbed under a different (acquisition) budget and so became 'invisible'?

Yes, I always wonder about 'smoke and mirrors' or simply inconsistent cost accounting (such as 'acquisition costs' paid twice for one airframe) corrupting what might otherwise be a nice dataset.

[60FltMech]

You are right, a sideways glance at the MH-60L numbers seem most warranted. Any aircraft with the MH designation will cost more due to the nature of the mission, those aircraft are worked very hard their whole lives and are equipped with a number of systems the standard versions aren’t, the numbers simply aren’t believable.

There has to be some context missing. Perhaps the numbers were compiled at a time of low utilization of the airframes, MH-60L have been replaced by the 60M variant, the variants are so dissimilar as far as cockpit layout and systems that it seems unlikely the 60L would still be used in a limited training role, but who knows?

FltMech

[Lonewolf_50]

If I interpret it correctly, MH-60L is based on UH-60L which in turn seem to be upgraded UH-60A's with T700-GE-701C originally fitted (to the L's) in place of T700-GE-700 (for A's). Not quite right.
A to L: Higher Gross Weight, Improved Durability Gear Box (didn't have the 3000 hour life limit like the A's) and a bunch of changes to the structure of the aircraft to handle the increased max gross. There was an an extensive A to L conversion program undertaken by the Army. Yes, engine upgrades were there also.
Yet MH-60L, of which only 37 produced and with all its 'extras', is one of the pair with the lowest listed O&M rate of all the variants. Who do you think operated those variants? Won't further comment on MH-60L.

A to L is IIRC from the Maintenance / Overhaul budget, not the acquisition budget. I am a little bit familiar with the original MH-60R upgrade from the SH-60B and SH-60F. The only way that was possible was to get it from rework money, not new program money, because there was no new program money to fund it during the Clinton administration.
(That approach ended up being a bit of a bust, as the lot 13 base line had to deal with early lot aircraft that had been ridden hard and put away wet).
Built new was the ultimate path forward for that, once a new administration showed up with funds for acquisition, and it got them into the fleet.

Back to Blackhawk
Yes, there is a bit of smoke and mirrors involved in moving money around. It is an arcane art ... :p

[helispotter]

I have already posted this link on the Queensland MRH90 crash specific thread (as reference is made to that crash) but also adding to this thread. It doesn't make for good reading, and comes across as being somewhat bloody minded:

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/defence-to-destroy-900-million-worth-of-taipan-helicopters/

While reliability and availability issue of NH90 / MRH90 didn't sound unique to Australia, some of what I have read did still give me a sense there was a 'camp' in the ADF who just wanted Blackhawk regardless. Also appears there are some in the ADF who can see that is the case and are speaking up, but can't do it officially (Kym Bergmann possibly being informed in that way).

ANAO has been critical of this acquisition project, but perhaps now they should revisit the subject and also look at the disposal decisions and the process for acquisition of the replacement Blackhawk instead.

[60FltMech]

I read the article linked, seems to me there are a couple of possibilities regarding what was reported:

1. The author is 100% correct and is reporting factually what is happening to the NH-90 fleet, and the events surrounding the replacement of the NH-90 in Australian service. Governments quite simply make the worst decisions regarding a lot of things, so parting out and disposing of otherwise useful (to someone) airframes wouldn’t be a uniquely stupid decision.

I look at what my government (USA) does regarding defense systems and shake my head fairly often. Just look at the debacle that all variants of the F-35 have turned out to be, as an example. The amount of $$$ burned on that system if maddening.

So to was the amount of equipment left in Afghanistan to be repurposed for Taliban use, its just too expensive to bring back home or take somewhere else.

So, would I be shocked at Australia giving away NH-90 parts and burying the stripped airframes? Nope. But there may be something else happening that is closer to the truth but not as wasteful?

2. Not all airframes are being stripped and buried. Maybe condition wise, there are issues with some airframes that render them not economically viable to retain or repair, for whatever reason, and those are indeed being stripped and buried? Maybe these were involved in previously unknown mishaps that didn’t cause death or bodily harm.

I can tell you from experience as it relates to the US Army, lots of things happen that don’t make it out into the news that are significant events damage wise. And the aircraft get repaired and put back into service(or sometimes not) and nobody but the service paying the bills and the people working on it know it ever happened.

As for the discussion of a nefarious cabal axing the NH-90 in favor of the Blackhawk, just because of some sort of nostalgia they have for it, I’ll agree that it’s just as possible as the reports surrounding the demise of the NH-90 aircraft themselves.

