Chinook - Hit Back Here

[Desert Alligator]

It's just amazing. All these pages. I do seriously doff my cap to all the pilots in the RAF, esp. the rotary ones, for your loyalty and ethos of 'benefit of doubt' to the dead who cannot defend themselves. As a layman, with lots of rotary experience in-Province and with experience of the precise same route that they flew, and in similar conditions (but without the benefit of 'reliable' navaids,) are we getting wrapped around the axle here? Could it just be a simple case of 'cumulo-granite'? I honestly do not mean any disrespect. We are all human, after all. There but for the grace etc.

[Ben Leice]

"The Board then considered the effect of the aircraft's speed on its climb performance, and the possibility that the crew did not recognise the implications of a cruise climb at 150 knots. The crew were unfamiliar with operating comfortably at high airspeeds, as the high vibration levels of the Chinook discouraged cruise flight above 135 knots. In the circumstances, an airspeed of 150 knots, coupled with a strong tailwind component, would have produced a high groundspeed and closure rate with the Mull of Kintyre. .. a level airspeed of 150 kt required a high power setting, leaving only a small power margin available for climbing.." .. Holland, 'Phoenix', p 240.

"As the noble Lord, Lord Jacobs, said, the aircraft crashed in cloud at a height of 812 feet at a ground speed of 151 knots, or 174 mph." .. Baroness Symons, House of Lords, 05.03.2001

At an airspeed of 150 kts would the pilots have seen anything considering the Chinook's vibration levels at that airspeed - a friend said that the eyeballs vibrate in their sockets at those vibration levels? Is it likely that the pilots would have voluntarily chosen to fly at such a high airspeed considering their knowledge of the location and the weather? Is it not much more likely that they were not in control?

When you look at the flightpath from Carnlough you would think that the Chinook may have veered to starboard after the change to port was made in the Way Point.

B52

If the pilots decided to deviate from their planned route because of the yacht they would not have opted for the side with the high cliffs. The Board speculated that, in the circumstances, even a minor navigational error could have been significant.

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

K52

With reference to speed, the AAIB and Boeing did indeed carry out various simulations to try to discover the aircraft parameters just before the accident. Their simulation indicated that a climb rate of 1000ft/min coupled with an airspeed of 150kts gave the closest condition to match their estimate of the aircraft attitude, speed and control positions at impact. Note that the control positions are only those thought to have pertained, as the AAIB report states that they are not certain if these had been altered by impact. So the speed of 150 kts IAS is still only a hypothesis.

If the simulation is correct in its assumptions, then we would need to ask why the aircraft was accelerated to this speed from a much lower mean speed for the rest of the transit. As the AAIB point out, without CVR / ADR evidence, the only way to do this is by speculation, and here we are again, full circle. No firm, positive evidence.

I would still be interested to know what the crew understood to be the met conditions required for a VFR flight, as others have posted that in the NI theatre, a lower limit than that which you quote was in force. Indeed, nowhere in the BOI report is a limit mentioned, only that with the forecast conditions, (which were less than 5km/1.5km/1000ft) the crew were correct in planning a VFR transit.

The Yachtsman could see the Chinook, so the Chinook crew could see the surface. How are you so sure that they were IMC?

I would like further explanation of your claim: ‘If they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence.’ I think not, as the pilots would have been alive to explain their thought processes and actions, a defence sadly unavailable to them in the event.

Yes, Alligator, it could have just been a case of ‘cumulo-granite’. It could have been many things including negligence, but without evidence ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’ the finding is unsafe, in common sense, natural justice; and more importantly, the RAF’s own rules.

[Ben Leice]

AVWEB NEWSWIRE:

Army Finds Pilot at Fault in Fatal Chinook Crash

Lack of instrument and night currency, a lack of current weather forecast and IMC conditions contributed to the March [1996] crash of a U.S. Army Special Forces Chinook helicopter at Ft. Campbell that killed all five soldiers aboard. [...]

The Army report said the pilot in training may have been unfamiliar with the instrument display of the MH-47E Chinook and "became disoriented during a turn and inadvertently placed the aircraft into an unusual attitude that neither he nor the (instructor pilot) could recover from."

The Chinook crash killed four members of the elite 160th Special Operations Air Regiment. A fifth crew member was assigned to a student detachment at Fort Jackson, S.C.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Was there a reference to an unusual attitude in the 1994 crash too?




[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 11 March 2001).]

[Pub User]

Arkroyal

The weather limits for Strike Command helis were then the same as they are now. That is, UKLFS 250' cloudbase 100m viz, Ex or Op area (incl NI) 100' cloudbase 1000m viz. SF exercises or Ops could/can operate to COCISS.

K52

All of the above is regardless of airspeed, although those promulgating it have obviously taken into account the ability of helicopters to slow down. The reason the crew in this instance did not do so is, to me, the most significant of many unknown facts.

[Arkroyal]

Pub User many thanks for that. I seemed to remember having much the same limits in the junglies.

So K52, still absolutely certain that the chaps were flying in IMC?

[L4Cuddles]

Pub User,
Sorry mate but you're wrong, the rules you quote were changed sometime after the accident to make the cloudbase and vis as 'in-flight' limits. Before this the 250'/100' & 1k were 'planning' limits.

[Brian Dixon]

In order to clarify the point, can anyone tell me what the rules were at the time of the accident. It would be those rules that Jon and Rick would have been flying to. What they changed to might very well prevent a similar tragedy, but it doesn't offer help to the campaign. (if that sounds offensive, I don't mean it to be).

Thanks
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Well said Brian.

L4, the fact that the limits were changed after the accident is probably very significant.

[K52]

Ben Leice,

The book on "Phoenix" is NOT an authoritative source. What you quoted is a reproduction of a passage of the BOI report with a significant Typo. It has missed out "HC1" after Chinook thus completely changing the context of the piece which discussed the Crew's relative inexperience in operating at such speeds in relative comfort.

If the Chinook had made a small deviation around the yacht then they would have done so on the downwind side.

PS. Speaking of Typo's - I am not a USAF Bomber.

Ark Royal, Pub User et al

Brian is, of course, correct; so could someone with a Service phone ask AIDU what limits they were promulgating in the FIH at that time. Theatre limits did not apply as they were out of Theatre in the UKLFS. The BOI did not appear to have any doubts as they stated: " The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

The BOI state that the "AAIB investigations were particulaly comprehensive and detailed" and " The AAIB Technical Investigation revealed convincing information on the aircraft's attitude and groundspeed, and determined precise values for the DASH actuator and LCT settings at impact."

I am still a little confused by Ark's statement about the aircraft having to accelerate "from a much lower mean ground speed for the rest of the transit." We have a satellite generated time for "power down" and we have ATC times for airborne and approaching the CTR boundary.

If we add and subtract 1 minute each way from those times to allow for rounding up/down; then the aircraft travelled the 43nm from LIFT OFF to impact in between 16 - 18 minutes and the 33nm between CTR and impact in 11 - 13 minutes (recorded times being 17 & 12 minutes)

This means that ZD 576 had a mean goundspeed between lift off and impact in the range 143 - 161kts and a mean groundspeed between the CTR and impact in the range 152 - 180kts.The only evidence that the aircraft was travelling at a slower groundspeed comes from the yachtsman, in his evidence to the FAI, when he gave an estimate of "60 - 90kts" which was considerably lower than the estimate he gave the BOI.

The BOI concluded that it was likely that the overwater transit took place at 200 - 400 ft ASL until such time as the aircraft started to climb at 150kts. The wind at lighthouse level(300ft)on the Mull was described as "almost calm" but the wind further up the hill as "strong and blustery"

[pulse1]

As they were approaching the yacht more or less FROM downwind the only turn which makes any sense would be a turn to the left. But perhaps they were so keen to avoid the yacht they flew into the Mull. For goodness sake, this is all speculation and we are now supporting speculation by quoting bits of speculation from the BOI report. All good fun and, for me, very interesting but is it achieving anything except showing how much DOUBT there is?

Incidentally, I thought that the OC Odiham (BOI review), with access to ALL the information, concluded that the most likely airspeed was 135kts, what he described as the normal transit speed for this aircraft. Of course that was speculation on his part and there must be considerable doubt.

------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[K52]

AN ORIGINAL THOUGHT?

Yes – it came as a surprise to me as well!! I tried lying down but it would not go away.

The BOI state at para 48 “The preserved data in the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems contained relatively little information concerning the previous history of the flight, as the computers are primarily required to retain data only pertinent to ongoing calculations. Nevertheless, it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained.”

The BOI state at para 49 “ Furthermore, it was determined that the SuperTans had performed a computation some 15-18 seconds prior to power down --- but aircraft position information corresponding to that point in time was not recorded.”

IS IT JUST POSSIBLE THESE RECORDED PIECES OF DATA REFER TO THE SAME EVENT?

If the Chinook was traveling at 180kts groundspeed (92.66 metres/sec) then 18 seconds before impact equates to 1.6679 km from impact and 15 seconds before impact equates to 1.39 km. That is a difference of between 81 metres and 360 metres from the calculated WP change selection, less the distance traveled whilst the computation was made.

[misterploppy]

Sorry K52 me old china,

The whole point is that we are not interested in the "is it just possible", were interested in the "beyond any doubt whatsoever".

You can speculate till the cows come home and all speculation merely adds to our case -that there is no proof beyond any doubt whatsoever that the pilots were negligent.

[Has a handle]

A little bit of knowledge... To all those assumers out there. You'll never know, will u ? If u don't know, don't criticise.

[Ramp Monkey]

Latest rumour around the Chinook fleetb at the moment: I know this forum has debated the subject of the RNS 252 but here we go again latest SD is for new CHINS, it is intalled on an aircraft at ODI flying with no technical info for engineers and a few sketchy notes for the crew, sound familar?

[Has a handle]

Take two very experienced pilots. Put them in an aircraft. Ask them to perform a task... There has to be a bloody good reason why they didn't complete it. Oh and it isn't because there's a bit of fog over the Mull... Now start asking the next 20 questions regarding the aircraft...

[Arkroyal]

K52, you know very well what I mean by suggesting that to fly at 150kts IAS just before impact would be to speed up from their transit speed.

43 miles in 18 minutes is an average of 143 kts groundspeed. With a tailwind of approx 30 kts their average IAS is about 115 kts. I know you choose to ignore this as it paints the wrong picture for your attack. It is, however, true.

Any calculation based on radio calls made at about the zone boundary, or calculated from a point at about midway between the coast out and coast in points are pure guesswork.

Any flight undertaken by the NI detachment would be treated as in theatre unless specifically authorised otherwise (NI is within the UKLFS). The negligent management failed to do this.

AIDU will most likely not be in posession of the Flying order book in force at the time, so save the call. SH VFR weather limits for the RN were promulgated in JSP318 blue pages. If I remember correctly they were 200' cloudbase and 1Km viz anywhere. RAF SH enjoyed similar easement of the VFR rules, without which SH would be impossible.

You are now grasping at straws with your latest TANS theorising. Why can't you accept that this speculation is pointless. You need evidence beyond any doubt whatsoever. If the main protagonist (you) of the 'hang 'em' faction can't find any, then it is obvious that there is none. QED no proof, no finding of negligence.

Edited due to finger trouble, and server glitches

[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 14 March 2001).]

[John Nichol]

K52,
Sorry old boy but your TANS info is incorrect. The waypoint change and height calculation were 2 different points. Not that it's important really, as the president of the BoI said of the reconstruction of the final seconds; it was an "ESTIMATED final track...it could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line".

Dormouse - thanks for the info - really interesting but I'm not sure it could be brought up at the Lord's inquiry. If you go down that line you get further into the realms of speculation.

The key to winning the argument in front of the Lords will be to show areas of doubt surrounding the crash. As most people can see from reading this forum there are many areas which are not facts - just theories.
If we can show areas of doubt we can win. Luckily we have a few "killer facts" that are undeniable.

[K52]

John Nichol

Thank you for the assertion John, any chance of an explanation? The BOI found that they had a WP change demand with a position but not a time, and a computation with a time but not a position. You, however, seem to be able to state categorically that these two events took place in two different positions. How, may I ask?

It seems to me, as a mere ex “Truckie” pilot, that a WP change demand would generate a computation. The computation retained in the SuperTans memory was 15-18 secs old at impact but had not been overridden by another computation, despite the aircraft steadily diverging from the computed track to WP B. It therefore seems, to me, reasonable to ask if these two memory extractions refer to the same event

One other point, the BOI state that the WP change demand took place at 1.75km from the impact point. Now the position information for the WP change came from the computer memory, but the computer memory position at power down was some 200m short of the true impact point. As the BOI decided that the position deviation errors would not have increased greatly in the distance between the WP change and impact; is it not reasonable to assume that, when the computer position was 1.75km from impact, the true aircraft position was actually some 200m closer at approx 1.55km from impact?


Ark Royal

I totally agree that the 43nm from lift off to impact would, if traveled in 18 minutes, result in a mean groundspeed of 143kts. I was not aware, however, that a Chinook lifted off at such a high groundspeed. I assumed that it lifted off at a relatively low airspeed and accelerated to cruising speed. That is why I suggested that a more realistic assessment of groundspeed would be achieved by taking the time and distance from the CTR boundary. Allowing 13 minutes (reported time 12 minutes) that would give a mean groundspeed of 152kts.

Of course that is only a rough indication, as the aircraft flew at approx 100ft from Aldergrove to the coast. Now, they may have traveled at very high speed at low level over NI; but I cannot help but feel that 130kts+ at 100ft would not have done much for passenger comfort.

Now I know that you have this 30kts tailwind fixed in your mind, and I assume it comes from the AAIB calculated wind at impact of 180/30kts (the forecast 1000ft wind was 170/20kts). As the aircraft Track was 027 degrees then only approx half of that windspeed would have been tail component. To get the 30kts tail component that you insist on using would require a windspeed of approx 60kts at between 200-400ft. I am a little rusty on the Beaufort Scale, but would that not equate to something around Force 8-9 on the surface? I feel sure the yachtsman would have mentioned that in his evidence.

Of course the only evidence we have from eyewitnesses regarding the windspeed near the Mull is from all those (11?) who were there at the time of the accident. The wind at the level of the lighthouse was described as “almost calm” whilst it was described as “strong and blustery” further up the hill. The lighthouse elevation is 300ft, smack in the middle of the yachtsmen’s height estimate for the Chinook of 200-400ft when he saw it 2-3nm from the Mull.

I very much doubt whether AIDU keep anyone’s Flying Order Book other than Northolt’s. They will only have that one for the rules on Airfield driving. What I was referring to was the Flight Information Handbook (FIH) which gives the VFR requirements for all aircraft types.

Finally, I am not the “chief protagonist” of a “hang ‘em” or any other faction (although I suppose I should be flattered by the appellation of “chief”). I merely hold a different opinion to the one you originally held when you first joined this thread. At that time, I seem to remember, you were fulminating at the audacity of 2 Air Marshals “overturning the verdict of a properly constituted Board of Inquiry”. I would point out that you are now not only criticizing myself, but also ALL the reviewing Officers (including the then CAS) as well as AAIB and the members of the Board.




[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 16 March 2001).]

[Has a handle]

Never mind the small talk. Never mind the finer calcucations. Last year a Hawk flew into the ground in N.Yorks. The crew were absolved. During the same period a JT was awarded a Goood show for finding a delaminating control pallet in a CH47 (the result of which would have been uncontrolled a/c inputs-findings of the investigation). Equate

[K52]

Has a handle

I'm afraid I cannot comment on recent accidents as for some reason I was left off the distribution list once I took the Redundancy.

The finding of negligence was based on the crew continuing to attempt to fly VFR in weather conditions that precluded that option. As the BOI succinctly put it " The weather was suitable for the Task but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre".

The crew did not comply with that requirement.

[The Nr Fairy]

I think a "back to basics" might work here, at least for the familes of the pilots if not also for those with their own thoughts about why it happened and what could have happened differently. My ramblings are based on recollections of this thread and other sources, but may be flawed in my telling - feel free to correct me.

1. The aircraft crashed in bad weather on the Mull, killing all on board. I think I've got that fact down pat.

2. The BOI stated ( in different words to mine ) that there was no way of telling exactly what happened in the cockpit in the last minutes and moments of the flight, and therefore there was some doubt as to the exact sequence of events.

3. Air Force regulations in force at the time stated that deceased aircrew should be found guilty of gross negligence "only if there is absolutely no doubt as to the findings". However, see point 2.

4. AVM Wratten and Day started their musings on the BOI by effectively saying "there is doubt as to actually what happened", but then imposed a finding of gross negligence on the BOI despite having less experience of SH ops than those doing the BOI'ing.

5. Therefore, looking at point 3 and 4, because there was doubt about exactly what happened, the finding of gross negligence flies in the face of the regulations, and ( here's where I get a tad emotional ) is the root of Wratten's arrogance in subsequent years to those who dare contradict him.

I don't wish to offend anyone, especially as those contributing to this thread have immeasurably more experience in the day to day operation of military aircraft, especially support helicopters, than myself. However, the above summary, in my mind, is the one BIG BIG flaw in AVM Wratten's argument, and as such I really don't see why any other factors need to be taken into account.

My feelings for those analysing and theorising in great depth - they're trying to avoid dying in a similar manner by understanding what DID happen, but of course, we'll never really know, all you can do is to learn what you can from the tragic events leading up to the crash on the Mull that day.

[bad livin']

A few points...

1. I heard somewhere that it looked from the IFF that someone may have been in the middle of dialling up 7700 - is this the case? If so, why?

2. On the last post, is it not conceivable that, if, for example the FADEC caused an undemanded spool up the crew may have left VFR unintentionally? Clearly, better up than down...?

3. As for the passenger comfort at 100' - true but then better to limit groundfire exposure and bump people around than sail plainly around at medium level for people to see.

[Brian Dixon]

Just to let you all know, that due to the impending removal of all Hotmail accounts from the pprune site, I have changed my e-mail address. You guessed it.....

[email protected]

Regards
Brian
(Still an irritating sod!)

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

Here (I hope) is the link to the full debate by Lord Chalfont.

www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_spnew2 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199697/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_spnew2)

Hope it works!
Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook


[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 16 March 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

K52

Perhaps the following will help:

"Baroness Symons [HoL, 11 July 2000]: {quotes AOC].. From this I am reluctantly drawn to the conclusion that the operating pilots could and would have avoided this accident had they followed a different course of action from the one they chose to pursue"

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean [HoL, 12 July 2000]: The flight plan indicated a route to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse and then a course change to port [~15 deg] on a track following the western shoreline of the Mull. .. There is no evidence of any significant change of course and none of the decision, if any, that the crew made. .. As they had not done so, they could--and, under the rules, should--have either turned away from the Mull immediately or slowed down and climbed to a safe altitude."

The Baroness uses 'could' even though the decision the crew took is not known and the AOC uses 'chose' on the same lack of evidence. It is quite possible that they were unable to do what they should have done and probably had decided to do.

Others

Does anyone know who piloted the second Chinook seen flying low in a northerly direction on the north Antrim coast about 5.30pm that same evening? If you can shed any light on this mystery, please email me.
[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 16 March 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 17 March 2001).]

