The facts and how they get reported

[barrymah]

The AAIU of Irleand recenly reoported on an incident on takeoff (tailstrike) with a RYR 737-800.

One of the Irish newspapers' (a generally respectable one, IMO) first para on the story was -

"NINE OXYGEN masks failed to deploy and cabin crew were reduced to banging on the cockpit door to alert the pilot during a serious incident on a Ryanair flight in September 2008, an air accident investigation has found."

The report said -

" Following the depressurisation of the aircraft, the environmental conditions in the cabin rapidly deteriorated. The CSS quickly realised that the cabin had depressurised and went forward to the crew intercom to contact the Flight Crew. The Flight Crew at this stage were busy donning their oxygen masks and did not hear her initial call on the intercom. She called again and banged on the flight deck door before communication was established. She informed the Commander that a decompression had occurred....."


Sells newspapers I suppose, however, it was discussed on a late night tv show in which they only referred to the newspaper item....

RYR were criticised and have changed their advice to PFs.

Report here -
http://www.aaiu.ie/upload/general/12076-2009025_EIDYD_AT_DUBLIN_AIRPORT-0.PDF

Bye, Barry

[Checkboard]

Not only sells newspapers - but is completely correct, in accordance with the report in your link. I fail to see the validity of your inference.

As a minor aside, I don't know that deploying the masks was necessary or particularly helpful at FL120. A PA and descent may have sufficed as well. I was mildly surprised that the cabin crew didn't know how to manually deploy the masks.

[Sonic Bam]

"I was mildly surprised that the cabin crew didn't know how to manually deploy the masks"

On 73NG, how do they do that then?

[hugel]

For me the official report was more alarming than the newspaper ! The newspaper doesn't seem to exagerate anything or factually mis-report anything. So I can't see the problem.

hugel

[merlinxx]

Is it not an auto-deploy?

[Checkboard]

On 73NG, how do they do that then?

You insert a pen or similar pointed instrument into the manual door latch hole on each individual PSU (Passenger Service Unit).

:confused:

[G-SPOTs Lost]

You insert a pen or similar pointed instrument into the manual door latch hole on each individual PSU (Passenger Service Unit).




Not particularly practical in an emergency situation at FL120 when you have pax at the back of the cabin calculating its going to be another 10 mins before the CC get to you and why are the people at the front getting their life saving gases and you're not.........:rolleyes:

[Checkboard]

This secondary system isn't designed for crew to walk up the cabin releasing each mask unit individually, it's to release the one or two which didn't happen to drop from the electrical signal - as in this case. The report stated that the cabin crew were trying to open the PSU's with ID cards, the passengers were hitting them with their fists. Unsurprisingly, neither method worked. :hmm:


merlinxx the masks auto-deploy around 14,000 feet - passenger oxygen use isn't required below this level. This aircraft was at 12,000 (odd) feet.

why are the people at the front getting their life saving gases and you're not.........
Given the operator, perhaps they paid more. ;)

[Callsign Kilo]

The QRH directs you to not pressurize the cabin if a tailstrike is suspected (for obvious reasons). I cannot imagine why the masks dropped if the cabin altitude (which it would have been) was below 14000'. The only thing that I can consider is that if they were at 12000' and completed the NNC for tailstrike then they would have induced the cabin altitude warning horn. The Passenger Oxygen may have been mistakenly activated from the flightdeck as a result??

(Apologies, just read the report - this is what happened)

[captjns]

Here folks... read this. This will shead more light relating to the events that took place after the tail strike.


Report: Ryanair B738 at Dublin on Sep 11th 2008, tailstrike on takeoff (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4242e490&opt=0)

[barrymah]

"Not only sells newspapers - but is completely correct, in accordance with the report in your link. I fail to see the validity of your inference."

With due respect the newspaper was selective.... compared to the investigation. OK, technically correct but maybe a bit sensational on the part of the newspaper?
BTW, as I implied, the newspaper is a broadsheet, not a redtop.

[Cyrano]

"Not only sells newspapers - but is completely correct, in accordance with the report in your link. I fail to see the validity of your inference."

With due respect the newspaper was selective.... compared to the investigation. OK, technically correct but maybe a bit sensational on the part of the newspaper?
BTW, as I implied, the newspaper is a broadsheet, not a redtop.

Barry, what's your point? The AAIU report is 14 pages long. Do you want the newspaper to reproduce it verbatim? The report you've quoted seems reasonable and not sensational (show us where it's sensational if you disagree).

There are frequent examples (discussed at length in these forums) of completely clueless/sensationalistic/factually incorrect media reports of aviation matters. With respect, this isn't one. If you are exercised by this report, then I strongly advise you to stop reading newspapers before the next "Terror at 30,000 feet as passenger sneezes" story!