It could also be that those making this decision are correct and that the UH-60 is better for use in Australian service, and the nostalgia they are harkening back to was something that was more easily maintainable, available and fit for purpose for the missions that they find themselves doing.

Maybe Blackhawk is “like a farm tractor”, but not in the derogatory way the one anonymous ADF source in the article laments, because, let’s be real: the two machines are contemporaries in capability. They both have all the modern systems a frontline medium helicopter of today has to offer and fairly similar performance.

Just maybe it is “like a farm tractor” in the way that it stands up to the rigors of use in austere conditions that a frontline medium helicopter has to endure, in training or combat, and that’s what is driving this change?

The only other commentary from the article that I found interesting is the raising of the point, again, about Blackhawks lack of a float system. This seems an interesting point, and I honestly don’t know how many militaries have adopted such systems to their maritime helicopter fleets. A quick perusal of the internet did bring me up a link to a Taiwanese govt report, part of which I’ll quote below:

“Due to the history of the SH-60B/F and HH-60H floating systems, engine reliability improvements and MH-60R/S project upgrades, the floating system is not installed in the MH-60R and MH-60S. The integration of floating systems raises some safety risks, including the blocking of flight crews' emergency escape routes. Because of these risks, the MH-60R has never been designed to contain a floating system. The MH-60R is followed by the development of the MH-60S, and the floating system is not considered. The survival rate of the shipwreck was basically the same before and after the system was removed.”

At any rate, this has gone way long and honestly none of this really matters much in the long run. No aircraft is perfect for every situation and indeed some are running NH-90 with seemingly no issues, others aren’t and it appears ADF ran into something they couldn’t overcome.

FltMech

[chopper2004]

I read the article linked, seems to me there are a couple of possibilities regarding what was reported:

1. The author is 100% correct and is reporting factually what is happening to the NH-90 fleet, and the events surrounding the replacement of the NH-90 in Australian service. Governments quite simply make the worst decisions regarding a lot of things, so parting out and disposing of otherwise useful (to someone) airframes wouldn’t be a uniquely stupid decision.

I look at what my government (USA) does regarding defense systems and shake my head fairly often. Just look at the debacle that all variants of the F-35 have turned out to be, as an example. The amount of $$$ burned on that system if maddening.

So to was the amount of equipment left in Afghanistan to be repurposed for Taliban use, its just too expensive to bring back home or take somewhere else.

So, would I be shocked at Australia giving away NH-90 parts and burying the stripped airframes? Nope. But there may be something else happening that is closer to the truth but not as wasteful?

2. Not all airframes are being stripped and buried. Maybe condition wise, there are issues with some airframes that render them not economically viable to retain or repair, for whatever reason, and those are indeed being stripped and buried? Maybe these were involved in previously unknown mishaps that didn’t cause death or bodily harm.

I can tell you from experience as it relates to the US Army, lots of things happen that don’t make it out into the news that are significant events damage wise. And the aircraft get repaired and put back into service(or sometimes not) and nobody but the service paying the bills and the people working on it know it ever happened.

As for the discussion of a nefarious cabal axing the NH-90 in favor of the Blackhawk, just because of some sort of nostalgia they have for it, I’ll agree that it’s just as possible as the reports surrounding the demise of the NH-90 aircraft themselves.

It could also be that those making this decision are correct and that the UH-60 is better for use in Australian service, and the nostalgia they are harkening back to was something that was more easily maintainable, available and fit for purpose for the missions that they find themselves doing.

Maybe Blackhawk is “like a farm tractor”, but not in the derogatory way the one anonymous ADF source in the article laments, because, let’s be real: the two machines are contemporaries in capability. They both have all the modern systems a frontline medium helicopter of today has to offer and fairly similar performance.

Just maybe it is “like a farm tractor” in the way that it stands up to the rigors of use in austere conditions that a frontline medium helicopter has to endure, in training or combat, and that’s what is driving this change?

The only other commentary from the article that I found interesting is the raising of the point, again, about Blackhawks lack of a float system. This seems an interesting point, and I honestly don’t know how many militaries have adopted such systems to their maritime helicopter fleets. A quick perusal of the internet did bring me up a link to a Taiwanese govt report, part of which I’ll quote below:

“Due to the history of the SH-60B/F and HH-60H floating systems, engine reliability improvements and MH-60R/S project upgrades, the floating system is not installed in the MH-60R and MH-60S. The integration of floating systems raises some safety risks, including the blocking of flight crews' emergency escape routes. Because of these risks, the MH-60R has never been designed to contain a floating system. The MH-60R is followed by the development of the MH-60S, and the floating system is not considered. The survival rate of the shipwreck was basically the same before and after the system was removed.”