[Has a handle]

If u try and get close to the 'assumed ' semantics in the cockpit, then u will end up in the predicament of a crew that did'nt 'basically' acheive the aim, however if u accept (re-my last post) that the crew had no powers to overcome the problem they found thereselves faced with. Then u r in a different game.

[misterploppy]

Might I suggest that you stop publishing the names of aircrew flying ops in the Province on this open bulletin board?

[Neil R D Kay]

Better still, edit or remove the posts.

[Neil R D Kay]

Thank you.

[misterploppy]

MoD rejects MPs' call to overturn air crash verdict

Stuart Millar, technology correspondent
Saturday March 17, 2001
The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,458189,00.html

The Ministry of Defence has brushed aside a damning indictment by MPs of its refusal to overturn the verdict of gross negligence against the pilots involved in the RAF's worst peacetime accident.
In its belated response to the Commons public accounts committee, which in November accused ministers and officials of "unwarrantable arrogance" in blaming the pilots, the MoD yesterday insisted that negligence was the only possible explanation for the loss of a Chinook helicopter on the Mull of Kintyre in 1994.

Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook died with two other aircrew and 25 senior members of the Northern Ireland intelligence community when Chinook ZD576 crashed into the cloud-covered Mull.

RAF rules stated that deceased aircrew could be blamed for crashes only in cases where there was absolutely no doubt. The air force's board of inquiry said a major technical malfunction could not be ruled out, but two air marshals overruled the board and blamed the pilots - effectively a verdict of manslaughter.

In its unanimous report, the public accounts committee found that technical problems, especially with the Chinook's computerised engine control system, meant there were clear grounds to doubt the pilots had been negligent.

It concluded: "We simply cannot understand why the [MoD] continues to defend the unsustainable finding of gross negligence and recommend it should be set aside."

In its five-page response, which should have been delivered a month ago, the MoD said: "The department does not agree that sustaining a properly reached judgment of a board of inquiry constitutes unwarrantable arrogance. Neither in the absence of new evidence, does it consider that the board's conclusions should be set aside."

Flt Lt Tapper's father Mike, said: "This pathetic response on an issue of such importance is indicative of the government's contempt for parliament and the views of ordinary people."

David Davies, chairman of the public accounts committee,said: "This is more of an ignoral than a rebuttal. The prime minister should correct this because it is clear that the MoD is unable to make a dispassionate judgment."

He said members of the committee would be furious and would now consider calling more witnesses.

[Arkroyal]

K52
My wind speed is not that calculated by the AAIB to explain the last manoeuvre, but from the AAIB report in which conditions are described as ‘Surface Wind 180/30 (approx) as part of a general after cast of the weather.

The Chinook is a powerful machine, which would accelerate to cruise in something under a minute. To humour you, let’s allow an average of a very conservative 60kts for the first minute and fly the next 42 miles in 17 minutes. Still gives an average cruise groundspeed of only 148 kts. With my ‘wizz-wheel’ this equates to an IAS of about 120 to 122 Kts. This still leaves us wondering why the aircraft would have accelerated to 150 Kts IAS prior to impact. Any calculation based on an estimate for the CTR boundary is worthless.

To your statement that rules for VFR flight are to be found in the FIH, I direct you once again to JSP 318 and local orders. As for my criticisms of those involved, I do indeed find the reviewing officers’ overturning of the BOI’s finding of no known cause bizarre. I am not aware that I have criticised the AAIB, whose painstaking report puts forward a few theories and ideas, but reaches no conclusion as to the cause of this tragedy.

[pulse1]

K52 & Arkroyal

To humour both of you, if they had flown for 40 miles at the normal IAS, calculated by OC Odiham of 135 kts, they could have slowed down to 60 - 80 kts for 2 miles before the Mull. (Witness, the yachtsman)

"Everything is possible to those who speculate". (Bill's Letter to the Chinookians Ch 3 vs 6, apologies to Private Eye)

[K52]

Pulse 1

Absolutely true - but that would mean that they then accelerated as quickly as possible, on a direct track for the Mull (the yachtsmans evidence,)and then hit it.

Would that not be negligence?

In addition; how did they know the yacht was there? Is there any other reason for them to slow down and then accelerate?

Perhaps some enquiries amongst the eye - witnesses (none of whom were interviewed by the BOI) on the behaviour of the Chinook, during its transit to the NI coast, that Lord Rathcavan quoted in a House of Lords debate would shed some light. He spoke of the Chinook following a meandering flightpath and suddenly stopping "as if looking to land". If true, it would render all time and distance calculations totally invalid.

A pity that John Nichol has not replied to my query as to HOW he knows that the two extractions from the SuperTans memory ptior to impact relate to different positions.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

K52,

Very briefly (it's 0550 here and I'm flying in 1 hour) in your first paragraph you state positively that the crew MIGHT have accelerated as quickly as possible into the Mull - implying a degree of choice on their part. Without bogging myself down in your increasingly pointless and tedious semantics, a simple reassessment of the very same situation you describe COULD be that the aircraft accelerated faster than the crew could control into the Mull. All supposition of course, just like your meanderings - all of which reinforces the weakness of the findings of negligence.

[K52]

Thud_and_Blunder

I never said "might" and, if the aircraft had accelerated without any input from the pilots, then they would have had over 1 minute to issue a Distress call, Squawk Emergency and get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in!!!

You are also suggesting that, apart from having no control over the acceleration of the aircraft, they were unable to turn away from the Mull.

Yet NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case.

Runaway engines that leave no evidence I could possibly live with. Runaway engines and total loss of flying controls I have a great deal of difficulty with. Runaway engines, total loss of flying controls and a pitch up corresponding to transition to a cyclic climb at a distance to the Mull that corresponds with the known visibility stretches my incredulity too far.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Just back from flying - this particular island nation's OEI occupants can rest easy in their bunks knowing that they are once again safe from baddies. K52 - you are correct about not saying 'might' - I assumed (error..) that you weren't claiming that the crew under these circumstances would have chosen deliberately to accelerate into the Mull. So, you now appear to me to be stating that the crew had at least one minute in which to carry out all the appropriate emergency drills. Such precision, such certainty... Perhaps you have not read the account of the US Army CH47D that flew a rapid-onset, no-warning uncommanded inverted manoeuvre after collection from a maintenance base? I don't have the article to hand, but I do remember the crew commenting that it took all their attention to try to overcome the unusual, undemanded extreme attitude changes and avoid hitting the ground. That they did not stoof-in was largely due to the aircraft altitude at the start of the incident. They had no time or spare capacity to carry out any other actions, including radio calls. After flight and complete examination of the AFCS and flight control system, no evidence of existing or previous fault was found. Your incredulity is in for a decent spot of stretching exercise; get hold of the aforementioned write-up and then see if you can come back to this forum encased in your current impregnable carapace of certainty. Anyone out there in the Chinook world able to post the details for K52s enlightenment?

Back to semantics: you write "NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was the case". I submit that, equally, NO EVIDENCE AT ALL was found that this was NOT the case. This implies doubt, which is (and was) unacceptable in a finding of gross negligence.

[John Nichol]

K52,
Calm Down, Calm Down - some of us have to work as well as fight for justice!

I say that the two TANS computations were at different points because that is the presumption the BOI seems to make - they do not link the two points together. Depending on which of the many estimated approach speeds you use (60-80kts yachtsman, 135 'ish Crawford, 150kts AAIB) of course you can get the two TANS points to link up. But you really are getting into the guessing game now K52.

I have to say again, the BOI state of their reconstruction of the final seconds of flight -

"it was possible to determine A MOST LIKELY position for the WP change"

"and to subsequently ESTIMATE a MOST LIKELY track"

"it could not be PROVEN that the aircraft flew in a sraight line"

Regarding the final ROC of between 550ft/min to 1250ft/min:

"Whilst total reliance COULD NOT be placed on these figures...it was MOST LIKELY that whilst coasting in etc."

K52, I can not find a single case in the BOI when they state, about any crucial factor you keep bringing up, something along the lines of, "such and such occured, definately, 100%, without any doubt" or some form words even close to that.

All of your presumptions are based on the "POSSIBLE/PROBABLE" situations found by the BOI - which is why the President, a Chinook pilot, a man who had examined the evidence for 8 months and despite considerable pressure from above, refused to come to the conclusion that you, Day & Wratten have come to.

Re. the IFF - it was found with a mode 3A code of 7760 - 2 clicks away from the emergency squawk. Were they trying to send a distress code? Who can say? The BOI simply states "whilst the crew may have been in the process of changing the code, it may have been moved during impact". Though the AAIB thought the possibility of impact movement unlikely.

All guesses, all theories, all supposition -still doubt.

[Brian Dixon]

Thud,
I think the US Army CH47D you refer to was in the Computer Weekly report by Tony Collins. Chapter 1 p 12-1.

www.computerweekly.com/chinook/rafjust.pdf (http://www.computerweekly.com/chinook/rafjust.pdf)

I'm not at all suggesting that the same thing happened to Rick and Jon. I simply just don't know.

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 21 March 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

K52

One of the most curious comments by Lord Rathcavan is:
"Higher up the glens it had hedgehopped over farmlands, terrifying animals. Horses at Glenravel belonging to a dentist, Hugh McCann, panicked and had to be taken in."

Glenravel is about eight miles north of the flightpath from Aldergrove down Glencloy to Carnlough and on to the Mull. There is a range of hills in between the two glens.

[K52]

John Nichol

My apologies. I forgot about the IFF.

Of course I accept that the crew COULD have been trying to select 7700 and ended up with 7760. That is a possibility. I would question, however, why a crew on a low level sortie, and not in receipt of a radar service, would try to select 7700 on the IFF as the sole means of indicating an emergency.

The UHF was tuned to 300.8MHz, the UK Low Flying Flight Safety Frequency - would that not have been a better bet? Perhaps Guard would have been better - at least it would have registered on SARSAT.

I would suggest that; as the crew had an incorrect setting on one of the barometric altimeters and incorrect settings on BOTH Rad Alt bugs (not to mention a commercial radio station selected on the ADF),it is also quite possible that they overlooked setting the usual code of 7000 on the IFF.

This is, of course, SPECULATION. That,
however, is what this thread is all about. The BOI reached their conclusions and submitted their Report. This was accepted, albeit with some reservations on the Part of OC RAF Odiham, by the chain of Command.

What was NOT accepted was the ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. AOC 1 Gp found that the Pilots were "negligent to a gross degree." Subsequently AOC in C STC and CAS concurred with that decision.

Since then there has been SPECULATION that there COULD have been an UNSPECIFIED emergency which prevented the crew from making any form of Distress Call but was purely transient so that it did not show up in the AAIB investigation.

What nobody promoting these THEORIES has even attempted to explain is how the aircraft came to crash in an attitude that would be expected following a 30 degree nose up cyclic flare, on track, and with no indication of excess stress on either the airframe or the occupants other than the trauma associated with the crash.

In my opinion SPECULATION about possible causes is irrelevant. The finding of negligence was because the crew did not adhere to the rules for VFR flight. There is NO EVIDENCE that there was anything wrong with the aircraft. SPECULATION is not EVIDENCE.

If it has ever seemed that I have tried to present my own thoughts on this tragic accident as EVIDENCE then I unreservedly apologise. What I have presented are MY thoughts alone.

As Brian Dixon continues to say " All views are valid".

[ShyTorque]

K52,

There was evidence that there may have been a radio fault. 7700 or 7600 would have been relevant in this case. The same evidence may suggest that there was an intercom fault. Although the crew had flown the aircraft that day, there is no doubt whatsoever that that they were much less familiar with the cockpit layout than that of the Mk1. It is of course possible that the aircraft went into a UP, as other Chinooks have done before following engine malfunctions. In that scenario, it is entirely plausible that someone may make an attempt to select a transponder code but didn't quite manage it.

I too fly a twin engined rotary wing aircraft fitted with FADECs. More often than not, if there is a fault (thankfully far more rare than was the case with the Chinook at that time), often it is transient and leaves no evidence or fault code for the engineers to see once battery power is turned off.

Your thoughts are perhaps in many ways more relevant to the theatre you have experience in?

[Pete O'Heater]

John,
Did you enjoy your time in the RAF?

[swashplate]

VERY DISSAPOINTED about the MoD's decision.

But not totally surprised........

The arrogance of this Govt is beyond belief!!!!!!!!

I wonder how many people are put off joining the services because of this???????


PS Congrats to John Nicol for starting what must be the longest PPRuNe thread ever!!!!

[John Nichol]

K52 - we could go down this road for ever!

You say "Why would the crew use 7700 as the sole means of indicating an emergency". How do you know they weren't making a mayday call that was not received? - You dont.

You say "the crew had a commercial station set on the ADF". How do you know it wasn't a previous setting from another crew? I flew with an HF set for 10 years and never once used it or checked the frequency dialled in.

The whole point is that you are trying to make absolute judgement on actions or events that may or may not have occured. May, or may not have been intended.

Eg. "why did the crew not broadcast a mayday call on UKLFS or Guard, is that not a better bet?" Probably, but again, how do you know they did not? And even if they did not what does that tell us? I have had quite a few dire emergencies at low level (one crash & witnessing one crash to name but 2). They are terrifying and instill a monumental amount of fear bordering on panic. Every action can be analysed for its perfection at a later date but I don't think I was grossly negligent. Not a perfect sim ride perhaps, but not negligent.

Eg. Transient faults - the US Chinook is the classic example of an aircraft going out of control, back under control and landed, and leaving no evidence of any fault. I can't find the exact figures at the moment but the rotary force reported many hundreds of UCFMs over the last 6 years - many which left no evidence & could not be explained.

You say the crew were negligent "for not adhering to the rules of VFR flight". Could a transient fault have caused the aircraft to accelerate to 150kts and "porpoise" towards the Mull? Perhaps it could; chinook pilots offered a number of scenarios along those lines. Did it happen - I dont know.

As you say, your "views" are valid - of course they are. But even you seem to be accepting that they are views.

Pete o'H - I had a great time in the RAF for most of my 15 years service - not sure this is really the place to talk about it though. Somewhere in the pprune archives is a thread (started by someone else I might say!) asking me all sorts of questions about it.

Swashplate - Thanks, but although I've been involved for 6 years there are loads of other people involved in this campaign - many are contibutors here. All deserve recognition.

[K52]

John Nichol,

I transmitted my reply to Shy Torque before seeing your latest post.

As you say, the ADF setting could have been left by another crew - so could the altimeter settings. I thought we had check lists to ensure that things were set correctly prior to getting airborne. The Route Planning having been done by another Pilot - are you saying that it is possible that they just took that on trust and didn't check it?

I confess that I was sorely tempted to comment on your revelation about the HF - but I will leave that to fellow members of SODCAT. It was very useful for getting weather colour states twice an hour.

You are postulating not one but two major emergencies. Control problems and total radio failure. When last seen by an eyewitness at 2-3nm from the Mull the aircraft was in straight and level flight - and either already was, or was imminently about to become, IMC. At that time it should have been climbing to SALT or turning away to maintain VFR.

[cheapseat]

K52

I can only admire your ability to respond to so many excellent points with equally considered replies. However, and I mean no insult, you are now showing a lack of experience in low level operations around the UK.

There are huge holes in radio coverage around these green lands. Fact. Before you head for your study to reference thousands of books and reports, which will prove that any number of frequencies are available 24 hours a day at ground level, let me assure you, from many years experience, lack of comms is common, bordering on the norm.

As I’ve said, the work you put in for this thread is impressive. The trouble is that if you spent five minutes on the phone to an SH operator before writing each post I’m sure you would lose the urge to comment. Again no insult intended. I must also make it clear that I do not, in any way, resent your comments. The beauty of this forum is the lack of censorship and, more importantly, fresh eyes may well spot the obviouse flaw which close in operators have missed.

[Has a handle]

Re - control inputs. Are pitch, roll, yaw and collective primary inputs not based through the control pallet? ie why find it hard to believe that a 'potential' restriction, is restricted to one input, when with the CH47, all inputs are grounded on the same pallet. (incident reports both prior to and post the accident state delamination of the pallet may have in flight led to...)
Re - one minute. Given(or maybe even if) your not familiar with the 'mod' type - even though you're a very experienced CH47 operator, start the clock next time you 'simulate' an airborne emergency. I have..The best case for a 'simple emergency' ie no contributing factors was 38 secs. With complications, ie one emergency leading into another, is 2mins 45secs...

[K52]

cheapseat,

I think that's quite the nicest reply I have had so far (apart from Brian). I totally take your point - but I come from a different era. First tour in the Gulf (amazing how things don't change isn't it - I seem to recall that the reason for us being there was to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait). Every Airfield had one frequency - 118.1 - who answered when you called depended on the time of day and the height of the ionosphere. The only beacon in our normal operating area worked better at night because you could see the flame from a greater distance.

First time across the Atlantic - single ADF, a Doppler that didn't work over the sea and a "sun gun" (great at night but not if it was cloudy). We reached 11200ft in a climbing attitude after a max overload take-off. First task was to move every thing we could off the ramp and bring it to the flightdeck - that gave us another 7kts IAS. In an emergency - head for the nearest weather ship. They had radar,lifeboats, NDB and could lay a flarepath at night to assist ditching and oil if the sea was rough. (A real possibility - the ferry tank was purely gravity feed and fed at a greater rate than the engines could consume the fuel. We had to keep turning it off and hopeing it would feed properly when we turned it back on)

The point is that we knew the limitations of our comm's equipment and thought about it. We had a contingency plan in the event of emergency.

ZD576 had 2 way comms with STCICS on 4722 approx 13 minutes before impact. Any call on 243Mhz or 121.5Mhz would have registered on SARSAT (and with 121.5Mhz any aircraft coming in from Oceanic). The options were there if they had thought about it beforehand!! If they had kept Aldergrove Approach on the VHF it would have given them a 90%+ chance of somebody hearing them.

Perhaps I am being unfair, but there used to be a Flight Safety slogan that said "EXPECT THE UNEXPECTED"

TO ILLUSTRATE:

Fg Off Don Mcloud was an American serving on 121(Eagle)Sqn at RAF North Weald in early 1942. He was sitting in the Link Trainer practising IF when a flight of German fighters strafed the Airfield. A cannon shell went through the wooden wall of the Link Trainer building and exploded at the base of the Link Trainer which then fell off its podium onto the floor.

Fg Off Mcloud thus became the ONLY person in the annals of aviation to have been physically shot down whilst flying a flight simulator.

[swashplate]

To John Nicol:

Not having a go, mate!! Of course, I recognise that there are many more people involved in this campaign as well as yourself - congrats to 'em all!!

There are now nearly 800 replies to this thread on PPRuNe- should the campaign not use this as evidence of the strength of feeling on this issue????

Maybe I should have made that clearer.....

[Brian Dixon]

Swash,
absolutely right!

This is a good indicator of the feelings surrounding this injustice. I make sure I refer to the thread in each of my letters to Ministers, MoD etc. Hopefully someone will take notice. You may also remember that the thread was mentioned on Newsnight after the PAC Report was published.

Lord Chalfont is well aware too.

Thanks for the support
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cheapseat]

K52

I can relate to your single frequency over the Iraqi border. If it weren’t for BEagle et al (I assume) I too would have had many a lonely evening trying to keep Iraq/Kuwait in their O Level positions.