[FlightDetent]

From AAIB's report: Training provided by the operator for FC and CC is of a high standard. Slides and animations are used to clarify the topics covered in the SEP manual.
........
Specifically, Cabin Crew are taught to learn the different types of decompression, the causes and effects of such decompression, decompression drill, to understand Hypoxia, and its effects, and to be familiar with the oxygen systems on board the Operators aircraft. The CSS was in the centre of the cabin when the cabin became depressurised. When she reached the rear of the Cabin she saw her colleague trying to manually open PSU’s with an ID card. She realised that a decompression had occurred and ran to the front of the aircraft. Her other colleague was also trying to open a PSU:

‘I ran to the front, I needed to inform the Captain that we were having a rapid decompression. When I reach the front of the cabin I saw No. 4 trying to drop masks from our jumpseat, it didn’t work. She was feeling very weak, she needed oxygen.’All the CSA reports were detailed and gave frank accounts of the event. Subsequent to the depressurisation the CSA’s attempted to manually open the PSU’s using ID Cards and other objects. The PSU’s may be opened manually if necessary by inserting any small pointed object through one of the holes adjacent to the oxygen door test stop.
CSA = Cabin Service Attendant
CSS = Cabin Service Supervisor
---------------------------------------
The cabin altitude situation was apparently not well understood by both cabin and flight deck crew. Actually it is quite challenging to explain all the impacts and outcomes of decompression below 10000 ft, in-between FL100-FL140, above FL140. And then you have rapid decompression, "normal" decompression, sneaky-leaky decompression; uncontrolled or cockpit-activated decompression too. Throw in a little of sterile cockpit rule where CCs are requested not to call flight deck except for important things when, conversely, an immediate report is required but of course the (non)importance will be only evaluated by captain after the call would had been done.

I think it is very clear how easily could the situation develop exactly the way it did. There's little to add but read the report and learn for ourselves. All the usual culprits are to be found: last sector of the day, last day of the tour, quite some delay due operational hiccups, training/checking duty of the commander ... all lined-up.

One topic got my attention though. The PSUs doors have a manual release feature to open them using a sharp and thin object. In contrary to the news piece referenced, only certain types of pens or pencils are shaped well enough to help. Hence a dedicated tool is provided for CCs to unlock the stuck PSU door. The Manual Release Tool (MRT) is a simple pin but it needs to be stowed onboard (acc. to Airbus MMEL, I do not have access now to Boeing's but expect it to be no different with reference to standard emergency equipment).

The report says that the back CCs attempted to open PSU boxes with ID cards. The report says that the front CC failed to open the PSU box. The report says CCs are trained to be familiar with OXY systems. The report says that training is of a high standard.

While not connected to the primary cause, and not really a problem at FL120 the investigation revealed one thing. Neither one CC out of four - all in perceived state of distress and urgent need for oxygen - were able to operate the cabin oxygen systems as designed, using the tools provided. In fact they seemingly had no clue whatsoever how to open an oxy mask container. To me, this is clearly below minimum standard. This being omitted in the report is what is really nasty and yes, my flak aims at AAIB.

Your thoughts?
FD (the un-real)

PS: Somebody tells me that line checks are per EU law to be done in normal crew complement, i.e. the checker is to be seated in the middle and not act as a member of the operating crew; what would be the CAA IE view on this?

[CPL_Ace]

Alas Cyrano is right - as the "ones in the know" all we can do is mock the situation and laugh when the next PPL holder gets his/her 2 minutes of fame on CNN.

It is alarming that after all these years, news reporters still struggle with the basics of aviation but for me it makes for some often quite humerous entertainment. A little pretentious I know but what are ya gonna do.....?

on the plus side the odd comment about it on this forum does make for some beneficial learning for the future.

[YoDawg]

The flight level of the aircraft is of no consequence to the CC who have no knowledge of this at the time and should treat the situation as a depressurisation.

The CSS quickly realised that the cabin had depressurised and went forward to the crew intercom

If the masks auto-deployed, then the CC should've seated herself and donned her mask (or opened her own PSU if it failed to auto-deploy) so as to maintain consciousness and be of use when contacted at the end of the depressurisation scenario.

Running to the cockpit door without using bottled oxygen doesn't sound very smart. She should've sat down, donned the mask and waited while the pilots finished whatever they're doing. Banging on the door while the pilots are obviously busy - is that recommended practice at RA?

The CC should know that if some masks failed to auto-deploy, nothing can be done from the cockpit. They need to use a sharp object to open the panels themselves - while using bottled O2 so they stay conscious.

[ei-flyer]

Says in the report the commander held a JAA ATPL...

...on an EI registered aircraft...?

[Dysag]

I can't figure out what you are trying to say.....

[non iron]

lreland is fully compliant.

[ei-flyer]

not up to scratch on licensing, i've always held IAA and not something that gets spoken about where i am...

based on a rumour i heard that all the new ryr peeps need to convert from jaa to iaa and i assumed that was the reason...?

[non iron]

lt started out with potential EU joiners wanting to fly around europe, with differing standards of training.
The "Joint" stuff was born, whereby countries meeting those standards could have their pilots trading "up" to JAA licences automatically, with a hefty fee of course, and the others had to work towards it.

A bit of a thumbnail sketch, but you get the picture.