At any rate, this has gone way long and honestly none of this really matters much in the long run. No aircraft is perfect for every situation and indeed some are running NH-90 with seemingly no issues, others aren’t and it appears ADF ran into something they couldn’t overcome.

FltMech

Spot on, there and i agree especially on your last couple of paragraphs as i have said exactly the same thing when peeps in the industry or enthusiasts ask me about the NH90, my response is "depending on who you talk to and who operates it". Mate of mine flew NH90 NFH in naval service of and did not have a bad word to say about flying it bar logistics and support system, which struggled. But again that has been an issue with a few operators, because going up from a Huey or Lynx to complex NH90, requires different mind set re the support and stuff.

AAAC issues with Tiger, I believe from what i hear and read, goes back to where they were finally assembled...

cheers

[60FltMech]

I guess the main thing that jumps out to me is how the implication, at least from this particular news source, is that ADF are so technically incompetent that they can’t maintain their aircraft while everyone else can(excepting of course the several other nations that have had enough of whatever is going on that they are replacing their NH90 fleets as well).

This is being directed at a service that seems to be able to operate and maintain CH-47F, which is not exactly easy and that has operated UH-60 previously, not to mention other types they have in service across all branches of Australia's military.

It’s curious to me that Italy appears to operate the largest NH90 fleet, without a lot of complaints. Could there be preferential treatment by the OEMs for their fleet? Or is it down to usage?

The European Security & Defense news site reported on 02 October of this year, on the occasion of the delivery of the 56th and final NH90 for Italian service:

“The first Italian NH90 was delivered in 2011, since which time the Italian fleet has logged more than 35,000 flight hours in Italy and on international operations.”

35,000 hours in 11 years. I feel like a fleet used this gently would be easier to maintain but maybe I’m missing something?

Again, if it’s working for others, great. But the tone of reporting, at least for this article that was originally posted(and past articles from the same source), seems to take great offense to the ADF position and experience regarding this aircraft and spends a lot of time attributing dark motives to those in charge, instead of considering a more straightforward explanation as to why they are choosing a different platform.

FltMech

[Rotorbee]

Who in his right mind would burry 40+ aircraft? The individuals responsible for that decision would not burry their car in their backyard just because the heater failed.

Somebody who wants a Ferrari and is used to a pickup truck (an ute if I remember right) cannot complain that it is more expensive to maintain. The NH90 is more complex than a UH-1.
Give the ships to Ukraine. They will show you how to operate them.

[Doors Off]

Bergman’s article highlights another truly sad chapter for the Aus Army Air Corps. Billions wasted. Lives wasted. People wasted.

The article eludes to some very, very accurate rumours about both “aircraft accidents”. Not to blame anybody on either aircraft, as all aircrew make mistakes every time they take to the skies. Shutting down the incorrect engine, is not an aircraft issue. Flying into the Ocean, is not an aircraft issue. I’ll emphasise again, everybody makes errors.

However, for an organisation to utilise those events to discard a platform and not get to the real causes of the events, means they are doomed to repeat the events again, this time in their shiny Blackhawks, just like the first time they had them. Sadly, the innocent will die and the hierarchy will abandon them and their maintainers and support staff.

[Cyclic Hotline]

​​ They outperform Blackhawk in all key metrics – speed, range, payload and cabin volume.

I think one of your key metrics is glaringly absent - availability!

While NH Industries pump out all kinds of ridiculous PR bumph about this platform and their commitment (inability) to support it, they must love this dude writing these articles as without a single identifiable reference, he produces stories like this which sound like the manufacturers crew down the pub, regaling the version they would like everyone to hear

As so much of what is reported in this article is either occuring secretly, anonymously, or at the behest of a secret and unidentifiable group of conspirators, can anyone shed some factual light on this?

[60FltMech]

“The article eludes to some very, very accurate rumours about both “aircraft accidents”. Not to blame anybody on either aircraft, as all aircrew make mistakes every time they take to the skies. Shutting down the incorrect engine, is not an aircraft issue. Flying into the Ocean, is not an aircraft issue. I’ll emphasise again, everybody makes errors.”

Absolutely correct regarding crew errors and accidents, I don’t believe anyone would dispute this. However, I can’t find where the ADF have chosen to end their NH90 usage based solely on accidents.