How about a little story. You stoophed in (not in my speil chocker, sorry) over The Pond for no reason other than you hit the bridge wing on a vessel no more than 150 feet asl. Lets say all the wreckage (less 20% to make it a fair fight) was found. There’s much gnashing of teeth but it just looks like you flew, flat out, at that ship. Worse, the ship was under tow and the Skipper of the Tug Bulstrode said he was in cloud, not 200 yds away. Well, I guess that’s gross negligence then.

Oh, and by the way, I’m on SAR and not every call on 243 is heard. FACT.

This comes across all negative (hence the edit). Sorry. I really, really like the dit about the sim. Guess this is why we need to keep the experience levels up: Good times when the tilly’s swinging!!!!

[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 24 March 2001).]

[Pete O'Heater]

John,
We flew together on F3s. I just wonder what all your 'crusading' is about?

[Pete O'Heater]

John,
We flew together for a while on F3s...
No offence intended mate, but I just wonder why you have become such a 'crusader'. As it was your time in the RAF that created your present 'status' do you not feel some loyalty towards the outfit?

[Laser Jet]

"Loyalty" is a two-way street. Pete O should put that question to the families involved here and ask what sort of "loyalty" the RAF has shown to them!

[ShyTorque]

Pete O'Heater,

I wouldn't have wanted the type (lack of) loyalty shown by the RAF towards the families left behind in this instance. It's a disgrace. I am glad I am no longer likely to suffer from it. I hope you or yours don't.

[John Nichol]

Pete - Although you say we flew together I obviously don't know who you are as you remain annonymous.

I think "crusade" is a strong word for my involvement. Yes, I feel a great deal of pride & loyalty about my time in the RAF. which is why I, amongst many others as I said to Swashplate (no offence taken at all SW) have fought for 5 years or so to clear the names of two men who could not defend themselves.

To be honest, I'm not really sure what point you are trying to make.

K52 - I am not postulating, as I'm sure you know. To give a verdict of "Gross Negligence" there has to be no doubt whatsoever. That means that if there is just one, tiny, miniscule area of doubt about the cause of the crash then the crew remain innocent. The onus is on the MOD to explain away every single area of doubt raised by the families. It is not for the families to offer any theories or explanations about the cause of the accident. I am saying, and have said more than once, that you are postulating. You are guessing about what may or may not have happened to ZD576. As has been said before, you have not one jot of evidence to support your theory.

I am pointing out that your version of events is a theory. I make no claim to know what did or did not happen. I'm simply saying that neither do you.

[Paul Wesson]

K52

HF use on SH, as I recall, is very limited. The HF was sometimes checked for serviceability by way of an 'Ops normal' call early in the sortie, with a later call if sortie length dictated. Rarely would we receive a reply.

I once recall in southern Germany, in unforecast IMC (all en route airfields green or better), with 2 pilots and a full ferry tank, spending 30 minutes trying to inform our destination that we were likely to be very late by virtue of the fact that we were transitting in sight of the ground at about 10kts/10' instead of 120kts/500'. When we finally arrived, having parked in a field for an hour and subsequently drained the ferry, very late with 50kg or less per side (not much in a Puma) the destination airfield confirmed that they had never received my blind transmissions nor a message I had tried to relay through Architect.

The 30 minute check of colour states presumes a number of things. Firstly that the information is of any use when you only have 90 minutes of fuel and can't go far. In emergency the nearest div is the flattest bit of open ground you can see out of the window! Secondly that the sortie is planned for more than an hour - 750+ of my 1000 Puma hours were achieved on sorties of less than an hour and doing things that didn't involve proximity to an airfield other than the home base/landing site. Thirdly, that there is someone with the capacity to ignore everything happening around them whilst they write down what is superfluous information. Unless there are rapidly changing conditions the forecast at destination tends to be pretty much the same as at the out brief. I've flown with plenty of pilots who never once spoke on HF in an entire sortie. I only once used the ADF - we tried to fly an NDB hold, but after 3 attempts decided that it wasn't going to work and landed!

Pete

Loyalty involves having the courage to tell it like it is. A loyal officer should be able to tell his seniors that he believes them to be wrong, without fear of losing his career, and explain why, with reference to facts where possible. Doing what is right is far more important than burying your head in the sand for fear of offending those in authority.

[This message has been edited by Paul Wesson (edited 25 March 2001).]

[Has a handle]

HF has a relevance, but limited. It is very hit and miss. More importantly is the relevace of the engineering findings with the a/c. ie this a/c was found to have have a problem with the control pallet not 10 days befor the accident...

[Pub User]

K52

Your story of those old trips across the pond is excellent and quite thought-provoking.

It is, however, an unfortunate fact (the reason for which escapes me) but comms from a helicopter at low level are absolutely dreadful. I personally have lost comms entirely whilst transitting from Aldergrove to West Freugh! No radio failure involved, just low-level-heli-typical comms!

As for your faith in Guard transmissions, a friend of mine once suffered rather badly from hypothermia on an exercise on Salisbury Plain and (before mobiles & hand-held GPS) used the emergency procedure and set off a PLB. It later transpired that it had not registered on SARSAT for over 3 hours, and once it did, he was picked up 40 mins later - by Landrover.

[Arkroyal]

Back from another 5 days at the coalface.

K52, what becomes more and more evident with each post you make, is that you really have no idea how helicopters are operated at low level.

I have about 5000 SH hours and about 1800 airline hours, and as the latter would equate fairly closely to your truckying, I think I have a good handle on your perceptions of aviation.

Please accept that the two genres are chalk and cheese, and that judging one with the experience of the other is a dangerous road to pursue.

The checklist in my SH types did not include setting up kit I had no intention of using. If the item was relevant, it was dialled up, otherwise it was forgotten.

In extremis, we all AVIATE, NAVIGATE, COMMUNICATE. In my airliner the first bit is done by the autopilot, leaving me a liesurely time to sort out the rest, hell, even in free-fall with no wings I've STILL got minutes to sort out a last prayer.

Low level, in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually..... THINK about it. It is a very different problem.

As John Nichol says, there is a requirement for the MOD to prove its case beyond any doubt whatsoever.

They simply cannot do this, and all your theories will not change that one bit.

[K52]

The Crew of ZD576 were tasked to fly 25 Pax from Aldergrove to Fort George. THe sortie was planned as a low level VFR sortie via the Mull, Corran and the Great Glen. The BOI stated in its findings that "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre." Yet when last seen the aircraft was 2-3nm from the Mull at 200-400ft in straight and level flight heading directly at high speed towards the cloud enshrouded Mull.

What is postulation is the idea that a trained SF Crew could not have failed to take the correct action to avoid disaster THEREFORE there must have been an emergency of some kind which the subsequent investigation failed to discover.

Regretably, trained aircrew have been flying into cloud enshrouded high ground for many, many years - the only member of the Royal Family (The Duke of Kent) to be killed on Active Service during either World War died when the Sunderland he was flying did just that.

Despite the evidence as recorded by the BOI, we learn from these pages that the route was planned by a member of the other crew the night before. I also understand that was the evidence given to the FAI; where it was also stated the the route was planned at low level "for training purposes". What the BOI does not include is the chart for the return sorie. I never personally saw that chart but I was informed by those who had seen it that it was planned "at MEDIUM level".

If the crew wanted to fly at low level "for training purposes" why do it with 25 Pax( some of whom were Civilians) on board? Why not do it on the way back to Aldergrove and replan a more direct route clear of the poor weather which was localised in the vicinity of the Mull. Perhaps, as Pulse 1 suggested, routing via the isle of Gigha. We do not, however know when the Pilots received the pre-planned chart for the outbound journey and whether they had time to replan it before their intended departure.

Paul Wesson

I did not mean to imply that this crew should have listened to the Colour States on HF. I was having a dig at JN for not turning his HF on in 10 years.



[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 26 March 2001).]

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

K52

I have bitten my tongue for long enough but i'm afraid that I now feel the need to reply. As an ex truckie it is quite clear to me and also to a number of other SH people who have contributed to this thread that you have absolutely no idea what SH flying is or was about! SH pilots NEVER plan just a medium level sortie; medium level to us is 500 ft or above and on the likelihood of probabilities we would have to fly low level anyway. Low level or 1000ft is just the same in the planning stages. perhaps you would find this difficult to believe since your MSD was probably 2000ft as a transport pilot. We appreciate the terrific interest that this thread has caused, but when faced with the overwhelming SH experience that has made comment on this thread, I suggest that you retire gracefully and leave this matter to those a little more appropriately qualified to comment. I would not dream of commenting on an AT matter of a similar nature.

Your comments on rad alt settings, could highlight a possible lazyness within the crew, however it could be counter argued that a rad alt set at 50ft would not have prevented this accident. Your emphasis on the reliance of the GPS further demonstrates your lack of low-level VFR experience. Do you think that the crew slavishly follow the steer bar? Do you know how difficult it is to do this in a Chinook? Has your boss ever told you that the Test Pilots have refused to fly the aircraft type that you are currently flying and will carry on flying regardless? Have you ever been at 50ft over water with poor weather ahead, no IFR option, pressures of the task, an aircraft that wasn't cleared for full use, a hierarchy that didn't give a fu(k?

K52, I plead with you to let dogs lie. Your counter bickering detracts from the real argument that there IS doubt about the negligence of the crew.

Leave it alone. A response will merely show your ignorance regarding SH ops.

HPT

[ShyTorque]

HPT,

I agree with all you say. K52 is very ignorant of the way SH has always been required to operate. He persists in his efforts to apply maxims from his own experience of medium level and IFR fixed wing operations. Sound familiar? The more senior of the two air officers had NO support helicopter operational experience.

K52,

You announced your verdict very early on and ever since have been trying to find evidence to fit. You have gone as far as 3 decimal places to "prove" your theories. Why?

As an SH QHI (from long before your first tour from what you have said) I continue to despise your efforts to belittle and besmirch the names of a crew who were trying to do their job despite the pressures of flying an aircraft that was brought into service without checklists, Flight Manual,or the necessary clearance to fly under IFR.

Your motive?

[smooth approach]

K52, in one of your previous posts, you talk about speculation and evidence. there is NO evidence that the crew were negligent. Many of the points here revolve around an aircraft that should not have been flying (no FRCs etc). That is evidence. Therefore, if one is going to speculate that the crew were negligent, one must also be willing to speculate that the crew may have been caught in an unusual situation without the ability or information required to resolve what may have been a major/minor problem.

John Cook has never categorically said that his son was "not guilty"; he is unconvinced by the argument that says he was "guilty".

[pulse1]

K52,

Even the AOC supported the Board by accepted that the flight was carefully planned. I think it is disgraceful that you should suggest that it was anything less without quoting the authority for your statement. These pages are not an authority, especially as you do not quote the reference.

I wonder if the BOI could have the last word on this argument.

“With no ADR or CVR, survivors or witnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it” (Ch 61 Cause).

There has been much logical argument in this bulletin, some of it scientific, but most of it based on credibility or, in K52’s case, incredulity. It can never be resolved without new evidence and the only logical outcome, therefore, must be that there is considerable doubt.

With respect to Human Failings “the Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading to the accident………..it would be incorrect to criticise him (Flt Lt Tapper) for human failings based on available evidence” (Ch67c).

As a civilian I have a little experience of involvement in a RAF BOI (naughty Chipmunk pilot flew into glider launch cable) and I would be very surprised indeed if the President of this Board did not come under immense pressure to change some of the findings, particularly when one considers the high profile of this case (even pre pprune).

The Board’s diligence and integrity in upholding this position should be respected, at least by accepting that there is too much doubt to maintain the subsequent finding of negligence.



------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Arkroyal]

HPT, Shy and smooth.

I too had spotted the similar willingness to pontificate upon matters of which they have no knowledge by both K52 and Sir Billy W. I have been told off by K52 for not showing the latter respect, so I have laid off him of late!

Just a further note to K52 as insight into SH ops.

Would it horrify you to realise that an average NI trip would carry no more knowledge at the outset than the Grid Reference of the start point? After that you are tasked by the unit. Planning is done on the hoof.

[3m Strop Carrier]

Ark Royal

Well Said. K52 sit back and put in another pie.

[Has a handle]

Keep with the thread. There are serious issuses pending here. If U cannot offer anything to progress the thread (K52) then butt out. The engineerinig implications as to the state of the aircraft are to my mind pretty paramount here. Is it not possible to get a CH47 qualified person to comment....

[rolandpitch]

If there was a problem with the aircraft then why were they still going so quickly? Is it not common practise to slow down(and climb if you can)when you've got a problem. I personally think that this was just a bad day....HOWEVER, the point is that you cannot POSITIVLEY say that there was not a problem with the aircraft, and therefore cannot blame the crew.

[Pub User]

Pulse1

The President of the Board does not need to review anything, that is partly what this case is all about. The boards findings were:

"insufficient evidence to support a finding of negligence on his (captain's) part"

and

"no human failings could be attributed to the co-pilot"

It was the reviewing officers who made up the final verdict.

[pulse1]

Pub User,

Sorry if I did not make myself clear but that is exactly what I was trying to say.

[ShyTorque]

The available eye-witness evidence was that they DID slow down approaching the Mull. All that is known from evidence is that subsequently the aircraft hit the ground at very high speed, which suggests that something possibly went wrong with the aircraft.

What happened in between is the uncertain part. Uncertainty and lack of evidence is the key to this whole debate. If there was sufficient evidence to prove without doubt the crew were the only factor (not theory or supposition based on a lack of real understanding of SH, K52) none of us would have any real problem with this.

In my OPINION, this was a management accident if ever there was one. Those involved could and should have prevented it -because this aircraft should not have been operational or even in use for crew training, let alone used for such an important mission. The hierarchy elected not to do so and subsequently developed sloping and Teflon coated shoulders when the accident proved their ill-founded over- confidence to be flawed. The Mk2 had bypassed the RAF's own requirements for acceptance into service because the test pilots refused to continue with the test programme because of uncertainties over the FADEC problems previously experienced. The true responsibility surely lies between MOD and Squadron.

[PercyDragon]

I can't believe this. I haven't checked on this thread for yonks and now am amazed to see that its reached 55 pages. Haven't you blokes got anything better to do? Look, it's the old old story. Flying low level to impress the Pongos in the back (done it myself many times) press on in sea fog...low level...forget that the lumpy bits are coming up..and we all know the end. So lets just let it drop shall we?

[smooth approach]

Percy, you're not needed here.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Percy,
I've always said that all views are welcome. However, if visiting here upsets you so much, it's quite simple.......don't.

Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 29 March 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

Welcome back Percy,

Even this thread benefits from the occasional injection of humour!

You cannot be serious.....right?

[Has a handle]

To retain the thread before it is lost; There is no way that Jon Tapper or Rick Cook flew this CH 47c into the Mull without having a damn good engineering reason not to do so: ie they had no choice. Graeme Forbes and Kev Hardie would have done (and I'm sure did do)everything in their power to keep this a/c flying. One can only surmise that whatevever happened was outwith the ability of the(extremely able) crew to deal with. Regardless of whoevere had hands on at the time of impact, regardless of whoever was designated Captain, an injustice remains...

[The Nr Fairy]

I was reading "Fly Navy" over the weekend ( bear with me, there is some relevance ) and came across a description of the resuce of the SAS troops stuck on Fortuna Glacier in mid 1982. One of the Wessex pilots was named as Flt Lt Pulford ( no first name ).

Two questions. First, might this be the same Andy Pulford who was the investigating officer on the BOI ? Secondly, I seem to remember that Wratten recently said in an interview that the person running the BOI was inexperienced. If the two Pulfords are one and the same, how did Wratten come to that conclusion, given that this one experience alone would be bound to imbue some understanding of SH ops ?

[Arkroyal]

Nr Fairy

Indeed one and the same. Andy was with porky pies (845) for a couple of years and was a very experienced SH man by the time of the Mull.

His examination of the evidence would have been most thorough and his conclusions sound.

Wratten's SH experience can be summed up on the back of a postage stamp written with felt tip marker!

[pulse1]

Nr Fairy,

Assuming you are thinking of the Newsnight interview, how do you know that he was referring to their flying experience? He could have been referring to their political inexperience which made them put integrity and justice before the convenience of their masters.

Yes, I know that is unthinkable, almost as unthinkable as……..um…, I know, .... two very experienced SH pilots flying straight into a hill they knew was there.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[K52]

Percy Dragon – have you not realized that anyone who invades this thread without being a true believer in the cause is automatically a numbskull/without any relevant experience/ unable to think for themselves or willfully pushing the party line.

First, a thank-you to those who have contacted me deprecating the personal abuse. I also see no need for it; but I suppose that they think that, as it disposed of (in a particularly vicious form) Pilgarlic, then it will work on me.

I was surprised, to say the least, to learn that the SH branch of the RAF would NEVER adjust the way they fly to suit the task in hand. I had always understood that the RAF became, and continues to be, a very effective Fighting Force PRECISELY because it adapted to changing conditions. I equally always understood that SH supported the forces IN THE FIELD. When tasked to do something completely different (such as a daytime passenger transit flight - as AOC 1 Gp put it); I see no reason why, once clear of the operating constraints of the Theatre, they could not adjust the mode of operation instead of continuing at low level “ for training purposes”: as evidence given at the FAI informs us. Incidentally, Lord Rathcavan, in his speech of 01/11/99, said “Most of us in Northern Ireland are used to the familiar throb of the double rotor Chinooks as they cruise across the countryside, usually at a height of 5000ft.”

I also am informed that I know little, or nothing, of low level flying (being a “Truckie”). I do seem to remember from the 60’s that the drop height for SEAC packs was 60ft and I certainly remember self authorizing my VIP aircraft, during an Operation, with a MSD of not ABOVE 100ft. Nor do 4 years as an Instructor on SORF seem to count (for those under 45 that was when the RAF was big enough to require a specialist FTS occupying 2 airfields just to carry out Refresher Training – with a Course every fortnight!).

The person who informed me of this is also of the opinion that his 1800 hours as First Officer on an Airline equates to my 19 years on the Transport Fleet. I realize that Civilianisation and Contractorisation have made deep inroads into the RAF but I didn’t realise that such activities as Para drops/ Halo/ 1ton drops/ ULLA/ STOL/ Aeromed etc had been parceled out to the Airlines. Of course, I do not know which Airline that person flies for. I wish I did, as any Airline which allows its Flight Deck crew to read The Times at 35000ft over the North Sea is one I would wish to steer clear of.

However, let us turn to the “refusal of the Test Pilots to fly the Chinook”. For some unaccountable reason we at HQ 1 Gp never got to hear about that. The story that WE got was that, as Boscombe were awaiting further data from the manufacturer on icing characteristics, an Engineering Management decision was taken to bring forward some pre-planned maintenance so that when the data became available the icing trials could proceed without interruption.

Likewise, the allegation that there were NO check lists. If that were the case then could someone please explain how the BOI could observe “ The Chinook HC2 FRC’s valid at the time of the accident were confusing”.

One other point. As the responsible Flight Safety Officer at HQ 1 GP may I ask what became of all the incident reports regarding FADEC failure resulting in UFCM’s? I do not recollect ever seeing one. Nor am I aware of any accidents involving RAF Chinooks following a FADEC failure. There may have been some since I left the Service but no-one on this thread has referred to them.


Now, I KNOW I shouldn’t – but I feel the need for a few ripostes:

Shy Torque

(1) The aircraft WAS cleared to fly IFR. The limitation was no flight in POTENTIAL icing conditions at an OAT below +4 C True. If they had routed clear of the Mull then they could quite easily have flown IFR at medium level to Fort George.

(2) “Responsibility lies between MOD and the Squadron.” Well, MOD had cleared the aircraft for service use and had laid down the limitations for its use. The interpretation of this clearance for Squadron use was down to that Officer who was in charge of Flying Operations on that Unit. In this case it was a Detatchment and, as such, supervisory functions were vested in the Detatchment Commander. The Captain of ZD 576 was the outgoing Detatchment Commander and the Co-Pilot was the incoming Detatchment Commander.

(3) Nearly forgot – SH QFI long before my first tour? Was that Whirlwind 10’s or the Bristol 2 rotor masterpiece? I joined, was Commissioned and started my Flying Training Course at 18 and my pension becomes index linked in 4 months.


Ark Royal

“ Low level in marginal weather, no comms due to altitude, flying manually”. Yes, it sounds just like the Gulf in the 60’s - particularly when you are looking for an airstrip and the maps have a dotted line 12 nm inland from the coast and the legend “ End of Reliable Relief Information”.

Or perhaps you would have preferred (from the perspective of your current employment) landing at the airstrip at Saiq – 1200ft long/ 80ft wide and 5500ft up a mountain (OAT +35C). The real problem was that the rest of the 9000ft mountain was right at the end of the strip!!! To take off again you had to do a 3-point turn (yes, we did have reverse) – but then you could just taxi off. You had 5500ft to gain flying speed! At the bottom of the mountain was another strip called Firq – yes you guessed, we had a tie made with the motto 4 Firq-Saiq.

Pulse 1

I agree. The AOC did agree that the sortie was properly planned. HE, however, was under the impression (as were the BOI in view of the evidence given to them on oath) that the Captain of ZD576 had planned the sortie. At the FAI it appears that the person who gave that evidence to the BOI changed his story and stated that HE HIMSELF had done the planning. So, we do not know whether the Captain of ZD576 would have chosen that routing himself and, as we don’t even know when he was given the chart, we don’t know whether he had enough time to make any changes given the crew duty constraints he had placed on himself.

-------------------------------

Pub User

I put the demarcation line in because you have always been very polite.

AOC 1 Gp was the Convening Officer of the BOI and issued its Terms Of Reference. Those TOR’s required the BOI to give their OPINION regarding Human Failings. As the AOC makes quite clear in his Remarks he considered these but then goes on to say “ The crew of ZD576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules. ----- In my judgement, none of the possible factors and scenarios are so strong that they would have been likely to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.”

[Arkroyal]

K52

Those who 'invade this thread' (your words) are not automatically considered 'numbskulls'. Some have earned that discription. You are not one of them.

I enjoy our sparring, as your views are as valid as any, and you have raised many good points and many which betray a lack of knowledge of things SH. I have obviously incurred your displeasure because I do not agree with much of your reasoning. I have not been diliberately rude to you, and if my passionate feelings about this case have led to the odd intemperate reposte, I apologise.

Granted, my 1800 hours of airline flying do not make me an expert in your field of aviation. I have never asserted that this experience equates to your impressive past. That is why you will not find me using that inexperience to judge my colleagues.

I equally ask that you respect my 16 year SH career as allowing me to speak of that genre with more authority than yourself.

Now, tell me with a straight face that you NEVER whipped out some non-relevant reading material during a long and boring cruise.

To your response to Shytorque's assertion that the blame lies with the MOD, it was not possible for Jon and Rick to fefuse to fly the Mk2. They had voiced their misgivings and been overruled. Like the loyal Officers they were, they accepted the task. Had they known the support they were to posthumously receive from the RAF, they may have chosen a different course of action.

[smooth approach]

Since the beginning of time, aircrew have flown in to the side of hills. Indeed, the recent events concerning 2 x F15 in Scotland seems to bear this fact out. On how many of these occassions has an aircrew mate been found guilty of gross negligence?

[K52]

Ark Royal,

Thank you for the kind words. I have never considered myself as an “invader” as I was involved before the BOI was published – albeit as the junior member of the Flight Safety team at 1Gp.

Now, with my very best straight face, the answer is NO – not on the Flight Deck. Perhaps the reason was that I have never had a boring flight. Exhilarating, wondrous, exciting and even, on the odd occasion, frightening – but never boring. If someone wanted a break on a long flight they went down the back.

If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment. Moreover, why were no incident reports raised or the matter raised with their Sqn chain of command?

Yes, I remember the newspaper article about a “memo” that appeared 6 years after the crash. No one had heard of that “memo” before that article appeared: it was certainly never mentioned to the BOI. There does, however, appear to be at least one reporter on the Scottish Herald who sources his articles from this thread and then adds a few embellishments quoting “sources”. With me I.B.?

I totally acknowledge your expertise gathered during your years of RN SH flying. You will, I trust, allow me to lean towards the view of an Officer whose period of service on SH was far longer than yours (and in an RAF environment); and covered a far broader spectrum of aircraft and responsibilities than yours – including service on the Chinook.

Smooth Approach

That is a difficult question. My memory is good – but not that encyclopedic. You limited it to people who have flown into hills. However for starters (and not limiting it to hills) - how about the Captain of Argosy XR 133 who crashed at Got-El-Afrag on 7th May 1968. It wasn’t really his fault, the groundcrew hadn’t issued a NOTAM regarding the 18ft high improvised shower that they had constructed during the Exercise and it was that which his wing clipped during the unauthorized beat-up at the end of the Exercise. The crew were all killed – as were all the Army Pax.

Then there was, at about the same time, the period when we lost 3 Shackleton’s in 6 weeks. Perhaps the one that was last seen doing a wingover during its “beat up” of a Frigate would fit the bill. The next thing the Frigate crew saw was the splash as it hit the sea.

As a Flight Safety man I asked the statisticians at IFS how many accidents there had been during my time in the RAF. The answer worked out at slightly greater than one for every 15 days – and I served for 11.371 days.

[earswentpop]

Edited as I only responded to K52 in a moment of weakness. Won't happen again.

[This message has been edited by earswentpop (edited 05 April 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

"If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment."

Might they not have been acting under orders, B52? Perhaps they had limited choices.

[K52]

earswentpop

You have such an elegant turn of phrase.

When last seen (by the yachtsman) the Chinook was 2-3nm from the Mull at 200-400ft in straight and level flight. At that point in time they either were, or were imminently about to become, IMC. Depending on the accuracy of the position given by the yachtsman they had between 40-70 seconds to go to impact. IF they had a major emergency at that time, which prevented them from turning away from the high ground or climbing to SALT, then they had ample time to get the Pax and Rear Crew strapped in (and in the crash landing posture) – Squawk EMERGENCY – and yell MAYDAY on some of the radios (not all because the VHF was switched OFF).

If they did NOT have a major emergency at that time which prevented them from turning away or climbing to SALT then they should have taken positive steps to maintain VMC. The first rule in any emergency is FLY THE AIRCRAFT.

THEY DID NONE OF THESE THINGS

The most depressing thing about being a Flight Safety Officer is that people keep making the same mistakes. I mentioned in my last post about the time we lost 3 Shackletons in 6 weeks. Having checked on the Shackleton Association web site I find I exaggerated by 4 days. WL786 ditched 120nm W of Sumatra on 5/11/67 after an engine failure/fire. WR 976 was next on 19/11/67 180nm from Lands End beating up the Frigate and that was followed on 21/12/67 by XF 702, which crashed in Invernesshire after experiencing severe icing.

There was then a (very) short break before WB 833 crashed on 19/4/68. The cause – continuing to fly at low level in poor visibility until they hit the Mull of Kintyre.

If we move on to accidents within the memory of most of those still serving then we find Shackleton WR 966 hitting high ground on South Harris while flying IMC at low level on 30/4/90. They had mis-identified the inlet that they were flying up. There were lots of findings of negligence on that one – the navigator was not even current on type.

[smooth approach]

K52. A good friend of mine was a co-pilot on the 1990 Shack. My question was; how many accidents were attributed to GROSS negligence?

Whilst I am at it, was Wratten subject to political influence due to the nature of the pax?

[pulse1]

K52,

Thank you for responding to my comment on the flight planning. I am sorry if you were offended by my criticism but I do think that any implied allegations should be supported by facts or, at least, good argument. In most cases this is what you have done very well.

As you say yourself “we don’t know” how much effort was put in to checking this plan. If it had been thoroughly checked by Fl Lt Tapper, it must be completely irrelevant who prepared it in the first place. As such it does not seem reasonable to imply, without solid evidence, that the planning had been anything less than careful.

The important factor to me is that the BOI and everyone else, except Wratten who did not refer to it at all, believed that the flight had been planned as a low level, VFR flight. More importantly, they all agreed that it was acceptable to plan a passenger flight on this basis and, in doing this, they presumably took into account the forecast and actual weather at Machrihanish (30% probability that VFR flight would be impossible in the vicinity of the Mull).

Now, like you, I find it a bit surprising that a passenger flight should be planned on these terms, particularly when you consider additional limitations on icing for the Mk 2 Chinook (only 400’ between MSA and FORECAST icing limit - BOI says that “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” How did they know that?). Now, if the SH lobby condemn you for commenting on their operating procedures, they will probably vilify or ignore someone like me for daring to support this sort of question. Incidentally I have privately aired this with several SH contacts and retired people like yourself who have immense RAF experience, mostly in fast jets. To a man, the SH pilots said they would have done the same thing. A friend of mine who has credentials at least as good as yours tells me that there is no such thing as a passenger flight – it is classed as either training or operational. If this is true, and you would know this better than I, it reveals a mind set which would tend to question your belief that the RAF has always depended on flexibility and possibly suggests that it depends too much on rules. It also raises the question as to whether the passengers had signed an indemnity form, especially as some of them were civilians.

Having thought long and hard about this, I have come to the conclusion that, the fact that there were passengers in the back has no relevance in fact to the cause of the accident. However, if you are suggesting that they were negligent because they were carrying passengers on such a flight, this raises two questions (I know you told me to stop asking them but I can’t help it):

1. Would they have been found negligent if they had not been carrying passengers? (I guess that this is the same question raised previously about other CFIT accidents leading to a finding of gross negligence)

2. IF it was unwise to carry out a passenger flight under these conditions in this aircraft, absence of any hint of criticism from the BOI and reviewing officers tell me that high risk passenger flying is considered to be acceptable for SH, and Fl Lt’s Tapper and Cook should not have to carry the can for that. They, like all other SH pilots appear to have been trained to believe that it’s OK to take such risks with passengers. Surely, the officers responsible for the whole SH operation should take responsibility for that?

Whatever, I am more than ever convinced by your dependence on speculation, in defending your own opinion, that the names of the pilots of ZD 576 should be cleared, and I hope that this will result from the efforts of the House of Lords select committee. If the committee investigates the whole question of passenger flying under these conditions, I hope they will place the responsibility where it belongs, recognising that, although the pilots were theoretically free to refuse the task, the well known contributory factors in many accidents, management and peer group pressure, were probably abundant in this case.

Incidentally, why did you initially give examples of CFIT which followed unauthorised beat ups? I see no similarity with the Chinook crash unless you are indulging in a little mischievous spin.

Referring to your accident statistics, I am sure that they have improved in recent years (nothing to do with you having left I suppose?) but I am constantly amazed by the low accident rate of the modern RAF, considering the amount of low level flying carried out. This must be a testimony to the excellent training and skills of the aircrews. However, practice and training reduces risk to an acceptable level, it does not remove it. Low flying will always be risky and, in this case, Fl Lt Tapper considered that medium level IFR was also risky under the prevailing circumstances. In my view, unless the cause can be positively attributed to pilot error, as in some of your examples, the present finding of negligence is, in my view, an abrogation of responsibility of those in command.

Now, if you think you have been condemned, just wait to see what happens to me.




------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[cheapseat]

K52

“If the Pilots of ZD576 felt that the aircraft was unsafe for the planned task then they not only had a right to refuse that task – they had a positive duty to do so. They were the experts on the spot and the executive officers of the Detachment.”

Quite right. The very thought that fellow officers in the Royal Air Force would force such a detachment commander to ‘play on regardless’ is abhorrent.

In actual fact this is EXACTLY what happened. Not only that but John Tapper had to look his detachment aircrew in the eye and say he had tried and failed to prevent the Mk2 Chinook being introduced into NI.

You’re going to ask why this sort of information was never put before the BoI. The sad fact is that EVERYONE involved with the Chinook force during this period had NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER that ZD576 killed John, Rick, Graham, Kevin and their passengers. There was no need to volunteer information to the Board as this would just make the individual a whistle blower in an open and shut case.

This simple fact is probably the final tragedy of this whole sorry mess. Just about every RAF Chinook operator of the period could have offered statements explaining flaws, minor and major, involved in the introduction to service of the Mk2 to the BoI but no one did, there was no need.

[Has a handle]

Good to here some snse talked about the job done. Sorry to here that some may think that anything other than the job, requiring a high level of professionalism to complete, may be biased by politics; Life included.

[Mrs Doris Hot]

Cheapseat . At the same time as Mull incident another Mk2 in a different theatre was "damaged" to keep it on the deck long term.

[Has a handle]

why change UR TUNE k52?Meanwhile in the real world...At the end of the day, how do u convince all these people to accept the evidence that is laid ou before them...

[Has a handle]

At the time in question, everyone felt that the a/c should not be operated. Every person in question was prepared to fly, but not one person, front or rear wanted to get airborne...resulting in a percentage of 1 in 100 actually achieving it, which grew rapidlly with peer pressure...

[Arkroyal]

Excellent post Pulse.

I too find it almost incredible that the task was allowed to go ahead as planned. There was no IFR option due to the limitations of the Mk2 in icing, so the trip was decidedly iffy.

Having been put in a similar position with VIPs, the pressure to complete the mission is almost intolerable. I turned back and was castigated for taking the safe option.

The trip went ahead and the responsible people blmed the crew. The crew may have been negligent, and no one in this thread has denied this as a possibility. We simply state that it cannot be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever, no matter how much spin and dodgy calculation is performed.

K52

Your comments regarding other accidents, and a wish to prevent recurrence would suggest that you support the finding of negligence 'pour encorager les autres'. That is not one of the parameters for such a finding in the RAFs own rules.

I would also suggest that monitoring the flight deck from behind a newspaper is safer than not being on the flight deck!

[Ben Leice]

Arkroyal

You are amazed that the flight was able to go ahead as planned. But what exactly was planned? An earlier poster in a private message said that he recommended on May 31 that two Pumas from the Aldergrove 7-strong fleet be used to transport the top security personnel. He also said that one of the people who died on the crash had requested the use of a Chinook on June 1 so that the passengers could be together for pre-conference discussions on the flight.

The Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove on May 31, the first time a Mk2 had been to Northern Ireland. Had the decision to fly the passengers in a Mk2 been taken before May 31?

In the light of what was known about the Mk2 it seems absolutely crazy that such a craft should have been used to ferry passengers who had to play such a key role in Northern Ireland's security.

[K52]

cheapseat,

You obviously feel deeply aggrieved and bitter about your perception of events. The BOI could not comment on what you feel so deeply about PRECISELY because no one gave evidence to that effect. Equally you are incorrect in stating that ALL involved with the Chinook were aware of these feelings. We in the Flight Safety Team at 1 Gp were not aware; nor were the Flight Safety Team at STC.

If I had been made aware of your concerns then, I assure you, they would have been pursued all the way to the top. I, after all, had nothing to lose – a Spec Aircrew Flt Lt in a ground post and already accepted for Redundancy. I may not have agreed with you, but I would have ensured that your concerns were heard – that is how I saw my Job.

It is not, however, too late in the day for you to voice your concerns at the highest level. Submit a CONDOR!! That will go, unopened, directly to the Inspector of Flight Safety who has direct access to CAS. I can guarantee that what you write will remain “In Confidence” between you and the Inspector. Some 15+ years ago, whilst at Boscombe, I was doing some research and wanted more information regarding a CONDOR that had been submitted. The then Inspector agreed that it would be useful for me to obtain more information on the incident but flatly refused to break the rule of anonymity. What he did do was write privately to the individual with my request and invited him, IF HE SO WISHED, to telephone me without revealing his identity. I am glad to say he did phone me and our conversation was very useful – but, to this day, I have NO idea who that person was.

Ark Royal

A cheap shot would be to point out that it was YOUR Service that shot Admiral Byng and engendered Voltaire’s saying ”Dans ce pays-ci il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres.”

I would never do that. Oh damn – SORRY!!!!

The only reason for quoting previous accidents was to show that Aircrew are not very innovative when it comes to killing themselves. Someone, unfortunately usually more than one, has always done it before.

Regarding the Flight Deck – we always ensured that if a Pilot left then someone else was on headset and observing. On the Andover it would be the Nav; on the 146 the Ground Eng and on the 125 the Steward(ess). We didn’t have “Trolley Dollies”- they were part of the crew (and they helped to refuel and do AF/BF’s). They also did a walkaround check after take off to see if they could spot anything unusual. I remember one Cabin Crew member spotting a massive oil leak from an engine.

Smooth Approach

Sorry about your friend, there was no way that any finding of negligence devolved onto him. I knew the Captain from training – he was on the Course above me. Did you know that he had to eject on one of his first trips (legend had it that it was his first trip)? The sortie was combined with a Wx check and they got to Break Off Height (that dates me) and commenced an overshoot having seen nothing when the FIRE WARNING went off. The Captain was reprimanded by the BOI for not transmitting a MAYDAY – 400ft, full flap and gear and no power!!!!!!

There is no way I can answer your point about Political Influence. All I can say is that I was never aware of any. After my initial reading of the BOI the GFSO asked me what I thought and my reply was “what were they doing there at that height and speed”? I would add that with a different BOI, when asked the same question, my reply was “It’s a stitch up.” In that particular case we got the BOI reconvened and the BOI’s findings of negligence were overruled.

Pulse 1

Sorry to leave you till last – but I join Ark Royal in his appreciation of your post. None of your posts have offended me – your points are well made and you keep me on my toes.

The planning and the execution of a flight (as you well know) are two totally different things. I agree that the planning of the flight as a VFR low level flight was correctly done (with some reservations about planned SALT’s). However, as the BOI pointed out (having used the same Met information as the crew in their calculations), the weather forecast for the Mull PRECLUDED flight in VFR conditions. My question, therefore, is “why did they attempt it”?

I agree that they could have “had a look” and then adjusted their flight so that they passed well clear of the bad weather BUT THEY DID NOT DO SO. As the AOC 1 Gp put it they “must have become aware of the actual bad weather near the Mull”.

Regarding icing – I have NO reason to doubt the information I was given by the GFSO that the return flight was planned at medium level. An independent source, who has many thousands of hours on RAF Chinook’s, has confirmed to me that a medium level transit was feasible in those conditions even with the icing limitations pertaining at the time.

You quoted “Tapper decided that IFR flight was unwise” Your question was “How did they know that?” I cannot answer that question; I do not have the annexes that contain the witness statements. I am not a betting man – but, if I were, then I would probably bet that those sentiments were conveyed to the BOI by the same people who informed them that Tapper spent the night before the accident preparing charts for the flight to Fort George. You will recall that at the FAI a different story emerged.