“However , for an organisation to utilise those events to discard a platform and not get to the real causes of the events, means they are doomed to repeat the events again, this time in their shiny Blackhawks, just like the first time they had them. Sadly, the innocent will die and the hierarchy will abandon them and their maintainers and support staff.”

Again, I’ll agree with you here that blaming the aircraft would not serve to correct accident trends and those issues would still occur whatever aircraft was in service. But i also don’t think it could be argued that lack of availability of training time in the actual aircraft is also a big contributor to accidents


Since the accident report for the latest incident isn’t even out yet, how are we so sure that this is what is happening within the ADF? How do we know what measures are being taken within those organizations? Are we privy to what is being discussed by the crews and their commanders in their briefing rooms?

As I understand it, Australian Army aviation is a very close nit group, whose members were all likely to have been closely, even personally affected by the loss of life from the latest accident.

Once again, I may be proven wrong in the future, but there are a lot of allegations of cold, callous actions by ADF leadership that may be wholly unfounded.

FltMech

[Blackhawk9]

I just returned from a reunion of my old Sqn mates , most of which went on to MRH and Tiger after BH, all said the MRH generally outperformed Black Hawk in all areas except tactical landings and the SF/CT role, the problem was there was never enough serviceable to do the roles, the ADF was about to buy 15 Bell 429 to supplement the MRH in the SF/CT role, when the MRH was dumped the 429 order never went ahead as they were not needed with the Black Hawk coming back into the role, those who had direct dealings with NH industries (WO's and Maj and above now retired) all said it was hard work, but the thing that got me was almost to a man when you ask them which machine would you operate in combat it was the BH over the MRH almost every time.
The guys who went Tigar said the same dealing with Airbus was a like constantly headbutting a wall, when the French took Tiger on ops they had a 30 man Airbus support team to keep 3-4 aircraft flying, so Airbus can say they have done operational flying and performed, you can't keep a fleet of A/C going with that level of support in real life. The Guys still in have said now dealing with Lockheed Martin(Sikorsky) and Boeing the stress levels have dropped considerably and a light can be seen at the end of the tunnel at last.

[LTP90]

35,000 hours in 11 years. I feel like a fleet used this gently would be easier to maintain but maybe I’m missing something?


that works out to like only 56 hours a year per aircraft. Not exactly a ton of flying.

[dascanio]

that works out to like only 56 hours a year per aircraft. Not exactly a ton of flying.
maybe they were “gently” used, but the first was delivered in 2011, the last in 2023, so, your average does not mean much…

[212man]

maybe they were “gently” used, but the first was delivered in 2011, the last in 2023, so, your average does not mean much…
I'm not sure any adjusting of the metrics will turn that into a productive flying rate

[megan]

I feel like a fleet used this gently would be easier to maintain but maybe I’m missing somethingObjects sitting idle tends to rust, requiring lots of maintenance. ;)

[Doors Off]

I'm not sure any adjusting of the metrics will turn that into a productive flying rate

If only the 1987-1997 AAAC Blackhawk Flying hours v Airframe numbers were available. You would probably find that the MRH out flew the Blackhawk. Is it the child or the parent?

[Blackhawk9]

If only the 1987-1997 AAAC Blackhawk Flying hours v Airframe numbers were available. You would probably find that the MRH out flew the Blackhawk. Is it the child or the parent?
A lot more than MRH , 88 to 94 the fleet all flew out their first 500 Hrly each and alot were on second so approx 30,000+ in first 6 years (88 initial delivery to 6 in service, 89-13 delivered 19 in service, 90-18 delivered 37 in service, 91- 2 delivered 39 in service), in 2011 the fleet flew 8300 hrs alone.

[ARRAKIS]

End of the MRH-90.
Australia Is Literally Burying Its Doomed NH90 Helicopter Fleet (thedrive.com) (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australia-literally-burying-its-doomed-nh90-helicopter-fleet)

[gsa]

End of the MRH-90.
Australia Is Literally Burying Its Doomed NH90 Helicopter Fleet (thedrive.com) (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australia-literally-burying-its-doomed-nh90-helicopter-fleet)


Destroy the evidence so it doesn’t come back and bite you on the arse at a future date.

[That lights normal!]

End of the MRH-90.
Australia Is Literally Burying Its Doomed NH90 Helicopter Fleet (thedrive.com) (https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australia-literally-burying-its-doomed-nh90-helicopter-fleet)

Should be putting an ex defence minister in the same grave.