I think you have a point in that some SH pilots have a mindset of “this is the way we have always done it – therefore this is the way it will always be done.” That is unfair, of course, to a lot of SH pilots who are only too willing to embrace new ideas and procedures. That is as it should be because in the (hopefully unlikely) event of hostilities then their tasking will be very short notice and based on refueling options.

I remember a request we had on 32 Sqn which was quite simple. A London Hospital had a cancer patient who required a specific isotope for his/her treatment. The problem was that the isotope had a half life of 2 hours and the nearest source was in Southern Germany. The simple answer was NO. A few hours on the telephone to various agencies allowed us to position a 125 (on a “training flight”) at Heidleburg where it received the isotope from a Canadian Helicopter (on a “training flight”), which had picked the isotope up from the German Hospital, and then the 125 flew in a straight line at max speed direct to Northolt and the isotope was transferred to a Gazelle (on a “training flight”) which flew it directly to the Hospital. 58 minutes from Hospital to Hospital. The patient recovered. (Training hours were used because of the time lag required to get formal tasking - and financial approval from the NHS- and because both the Canadians and ourselves agreed that this was a useful training scenario).

Regarding the Pax. Yes, I firmly believe that the finding would have been the same regardless. My point was that the fact they had Pax should have concentrated their minds. With regard to the CFIT accidents I quoted following “unauthorised beat ups”: may I draw your attention to the speech of Lord Rathcavan in the House of Lords regarding the “antics” of the Chinook that fateful evening.

Regarding my contribution to the accident statistics – I own up to 2. One was an Air Cadet Glider in 1963, which doesn’t show in the statistics as they weren’t counted then (and I was exonerated from blame), and the other was a Cat 3 birdstrike in 1967. Cat 3’s don’t show any more. So, officially, I never had an accident!

[basing]

Has anybody got knowledge of how long SB were on the site of the crash before the rest of services were allowed access??

[pulse1]

K52,

Thank you for your kind remarks (thanks also to ArkRoyal). Thank you also for a detailed response to some of the issues I have raised. Unfortunately you appear to have missed some of the most important points. This is probably because I have been insufficiently clear but could it be because you may also inevitably suffer from a RAF “mind set” which prevents a more objective view?

Of course I know that the planning and execution of a flight are two different things. My point is that all planning (and every subsequent decision) should include a risk assessment and cost benefit analysis. Although I am unqualified to make a total risk assessment for flights of this kind, I suspect that a proper assessment of this operation would demand that the flight should have been rejected at the planning stage. I repeat my main argument for that, which is that the IFR option was too risky because of the icing limitations.

My point is that none of the reviewing officers questioned this aspect of the planning which tells me that the “mind set” EXTENDS TO THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL, not just to some of the SH pilots. In those circumstances it is unreasonable to place the responsibility onto individual pilots. Others more qualified than me have given testimony to the pressures placed on aircrew to conform.

You refer to the feasibility of flying IFR at medium level and I am really unqualified to do more than ask awkward questions. You quote your source as a well qualified SH pilot and we should not forget that he too may suffer from the “mind set”. However, on a more scientific basis, a risk assessment would raise three questions:

1. What is the probability of an accident occurring? This would have to be based on the skills and training of the crew (obviously very high), something going wrong with the aircraft, and the probability of the forecast 4 degree level being lower than forecast. (I am sure that there are many other factors but these will do for now).

There have been many questions raised about the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft and this should have been included in a risk assessment. What was safe in the Mk1 may not have been safe in the Mk2. Just as you can fly ETOPS across the oceans in some aircraft and not others.

I would not be able to comment on the likely accuracy of the forecast but, when you have only got 400’ tolerance, it seems to me that this factor alone should have made the risk too high, and we have seen that Tapper may have thought so also.

2. What is the extent of likely injury or damage. This question should show the obvious difference between a training flight and a passenger flight. This also may explain why it is thought to be feasible to have returned medium level IFR without the passengers.

3. How often is this activity carried out? Probably not meaningful in this case, but it might explain why single engine BBMF Spitfires can fly at low level over London, when I am not allowed to in my Cessna 172.

At least we have one thing in common. The only accident I have had was in an ATC glider when, as a gliding instructor, I was doing the hangar landing with the CO and “we” broke the skid trying to avoid going into the hedge. A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together. This was not many years after your own accident.




------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[oldgit47]

I read all the theories with great interest. but please can we stick to the facts. The properly constituted Board of Inquiry, led by a very experienced operator, reached a perfectly logical conclusion. Wratten and Day in spite of their seniority, were not in the same league when it came to SH operations. If the Board were wrong with their assessment, then there must be evidence that was not made available to them. Just where is this evidence?

[Per Ordure Ad Asti]

I have been a long time reader of PPRUNE but this is only the second time I have felt the need to post. This is obviousely an extremely emotive subject, several threads have appeared over the years and this one is on its 57th page. I just can't help wondering if it's time to stop.
As I understand it, the two Senior Officers who blamed the crew were not members of the board of enquiry and were, therefore, technically entitled to any opinion they cared to hold, however bizarre or upsetting it may be.
It will never be possible to change their minds on the issue and the only way to force the RAF to overturn them is through the courts.
Nothing said in this forum is going to help the crew in any way, we are just picking at the wound and keeping it fresh and painful. The only way to help is for those with concrete evidence to give it to the families solicitors.
Without wishing to cause offence to those who feel strongly about the subject, and I am one of them, perhaps it is time to close the thread.

[John Nichol]

Per O - What you say about trying to change the Day/Wratten mindset is probably correct; I doubt that they will ever accept that their finding was wrong. However, at some time in the future, there is a chance that the RAF might be instructed to overtrurn their verdict. To that end, the arguments being rehearsed here are the ones that will be presented to the Lord's inquiry. Amongst a few others.

And to all but a tiny minority, it can be seen that Day & wratten were wrong.

There were people advising the families to "let it lie" 5 years ago. Thank heavens they didn't!

[Brian Dixon]

Per O A Asti,
welcome to the thread. Is it testimony to this thread that you feel that in all your visits, on this occasion you feel compelled to post.

I have to disagree with your pondering about whether this thread should stop. It clearly shows the level of dissatisfaction in the (in your words) opinion of the two senior officers, although I will agree that they were, and still are, entitled to their opinions. I just choose to disagree with them. Their role was to review the findings of the properly constituted Board of Inquiry, who had listened to all available evidence before reaching their conclusions (which were that it was unable to attribute human failings from either pilot as a cause of the crash). The reviewing officers, despite having no further evidence, and basing their findings on reading the report of the Board, chose to override those original findings.

Again, I agree that nothing said here will help the crew. It may help their families though. It may also help restore the confidence of some serving aircrew with regard to the procedure should they (Heaven forbid), find themselves in a similar situation.

With regard to further evidence, I would urge anyone that has 'concrete' evidence - either for or against the argument, to come forward and make themselves known. That way, the families will be able to resolve the matter once and for all. As it stands at the moment, the evidence presented does not support the verdict of gross negligence, and it is this that I am campaigning against. I respectfully remind you that in order to find deceased aircrew negligent, there has to be absoultely no doubt whatsoever. If you have any doubt, no matter how small, you must agree that the verdict is unsafe. I must say though, that I don't believe that anyone is deliberately witholding any evidence.

I'm grateful that you say that you have not intended to cause offence, and I trust my reply is accepted in the same manner. I do, however, feel that if this were allowed to slip from public view, the MoD would allow it to fade from memory. I for one, will not allow that to happen.

Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

K52

Touche mon brave.

[cheapseat]

K52

My point was that anyone OPERATING the Chinook felt that there was no doubt about the fact that the BoI would, in TIME, find a reason, any reason, for the tragic events of 2 Jun 94. The same BoI that did not even hint at GROSS NEGLIGENCE. I apologise for my apparent scattergun and its inclusion of yourself, especially, considering you had nothing to do with helicopters in your RAF career.

On the subject of you, K52, did you, in any way, advise the BoI. Be it from advice to ‘The Board’ to advice enroute Day/Wratton.

For the record I am biased in all my posts through my friendship of John, Rick, Kev and Graham.


[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 09 April 2001).]

[K52]

cheapseat,

The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground. The AOC accepted the Board’s FINDINGS but did not accept their ASSESSMENT of Human Failings. The CinC concurred with the AOC’s view, as did CAS.

I did not arrive at I Gp until 2 weeks before the AOC "signed off" the BOI on 20 March 1995. I assisted GFSO in co-ordinating all the staff responses so that the AOC could formulate his Remarks. I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.

Basing

According to the BOI the first response to the 999 call was by a Police Landrover of Campletown Police. This was followed by Civilian Fire and Ambulance crews, together with a Civilian Doctor, and were followed by a Crash tender from RAF Machrihanish. RAF helicopters subsequently arrived carrying an RAF MRT to act as crash guard.

Ark Royal

Bravo a vous pour la riposte

Pulse 1

Apologies for missing your points; not “mind set”- just trying to catch up with some of the jobs I should have been doing around the House and Garden while it has temporarily stopped raining!!

Regarding risk assessment. Ideally this task should have been carried out by a fixed wing Comms Fleet aircraft – but there were none available that day. I do not even know if that option was the subject of a request. The option of Civil air flights was probably rejected on grounds of cost and security. The flight was tasked “in house” using the medium lift capacity afforded by the Chinook Detachment. I do not know what priority was placed on this task by those responsible for such matters.

We are told that the initial planning was carried out by a member of the other crew and we don’t know when the crew involved in the accident were given the chart or if the routing was discussed with them. We don’t know because that was not the evidence given to the BOI who were told on oath that Flt Lt Tapper did the planning on the night of 1 June 1994. Consequently such questions were never asked. We don’t know, therefore, what risk assessment was carried out at the planning stage.

As I have said before, it is my opinion that a re-routing around the forecast poor weather at the Mull would have been a sensible option but, as we don’t know when the crew received the chart, we don’t know if they had the time to replan the sortie because of their self imposed crew duty problem. Certainly the copy of the chart left behind showed no evidence of any alterations. I am informed that a medium level transit avoiding the poor weather at the Mull was an option available to them. The aircraft was not precluded from flying in IFR, it was precluded from flying in potential icing conditions below +4C. If, as you conjecture, Tapper may have thought the risk too high to transit IMC then why did the crew proceed to fly a routing that took them directly towards the forecast bad weather? The BOI, with the same forecast, decided that the conditions precluded VFR flight in the vicinity of the Mull.

Regarding “ the reliability of this relatively untried aircraft.” This was tasked as an operational flight in support of the security forces in the Province. The aircraft was cleared by the appropriate authorities to undertake such flights. As such the crew correctly complied with operational procedures whist flying over the Province. Once clear of any threat there was no reason for them to continue at low level. At the FAI it was stated that they did so for “training purposes”. Having said that, this was classed as an operational flight in a military aircraft. Military aircraft are not subject to the same restrictions as civil aircraft operating under the ANO. (Hence Spitfires over London – and me crossing the Atlantic in an Andover with a gravity feed ferry tank).

Your comment at the end was interesting – “A classic example of the dangers of two instructors flying together.” What of the dangers of the outgoing and incoming Detachment Commanders flying together?

[K52]

Whilst not wishing to appear to be acting in the role of a moderator; may I suggest that, in view of the tragic news emanating from Kosovo regarding a fatal Puma crash, we suspend comments on this thread for 48 hours.

I appreciate that it is not my role to suggest this, but I feel that it would be an appropriate mark of respect for those who have lost their lives on Active Service if we did so.

I suggest we resume discussion on this thread WEF 1800 BST 11 April.

My condolences to those who have lost loved ones.

[cheapseat]

K52

I really don’t want to get all excited and see this degenerate into a tacky argument so please humour me as I try a new tack.

AP3207 – RAF Manual of Flight Safety, Chapter 8, Appendix G, page 9 at the time of this BoI:

ONLY IN CASES IN WHICH THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER SHOULD DECEASED AIRCREW BE FOUND NEGLIGENT

The BoI said:

SUMMARY OF CAUSES AND FACTORS

14. Cause. With no ADR or CVR, survivors or eyewitnesses, the Board based its findings on logical argument derived from the limited evidence available to it. There were many potential causes of the accident and despite detailed and in depth analysis, the Board was unable to determine a definite cause. However the most potential causes could be dismissed or considered unlikely, and the Board concluded that there were only 3 likely scenarios that could be considered fully consistent with the evidence. In deciding which one of these three was the most probable cause, the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation. However, after careful consideration, the Board concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate ROC to safely overfly the Mull of Kintyre.


And for you this becomes:

“The Board did find the reason for the accident; the crew attempted a cruise climb at 150kts/1000fpm when IMC approaching high ground”


Now I don’t mind what you THINK happened, however, I take exception to people who claim, publicly, to KNOW what happened, because of AP3207. Now please, please answer the question; where does the BoI state with ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER what caused this tragedy.

I honestly don’t mind what you think happened. I have been involved with flying for long enough to realise that it is from the crewroom discussion of accidents and incidents that I have learnt so much (for my humble brain anyway), however this thread is about removing the uncorroborated charge of gross negligence from John and Rick.

Your points and arguments have all been well founded and, I am sure, well intended, most probably posted for the reasons above; that we all may learn. Some points did not stand up to scrutiny but some made me sit back and look at areas of my own ‘norms’. I stand by my earlier comment that the RAF has lost out through the loss of the ‘senior spec aircrew Flt Lt’, this loss, combined with the reduction in numbers of aircrew and an obsession for trivial paperwork has led to the crewroom being a quite place!!!!!! However it is in that setting, the ‘old’ crewroom, that our former sparring should remain, as Joe Public, and the more capable politicians, would at best misunderstand and worst ‘cherry pick’ this thread.

So, once again, where is the ‘absolute’ in the findings of the BoI?


[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 11 April 2001).]

[K52]

cheapseat,

The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT.

The 3 scenarios considered by the Board regarding the crews intentions were:

1. Appropriate ROC Determined but not flown.
2. No decision made on how to avoid the Mull.
3. Inappropriate ROC selected.

As OC RAF Odiham put it "The decision to be made was relatively simple and the courses of action available when approaching high ground in poor weather would have been ingrained in this crew, and indeed in all helicopter crews, since basic training. Those alternatives are: to slow down and if necessaty stop; turn away from high ground and if necessary turn back and, if a climb is required, to do so on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude."

AOC 1 Gp decided that the failure of this crew to carry out the actions required to "maintain safe flight" was the direct cause of this crash.

Which of the possible scenarios postulated by the Board is correct is irrelevant. They are just that - postulations as to the crews decision making and the execution of that decision.

What there is absolutely NO DOUBT ABOUT is that the crew should have avoided the Mull by carrying out one of the actions described by OC RAF Odiham and reiterated by the AOC in his remarks. This was also the opinion of the Board when it stated that "a suitable bad weather contingency plan would be required" at para 42 when discussing the weather forecast.

[John Nichol]

Just seen a clip on Ch4 news that seems to be saying that the Lords inquiry has been stopped before it starts. Watch this space.

[oldgit47]

K52, Still very confused by your line of arguement. Of course the crew should have made the early decision to make the appropriaite rate of climb and avoid the Mull. Why didn't they? With an ADR and a CVR we may have known, but we don,t. Open verdict? Any other planet on the galaxy would agree. Just what is your problem?

[Brian Dixon]

Perfect timing by the Government in their attempt to stop the debate in the House of Lords. Announced on the afternoon preceeding a Bank Holiday weekend and a recess, leaving no time for reply.

Cynic...me? Absolutely! :rolleyes:

Couple of points for those attempting to avoid the debate:
1. We will still be here after Easter.
2. We will not go away.
3. We are not scared to debate the issue.

Finally: Dear MoD, any chance of a reply to my letter? You said you hoped to reply shortly - and that was on 7 March!!

Regards all and Happy Easter.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Ed for spelling (again!!)

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 14 April 2001).]

[K52]

oldgit 47,

"Why didn't they" make the early decision to avoid the Mull? I would suggest that the answer to that would be what has, historically, proved to be the greatest killer in aviation - COMPLACENCY. There was no need to do so because that had done this hundreds of times before without a problem.

AN ANALOGY

In the early 70's (1972?) an Andover C Mk 1 crashed in Italy carrying members of the Falcons Display Team. The cine film taken at the time, and shown on TV News, seemed to show quite conclusively that the starboard engine had failed just after take-off and the aircraft had veered, and rolled, right before crashing. There were, unfortunately, several fatalities.

The investigation showed a totally different scenario. The Captain had decided to perform a STOL take-off. There was no requirement to do so but there was, equally, no reason why he should not do so for Training Purposes. A STOL take-off required the use of 27 degrees of flap. The flap was a modified Fowler Flap and thus the tab travelled to a far greater angle than the nominal flap position. If my memory serves me correctly this actually gave a flap angle of 64 degrees.

The investigation showed that the flap selected for take-off was not that required for a STOL take-off but that required for a STOL landing (ie 30 degrees) which gave an actual flap angle of 106 degrees. Neither Pilot spotted this error during the "challenge and response" pre take-off checks. The Navigator who read the checks was not to blame as there was a passenger in the "jump seat" between the Pilots and he was unable to see the lever position selected without unstrapping and standing up to look.

With that flap setting there was no way that the aircraft could accelerate to a safe flying speed to accomodate an engine failure. However, it transpired that there was NO EVIDENCE of an engine failure and the most likely cause of the power reduction on the starboard side was that the starboard side had run out of water methanol (used to boost engine power output on take-off) before the port side. NB The starboard tank held 27 Galls and the port tank held 31 Galls of water methanol.

Following the crash the Pax had extreme difficulty exiting the aircraft because the locking pins for the emergency escape door had not been removed before take-off. The ALM was, unfortunately, unable to help because he had neglected to strap himself in before take-off and had suffered fatal injuries in the crash.

This was a well thought of, and experienced, crew who had been selected to carry the RAF Parachute Display Team on an Overseas Tour.

[misterploppy]

K52

The major difference between the Chinook accident and your allegedly analogous accident would appear to be conclusive technical evidence and survivor testimony: Neither of which are available to support an insubstantiated finding of gross negligence in the Chinook case.

[oldgit47]

K52, I was on 46 Sqn at the time of the Andover accident. In fact I was airborne at the time and learned of the accident on landing. There are two major differences to the Chinook accident.
1. Both pilots survived in the Andover and gave evidence to the Board.
2. Their was also photographic evidence.
All we have in the case of the Chinook, is opinion, supposition and a distinct lack of hard evidence.
How on earth can you decide on complacency? I don't recall the word being used by the BOI.

[ShyTorque]

K52,

How can you possibly expect to use evidence from one accident to reinforce your argument for your verdict / opinion on another where there was no conclusive evidence? How can you possibly say this crew were complacent?

Your words indicate prejudiced reasoning and verge on libel, were that possible for persons deceased.

I note that you elected to answer my previous point but chose not to disclose your motive for your crusade against these two deceased pilots.

The question must be asked again. What axe are you grinding?

[cheapseat]

“Did you, in any way, advise the BoI. Be it from advice to ‘The Board’ to advice enroute Day/Wratton?”

K52 you answer:

“I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.”

Come on, answer the whole question; did you give advice, to anyone, involved in the final copy of the BoI?

You also say:
“The Board did indeed decide that there were only 3 likely scenarios regarding the probable cause of the accident ONCE THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN A POSITION WHERE IT WAS UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF VFR FLIGHT."

Please explain to me, with out doubt, using only evidence either in, or offered to, the BoI, how ZD576 got into a position where it was unable to comply with the rules of VFR flight. Oh, and while you’re at it please explain how you completely overlook the essence of the BoI’s paragraph concerning cause.

[cheapseat]

PS

John Tapper and I sat under the tigers head in 230’s crewroom WEEKS before the crash looking at a ½ mil map trying to find a way to use this fateful task as another reason not to allow the Mk2 Chinook into NI.

[K52]

Shy Torque,

I really must buy another Dictionary, and another Thesaurus, as my current ones seem to really get you angry.

I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”. Hence the analogy of the Andover where the crew, having carried out all the preflight checks using the “challenge and response” system, were content (or satisfied) that it was correctly set for take-off.

As you will be aware; the Board, whilst discussing the “Crew’s Decision Making Process”, stated that “it was impossible for the Board to decide, with any degree of confidence, whether mutual crew complacency had delayed the crew in their decision making as they approached the Mull”. You will also be aware that OC RAF Odiham stated “I do not agree that the decision making process was a complicated one” and then went on to outline what the crew should have done. The Reviewing Officers agreed with OC RAF Odiham.

Or are you are suggesting that the crew were not “content” with the way things were going but carried on regardless?

I, unlike most contributors to this thread, have NO axe to grind. I am satisfied that the conclusion reached by the Reviewing Officers was correct. The lack of ADR and CVR did not prevent attribution of blame before these items were fitted to Military aircraft. I, incidentally, only flew one type of aircraft in my Service career which boasted both ADR and CVR, and most types in the 60’s and 70’s did not have either.

If you are saying that it is impossible to attribute blame without the evidence of BOTH ADR AND CVR then you are implying that ALL BOI’s where blame was apportioned prior to circa 1975 will have to be reviewed.

There has been NO evidence whatsoever brought forward of any technical malfunction affecting ZD576 which would have caused this accident. The PREDOMINENT theme, it appears, has been that the crew would not have flown the aircraft in IMC below SALT “therefore” there MUST have been something wrong which did not show up in the AAIB investigation.

Accidents such as the Andover in Italy, the Shackleton which crashed on Harris and the Hercules which crashed in the Scottish Glens all show that even one error is one too many – and these were all experienced crews. In the cases of the Shackleton and the Hercules (and I knew both of the Captains from Acklington days) many thousands of hours on type did not prevent the accidents. I hasten to add that in the case of the Hercules it was adjudged to have been an error of judgment.

If you provide the EVIDENCE, rather than supposition or speculation, you may then be able to change my mind.

cheapseat,

Fascinating to read that Jon Tapper and yourself were discussing this very task WEEKS before the accident. If that is the case then why was the planning left till the night before and why did neither of the 2 Pilots involved do the initial planning? May one ask what routing was decided on and why?

As I have said before; it was part of our job in FS to co-ordinate the various responses from relevant Staffs into one document and “flag up” the pertinent responses and provide a response from the Flight Safety aspect. Once complete the document was passed through SASO to the AOC. So the answer would be yes – comment from myself would have been included in the document that went out under GFSO’s signature. All responses from the various Staffs were “In Confidence” and I have no intention of divulging what was said or who commented. The same process would have been repeated at HQSTC by the CFSO and his Staff.


Regarding the Boards paragraph on “Cause”. At the speed that the aircraft was traveling, as determined by the Board, of 150kts IAS (giving a groundspeed of 170-180kts); the requirement for VFR flight was 5km visibility, 1000ft vertically from cloud and 1.5km horizontally from cloud. The Board themselves concluded at para 16e “The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.” The evidence accumulated by the Board showed that in the vicinity of the lighthouse the weather “was very poor with cloud and hill fog extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500metres”.

The Board also states at para 56, when discussing why the crew had not been alerted to their proximity to the ground by visual sighting, “The lack of visual warning appears to indicate that the crew had lost all external references and were in IMC during this phase of the flight.”

The evidence is that they continued to fly towards the Mull at high speed and with “an inappropriate rate of climb” until a visual sighting of the Mull at approx 400metres range prompted the cyclic flare. They did not do what they had been trained to do since basic training – what OC RAF Odiham stated “would have been ingrained in this crew, indeed all helicopter crews” – climb on a safe heading at full power at the maximum rate of climb speed to at least Safety Altitude. That is what gave rise to the finding of “Negligence to a Gross Degree”.

[misterploppy]

K52

You are now being disingenuous in the extreme. You say:

"I fail to see how suggesting that the reason the crew of ZD576 failed to make the decision to climb or turn away in time was “COMPLACENCY” could possibly be construed as Libel. The word means “CONTENTMENT” or “SATISFACTION”."

The word "complacency" carries a far more pejorative meaning than just "contentment" or "satisfaction". My dictionary (Collins Concise) gives "extreme self-satisfaction" or "smugness", both terms which I feel would be far more appropriately applied to you than to Jon Tapper or Rick Cook.

[ShyTorque]

K52,

Again you confuse your opinion with evidence.

It is not your dictionary that irritates me but your self satisfied arrogance and your eager willingness to jump on your ex-colleagues graves. Your time in the military appears to have left you with little understanding of esprit de corps (devotion to and pride in one's group, to save you looking it up).

Again you are not willing to state your motive in all this. If you have nil motive then why do you persist in publically smearing the names of these dead men who cannot have their say?

Finally, I can only remark that if you were to find yourself in the same highly regrettable situation as Flt Lts Tapper and Cook then it is to be hoped that your family would obtain more support than you are prepared to give.

[Brian Dixon]

Apologies for being the self-appointed busybody again, but I don't think anything is being gained by arguing amongst each other (and I include myself in that statement).

K52 is entitled to his opinion as we are ours. We need to focus on the element of doubt as opposed to speculation (unlike the senior reviewing officer who admits as much in the opening paragraph of his statement). Only 80% of the aircraft survived for examination, and not all of that was. The AAIB examiner had areas of doubt, as did the three members of the Board. Therefore, an element of doubt exists with regard the final verdict, therefore it is unsustainable (I could go on with more but I'll spare you all). That is where we must concentrate our efforts and not venting our spleens on people who post here. By all means argue the point, but I feel this subject is above personal insults.

Please please don't think I'm telling anyone what to do (after all how could I stop you!), I just feel we need to keep to the task in hand. If you disagree please feel free to send hate mail to my e-mail address!! http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/tongue.gif

Just for the record - K52, I disagree with you. There I said it!

Regards all
Cheekily,
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[ShyTorque]

Brian,

I agree, we should concentrate on the uncertainties, so I will state the obvious and repeat both myself and others. It's time we had a recap anyway. No offence to your good self but the title of this thread is "Chinook - Hit back here".

It is about two good men being blamed for an RAF aircraft accident. One causing a large loss of life when is there IS doubt about the cause, in an aircraft that had been made to bypass the normal safety procedures and requirements for introduction into service. (It should be borne in mind that the Mk2 Chinook is quite different to the Mk1).

The RAF's own Handling Squadron (test pilots) had elected not to continue flying the aircraft, even for the purposes of further aircraft tests towards issue of a Release to Service, because of doubts over the safety of the computerised engine control systems (FADEC). Some similar MK2 aircraft had suffered loss of engine control during trials in the USA and there had been some less serious but unexplained occurrences with the RAF trial aircraft.

Some time after this accident it came to light that MOD were actually suing the aircraft manufacturer over the problems with the FADEC software at that time but had not publicised the fact.

[A loss of engine control in a helicopter, especially a runaway up, can be disastrous in that the rotor may overspeed causing rapid and terminal failure. Immediate action is required, in that the aircraft must be flown at a much higher collective pitch setting than normal. This results in a climb, an increase in speed, or a combination of both. There was no published evidence to indicate that this had happened but it is NOT uncommon for FADEC faults to clear once electrical power is removed from the aircraft so it cannot be completely ruled out as a causal factor].

There were no proper Pilot Manuals or Flight reference cards available because they had yet to be published. I understand that some Engineering manuals were also not available at that time.

Despite this, pressure was brought from on high to bear to introduce the aircraft into squadron service and even to use it for passengers of extreme importance. The crew flying this Mk2 aircraft (in fact all crews)had only a small amount of operational experience on it.

This particular airframe had suffered recent unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance. There was EVIDENCE in the wreckage that it may have suffered an intercom fault during the last flight.

The weather was not good, but RAF SH has always been required to operate VFR in conditions well below what would be considered normal VMC for fixed-wing aircraft because of the ability to slow down or stop. There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence. Although the BOI did their job of collecting and collating the available evidence, the President of the Board and his team were unable to reach a conclusion on the cause of the accident.

As we all know, this was swept aside by two more senior officers directly involved in the chain of command responsible for, and obviously supporting, the Mk2 Chinook in service.

The more senior officer of these two had no SH experience to speak of at all, and only experience of the rules and operation of fixed wing aircraft which operate to more stringent weather and height limits. Strangely, he later publically dimissed the experience of the President of the Board of Inquiry, a Wing Commander who was a highly experienced and current Chinook operator.

Any loss of confidence in, or a grounding of the Mk2 aircraft could have meant that there was no medium SH available to the RAF due to the lack of Mk1 airframes. (Mk1s were being removed from service to be rebuilt into Mk2s) and the remainder were suffering from poor servicability.

In my opinion, this resulted in the reputations of two dead pilots being seen at the time as of lesser importance to the RAF than for MOD to admit there may have been other, aircraft and organisational factors involved in this appalling accident.

====================================

I find that unacceptable. Others apparently do not. That is why there is discussion, argument, call it what you will.

Those in agreement please say "AYE".

[PlasticCabDriver]

Nicely summed up.

Aye.

[basing]

AYE

[Brian Dixon]

AYE

Shy,
an excellent reply, and I hope that I didn't cause offence (none taken by me). I accept everything you have written, and I share all your concerns. I just didn't want the issue to go off at a tangent. Selfish I know, but that is how I am with regard this issue.

I will also repeat that those at the heart of the campaign are grateful for the support shown by those on this site. I will also repeat that I never intend to cause offence on any post I submit.

Shy - Would you be willing to drop me an e-mail?

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Man-on-the-fence]

Aye

[pulse1]

K52,

I had decided not to continue our debate as, although I have enjoyed it, it did not seem to be leading to any kind of resolution. However, I cannot let you get away with your suggestion that complacency played any part in this accident, whatever understanding of the word you want to use. As I understand it, this is the first time anyone has made this suggestion in public, and I can only wonder about your motivation in suggesting it, without a shred of evidence.

We all know that lack of evidence is the main problem in this whole sad story but I would have thought that we had enough evidence which suggests to me that the very opposite of complacency was more likely to be the problem here.

1. Fl Lt Tapper had expressed considerable concern about the reliability of the Mk2 Chinook to his father.

2. Cheapseat and Tapper had previously discussed ways of not having this machine in NI.

3. Many other SH pilots have witnessed to the concern about this aircraft. Did they know that Boscombe Down had grounded their aircraft the day before?

It would therefore seem to me that a high degree of nervousness about the flight was more likely to lead to distraction by any indication of problems, false or otherwise.

To ShyTorque therefore, I also say AYE.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Arkroyal]

Shytorque.....AYE

I too have tired recently of the circular arguments with K52, who refuses to answer the pointed questions, but instead raises more supposition and half-baked theory.

K52, I could not let your asking for EVIDENCE to prove our point pass without comment. It is not for us to do so. Can't you see that by all that is fair, and in line with the RAFs own rules, that it is for those who brought in the finding of negligence to prove it beyond any doubt whatsoever. No-one else is required to prove anything.

In the other cases raised by yourself, crews found negligent have been so found on strong and irefutable evidence. In this case there is none.

Your latest speed calculation cannot go unchallenged. The only evidence is that the GSDI showed a speed at impact of 147 knots groundspeed. From this, and making many assumptions, Boeing produced a likely scenario which was very theoretical, that an airspeed of about 150 kts was required to reproduce the accident in the simulator with a fully servicable aircraft.

With no hard evidence that the aircraft was fully servicable, or that the airspeed was actually 150 kts you have no proof. With no proof, you cannot be sure beyond any doubt whatsoever, and without that certainty the benefit of the doubt must rest with the crew.

Any other reading of the events suggests a very large axe to grind. What, pray, was your full involvement in this investigation?

[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 18 April 2001).]

[oldgit47]

Aye

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Aye

I did think of framing a reply when K52 wrote about his days hauling alfalfa from Firq up to Saiq - if he'd flown an approach at 5500 feet he'd have stoofed in 800 ft below the ridge. But probably not have been found grossly negligent post-mortem (Saiq was always 6300 ft, even on the out of date charts he and I used to have to use). However, that would have trivialised the whole issue and distracted everyone from the main point, so I won't mention it.

Oh, b*gger...

[1.3VStall]

ShyTorque,

AYE!

[Nil nos tremefacit]

AYE

[BEagle]

AYE, AYE, A THOUSAND TIMES AYE!!!!!!!!!!

[The Mistress]

AYE (with brass knobs on)

[Liam Gallagher]

Whatever Beagle said....plus AYE!

[misterploppy]

an AYE for an AYE

[Brian Dixon]

And a truth for a truth!

Plus a sneaked in extra AYE

Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Paterbrat]

The dedication and efforts of friend family and collegues of the deceased aircrew to clear their names deserves commendation.
As an observer and having read the thread I venture the following opinion. I am not involved nor have the expertise to venture amongst the obviously qualified, but having read what would seem to be concerned and qualified opinion for and against, I would say this.
I would venture that the SO's had a predisposition in the final verdict by virtue of their own involvementin the introduction into service of equipment that by all accounts had some doubts about it's ability to perform safely. They would appear to have disregarded the findings of not only the BOI but also a civil legal opinion.
I think that very reasoned and obviously professionaly expert arguments in favour of that final verdict have been offered on this thread, however, 'no axe to grind' is not correct in that collation of and an offering of FS opinion was made at the initial hearing. That this opinion is still held does not neccesarily make it correct or complete. Doubt was expressed both by the BOI and at least one of the SO's however fleetingly. and it would seem that the final verdict does not itself pass the qualifying limits demanded by the service concerned.
As an ex senior serviceman, a pilot and citizen of the UK, I have myself been on the recieving end of a reply to the only letter I had been moved to write to the PM in defence of the Paras, by a flunky who had not even had the grace to read the letter.
The said regiment shortly after being castigated for their efforts in Ireland were sent in short order to Kosovo and Sierra Leone.
Loayalty by servicemen and women to Queen Country and the Government deserves loyalty in return. The very least is an impartial re-examination of the facts where serious doubts have been raised by previous verdicts not some fobbing off and run around by a goverment who it appears is far more interested in politicaly correct race and sexual orientation questions, not that they are more or less important but somehow seem to domininate. The services somehow end up on the bottom of the list until of course they are required for a job. Then of course it's ' our brave lads and lasses.

[This message has been edited by Paterbrat (edited 20 April 2001).]

[basing]

"K52,
I was not in the RAF but served my time in the Army. We were always taught that the best form of defence was attack.
Having read your postings on this thread, it would appear that you attack everything that is written. Why is this? I
believe that you are on the side of the MoD and that there is a hidden agenda to your motives? If there is not, please
explain why. Can you say that you know exactly what happened without any doubt whatsoever? I don’t believe
anyone can. I have used Crab Air (that is what we called the RAF -being an ex-yomper), and hold them in high regard.
You should show some loyalty to your fallen comrades, as opposed to burying them with unfounded guilt."

[Brian Dixon]

You may all be aware that the Lords Liaison Committee is trying to stop Lord Chalfont's efforts to have a Select Committee look into this matter. The link to their report is as follows:
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldliaisn/67/6702.htm#a1 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldliaisn/67/6702.htm#a1)

Strange how they say that the matter would take too long to investigate. How come the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry managed to do the whole lot (including interviewing all witnesses)in just four weeks??

The Public Accounts Committee has also issued a second report on this matter. When I find it on the web I'll post the link here.

House of Lords next debate is on 30th April. Updates as and when.

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Kiting for Boys]

This mornings Sunday Times:

Leak casts new doubt on Chinook crash verdict

Jonathon Carr-Brown

MINISTERS may have misled parliament over the weight of evidence used to blame two RAF pilots for the 1994 Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre that killed 25 of Britain's most senior intelligence officers and all four crew members.

A leaked report by a government agency has now revealed doubts over official explanations of the crash.

Defence ministers have consistently told MPs that the pilots were found guilty of gross negligence by an RAF board of inquiry on the basis of an Air Accident Investigation Branch technical report, flight path simulations by the helicopter's maker, Boeing, and a separate simulation by the government's Defence Research Agency (DRA), said to back up the Boeing findings.

On the basis of this evidence and navigation data, the RAF inquiry found that the pilots crashed because they were flying too low in thick fog and were unable to execute a steep climb to avoid cliffs.

Defenders of the pilots have always claimed there has never been enough evidence to reach this conclusion and that the RAF had broken its own strict standards of proof. Now Computer Weekly has obtained a copy of the previously unpublished DRA report - used by ministers to justify the RAF board's conclusions - and discovered that its findings are not fully in line with the claims made by Boeing.

The maker of the helicopter stated that its simulation indicated that the steep climb caused the crash; the DRA report says that this hypothesis is technically possible but describes it as a "doubtful" explanation of what happened. Current and former defence ministers have consistently suggested that the DRA report was part of evidence backing up the board of inquiry's decision.

There is no suggestion that ministers knowingly misled, parliament, but campaigners including David Davis, the Conservative chairman of the public accounts committee (PAC), believe that the Ministry of Defence's actions since the crash have suggested a "disregard for the parliamentary process which is unacceptable".

Since the RAF board's findings, a Scottish civil judge and the public accounts committee have both found its conclusions to be unsafe.

[Vfrpilotpb]

As a civilian observer to this thread, and being very connected with flying Helios, I feel that the RAF/MOD has shot its self in the foot, by putting the blame for this accident on to the shoulders of the pilots, the Sunday Times today the 22nd of April, would seek to indicate the MOD has agreed with Boeing's information, this stinks of a cover up, to hide something more fundemental, Ie hardware problems! If the man from the desert is interested in the truth , then he should be digging with a JCB through what must now be availble, But me thinks he is only really after the coin!

[cheapseat]

Sorry, been away for the week:

AYE

[Multp]

Yet another resounding AYE.

Shy: just a minor point, it was DERA who allegedly discontinued the trial, not RAF Handling Squadron. The latter are a lodger unit at Boscombe and are concerned only with FRC and Aircrew Manuals, although one or two of the serving aircrew and ROs are tp qualified.

Back to the important bit. On the subject of hasty introduction to service of the Mk 2, in whatever guise (presumabaly a raft of Service Deviations rather than a Military Aircraft Release) it would appear highly unusual for it to get to a squadron without some form of official Differences Training. From what I have read about the case, having moved out of the Service envrinonment some time before this unhappy event, this training was not given. The RAF was, in my day, a haven of 'you can't do it if you haven't done it before' itis. Even in the pre-JAR civil world at the time of the accident, our company ops manual would have required formal Diffs trg in a similar situation,when less fundamantal changes had been made to aircraft systems: eg change of RNAV kit in the AS332. So: Duty of Care by The System?

A rubbish overturning of the Board's findings. AYE, AYE and AYE again.

[Paterbrat]

Hopefully at some stage someone eventualy says " ...and the Aye's have it!"

Your's Aye,
.....

[Brian Dixon]

I've managed to find the whole of the Minutes of the Lords Liaison Committee debate where they are trying to pull a fast one. It also includes a link to the reply by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee.

Here it is in full:

http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldliaisn/67/67moe01.htm

Regards all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[K52]

Firstly, an apology to those who have e-mailed me. We went to France for a few days and when we got back I found 3 e-mails from my ISP telling me that they were sorry that I could no longer send e-mails since their software update had screwed the system, but they are trying to fix it!! (All right – they didn’t exactly use that phrase). I will reply once I get the facility back.

I regret that once again we appear to have a rehash of the misconceptions and myths that surround this tragic accident. The misconception over the role of RAF Handling Squadron has already been addressed but the misconception that the AOC 1 Gp and CinC STC “overruled” the BOI remains.

A BOI is the responsibility of the relevant Group AOC (or AOC DAU’s) and it is the AOC who convenes a Board to investigate on HIS behalf. If the AOC is not satisfied with the findings of the Board then he may reconvene it to reconsider certain aspects or he may reconvene it with a new President to investigate afresh. He may even convene a completely new Board. AOC 1 Gp did none of these things: he accepted the findings of the Board as to the events leading up to the accident, but did not accept their assessment of Human Failings.

The mantra of “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” has featured heavily in these pages; generally along the lines of “it is up to them to provide proof that none of these potential failures occurred otherwise there is doubt”. In my view it is the person who is charged, under the rules laid down by Act of Parliament, with the formal investigation into the cause(s) of an accident who is the person who has the grave responsibility of deciding whether there is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”. That person is the Convening Officer: the doubt, or otherwise, must be in his mind.

The Convening Officer having come to his decision, the BOI was reviewed by the CinC. It is not unknown for the CinC’s view to differ from the view of the AOC. In this case they were in agreement and the BOI (because of, I suspect, the Political and Media interest in the case) was then reviewed by CAS. No change was made to the findings of the Convening Officer.

Thus we find that the AOC (2 Star), CinC (4 Star) and the Professional Head of the Royal Air Force (CAS) all had “ absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as to the cause of the accident. In reaching their respective opinions they had a wealth of expertise and experience amongst their respective Staffs to help and advise them. My own part in that process was miniscule; I had only been in post for 3 weeks and, as the AOC well knew, had no helicopter experience.

THE MYTHS

These run & run. The Test Pilots did NOT refuse to fly the HC2; preplanned maintenance was brought forward whilst they were awaiting further data on icing trials so that, once the data was available, the trials could proceed without interruption.

“This aircraft had suffered unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance.” The BOI found, having access to ALL the maintenance documentation of the aircraft since its return from update, “All the reported GPS faults were confirmed as definite faults and were rectified successfully. None of the faults were consistent with the satellite tracking difficulties reported with the aircraft on 2 Jun 94.” The BOI also found that ”GPS satellite information was accurate during the period prior to the accident.” The question has to be asked, however, why was no Aircraft Maintenance Sheet raised by the Captain over the problems encountered during the morning sortie?

“There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence.” There was no conflicting evidence at the time of the BOI. The confliction arose when one witness changed his account at the FAI over a year later by which time the BOI was in the public domain.
------

“The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground.” Not my words – the words of OC RAF Odiham, an experienced helicopter pilot and current Chinook Operator. The AOC, also an experienced helicopter pilot and previously a Chinook operator, agreed and stated “it was flying at high speed, well below Safety Altitude in cloud --- in direct contravention of the rules for flight under either Visual Flight Rules or Instrument Flight Rules.

Why the crew were operating in the way they were was, and remains, a matter for conjecture; particularly because there was no evidence whatsoever of any technical malfunction. The fact remains that they should not have been operating in those weather conditions at that height and speed.

[Multp]

K52:
I generally choose my words carefully, so you will see that I merely state,without using emotive words, that the trial appears to have been discontinued by DERA.
Thank you for the reminder of QRs regarding the convening of the BoI.
I note that you do not contest my suggestion that introduction to service of this Mark of the Chinook was...unusual. Given that this will have had the authority of the Convening Officer, his impartiality is automatically impugned.
QED.
(Edited for spelling of 'Note'!!)

[This message has been edited by Multp (edited 23 April 2001).]

[cheapseat]

K52

“I did not arrive at I Gp until 2 weeks before the AOC "signed off" the BOI on 20 March 1995. I assisted GFSO in co-ordinating all the staff responses so that the AOC could formulate his Remarks. I do not have any recollection of being specifically asked for my advice by the AOC or CinC.”

“As I have said before; it was part of our job in FS to co-ordinate the various responses from relevant Staffs into one document and “flag up” the pertinent responses and provide a response from the Flight Safety aspect. Once complete the document was passed through SASO to the AOC. So the answer would be yes – comment from myself would have been included in the document that went out under GFSO’s signature. All responses from the various Staffs were “In Confidence” and I have no intention of divulging what was said or who commented. The same process would have been repeated at HQSTC by the CFSO and his Staff.”

“Thus we find that the AOC (2 Star), CinC (4 Star) and the Professional Head of the Royal Air Force (CAS) all had “ absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as to the cause of the accident. In reaching their respective opinions they had a wealth of expertise and experience amongst their respective Staffs to help and advise them. My own part in that process was miniscule; I had only been in post for 3 weeks and, as the AOC well knew, had no helicopter experience.”

We’re getting there eh?

[Judge Rembrandt]

K52, Not convinced. Its got to be AYE.

[K52]

cheapseat,

I see where you are coming from - but there is a world of difference, when staffing a document, between "Comment"and "Advice".

"Comment" would be to highlight opinions and evidence in the various enclosures; "Advice" would be to offer one's own opinion.

I note, however, that you declined to answer my question. I will put it to you again.

This Chinook sortie has been consistently portrayed as a short notice sensitive mission to transport high priority Security Personnel to a high level Conference on the mainland.

So how was it that you and Jon Tapper sat under the tiger's head in the 230 crewroom WEEKS before discussing this task?!!! It is obvious from your statement that you knew when this task would take place because you knew it would involve an HC2 whose deployment date was known. With the "NEED TO KNOW" principle in mind; if YOU knew, how many other people knew?

When replying you should bear in mind that at least one journalist from a Scottish Paper appears to source his "Exclusive" articles from this thread!!

[K52]

Multp,

It was Shy Torque who raised the "Test Pilots refused to fly" issue again - not yourself.

Regarding the issue of the clearance into RAF service of the HC2 you will find somewhere in the pages of this thread an answer from MOD to Brian Dixon on this subject which states that it was the VCAS who authorised the aircraft into service - one AVM(?) Bagnall.

[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 25 April 2001).]

[cheapseat]

K52

Thanks for your’ prompt reply and may I apologise for my failure to treat you with equal good manners.

In giving a full account of my dealings with John Tapper I would certainly be pushing the bounds of ‘need to know’. I realise this is shutting the door having yelled my argument through it and for that I also apologise. I’m afraid your use of the word ‘complacency’ got me all tired and emotional.

[Multp]

K52:
Thanks for the reply. I'll try to backtrack to find the reference you quoted.

[Brian Dixon]

Multp,
It's on page 10. Entry date of 24 Nov 00.

Hope this helps.
Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[K52]

cheapseat,

NO offence was taken, I assure you.

Multp,

Try page 17 - and it should have read ACAS. The release for the RAF to fly the HC2 was, of course, provided by CA.

[K52]

Multp,

My apologies, I neglected to answer your point on "differences training" on the HC2.

According to the Boards investigation all four Crew Members "had completed Chinook HC2 conversion courses between Jan and Apr 94.

On 31 May 94 Chinook HC2 ZD576, the first HC2 to be operated in NI, was delivered to RAF Aldergrove. This was 2 weeks later than planned and, as a consequence, out of phase checks were conducted by the 7 Sqn Second in Command on Flt Lt Tapper and other members of the detatchment, who were by then out of Chinook HC2 currency."

The Board concluded that "The crew were competent to undertake the flight."

Thus it would appear that the Board were satisfied that formal conversion training had been given to all crew members, and refresher training given to those who required it, before the crew embarked on HC2 operations in NI.

[Brian Dixon]

Oops,
sorry for the duff information Multp. I forgot that the thread was reformatted and took the page reference from my hard copy http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/redface.gif

Thanks for the correction K52.

Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Multp]

Brian and K52: thanks, noted, will read and possibly comment again when I have a moment more than just now.

[John Nichol]

Just to keep you all informed - The House of Lords votes on Monday afternoon on Lord Chalfont's call for a select committee. As you know, the liason committee refused to recomend setting a select committee up (bit confusing but it seems to have been a failrly clever Govt trap to knoble the process).

We shall know by 1700 'ish what the Lords decide - expect CH4 News to cover it.

Here's hoping.

[John Nichol]

Great News - The House Of Lords has voted to set up the select committee. Well done Lord Chalfont.

[cheapseat]

From the BEEB:

Peers have voted in favour of a House of Lords inquiry into the 1994 Chinook helicopter crash.
A majority of peers voted by 132 to 106 for an all-party inquiry into the crash on the Mull of Kintyre in Scotland.
The helicopter had been carrying Northern Ireland intelligence personnel to a conference in Fort William when it came down, killing all 29 people on board.
An original inquiry by the Royal Air Force concluded that both pilots were guilty of "gross negligence".
There have been continued calls for a fresh inquiry and a majority of peers supported calls for an investigation by a House of Lords select committee.
The Lords campaign for an inquiry was led by the crossbench peer Lord Chalfont.
He raised strong objections to the findings of gross negligence against the pilots by two air marshals.
A peers' liaison committee had rejected a call by the House of Lords on 5 March for an investigation into the controversy.
However, Lord Chalfont told peers on Monday that there was no evidence to prove "beyond all doubt" that the highly trained and experienced pilots had been at fault for the crash.
The peer said an RAF board of inquiry had originally placed no blame on Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook but a second inquiry by the two air marshals had found them guilty.
'Unwarrantable arrogance'
Although they were "perfectly entitled" to reach that conclusion, a wealth of evidence had been uncovered subsequently to suggest there were many doubts.
Independent reports by military aviation experts, a fatal accident inquiry in Scotland and other investigations had all concluded that there was no conclusive proof of what caused the accident, he said.
The government's insistence on standing by the verdict of the air marshals despite the evidence, was described as "unwarrantable arrogance" by the influential Commons public accounts committee, he added.
Lord Chalfont said the RAF regulations at the time demanded no airman should be found guilty of negligence unless there was "no possible doubt whatsoever about the causes".
The peer said that distinguished people including judges, aviation and computer experts former ministers and politicians of all parties had the gravest doubts.
Lord Chalfont's move came as an amendment to an attempt to approve the liaison committee report and he rejected protests that the Lords was not the right forum to examine the issues because they were too complex.
He said there was no need for a select committee to examine hundreds of witnesses or examine technical issues for it be fair.
He won the support of opposition peers' leader Lord Strathclyde who said he was "surprised" that the government did not vote to set up a select committee when the issue was debated at the liaison committee.
Tory defence spokesman Earl Attlee gave his support to a Lords' inquiry, arguing that there could be no proof that both pilots had been negligent.
Earl Attlee said: "I have no difficulty with the house acting in a quasi-judicial role, if that's what it would be doing.
"This case is different from a criminal case because the deceased in this case were not able to defend themselves."
Tory Lord Mayhew of Twysden, who was Northern Ireland secretary at the time of the crash, gave his support to Lord Chalfont's call.
Lord Mayhew, a former Attorney General, denied that a Lords inquiry would be tantamount to the legislature interfering with judicial discretion.
He told peers: "This is not the judiciary we are looking at but extremely senior and experienced officers of one of the armed forces, for whom ministers answer in parliament.
"There are doubts outside about their conclusions.
"There are doubts that have been mightily reinforced by contributions from all sides of this House.
Lord Mayhew said he had an "emotional involvement" in the case and told peers: "I knew most of those who perished in the Chinook. I met their families.
"I went to a religious service in connection with one of the pilots. I stood at the airport for a very long time while the bodies of those who perished were brought back to Northern Ireland.
"And I have always felt that there should be something more done than has, as yet, been done to explore the conclusion that was reached by the board of inquiry.
"A grievous wrong was done to the passengers. On one view, a grievous wrong may have been done to the pilots."
All that the Lords inquiry had to consider was whether there had been "absolutely no doubt whatever" of the pilots' negligence and peers would not be expected to discover what had actually happened on the Mull of Kintyre.

[rolandpitch]

Good News, fingers crossed!

[Arkroyal]

Lord Chalfont....and Brian,

BZ
:)

[pulse1]

Another 132 AYE's. Well done the House of Lords and especially Lord Chalfont. Let us now hope that the selection of the Committee is not corrupted by the same influences which tried to stop the enquiry.

[Brian Dixon]

Sorry for the delay in posting on such a magnificent day, but I have just returned home from the House of Lords.

My thanks and congratulations to Lord Chalfont, the families, the Mull of Kintyre Group and everyone who has been so supportive.

There was a slight amendment to Lord Chalfont's motion. I have taken the liberty of writing it in full here:

"That, whilst recognising that the final decision will be a decision for the whole House, it is desirable that this House rejects the recommendation of the Liaison Committee and appoints a Select Committee of five members to consider the justification for the finding of those reviewing the conclusions of the RAF Board of Inquiry that both pilots of the Chinook helicopter ZD576 which crashed on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994 were negligent."

I must stress that the integrity of the reviewing officers is NOT being called into question.

Hopefully the Select Committee members will be chosen soon.

Thank you all again.
Regards
Brian :)

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[misterploppy]

Well done Brian, Lord Chalfont and the MoK Group. Tremendous news!

[ShyTorque]

Excellent stuff.

Well done Brian (and all), did you get my email as you requested?

[Nil nos tremefacit]

Great news, but who were the 106 who voted against?

[JIMMACKENZIE]

In reading the excellent news that there is to be a fresh Lords Inquiry, I was struck by something Lord Mayhew (Patrick Mayhew, Sec of State NI at the time)said during the Lords debate:
"I knew most of those who perished in the Chinook. I met their families.
"I went to a religious service in connection with one of the pilots. I stood at the airport for a very long time while the bodies of those who perished were brought back to Northern Ireland.
"And I have always felt that there should be something more done than has, as yet, been done to explore the conclusion that was reached by the board of inquiry.
"A grievous wrong was done to the passengers. On one view, a grievous wrong may have been done to the pilots."

Now a few of us had an emotional involvement in the crash, myself included. Only the sheer bureaucracy of HQ NI and the heavy-handed secrecy surrounding the whole affair denied me the opportunity of standing at the
graveside as two of my former colleagues amongst the passengers were laid to rest.

The passengers on board were the highest terrorist targets in NI at the time, what exactly did Lord Mayhew mean when he said:
"A grievous wrong was done to the passengers".? He should be asked to explain fully what he means.

For the sceptics amongst you, disregard this as just another conspiracy theory at your own peril. The fight for justice will still go on.

PS: It appears that my MP has declared me Persona Non Grata, and refuses to ask MOD any more questions I raise on matters surrounding the Chinook crash.

[The Mistress]

Excellent news. A hearty "well done" to ALL concerned. I hope this gives a morale boost to the families.

There is still a long way to go, but each small step in the right direction is a victory in itself.

[John Nichol]

Just a small note of caution in our euphoria - don't forget that it is the liason committee which appoints the select committee. This is the liason committee that went out of its way to try to scupper any further investigation. Be in no doubt, the MOD & the Govt are going out of their way to ensure that this goes no further.

Rumour has it that AM Day has said he will resign if the Lords find against him & Wratten. This is heavy stuff, as Liam Halligan said on CH4 last night, powerful forces are at work and much arm twising is going on.

For us, this is still about 2 men being found guilty of manslaughter with no evidence. For others it has become a constitutional issue.

Watch this space.

[lightbob]

I too would like to add my congratulations to those who have achieved a small victory in the bigger war. I knew several of the passengers and may well have been flown by the pilots. The rest of the Armed Forces ask a lot of our helicopter pilots in flying what, we think, are routine tasks. We expect them to arrive on time, at the right place (!) and in all weathers. We should not castigate two men who would not have flown recklessly rather we need to find out how to prevent a similar accident happening in the future. There is a duty of care that the MOD should accept to the crews and passengers who continue to fly in similar ac.

[Brian Dixon]

For those interested, the transcript of yesterday's debate in the House of Lords can be found at:

http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10430-03.htm#10430-03_head1

Updates as and when
Regards (and thanks) as always
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Shy,
apologies. Yes I did get your e-mail, and I replied the following day. Send me another if mine didn't get through, and I'll try again.

I thought I was getting on top of this computer malarkey!!!

Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[MrBernoulli]

Top job! Well done to the 'movers and shakers', particularly those on this forum, who have kept this subject at the fore and effectively forced this decision. If not a soul had stirred then nothing would have changed.

Keep it up!

[misterploppy]

JN

Your note of caution is well-placed. However, Day presumably only put it about that he will resign if their Lordships have the temerity to find that he was wrong in attributing 'Gross negligence beyond any doubt whatsoever' on the assumption that this will inlfuence their Lordships' finding. This strikes me as just the kind of unwarrantable arrogance that the PAC observed.

I suspect that his Airship would find no shortage of volunteers to help him to pack.

[Arkroyal]

mr.p

Unwarrantable arrogance indeed, and childish foot stamping.

If Day and Wratten are sure of their case, they will welcome the chance to prove it once again, and see this sorry affair laid to rest. In any case they should, if they are/were worthy of the uniform they wear/wore, be interested only in justice and truth, and not their fragile egos.

It would appear that they are confident that their earlier arrogance, and camouflage will be put right, and hence the bluster and bluff.

If Day can't live with the truth coming out, then I'll not only offer to help him pack, I'll donate a trunk!

[Tandemrotor]

Interesting isn't it, how the MOD, and the two senior officers who made the finding of gross negligence against the two pilots seem so keen to avoid having their 'opinion' scrutinised in public.

Contrast this with the observation that those on the receiving end of those allegations weren't even afforded 'representation' during the discredited process that'found' against them.

And they call that justice!

May hell freeze over before they get away with this.

[Brian Dixon]

Tandem,
I'll get me duffle coat! :)

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Nichol]

Tandem, to be fair to the AMs, I understand the are "looking forward" to giving their side of the story and that they are already rehearsing their arguments.

As I have said before, I've seen Day's brief and it is very, very convincing. Witness all of the ministers he has managed to convince. It's not until you see the other side's case that you begin to understand the major flaws in the MOD's case. One example of the MOD's dodgy line, "we used the TANS as a basic ADR to reconstruct the final seconds of flight".

But be under no illusion, the Lords are going to have an interesting, perhaps difficult, time making the call.

As an interesting aside, I dont think that the 2 AMs actually BELIEVE that the two pilots were grossly negligent. Maybe it was their best guess, but I think that they perhaps thought that, for whatever reason, finding that the pilots were the only cause of this accident was the quickest way to put it to bed.

Big, fat, ugly, hairy mistake. They picked on the two worst people to make an example of. They simply didn't understand their fathers. And it is Mike Tapper & John Cook that have forced this forward from the start. Yes, they have had varying degrees of help, support & advice, but without them there would be no case to answer. I think that those currently serving want to ruminate about this - The people who passed judgement were arrogant enough to think their verdict would go unchallenged. Indeed, a BOI verdict had never been challenged before.

This, perhaps, is the real cause for concern now. It's also what's got the Lords up in arms. Baroness Symonns and others said that the reason not to have a select committee was simply that questioning the verdict of 2 senior officers would undermine service discipline. In other words, an Air Marshall simply cannot be wrong by virtue of the fact he is a senior officer. In simple terms Day and Wratten are above the law.

Some people might be a bit worried by that notion. The Lords were.

[Reheat On]

This thread is all things that a forced shift in a political agenda can be, and many cngratuilaions to all contributors over time. It has been a plasure to feel that free spech is alive and well, for it may be that it is more open than the mother of Parliaments in many ways.

I do wonder: Day and Wratten are by most analysis no fools, and would have been VERY aware of the precedent of overuling the BoI President.

Indeed, all their GD training would have tended to them being against it - no matter who the pax were.

Theye are loyal officers and would be very unlikely to go public about anything to further their own interests - unlike their various political masters.

Given this and other arguments, one is led to conclude there might be an outside agency and a separate agenda affecting the actions of these gentlemen.

So WHO *instructed* the AM's to take this action - and on behalf of whom? in other words, were the AM's themselves simply fall guys acting under orders.

THAT is the question....

Whether the HoL will be able to unearth the answers rather depends upon the political clout of the unknown party eg the Mayfair funny mob et al

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Reheat,

Methinks you are on the wrong track with 'conspiracy theories'. On the basis of the evidence, this particular 'one' is certainly not led to conclude that their Airships were following anyone else's agenda, just their own. As for "theye (sic) are loyal officers" and "unlikely to go public about anything to further their own interests", you may care to question some of those who've worked for them in the past before reaching such conclusions. Remember, loyalty used to work down as well as up, at least until this event.

[Norman Goering]

Calling John Nichol

Please contact me on a different subject matter.

[Reheat On]

Point taken T & B; patently those close r to the Airships and their actions will have a closer undertsnading.

The fact remains however that at that level in the decision chain, Airships generally will be vunerable to outside 'persuasion', be it on the record or off. They do, like the grunts, have masters too.

There are many major interests here, as witness by the confessions of a certain Education Minister across the water, and it may just be possible to conclude that the loss of this aircraft in some bizarre way accelerated the political receptivity toward a peace process. Clutching at straws here, but trying to see a greater purpose for good in a tragic incident.

Or maybe they (their airships) were just nervous of taking a hooge rap.

[Arkroyal]

Reheat,

I don't reckon there's a conspiracy here, just two blokes who felt that the importance of the pax necessitated a robust finding, regardless of the evidence, and who thought they'd get away with it.

Interestingly, in the reply to my first (of many) letters to my MP he wrote:

'I understand that the finding of gross negligence came about because of the tragic consequences....'

Such bizarre logic seems prevalent in politics.

Baroness Symmons's assertion that questioning the AMs' judgement will have a negative affect on service morale is frightening, and 180 degrees out. Rightly their Lordships disagree with her too.

BTW where is K52??

[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 10 May 2001).]

[Reheat On]

Can anyone confim that the actions [proposed] of the HoL have NOT been affected by the impending election - I have heard it mooted that the loss of executive through dissolution has meant that is on hold until after the election. Has to be said the source was making a 'best understanding guestimate.'

One assumes that the HoL will use that familiar bite that means it will not let go until justice is done.

[Brian Dixon]

Don't worry. The HoL is not affected by the current election situation. The HoL process carries on as normal.

That comes straight from Lord Chalfont.

Regards
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Back to the top

[Brian Dixon]

STILL no reply to my letter to the MoD, dated 4 February, despite a short letter from DAS 3a (Secretariat) on 7 March stating that I would hopefully have a reply shortly after that date.

Anyone would think that they were busy with some other matter.

Perhaps they are busy preparing documents for the forthcoming Lords Select Committee.

I would, however, like a reply to my 25 questions and have written again today to ask if it would be too much trouble.

Don't forget to ask any Parliamentary candidates who have the audacity to knock on your door what their views are on this injustice.

Updates as and when.

Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cheapseat]

Would someone please tell me why John and Rick flew into a hill they had already acknowledged in their GPS?

[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 22 May 2001).]

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Cheapseat,

The people who believe they can answer this for certain are Day and Wratten, who may well not trouble themselves to read this noticeboard. Perhaps an ex-member of their staff may choose to answer you at some time; probably not.

[Brian Dixon]

Heard that although the House of Lords Select Committee process is continuing, there will probably not be an announcement until after the general election.

However, I can assure everyone that work on this injustice will still continue. I will try to keep everyone updated with whatever information comes my way.

7th Anniversary of the crash coming up very soon. Watch this space.

Regards all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Hi everyone,
sorry things have got a little quiet lately. I have heard that when Parliament returns on 20th June, we can expect rapid (their term) movement on this injustice.

7th anniversary nearly upon us. Watch this space.

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[keepin it in trim]

One small point about over-ruling the findings of the president of a BOI, AM Wratten has done it at least once before.

[Brian Dixon]

Kiit,
do tell.........

Also, I received a reply from Mr Price (MoD), in response to my 'where is my reply' letter. He restates that as far as they are concerned, they have answered my questions so will not do so again. Have to disagree Mr Price, but there you go! Letter on it's way back to you.

He also states that the Tench Report was finally published in the House of Commons library on 30 November 2000, and that it is available to MPs. Once the dust has settled, perhaps you could all write to your (?new) MPs and ask them to get hold of a copy. I'm sure it will be interesting reading.

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Edited because I am a fool!

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 30 May 2001).]

[John Nichol]

Brian - BOI Harrier ZG475 - 1 June 95

Circumstances - Harrier on Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) testing flew into the sea.

BOI conlusion - "The cause of the accident was the failure of the pilot to prevent the aircraft from impacting the sea".

Comments by higher authority -

"The AOCinC STC reconvened the Board to seek further medical advice on short term incapacitation. Having considered additional evidence, the Board concluded that, in spite of control movements during the last 15 seconds of flight, pilot incapacitation remained a possible (factor), with a form of partial epileptic seizure being the most likely..cause."

Without commenting on this particular accident or the chap who was killed, it appears that a Harrier pilot can have an epileptic seizure. But a chinook pilot can't.

Interesting

[pulse1]

Brian,

For those of us who don't know, can you please let us know what the Tench report is? I will then be pleased to chase new? MP after June 7. Incidentally I have a dilemma with my own vote as the present incumbent has been quite responsive on this issue but overall, hmmm! Marginal seat too. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/confused.gif

Edited by pulse 1 because my smilie didn't work.
------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[This message has been edited by pulse1 (edited 31 May 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

JN,
thanks for the info regarding the BoI.

Pulse,
my apologies for the lack of information. The Tench Report was a report published by Mr Bill Tench in 1987. This was following a request by a member of the House of Lords, who asked Mr Tench (at the time he was the chief inspector of the Air Accident Investigation Branch) to compare the process of investigation between military Boards of Inquiry and the AAIB.

In his conclusion (so I believe), Mr Tench commented that the process of a military Board of Inquiry was open to too much interference from senior commanders which could lead to conflict.

This report was never allowed to go public until very recently.

Ironically, Mr Tench and Rick's father John worked together in getting accident data recorders and cockpit voice recorders fitted to all passenger carrying civilian aircraft. How easily this injustice would have been sorted, had the Chinook been fitted with such devices.

Sadly, Mr Tench passed away last year.

Please note - I'm not suggesting interference or anything improper by the Air Marshals. I believe that they reached their verdict in good faith. However, I believe they are wrong and their verdict does not conform to regulations in place at the time. Nor does it stand up to close examination. Hope that makes sense!

Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[readytoturnthelightsoff]

John Nichol: although a throw-away line, your reference to seizures is not entirely true as there has been an instance of a Chinook pilot having been grounded as a result of having suffered an "epileptic type" collapse - as witnessed by an RAF medical assistant. I know that this is neither here nor there, but we all know what is possible.

[Brian Dixon]

Today is the seventh anniversary of the accident. Again, I will dedicate this posting to the memory of my friends Jon Tapper, Rick Cook, Graham Forbes and Kev Hardie. Also, to the memory of the passengers.

I had hoped to be able to inform you all of a link to my own dedicated web site regarding this injustice, but due to an unforseen computer problem cannot do so at the moment. The site has information on the pilots, a memorial page and (thanks to the families) links to many of the key documents that form part of the 'evidence' against Jon and Rick. When they are available, read them and make your own mind up.

As soon as the site is ready, I'll post a link.

Regards all.
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 02 June 2001).]

[keepin it in trim]

Sorry, been out of circulation for a few days. I'm sure JN is correct, however that is not the inquiry I was refering to. If memory serves you need to go back to 1990. Ten good people died, the general concensus was that the President got it about right (in similarly difficult circumstances regarding evidence). However, the comments by "Higher Authority" changed the whole tone of the report.

[WIWOV]

Keeping it at the top. Do you think it will make any difference now that Mr Day is C-in-C Strike Command?

[Skycop]

Lets just bear in mind that it would be inconvenient for the RAF to find a replacement at short notice.

MOD will continue to do all they can to keep him in post.

[This message has been edited by Skycop (edited 10 June 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

Unfortunate, and a blow that Martin Bell was not re-elected. He is a great campaigner and supporter and his presence will be missed within the Houses of Parliament. However, I know that Mr Bell will continue to campaign on this issue.

Perhaps Mr Blair could include him in the next peoples peers list?

Everyone now knows who their MP is, so drop them a line and give them their first task - press for this injustice to be rectified!

More news as and when.
Regards all
Brian

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[pulse1]

I discovered just before the election that, due to a quirk in constituency boundaries and an error in the H of C website, I have been pestering the wrong MP for the last year. He was actually quite responsive and sent me quite a lot of helpful material. However, he lost his seat in the election. I will now start from scratch with my real MP who kept his seat without any help from me.



------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Brian Dixon]

Don't worry Pulse.
If it's not too much trouble, and they are both fairly receptive to the cause, could you keep them both on the go (so to speak). Thank you for all your efforts so far.

The dedicated web page is progressing nicely, and is currently being reviewed. Once it is ready, I'll post a link here.

Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Just been told of a new publication called "Eye Spy". In it's first issue of 2001 it has a seven page article "The fatal flight of ZD576 - Whitehall's shameful cover up?" In the shops now - I'll be looking tomorrow!

Next issue is due out 5th July and will have a follow up article.

Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Ben Leice]

Good luck with your continuing campaign. My MP bit the dust and needless to say he didn't get answers to all the questions he asked about the Chinook crash.

Ben

[Brian Dixon]

Parliament is back tomorrow. Hopefully things will now start to move again.

Hi Mr Hoon, remember me!!!!! :)

Regards all
Brian Dixon
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Scatterling]

Brian,

May the Good Lord bless your enthusiasm! Don't let the $%^&*$ get away with this travesty.

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks for the latest letter, Mrs Bellchambers (Directorate Air Staff 3a).
I'll be in touch soon.

Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[misterploppy]

BBC Radio Scotland reported this morning that the HoL Inquiry was getting under way today. Anyone heard any dx?

[Brian Dixon]

It would appear that the House of Lords Select Committee will comprise the following Lordships:

Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle (Chair)
Lord Tombs
Lord Bowness
Lord Brennan
Lord Hooson

Their first meeting is scheduled for Tuesday 3rd July.

Regards all.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Hi all,
just an update. The Mull of Kintyre Group met last Thursday. It was agreed to allow time for the Select Committee to acquaint themselves with the subject, before the Group deciding on the next move.

As usual, I'll keep everyone updated as and when.

Regards
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[K52]

If the House of Lords Committee has to have time to assimilate the subject matter; may one ask what expertise they possess that will enable them to to deliver an opinion on the findings of the responsible Commanders?

I am not aware of any other aviation accident report that has been subjected to analysis, and subsequent approval(or otherwise), by the House of Lords: at least not since the R101.

I do not deny the right of their Lordships to enquire into this matter. I do, however, wonder what expertise they can bring to the subject that will enable their deliberations to be seen as balanced, focused and free from prejudice.

[fobotcso]

Take care, K52. Many people have fought long and hard to get to this point because there has been no alternative.

If the Select Committee finds the Wratten/Day stance to be flawed, will you regard their deliberations as balanced, focused and free from prejudice? I hope so.

[oldgit47]

K52, I think you are missing the point. The House of Lords committee do not need to be aviation experts, nor is new evidence needed. The basic facts are the Board of Enqiry, who were the real experts, did not return a verdict of gross negligence. The reviewing officers, overrulled the findings of the board. These officers, in spite of rank seniority, were far less expert on Chinook operations, than the original Board. All the committee neeeds to ascertain, is what evidence did the air officers use to overturn the findings of the original board. As far as I am aware no such evidence exits. If their lordships can grasp that basic fact then they must accept that gross negligence is at least "unsafe" if not downright unfair

[pulse1]

K52,

Hello again! What Brian actually said was "acquaint themselves with the subject" not to assimilate the subject. Surely this means that they are sensibly getting whatever facts are available before they start work.

Over the last year or so we have seen many people with expertise, like your goodself, offering all kinds of opinions which, at the end of the day, reflect the overall opinions expressed by the BoE - the Chinook experts had considerable doubts, the senior officers, with less relevant experience, had no doubt.

Hopefully, this committee will review this situation against the laws of the RAF pertaining at the time and against those of natural justice. I sincerely hope that they have some expertise in making this kind of judgement.

Brian,

I have tried without success to find out the backgrounds of the members of the Select Committee. Do you have any information?

[TangoMan]

The whole Computer system controling the engine systems was totally not in a fit state for use on Sqn aircraft. How can the MOD say that the pilots were negligent when they had requested a Mk1 on standby because they were not comfortable with the Mk2. Also several days before the crash on the Mull the test pilots had refused to fly the Mk2 over the engine control systems. The fault been that the engines would unpredictably go to max revs with no prior warning or it would close down the engines altogether. The Mk2 shouldnt have been put onto Sqn duties until it had been fully tested and the test pilots totally happy with the whole kit. The MOD will not admit that their decision was at fault, they went for the only option they could to get out of it, Blame the lowest down the chain!! The MOD just want to get the cheapest kit to do the job i.e. the SA-80!! :mad: :mad: :mad:

[TL Thou]

Mebbe of interest...for Pulse 1

Rt Hon the Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Cross-Bencher
Profession:
Advocate, Scottish Bar 1949; Standing Junior Counsel to Admiralty 1954; QC (Scotland) 1963; Kintyre Pursuivant of Arms 1955-71; Sheriff Principal of Fife and Kinross 1971-74; Judge of the Courts of Appeal of Jersey and Guernsey 1972-79; A Senator of the College of Justice in Scotland 1979-88; A Lord of Appeal in Ordinary 1988-96

The Lord Tombs
Cross-Bencher
Profession:
GEC 1939-45; Birmingham Corporation 1946-47; British Electricity Authority, Midlands, then Central Electricity Authority, Merseyside and North Wales 1948-57; General Manager, GEC, Erith 1958-67; Director and General Manager, James Howden and Co., Glasgow 1967-68; Successively director of engineering, Deputy Chair and Chair, South of Scotland Electricity Board 1969-77; Chair: The Electricity Council 1977-80, The Weir Group 1981-83, Turner and Newall 1982-89; Director: N M Rothschild & Sons Ltd 1981-94, Shell UK 1983-94; Chair, Rolls-Royce plc 1985-92, Director 1982-92

The Lord Bowness
Conservative
Profession:
Admitted Solicitor 1966; Partner, Weightman Sadler, Solicitors, Purley, Surrey 1970-

Lords:
House of Lords representative to Convention to Draft an EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The Lord Brennan
Labour
Profession:
Called to the Bar, Gray's Inn 1967 (Bencher 1993); Crown Court Recorder 1982-; QC 1985; Member, Criminal Injuries Compensation Board 1989-97; Vice-Chair, General Council of the Bar 1998, Chair 1999

The Lord Hooson
Liberal Democrat
Profession:
Called to the Bar, Gray's Inn 1949; Deputy Chair: Flintshire Quarter Sessions 1960-72, Merioneth Quarter Sessions 1960-67, Chair 1967-72; Bencher, Gray's Inn 1968; Recorder of Merthyr Tydfil 1971; Recorder of Swansea July 1971; Elected Leader of Wales and Chester Circuit 1971-74, Treasurer 1986; Recorder of Crown Courts 1972-91; Non-executive Director, Laura Ashley plc 1985-95, Chair: Severn River Crossing plc 1991-2000 Laura Ashley plc 1995-96

[John Nichol]

K52, a pleasure to have you back. What expertise do the Lords have? Well, mostly they can listen to a case when put to them in person and to hear the other side's argument.

This is not about understanding the technical evidence. It is about the interpretation given to circumstantial evidence. As I have said on a number of occasions, I don't say that the pilots could not have caused the accident. I simply point out that there is no EVIDENCE that they did.

The RAF was entitled to say what it believed happened on the Mull. What it was not entitled to do was find 2 men guilty of manslaughter without a trial, representation or any evidence.

For too long now the MOD have managed to hide behind ministers and letters. In a few weeks or perhaps months Wratten, Day and the team will be sitting in front of, to all intents & purposes, an independant jury, More importantly, they will be questioned about their judgements and theories for the first time since the accident. The HofL committee will be able to "cross-examine" them using the information they have been given by the experts from the families' side of the argument. This will be the first time that this has happened. The last time something similar occured (the Scottish FAI) the judge found for the families without hesitation.

Make no mistake about it, this is a milestone in military history. The absoloute authority of senior military officers is being questioned. Quite rightly in my opinion.

I understand that both Day & Wratten are "looking forward" to giving evidence and I think the outcome is far from assured.

But I take great comfort in the fact that almost everyone that understands this case believes an injustice was done.

We shall see what their Lordships think.

[pulse1]

TL Thou,

Many thanks for the information. Just what I was looking for.

[Brian Dixon]

Blimey,
I break my computer for about a week, and look what happens!

K52 - Welcome back. Trust you are keeping well. I'm not sure what aviation expertise the Select Committee possess, but four of the five come from a legal background. I understand they will be looking at the legality of the reviewing officers findings as opposed to the technical aspects of the aircraft and the flight itself. As usual, however, I'm happy to admit any misinterpretation on my part, should there be any.

Fobotcso, Oldgit, Pulse, TangoMan - Many thanks for your posts. As usual, kind words of support.

TL Thou - Thanks. Saved me some typing!

John Nichol - You are right to point out the milestone in history. So far, many things that have happened with regard the campaign have been unprecedented. Some satisfaction may be gained from knowing that a path has been set for others, should they find themselves in such a terrible position. Don't forget the possible constitutional issue of who answers to who - civil power to the MoD or vice versa? We shall see.

Proposed web page is progressing nicely. I'll let everyone know when it's available.

Regards to all as always.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook