Chinook - Hit Back Here

[ShyTorque]

I also voted for "the wicked uncle".

[Kiting for Boys]

Not a Professional Pilot at all but just wanted to say that I've voted for a certain senior officer as well.

Keep up the fun stuff also...I particularly liked the noisy aircraft thread (we're ex non-complainers from somewhere near Salisbury - but it was a bit disconcerting when a large green object popped-up over the BBQ party)

[RFCC]

And me! Another one for Wratten.

[Slightly Stocious]

I too have voted; directly to the Radio 4 website, (thanks Jackonicko). I can just see John Humphrys working himself up...

[John Nichol]

Anyone know when the R4 results are being announced? Be nice to tune in and see what is said.

Keep voting, and tell your mates to do the same.

[pulse1]

I believe that the result will be announced on Friday morning Dec 29. Voting is still possible on Dec 27. They said so this morning.

[The Nr Fairy]

JN :

Culled from the Today web site :

Nominations close December 23rd. We'll draw up a shortlist December 27th when you'll get a chance to vote for the winner, which will then be announced Saturday December 30th.

Interesting to see that they've asked Bob Ayling for his hero and villain !!

------------------
I got bored with "WhoNeedsRunways"

[stiknruda]

voted for WW

received reply from PM's office, stating that TB was interested in my comments BUT it did not disclose any intention.

sNr

[The Mistress]

This morning I received a 2 page reply from William Hague's office. The meaty bit reads:

"The Government is wrong to hide behind the mantra of 'no new evidence', as a reason not to set aside the gross negligence verdict of the two dead RAF Chinook pilots.

The Prime Minister recently told Martin Bell MP that the Government was being 'entirely straightforward' and that 'questions had been fully answered'. However they blocked answers to four Parliamentary questions put down by Robert Key, one of our defence spokesman.

They misled Robert Key and the Defence Select Committee and later wrote to put the record straight. The Government also failed to publish the crucial Tench report, which we believe came to the same conclusion as the new PAC report - that the RAF Board of Inquiry officers are judge and jury. This procedure falls foul of the European Convention of Human Rights Article 6 (Entitlement to a Full and Impartial Tribunal).

This arrogant and stubborn attitude sends all the wrong signals to the families of the servicemen and the world-wide aviation soft-ware industry. The Government is saying that if you can not prove software is defective, then blame the pilots. But increasingly, the Government does not have the capability to evaluate software and they are now privatising Boscombe Down, which is our only independent public sector aircraft testing and evaluation capability. It was Boscombe Down that grounded the Chinook the day before it crashed."

No surprise about the blocking and evading but it's good to see it put down in black and white.

Still no reply from my Labour MP!!!

Oh yes, I voted for Mr Wratten as 'villain' on the 18th December.

[alleycat]

Also voted for ACM WW on the 22nd - nobody more deserving I feel! Had also requested several of my offshore buddies do the same - we know the skill levels that you helicopter pilots have - thanks to the guys (and gals) from Bristows/Bond/Helikopter Service/Norsk etc etc for getting us all safely to & from.

Where is everybody? No posts since the 23rd?

[Brian Dixon]

Reply received from Dr Gadian with regard to the article on his studies in wind shear in the Daily Telegraph. Text from his e-mail to me below:

Dear Brian,

This article has indeed caused me some major difficulties. I am
actually a lecturer in Atmospheric Physics at UMIST and am working
on turbulent airflow over hills, as one of my research topics.
I use very high resolution models to examine airflow over hills.

The article has only a few lines which give an accurate reflection
of a conversation the reporter had with me, when he phoned me at home
on a Tuesday evening.

I am afraid I cannot help you with the Chinook crash, as I have no
knowledge which can relate to that, other than the fact that when
air flows over hills there can be turbulence and in certain circumstances
strong downdraughts. These effects are found at heights slightly greater
than the summit height, and can exist down to teh ground, again in
specific circumstances. My research specifically relates to turbulence
caused in these special circumstances. If an aircraft is too
close to steep hills then turbulence can be a problem. This is well
known and why pilots are told not to fly near hills. There is a
problem obviously when aircraft land, as they have little option but
to travel near the ground! This is what some of my work relates to.

Since the controvesy I have wondered what the airflow was like
over the peninsula for that day. However briefly
looking at the charts the weather looks totally unsuitable for strong
turbulence. Also it would take me 6 weeks of effort, for something
that looks a totally unsuitable case study.

I thus feel I cannot contribute anything to your case
Regards
Alan Gadian

My thanks to Dr Gadian for taking the time to reply to my enquiry.

Regards all. Enjoy the New Year, before the re-commencement of battle!!

Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[X-QUORK]

Unfortunately Wratton didn't make it into the short list of Villains on Radio 4.

Still, Ann Robinson get's my vote from here on in.

[JATOC]

To Ben Leice.
I was the tasking WKPR at JATOC that week. My Brief from the Flt Lt was, These people have to get to Fort George At Inverness. All of them could not go civ air so how do we get them to Fort George. Option 1 was 2 Pumas. Option 2 was Chinook.
I went for the first option. By wednesday afternoon I was informed by my boss that they have to travel together as they have things to discuss on the way across before the conference. So it was changed to the chinook.
I saw the news report on Ch4 about a helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre when I got home from work, I phoned the office to find out if it was our chinook. The night wkpr said yes. I then phoned my brother in law to find out if his father in law was away in scotland that weekend he confirmed thet he was. I told him that he had better get round to her house as she was going to need him shortly. To this day His wife doesn't know it was me that put her father on that flight.

[Brian Dixon]

JATOC,
welcome to the thread. Are you in a position to say who the individual was who made the decision to place all these people on the one aircraft? Surely, it would have been at a higher level that a Flt Lt? (no offence meant to the Flt Lt).

I also have many more questions I would like to ask, if you are in agreement. Drop me an e-mail if that's OK.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

Happy New Year all.

[Ben Leice]

JATOC

There were two low-flying Chinooks sighted that evening in Co Antrim; one was seen near Carnlough on the east coast and the other near Portrush on the north coast. Did you make the arrangements for both? If not, which one?

You said that the decision to use a Chinook was passed to you on Wednesday afternoon, June 1, the day before the crash. Do you remember when you were given the brief to organise transport?

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 01 January 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

Ben,
Happy New Year. I'm sorry if I'm being a bit thick, but why are you so keen to explore other Chinook flights? What does it have to do with the one that crashed?

Please don't think I'm being rude as that is not my intention (I'm usually far more blunt!). I'm just a little curious. Where do you hope to take this line?

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Ben Leice]

Brian, I think we can leave rudeness to one side! A happy New Year to one and all.

Like many other people I'm curious too. I'm still not sure which of the two Chinooks crashed. I hope JATOC can shed some light on the mystery.

The Scottish sheriff wanted to know why the Chinook which crashed was where it was when it was and the wing commander could offer no explanation. It was about a mile to the east of its projected path despite its sophisticated navigation equipment and the clear view of the lighthouse.

Two RAF senior officers blamed the pilots for the crash although the board said it would be a mistake to criticise the pilots on the evidence available. Does anyone know what the views of the third RAF senior officer were? [He is referred to in Holland's book "Phoenix" but not named.]

[Bertie Thruster]

JATOC, please excuse my lack of understanding with your post but isn't your brother-in-law's wife your sister?

Your boss must have been badly informed to think all the passengers could have any form of group discussion (apart from hand-written notes)in the back of a Chinook.

Incidentally ,why did you choose 2 Pumas as your first option?

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Ben

The crew could have been a lot more than one mile off track, even with its sophisticated nav systems for a few reasons:

1. It may have lost GPS signal temporarily. This is common in wet weather with a cracked aerial and I've had it many times. Pretty tricky to nav within one mile wwhen over water with no nav aids!

2. Also there are places on the globe that even with a fully functional GPS you get an alert and no GPS info; just a black hole I guess.

3. In route steer mode the RNS252 give you left and right of track in nautical miles, but the steer bar indicates the quickest way back onto the track line. What we tend to do is use the GPS derived track and fly a wind corrected heading to achieve the track line. WE tend not to keep the steer bar in the middle all of the time as it is pointless and requires vitually constant heading adjusment (impossible at low level). Instead we fly for a while, check our position and alter heading to converge wit track, that is if we want to.

4. There is no reason to religiously follow the steer unless you are trying to avoid something which is off your track, such as a stud farm or a bloke with a metal plate in his head.

Ben, I think you are mistaken about the second aircraft. Don't believe everything you hear from unqualified eyewitnesses, in most cases they remember only what they want to.

HPT

[Ben Leice]

HPT,

Thanks very much for the GPS info.

The lighthouse was visible from at least two miles out at sea, according to the yachtsman, so it seems unlikely that the pilots would have opted for the path they found themselves on if they had been able to follow the planned route to the west of the lighthouse.

A large twin-rotor helicopter with patchwork quilt-like camouflage is fairly distinctive. What else could it have been but a Chinook?

I don't wish to sound facetious but I'm sure the pilots would have taken every measure possible to avoid the mountains just off their planned route.

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Ben

Trust me when I tell you that people make things up, either because they think they are being helpful eyewitnesses or more usually because they are trying to claim for damages from the MOD.

I have on numerous occasions been contacted by the flying complaints branch because a member of the public has reported that a Chinook had flown over their property and caused damage. On some occasions a Chinook had been in the area, on other occasions there was none and the Chinook had actually been something else. People may hear a helicopter and assume its one thing, when actually it isn't. There are times when even my sensitve and seasoned ears cannot tell the difference between different aircraft types.

To add weight to my argument, following landing at my home base recently, I was informed that SAR Ops had been on for me as a member of the public had reported to the police that she had seen a Chinook crash with smoke coming from the area. At no time did the eyewitness mention the second aircraft that I was in formation with and only a 100 metres away. I guess she thought that she was helping!!

Ben there is no conspiracy in this case, just injustice. Don't cloud the main issue with irrelevancies.

HPT

[Hydraulic Palm Tree]

Oh and I forgot Ben

MK2 Chinooks did not have patchwork quilt camo, not then, not now.

And without trying to turn this into a p1551ng contest, there is no problem flying through mountainous areas, even in bad weather, as long as the valleys are clear, which you never know until you've had a look.

HPT

[Ben Leice]

HPT

Perhaps we can let history take care of 'irrelevancies'. By the way, two of the eyewitnesses were beside each other as the Chinook passed over in a northerly direction; their position was roughly two hundred yards to the west. The sky was relatively dark for the time of year - there had been heavy rain about an hour earlier - but the markings were fairly clear.

Thanks for the info about camouflage. That eliminates an RAF Chinook Mark 2 as a candidate for the second Chinook.

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 02 January 2001).]

[The Mistress]

On a more constructive note - I have finally received a reply from my Labour MP (who had the good grace to apologise for the delay). He says:

"I have immediately taken up your specific concerns with the Secretary of State and will come back to you as soon as I have his response to them."

I'll let you know ...

[John Nichol]

Greetings Ben,

With the greatest of respect it doesn't really matter if ZD576 was a mile right or left of track. The "track" is just a line plotted on a map, when flying VFR one does not stick rigidly to that line. You can wander left and right as the terrain and weather dictate.

Re the 3rd Senior Officer - not sure who you mean but if you give me a page number in "Pheonix" I'll try to work it out. I suspect that Susan Pheonix was refering to one of the Station commanders.

Happy New Year All

PS. Just had a letter from AVM Roser, Chairman of the RAF Club, saying that he has had a complaint that I used the RAF Club as a contact address in my letter to the Times. Now who might be the complainer?

[This message has been edited by John Nichol (edited 03 January 2001).]

[Titan Locked]

John

Call me a bluff old traditionalist but I was always led to believe that, assuming you are a member of the RAF Club (or indeed any private club I would suggest), it is perfectly acceptable to use that clubs address in your correspondence.

Dare I say it I also remember being told of the days when all RAF officers had "business" (ie calling) cards. On arrival at a new station, you always left a copy of said card on the table in the entrance hall of the Officers Mess. These always (I believe) had the RAF Club printed as the address. This started to go out of fashion in the mid 70's but surely still within the time frame of a certain senior officers career.

Obviously some people are just not busy enough in their new jobs !!!

TL

[This message has been edited by Titan Locked (edited 03 January 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

Dear John,

With similar respect, I described the situation of lateral displacement with reference to the lighthouse, where terrain and visibility were very relevant. It certainly was of concern to the Scottish sheriff ["Phoenix" p 250] and may have led to the crash.

"In contrast two of the three senior RAF officers who appended remarks to the main body of the board's conclusions were harsh in their assessments of who was at fault" [Phoenix p243] This suggests to me that three RAF officers appended comments; perhaps I've misunderstood the sentence or the author has made a mistake or has badly worded the sentence.

[misterploppy]

Ben

As the Chinook was detached from RAF Odiham, unusually in this case 4 snr officers commented on the BofI:

OC RAF Aldergrove
OC RAF Odiham
AOC 1 Gp
AOCinC STC

[This message has been edited by misterploppy (edited 03 January 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

Thanks, misterploppy. Can you put names to these ranks? Did their views carry equal weight?

[Brian Dixon]

Ben,
I'm not sure if it's appropriate or not to print all four names here. E-Mail me and I'll let you have them.

Perhaps I'm a little over cautious, but I don't want to score an own goal at this stage!

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

I too find the argument regarding ‘the second Chinook’ rather baffling and irrelevant. The point is that ZD576 hit the Mull, and its pilots were found guilty of gross negligence despite a total lack of evidence to support the finding, which needed to be proven ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’.

The fact that the yachtsman could see the lighthouse does not mean necessarily that the crew could see it from their different viewpoint. Judging visibility or the presence of cloud over the sea is extremely difficult as the cloud will be patchy, and visibility judgement requires something of known size to give scale.

Four senior officers commented upon the BOI report, as mrploppy points out. AMs Day and Wratten, whose crystal balls allowed them to perform the hatchet job, and the two Station Commanders who, I believe, were rather more objective.

[John Nichol]

Ben,

Please don't misunderstand the tone of the question but could you give us an idea of your background? I ask because if you are not aircrew I will try to explain how pilots fly VFR. I can assure you that they do not use "sophisticated navigation equipment" to miss the lumpy stuff by a few hundred yards. (Unless you fly GR1 or GR4 of course). You use your eyes.

Whether the Chinook was a few yards left or right of a line on a piece of paper really had no relevance in this accident.

Regarding the reporting chain for the BoI:
Neither OC Aldergrove or OC Odiham could offer further explanation of the crash. They did put a different emphasis on some of the BoI's findings but neither passed a verdict of gross negligence on the pilots. AVM Day was the first to do this followed by Wratten.

[Ben Leice]

Has Parliament been misled by Government spokesmen? Have ministers been economical with the actuality? Have ministers been misled by a lack of information from their officials? Could a possible serious injustice have been averted?

The Board had been careful not to point the finger of blame at the pilots; it merely concluded that there might have been errors of judgement during the flight but the available evidence did not justify criticism, let alone a more serious charge. Were the President's conclusions given to Parliament?

The Scottish sheriff was perplexed as to why the Chinook was where it was when it was and the RAF wing commander could not offer an explanation. Were the sheriff's conclusions given to Parliament?

Was Parliament told that the Board's report was reviewed by four senior RAF officers and that just two of them apportioned blame? One officer accused a pilot of a failure of duty; a second concluded that the crew were guilty of gross negligence; a third said that the Chinook crashed in an unrecognisable way but did not blame the pilots; and the fourth did not blame the pilots. Have the reviewing officers normally more say than the Board itself?

If ministers and Parliament had been in full possession of this information would we be in the current sorry state of affairs?

[Ben Leice]

Thanks for the offer, John - I'm not aircrew.

Assuming the Chinook which crashed took the route via Carnlough, what would you have done after you passed Garron Point? They were just over twenty miles from the lighthouse on the Mull and it would have been visible on a clear day. On June 2, the top of the Mull was covered by localised thick mist. The priests at Garron Tower saw the Chinook heading towards the west side of the Mull.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Ben,

Although I appreciate that your posts are keeping this thread near the top of the list, they aren't (in my admittedly-selfish opinion) actually contributing anything to righting the miscarriage of justice - the reason the whole thing was started. If you'd like to open another thread to discuss VFR nav techniques or unusual camouflage schemes, or to speculate on the intentions of Jon's crew after the TP, you'd have my gratitude. Many of the answers to questions you've asked in the past are available in publications other than the Phoenix book, by the way - you might wish to expand your reading list. Perhaps start with the BoI report and work from there...

Regards,

T&B

[Brian Dixon]

Mr Davis, Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee is, I think, a little frustrated with the speed by which some ministers responded to the 45th report. Here's a direct lift from the Parliament site:

"However, in recent weeks we have seen Ministers rush to judgment, either misrepresenting the Committee's findings or taking issue with agreed facts. Recently, our estimate of deaths from hospital-acquired infections has been disputed, despite the fact that the Department's accounting officer had already agreed the figure with the National Audit Office.

A similar incident occurred following publication of our recent 45th report on the acceptance into service of the Chinook mark 2 helicopter and the crash of one of those helicopters on the Mull of Kintyre, when Defence Ministers reacted hastily and negatively. That report formed part of our wider study of the MOD's acceptance of equipment off-contract and into service, which formed the 44th report, and both reports were issued simultaneously.


Mrs. Ray Michie (Argyll and Bute): May I say how much my constituents and I welcomed the 45th report, as the Chinook crashed on the Mull of Kintyre? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the MOD could set aside the verdict of gross negligence on the part of the two pilots? The MOD need not admit that it was wrong, but new rules now cover boards of inquiry and it should lay the matter to rest and get rid of the very unfair and unjust verdict, which the report highlighted.


Mr. Davis: I hope that the hon. Lady will forgive me if I return to her question in about 30 seconds, when I have finished the thrust of my current argument.

The Committee deliberated long and hard on the Chinook incident and amassed a significant body of evidence, mostly from the MOD, to support the conclusions that we reached. We aimed not to establish the truth of what happened--which is unknowable--but to point to the severe weaknesses in the processes by which the MOD accepted those helicopters into service and the subsequent procedures by which they concluded that the fault for the crash lay with the pilots. The immediate public response from Ministers was a discourtesy to the Committee, prejudices the Government's considered response and, in my view, flies in the face of the agreed convention.

On the hon. Lady's specific point, we do not seek to lay blame anywhere. It is perfectly possible for the Government to set aside the verdict. Ministers then in the

14 Dec 2000 : Column 836

Department accepted that as the right route, and other experts--whether those involved in the fatal accident inquiry or in aeronautics generally--all think that the verdict is unsafe. None of us seeks to score points; we want a matter of honour to be put right and the system corrected for the future. So I agree with what the hon. Lady has said.
One Minister even suggested that the PAC was acting beyond its remit. I have three responses to that suggestion. First, it is for the House of Commons and the Committee to decide our remit, not for Ministers. Ministers are accountable to Parliament, not the other way round. Secondly, the investigation arose from a study of the badly managed introduction into service of the £140 million upgrade that created the mark 2 Chinook. After six years in development and three years in production, that helicopter was still having erratic engine-control software problems during flight testing. As a consequence, its operational capacity was restricted for more than four years after the Mull of Kintyre crash.

Similarly, the Committee concluded that the accident investigation procedure was flawed, and therefore could not guarantee to deliver the lessons necessary to enhance future safety and performance. Those matters clearly all come within the Committee's remit. Finally, in the midst of that assessment of performance, the Committee was faced with what we unanimously thought to be a serious risk of an injustice. In my view, not only is it the right of any parliamentary Committee to bring injustice to the public's attention; it is the duty of any parliamentarian to do so."

So I can't be accused of selective quotation, here's the full link to the site-

www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/cm001214/debtext/01214-12.htm#01214-12_spnew1 (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200001/cmhansrd/cm001214/debtext/01214-12.htm#01214-12_spnew1)

Phew!

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Thanks Brian, nice to know that the PAC aren't taking Bufhoon's trite response lying down.

Still no response from my letter to Biar (passed to Hoon) or the one to Hoon himself.

If the PAC can be held in such contempt by theis twit, then what chance have we ordinary folk?

Collating all the latest stuff to make another attempt to galvanise my MP, althouigh I fear that the second coming is more likely.

Nice to see that others are having more luck.

Agree with T&B re the arguements concerning VFR flight.

Just to assist (maybe), had I been flying this sortie I'd have used the Mull as W/P 1 and once visual with it, followed the west coast around to Corran W/P 2 (as selected by The crew, and in no way implying any intention to fly direct routes to and between W/Ps), and then up the great Glen to Inverness.

[stiknruda]

Yesterday's post brought my long awaited response from Hoon, to my letter to his boss which I also copied to him. The response was obviously not from the great man himself but emanated from Air Staff 3a(Secretariat).

From: Miss V L U Directorate of Air Staff 3a(Secretariat)
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Room 7249, Main Building, Whitehall, London, SWIA 2HB

Mr Stiknruda
Aileron Farm
Elevatasville
Norfolk

Dear Stiknruda

Thank you for copying your letter of 4 December to the Defence Secretary about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June l~94. Your letter has been passed to this Branch for response as we have responsibility for this matter.

Your letter was prompted by the media coverage following the publication of the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) 45th Report on the acceptance of the Chinook Mark 2 into service, which links problems experienced during the Chinook acceptance process to the Mull of Kintyre accident. The MOD had early sight of this PAC report and we were disappointed to find that the Committee had accepted comprehensive and detailed briefing from those campaigning to overturn the finding of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull accident. We will respond formally to the specific points raised by the Committee on the acceptance of the Chinook Mk2, but do not accept the statements about the Board of Inquiry verdict. The PAC report contains no new evidence, and its conclusions run contrary to those reached by the Defence Committee that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the in the design of the Chinook or its components.

I can understand that you find it difficult to accept that two experienced and well-trained pilots might have been to blame for this accident, but it is a sad fact that accidents do happen to even the most competent aircrew. Often, it only takes a momentary lapse but the situation cannot be recovered, particularly when flying at low level.

I can assure you that Sir William Wratten and Sir John Day had no involvement in the release of the Chinook MK 2 to service and I hope it will help if I explain why they reached the conclusions that they did about the cause of the accident. Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed independent technical investigation for the Inquiry and concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash. However the Board of Inquiry established that about twenty seconds before the crash, the crew re-set their navigational computer, a telling indicator that they were not then grappling with an in-flight emergency as subsequent media speculation has suggested. Having studied a wealth of detailed evidence, the two senior reviewing officers reluctantly concluded that the two pilots had broken the basic rules of airmanship. They continued to fly their aircraft towards the Mull, below a safe altitude in unsuitable weather, which they had been warned to expect. In allowing their aircraft to do this, the pilots had not exercised the skill, care orjudgement they were known to possess, and so they were held to be negligent.

The MOD has always said that if new evidence were to come to light, it would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion. To date we have seen nothing that causes us to doubt the integrity of the verdict of the RAE Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new Inquiry.

I hope this explains the position

Yours sincerely


V U


----------------------


Unsurprisingly there appear to be several inconsistencies/irrelevancies in the above letter. Notably, resposibility for release into service, resetting the S-TANS, safe altitude in unsuitable weather, etc. I have asked Brian to assist with a response to ensure that focus remains on the key elements.

Yours


sNr

[X-QUORK]

How could they deduct that the navigational computer had been re-set 20 secs before the crash ? Is it possible to "read" what the crew had done post-incident when there was no CVR or flight data recording ?

Apologies if this has been covered before.

[1.3VStall]

I, too, had a banal reply from the said Secretariat. This was in response to my letter to BLiar, which had been forwarded on to the MOD.

The letter mostly regurgitated what we have all heard before from. However, in my letter I had made the point that as the MOD had, once again, procured an aircraft without either CVR or FDR no-one will ever know what happened in the final moments of the flight in question. The MOD response was that the Chinook was procured in the 1980s when it was not the Department's policy to fit the said devices. I did think about writing back to make the point that it would have been prudent to include fitment of a CVR and FDR during the upgrade to Chinook Mk 2. However I felt that this would divert attention from the fundamental point - AS NO-ONE WILL EVER KNOW PRECISELY WHAT HAPPENED, HOW CAN ANYONE AFFIRM WITH ABSOLUELY NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT THE CREW WERE CULPABLY NEGLIGENT?

This "verdict" would not stand up in a court of law and MUST be overturned!

[antennae]

I have followed this crash and this thread from the beginning. I appreciate all that has been written. With regard to the most recent responses from the MoD it is relevant to note that they continue to bang on about the independence of the AAIB's investigation. Yet the AAIB did not know the history of problems regarding FADEC, and they did not have access to black box recorders despite the money being voted by the Treasury in May 1988 for their installation in Chinooks. Essentially the AAIB worked within the confines that they were directed towards by the MoD "experts". Why is it then that the AAIB did not appreciate what it meant to find a code 5 fault within the one surviving DECU of ZD576. This anomaly in a flight critical piece of software should never exist, it was subsequently discovered. To the AAIB (and presumably to the BoI president) it was a true revelation.
But because the information came from MoD files, the Ministry decided the information was not new evidence.
It is this mindset that must be conquered.

[Brian Dixon]

Keep up the good work folks. There will be no suprises in any of you replies, but the MoD are getting seriously hacked off with the bigger post bags!

Stik,
I'll give you some ideas in a few days after I have had time to sit down and think (Well, there's a first for everything!!)

X-Quork,
The information was taken from the survivable memory. Only tells you what they did, not what they were doing. The BoI to this accident made reference that they were hampered by the lack of CVR and ADR. The Board also noted that recommendations to fit CVR and ADR were made by Boards from 1987 and 1988. I have pointed this fact out to the PM in my letter, of which no reply received yet.

1.3VStall,
Yep, agree entirely.

antennae,
Welcome to the debate. Despite a thorough investgation and report by the AAIB, FADEC was a recent innovation to them. It was not fully understood at the time. I do, however, think the AAIB were thoroughly professional in their task.

Believe it or not, FADEC was not considered flight safety critical. I think I am right in recalling that someone in the MoD said in a written statement that "Boeing did not consider the FADEC to be flight safety critical because the engines on the Chinook are not considered safety critical". (This bit taken from the Computer Weekly report). http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/eek.gif
Bizzare if you ask me, but that's what we're up against.

GICASI
Again, I agree. It seems that there's one rule for us and another for them.

Thanks everyone for the continued support.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 05 January 2001).]

[bad livin']

All - I hope this isn't an obtuse question...but is a BOI capable of attributing blame or responsibility to rear crew not in direct physical control of the aircraft? I ask as a chopped pilot looking at re-entering as an ALM.

[antennae]

The AAIB work is beyond reproach. My concern lies with the fact the tremendous work of the AAIB had to be based on so much guidance from the MoD. I am also firmly of the view no new evidence is necessary. What more does the MoD need than is already contained within the AAIB report and BoI? There are a host of potential problems and none as complicated as FADEC - the debonding incidents of the flight control pallets, the ENG Fail caption lights whose accuracy could not be guaranteed for up to 12 secs etc. How though, in precise terms, do we move the fight on? I have only joined this debate here because we need to develop a new strand of thought. Repetition by letter of already known facts to civil servants is of limited use. I concede, however, that I am at a loss as to how to move it forward. Bigger brains please intervene.

[Brian Dixon]

bad livin'
I think the BoI rules have now changed so that they do not apportion blame. They look at the cause of any accident and seek to use any findings for future air safety.

In this particular accident, no blame was allocated to either Graham or Kevin.
Funnily enough, the Board felt that it would be incorrect to blame the pilots for human failings too. It just lost it's way higher up the chain.

Hope that helps.
Safe flying

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[misterploppy]

Listening to the MoD statement on the effects of DU shells in FRY and the Gulf:

"We are approaching this problem with an open mind...

"If new evidence comes forward..."

Yada yada yada...

A case of aural deja vu? Can I have a job in MoD PR? - Spout the same old cr@p whatever 'problem' comes up. I think they have it on a tape and just press play!

Ho, hum!

[TimC]

"... the Board felt that it would be incorrect to blame the pilots for human failings too"

Am I missing something here, but how can anyone blame the pilots if the board of inquiry states the above? I'll delete this post if I have missed something and therefore I'm talking bollox.

[FJJP]

Brian,

Here are the questions to put to the AOC and CinC:

Q. ‘Exactly what happened, second by second, in the cockpit in the final 60 seconds of the flight?’

A. ‘we do not know’. [FACT]

Q. ‘Do you know if something catastrophic occurred in the cockpit or to the aircraft during the final 60 seconds (YES or NO)?’

A. ‘No.’ [FACT]

Q. ‘If something catastrophic had occurred, can you guarantee that either pilot had the skill to deal with the emergency?’

A. ‘No.’ [FACT]

Q. ‘In view of this, can you categorically, and without error, conclude that the pilots were negligent?’

A. ‘No.’ [FACT]


I fear that this case is going to have to go to court the clear the guys’ names. (Thinks...MOD has the habit of settling before going to trial - just as you go to open the courtroom door, the MOD legal team rushes forward and makes you an offer you can't refuse...)


[This message has been edited by FJJP (edited 07 January 2001).]

[misterploppy]

FJJP

Unfortunately, the Courts are probably not an option. Under Scots Law there is no reason to challenge Sir Stephen Young's FAI since he came to the same view we have come to. In Scotland it is Sir Stephen Young's verdict that counts, whatever some 10-a-penny (and hardly independent or objective) Air Marshals may have said.

AFAIK there is no English law under which Wrotten can be challenged in England.

[This message has been edited by misterploppy (edited 07 January 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

FJJP,

Good questions, and ones that have been asked many a time. The answer given is one of, "Well the wreckeage suggests that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft, so it must have been some other reason."

It doesn't seem to matter to certain individuals that the final 20 odd seconds are unaccounted for, or that 20 odd per cent of the airframe was never recovered from the crash site.

This WILL go on until justice prevails.

Thud & Blunder, would you drop me an e-mail??

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

Tim C,

You have not missed anything. The Board conclusion for each pilot was as follows:

Jon Tapper
"The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is likely that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence."

Rick Cook
"Flt Lt Cook could not be criticised for failing to identify any errors. The Board concluded that there were no human failings with Flt Lt Cook."

Now, where is there a reference to Gross Negligence? Maybe it is just me that is missing something.

Still looking to join up??

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[TimC]

Yes, still looking to join up. I've been told that the RAF's getting so few applicants at the moment that they are cancelling boards. Maybe some others have been put off by this whole thing.

[K52]

In March 1995 I was posted at short notice to HQ1Gp as FS(Flight Safety)1. The job spec called for either Fast Jet or SH experience of which I had neither (apart from half an hour in a Gazelle with Buck Rowlands circa 1980). It is, of course, entirely possible that this (the posting - not Buck!!) played some part in my decision to opt for the 1996 redundancy scheme.

The BOI into the Chinook accident was in the process of being Staffed when I arrived. To try to get a feel for the job I read this BOI in great detail, and repeatedly, over many weeks. It is now some 5 years since I had access to this BOI so I hope my memory is still as accurate as it used to be. I will, however, try to answer some of the points and queries that have been raised on this thread.

It was Sir Malcom Rifkind who decided that BOI's could be released to next of kin if they so requested. The only caveats were that the BOI would be reduced to RESTRICTED security level by deletion of any information with a higher classification and that any matter that could be disturbing (photos or descriptions of injuries etc) would be handed over in a sealed package with the advice that the next of kin should not open it by themselves.

In the case of ZD576 it was decided at Ministerial level that copies of the BOI woiuld be given to all Next of Kin simultaneously.

It is not "unprecedented" for the Convening Officer to overrule the findings of the BOI. In fact in 2 other BOI's that were running concurrently with this one (it was a bad year-there were actually 5 on the go at that time) the findings were changed and 2 crews who had been found negligent by the BOI's were exoneratd and pilots who had been left alone by a BOI were found to be negligent by their respective AOC's.

It has been suggested that the Pilots must have been specially chosen for this task. The truth is that this was a detatchment and the Pilots chose themselves - they were the outgoing Detatchment Commander and the incoming Detatchment Commander. They also chose to do all the tasking that day to give the other crew a day off. The BOI decided that there was no administrative reason to preclude this. Whether this was a judicious use of resources is another matter.

"The aircraft returned from an early morning sortie with engine problems and suffering from UFCM's." This is just blatent Press speculation. If this were true it would mean that all the engineering and Flight Authorisation documentation was removed and substituted before the BOI could inspect it; and that all those who gave evidence to the BOI on these aspects lied on oath. The evidence is that the aircraft and crew performed some five and a half hours of internal tasking prior to the final sortie and that the aircraft was given a normal turnround servicing. The only abnormal aspect was that Flt Lt Tapper asked an avionics tradesman to look at the GPS which had been losing signal. The tradesman found no fault.

One of the first things that is taught in Flying Training is that if you are flying below Transition Altitude then you set the regional QNH on the subscale of your altimeter unless you are on approach to an airfield when you set the Airfield QNH or QFE as directed. The AAIB investigation into the crash of ZD576 showed that the Right Hand altimeter was so set but the left hand altimeter was some 10mb lower. There was no evidence that this setting had been altered by the crash. The BOI speculated that it could have been set on Aldergrove QFE.

The Rad Alt warnings were not set in accordance with the SOP. One was set above cruising altitude and the other at minimum where it would have given little, if any, warning of impact with the ground. Again there was no indication that these settings had been altered by the impact.

Several people have criticised Sir William Wratton for saying that the crew should have climbed to their SALT of 2800ft when the true SALT was considerably higher. Much as I regret having to agree with the criticism of a Senior Officer (and I nearly had a straight face as I typed that)I have to accept that he was in error in this case. What he should have said (and possibly meant to say) was that they should have climbed to their CALCULATED SALT of 2800ft. The BOI included a copy of the route chart that had been left with the authorisation sheets. On this chart their planned SALT for the leg Aldergrove to the Mull is clearly shown as 2800ft and their planned cruise speed as 120kts. In fact, on their entire route to Inverness there was not a single planned SALT that took into account the proximity of Ben Nevis. A climb to 2800ft would have meant that they cleared the Mull by 1000ft. I appreciate the problem of the icing level but,if they went into cloud inadvertantly, the possibility of icing has got to be a better option than the probability of impact with the ground.

The distance between Aldergrove and the Mull is approx 43NM in a straight line. To travel this distance in 17 mins gives an average groundspeed of 152kts. Because of the time needed to accelerate the cruise groundspeed would be higher. They did not, however, travel in a straight line; departing initially to the east and transiting overland at very low altitude. It is likely that actual track mileage was about 46NM which would give an average groundspeed of 162kts. The VFR requirements for a Military Helicopter with a groundspeed of 155kts or greater were 5km visibility and 1000ft vertical seperation from cloud.

Several people have quoted the Yachtsman who saw the Chinook approx 2 miles from the Mull. It is my recollection that his evidence was that he saw the Chinook flying "in good visibility just below the cloudbase".

The people on the Mull all reported that the weather was foggy. All heard, but did not see, the helicopter (with the possible exception of the wife of the Lighthouse keeper who stated that she thought she saw the lower red anti-collision beacon but may have imagined it because she would have expected to see one--there is a landing pad close to the Lighthouse). Moreover, there was video evidence taken about 10mins before the crash. This was analysed at Wyton and the visibility at that time assessed as approx 400 metres. The computer projection of the final flight path assessed that the aircraft pitched up 440 metres before impact at an IAS of 150kts.

The evidence in the BOI shows that prior to the crash the aircraft was being flown under VFR in IFR conditions with one barometric altimeter subscale and both rad alt warnings incorrectly set and on a flight plan with incorrectly calculated SALTs.

I know that many will disagree with me but I have to conclude that the findings of the AOC and CinC were justified.

Brian, please feel free to e-mail me if you wish.

I will now retire to await the incoming (and possibly the thought police for breach of the Official Secrets Act)

Oh, If CAS DOES read this then maybe he would like to get his ADC to give me a ring because I think that there may be a way to solve this issue once and for all. Innsworth have my number.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi K52. Welcome to the thread.

Your power of recall is very impressive. There is little, if anything in your post for me to argue with.

However, it still does not convince me that there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever. The AAIB report noted that the No 1 DECU was unreadable. It stated that around 20% of the aircraft was totally destroyed. It stated that although there was no evidence, the possibility of control system jam could not be positively dismissed. It also stated that the pre-impact serviceability of the aircraft could not be positively verified. There are also several more examples that I could offer here but I shall spare you my typing.

I also accept that you may be entirely correct in your assumption and support of the reviewing officers findings. But, in order to find deceased aircrew guilty of negligence, there has to be absolutely no doubt whatsoever. The comments by the AAIB are enough to introduce that doubt, however small, and therefore negate and invalidate the reviwing officer's verdict.

It may be that Rick and Jon made a mistake, but as it stands, there is not the absolute proof necessary to support the current verdict. That is why it should be withdrawn immediately.

Can't see how you have breached the OSA and hope you don't get bombarded with unpleasant responses.

I'm certainly not the CAS but would be interested in hearing your proposal for a solution. Would you be willing to drop me an e-mail??

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

K52 First of many incoming I must be quick as I am in a hurry.

1 The VFR rules apply to airspeed and not groundspeed. The rules were clear of cloud in sight of surface.

2 SALT was 5900ft based on Ben Nevis. The Chinook icing clearence of +4 degC allowed a climb to 2500, not even enough for the local calculated value of 2800'

You do not know what occurred in the last moments of ZD576's flight, so just like all of us and Wratten too, you do not have the evidence to find the pilots guilty of gross negligence 'beyond any doubt whatsoever'

You indeed show your lack of SH experience, in the same way as Wratten did his!

[antennae]

Couldn't agree more Arkroyal. Worth remembering that Fl. Lt. Tapper had been told shortly before the accident by a superior officer that any pilot who broke the icing clearance rules relating to the Mk2 would be held personally liable. Within that less than helpful culture, therefore, the crew would not have considered an overfly of the Mull - especially when a transit over water, first to Corran and then up the Great Glen, would have taken ZD576 to its destination at Fort George. And had the weather deteriorated to such an extent that the crew felt they were in danger of being outside VFR, they should have been able to either stop and find another way through or turn back.

[Brian Dixon]

Aha!!!

I'm not going to fall for the 'superior officer' bait again.

Damn!............. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/tongue.gif

[K52]

ARK ROYAL

Sorry, that salvo was over. You have based your calculations on a standard lapse rate of 2 degrees C /1000ft (actually its 1.98 degrees C /1000ft up to a height of 36090 ft above which the temperature is assumed to remain constant at minus 56.5 degrees C - I claim my merit star). What was the actual lapse rate that day - was there a temperature inversion? I would still say thay the POSSIBILITY of icing is a better bet than the PROBABILITY of impact with the ground!!

In addition, as you should know, the Military make up their own rules; it is therefore THEIR rules regarding VFR flight that we should take into account. It is, of course, possible that No1 Aeronautical Information Documents Unit made a complete B*lls up regarding VFR for military helicopters but, on the assumption that they didn't,then the requirement for Military Helicopters to fly VFR at a GROUNDSPEED of greater than 155 kts was 1000 ft vertical separation from cloud.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

K52,

Re your first paragraph in reply to Arkroyal, it is possible (all conjecture, like the Air Marshals' findings..) that it wasn't icing the crew were bothered about when they strove to maintain VFR Low Level. As you'll have seen in earlier posts, the point was that to go into any temp below plus 4 deg C was outside the Release to Service at that time, and the Chinook force had been specifically told beforehand that any deviation from R to S was something the pilots could be held personally liable for. Neat trick - make an exceptionally difficult set of limitations when applied to real-world tasking, then absolve the organisation of any responsibility when it all goes pear-shaped.

In the RAF SH world, as with the RN and the AAC, no-one relies entirely on a weather-guessers forecast. However, there was probably no point in including Ben Nevis in the S Alt calcs as it would obviously have been so far into the minus on the Celsius scale as to make it an impossible option within the constraints mentioned above.

However, none of this detracts from the point made so well by people more erudite than me: where is the certain knowledge that the pilots were negligent? Nowhere - so why does the unjust verdict still stand?

[Ben Leice]

Who would have taken the decision that the Chinook should be flown by VFR? Was it left to the discretion of the pilots? Did they have freedom to alter any orders issued?

[Nil nos tremefacit]

Ben

Still don't understand where you're coming from.

The flight would have been authorised to fly either VFR or IFR as required. The duty authoriser would have given the authorisation in discussion with the crew based on all sorts of factors - available nav aids, weather etc. Once airborne the captain could have changed from VFR to IFR and back again depending on the conditions. Although the flight was 'tasked' to carry the set passengers from A to B, the tasking signal or whatever would not normally have specified the flight rules as these would usually be selected at the time by the authoriser and crew.

The crew would not have had freedom to change the task, but would have had freedom to achieve it within the parameters laid down by such things as fuel, weather, available diversions, whether or not the passengers turned up on time or wanted to be early or whatever.

I don't know, but from earlier posts it seems that the task was to be achieved by the RAF NI squadron, who even had the flexibility to decide Puma or Chinook. If, Ben, you'd ever seen one of these tasking notices (Heltasks)you would understand that it might just have said 'Fly 32 VIP pax from A to B, PUP 0000, arrive 0001'. It is a direct order, but as you can see there is a lot of scope for the crew to do their own thing. Actually, Ben, I've been on crews where we've had similar tasks, taken one look out of the window and decided not to go because of the weather. I've also been on a sortie where we've taken off and then ended up with an aircraft full of VIPs in a layby in Germany because we couldn't go any further (even the 4* smiled)!

The important thing, Ben, is that the crash happened and there is no way of knowing who or what was really to blame. The issues you raise are irrelevant to that point.

[Arkroyal]

K52

I prostrate myself at the feet of our country's leading living meteorologist!

To correct my earlier posts, the met conditions of the day assuming a sea level temperature of 9deg and an ISA lapse rate of 1.98deg/1000' would have allowed a climb to 2525.25252525252525 feet and not 2500' as previously claimed. Sadly still below SALT!Your merit star is en route. Be careful where you put it as the points are sharp!

VFR speed, I am working from memory, but I thought it was 140 KIAS. if I am wrong I apologise.

Ben,
As Nilnos says, it would have been the crew's choice, but they simply had no choice due to the utterly pathetic icing (not) clearance of the Chinook Mk2.

GICASI, Well said. There is doubt and the crew must have the benefit of it.

[Ben Leice]

NNT

Thanks for the info - and your patience!

[Tandemrotor]

K52

Welcome to this forum. It is very valuable to have people such as yourself contributing to this thread, as it makes all of us re-examine the few known facts to assure ourselves that we are not simply willfull mischief makers.

You say at the beginning of your initial post that you hope your memory is still accurate. I would have to say that in the most general terms, your memory is loosely correct, but in specific terms your recollections are almost completely misleading.

It would be churlish to criticise everything you said, particularly, since I have had the benefit of frequent refreshers on the subject. However to pick a few points at random:

You made some observations about the subscale settings on the 2 pilots bar alts. Presumably as some kind of circumstantial evidence as to the competence of the operators. You may of course recall the comments of the President of the BOI, who said, "the pressure setting could also have been moved during the accident." (The AAIB report most definitely does not exclude this possibility in such a violent impact!) The president summarises the paragraph by saying, "The Board concluded that Bar Alt setting procedures were not a factor in the accident."

As far as the rad alt settings are concerned, a fairer description would probably be that, each setting would have been appropriate, but for different types of flight. However, since we can not know at what moment each was set, and what was going through the pilots minds, it is difficult to deduce with any certainty what the thought processes were. Though, to be fair, Wg Cdr Pulford did state, "the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident."

You mention that a yachtsman saw the helicopter, 2 miles from the Mull of Kintyre, "just" below cloud. In actual fact, his statement to the Board reads, "The helicopter appeared to be in sunlight" and "well below cloud level, at no time whilst I observed it, did it move into cloud cover."

You also made mention of a holidaymakers video, taken at the Mull lighthouse very shortly before the accident. I have viewed this video, and indeed, out to sea, a rock is visible which we calculated was 400m away. However, looking out to sea, nothing else would be visible before the coast of NI. So all anyone can say is the visibility at 300'asl, in the base of the cloud was at least 400m.

Your calculations regarding groundspeeds is guesswork in the extreme. I could come up with something completely different simply by 'programming' in different factors, such as wind speed, but even if I did, what does it prove?

You seem to have recalled the rate of climb of the aircraft in the final second or so. May I ask what this proves? If you had told me that the crew were NOT doing everything possible to avoid ground contact, I might be more curious. It doesn't help one jot in our understanding as to HOW or WHY the aircraft came to be there.

Finally you gave examples of other BOIs, presumably in an attempt to suggest there was nothing unique about this one. I will offer you a challenge. I will throw the towel in on this one, if you can come up with one other RAF BOI, which found deceased aircrew negligent, without survivor's evidence, without eye witness evidence, without CVR evidence, without FDR evidence, without radar traces, and without radio recordings. The AAIB couldn't even say whether the wreck had been serviceable!

This one IS unique, and you know it, as does everyone else!

Please tell me where I am wrong.

Incidentally, if CAS does read this, he might like to get his ADC to ring me too, as I also have some ideas as to how this could be resolved. BT have my number!

[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 09 January 2001).]

[pulse1]

I have followed this fascinating thread since it started and became actively involved when I heard Hoon’s ridiculous response to the PAC and the interviews with Wratten. This active involvement has, so far, been limited to writing several times to my MP (not very effective so far) and to Hoon (no response at all). At the moment I want to continue to do whatever I can to support the campaign.

However, reading the most recent posts, I must admit to becoming less clear about the main issues and I get a bit concerned when I see what appear to be experienced pilots arguing about definitions of VFR.

As a humble PPL, I know that, had I been flying that route in my C172 under those conditions, I would have been legal when the yachtsman saw me, being clear of cloud and in sight of the surface and below 140 KIAS. However, in that weather, with no IR most of you would agree that I was being very stupid (read grossly negligent) whether I hit the ground or not. The fundamental question is – were the immensely more experienced and qualified Tapper and Cook being similarly negligent by putting themselves in that position, two miles from the Mull, and limited to VFR by icing constraints?

From his explanation published in Pilot, it appears that Wratten believes that they were being negligent AT THAT POINT (“like a motorcyclist riding in fog” ;), which is the only time we KNOW what was going on. This appears to be the whole crux of his argument. That implies that, in his view, they were being negligent even if they had not hit the Mull.

If they were not being negligent under those circumstances, as anything which might have happened afterwards is pure speculation, Wratten should be overruled. Presumably, the very experienced Chinook pilots on the BoI did not agree that they were being negligent then and, at the moment, that is good enough for me. With my limited experience I could not possibly make a judgement on it but might find the opinions of experienced military aviators helpful in restoring my confidence to renew the battle, for whatever my efforts might be worth.

To Brian Dixon,

I have been trying to persuade my MP to support Lord Chalfont but he does not seem to see how he can. Can you give us some arguments to use. Particularly some details of the committee he is trying to set up. Thanks.




------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Tandemrotor]

Pulse 1

Very good to hear this medium is an effective recruiting tool, I guess that's why we (and probably 'they') look upon this as being a reasonably important 'talking shop'.

One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not.

But, this is to overlook the key issue of this case, which is:

The ONLY eyewitness to have presented evidence to the BOI, or FAI, stated that the aircraft was flying in conditions of sunshine, and well below the cloud base, and at no time that he observed it did it move into cloud cover. As far as we know, nobody else saw the aircraft, and nobody this side of the Pearly Gates can tell us what the in flight visibility was from the cockpit.

This sighting possibly occured, very approximately, 40 seconds prior to impact. The widely quoted waypoint change may have occured, very approximately, 20 seconds later.

Was the aircraft in cloud then?

Who knows.

Were they transitioning from VFR to IFR in response to a deterioration in weather?

Who knows.

Had the negligence already occured?

Who knows.

When did the aircraft enter cloud?

Who knows.

Was the weather still suitable for a low level VFR transit up the West coast of the Mull, remaining below a cloudbase which was probably around 300'?

No evidence I have ever seen, precludes it, and the incredibly limited evidence available,can easily suggest that it COULD legally have been attempted.

So why did the aircraft crash at around 800' ASL, at high speed?

I do not know. Neither did the President of the BOI, neither did the first two reviewing officers, neither did the AAIB, neither did the Sheriff at the FAI, neither do senior members of the RAeS, neither apparently does the Public Accounts Committee.

Who does? and here's the rich bit, they have "absolutely no doubt whatsoever", well you are probably ahead of me already.

Only in the rareified atmosphere of the upper echelons of the MOD could such a level of "unwarrantable arrogance" exist that would allow such an opinion to persist.

Did you notice I didn't even mention 'conflict of interest'!

"Take me to your leader"





[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 10 January 2001).]

[pulse1]

Having read my post above I was surprised to see that a smilie has appeared after my Wratten quote. I didn,t put it there as I have not worked out how to do it. Could be finger trouble but why did it just happen to go in the best possible place? Divine intervention (support) perhaps? I even tried to edit it out but couldn't because Capt Prune was doing some maintenance.

------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Brian Dixon]

Pulse,
Thanks for your continued support. If you drop me an e-mail, I'll give you the information requested regarding the Mull og Kintyre Group.

With regard to the smilie, what you need to do is click in the 'Disable smilies in this post' box underneath the reply window where you type.

Hope that helps. Look forward to hearing from you.
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Arkroyal]

Pulse 1

I too thank you for your support. Your MP seems as useful as mine (and an astray on a motorbike). Tandemrotor's reply to your post says it all. None of us claim to know with certainty that Wratten is wrong. We are, however, certain that he has come to his conclusions with insufficient evidence and deeply flawed logic.

He simply cannot claim to be certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the accident was caused by the crew's negligence; and that is the only point we must press home to all who will listen (and those who won't).

a ; followed by a ) gives you a ;)

[K52]

Brian

Thankyou for your e-mail. I do not agree, as you know, with your viewpoint but I have nothing but admiration for the way that you are fighting for what you believe in.

Arkroyal

Thankyou, I'll tell Charlie (the Postman) to watch out for the pointy bits - but you didn't answer the question. What was the actual lapse rate and was there a temperature inversion (it was an early summer evening)?

I'm sure you appreciate the signifcant difference between "clear of cloud and in sight of the surface" and the requirement of "5km visibility and 1000ft vertically from cloud" in the context of this accident.

When last seen the Chinook was "2 miles" from the cloud enshrouded Mull - heading towards it in level flight. If its groundspeed exceeded 155kts (see reply to Tandemrotor below)it was already IMC in accordance with Military Flying Regulations.

I have had a look at a chart for the UK (and before anybody complains about misuse of Service Property by retired personnel - its my Wife's, she has a PPL) and I would suggest that the SALT for that leg was based on the mast 1755ft AMSL to the west of Belfast. SALT within 25nm of the Mull would have been 2500ft.

Incidentally, and here I go showing my ignorance again, I did not realise that there were different criteria for rotary and fixed wing as regards SALT in the RAF. As a fixed wing pilot my calculation would have been Ben Nevis + 2000ft rounded up to nearest 100 ft (obstacle greater than 3000ft AMSL). I know that civil aviation has different criteria.

Capt. Jack Broome DSC RN quoting in his book "Send a Signal" (we used to live in the next village from him)

Tug towing splash target to Frigate that has just straddled Tug rather than target:-

WE AIM TO PLEASE --- YOU AIM TOO - PLEASE!!!


Tandemrotor

Thankyou for your comments - I always new I had a use in life, despite what my 1369's used to say.

First let me say that I agree that what the AAIB investigation found cannot be regarded as an absolute. There were nearly a dozen people on the Mull - many of whom, in addition to the Emergency Services once they arrived, searched the wreckage in the forlorn hope that they may find someone still alive. It took several hours before the Kinloss MRT arrived to act as crash guard. It is inevitable that some wreckage was moved and possibly some evidence destroyed in this time.

I also agree that because AAIB found no evidence that an item had moved because of the impact did not prove it had not moved. Equally, the fact that there was an impact does not mean that an item probably moved. The Captains Barometric altimeter is the point you raised. It was found approx 10 mbs different from the RHS Pilots altimeter, and the BOI speculated that it had been left on Aldergrove QFE. As you say the BOI felt that they could not rule out movement during impact. However the digits do not move independently; which means that the subscale did one complete revolution of the lowest digit wheel ie it rotated through 10 digits. For the 10's digit counter to have moved independently it would have needed to have broken free, which would have been obvious to AAIB.

You accept that the BOI concluded that the Rad Alt warning settings contributed to the accident.

I must admit, however, to having severe difficulty with your comments on my calculations of groundspeed.

If the distance between Aldergrove and the impact point is 43nm and the time between take-off and power down was 17 minutes then that distance needs to be covered at a speed of 152kts (groundspeed). This has nothing to do with wind (speed or direction) except in so far as that affects the IAS that needs to be maintained to achieve that groundspeed.

Also, as you know, the Chinook did not proceed directly from lift - off to the Mull. Therefore track miles will increase as will required groundspeed to cover that distance in 17 minutes - again this has nothing to do with wind speed or direction. In addition, allowance has to be made for the time and distance covered in acceleration to cruising speed as this will inevitably increase the required groundspeed to cover the remaining distance in what is left of those 17 minutes.

I accept that we will never know what happened in those final 20 secs. The aircraft was last seen in straight and level flight approx 2 miles from the Mull. It crashed tail end first into rising ground. A pitch up of that magnitude, whether pilot induced or otherwise, would have had the effect of rapidly decaying IAS and therefore groundspeed. Yet the aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of 150 kts.

The computer projections produced a prerequiste 150kts IAS prior to the final manouvre - giving a groundspeed of 170-175kts. Yet above 155kts groundspeed they should have maintained 5 km visibility and 1000ft vertical seperation from cloud.

At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative but a finding of negligence.

[FJJP]

A personal message to CAS:

Sir,

You are the one person in uniform left to whom we can turn. No doubt you have been following this forum; some ideas and comments are decidedly questionable, but the main thrust of the matter is that Air Marshalls Day and Wratten had no basis for their negligence finding.

Despite the whole affair becoming distressingly political, it must surely be within your power (political dynamite that it may be) to order a review of the whole sorry saga. Be assured that this affair is not going to go away. It is only a matter of time before the Royal Air Force comes up with egg on its face.

Would it not be better to kill the whole thing stone dead now - never mind the arguments about FADEC and entry to Service. Just the retraction of the gross negligence finding would do.

Me? I have had nothing to do with this accident or had any connection with the family or Inquiry. I just want a wrong made right.

[Tandemrotor]

K52

As a previous holder of the post FS(Flight Safety)1, thank you for confirming that this case is indeed unique, in that no other aircrew have EVER been found negligent, without any supporting evidence from survivors, eyewitnesses, CVRs, FDRs, or a positive declaration of the aircraft's serviceability.

In response to your final paragraph;

"At the end of the day if an aircraft full of passengers is flown at low level, at a speed just below Vne, in IMC, directly at high ground which the crew believe they cannot clear by the minimum margin allowed and it all turns to worms - then there is no alternative to a finding of negligence."

Could you explain what additional evidence you were able to draw upon that was not available to the President of the BOI, Wg Cdr Pulford - who after all, GATHERED all the available evidence, and who in contrast states;

"The Board was unable to positively determine the sequence of events leading up to the accident, and therefore concluded that although it is LIKELY that Flt Lt Tapper made an Error of Judgement (nb This has a VERY specific meaning) in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be INCORRECT TO CRITICISE HIM FOR HUMAN FAILINGS BASED ON THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE."

In consideration of the co-pilot, he said, "As Flt Lt Cook would have been fully occupied at the time with flying the aircraft over the sea in deteriorating weather conditions, and as it is unlikely that he would have had any reason to doubt the actions of his experienced captain, the Board concluded that Flt Cook could not be criticised for failing to identify any errors. THE BOARD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE NO HUMAN FAILINGS WITH REGARD TO FLT LT COOK."

As an aside, I did notice that you do not claim to have any relevant helicopter flying experience. For the benefit of our readership, Wg Cdr Pulford was probably one of the most experienced Chinook pilots in the RAF at the time.

It is interesting to note isn't it, that EVERY SINGLE TIME this case has been reviewed outside the MOD, the conclusion reached has been very similar to that of Wg Cdr Pulford, and very dissimilar to that of yourself and two Air Marshals whose names are rather better known now than they used to be.

I wonder how long it will take?

[Flatiron]

Many good points have been made since I last wrote, and all aircrew have been given much food for thought. However, the oft-repeated tendency to abuse air officers has tended to mask one crucial point. We all agree that the spirit and the letter of BoI rules in the Manual of Flight Safety are that no negligence finding should be found against deceased aircrew if there is any doubt. But that does not mean that 50 million people should have no doubt. Many of us have sat through civil court proceedings and come up with a different verdict from that found by a jury. That is just tough. If every civil case had to be re-tried until everyone agreed a verdict, the upshot would be chaos.

Like it or not, the chain of command that convened and adjudicated on the Chinook BoI was the properly authorised 'jury'. And that 'jury' was left in no doubt. Saying you don't agree with their opinion will get you nowhere, because the UK legal system would collapse under the implications.

K52 is quite right to flag up the point that BoI findings don't contain everything that goes into the final decision. Moreover, none of us have any legal right to know all the background, just as it is forbidden for jury members to reveal their deliberations.

In my humble opinion as a former FS 2, you will only stand a chance of overturning this negligence finding by working with the system rather than throwing spanners into its workings. Which means one of two things. Either you unearth meaningful new evidence, which means more than trying to imply that some very dedicated professionals in the SH force, HQ 1 Gp, HQ STC, IFS and MOD (PE) were all out to lunch, or you must show that the RAF violated its established precedents and procedures. I would incline to the latter.

Finally, a word on tactics. Those of ue who have worked in outer offices know that sending snottygrams to the PM or SofS only alienates those in high places who might otherwise be inclined to help you.

[The Mistress]

And your legal training is? Actually writing to the S of S sometimes gets you invited to have tea and biccies in his outer office to explain your side of the story. Trust me, I've done it! (Micheal Portillo's era). Not everyone takes offence and some would rather get to the bottom of things, rather than let them fester.

My own letters in this matter have been couched in polite and respectful manner, mostly to people I know personally. I'm sure most of the others have too.

[fobotcso]

Flatiron,

It is helpful to draw the analogy of the jury system to gain greater understanding of what is going on here, but you stop short where it is convenient for your argument to do so.

If course we can disagree with the verdict of the "jury"; it happens all the time in our courts and appeals are frequently lodged by Crown and Defence and also in Civil cases. And the UK legal system is far from collapsing under the implications of these appeals.

Those who cannot accept the finding of culpable negligence on the Chinook pilots wish for the matter to be re-considered. That's all.

[Nil nos tremefacit]

Flatiron,

Nobody is suggesting that the vast majority of professionals who have gathered and assessed the evidence on this matter are 'out to lunch'. The Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons did more work and researched more material than anyone else and they think that Day and Wratten are wrong. The Wg Cdr who chaired the BOI by definition disagrees with the ACMs as do the 2 Gp Capts who perused the papers before they reached them.

The legal system of our country is robust and allows of appeals from almost every court and tribunal. Typically a case could start in the Magistrates Court, progress to the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Very few do that. The option is there, but the vast majority of cases are accepted at first instance. The same applies in the civil system. Where people feel that there is still an injustice then they ask their elected representatives to support them. Many famous cases have included interventions by the Home Secretary.

The civil servants, or in the military, staff officers, prepare responses to letters. If they are upset about having to answer detailed letters, couched in a polite fashion, just because the views of the writers do not accord with their own or because they will have to challenge preconceived ideas then so be it. Every civil servant and military officer is the paid employee of each and every elector. MPs are elected to represent all of their constituents regardless of their beliefs and without fear or favour. If they are the characters you describe, Flatiron, then might I respectfully suggest that they are in the wrong job. There are in my experience many such people in the RAF system who are doing the job because it is a promotion step and not because they want to look after the people who pay their salaries. If a staff officer has to answer a PE and sits up all night doing it then 'tough'. If the staff officer has to rewrite his whole report because someone has deigned to challenge his conclusions then likewise 'tough'. At the end of the day Wratten, Day, Squire etc could have not bothered with ISS, OCC, C etc and could have tried to become good enough at flying to be considered for Spec Aircrew. Heavy lies the head that wears the crown..

If a Minister is upset because he receives hundreds of letters on a particular subject then he should quit. The volume of correspondence shows the strength of feeling. If individuals, in large numbers, perceive that there has been an injustice then they have every right to campaign by whatever legal means they feel. So far none of us has dug up the hallowed turf of Headingley to make our point. Interestingly the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four campaigns continued for much longer than this one has so far. They had the active support of Members of Parliament even though many of them were citizens of a foreign country. They were acquitted and compensated. The legal system continues as before. Under Flatiron's rules they would have resigned themselves to 30 years behind bars lest they upset any senior police officers or Home Office civil servants.

Still no reply from my MP!

[This message has been edited by Nil nos tremefacit (edited 11 January 2001).]

[John Nichol]

Nice reasoned stuff Flatiron.

The point is that the families HAVE shown that the RAF violated its own procedures.

There was doubt, of this simple fact there is no doubt. The BOI president said so, the 2 Group Captains said so, a judge (sheriff) said so and the Commons' PAC said so. What more does one need?

New evidence? Don't need it! The evidence layed down in the BOI shows that there is tons of doubt, masses of it, $hit loads in fact.

Violated its precedents? Yup, shown how they have done that. I have written reports on 7 other BOIs that cleared the various crews of any negligence despite far more compelling evidence. As a former FS2 (do I know you?) you will know the ones I mean.

On the question of the "jury", of course Sir Bill is entitled to his opinion, indeed as "our judge" his opinion became the verdict. But, and it is a big but, most people think he was wrong. Indeed, every independant person who has read and understood the evidence thinks he is wrong.

You seem to be saying that simply because he WAS the jury, because he was a senior officer, that doesn't matter, his rank entitles him to be right. Regardless of his wrongness.

Any other pointers for us?

[Tandemrotor]

Can any of you 'legal eagles' out there answer a question for me?

If a juror was subsequently found to have had a significant connection with a case he had considered, would that be grounds for a mis-trial?

And by the way, what if there WERE only two jurors, and they BOTH could be vulnerable to criticism if the case went against them?

Hey, I guess it just goes to show, some examples are more DIFFERENT than SIMILAR.

Hey ho.

[Paul Wesson]

TR

1. Yes. Masses of case law somewhere, but not to hand in my study.

2. Likewise, yes.

Nemo judex in causa sua - no-one may be judge in his own cause - springs to mind. Most famous recent case was when a member of the House of Lords was disbarred from hearing the appeal on the Pinochet extradition matter, when it was noted that he was a paid up member of Amnesty International.

I suppose that the matter could be referred to a judicial review, but all other legal avenues have to be exhausted first. You only have 3 months to react from the final decision. One or other of the Cook/Tapper families would have sufficient interest to bring such a review. If it's less than 3 months from the date of Hoon's refusal to react to the PAC report then I would argue that it would be acceptable to file an application for permission to seek a judicial review of that decision. Michael Fordham would be the best counsel to advise on this matter since he wrote the exceptionally good judicial review handbook.

Hope this helps.

[Brian Dixon]

Hi Flatiron.

Thanks for your post. grateful if you could advise me who to contact with regard an appeal against conviction. What?? This is not possible?? Goodness me, what a poor state of affairs. We just have to accept what we are told do we?

I seem to recall some bloke, now what was his name....Tench, yes, that was it. He wasn't convinced of the procedure and wrote about it. Appears that his report failed to make it to the publishers. Hardly fair now is it.

To use your legal analogy, I would point out that the "jury" (Wg Cdr Pulford + 2) reached a not guilty verdict. The "Judge" chose a different verdict.

I have absolutely no problem with anyone having a different view to that of my own. However, if you put forward an argument please support it with evidence and fact, as opposed to just "live with it". It makes for a more interesting debate.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[FJJP]

WHOA!

Tandemrotor! You cannot compare the BOI with a TRIAL! The BOI is an inquiry, set out to ascertain the facts and reach a conclusion as to what went wrong. A trial does the same, except that the jury is required to decide who is guilty (if anyone). The judge then decides the sentence.

What went wrong here was that the Sen Offs concerned expressed an opinion (which they were perfectly entitled to do), but that a large volume of informed opinion agree that the conclusion they reached was in error, according to the laid down procedures (in the AP). Also, the BOI and/or the Sen Offs concerned are ENTITLED to find guilt, if the evidence warrants it. In such a case, the BOI procedure would trigger the preliminaries to Court martial.

By the very nature of the BOI and the environment in which it is held (ie it is an in-house procedure), everybody involved has a connection with the case, if for no other reason than the Board is composed of uniformed EXPERTS, some of whom will probably know, have worked with and socialised with the individuals involved.

No, I’m sorry old sport, to answer your question, there was no trial, therefore there can be no mis-trial. The best we can hope for is that someone of the calibre of our present CAS will stamp his feet and order a review, despite the s**t that would be slung his way by our political SERVANTS.

[Paul Wesson]

Lets not confuse ourselves with analogies between trials, tribunals and boards. Any legally constituted body or any body exercising a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative function in accordance with a power conferred by statute which affects the rights or legitimate expectations of others and acts in accordance with the rules of natural justice is susceptible to review. The Air Force Board of Enquiry rules and regulations are based in statute under the Air Force Constitution Act 1917. Therefore if the rules are not operated in accordance with the rules of natural justice then I would argue that the decision is reviewable. Whether or not the decision is made by one man, two men, three men or twelve is irrelevant. The Board and all the people confirming the decisions thereof have a duty to act fairly and to be seen to have acted fairly.

[John Nichol]

To be fair to Flatiron I can tell you that AVM Day was convinced by his own argument. When I first got involved in the case he granted me an "off the record" interview - the only time he has ever spoken about the case outside of MOD circles. His arguments were very persuasive (so good, in fact, that I almost give up the case; he had me convinced). By all accounts he still gives the same brief to Ministers. It was not until I spoke to serving Chinook operators that I began to understand the flaws in his arguments.

As it was off the record I can't tell you what he said - Oh sod it -

He did say that he thought Andy Pulford was cowardly and had dodged making the big decision that Day himself then had to make.

In a very telling aside he also said that they had used the TANS as a "basic ADR" to reconstruct the flight. I think that this has really shaped the MODs thinking; they BELIEVE that they know what happened in the final seconds of flight. I've written a fairly comprehensive critique of the way the TANS was used; needless to say it is anything but an ADR, basic or otherwise.

To answer your question GICASI - no, I don't think he regrets it at all. He thinks he was right.

[InFinRetirement]

I am fascinated by the length of this thread and that John N is still there punching away - which I applaud.

However, I have a pertient question.

In spite of some compelling arguments against the great white chiefs and their minnions, jurors, etc., etc., etc., Could any of the above influence another 'trial' to get to the real truth which, on the face of it, is here right in this thread. Would/could the MOD be forced, coerced or whatever to re-open the case and make the fools look bigger fools than they already are? And then give a verdict that indicates EXACTLY what happened.

[1.3VStall]

Flatiron,

I may be missing something, but I do not believe comparing the BOI to a civil court is valid.

As I understand it a civil jury finds guilty when it believes a case is proven "beyond reasonable doubt". I do not believe any civil jury would find guilty in this case if the yardstick of proof was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever".

[John Nichol]

InFin,
An excellent point, and a one that has worried me for some time. If the highest authority in the land (The Def Sec and the PM) have said that they don't accept what seems to be a pretty convincing argument, where can you go?

Well, the idea of a Select Committee is still being examined though I presume its findings could also be rejected.

A juidicial review is a possibility though prohibitively expensive.

Any other thoughts?

[Flatiron]

Thanks for all the comments.

I am not saying that a BOI equates to a trial - as I have said before, if the RAF wanted to discipline anyone after an accident investigation, it would have to initiate a separate Summary of Evidence first. The point I was trying to make was that Geoff Hoon can no more overturn the verdict of a properly and legally constituted BoI than Jack Straw can unilaterally overturn the verdict of a legally constituted civil jury.

Consequently, pleas to Geoff Hoon to 'quash' the Kintyre findings will get nowhere. That might work in a dictatorship, but not in the UK where there a distinct gulf between the executive and the judiciary. What you have to do is persuade him to get the inquiry re-opened. And this is best done by informed pressure, rather than personal slurs on anyone.

As an aside, much mention has been made of the BoI President, Andy Pulford. For the past two years, Gp Capt Pulford has been Personal Staff Officer to the Chief of Air Staff, which means he has been in-face-to- face contact with Dick Johns and Peter Squire for an average of 2 hours per day. I think it is safe to assume that if Gp Capt Pulford had had any doubts about the use to which the findings of his BoI were put, he would have had ample opportunity to express them at the highest level.

[Tandemrotor]

I believe Andy Pulford did once express his opinion to senior officers regarding the use to which his BOI has been put.

Corporal Pulford sends his regards to everyone who knows him, and says cleaning toilets at RAF Boulmer really isn't that bad after all.

[Arkroyal]

At last a reply to my two letters, one to Blair and one to Hoon in response to the PAC Report:

Thank you for your letters of 2 December to the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994. Your letters have been passed to this Branch in the Ministry of Defence for response as we have responsibility for this matter and I hope you will accept this letter as a reply to both of them.

You refer to the media coverage following the publication of the Public Accounts Committee’s (PAC) 45t1’t Report on the acceptance of the Chinook Mark 2 into service, which links problems experienced during the Chinook acceptance process to the Mull of Kintyre accident. I should explain that the MOD had early sight of this report and we were disappointed to find that the Committee had accepted comprehensive and detailed briefing from those campaigning to overturn the finding of the Board of Inquiry into the Mull accident without giving due weight to the Departments views. We will respond formally to the specific points raised by the Committee on the acceptance of the Chinook Mk2 shortly. I would, however, point out that the Defence Committee in its 1998 report on lessons learnt from the Chinook accident, found that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.

It may help if I explain why the RAF Board of Inquiry, which was painstakingly thorough, reached the conclusion it did. Investigators from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash. However the Board of Inquiry established that about twenty seconds before the crash, the crew re-set their navigational computer, a telling indicator that they were not then grappling with an in-flight emergency as subsequent media speculation has suggested.

The MOD has always said that if new evidence were to come to light, it would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion. To date we have seen nothing that causes us to doubt the integrity of the verdict of the RAE Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new Inquiry.

I hope this explains the position.


Any similarity to stiknrudda’s reply posted on 5 Jan is entirely to be expected as mine too was written by Miss V L U.

Her third paragraph would suggest that she has not actually read the ‘painstakingly thorough’ BOI report, which until the intervention of the reviewing officers found, as Tandemrotor explains so well, no reason to cite human failings as a cause. She obediently sticks to the MOD line (re-iterated in the 1998 defence committee report) that the BOI report and its reviewing officers’ remarks cannot be considered seperately, and that new evidence is required in order to reopen the Inquiry.

Why do these people willfully ignore the argument that our case is that sufficient doubt exists to overturn the original verdict. That requires no new evidence.

K52 and Flatiron,

I don’t know the lapse rate on the day. I simply put forward that it was almost certainly not possible within the clearance of the Chinook Mk 2 to complete this transit in IMC. Since their failure to do so is used as a stick to beat them by Wratten, that makes it pertinent.

As CICASI points out: No-one on this planet can affirm why that Chinook crashed on that day, to a standard of proof equal to 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and so the finding of gross negligence is unsafe in RAF law and common sense.

[antennae]

Four questions for our Secretary of State:

Your department consistently states that the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAJB) of the Department of the Environment Transport and the Regions, carried out a detailed technical investigation. The Inquiry
concluded that there was no evidence of any technical malfunction that could possibly have caused the crash.
Does an absence of evidence prove beyond all doubt that a technical malfunction did not occur?
As Secretary of State, does your department acknowledge crashes can occur with "no fault found"?
Was the AAIB able to say, beyond all doubt, that the 20% of ZD576 that was obliterated could not have provided the slightest clue to this accident?
What is your view of the post-impact position of the pilots' foot pedals?

[K52]

Tandemrotor
re your post 10 Jan @2224.

I did not say that and I do not believe that anyone could assert that. To do so one would have to go through 83 years worth of accident enquiries at IFS, AHB and the PRO. A fair task given that in the 2 years leading up to November 1939 no less than 478 aircraft of Bomber Command forced landed due to the Pilots "losing their way". The same Command lost 8305 Aircrew due to flying training and other accidents during the war.

GICASI

As I said in my original post the BOI was being Staffed when I arrived at HQ1Gp. You are quite right that the 1Gp Flight Safety Office has gone, it disappeared when 1Gp moved from Benson to High Wycombe in 1996 - the FS1 post was disestablished and the GFSO post was absorbed into STC Flight Safety.

The FS staff distributed copies of the BOI to all relevant Departments within Gp as well as the Eng staff at HQ STC, IAM, SCSR etc for specialist comment. Replies were then collated by FS and forwarded through SASO to the AOC. I would not comment on ANY of the papers relating to ANY of the BOI's I saw as in some cases they were, in effect, discussion documents containing different perspectives. They were not meant for publication and were, in effect, " off the record".

Flatiron and FJJP are correct, the BOI is an administrative tool and the evidence, although give on oath, is priviliged. It cannot be used as evidence in any legal proceedings. To initiate legal proceedings a Summary of Evidence has to be taken.

I have been accused of being engrossed in trivia. That may be the perspective of some but my limited experience in the FS world, and somewhat larger experience of BOI's, showed me that the truth is often buried in the evidence. I can think of at least one crew who might be willing to buy me a beer for digging in to what was concealed in the pages of their BOI during my short time at 1 Gp.

A recent e-mail I received sums it all up, for me anyway; QUOTE I see that PULSE 1 has got the nub of it and he only has a PPL UNQUOTE.

The finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull in conditions that precluded flight in VFR.

There is one point that I never understood. The BOI, if it feels that it unable to find a definite cause of the accident; has to give what, in its opinion, is the most likely cause and in this instance the BOI decided that the most likely cause was " selecting an inappropriate rate of climb."
I do not see how, if an aircraft is approaching a KNOWN OBSTACLE on its route and selects "an in appropriate rate of climb" to clear that obstacle it does not attract a finding of negligence.

[pulse1]

K52

I'm flattered that someone should be quoting me but surely, if the BoI HAS to offer the most LIKELY cause, this in itself implies a high degree of DOUBT. How then can the finding of "gross negligence" stand.

In my view you are clearly strengthening the argument for changing this finding. Thank you.

------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[trailfinder]

I have been following this thread for a while.

What puzzles me about the situation is MoD's intransigence on this matter. What harm would it do to admit that the pilots were not at fault? Not wishing to sound like a conspiracy nut, but do MoD have something to fear from a new enquiry being opened and therefore are determined not to overthrow the negligence verdict? Is there something they feel they have to hide (other than protecting the butt of a particular senior and still serving officer)?

As far as Hoon goes, he is nothing but a mouth piece for Blair; that is why he is in post. Robertson was too independently minded for TB to control therefore he puts in a yes-man. Blair is not known for following deeply unpopular causes so what is he up to?

Just my two pence worth.

[InFinRetirement]

John N, it seems to me after my last post and your obvious frustration, that a new line of attack is required, nay imperative. It also seems to me that a sort of "people's champion" is required. Someone who couldn't give a toss about the MOD, or the idiots who reached the conclusions they did. Those findings are clearly flawed and negligence has never been proved - "must have been negligent" would be slander in civil courts.

The findings of W&D should be declared biased, unfair and a new JUDICIAL review should be ordered with NO involvement by the MOD, or the Services but by a aviation man honest through and through who will get to the real truth.

Hiding behind a impenetrable screen is just the thing that those chosen to conduct the last enquiry would have predictably used to protect themselves, the military, and anyone else who was or is guilty of malpractice - of ANY kind or description.

Such a man exists. Who is he? David Mellor - not as mad as it sounds - he's a tenacious bugger. The CAA AIB under the aegis of the CAA and not the MOD would be my choice. And ALL those brilliant gentlemen would have carte blanche to investigate ALL records, and seek and find those that have, perhaps, been deliberately witheld or conveniently forgotten. And who will use intelligent and answer seeking questions and who will not jump to conclusions.

A select committee is NOT the answer in my view. The questions would be as good as next to nothing. Remember, "are you now, or have you ever been a member of the communist party?" a simple NO answers the question.
Mind you Mrs Dunwoody is good, but not aviation minded, and therefore good enough. Gerald Kaufman deters people giving answers by his demeanour and arrogance.

No, it needs an unbiased, independent review, with top level ministerial support, and only the PM will do. No interference, and penalities for non-coperation. It needs a man of iron who will not allow any crap.

A judicial review is the only way. One final way to get to the truth. It is owed to the Pilots whose names have been dragged back and forth in the mud, and it is certainly owed to the very special passengers on board. At the end of it there should then be a board to let it be known that Wratten and 'crew' were probably guilty of the most serious and wayward shortcomings.

Draconian? You betcha! But is there another way?

[This message has been edited by InFinRetirement (edited 14 January 2001).]

[Ben Leice]

There is no evidence to conclude that the pilots were in control of the Chinook when it crashed.

No one has been able to identify the Chinook with patchwork camouflage sighted near Portrush in North Antrim about 5:30 pm on the evening of the crash.

As for records, it is reported that tasking records for the period of the crash were destroyed three weeks before Christmas. This more or less coincides with the time that tasking records were mentioned following John Nichol's letter to the Times on December 5. The destruction of the records was described as routine.

[Brian Dixon]

Just a couple of points.

Infin. Another 'trial' would provide nothing new. It is a review of the Board reviewing officer's findings that needs to be addressed. All available evidence is there. It just fails to lend support to their verdict. They have also shown disregard for their own rules. That is what should be addressed and rectified.

K52. You say the finding of negligence was for continuing to fly towards the Mull. At what point on the route did it change from acceptable to negligent, and why. Where is your evidence to show that the pilots did absolutely nothing to avoid the accident.

Trailfinder. Welcome to the debate. I don't know why the MoD are reluctant. Might have something to do with rushed introduction of aircraft with dubious servicability (allegedly), or a sacrificial lamb was needed for the loss of such a valuable pax list (plus specialist crew). I would love to know why. Perhaps that are not saying as they know there will be a counter to their argument.

Infin (again). I believe the Select Committee being considered by Lord Chalfont may prove interesting. Especially if he chooses to get the two Air Marshals to make personal appearences. I don't know whether that is the case, but it is a pleasant thought. They were not called for either the FAI in Scotland or by the PAC, and I for one think they should have their turn in the hot seat.

Ben. Agree with your comment over whether the pilots were in control or fighting for control, but please, please forget this other Chinook. It has no bearing as far as I can see. I do not mean to be rude by this post either. Honest!!

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[tonka]

Just wanted to make it 600 posts

[K52]

Brian,

You asked me "when did it become negligence."
The simplistic answer is once they failed to maintain the minimum criteria for VFR flight. However, aviation, like life, is rarely that simple. Several contributors to this thread have used the analogy "nibbled to death by ducks." I would put it slightly differently; I think that some of the ducks that they had been feeding turned round and bit them.

You will remember that the decision had been taken to utilise one crew for all the days tasking and give the other crew a "day off". The BOI decided that there was no administrative reason why this should not be the case, although it does not tell us when this decision was made. You will also remember that in my first post I questioned whether this was a judicious use of crew resources.

The morning tasking was scheduled to take 5 flying hours out of the 7 flying hours normally allowed in the NI crew duty period. This 7 hour limit could be extended by one hour by the 230 Sqn Duty Auth Sqn Ldr or further by SRAFONI. So if all went to plan they could do the round trip in the evening with the 1 hr extension from the Duty Auth, which was almost certain to be given. As far as normal authorisation was concerned the Chinook detatchment was self authorising.

The morning tasking actually took five and a half flying hours. This not only reduced the margins available in which to complete the evening sorties but reduced the time available to prepare for them. The Met briefing arrived by fax (no time to go to see Met for a face to face brief?)and the crew departed to see the Duty Auth to brief him on the sorties and negotiate a 1hr extension to flying duty time.

Unfortunately, the Duty Auth was tied up with another crew and departure time was looming. They photocopied their charts and left them for the Duty Auth and departed without obtaining the flying time extension they needed. The interesting thing about the photocopied charts is that the writing on them does not belong to either of the Pilots who were now doing the sortie. I understand that the other crew did the planning on the assumption that they would do the sortie as the first crew were already planned to do a 5 flying hour (out of a normal 7 allowed) task.

Jayteeto has told us that the Mk1 Chinook was U/S otherwise it would have done the task. Is it possible that the sortie was planned on the basis that the Mk1 would be used? If that was the case, and the planning was not adjusted by the crew of ZD576 in the light of the much more restrictive icing limitations of the Mk2, then perhaps the negligence started here.

Back at the aircraft they found that there were delays due to late arriving Pax and baggage. This was now threatening to impinge on the overall crew duty day period of 14 hrs if they were to complete the task and return to Aldergrove that evening. They also had the imponderables of how long it would take to offload Pax and Baggage at Inverness and how long would it take to refuel at Kinloss. (From personal experience I know that the latter could involve a considerable wait for a bowser outside normal office hours in those days).

Although not specifically stated in the BOI I have little doubt that the crew planned to return that evening. They did not take the F700 with them, they had not booked overnight accommodation - or parking - and the pilots had no overnight kit with them.

I would suggest that they now had three options:

1. Call for the other crew to do the task, which would involve further delay - and probably involve some embarrassing questions in the morning.

2. Request a crew duty extension or permision to nightstop out of theatre from SRAFONI. Ditto regarding questions.

3. Try to make up as much time as possible around the route.

They certainly did not plump for either option 1 or 2. The evidence suggests that they were implementing option 3.

I stand by my earlier posts; the distance from Aldergrove to the crash point is 43nm in a straight line and the aircraft was airborne for 17 minutes. That is an average groundspeed of 152kts but it does not allow for acceleration time after lift off. I do not know how quickly a Chinook accelerates but, if we assume that it takes one minute to get from zero to 120kts, then it will do so whilst covering 1nm. That would leave the remaining straight line distance of 42nm to be covered in 16 minutes - a required groundspeed of 158kts. We do know, however, that it did NOT travel directly to the Mull but departed initially to the east. I postulated in an earlier post that this could have added an extra track mileage of 3nm. If that were true then the required average groundspeed becomes 169 kts. Whatever calculation you make,the required groundspeed to cover the distance in the 17 minutes from lift-off to accident is considerably in excess of the planned 120kts.

There has been considerable debate in respect of SALT around the Mull and whether ZD576 could have safely climbed to SALT without infringing the icing limitations of the Mk2 Chinook. Initially it was maintained that SALT was contingent on the proximity of Ben Nevis. Ben Nevis is 95nm from the crash position - to base SALT on that feature is akin to basing SALT for London Heathrow on the height of the cranes in Boulogne or Calais Docks (93nm). The planned SALT for the first leg was based on a mast in Belfast and the 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. What none of those who claim to have access to the BOI (which contains both the Met forecast and the aftercast) have disclosed is the height of the +4 degree isotherm.

The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.

OC RAF Odiham made the point in his comments that a climb at an IAS of 150kts was not " recognisable as a Chinook technique". But if you are trying to make up time, and don't appreciate the proximity of the Mull, then is it not at least a possibility?

Just one final point. We have been repeatedly told that the crew could not climb and operate in temperatures below plus 4 degrees C. We have even been told that draconian disciplinary action would be taken against them if they did deviate from the R to S. So, what was their planned route back from Kinloss?

[Arkroyal]

K52

Those of us who claim to have access to the AAIB and BOI reports can only use the information within, and the +4 isotherm is not included, only the sea level temp of +9 deg C. I have asked the Met Office for an aftercast, and recieved the reply that the freezing level that afternoon in western Scotland was 'about 5000ft'. From this we can only speculate (as would the crew that day) that the 4 dg C level would be about 2500ft. As for the SALT, that for the next leg would have been 5900ft based on Ben Nevis. Wratten comes up with a figure of 2800ft, but in any event, the climb to SALT was decidedly iffy for a Mk 2 Chinook.

You say that 'The final sighting of ZD576 was by the yachtsman when the aircraft was 2 miles from the fog enshrouded lighthouse. At that point they were already contravening the rules for VFR flight yet they continued without deviation as observed by the yachtsman.' As he states that the helicopter was clearly visible, as was the lighthouse, on what do you base your assertion that they were already contravening VFR?

The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?

As for the planned return route, that is utterly irelevant.

As GICASI points out, you are relying on speculation to come up with a cause. None of us will ever know what happened in the last moments of this flight, and because of the rules in force at the time the crew must be given the benefit of 'any doubt whatsoever' as to the cause of the crash. Any doubt whatsoever must make the finding of gross negligence unsafe.

[Tandemrotor]

K52

Thank you for your recent posting. I am truly staggered by your apparent powers of recall on this subject, as you said you had had no contact with the case in recent years. Have you ever written a book on the power of memory? If not ,you should, because most of yours is vaguely accurate.

However, I feel obliged to echo the thoughts of GICASI. I find it a little depressing that you seem to attach so much importance to very debatable trivia, and then try to use this 'evidence' to somehow imply that the crew had been wreckless, or "injudicious" throughout the day. Indeed, perhaps the negligence began at breakfast, as only one pilot was witnessed partaking of that meal!(and you people seem to think that 'absence of evidence' equates to 'evidence of absence')

I had hoped that I could avoid the need to counter each and every one of the assertions you made in your first post. My overwhelming response to which was "so what!" But as you have now repeated them in a semi-factual manner, I guess ignoring them is no longer an option. But, I stress, to me it is utter trivia, and does absolutely nothing to help us understand this accident.

It is interesting isn't it, that the test to be satisfied is 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever', and yet the best any of the 'prosecution' can muster is to resort to highly debatable trivia to concoct a circumstantial case to undermine the professionalism of the crew, in an attempt to make a suggestion of negligence somehow more believable!

Why? Because there IS no other evidence.

Perhaps this is precisely what honourable men in the Royal Air Force suspected could befall those of it's servants unable to defend themselves, when they decided on the phrase "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER."

What say you?

[K52]

GICASI,

The glib reply would be that you seem to have spent more time counting the words than reading them.

However, it is clear from your posts that it is you that has missed the BASIS of the findings entirely. The findings of negligence by AOC1Gp, confirmed by AOCinC STC, were for the pilots actions BEFORE the accident.


Arkroyal,

From what you say the Met forecast did not give the height of the +4 degree isotherm. Surely for an "experienced professional crew" alledgedly worried about the icing clearance of the Mk2, and in the light of the forecast weather at the Mull, that would be an essential piece of information for their flight planning?

I agree that ACM Wratten gave the SALT for the Mull as 2800ft but, as I have pointed out before, that was the planned figure for that first leg based on a mast in Belfast. The 25nm SALT for the Mull is 2500ft. It would appear therefore that SALT was achievable in the extant icing clearance.

Regarding the timing of the crash, the BOI says that engine power down time was 1759. That is 17 minutes after take-off.

The weather at the Mull, as described by the Lighthouse Keeper and his wife standing outside the Lighthouse as they heard the Chinook approach, was foggy and had been for some time, There were several other witnesses on the Mull who provided the same information.

[John Nichol]

K52,

I offer these thoughts:

Timing – you suggest that the crew were in a hurry to get back because of crew duty time. I hypothesise that they may have wanted a nightstop. You say they had not prepared for that eventuality, I say neither would I. ‘Cos then you can claim you were caught unawares. Of course, we are both guessing.


SALT - I utterly dispute your SALT calculations. As I remember, SALT is calculated for each leg of the route. Not at specific points on that route. The SALT for the leg to the Mull is 2800ft and from the Mull to Corran it's 5900ft. Maybe some rotary mates can clarify this.

BOI – I don’t “claim” to have seen it. It’s on my desk, alongside the AAIB report, Sheriff’s report, Racal report, Boeing report, witness statements, pictures, Uncle Tom Cobbly and all.

+4 degree isotherm – Actually it’s not in the BOI as far as I can see. It came out in the Sheriff’s inquiry from Tony Cable of the AAIB. He used a surface temp of 9 degrees but could not say where he got that figure from. The aftercast (which itself, is guesswork) shows;

1000ft +9
2000ft +9
3000ft +8
5000ft +4

There is, as you might expect, a fatal flaw here. The crew didn’t have access to an aftercast (acurate or not) ‘cos they were dead.

So, if we go for the aftercast temp of +9 at sea level. Using the aviators ROT we get

1000ft +7
2000ft +5
3000ft +3

Using this model, your +4 degree isotherm is at 2500ft.

But wait, yet another problem. The only temp the crew have is on their OAT guage. Do you know what was on it? I don’t. Suppose it said +7 at 200ft? That would place their +4 isotherm at about 1500ft.

The point is we are guessing. Everything we are talking about is a theory. Every time we say “the crew would have” or “the crew’s intentions were”, we have to use the phrase probably or possibly.

I concur with GICASI; you cannot say why or how ZD576 crashed. You are entitled to an opinion, and for the most it is well argued. But I can offer an alternative to every step of your argument which you cannot say is wrong.

I am not arrogant enough to say that your opinion is incorrect. I am simply saying there is no evidence that it is right.

[pulse1]

K52,

In my professional life, the people who worry me most are fools with lots of knowledge. You are obviously not a fool so the way you keep presenting your impressive knowledge while ignoring the fundamental question is beginning, in my mind, to look rather like you may have some sinister role in this campaign. (Re: your apparent ability to remember such detail after all this time?)

For goodness sake, please justify how even your arguments do not leave enough DOUBT to make the condemnation of two professional aircrew UNSAFE, particularly when they cannot defend themselves.

This is all anybody wants.As far as I can see, no-one is asking for a conclusion that says they were not being negligent.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[SteadyNote]

K52
Are you the Keith Poulter who was on the Ops Desk on 16 in the 70s??

[Brian Dixon]

K52,
thanks again for your detailed reply. Your memory is amazing (are you sure you haven't got a copy of the board?).

I think most of the points have been addressed, certainly by people far better than I, so I won't repeat everything here.

However, you still offer no firm evidence which proves with "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the pilots were negligent. Remember-(I'm sure you will), that only 80% of the aircraft was available to examine, and not all of the 80% was in a condition to be examined thoroughly.

Our differences aside, thank you for presenting such a detailed point of view. It makes a change from individuals on your side of the fence.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Tandemrotor]

K52

Okay, okay. I have given some thought to this, and I really don't think anyone would be interested to read a posting from me that counters every trivial, circumstantial, hypothetical allegation that you have made in the course of your recent postings. (By the way, you have changed your ground a little haven't you - from altimeters, and the point of negligence etc.) It really would have to be a long, not to mention, meandering response.

Would it be possible, do you think, to wrap up your case, in the most important 'bullet points', as you see them. Perhaps you would even like to end it with the way in which you are able to satisfy yourself that there is "absolutely no doubt WHATSOEVER" that the cause of this crash was negligence on the part of both pilots. I am sure this would clarify your position for many of our readers. Not least me.

Incidentally, you seemed quite reluctant to confirm my assertion that this case is indeed unique. In that, no other deceased pilots have EVER been found guilty of negligence in the circumstances of no positive evidence apparent in this one. But of course you couldn't deny it either. So I guess we will all have to assume that I am right. Unless, of course, you know better!

TTFN

[K52]

First things first,

Steadynote!!

I was not particularly concerned about remaining anonymous which is why I gave deails of my last posting, and exit date, and left the e-mail button available. I used K52 because it was my "first solo" on this site and that was my callsign for my "first solo" in Jet Provost Mk 3 XM474 from Acklington in 1965.

No doubt others have looked to see who I am. Some, like Brian Dixon, have had e-mail correspondence with me and have learnt my full name. All, up to now, have respected the rule of not posting anything "invasive of a person's privacy" - but as it was your first post, perhaps you didn't read that bit.

So, is this the start of some personal abuse or was it an innocent question? If the latter then you could have e-mailed me.

If it was a genuine mistake then I'm sorry for the acerbic reply. If it wasn't then I'm not!!

But what does it matter, I am a retired Spec Aircrew Flt Lt. We live in a 16th Century Cottage in a small village, next door to a Pub, and my Wife earns 50% more than I ever did.


John Nichol

I certainly take your point that we will never know for certain if they intended to nightstop at Kinloss. My apologies if I didn't make that clear. The evidence is circumstantial but, as I stated, in my opinion the lack of overnight kit; failure to book accommodation (or parking for the aircraft), and failure to take the F700 point to an intention to return that night. We will never know because of their failure to complete the mandatory out brief with the 230 Duty Auth. If they had intended to nightstop then where did they intend to record the A/F & B/F servicings, as well as the refuelling, because they left the F700 behind?

I have always agreed your point that the planned SALT for that leg was 2800ft, which incidentally several people have derided ACM Wratten for quoting. You also quoted the SALT as 5900ft in a previous post. My point is that the SALT of 2800ft was based on a obstacle some 35nm behind them, the 25nm SALT {the same radius as SALT's shown on TAP's} was 2500ft. If they had been flying the same route in reverse {Inverness to Aldergrove}, and had encountered the same conditions on the other side of the Mull, would you expect them to base their SALT on Ben Nevis 90nm behind them?

Regarding the Wx forecast and aftercast. There should be copies with the BOI,it is standard procedure to obtain them in the same way that it is standard procedure to impound relevant documentation such as engineering records and auth sheets etc.

As 2 different contributors have said that they don't have them then it is possible (assuming that those copies came from different sources) that those pages were missed out in the copying. Perhaps if you ask MoD politely?

If you want a chat e-mail me details, I might even buy you a pub lunch if you get out my way.

Pulse 1, Tandemrotor and Brian Dixon

Between the 3 of you the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent. The different perspectives that people apply to the same items of information:

Pulse 1 asks if I have a sinister motive. (NO)

Tandemrotor says my memory is "Vaguely accurate" (Thankyou)

Brian Dixon says my memory "is amazing" ( Thankyou Brian - I like you better) I don't have a copy of the BOI - but if someone would like to send me one? That includes MOD but if they don't have one to spare then what about a draft copy (hint).

Tandemrotor - you accused me of confirming something which I could not confirm. I do not know the answer - But, what about the Meteor(?) section leader who left 2,3 &4 embedded in Flamborough Head? Just a guess for starters.

K P

[Tandemrotor]

K52

Hi there, I too regretted the fact that your monica had been included in a previous post. I guess it can, and should, be removed.

I was intrigued by your suggestion that, between Pulse 1, Brian, and myself, "the root cause of all the controversy surrounding this accident is readily apparent."

I genuinely would like to explore that idea more. Please would you elaborate.

I am also genuinely interested in the Meteor formation at Flamborough Head. Again, please would you tell us a little more, if only to allow us to ask relevant questions.

Cheers

PS. By the way, any chance of a pub lunch for me too, who knows, perhaps my 16th century cottage is right next door to yours?

[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 19 January 2001).]

[misterploppy]

K52

You quote 3 different opinions of your motivation and/or the quality of your memory. There indeed is the rub. I dare say 50 aviators could look at the circumstances leading up to the Mull crash and all have different *opinions* as to the intention of the crew, which SALT was correct, whether they planned to return to Aldergrove, what happened in the immediate run-up to the crash etc, etc, etc.

That, I would contend is precisely why the RAF BofI rules stated that negligence (let alone gross negligence) on the part of deceased crew may only be found when there is no doubt whatsover that negligence was the cause.

I fail to see what possible bearing the crew's intention to return to Aldergrove or not has on this matter. No amount of speculation on the matters you raise changes the fact that no honest person can have *no doubt whatsoever* that negligence was the cause of this accident.

[ShyTorque]

K52,

A minor point - You get an award for stating the obvious. Of course any supposed negligence was alleged BEFORE the accident took place. A little late just after?

Please could you explain how you are so sure there is NO doubt that the VFR rules were broken at any one point in the flight? In the absence of an FDR there is no proof, only supposition.

It seems to me that the normal chains of command and authorisation sadly failed in this case but responsibilty for some of the "nibbling ducks" only moved downwards.

All those who could have stopped this flight or recalled it and are still around to draw their pay - one pace backwards MARCH! Oh, they did that already.

[Flatus Veteranus]

Flamborough Head 1951

I have thought about the similarities between Kintyre and Flamborough Head. The facts of the latter incident were (to the best of my memory after 50 years!) as follows;-

In the summer of '51 203 AFS was flying from Carnaby (W. of Bridlingon) while the runway at Driffield was under repair. On the day in question the weather had been poor in the morning, but the stratus lifted after lunch and full flying was resumed. A formation took off, led by a very experienced instructor (a well-respected Master Pilot, I think)with two Dutch students as wing-men. The R Neth AF was buying Meteors and there was some pressure to pass these students out on time.

About 30 mins later stratus started to roll in again from the sea and a general recall was broadcast on Driffield Approach. The only approach aids available were a manual VHF/DF feeding into GCA. The manual homer required long transmissions (several seconds) to get a reliable bearing, so only about 5/6 aircraft could be handled at a time on a Controlled Descent (QGH). Driffield still used Meteor 4s which had an endurance of less than one hour (normal sorties were about 45 mins). Driffield approach was under pressure from solo aircraft declaring low fuel states. The formation leader therefore elected to do a free let-down with what help he could get from the Fighter Fixer Service (VHF/DF triangulation) and Carnaby Homer. he positioned his formation over the sea, well NE of Carnaby (so he thought) and began a descent through cloud on a southerly heading. His wingmen, although new to the meteor, were experienced fighter pilots and steady in formation. He expected to break cloud above 500ft over the sea, wait to obtain a True Bearing from Carnaby greater than 090 and then turn right onto West to run in over Bridlington, where the coast is low-lying. Unfortunately the winds at altitude were probably less strong than forecast and he started his descent closer to the coast than he thought. The coastline N of Flamborough Head trends NW/SE and the cliffs rise to about 250ft amsl. The leader did not gain contact with sea until about 150ft in poor visibility, unaware that he was closing with the cliffs at an angle. The leader saw the cliffs through the murk, yelled "pull up!" on the RT, scraped over the top himself, but his wingmen went in.

Inevitably, they threw the book at the leader. On reaching safety height, it was said, he should have declared an emergency, and if there was no alternate within range (there was not) he should have ordered his formation to bale out. However, since the Meteor 4 had no ejection seat, the chances of a successful bale-out (we had been told) were slight. It was always best to try to get the aircraft onto the ground, somewhere, somehow. I believe the instructor was acquitted of the main charge of negligence and found guilty of an alternative charge, for which he received a reprimand. He returned to flying duties with his honour unimpeached. But in this case, unlike the Kintyre accident, the leader survived to recount all the relevant mitigating circumstances.

PS I believe that in the morning I had been slated for this sortie myself, but it was cancelled due to weather. There but for the Grace...


------------------
presto digitate

[Tandemrotor]

Can anyone out there prove me wrong? I am really beginning to believe now that this case is indeed unique. In other words, no other deceased aircrew ever HAVE been found guilty of negligence, without evidence from survivors, eye witnesses, FDRs, VCRs, radio calls etc.

Can that be right?

[John Nichol]

Tandem, I stand ready to be corrected but I believe that the verdict of "gross negligence" has been passed on 2 crews:

1.The GR1 crash in the desert just before the war started. Don't really want to go into the details; if you know the accident you know what happened.

2.The F3 crash in Cyprus (steady descent into the sea).

Obviously, full ADR CVR evidence in both cases "proved" CFIT.

Can't find any others. Anyone know different?

[Brian Dixon]

I was forwarded a reply from John Spellar today by my MP. He questions my comment that the Chinook issue is having an effect on morale and recruiting after I supplied un named comments posted on the thread. Here's the section from the letter:

Mr Dixon suggests he has evidence that the Mull of Kintyre issue is directly influencing RAF recruitment levels and lowering morale. We do not have any evidence of this, and I should therefore be grateful if Mr Dixon would let me have any evidence so that we can examine the contention in more detail.

What I would like is for Spellar to be informed of exactly how this issue is affecting your morale or intent to join up. The more the merrier! Either write to him at:
MoD
Main Building
Whitehall
London SW1A 2HB

or e-mail me at the address below and I will compile them (again, no names if requested) and forward them on. Don't forget to tell you colleagues!

I'll keep you all informed.

Regards and thanks
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[colinj]

Well my emails to MP and MOD meant a reply by post was awaiting me after arrival back from business trip to USA.

Why does it take MOD one month and 10days to get their finger out and reply correctly.

I will not bother to write out the content of the letter from Mrs V J Bellchambers however suffice to say a serious matter like this does not need to have a templated letter same as sent to others with I believe the DAS ref indicating one of five of the same letter has been sent out.

Suffice to say a direct dial phone call will be made on Monday morning explaining I want answers to questions and not misjudged and misinformed low quality typed replies.

http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/frown.gif

------------------

[Brian Dixon]

Colin,
I am the lucky owner of three letters from Mrs Bellchambers. Each has the Ref DAS(Sec)58/1/5. I hope you have better luck that I did in telephoning. Please let me know how you get on.

With regard to the delay in replying to any letters, I am still waiting for a reply sent to the PM on 2 Dec 00!! Not even an acknowledgement this time. This is how much personal attention he gives the matter.

Don't forget to let me know if this is part of the morale issue.

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[bad livin']

Guys just a quickie - I have found that around where I live the Mull issue is seriously affecting people's opinions of and confidence in the Royal Air Force. This bothers me - a lot. It will be intersting to discover if this disquiet does in fact have a bearing on recruitment and retention.

[Brian Dixon]

Bad,
how can this be so?? Minister Spellar says that there is no evidence of this. Surely he knows best. After all, he appears to know more about the Chinook crash than anyone else (not that he's letting on). His confident appearence with Paxman should have told you that!

With regard to the confidence issue, see my posting a few entries higher up. If these people would either like to get in touch with me, or write direct to Minister Spellar expressing their concern, he may then have to accept the fact that there are indeed wider issues surrounding the crash.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Brian Dixon]

There was a meeting of the Mull of Kintyre Group yesterday. As soon as I have an update of the meeting, I'll post it here.

Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[FJJP]

Just keeping the post close to the top of the index.....awaiting details of the Group meeting.

[MP No 805]

John

Having come from the Senior Service I know less about the accident than many. My back ground 20 years, most service types, A1 Cat and one of very few Master Pilots. It is morally wrong, given the many possibilities to find men who have died on duty negligent without clear and irrefutable evidence.

In terms of your research, before this accident I flew a rescue sortie recovering Gurkas and the crew from a crash on West Falklands. It struck me at the time that Chinook procedures and training may leave a few gaps when considering the mission and appaling weather.

[Brian Dixon]

Finally in receipt of a reply to my letter of 2 Dec 00. Not much of a reply but I get the distinct feeling that I am getting on someone's nerves! Here's the main body of the reply:

"Thank you for your letter of 2 December to the Prime Minister, and of 6 November to the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre. As you are aware, this Branch of the Ministry of Defence has responsibility for this matter. Your letters have been passed to us, and my letter is to be taken as a reply to both of them.

The accident and conclusions of the RAF Board of Inquiry have, and continue to be, the subject of much attention, and you have received letters from officials on a number of occasions which I believe address the points raised in your latest letters. I do not think there is anything I can usefully add to what has been said before.

Further, I understand that the Armed Forces Minister has written to you recently regarding the Public Accounts Committee 45th Report on the Acceptance into Service of the Chinook Mk2 helicopter. The Minister also took the opportunity to re-state the Government’s position, which is that, to date, nothing has been seen that causes us to doubt the integrity of the RAF Board of Inquiry finding, or would prompt us to hold a new Inquiry, including material posted on the “pprune” website you referred to in your letter to the Prime Minister. Of course, were new evidence to come to light it would, as we have said before, be examined with scrupulous care and thoroughness."

They've now reached the 'let's not talk to him anymore stage' I think. Unfortunately, there will be another letter with some more questions in the post this week. Updates as and when.

With regard to the latest Mull Group meeting, there is little to report at the moment (sorry). It was more of a strategic plan meeting. I will however, keep my ear to the ground and update you all as and when.

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[This message has been edited by Brian Dixon (edited 03 February 2001).]

[Chris Kebab]

JN - Regarding gross negligence findings. I think the Jag that went in showing off by a beach near Decci was another. Memory fades but it must have been early/mid '80s.

[BEagle]

805, this is 788. I couldn't agree with you more regarding the burden of proof which must be established before such a verdict is pronounced!!

Chris Kebab; if it's the accident I'm thinking of, involving an ex-JP QFI who was at Leeming in 1974-5, then the accident was hardly surprising. Whilst it may be distasteful to criticise the deceased, the pilot I am thinking of was an accident waiting to happen. Flagrant disregard of low-flying orders, unauthorised low-level aeros....I haven't been scared often in the last 33 years of flying, but I was petrified when I saw the 'Buttertubs' of Yorkshire flashing past 50' away. ABOVE the canopy of our inverted JP5.......in those days, we couldn't say anything for fear of the chop!

The Chinook accident is NOT in this category!!

PS - The certificate signed by The Grand Master of The Guild confers upon one the status of Master Air Pilot, not 'Master Pilot'. Which is an obsolete RAF Master Aircrew rank.


[This message has been edited by BEagle (edited 03 February 2001).]

[Brian Dixon]

Just a thought (first in ages).
Anyone interested in a specific Chinook room on the chat part of the site? If so, I'll contact Danny.

Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Chris Kebab]

BEagle, yes sadly sounds like the one.

Please......did I ever suggest that accident was in this category. No. Most certainly NO.

I was merely answerering a specific question raised by a previous posting.

[Phantom Av]

Why all this fuss over one Chinook? Lots of Tornado aircrew have been killed. Probably because of the poor servicing standards that exist in the RAF.

[Brian Dixon]

I get quite a few e-mails of support and sight of different letters with regard to the Chinook crash. Below is a copy of the body of a letter sent to Mr Turnill by Minister Spellar. What an interesting comment he makes about the BoI having more technical and operational expertise available to it than the Fatal Accident Inquiry. Why???

"Thank you for your letter of 9th January to Geoff Hoon enclosing an e-mail from your constituent Mr Bill Turnill about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre. I am replying as this matter falls within my area of responsibility as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.

Mr Turnill appears to be disappointed that no action has been taken to review the finding of gross negligence against the Chinook pilots. However, I can assure you that the investigation following the accident could not have been more thorough, but revealed no evidence of any technical malfunction. the reviewing officers considered all the circumstances of the flight, its planning and execution, the weather conditions and the serviceability of the aircraft, before reaching their conclusion. This was that the pilots made a fatal error when they flew their serviceable aircraft at high speed into bad weather, which they had been warned to expect, and which they failed to take any action to avoid, towards the high ground of the Mull of Kintyre. In allowing the aircraft to do this the pilots had not exercised the skill, care or judgement they were known to possess. They were therefore held to be grossly negligent.

The two reviewing officers did not overturn the original Board of Inquiry finding, as Mr Turnill suggests, although this is one of the misconceptions that has grown up about the case. Rather, the reviewing officers were part of the Board of Inquiry process and reviewed and commented upon the conclusions of the investigating board, bringing to bear their own experience and professional judgement. They reached an honest decision based on the evidence, which is what they were required to do.

Mr Turnill also mention the subsequent Scottish Coroner's inquiry did not find evidence of gross negligence. However, this inquiry was carried out for a different purpose to the RAF Board of Inquiry; the former was intended to determine the cause of death, while the aim of the latter was to ascertain the cause of the accident and identify what action may be necessary to minimise the risk of recurrence. The Board of Inquiry also had much more technical and operational expertise available to it.

Mr Turnill also mentions the findings of the Public Accounts Committee which was published at the end of November. The Committee appear to have accepted advice from those campaigning to overturn the Board of Inquiry verdict and did not give equal consideration to the MOD's arguments. However, we will shortly be responding fully to the Committee's report.

Finally, I must take issue with any suggestion that the Department has "stonewalled" attempts to have the inquiry reopened. We have examined, in depth, all the arguments and theories put forward to explain this tragic crash. Ministers and officials have gone to unprecedented lengths to explain the rationale behind the finding of the Board of Inquiry and have consistently confirmed the Department's readiness to consider very carefully, anything presented that claims to be new evidence. This remains the position."

Perhaps everyone would like to write to Minister Spellar and ask what he meant.

Thanks for your support Bill, and everyone else. Let's keep the pressure on.

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[John Nichol]

Brian - I think a specific Chinook chat room is a really bad idea. The topic needs to be on the Military Pilots board so those who know most about military flying see it on a regular basis.

805 - I'm aware of the other Chinook accidents and although they were not technically linked some of the fallout makes interesting reading. That said it's a red herring to try to compare them.

If anyone can provide me with a definative answer to the Jag crash findings I'd be really interested.

[Brian Dixon]

John,
I wholeheartedly agree that this subject should remain on the Military Pilots Board.

What I meant by the suggestion of the chat room, was somewhere that people could visit at a pre-determined date and time, and chew the fat in real time. Perhaps once a month. It was never meant as a suggetion to replace the thread. Sorry if it didn't come across that way.

Not to worry, it was just an idea.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[cheapseat]

FOUR man crew?

------------------
Not sure where 'line training' came from!

[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 07 February 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

Back to the fight after a busy time at work.

In his reply to Bill Turnill's MP, Spellar continues with the line that the PAC found so unpalatable, i.e. that in the absence of any hard evidence to determine the cause of the accident, then the lack of evidence to disprove the negligence theory allows such a finding to be upheld. Guuilty until proved innocent?

TOSH. The negligence finding requires evidence 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' that the pilots were negligent. My reply to the brush-off I received from one of Hoon's minions points this out. Again.

The assertion that the reviewing officers' remarks did not overturn the BOI findings is also TOSH. After a detailed examination of witnesses and evidence, the BOI found that although mistakes had been made, they did NOT amount to negligence. The reviewng officers, for reasons yet to be examined, decided to bring the finding of gross negligence based on the written report only.

I am about to write to my useless MP to express my feelings of utter impotence in this case. He won't help, and all letters to Government are palmed off with platitudes and evasions which insult my intelligence. He will be short of at least one vote in May.

[Pedro Crab]

I apologise for joining this thread so late in the day - my interests are commercial now. I flew the HC1 for many years before joining an offshore operator. On the day of the accident, I was flying an AS332L Super Puma North out of Aberdeen IN THE SAME AIRMASS and at about the same time.
Of course, I cannot remember the OAT at 3000' after all this time, but I remember wondering when I heard about the accident after my flight, why the crew remained at low level when conditions at MSA were well within the clearance for the HC1. Did the Mk2 have a more restrictive icing clearance?


------------------
Pedro

[Arkroyal]

Pedro.

Don't know the HC1 clearance, but the Mk 2 was cleared to fly in icing conditions not below +4 degrees celcius.

If you've got the time, I would suggest a read of the thread from the start. Welcome!

[STANDTO]

It may have already been mentioned in these many pages, but has anyone thought of getting one of the daily national papers to take up the cause. The amount of evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the guys.

It got Pte Lee Clegg out of jail. I know we can never bring them back but.....?

[Sven Sixtoo]

Having just found out how to check my previous posts:

I've been lurking on this thread since just about the time it started.

In 198* I was in the Falklands, where a Chinook Mk2 was having significant problems in getting its rotors in tune. After much effort the local GCs called in specialist help from the UK. Specialist help, on arrival, not unreasonably decised to ignore all previous work which had achieved zilch and reset everything to basics. Unfortunately, they did not have a rigging scheme for a Mk2. Fortunately, they had a rigging scheme for a Mk 1 and a letter from an "appropriate" authority (sorry - don't know who issued it) saying that where no Mk2 docs were available, Mk1 docs could be used (on the assumption / belief that all the differences were covered in the issued Mk 2 docs I guess). They rigged the ac to the documents, called for aircrew, and a young F/O (who is teetotal but turns up in the mood at parties by mental effort rather than alcohol) started the thing up and was well surprised when the front end left the ground at about 75% RRPM. Turned out that the head is about 1" different in length in the Mk2, and if you follow this through the control runs, you get some blade pitch you didn't expect.

All the above might be bollocks - I was quite junior at the time and not a Chinook driver so may have missed a point. But I believe it to be correct to the best of my ability, and it may add to the evidence about the lack of preparedness of the Mk2 for service if checked.

Of course this remains irrelevant; the real Q lies with the (non)compliance of the RAF with its own rules for BoI.

Sven


------------------
"For evil to triumph, it is only necessary for good men to do nothing."
Report it!

[Brian Dixon]

Standto,
welcome to the thread and thanks for your comment. Most newspapers have covered the story at one time or another and would only look at it from either a different perspective (if any are left!), or if there is something recent (such as the PAC Report). Computer Weekly, although not a general newspaper, has been running an excellent and continual campaign for this injustice to be resolved.

Sven,
Likewise, welcome. Not sure if your Falklands story is connected to this injustice but it does highlight the difficulties of the Mk2 during the early days. You are absolutely correct in your closing comment. The RAF completely disregarded their own rules and the verdict is unsustainable. Let your MP know!

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Safely Single]

Just back from the lovely place in the southern hemisphere and I am well pleased to see that the fight is continuing.

The last thing that I saw on British TV before heading to MPA was Hoon trying to slag the C4 news people off for biased reporting. The whole thing made my blood boil.

As a helo operator(yellow not green) I am forever flying around in dodgy weather, at low level certainly near a lot of cumulo granite. I have been caught out a couple of times when you say 'lets have a look at this valley' only to find that the cloud suddenly gets you. In fact some of my more terrifying experiences have been as a result. Do I consider myself negligent.....NO. As long as you have your escape routes and the like then you can reasonably keep the aircraft and crew safe. So much for operational flying, even on training when our limits are much more strict it is still possible to get caught out as cloud can easily be undefineable(I think that that is a word) and creeps up on you.

Thank you all for keeping this alive, if I can help please email me, details soon to be posted.

I hope that if I ever end up with a similar fate then there will be enough decent fellow aviators to try to clear my name.

[Ed Winchester]

Not quite worked my way through the whole thread yet, but I didn't want it disappearing from the front page.

[Brian Dixon]

Safely,
welcome to the thread and welcome back to the UK. You could help the campaign by contacting your MP and asking that they support the Mull of Kintyre Group. Get them to write to the office of Lord Chalfont and pledge their support. There is nothing else that they need do. The vote of support is their contribution. Some MPs do not feel that they know enough or simply are not interested. If yours falls into either of these categories feel free to let me know and if you wish, I'll help you draft a reply. On the whole though, most have been supportive. It would appear that only those called Spellar and Hoon are unable to see the blindingly obvious.

Ed,
likewise, welcome to the thread. As above, if there is anything I can be of help with, please do not hesitate to ask.

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[misterploppy]

A thought...

If the MoD has such a surefire case that Day & Wrotten's overturning of the BofI finding should stand, why is it taking them so long to respond in detail to the PAC Report?

[Arkroyal]

Valid point mr p.

Another reply from a Hoon minion today, yet again missing the point entirely, this time from a Mrs Bellchambers:

'Thank you for your further letter of 15 January to the Secretary of State for Defence about the tragic Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintvre. As with your previous letter of 2 December. which my colleague Miss Underdown answered, this has been passed to this branch for attention.

I am sorry that you found Miss Underdown’s letter of 11 January unsatisfactory. I would however re-emphasise that the Government’s position is that to date, nothing has been seen that causes us to doubt the integrity of the RAF Board of Inquiry, or would prompt us to hold a new inquiry. Were real new evidence to come to light this would be examined with scrupulous care, thoroughness and compassion.'

The letter to which this reply is supposed to be an answer stated quite clearly that the BOI finding had been tampered with, and that it needs no new evidence to overturn a finding which is unsustainable.

I shall try again, as the point must eventually get through.




[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 17 February 2001).]

[The Mistress]

Brian

Apologies for not posting this last week, when I received it. This is the response my MP received when he wrote to the MoD on my behalf:

Thank you for your letter of 18 December to Lewis Moonie enclosing one from your constituent, Mrs ..., about the Chinook accident on the Mull of Kintyre. I am replying as this matter falls within my area of responsibility as Minister of State for the Armed Forces.

I am sorry that Mrs ... disagrees with the stance taken by the Secretary of State and Sir William Wratten in response to the Public Account Committee's report. However, as seen from here, the Committee accepted a mass of advice from elsewhere, and yet failed to give equal consideration to the Department's arguments. Neither Sir John Day or Sir William Wratten, the two senior reviewing officers of the RAF Board of Inquiry, were called to give evidence. Had they been called, Sir John and Sir William would have been able to provide more balance to the other evidence that the Committee had. You will also appreciate that the Public Accounts Committee's conclusions run contrary to those reached by the Defence Committee, in 1998 following their own inquiry into lessons learnt from the accident, that there was no compelling evidence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook or its components.

I appreciate that as the wife of retired RAF aircrew, Mrs ... enjoys a common bond with other RAF wives whose husbands are aviators. The anguish felt by the families who lost loved ones in this tragic accident must seem particularly real to her. However I can assure you that the investigation carried out by the RAF Board of Inquiry following the accident could not have been more thorough. The exhaustive, detailed and professional process of the accident investigation revealed no evidence of any technical malfunction. Moreover, the reviewing officers considered all the circumstances of the flight, its planning and execution, the weather conditions and the serviceability of the aircraft, before reaching their conclusion. This was that the pilots made a fatal error when they flew their serviceable aircraft into bad weather which they had been warned to expect, and which they failed to take any action to avoid. In allowing the aircraft to do this the pilots had not exercised the skill, care or judgement they were known to possess. They were therefore held to be negligent.

To date nothing has been put forward which undermines the original finding of the Board of Inquiry although the MOD has examined, in depth, all the arguments and theories put forward to explain this tragic crash. Although the Board of Inquiry concluded that the pilots were to blame for the accident, this has not precluded the payment of compensation to the families of all those who died in the accident, including the pilots. By 1999, all this compensation had been paid in full.

Ministers and officials have gone to unprecedented lengths to explain the rationale behind the finding of the Board of Inquiry and have consistently confirmed the Department's readiness to consider, very carefully, anything presented that claims to be new evidence. This remains the position.

One final point, Mrs ... also wrote to the Prime Minister in the same terms as she wrote to you. This letter has been passed to the Department for attention, and I would be grateful if you could ask her to accept this reply as an aswer to both her letters.

John Spellar MP

Don't you just love being patronised. I wasn't going to vote Labour in the next General Election anyway. Chances are I shall most likely be actively campaigning against them.

Back to the top.

[K52]

First. Thank you to whoever it was that sent me a copy of the findings of the BOI. Hotmail is wonderful - think of a "nom de plume" and send something - then never bother to use that e-mail address again.

Ark Royal

You say that the findings of the Board had "been tampered with". From this I assume that you mean the Reviewing Officers differed in their assessment, in regard to Human Failings, from the view of the Board.

I would point out that you have also, and quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board. You have stated that the aircraft was quite legitimately being flown VFR "in sight of land or water" when the Board specifically state at para 16e "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."

You have further stated that it was impossible for the aircraft to be climbed to Safety Altitude because the icing limitations precluded this option. The Board state specifically at para 30c " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."

Given that you differ from the assessment of the Board on two such fundamental matters, how can you justify such a statement in regard of the Reviewing Officers decision on Human Failings.

I would also point out that ALL the Senior Officers who had the remit to comment on the findings of the Board in respect of the actions of the Pilots differed, independently, in their assessments from those of the Board. Only OC RAF Aldergrove did not comment in such a way because he did not have administrative control over the crew and it was not in his remit to offer comments on such matters. He, quite properly, confined his comments to those matters within his remit.

Thus OC RAF Odiham, AOC 1 Gp, AOC in C STC and (unusually but not surprisingly due to the Media and Political interest in the findings) CAS; ALL differed from the view of the Board in their assessments.

Given that the Reviewing Officers, with the exception of OC RAF Odiham, all had copious inputs from their Staffs and reached the same conclusions, how can you be justify the charge thet the findings were "tampered with"?

[Brian Dixon]

Mistress,
thanks for sight of your letter. As you say, there's nothing quite like being patronised. I had a letter advising me that all my questions had been answered, so they didn't feel it necessary to provide further answers. Wrong!!! Letter straight back requesting the answers and not a bland statement. I'll keep you informed.

K52,
I'm pleased that you now have a copy of the BoI, although I'm still not convinced you needed it due to your amazing powers of recollection. I take it from your posting that there is nothing in it that would cause you to change your opinion. No problem, as you provide an opposing view which helps keep the thread balanced. I will, of course, continue to disagree with you though!

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[FJJP]

CAS, PLEASE READ THIS

This thread is not going to go away. I am a serving officer in the Royal Air force and I am ashamed that nothing has been done by the hierarchy to correct this wrong.

There is no dispute over the findings of the BOI. A very experienced President came to the only conclusion that he could, given the evidence placed before him.

The AP makes it quite clear that findings of negligence should only be considered where there is uncontroversial proof.

There is none to suggest that those men failed in their duty. Yes, they failed to avoid hitting the ground (but was it CFIT?). However, and leaving aside all the speculation and hogwash talked about in many of the posts about the fitness of the aircraft, NOBODY KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED IN THE LAST 30 SECONDS OF THAT FATAL FLIGHT. All the experts in all the world can speculate until hell freezes over, but there is not one shred of evidence to support the comments of the AOC and CinC.

The more things are left the more the Royal Air Force which I loyally serve is being hurt. You have the power to change things and clear the names of these 2 fine fellow aviators. I know what it is like for widows who have lost their loved ones - God knows, as effects officer, a month of looking after a family with small kids who lost their head of household was a totally devastating experience for me. Can you imagine the trauma of the crews’ families to be told that their husbands killed themselves and all those passengers?

I am not interested in any witchhunt or criticism of the Air Officers. If for no other reason than to let the families grieve in peace, DO SOMETHING.

With respect,

FJJP

[notarmy]

FJJP...your last para sums the whole thing up nicely

good words

[Arkroyal]

K52

Sorry for the late reply, but duty called.

I too am glad that you now have a copy of the BOI report, and before accusing you of being selective with its contents in order to bolster your views, I must be careful not to do the same.

You say that I have “...quite vociferously, differed in your assessments from those of the Board” in that I disagree with them over the questions of whether the flight was legitimately flown under VFR; and in that the weather conditions precluded a climb to SALT.

VFR vs IFR

You quote para 16e [The board concludes that:] "The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre."
This is extracted from the Board’s conclusions, and is not a criticism of the planning carried out by the crew. Indeed the Board state in para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: “Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct.” I agree. As to whether the aircraft was actually in VMC just before the crash, I do not know. Nor do you. Remember it was seen in sunlight and clear of cloud by the yachtsman just before the accident


SALT

You quote from para 30c ‘Flight Planning Considerations’: " in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."

Before I go on, let me put your quote in context by including its preceding sentence. The whole quote is:
" The Board determined from this information that, in the forecast conditions, the Chinook Mk2 icing clearance would most likely have precluded flight in IMC above safety altitude over the highlands of Scotland, and that Flt Lt TAPPER’s decision not to plan to fly to Inverness under IFR was correct. Nevertheless in the forecast icing conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre, and an IFR transit to Prestwick or Glasgow."
I base my assertion that a climb was out of the question on the same rule of thumb that the crew would have used, based on a sea level temperature of +9 deg C and a lapse rate of about 2 deg/1000ft.
The Board gave no indication as to how they arrived at their view that a climb was possible within the Chinook’s clearance; but they do concede that (para 30c continued): “Nevertheless, the Board considered that if Flt Lt TAPPER had mentally dismissed the possibility of flight in IMC, it may have reduced his willingness, if only for a brief period, to convert from VFR to IFR flight on encountering bad weather....”

I make that one minor disagreement with the Board, which I would be pleased to retract if given evidence that the actual 4 deg C level at the time did indeed allow a climb to SALT.

I could speculate that a reluctance to climb into expected icing conditions did indeed delay the decision to climb ‘for a brief period’, but I will not, as speculation is worthless.

The Board of Inquiry diligently carried out its investigation, mindful that a finding of negligence would require proof ‘beyond any doubt whatsoever’. They failed to find the required evidence, (and neither did the Scottish Fatal Accident Enquiry) and although alluding to some errors, quite rightly (in my opinion) found no one cause of the crash.

The reviewing officers (with the exception of OC Aldergrove) chose to ignore the requirement that a finding of negligence required such a high degree of proof, and in the absence of proof of any other cause, chose to blame the crew (and it is this that the PAC find so unpalatable).
It is not even as if the final reviewing officer (Wratten) is at all sure himself. He opens: “Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and a CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the events in the minutes and seconds immediately prior to impact.”

Bearing in mind that ‘irrefutable evidence’ is exactly what he requires, he is wrong, by his own admission. If that is not tampering, I would like to know what you would call it.


Edited for typos


[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 22 February 2001).]

[K52]

Ark Royal,

I too have to apologise for a tardy reply but in my case I cannot plead duty merely being Bl**dy cold. We got flooded twice earlier this month and we still have no central heating. Still, on the bright side, the County Council did clear, on monday of this week, the blocked culvert I informed them about before we got the first flood.

When quoting from the "Board" it is impossible not to be selective because it is itself a selective narrative: a precis of the deliberations of the "Board" referring to the exhibits, evidence and reports that THEY have decided to include in the proceedings. It does not include ALL the evidence produced for the "Board". One example is the return plan from Kinloss to Aldergrove. This is not included in the proceedings even though the "Board" concluded that it was "most likely that at the time of the accident, Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening". It would, therefore, be germane to considerations about Flight Planning and Crew Duty. In conjunction with this they do not define the overall crew duty day, only the maximum flying hours: nor is there any mention of the proposed tasking for 3 Jun - would it have allowed the crew to night-stop at Inverness or Kinloss?

The "Board" also introduce evidence that they do not follow through to a conclusion. One case in point is what the crew had to eat that day. We are told quite specicifically in para 5 that "During the evening of 1 Jun, Flt Lt Tapper and Flt Lt Cook took dinner in the Officers Mess, finishing at 1910hrs." There is no mention of the Rear Crew members in this respect.

In para 6 we are told " On the morning of 2 Jun 94 Flt Lt Cook was served breakfast in the Officers Mess, and MALM Forbes and Sgt Hardie took breakfast in the Sergeants Mess. The Board were unable to ascertain whether breakfast was taken by Flt Lt Tapper." Why? Was no record available in the Officers Mess? If Flt Lt Tapper did not take breakfast in the dining room, did he have facilities in his room to provide a light breakfast in order to comply with GASO's? We do not know because no comment is made upon it.

At para 27 the the "Board" noted "that the crew had little opportunity to take a proper meal during their duty period and had probably only eaten a limited amount of confectionary and biscuits". No evidence is produced as to what in the way of In-Flight rations had been provided prior to their morning task.

What we are left with from the evidence produced by the "Board" in the Proceedings is the PROBABILITY that, when they departed Aldergrove at 1742, the Co Pilot and the Rear Crew had not had a proper meal for approx 9 hrs and the DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that the Captain had not had a meal for 22 1/2 hrs. If this were indeed the case then why is there no discussion of it in the proceedings and medical evidence as to the effect on crew performance? Would they not have been able to ascertain information from the report by IPTM?

I also have some difficulty with the "Boards" discussions regarding the secondary navigation equipment. Flt Lt Tapper had asked the groundcrew, following the morning sortie, to check the SuperTans computer because he felt it was giving "unusual GPS satellite tracking data" and no fault was found. In my own opinion it would have been, to say the least, prudent during the evening sortie to have utilised the secondary navigation equipment to back up the primary aid.

The Tacan was selected to Machrihanish and I have no problem with that. The VOR was selected to 115.2 DCS and the "Board" was of the opinion " that this beacon would have been out of range throughout the flight, and that it was likely that the frequency selection was moved during the crash." I submit it is just as likely that the VOR had originally been selected to 116.2 BEL and that once the aircraft had travelled out of range of the beacon the frequency was deliberately deselected by 1 Mhz to stop the needles wandering.

Finally the ADF. Should this not have been tuned to the LAY (Islay) which would have been their closest diversion given the Machrihanish weather; or perhaps to Prestwick or Glasgow in the event an IFR transit was forced upon them? The most useful beacon however would, in my opinion, have been the AH (Rathlin Island) bearing due magnetic west of their turning point at a range of 12nm. IF they could receive that beacon then it would have given them a secondary means of assessing their distance from the lighthouse with a change of bearing of 5 degrees for each 1nm travelled. One thing that I am certain of is that the ADF should not have been selected to the frequency on which it was found - Atlantic 252, a commercial radio station!!

Finally, a question for those who do have access to the annexes. Whose is the writing on the planning chart? It never looked to me as though it belonged to either of the Pilots.

[Arkroyal]

K52, Sorry to hear of you flooding woes.

Haven't got time to go too deeply into your post as duty calls again.

I take it from your comments that you would discredit the Board's thoroughness in that they appear to have left some avenues of investigation unexplored. As you point out, not all of their work is presented in the report.

What is important is that they did not find evidence of negligence. If your comments about the crew's meal arrangements are meant to imply negligence in that they they failed to take proper sustenance, then you show your lack of understanding of Support Helicopter ops. You eat what you can when you can, and carry on. That is normal, not negligence. I agree that this particular sortie should have been flown to a different set of rules, but it wasn't; and that would bring us back to the real negligence in this sorry case, that at a higher level than Tapper and Cook.

Your discussions concerning the tuning of the radio navaids are interesting. Again deriving useful information from ADFs and VORs would require a lot of head down plotting. This is simply not the way SH operate. At low level, the VOR beacons are at best unreliable, and most usually blanked. ADF is simply not accurate enough for pinpoint Nav. GPS Tans and Mk 1 eyeball were the order of the day. They were flying VFR in VMC.

What went wrong we can speculate on until forever. They may have gone into IMC and quite negligently flew on regardless into the Mull. They may have suffered an unknown failure. What none of us will be able to do is to state "with absolutely no doubt whatsoever", what DID occur.

[Brian Dixon]

K52,
I also offer my sympathies with regard to your flooding. Hope it is now resolved and you don't get a recurrence of the problem.

You mention about the writing on the planning chart not belonging to the pilots. Although I have not seen the map, I would suggest that it would be easy to identify the individual. Handwriting samples could be taken from all crews in the Province at the time, and could also be compared against samples from documents that had been completed by the deceased crew. The BoI mentioned that MALM Forbes had been seen preparing maps for the trip. It may have been his writing.

Perhaps this is another issue where the Board could have expanded further. Or maybe they were in receipt of the answer and did not think it useful to enter in the final document. Either way, it does not amount to evidence of negligence. Just speculation as to the intention of the crew. Speculation proves nothing beyond all doubt.

Stay dry!
Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Mmmmnice]

K52 - re yr last, and apologies for the rather disjoint nature of this but I've not passed this location in a few weeks, a couple of trivial points spring up; as an ex serving officer you should realise that it is a DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that there is no record of some meals that John Tapper may have taken and, the quickest way of changing VOIR fqs to stop the needle wandering would have been to go up or down by .05 rather than a whole mhz - must go now Spotter Alert chin chin

[K52]

Mmmmnice,

I agree with you on both points; however it would have been highly likely, in my opinion, that the BEL was the intial VOR selection. My point was that the Board raised the issues in the Proceedings and didn't follow them through. With regard to the Nav equipment the Board say it was "likely the VOR frequency selection was moved during the crash" and that the IFF Mode 3A "may also have been moved during the crash". They make no such comment regarding the ADF and Tacan selections. With regard to the ADF being selected to a commercial radio station the "Board considered the distraction that could have been caused by this radio but as the ADF volume on both pilot's audio selector panels was selected off, dismissed this as a possibility". How can it be "likely to have moved" or "may also have been moved by the crash" in regards to some equipment yet the position of a control on another piece allows them to "dismiss" the possibility of distraction? There is, I suggest, a level of inconsistancy in these findings.


Ark Royal

Thank you for your commiserations.

Despite my demonstrable, and freely admitted, lack of knowledge of SH operations it is you, I believe, who are missing the point. The findings of the "Board" were the collective interpretation by the President(Wg Cdr GD/P) and 2 members(1 Sqn Ldr GD/P and 1 Sqn Ldr Eng) of the evidence that they had selected as important in the determination of the causes of the accident. The findings were not carried down from the mountain carved on tablets of stone and are not immutable.


Brian,

Thank you also for your commiserations

Regarding the chart. It was only my opinion that the writing on the chart differed from that of both pilots; I am not a graphologist!! I agree that it could have been that of MALM Forbes but that would then call into question the specific statement by the Board that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jun 94".

Have to leave it there because I think I have just heard the boiler fire up. If true I will go and cuddle a radiator for a couple of hours!!!

[Tandemrotor]

K52

I know you are familiar with my views on your attempts to make a circumstantial case for negligence against the two pilots. I have also stated previously that the clear reason yourself and others have to resort to this rather distasteful method of besmirching the names of the two officers (who each had utterly exemplary service, and flying records) is that you cannot offer ANY other evidence. It simply does not exist.

Neither you, nor I, nor anyone this side of the Pearly gates, has any idea what the crew's intentions were, regarding remaining out of theatre overnight, or returning. One thing IS irrefutable. At the time of the accident, they were well within ANY duty limits you care to mention. PERIOD.

As far as eating is concerned. Isn't this more a criticism of the organisation, and the operation of Her Majesty's Air Force, rather than the two individuals at the end of the line? In any case, AGAIN, nobody knows what these individuals did, or did not eat that day. If it was such a big issue, why weren't their stomach contents examined?

I'll tell you why. Because it is only now that people feel the need to 'find' very second rate circumstantial evidence to support a discredited judgement!

Finally, you have been very interested previously in the preparation of the crew maps. I assume you will again attempt to 'rubbish' the crew's preparation, by suggesting it was somehow imperfect. So let's put this one to bed here and now.

I am 99.9% certain that the photocopied map of the route left at the Auth desk by the crew in a commendable attempt to fulfil their requirement to brief the duty auth (Flt Lt Tapper self authorised the trip)
was prepared the previous evening by Lt K******n RN, an exchange officer flying the Chinook in NI that day.

The reason it was prepared by him, and not the crew who flew the sortie, was that there were only two Chinook crews in NI. they operated a 'day on, day off' basis. The tasking came through on the 1st of June, while Tapper and Cook were sitting in the mess, on their day off, presumably stuffing their fat little faces.

The reason suggested for Flt Lt Tapper's decision to fly the long days tasking on the 2nd June was to preserve Lt K******n's crew's day off.

So, if there were any errors on the map subsequently photocopied, and included in the BOI, those minor errors are likely to be Lt K******n's. As far as I am aware, he has not been charged!

But, here's the rub. The BOI made no attempt to discover when that map was copied. Was it on the previous evening, was it on the morning of the accident, or just before they left? Who knows. In any event, were any corrections made to Lt K******n's map by Flt Lt Tapper, after copying, but prior to flight. Meaning the copy was wrong, but the actual map was not!

We don't even know if Tapper was using that map at all!

So please now explain your interest in 'the map.'

Finally, if you think helicopter crews operating at low level have nothing more important to do than scrutinise their charts for the frequency of the nearest suitable NDB, you really should get out more!

[This message has been edited by Tandemrotor (edited 25 February 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

K52

Hope you are warmer,

I'm not sure which point I am missing. Agreed, the BOI Report is the collected thoughts and conclusions of the three appointed officers. They collected, sifted and reported on a lot of evidence. Obviously the potted report is not exhaustive, but if the three were trusted to carry out the inquiry, then their findings should also be trusted as relevant and acceptable.

The ADF may have been tuned to Atlantic 252, probably quite routine in NI for the more mundane tasks within the province. The ADF is of no use in VFR SH operations, and it would appear that the Board were satisfied that none of the crew was actually listening to the station at the time of the crash. Not knowing precisely what kind of knobs/sliders are fitted to the various radio aid controllers and the transponder in the Chinook, I would not comment on which could be adjusted or not by impact. I trust that the Board used their better knowledge to come to an honest conclusion.

The reviewing officers decided that the Board was not to be trusted in its findings and over-ruled them.

I simply ask how they, and you can categorically state that, on the available evidence, the crew were guilty, 'beyond any doubt whatsoever' of negligence.

If you/they cannot, then the finding is unsafe.

[TheRevoltingCrewman]

44 pages and counting...no doubt were not even half-way there. Let's face it guys, unless you're in a UEFA cup match the referee's not going to change his mind. Can we put it to bed now? They were distracted, probably by a spurious Eng Fail caption, and they flew into a hill. All this FADEC hypothesising gets us nowhere.

[cheapseat]

RC

44 pages of hypothesising about one aspect or another of this simple flight is what I see to be the whole point of this thread.

After all this “hot air” who can say, absolutely, without doubt, gross negligence.

[Tandemrotor]

RC

You just don't get it do you.

Let's hope, for you and your family's sake there are people of a higher calibre than you around to defend your reputation if you, or they, ever need it.

[FJJP]

TRC

It grieves me to reply to your post, but I feel strongly enough about it to do so. I doubt whether you have read the forum from start to finish. If you had, you would undoubtedly have gauged the feeling of fellow aviators who feel strongly that an injustice has been done to the crew involved.

I hope to God that you never have to get involved with the family of mates who have died - I have, and it is not an experience that I will ever forget. It is bad enough to lose one's husband, but to be told that the death of his crew and passengers is down to his negligence is more than any widow should have to bear.

If you have nothing constructive to contribute to this debate, shut up and stay off - it is not compusory to add your comments. Someone like you (a veteran of 1 (that is ONE) post) clealy has little to add - I am sure that the rest of us would be quite happy to roll along through life without your fatuous remarks.

Goodbye. Hope I don't see you again on the forum.

[meonmeown]

Bill Wratten is right.
The fact of the matter is that these guys were flying in cloud below their safety height. That is what killed them!

[Ed Winchester]

TRC,

You are missing the point completely - see cheapseat's comments.

Meonmeown,

Earth shattering theory. You must be in possession of some vital evidence (that nobody else is privy to) in order to reach this conclusion.

[Touchin' Down]

FJJP,

Well said!

Have been following this thread periodically over the last while and a recent accident in my Air Force made me revisit it.

You may or may not have heard about the RNZAF Skyhawk pilot killed in Australia, while conducting a "plugged barrel roll". If your unfamiliar, this involves 2 skyhawks carrying out a barrel roll while connected by the AAR hose, although no fuel is transferred.

Well the formation lead managed to hit the ground during the 2nd half of the manoeuvre. The aircraft in the basket managed to recover (just). While the BOI is still under way, it surprised me that the skyhawks were about to fly the following day. Although CFIT may be suspected, I don't believe that we can say that he didn't attempt to eject and the seat malfunctioned, or that he was distracted or hindered by another emergency or aircraft fault.

In your case it may be that the pilot error answer was the easiest way out, when no other evidence was observed and we all know that this may be absolutely incorrect. I hope we don't see a similar outcome here.

Regards

[FJJP]

Touchin'Down

I read about the Skyhawk accident through this site, and the links to the NZ Herald. Display flying carries its own unique risks; however, every step possible is taken to minimise those risks. Murray was clearly held in high regard by the NZ aviation community, and would never have been cleared to display fly if he were not competent to do so. So why did he crash?

The BOI will do their best to try to figure out what happened, reaching their conclusions based on technical evidence and sound reasoning. It is rare for those up the command chain to overrule the BOI findings - in fact, I cannot remember an instance where this has occured, apart from the Chinook crash. There have been some where the AOC or CinC has added weight to the praise/condemnation of the pilot where the findings warranted it (such as an uncontroversial finding of gross negligence connected with a breach of flying discipline). We await the findings of the Skyhawk Board with interest.

Perhaps you could keep your ear to the ground and let us know the outcome (as a new topic) when the report is published?

Rgds

FJJP

[Tandemrotor]

meonmeown

I confidently predict you know precious little about this accident.

Go ahead, prove me wrong.

Otherwise.

You are the weakest link - goodbye!

[TheRevoltingCrewman]

Get a spellchecker, then get a girlfriend!

[Arkroyal]

meonmeown,

It is easy to see why you are indeed me on me own. You have nothing constructive to add, apart from moving this thread to the top of the page.

Revoltingcrewman,

Pray you are never in the situation where your family need the support and help that we are trying to provide.

[TheRevoltingCrewman]

FJJP that is. At half past nine on a saturday night shouldn't you be enjoying life?

[Brian Dixon]

TRC and Meon,
welcome to the thread. I'm not interested in having a public slanging match with either of you. What I would ask is that you both read the thread from the beginning before just writing everyone else's contribution off.

The argument regarding FADEC passed many pages ago and the main point is that no-one knows exactly what happened prior to impact. Also, is being distracted by an Eng Fail caption (and presumably trying to do something about it) to be regarded as negligent? Not all the aircraft was recovered for examination, and no matter how remote, there are elements of doubt regarding the crash. Therefore, according to rules at the time, the verdict of negligence is not only unsustainable, it is against the RAF's own rules. Wratten himself admitted that there was inevitably going to be a degree of speculation. That is simply not good enough for absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Touchin' Down,
Welcome to you too. I am sorry to hear about the death of the RNZAF pilot. I hope his family do not have to go through the same as Rick and Jon's families.
Would you be in a position to advise me why the RAAF had grounded its Chinook fleet several months ago? I have e-mailed the Australian Defence Dept, but have not had a reply.

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[L4Cuddles]

Tandamrotor,
Have you become the self-appointed moderator of this thread? Are you now saying who can join in and what they should contribute? Is this site only for your own views? Perhaps you should browse the 'moderator' thread in that case.

[FJJP]

TRC,

I apologise for my remarks - you hit a raw nerve. I do not really want to get into a slanging match (BD Apologies also). TRC, I think this topic has become a fight for justice - to clear the names of 2 fellow aircrew who have been defiled without due cause.

I hope you will read the whole thing - a big task, I grant you, but you will then see why many of us feel so strongly about it. I believe we are hoping to swing someone at high level to come out of the closet and re-visit the whole sorry saga, and give the families peace of mind.

It matters not a jot to me personally the rights and wrongs of the case, but as I said, having dealt with a family who lost the head of household to an aircraft crash, the whole affair is a tragedy which should not be compounded by the insensitive remarks and unecessary findings of a couple of V. Senior officers.

Rgds

FJJP

[K52]

Ark Royal,

Thankyou for your opening comment.

I agree that ADF is of little use in "mundane" tasks in NI, but this was not a routine task.Moreover, Flt Lt Tapper HAD queried the operation of the GPS during the morning sortie and asked for a functional check to be carried out. It remains my opinion that it would have been prudent to use the secondary nav aids to back up the GPS, paricularly in the vicinity of the Mull where the Wx was forecast to be poor - a forecast borne out by the actual the crew were given for Machrihanish.

Regarding the frequency selections I was pointing out an apparent inconsistancy in the Boards findings.

Tamdemrotor

I do not think that, in the current security climate, it is a good idea to broadcast the real names of personnel who have served in NI on this thread. A simple job description would have sufficed - and you do have my e-mail address. However, your post has confirmed information which had been e-mailed to me.

Are you seriously suggesting that Flt Lt Tapper would have left a false document with the Ops clerk in order to satisfy the outbrief requirements?!!

As the other crew were flying in the afternoon of 1 Jun 94 I take it that the tasking came in during the morning and the other crew did the initial planning on the assumption that they would do the Inverness task because of the crew duty implications for Flt Lt Tappers crew after a planned 6 1/2 hour morning task.

You say it has been suggested that Flt Lt Tapper decided to do all the tasking on 2 Jun to ensure the other crew had their day off. Is it not possible, though, that the decision was based on Flt Lt Tappers crew having the Friday off? Whoever did the second task on 2 Jun was unlikely to get back to Aldergrove much before 2130. If the other crew did the Inverness task there could have been minimum crew rest implications in the event of an early task on 3 Jun which would have required Flt Lt Tappers crew to do that early task.

Regarding meals. The RAF likes to have lots of rules thes days. Things that used to be left to common sense are now regulated because too many people failed to exercise any common sense. Thus it is a requirement for aircrew to have breakfast before flying and the RAF provides in flight rations to provide sustenance for the crew whilst operating ane denotes maximum periods between main meals for operating crews. Under their Terms of Reference (Part 1 para 2e) the Board were required to " Ascertain if all relevant orders and instructions were complied with".

In a much earlier post (1 Jul 00), after some slightly disparaging comments on the AAIB investigation and the computer models prepared for the Board, you quote the Yachtsmans estimate of the Chinooks speed as it approached the Mull (60-90 kts). You then state "No other evidence whatsoever, real or imagined, exists to tell us what speed the a/c was flying at as it approached the Mull".

According to the ATC evidence the crew "requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747hrs". The distance between the CTR boundary and the impact point is approx 33nm yet engine power dowm was recorded at 1759hrs - just 12 minutes later. That implies a mean groundspeed of 165 kts and with a forecast wind of 180/20kts implies an IAS approaching vne. At such a speed the VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5km horizontal clearance from cloud with a visibility of 5km (slightly less than 2.7nm)

Irrespective of his subsequent evidence to the FAI several months later the yachtsmans evidence to the board was that he saw the Chinook "below cloud at a position 2 to 3nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse --flying in a level attitude and in a straight line at a height estimated to be between 200 - 400 ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze"

They were at that time IMC - yet they took no action to rectify the situation. The did not climb to SALT or turn away to regain VMC.

Which brings me to:-

Meonmeown

If you are going to come in supporting me then you will have to get used to the flak.

[ShyTorque]

K52,

Having flown and operated SH in NI, I think you will find that the weather conditions you have quoted are not necessarily IMC. Some RAF theatre SH wx limits are extremely low. How does 500 metres visibility and 100 ft cloudbase sound to you? We were required to operate VMC in those conditions in Germany.

There is no proof that the aircraft was IMC at the time of the accident, only speculation - which you are trying to call proof.

What is very strange about the evidence is the very high speed at which the aircraft apparently hit the ground whilst climbing. The aircraft would not normally be capable of this performance. Undoubtedly, something very unusual happened. This was commented on by the BOI but has been forgotten since.

It stands out a mile that it was probably more convenient and less potentially career damaging to someone higher in the management chain (who should have known better than to allow this trip to take place at all in an unserviceable aircraft) to attempt to put a lid on it by blaming the pilots.

Sad day for the integrity of the RAF.

[meonmeown]

K52,

Sure, happy to take some flak but why is this sorry tale being dragged on?

Flying IMC below SALT was ultimately the cause this accident and no amount of discussion, re-examination of the evidence, or wishful thinking will change that.

[Tandemrotor]

Oh dear

where to begin?

Perhaps with the allegation that I have somehow 'outed' a certain officer connected to this case, in response to a direct question from K52. Since the Lt in question named himself sometime ago during the course of a very supportive TV interview, and was named in just about every national newspaper during the course of the FAI, forgive me if I do not share your horror.

Secondly, I am very struck by the way K52 is so keen to believe the yachtsman's evidence given to the BOI regarding visibility (inspite of the fact that this differed markedly from his sworn evidence given to the FAI, when he stated that he believed the pilots would have been able to see the area of the lighthouse as well as he!)

Yet you appear to ignore his assessment of the aircraft's speed. Is it just me, or are you being selective? Was his evidence reliable - in which case the pilots were operating in accordance with VFR, or was it not reliable, in which case, what's your point?

As far as calculations of the AVERAGE speed of the aircraft is concerned, this requires an assumption of the AVERAGE winds experienced during the flight. It most definitely DOES NOT allow anyone to predict the speed of the aircraft in the 50 seconds or so from yachtsman's sighting (in sunlight) to impact. At least, not unless you are prepared to make some pretty big assumptions. My question is this. Where else would guesses be allowed to condem individuals who are totally unable to defend themselves? Well, you know the answer!

As far as your horror that an apparently innaccurate map may have been left with the DAO is concerned. There was no requirement to leave any map AT ALL, never mind a corrected one. It was simply a commendable attempt to give the busy DAO an overview of the planned route, in his forced absence.

I ask again, what is your point?

As far as cuddly L4 is concerned. Are you now a moderator? Telling me what I can or cannot write. As it happens, In the last seven years, I have had a gutfull of pompous ignoramuses, making pronouncements on this case with the luxury of utter ignorance, so forgive me if, on occasion, I fail to welcome them with open arms.

(K52 you obviously do not fall into this category - at least you give me food for thought)

[TheRevoltingCrewman]

FJJP

No problem. I may be new to the thread but I'm not uninformed and it's worth remembering that as a discussion forum there will naturally be conflicting views.

[L4Cuddles]

Tandem,
I forgive you, my point was that others should be allowed to make their views known, however contary to your own, on this thread without fear of a public pillory. I've read many an excellent point by yourself on this and other threads - keep it up. I agree people should read through a thread before wading in - some of us know just as much as you about this case but don't feel the need to shoot down honest contributors with varying views.

[Low and Slow]

Sorry if this has already been covered, but 1. does anyone know of another CFIT, incident where the BOI concluded the pilot was negligent??

2. Can someone outline the following points for me:

a. Is it suggested the Crew was lost, or un-aware of their location?
b. Were they flying in cloud?
c. Did they have cartography(real or software) indication the terrain saftey height for the area?

I've no point to prove here, but it seems a lot of people are talking at completely cross purposes for just for the sake of it and we gain no real insight into what happened, or any new information.

[John Nichol]

Low and Slow:

1. 2 other CFIT BOIs proclaimed gross negligence. The GR1 just before the start of Granby and the F3 off Cyprus. Needless to say full evidence from ADR & CVR was available.

2a. Lost? - No suggestion. Unaware of location? - Depends on your point of view. If you believe in the negligene then they must have been unaware of position unless they decided to deliberately fly into the Mull.

2b. Flying in cloud? Last person to see the cab said that they were flying below the cloudbase with the Mull visable (see Tandem's points). Everything else is speculation and guesswork.

2c. SALT has become a big discussion point. The map showed the SALT for the leg to the Mull and then the leg to Corran - perfectly in order as I understand it.

I don't accept that people are talking "just for the sake of it". But you are right about "no new info". The fact is that no new info is required.

Without the evidence of ADR/CVR, witnesses, survivors, radio or radar everything after the yachtman saw the Chinook is speculation & theory. K52 makes some very good points but he "speculates" as to the importance and interpretation of those points. Meonmeown says, "flying low level in cloud below SALT" is negligent. Indeed it is. But unless he has more info than me I have not seen one jot of EVIDENCE to say that Tapper & Cook were doing that.
I have seen no EVIDENCE that the aircraft was 100% servicable on impact. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows a lose artcle was not present. I have seen no EVIDENCE that one of the pax didn't go mad or have a death wish. I have seen no EVIDENCE that shows there was no software fault. I could go on. I am not saying any of these conditions did or did not exist - but neither can anyone else.

That's why this debate is so important.

[Arkroyal]

K52

Regarding the ADF, I didn't say that it was of no use in 'mundane NI tasks', I said it was of no use in VFR SH operations. Believe me, it is not! At best a bearing with an accuracy of + or - 5 degrees, which will need to be plotted on a chart for a cross-cut. Useless, especially in the area of the Mull, where I can find two beacons.

1. The ‘AH’ on Rathlin Island, (which you have mentioned) a marine beacon freq 294.2 KHz. This would almost certainly be invisible to an aircraft receiver, which will only tune to the nearest 0.5 KHz and in any case transmits every 6 minutes!

2. The ‘LAY’, the Locater for Islay Airport. 395 KHz. Readable if within range, but the aircraft was outside its promulgated range of 25nm, and to use it would have been unwise to say the least.

So there you are. The ADF; as useful as an ahstray on a motorbike to the SH pilot, and left tuned to a pop station, and not being listened to at the time of the accident. Evidence of negligence? I think not.

What else, pray, would the crew have at their disposal, other than a GPS/Doppler Tans, which had obviously been tested and found serviceable between the sorties.(Otherwise they would have cancelled).

Tandemrotor and Shytorque have made the rest of my points, thanks.

I ask you again, on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.

By the way, if you are looking for an ally, I would suggest trawling for a few more brain cells than are being exhibited by the three clowns who have recently invaded this thread. To all serious debaters, I would suggest ignoring them entirely, as I will from now on. (Unless of course they come up with a reasoned and polite argument).

[Low and Slow]

John-

1. Yes the debate is important, but I feel it has really run it's course. What more have we to gain by hypothesising? I know the media is SPECULATION driven but surely 'we' are beyond that. (not comfortable using we, but their you go :) )

2. I believe, based on the all the evidence at hand, that this was a CFIT accident. I know there are other possibilites but this is the one that fits the version of the facts as I understand them. Am I very wrong?

3. Do they deserve to be found guilty of GN? NO-WAY, because there are gaps in the evidence chain, and to do so would be unjust, as was the Wratten descison (IMO)

But that's just my opinion....



[This message has been edited by Low and Slow (edited 26 February 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

Sorry all if my last post seemed to ignore some earlier contributions, but I have only just found page 46.

Low and slow,

As you seem to agree that a gross injustice has been done here, you have answered your own question. 'We' are not speculating, simply asking for anyone with the required level of evidential proof to show us it. As Brian says, 'justice has no expiry date'. He is right, and until the injustice is put right the campaign goes on.

[K52]

Ark Royal,

Thanks for that, as I think I have mentioned before I only have a 1 million chart these days; it shows the beacons but not frequencies etc. Pesonally I would have had LAY selected in case of an emergency requiring an immediate diversion.

I'm not looking for allies, just warning in view of the ridicule and abuse that has been directed at other contributors to this thread.

John Nichol

Thanks for the comment but sometimes you have to speculate to accumulate. We already know that the Yachtsman gave different evidence to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the Accident to that which he gave to the FAI over a year later. Now we find that the statement in the BOI that Flt Lt Tapper "carried out the flight planning for the Inverness flight during the evening of 1 Jub 94" appears to be incorrect. Was this a typo, a genuine mistake by the board in assuming that he did the planning for that flight because he was seen preparing maps or is it a case of different evidence being given at the FAI? I believe you have all the annexes; any chance of an e-mail to let me know?

Tandemrotor

You know as well as I do that in his evidence to the BOI, which differs considerably from his evidence to the FAI, the yachctsman did indeed say that he could see up to the lighthouse but that was at 1730 whilst the Chinook was still on the ground at Aldergrove and the yacht was only 3/4 mile from the coast. His evidence on visibility given to the FAI appears to be at variabce with the evidence of all the people on the Mull at the time of the accident, including a lighthouse keeper and his wife who were standing outside the lighthouse in the fog.

With regard to his estimate of speed, which again is significantly different to that he gave to the BOI, let us presume for the moment that he is correct. In which case as we have a time from Belfast ATC for the Chinook leaving the CTR and a time for the impact of the crash (calculated from engine power down) 12 minutes later; to be able to get to that position and the speed band described the the Chinook would have had to transit at vne AND have at least a 30kt tail component to make it.

[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 27 February 2001).]

[pulse1]

Although I could not put point 2 so strongly, I agree with Low and Slow. For me this forum has provided a lot of useful information and impressive argument which has helped me do what little I can to support the campaign. Until something better comes along I hope it will go on providing a valuable means of communication for those who are actively trying to re-open the enquiry.

The main reason I would be more doubtful about CFIT is that I still find it difficult to believe that such a highly trained and well equipped crew could fly into the FIRST bit of high ground they come across, within a minute or two of knowing their position. It is rare for PPL’s like me to do that, even though CFIT is the biggest single killer of PPL’s.

If it was CFIT, several previous posts suggest to me that a lot of military helicopter flying takes place under these conditions, with the belief that superior training makes it alright. In most cases, results show that it obviously does, but it must mean that the risks are high. It also must mean that most of you who do it are also exposed to the risk of being condemned as grossly negligent. This is one of the reasons I fight on. We suffer enough from blame culture in the real world. I would hope that those of you who take high risks for our benefit would be protected from that.

I quote two of the posts:

TandemRotor

“One thing that may not have come across to anyone without military flying experience, is that this type of flying regularly occurs on the very margins of what is deemed to be acceptable weather.None more so than military low level helicopter operations. Crews are very well practiced at it, and almost invariably, very good at coping with such weather. Indeed members of this crew would have flown on operations, in other theatres, in which far less stringent minimum weather limits apply, only an overwhelming sense of self preservation dictate what is sensible, and what is not”.

Safely Single

“As a helo operator(yellow not green) I am forever flying around in dodgy weather, at low level certainly near a lot of cumulo granite. I have been caught out a couple of times when you say 'lets have a look at this valley' only to find that the cloud suddenly gets you. In fact some of my more terrifying experiences have been as a result. Do I consider myself negligent.....NO. As long as you have your escape routes and the like then you can reasonably keep the aircraft and crew safe. So much for operational flying, even on training when our limits are much more strict it is still possible to get caught out as cloud can easily be undefineable(I think that that is a word) and creeps up on you”.



------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks to everyone for their recent contributions (regardless of which side of the debate you are from). It helps to keep this important matter at, or near the top of the threads.

Just for information:
Lord Chalfont has been given Monday March 5th as the date to submit his motion for a Select Committee hearing. Should the Government try to stop him (for whatever reason) he will put a motion to a vote of the House. If he gains a majority, then the Select Committee will be established.

Updates as and when.
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Pub User]

K52

You make some interesting points, but your branch of aviation is obviously significantly different from the SH operation under discussion. A couple of points:

Meals - no one routinely logs you in at breakfast, or any other meal, in the mess. In-flight rations are available only after almost prohibitive administration, and often subject to a lead-time greater than the tasking-notice. In 13 years of SH flying I've never heard of the 'maximum times between meals' mentioned in your thread, I suspect it's a truckie thing.

The ADF - Your support for this device is commendable, but very flawed indeed. The LAY is about 27 miles from the impact point, which by my 1 in 60 rule gives a bearing change of about 2 deg per NM, and 2.12 deg by trigonometry. The needle on a chinook ADF oscillates either side of its bearing by about 4 to 7 degrees, thus its use as a position check would have been very difficult, and if the crew had tried it they would probably have flown into the water before reaching the Mull! Tuning the ADF to LAY as the nearest diversion would also be a waste of time, as TAPs for Islay are not published by the RAF, and even if they were the MDH would almost certainly be well above the minima required for VFR flight in a helicopter, which by the good book is Clear of Cloud and in Sight of Surface, amended by the not-so-good book to 250' cloudbase and 1000m viz.

[Arkroyal]

K52

I think Pub User has said it. The ADF is of no use whatsoever to the SH environment, and as he says, your thinking shows a total lack of understanding of such operations. If you can imagine your erstwhile truckie mates being judged by the SH fraternity, who know nothing of their operation, you may begin to realise our frustration with the way our fellows were judged very harshly by Wratten, who patently knows Jack about the SH world he presided over.

Care to comment on the likelihood that local orders modified the definition of VFR for the theatre?

I will ask you again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.

Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAFs own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.

[K52]

Pub User

Thanks for that. I did suggest originally LAY because it was their nearest diversion and qualified the suggestion of the AH by saying " IF they could receive it". The reason I suggested LAY was (1) it was the closest (2) Prestwick was farther and direct track would have been across the fog evshrouded hills. I accept the point about TAP's but the were supposed to be flying VFR.
In addition Machrihanish provides a radar service for Islay.

Ark Royal

Thought you might be interested in an e-mail I have had from "a current SH operator" which says "a good operator makes use of all available navaids: ADF, TACAN or VOR if they can be of use".

A further quote is "modification of local theatre orders is invalid as the crew were operating on the mainland at the time of the crash".

As I have said before - from crossing the Belfast CTR boundary at 1747 (as recorded by ATC) to impact at 1759 (power down) required a mean groundspeed of 165kts. With the forecast wind this would have required an IAS of 150-155kts which correlates remarkably well with the profile prepared by Boeing and DRA which showed a climb at 150kts IAS followed by a flare to 30 degrees nose up. During this flare the aircraft would naturally lose speed yet the impact was at a groundspeed calculated by AAIB to have been 151kts.

I confess that I find it exceedingly difficult to accept Tandemrotor's proposition that we accept the Yachtsmans evidence of the aircraft at 2-400 ft at 60 - 90kts (ground speed obviously) at a range of 2-3 nms from impact to the aircraft crashing at 810ft ASL in a 30 degree nose up attitude at a ground speed of 151kts. Of course I may have found that evidence more worthy if it had not changed between the BOI and the FAI.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

K52,

Your last reply to Ark avoided answering his main point, as usual, and referred him to an e-mailed comment about what a 'good SH operator' does. May I respectfully further add that a 'better SH operator' filters out what is useless (NDB on an unavailable freq, out of range, coastal effect and so forth) and ignores it? As the crew in this case 'appears' to have done. I say 'appears', because in this sad case there is still absolutely no clear evidence what caused the Mull crash.

[Arkroyal]

Thud,

Crikey, up early! Thanks for your support. I begin to think K52 is a politician, so well does he avoid the direct question. His economy with the actuality is also reminiscent of the breed.

K52 computes that in 12 minutes, the aircraft required an IAS of 150 – 155 Kts, intending, I suppose to convey a picture of men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent. He bases his figures on an unspecified ‘forecast wind’ and an unspecified distance, the more to sound authoritative. Remember that the flight took place in the actual conditions; and not those forecast. For the record forecast wind was 180/20kts , whilst actual was 170/30kts approx [AAIB].

ZD576 took off at 1742 [logged by ATC] and proceeded on a track of 027 deg to the zone boundary. According to the BOI ‘The aircraft requested to leave the Aldergrove Approach Radar frequency slightly before the Control Zone Boundary, and concluded its ATC service with Belfast International Airport at 1747 hrs’. This final call was logged by ATC at 17:46:30 BST [AAIB]. K52 has construed from this that, ZD576 crossed the exact zone boundary at 1747, and his calculations are based on this flawed hypothesis and the forecast wind rather than the actual, which provided some extra 10kys of tailwind.

The crash occurred at ‘about 1800hrs’ [BOI]. (I am unable just now to find any reference to the 1759 power down, but am quite willing to believe it exists). Were all events timed by the same timepiece, then accurate calculations could be made. They were not.

I said in reply to K52’s calculations back around page 40:

"The aircraft took off at 1742 and departed on a magnetic track of 027degrees (pretty well direct the Mull) and witnesses heard a dull thump at 'about 1800 hrs.' The 999 call was logged at 1804. About 20 minutes for 43 miles or 130 kts groundspeed. Not as accurate as your figures? Who knows the exact airborne time? Somewhere between your figure and mine? Still not convincingly outside of the VFR <140 Kts COCISS requirement is it?"

K52’s insistence that the aircraft crossed the exact zone boundary at precisely 1747 and covered 33 miles to the crash site in precisely 12 minutes nicely fits his version of the events in order to [b]imply negligence (still no proof). His calculations are based on flawed data, skewed deliberately to reinforce a weak case.

Now, K52, put away your calculator, and answer my question, which I put again: on what evidence do you find beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew of ZD576 was negligent.

Remember that this is not a 'balance of probabilities', it is not even 'beyond reasonable doubt'. By the RAF’s own rules, which you are fond of quoting, it is a burden of proof beyond any doubt whatsoever.

edited for finger trouble

[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 28 February 2001).]

[Pub User]

K52

You're still missing the point about LAY. It would only have been of interst to them as a diversion if it had been a valid IFR diversion following a pull-up. As a VFR helicopter they do not need an airfield as an emergency diversion - they can land anywhere. If Machrihanish could provide a useful radar service to get them into Islay I'd be very suprised, and if they'd been open at that time of day, and the crew were able to establish comms with them at low-level, then I'm sure they would have.

Lots of ifs.

[SteadyNote]

Just for accuracy, if memory serves, the expression goes: 'only in cases of absolutely no doubt whatsoever are deceased aircrew to be found negligent'.
Bear in mind that this was probably staffed, about 25 years ago, by some poor IFS chap who was trying to do the right thing; he could just have easily gone the army route of 'beyond reasonable doubt' which would have changed the picture entirely.

[This message has been edited by SteadyNote (edited 28 February 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

Thanks, Steady.

But he didn't, and it hasn't.

For absolute accuracy, the wording is this, lifted from the Defence Committee report:

The RAF’s regulations state that “only in cases where there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent”.

Very clear and the rules at the time.

[K52]

Pub User

Thanks for that. I appreciate that a helicopter can land (almost) anywhere but with the prevailing Wx at the Mull where was it going to land? The wife of the Lighthouse Keeper remarked in her evidence that when she heard the helicopter she expressed the hope that it wasn't going to try to land at the nearby Heli-Pad. According to the BOI " The weather in this area was very poor, with cloud and hill fog extending from below the lighthouse level (300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice (1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres. The wind on the hillside was blustery and strong, but close to the lighthouse it was almost calm".

Machrihanish weather was also very poor and the direct track to Prestwick would have entailed a climb over the mist enshrouded Mull. It was my thought that an aid which would have given an immediate rough track to a VFR diversion would have been more use than a commercial radio station. I appreciate that it would have been of no use if the imperative was "LAND IMMEDIATELY".

Ark Royal

Yes, I did take the time of release of the Chinook by Belfast ATC from the BOI time. I fully accept that it may have been 30 seconds earlier but then it was "slightly before the Control Zone Boundary".

The "power down" time came from the post crash interrogation of the SuperTans and the Trimble 8000 GPS which corresponded. I believe the GPS gets its time information via satellite from the atomic clock. As for Belfast ATC I confess I do not know. In days of yore when I used to Duty Instructor during my penance in Traing Command the ATC clerk used to ring the speaking clock every morning to get a time check. I have, therfore, e-mailed Aldergrove ATC to ask them how they do it these days.

Regarding the wind quoted from the AAIB of 180/30 (approx). Was this not the wind derived by AAIB from their crash investigation ie interpolating from the witness marks giving IAS and Heading at impact with their calculated track and groundspeed from the wreckage spread?

Yes, I did use the abacus to work out that 33nm in 12 minutes meant an average groundspeed of 165 kts Oddly the BOI seem to have made remarkably similar calculations. Referring to the unanswered call to Scottish Military in Pt 2 para 50 they state "This call was made 4 minutes before impact and, BASED ON GROUNDSPEED CALCULATIONS (my emphasis), at a point approximately mid way between NI and the Mull". As the Chinook costed out at Carnlough 21nm from the impact point I suggest that this implies a groundspeed of 157.5kts (approx).

You, on the other hand, believe differently and quote the (revised) evidence of the Yachtsman the the Chinook was travelling at between 60 and 90 kts(Groundspeed). Now if you are saying that you believe that this was the transit speed of the aircraft, then you will have to agree that the wife of the Lighthouse Keeper was remarkably prescient in that(taking the higher groundspeed of 90kts)she dialled 999 approx 5 minutes before the aircraft could have reached the Mull. You are also dismissing the evidence of the AAIB investigation.

Or are you saying that the Chinook initially travelled at a much higher groundspeed and slowed down to pass the Yacht? How did they know it was there? The corollary to this would be that, having passed the yacht, in order to meet the AAIB parameters; the crew would have had to accelerate rapidly on an undeviating track towards the cloud shrouded Mull until the manouvre that preceeded the cyclic flare.

Regretably I have too stop there to attend to something urgent. I will continue this a little later. Part 2 will be transmitted as soon as possible.

[pulse1]

I hope that Part 2 includes answers to the repeated questions posed by ArkRoyal and tandemrotor and which you keep avoiding.

[Arkroyal]

K52, As much as I enjoy this sparring, do, please pay attention:

At no time have I made reference to the yachtsman’s speed estimate, only the observation that he could see the helicopter, clear of cloud, and the lighthouse.

My reference to the timing at the zone boundary was simply to show that we cannot be exact. ‘Slightly before the zone boundary’ is too vague to start extrapolating speed calculations, and in any case was where the call requesting a frequency change was made. By the time the concluding call was made, who can say where the aircraft was with reference to the boundary?. The average speed over the whole trip is more relevant, but at around 130 to 140 kts groundspeed, this would not support your increasingly shaky case.

Please pay attention one more time: The ADF is absolutely no use to VFR SH operations. On Tans there is a little button which calls up the nearest airports (can’t remember how many) so who would use a wartime wireless aid, with no beacons within its range, in preference to 90s GPS? Were it tuned to Radio4, you might be more sympathetic, but in any case the evidence shows that no one was listening to it.

Of course the crew had no intention of landing at the mull lighthouse. Because the keeper’s wife mentions the possibility, does not make it relevant. SH helicopters fly below weather, and when the going gets tough they fly around it. Diversion airfields are not required.

Your calculation of speed based on the call to Scottish ATC is laughable. The call was estimated to have been made midpoint. Could have been made anywhere on route, so a speed calculated to 0.5kts based on this is, as I say, a joke!

My wind figure is taken from the AAIB report. How they obtained it I know not, but I would think they could be trusted to be more accurate than the forecast.

I look forward to Part 2. I somehow fear that pulse1 and the rest of us are going to be disappointed if we expect an answer to my direct question of the last few posts, because there is not a shred of positive evidence to support the finding of gross negligence in this case. You know it; the minutia of the various reports provides none, for if it was there, you would have found it.

edited for finger trouble (early start this morning)


[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]

[This message has been edited by Arkroyal (edited 01 March 2001).]

[K52]

Ark Royal

Sorry about the break - aftermath of the flooding I'm afraid; people want to inspect the damage. I must confess though that I took the opportunity for a small libation and a sandwich at a local Hostelry - this retired life is hell.

Part 2

Where were we - oh yes

You, in your previous post, implied that I am portraying the crew as "men in a hurry, men who are putting speed before safety, men who are being negligent." Well, if Flt Lt Tapper was planning to return to Aldergrove that evening he may of felt pressure to complete the sortie as quickly as possible,and this may have been a contibutory factor in the accident.***

In your post of 27th February you also attacked my credentials and, by implication, my ability to comment on this accident as it was an SH operation of which I, as I have freely admitted from the first, have no experience.

The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules" A previous contributor demanded to know why this flight was carrying " every VIP in NATO".

Now, I can claim to have a modest knowledge of flying passengers and even VIP's. ( I know that under normal rules none of the passengers could be described as "VIP" because they were not at least 3 star - but given the circumstances of their roles I agree with the description).

Prior to my appointment at HQ 1 Gp I had spent 14 years (in 2 tours)of the previous 18 years as an Aircraft Captain on No 32 Sqn. In that that time I had been, variously; a Training Captain, Flight Instructor and Local Examiner/IRE. During 2 of the 4 years I was not on No 32 Sqn I was Deputy Flt Cdr and Training Captain of the Bae 146 Evaluation Flight. During that time I always tryed to teach people that the aim was the get the passengers, irrespective of status, to their destination "Safely, Comfortably and On Time" - IN THAT ORDER.

Lets take that in reverse order.

ON TIME. The passengers had "no firm arrival time to meet at their destination". Time, therefore, should not have been a factor. However, as is only too obvious, it WAS a factor because of self imposed constraints on the crew to meet the Crew Duty limitations.

From the moment the tasking for that day came in it would have been obvious that it was exceedingly unlikely that a single crew could complete both tasks within the constraints of Crew Duty even utilising the 1 hr extension available through the 230 Sqn Duty Auth. Yet at no time in the 24hrs or so from receiving the tasking to departure was any request made to SRAFONI for a further 2 hr extension nor were any approaches made to HQNI regarding a nightstop out of Theatre.
Thus, when they took off from Aldergrove that fateful evening, they did not have enough Crew Duty time left to complete the task.

This, of course, brings us back to the statement above that I marked ***. Those were not my words - they were the words of the BOI in para 30c. In addition, at para 59, the BOI also state " it is possible that the crew may have been reluctant to reduce speed for the climb in order to complete the task with a minimum overfly of their Crew Duty limits." Note there that the BOI appear to have conceeded that the crew would exceed the limits.

In my opinion the oft repeated statement that " they were within crew duty limits at the time of the accident" is a total irrelevance. It is the effect on their decision making and performance because of potential " overfly of their Crew Duty limits" that is the important factor.

COMFORTABLY

Probably more a question of the degree of discomfort being the variable, but a more measured speed at low level would probably have been more comfortable than a high speed transit because time was of the essence for the crew. Note that:- the flight was for the benifit of the passengers but it was self imposed crew considerations that would denote their level of comfort.

SAFELY

I think everyone knows my views on this by now. Incorrectly set barometric and Rad altimeters ( the latter being judged a contributory factor in the accident). Only one attempt to contact Scottish Miltary ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?). The undeviating approach to bad weather and, finally, the failure to execute an IF abort procedure in which they were fully practised.

I apologise for the length of this but, as I have said before in my original post, in my opinion they were nibbled to death by ducks that they had been feeding.

[pulse1]

K52,

You say that this is your opinion, and very reasonable and well argued it is. But, do YOU have absolutely NO DOUBT whatsoever that your interpretation is correct. I know that once you have honestly answered this frequently asked question, your justification for carrying on a very informative debate might cease, but this must be such a serious issue, at least for the families of the deceased, that they deserve an honest answer from someone who can so powerfully argue the case against their interests.

If you genuinely do not have any doubt whatsoever, and say so, I await your continued argument with interest.

------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Arkroyal]

K52

True to type, rather than answer my question, you raise a few more.

OK, It was indeed a passenger flight. Were there any particular rules pertaining to the operation of this kind of flight? I doubt it, since all SH flights would be operated to the rules in force for the theatre, unless the mission was specifically authorised otherwise. I have seen no evidence that this flight was treated any differently than any other that the Chinook Flight operated during their tour. It should have been treated very differently by the very people who later castigated the crew. IMHO they were negligent in not treating it so.

Your credentials are impressive, and I apologise if any of my comments have caused offence. I stand by my conviction that your status does not qualify you to judge the actions of an SH crew on speculation and ‘how you would have done it’.

My credentials are as impressive as yours, but were gained entirely within the SH environment. I would not presume to judge a 32 squadron incident by the practices of the SH world any more than I would fly my civilian jet to SH rules (fun though that would be).

At no time have I said categorically that Jon and Rick made no mistakes on that terrible evening. The whole point is that negligence has a specific meaning which requires, quite rightly, an astoundingly high level of proof. That proof simply does not exist

I have heard it said that the finding was in part to placate the families of the deceased passengers. Knowing such a person, she finds that assertion an insult to her intelligence. Injustice piled on grief is no help to them. Justice, and a laying to rest of the whole affair would suit all (with the exception of Wratten’s misplaced pride) better than this constant argument.

Pulse1 has asked again as I do now:If you are certain beyond any doubt whatsoever that the crew was guilty of gross negligence, then show your evidence. So far your theories have shown that they might have been. Not good enough by several degrees of evidence.

[smooth approach]

I may be somewhat niaive, but can someone please explain the difference between 'gross negligence' and 'CFIT'. I ask this because, if you read a few accident reports relating to CFIT, it seems to me that the Kintyre accident could easily have fallen into this category.

Smoothy

(PS. Apologies if this angle has been covered in the previous 46 pages)

[This message has been edited by smooth approach (edited 01 March 2001).]

[ShyTorque]

K52,

I am somewhat bemused that you to continue to theorise and comment at length on a subject on which you admit you have no experience, as if you were an authority. You actually sound like a Wratten stool pigeon to me, especially as he also has NO operational SH experience. You have actually come up with nothing new. It has all been said before, all well chewed over by the BOI who WERE all highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations, and of course by many others since. My own experience is 20 or so years of helicopter operations, most of it RAF SH, some of it in that theatre, quite a bit of it at low level in marginal weather. I was a QHI on an SH type. I also flew fixed wing and was a QFI. I held a master green instrument rating on both rotary and fixed wing and taught instrument flying on both types. I now have civilian professional fixed wing and rotary licences but still fly military fixed wing aircraft on occasions.

My OPINION of what PROBABLY and finally caused the accident, like yours, is irrelevant but the initial BOI were completely correct in their findings, having considered all the available EVIDENCE. No-one will ever know what actually happened towards the end of that tragic flight and "cause not known" or similar would therefore have been a fair and adequate verdict.

OPINION has no real standing in legal matters. Mr Wratten has made the error of allowing his own strong opinion to get in the way of correct and fair judgement. The outcry is because he has been allowed to do so to the detriment of the bereaved families.

The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight.

The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs.

MANAGEMENT ERROR was surely the true main cause of this accident. If one or both of the pilots had survived to give the full story someone else would surely have taken their fair share of the blame.

This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially unsafe and unserviceable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather.

The squadron management undoubtedly felt obliged to send them because of prior negligence at the highest level and because no-one had big enough balls to step in and say NO!.

You are missing the real point of this thread. The flight SHOULD have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets instead. If a proper management decision had taken place, all of the deceased would have been alive today.


[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 02 March 2001).]

[cheapseat]

Smooth something

Have a look at your headstone. Which do you want?

[This message has been edited by cheapseat (edited 01 March 2001).]

[John Nichol]

Smoothy - CFIT would be the cause of an accident. In a BOI it would come at "Summary of Causes and Factors"

"Gross negligence" is the subsequent judgement passed on the crew's actions that may have resulted in CFIT. In the BOI it comes under the section "Consideration of Human Failings".

K52 - Yet again, you offer very reasoned and well presented opinion. But you continue to avoid the question that has been put time and time again.

Can you say that your reasoned and well thought out theory about the cause of the crash is correct "without any doubt whatsoever"?

[Seat Stick Interface]

Do you ever feel that we are constantly going around in a circular arguement.

As we have seen in the preceeding 40 odd pages that all of us who have contributed to this discussion do not know beyond reasonable doubt what happened on the day. I am all in favour of continuing the campaign to get the verdict of the chimps at the top overturned. But I feel that this thread is now just going around in circles with a little personal abuse thrown in.

The thread has been useful if nothing else for flight safety, as I have heard more and more come out about the build up to the flight I have taken a look at the way I operate and I hope that it has given others food for thought. However, I feel that this thread has used up it's usefulness in terms of the campaign. Perhaps it is time to give the thread a rest and concentrate on whats important. Maybe a new thread with campaign updates and what people who wish to help can do.


edited for spullin. That ISS curse wuz werth it.


[This message has been edited by Seat Stick Interface (edited 03 March 2001).]

[JIMMACKENZIE]

Time For Action:

First of all let me post two articles from the (Glasgow) Herald on Friday 2nd March:

New hope for fresh Chinook inquiry
MICHAEL SETTLE

CAMPAIGNERS are confident that a new inquiry into the 1994 Chinook helicopter
crash on the Mull of Kintyre will be triggered next week.
Lord Chalfont, chairman of the Mull of Kintyre group that has been campaigning for a
new investigation, has succeeded in securing a debate in the House of Lords on the
subject for Monday evening.
The purpose is to set up a Lords select committee to look into all the circumstances
when Chinook ZD576 plunged into the fogbound hillside on June 2, 1994.
It was the RAF's worst peacetime accident. All 29 people on board, including some of
the country's leading anti-terrorism experts, perished.
Politicians from all parties - including Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was defence secretary
at the time - as well as victims' relatives, hope an inquiry will be established and
exonerate the pilots, Flight Lieutenants Richard Cook and Jonathan Tapper.
The Lords debate will be led by Lord Chalfont, with Baroness Symons of Vernham
Dean, the defence minister, replying for the government.
If the government were to reject the call for a committee to be set up to launch a new
inquiry, then peers would vote on whether one should be established.
Last night Lord Chalfont, a former Labour foreign office minister, who recently met
with Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, said his "guess and gut feeling" was that the
government would agree to a new inquiry.
"In all the circumstances, it would be in the government's interest to accept this select
com mittee. The result of that would be to draw a line under the whole thing," he
explained.
Lord Chalfont insisted he would abide by the Lords committee's verdict and hoped the
government would do so too.
If the Lords committee concludes the air marshals' verdict was unsafe, then it will be
up to the Ministry of Defence to set aside the verdict or, a more unlikely outcome, set
up yet another inquiry.
The saga of Chinook ZD576 has been long and fraught. The original RAF board of
inquiry found there was not enough evidence to find the pilots responsible but this was
overruled by two air marshals, who found there was "no doubt whatsoever" they were
to blame. A year later, a Scottish court conducting a fatal accident inquiry again found
too little evidence against the pilots.
Subsequently, reports emerged of major problems with the helicopter's computer
software.
It also later transpired that the MoD was suing Textron Lycoming, the US maker of
the computer software, a fact neither disclosed to the RAF board of inquiry nor to the
fatal accident inquiry.
Last December, a damning report by the powerful Commons public accounts
committee (PAC) into the crash accused the MoD of "unwarrantable arrogance" and
said defence chiefs were guilty of "a major miscarriage of natural justice" when they
blamed the pilots.

Ministry fails to ground Chinook campaigners
Ian Bruce

THE Ministry of Defence has fought a dogged, six-year rearguard action to block any
public inquiry into the tragic crash of Chinook helicopter ZD576 on a fog-shrouded
hillside on the Mull of Kintyre.
It has stonewalled behind the unproven finding of "gross negligence" by two young
pilots who cannot defend themselves because they died along with two other crewmen
and 25 police and intelligence service passengers in the RAF's worst peacetime
disaster.
In November last year, the influential all-party Commons public accounts committee
accused the ministry of "unwarrantable arrogance" for its persistent refusal to reopen
the case.
It also branded senior RAF officers as being "guilty of a major miscarriage of natural
justice" in overturning the finding of a fatal accident inquiry which concluded that there
was insufficient evidence to blame the pilots.
Instead, the RAF hierarchy convened its own "very unsatisfactory" board of inquiry
and pinned responsibility squarely on Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick
Cook, ignoring what the committee described as "the superior standing of the Scottish
courts".
The 1995 service board was headed by Air Chief Marshal Sir William Wratten and Air
Marshal Sir John Day, an unusually high-powered duo for such a task.

Since then, the parents of the special forces pilots have conducted a persistent
campaign to have their sons' names cleared in the light of a growing weight of evidence
that the Mark 2 Chinook model flown that day had serious software flaws in its
computer system.
The Fadec system controlled fuel flow to the aircraft's twin engines. At the time of the
crash, the RAF was experiencing "repeated and unexplained technical difficulties" with
its entire fleet of Mark 2 aircraft.
In 1997, the MoD admitted that the helicopters had not been fully tested before the
accident. It also emerged that the ministry was suing Textron Lycoming, the US
manufacturer of the software, a fact disclosed neither to the fatal accident inquiry nor
the RAF investigation.
The families' bid to force the ministry out of its intransigence has been boosted by the
intervention of Lord Chalfont, the support of veteran Lib-Dem MP and defence
specialist Menzies Campbell, and the about-turn of Sir Malcolom Rifkind, who was
Tory defence secretary at the time of the crash.
Sir Malcolm originally pushed the MoD line in the Commons, but then became
involved in a behind-the-scenes dispute with his own ministerial officials over the
circumstances of the incident and has now thrown his weight behind the campaign for
a public inquiry.
Ironically, Dr John Reid, now Labour's Northern Ireland secretary, steadfastly
supported the MoD's refusal to contemplate any change in its stance when he was
armed forces minister.
Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, has until now simply repeated the mantra of "no
inquiry without new hard evidence".
The hardline refusal has angered many RAF helicopter pilots who feel a sense of
betrayal by their own service chiefs and harbour the suspicion that blaming dead pilots
for no-survivor crashes may be the MoD's cynical method of avoiding expensive
compensation claims.
The pilots, both military and civilian, have set up a website to keep the controversy
alive. Most serving personnel who contribute do so under pseudonyms.
The key objective of an inquiry is to try to clear Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook's
names, given full disclosure of the relevant technical facts and the absence of evidence
of their culpability.
Among other issues to be explained are why so many top intelligence officers were put
at risk in a single aircraft and why the MoD persists in the lie that the flight was en
route for Fort George. As revealed exclusively by The Herald, the helicopter was
heading for a security conference at Machrihanish.

-March 2nd

The Herald has fought a long campaign to clear the pilots name and I know that their reporter Ian Bruce regularly reads Pprune.

Can I suggest that all day Monday the following are inundated with telephone calls, faxes, emails etc to ensure the debate on Monday evening gets the maximum attention:
Lord Chalfont
Baroness Symons
Sir Malcolm Rifkind
Geooff Hoon
Menzies Campbell
John Reid

The peers can be contacted via 020 72193000
and the MP's via 020 72194000

No doubt you will all know direct phone no's for your MP's , email addresses and fax no's.

[misterploppy]

K52

Your *speculations* show an attention to detail and little more. I put it to you that we can argue over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin (or nibbling ducks may occupy this pond to use your analogy) until hell freezes over.

You still refuse to answer the basic question. Bearing in mind that absence of evidence is *not* evidence of absence: What *evidence* is there that gross negligence was, with *absolutely* no doubt whatsoever, the cause of this accident?

JM

Great news, let's hope their Lordships (who seem to be the only people able to hold the executive to account in this parliament) manage to pull the cat out of the bag. One thing, though: I'd suggest not pestering the enlightened ones but firing off e-mails to the press, BBC's PM programme etc to try and drum up interest from opposition peers to attend the debate. Hopefully the NuLabour Flockmasters would not try to pack out the Upper House on the night with placemen to kill Lord Chalfont's motion, but nothing would surprise me with this lot.

[Nil nos tremefacit]

Geoff Hoon's outer office number is 0207 218 2111. There's 4 of them in there so 'phone to your heart's content. ;)

[snafu]

K52

In reply to your most recent posts, (Part 1 & 2), I'd just like to make a couple of points in relation to SH ops.

The BOI state at Pt 2 para 5 that this was a "passenger flight" rather than an SH flight. AOC 1 Gp concurs and describes it as planned to be "a low level, daytime, passenger carrying transit flight flown clear of cloud under Visual Flight Rules"

As a current SH operator (same a/c type as ArkRoyal's past), I spend the majority of my operational tasking flying passengers. Yes, we also carry cargo either internally or underslung, but in the main I carry people. These operational tasking flights are normally conducted clear of cloud under VFR and will involve low level flight either if the tasking requires it or if we encounter poor weather en route. If neither you or AOC 1 Gp think this was an SH flight, I'd be interested to know exactly what you think we do as SH.

Only one attempt to contact Scottish Military ( and we will all have experienced failure to obtain a reply from a ground station first go - did you give up?).

I'm sorry to have to answer your question by saying 'Yes'. (Ok, so I may have tried two or three times before giving up for a while). Having flown around the west coast of Scotland at low level, there are an awful lot of places where you simply cannot get through to Scottish Mil due to the terrain. Admittedly, if you are in company with another aircraft and therefore have mutual SAR, there's more of a warm fuzzy feeling that you're not on your own if the guano hits the fan, but if you are alone with no IFR option you may just have to press on until you do get comms. HF may offer some assistance in these situations but you can't always get through, so yes, I have continued without talking to anyone. It wasn't comfortable and our threshold for going into a field in the event of anything going pear-shaped probably rose a few notches.

Do I consider myself negligent for doing so? No, we were clear of cloud and in sight of the surface with at least 5 km vis. Did I feel like we were suffering from 'Press-on-itis'? No - in a mountainous terrain with no IFR option and poor comms at low level it is just a characteristic of SH ops. Not particularly nice but not entirely unfamiliar.

[Brian Dixon]

Thanks again for everyone's contribution. Excellent articles from the Herald. Thanks for posting them Jim.

To answer Seat Stick Interface, (welcome, by the way), I have been campaigning for over 6 years now and have, on occasion, felt as though I was going around in circles. That is because Ministers and senior Officers refuse to even look at anything that may cast doubt on their summation of events. I do genuinely believe this thread is important, as it shows those with cotton wool in their ears that the issue will not go away. If a new thread were started, not only would we lose the contributions of everyone here, but the Ministers could say, "There's only the odd posting on the subject so it can't be that important anymore." It IS important and should remain as a testimony to those who have a belief in justice and as a sign that some of us respect those who serve in the Armed Forces.

What people can do to help is get on to their own MPs and ask that they lend support to Lord Chalfont, and not contact him direct. I have a feeling he will be quite busy over the next few days!

I'll keep everyone informed of the progress as and when I can.

Regards as always.
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[K52]

Ark Royal, Pulse 1, John Nichol et al
(Shy Torque - I'll reply to you at the end)

Thank you for your comments. I have been trying to explain the events leading up to the accident - not the cause. I am in no doubt whatsoever that the cause of this appalling accident was the the crew continued to fly an undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull and when they transitted from flight in VMC to IMC failed to take appropriate action to maintain safe separation with the ground. Even though they failed to take the correct action and adopted what OC RAF Odiham called " unrecognisable as a Chinook technique" it is likely that they could have averted disaster if the Rad Alt bugs had been set in accordance with SOP's. You will note from the BOI at para 56 that " it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the poosition of the WP change until some 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb". The crew did initiate a cyclic climb - but fractionally too late, with tragic results. The cyclic climb was initiated at a distance from the Mull that co-incided with the reported visibility.

I have no doubt whatsoever that the Determination by AOC 1 Gp was correct.

Before you reach for your keyboards please read the reply to Shy Torque. But first I will share with you the reply from Belfast ATC on how they keep their clocks accurate:-
" The clocks are always kept up to date. How? I'm not sure I'll have to ask an engineer, they must be calibrated and checked all the time (I think)."

Shy Torque

Thank you, despite the unwarranted disparagement, for your reply to my post. Oddly enough I have never, as far as I am aware, met Sir William Wratten. I do, of course, know Sir John Day - we first met when I was instructing at The School of Refresher Flying RAF Manby in the early 1970's (Manby closed in 1973). From that time, until I arrived at HQ 1 Gp, I do not recollect our paths crossing again.

I was surprised to note from your post that the Engineer Officer on the BOI was "highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations", I was not aware of that. I am, of course, aware that Sir John Day is highly experienced in Support Helicopter Operations (including Chinook) so perhaps it was him that you had in mind. It was, of course, his BOI as Convening Officer.

I am not really sure which of your bizarre accusations to answer first, however:-

" The crew did NOT order the flight. They were ordered to make it against their better judgement and against their will. The authorising officer and those above him did not stop the flight from taking place despite the fact that they were aware of the weather, the crew's duty hours, the state of the aircraft and the implications of making the flight"

HQNI tasked the flight and JATOC tasked the Chinook.

If it was against their better judgement and will then why did the volunteer to do all the tasking that day?

"The authorising officer etc". Flt Lt Tapper WAS the authorising offficer; he was also the Detatchment Commander and HE allocated the crews to tasks. The crew's duty hours were solely his responsibility as HE had decided on the dual tasking and as Aircraft Captain it was HIS DUTY to take into account all the implications of making the flight.

"This unfortunate crew were ordered to make a VFR over-water flight in an untried, potentially insafe and unservicable aircraft, with no proper IFR option and unreliable nav kit, in marginal weather."

Who ordered them to make a VFR flight. The BOI make it quite clear that this was the OPTION chosen by Flt Lt Tapper. Untried - the crew had been flyimng that airframe all day. All man made mechanical objects, includng machines that fly, are POTENTIALLY unsafe. The aircraft was declared servicable for the task and was also deemed to be by the BOI.

I'm not sure which bit of the nav kit you deem to be unreliable but this was planned as a low level VFR flight. The marginal weather was localised in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre and it was the CAPTAINS decision to take that routing. The IFR climb to safety altitude was deemed feasible by the BOI.

"should have taken place in one of your shiny 32 squadron jets". Well, I doubt it would of got airborne but it would almost certainly have made the Guinness Book of Records! 25 Pax in an HS125!! To transport that number of people would have required 5 HS 125's or a lot of work to re-role an Andover into a 28 seat fit which would have left precious little room for luggage. ( There would not have been any room for luggage in the 125's).

" The disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI removes the onus of responsibility from where it truly belongs."
I'll leave that for just a moment.

"OPINION has no real standing in legal matters."

Yes, I totally agree with you. I'll say it again - I agree with you. Let me explain.

A Board of Inquiry into an aircraft accident is normally convened By the AOC of the relevant Group; except in the case of a Directly Administered Unit (eg an OEU) when it will be convened by that Officer who, besides his normal duties, is also AOC DAU's.

The AOC assembles a panel of Officers of whom one will have been nomonated as President. The President may be a Flt Lt but is usually a Sqn Ldr. In the case of a fatal accident the Pesident MUST be of at least Wg Cdr rank. Having convened the BOI the AOC issues them with Terms of Reference and it is to these TOR's that I would draw everyones attention.

As not all contributors have a copy of the BOI I will reproduce the TOR's.

a. Investigate the circumstances of the accident to Chinook HC2 ZD576 at Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994.

b. Determine the cause or causes of the accident and examine related factors.

C. Ascertain degree of injury suffered by persons both service and civilian.

d. Ascertain if service personnel were on duty.

e. Ascertain if all relevant oreders and instructions were complied with.

f. Ascertain if aircrew escape and survival facilities were fully utilised and functioned correctly.

g. Ascertain extent of damage to aircraft, public property and civilian property.

h. Assess any human failings.

i. Investigate the loss of all classified material carried on or in the aircraft at the time of the accident.

j. Make appropriate recommendations.

These are standard TOR's for an aircraft accident.

Please look at the wording:
Sub para (a) says "Investigate" which means " to inquire into with care and accuracy".

Sub para (b) says " Determine" which means "to decide".

Sub paras (c) to (g) say "Ascertain" which means " to find out for certain".

Sub para (h), however, says "Assess" which means "to give an opinion".

The BOI did not establish a lack of human failings they gave their OPINION!!!

The BOI delivers its report to the AOC who can either accept it, reconvene it with expanded TOR's or, if he deems it necessary, reconvene the BOI under a new President. The finalised BOI is staffed at Group and , folowing that, the AOC makes his determination on the findings of the BOI.It is the AOC's duty and resposibility, and his alone, to make a finding on human failings.

THERE WAS NO " disgraceful and vindictive over-ruling of the BOI". The power to decide on human failings had not been delegated to the BOI. If the power to make a decision has not been delegated to you then you cannot be "over - ruled". All that happened was that their OPINION was considered, along with all the opinions provided during staffing, and the AOC made his DETERMINATION.

[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]

[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]

[FJJP]

We're missing the point here. No-one is arguing about the BOI findings prior to submission to higher authority. A lot of hot air has been expounded over the fitness of the ac and systems, and whether or not the pilot failed to avoid high ground, flying imc when he should not.

I reiterate a point I made some time ago, which I will repeat here:

NO-ONE KNOWS WHAT WENT ON IN THAT COCKPIT IN THE FINAL 20 SECONDS OF THAT FLIGHT.

Since no-one knows what went on, you can speculate until hell freezes over; there may have been a catastrophic failure, transitory or otherwise, which was so bad that it completely distracted them at a critical time. They may even NOT HAVE BEEN IN CONTROL. I don't know and neither does anybody else.

I draw your attention to the Lynx crash last year, where 1 survived and 3 did not. The cause was a massive hydraulic leak INTO THE COCKPIT which rendered the cockpit atmosphere untenable, which prevented the pilot from making a SUCCESSFUL forced landing. Had 1 crew member not survived to explain what happened, the true cause of the crash would probably never have been known.

I am not suggesting that that is what happened at the Mull of Kintyre, but it illustrates the point that because we do not know what happened at the latter stages before impact, NO FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE. You can talk about the balance of probabilities all you like, and theorise until the cows come home, but in the absense of positive evidence to the contrary, IT HAS BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO CATEGORICALLY STATE, WITH 100% ACCURACY, WHAT CAUSED THE CRASH.

Ergo, and the whole point of this thread, is that the findings of negigence should never have happened.

[K52]

FJJP,

I take your point but the issue here is that they were IMC below SALT approaching high ground which they knew was there. Irrespective of any emergency, for which there is no evidence, they had backed themselves into a hole. Even if as a result of their actions they had forced landed and everyone had walked away then the finding would still have been "Gross negligence">

[Flypuppy]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/uk/scotland/newsid_1202000/1202480.stm

[pulse1]

K52,

Thanks for another interesting contribution. I would be grateful if, with your access to the BOI report, you would be kind enough to explain your position with respect to the "undeviating track directly at the mist enshrouded Mull"

I have seen a lot of discussion about the height and speed of the Chinook when seen by the only witness. Presumably, his evidence was also used to estimate the position and heading at that time. Was this calculated to be on the direct track between their last known position and the Mull?

I understand that the flight was planned to be VFR low level. This means that in that area and in the forecast weather conditions, it had to be over water the whole time? Assuming that they were intending to track west of the Mull, a direct track to clear Gigha Island should have put them several miles west of the Mull. If they set the Mull as a waypoint, no-one is going to fly to the waypoint knowing they are a long way below it. Presumably they would have had a planned turning point before they reached the Mull.

It is reported that they had changed waypoints, is it not certain that they would have changed heading at the same time if the first wp was the Mull?

There still seem a lot of room for doubt to me.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[Low and Slow]

Sorry to add to this circular argument, but may I ask two more questions?

Let us assume the existance of a CVR, with two hypothetical recordings from the Chinook.

1. Pilots chatting, interupted by one saying "look out!" or "Oh Sh*T", then no further signal.

2. Pilots in the midst of dealing with a 'runaway up' or similar, then no further signal.

Which of these exhonnerates them, and which dams them for negligence?

As niether exists, what can be a fair verdict?

Sorry to have to resort the cheap psycology guys, but how else do we clarify this?

[The Mistress]

http://uk.news.yahoo.com/010305/79/b9ril.html

[FJJP]

K52,

I'm sorry, I may not have expressed myself clearly. The point I am making is that there IS NOT DOUBT that they were IMC below SALT. QED. They hit the rock-filled cloud. The point I was trying to make was that they MAY HAVE HAD NO CONTROL over the ac at that time, and that they flew into the hillside BECAUSE THEY MAY HAVE HAD AN EMERGENCY SITUATION OVER WHICH THEY HAD NO PHYSICAL CONTROL. That is the whole point of this thread in a nutshell.

Because of this possibility, which the BOI could not prove or dis-prove, they, rightly, found no negligence. However, those up the chain made certain assumptions which WERE NOT BASED ON FACT, BUT SPECULATION.

A test pilot will fly an ac to the limits of control IN HIS OPINION. Then the flt envelope is curtailed to the point where the TEST PILOT CONSIDERS THE AVERAGE PILOT can cope.

It's all a matter of opinion. The test pilot can cope with much more than the average because he is trained to do so. The average pilot may or may not be able to cope - no-one can definitively say. Therefore, we fly to the limits that is dictated by the test pilot.

It is not for those above to say what happened or did not happen that fateful day - because it has been impossible to state categorically what happened in the cockpit, it was wrong to overrule the BOI.

LORD CHALFONT - I hope you read this - I suspect youwill, since you know of its existance. Sir, just ask the question - what happened in the final 20 seconds of that flight. If the answer is 'no-one knows' then the findings of negligence MUST be overturned.

It will take a big man to admit he was wrong; I hope that the Air Marshalls shown that they have real leadership - the ultimate test of such leadership is the ability to admit that they are human, and perhaps can make mistakes after all.

At the end of the day it is not the sensibilities of 2 Air Officers that counts, it is the comfort and peace of mind of the families of the crew that are the most important factors. How would you all feel if it was YOUR son that was involved?

[Velvet]

I understand the Government has just agreed to the Lords' request to set up a Select Committe on this.

Let us hope the truth will now come out and the MOD made to face up to their responsibility.

[K52]

Pulse1,

Thanks for the comment and the question. The BOI report is basically a precis of events, and the Boards deliberations, with margin reference to the appropriate annex or witness statement. As I have said I do not have these but I will do my best to answer the Question. Please remember also that I received this out of the ether and it is 5 years since I saw the original It LOOKS all right, apart from some obvious typo’s. The typo’s in words I can probably spot but ones in the figures are far more difficult’

Regarding the track - I will precis the Narrative of Events reproducing the parts referring to the aircraft's track:-

“ Chinook ZD576 --- took off from RAF Aldergrove at 1742hrs and departed on a magnetic track of 027 degrees. --- The aircraft was observed by several witnesses to continue its 027 track at low level over the Antrim Hills to a coasting out point close to Carnlough. --- Chinook ZD576 was subsequently observed by an amateur yachtsman to be flying below cloud at a position 2 to 3 nm to the Southwest of the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse. It was seen to be flying in a level attitude and in a straight line, at a height estimated to be between 200-400ft ASL. The visibility at that point was approximately one mile in haze, with about 80% cloud cover.

At about 1800hrs a helicopter, which sounded like a Chinook, was heard by one of the two Mull of Kintyre lighthouse keepers to be approaching from the Southwest. It was also heard by several other witnesses who were in the vicinity of the lighthouse. --- At about 1800hrs several witnesses heard a dull thump followed by a whooshing sound. Two cyclists on the hillside were then enveloped in smoke, and the second lighthouse keeper, who was driving down the road to the lighthouse, saw an area of flames through the fog behind him on the hillside. --- ZD576 had crashed into the Mull of Kintyre at Grid Reference NR 593085 at an elevation of 810ft. The aircraft impacted at a groundspeed of approximately 150kts, in about a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and banked slightly left.”

It is only fair to point out that the evidence that the yachtsman gave, on oath, to the FAI more than a year later differed considerably from the evidence he gave, on oath, to the BOI in the immediate aftermath of the events.

With regard to the waypoints I will reproduce the relevant part of para 43b(2) dealing with SuperTans,GPS and Doppler which the Board considered would have been “ the primary navigation equipment in use”.

“ When power to the SuperTans was cut during the crash, navigation information was stored in its memory. This information indicated that the system had been switched on at RAF Aldergrove at 1706 hrs, and had remained on until, or fractionally after, the impact with the ground. The crew had programmed the system with a selection of waypoimts (WP) which corresponded to their planned route. These WPs had been programmed with no gross errors and to a sufficient accuracy for the planned VFR flight. However, on closer inspection of the co-ordinates used for WP A, the lighthouse on the Mull of Kintyre, the Board established that the WP had been programmed 280m from the true position of the lighthouse. The Board was of the opinion that the most likely cause of this inaccuracy was the plotting of the WP from a 1/500 000 scale chart. At power down of the SuperTans the system calculated position of the aircraft from the GPS sensor was approximately 200m south west of the impact position, and the aircraft position from the Doppler sensor was approximately 200m south east of the impact location.”

“ The board concluded that the accuracy of the aircraft navigation systems was not a factor in the accident.”

“ At the time of the impact, the SuperTans was selected to “Tac Steer” to WP B, Corran, on the western end of the Great Glen. This WP had been selected at a point on the track, 1.75 km before the impact point. Although the Board were unable to establish the SuperTans selection prior to this WP change, it is considered most likely that a “Tac Steer” to WP A was selected, as this was the first WP programmed into the SuperTans route and the first turning point on the crew’s plan.”

Para 48

“ it was determined that a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75km south west of the impact point, although the time at which this selection was made was not retained. The Board assessed that the magnitude of the small difference between the true impact point and the computed position at power down of the SuperTans was unlikely to have changed significantly in the small time period between WP change and impact. This estimation was supported by further power down position data stored within the memories of the SuperTans and Trimble 8000 systems, and power down final track information in the SuperTans. The estimated final track also correlated with the AAIB assessment of the impact parameters. It could not be proven that the aircraft flew in a straight line from the WP change point to impact but timing considerations and Doppler accuracy both indicated that there was little variation in heading throughout the flight.”

The BOI calculated that the heading change required at the time of the WP change would have been 14 degrees (approx). This would not have been sufficient to have avoided impact with the ground at the height at which they were operating.

Hope this has been of some help

[K52]

FJJP

I'm sorry but I totally disagree. What happened in the final 20 seconds was NOT the basis of the finding of negligence. The only happening in that period that can be ascertained was that the crew initiated a cyclic flare fractionally too late to avoid impact with the ground. Of course, if they had set the Rad Alt bugs properly they would have had more warning of imminent impact.

According to the BOI, at that time (20 seconds before impact) the aircraft was travelling at an IAS of 150kts and, as Ark Royal has pointed out, the calculated wind was 180/30 giving an approximate groundspeed of 180kts. The VFR requirements were 1000ft vertical and 1.5 km horizontal clearance from cloud with 5km visibility yet, as the BOI put it, " The weather in the area was very poor, with cloud extending from below lighthouse level(300ft) to at least the summit of Beinn na Lice(1400ft), the highest point on the southern tip of the Mull. The visiblity below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres."

The finding of negligence was because, whilst they were aware of the forecast poor weather and must have become aware of the actual bad weather, they flew the aircraft " both at high speed and low level directly towards the Mull, notwithstanding the obvious dangers of such an undertaking."

Irrespective of any conceivable malfunction, no matter how unlikely or bizarre, which may have occurred in the final 20 seconds of that flight, it does not alter the basis of the finding of " negligence to a gross degree."

Quite simply, they should not have been there, 20 seconds before impact, at that height and that speed - that was the negligence.

[This message has been edited by K52 (edited 05 March 2001).]

[The Mistress]

Brian

Just seen the news on page 121 of CEEFAX. Absolutely brilliant! Thank you Lord Chalfont.

[ShyTorque]

In view of the news today, this post, which was a reply to K52 is irrelevant and I have deleted it.

My sincere thanks to Lord Chalfont and all who have tried long and hard to achieve this.
Excellent news. Lets hope this time a correct and fair verdict is reached.

[This message has been edited by ShyTorque (edited 06 March 2001).]

[The Nr Fairy]

All :

The Today programme carried about 3 or 4 minutes of reporting today on the House of Lords discussion related to the Chinook crash. Overall the emphasis was on the side of those wishing to have another inquiry, although both a former CDS and Lady Symonds ( sp? ) were opposed to the idea.

I've emailed the Today programme asking if the clip can be made available to listen to via the Internet, but there's no guarantee of that. The email address is "[email protected]", should you wish to make a request yourself.

[The Nr Fairy]

I knew I should have waited !! At about 7:15, Lord Chalfont was on the Today programme.

The good news is that there's going to be a select committee looking again at the verdict of gross negligence. The bad news, well I didn't detect any but if you're cynical you could say it's not over till it's over.

Lord Chalfont also reinforced the points that 1) the original BOI didn't bring in the verdict of gross negligence, it was the Air Marshals and 2) that all the evidence is known and it's purely the verdict which is disputed.

Hopefully this is the beginning of the end.

[John Nichol]

Nr Fairy, I hope you are right about "the beginning of the end", but let's wait and see what happens. I may be cynical, but I suspect there is a reason for the Govt not opposing last night's motion. It will be interesting to see who is on the committee, but don't forget that Hoon et al simply dismissed the PAC report without a second glance using the well worn phrase "no new evidence".

There is no doubt that this time, Wratten/Day will give evidence. Make no mistake; they are very convincing, I know from experience as Day gave me his brief before I got involved in the CH4 programme about the accident. He is very, very good.

I'm not sure who else the committee will call to give evidence but they will be crucial in dicounting the RAF's argument.

Let's all hope that the outcome is the one we want.

[pulse1]

K52,

Thank you for taking the time to answer my question. I will now take considerable time to work out what it all means. I am still puzzled about them flying direct to a WP(A) which they would have known they could not reach at the altitude at which they were flying, and then set a WP(B) which they also could not reach for the same reason. They must have known that they had to climb and/or turn. We know that they were climbing at the point of impact but we don't know if anything distracted them or prevented them from turning.

However, the basis of your argument is that they were being negligent BEFORE the event and, presumably, this will be the key point of debate for the new select committee as it is also the key point of Wratten’s argument for his position, as expressed in his “Pilot” article.

I do hope that those involved in this new enquiry will read your contributions and realise what they are up against. As JN correctly says, it will be crucial who they call to give evidence.

Hopefully we will now see this case being argued in public by people far better qualified than me, as we have already seen in this forum. My interest in seeing justice being given another chance to prevail has been satisfied, thanks to Lord Chalfont and those who have supported him.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[pulse1]

K52,

Sorry I could not resist a quick further question. If a constant track of 027º took them directly from Aldergrove to the impact point, why was the Mull bearing 045º when they changed waypoints? Would not that have involved a change in heading, the wrong way? Unfortunately, as I only fly in the south I do not have a ½ mil of the area but, according to my nav computer, a direct track which put them 1.75Km SW of the Mull might have ended very differently.

------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[basing]

Just to let everybody know, this is my first post, I have read all the mail and will do anything within reason to get some justice done.I have arranged with Brian to talk to Andrew Hunter MP on this Saturday to try to get him on board, either myself or Brian will let you know the outcome. I can not make any comments because I am a ex- yomper,so I used all your machines as taxis

[meonmeown]

John Nichol,

Sorry for the delayed response to your comments posted 26 Feb 15.00.

I did not actually say that 'flying low-level in cloud was negligent' - implied it maybe but did not say it. Your assertion that there is not one 'jot of evidence' to say the crew were IMC below SALT is rather disingenuous. They hit the ground which is pretty complelling really.

At the risk of being castigated again for "offering no new evidence", I would suggest there is nothing new to offer. The SALT issue is fundamental. If the ac had been VFR when it hit the ground and the Board had reached the same conclusion then I agree all the speculation or hypothesis discussed in this forum may be relevant. But given the actual at the time, sorry.

As one who spent the best part of 25 years flying VFR underneath SALT remains the key to survival. If anything went wrong - emergency, dropped map, felt sick, got lost -the list is never ending the first rule, climb to gain VFR or to SALT then sort things out. If that is impractical then turn round and go back and/or stay VFR.

Nothing I have read or heard convinces me (nor evidently the BOI)that in the case of this accident such a basic principle of airmanship was being addressed.

So, what price 'Pressonitis'?

[misterploppy]

As Lord Chalfont pointed out, the committe requirs no real technical expertise, merely legal expertise. Therefore K52's 'nibbling ducks' needn't come into play.

As a non-pilot am I missing something? The fact that the a/c hit the ground to my mind proves only that it hit the ground, to say that therefore the crew were flying IMC below SALT makes (to my mind) the major assumption that they had full control of the a/c. Can there be no doubt whatsoever that they did?

As all the facts that are knowable are known, the HoL Select Committee has only to answer the question: "Do these facts prove beyond any doubt whatsoever that either, both or neither of the pilots were grossly negligent?"

There is no need for any new evidence.

[Ben Leice]

Coincidences?

I posted queries about Chinook flights in Northern Ireland on June 2, 1994, at the beginning of December and tasking information for 1991-94 is destroyed. [Tasking forms recording helicopter flights in Northern Ireland are retained for six years ... Spellar, HoC, Written Answers, 15.02.2001]

I persuade a Northern Ireland MP to raise a series of questions about Chinooks in parliament [see William Ross, 14.02.2001] and the Government are prepared to let the Lords carry out an investigation - 'without new evidence'.

I've been told that Colonel C Biles, an army intelligence officer who died in the crash, requested the use of the Chinook. Is this likely? Apparently the advice on May 31 was to use two Pumas. This was also the day that Chinook Mk2 arrived at Aldergrove, the first Mk2 to be used in Northern Ireland. There was a Mk1 already there but I don't know if it was available to fly to Inverness. Presumably Tapper and Cook would have preferred to use the Mk1.

Are we beginning to see the light at the end of the tunnel? Let's hope so.

[Brian Dixon]

Thank you very much to everyone who has been so supportive so far.
This is just a small step forward in the process. What everyone could do at the moment is to get their MPs to pledge support to Lord Chalfont. It may have a bearing when we know who is appointed to the Committee. Once the HoL Committee members are known, it may be worthwhile getting our MPs to canvass them. That said, keep the questions going into the MoD. They are soooo keen to reply, and nothing seems too much trouble for them. (Any chance of a reply to my letter by the way?)

Basing,
Nice to see you have finally managed to get a post on!! Thanks for arranging the meeting. I'm looking forward to it.

Remember, the light may be on at the end of the tunnel, but the end of the tunnel is still quite a way off. Lets keep the momentum and direction going, and not get complacent. We will then get the verdict that is right and just.

I cannot begin to thank everybody enough.
Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[rivets]

Lords debate information can be found on
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld19990 0/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_head0 (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds01/text/10305-22.htm#10305-22_head0)

[This message has been edited by rivets (edited 06 March 2001).]

[samsonyte]

FYI there was a very sympathetically presented feature on the re-opening of the case on Meridian last night (6 Mar), including an interview with Lord C and John Cook. Nothing from the 'Establishment' - one presumes that they would have to have been offered the right to reply?

Let's hope that some good comes out of this.

[K52]

Pulse1,

Now that is a very good question. I knew I shouldn’t have dismantled the abacus!! I will have to try and answer with a bit of mental arithmetic - and this early in the morning.

The problem with dealing with just the Summary of the BOI’s deliberations is that you cannot check the statements against the detailed evidence in the annexes. So when the BOI state “ a WP change was recorded at a point very close to a direct track from RAF Aldergrove to the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse, 1.75 km south west of the impact point” one does not know exactly what they meant. Did they mean “south west” or “in a southwesterly direction” or even “south and west”? Nor do we know whether they mean the actual position of the lighthouse or whether they meant the mis-plotted position. If they meant the latter then all we know is that it was mis-plotted by 280m, they did not specify in which direction!!!

With those caveats in mind then all I can do is TRY to offer min and max deviation from ideal track on the assumption that the BOI are referring to the true position of the lighthouse. If the true position was on a bearing of 117 degrees from the plotted position then at 1.75 km that, using the 1 in 60 rule, equates to 9.6 degrees leaving us to find another 8.4 degrees (045 degrees minus 027 degrees = 18 degrees). As 8.4 is 7/8ths of 9.6 then 7/8ths of 280m is 245m. Ergo, the aircraft was at a minimum 245m left of ideal track. If, on the other hand, the true position bore 297 degrees frm the plotted position then the calclation would be 280+280+245 = 805m left of ideal track. The truth would be somewhere within those parameters.

Hope no Navigators are reading this.

[pulse1]

K52,

Thanks again for that. With my maths I shall take even longer to work that one out.

I am still puzzled about why every one, including the BoI accepts that the Mull was a reasonable waypoint for a low level VFR flight in marginal weather. Wouldn't it make more sense to have routed direct to Corran in the first place? Still, I guess it might all now become clearer when, hopefully, we can all see the outcome of the new enquiry.


------------------
"If you keep doing what you've always done, you will keep getting what you've always got"

[K52]

Pulse 1,

Firstly an apology, the southwest bearing was from the impact point not the lighthouse; regretably the only map I have which shows the OS grid doesn't show the lighthouse. The impact point was, I think, north and slightly west of the lighthouse. My own view is the "southwest" reference was a generalisation.

Secondly : will you please stop asking very relevant questions!! The routing is a key element now that it appears that there will be further investigation into the accident. Let me explain.

The BOI based their assessment on the photocopied map left behind by the captain. The evidence given to the BOI was that the Captain had planned the sortie the night before. We now learn that the sortie was in fact planned by the other Chinook Captain on the detatchment the night before the final sortie; although he appears, if he was witness 19, to have corroborated the evidence given to the BOI that Ft Lt Tapper did the planning.

If the other Captain did do the planning, as he swore at the FAI, then this brings to mind some very relevant questions:

1. Did he discuss the routing with Flt Lt Tapper or was it his own idea?

2. What meteorological information did he use to formulate the route?

3. When did he give the prepared map to Flt Lt Tapper?

At the very least any new inquiry will be able to learn definintively why that route was chosen.

[Brian Dixon]

Received notice from Basing that our proposed meeting with Andrew Hunter MP has had to be cancelled for the moment, due to ill health by Mr Hunter.
Firstly, thanks for letting me know Basing, and secondly, get well soon Mr Hunter. I do know that he has sent a very supportive letter to Basing.

Once he feels up to it, we will go and see him. Post-meeting report will be posted here.

Regards
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Ben Leice]

"If your Lordships so decide, perhaps I may suggest that all these matters are ones that a Select Committee might look at. But I make one point. The air marshals will then be able to explain properly, in their own words, to the Select Committee why they reached the conclusions that they did, something they have not been able to do properly before.

It would be wrong to re-run the board of inquiry. It is important that all the views are carefully listened to and very carefully balanced. I must say that that has not always been what has happened in the past, although I know that the House today has been very balanced in the way that it has approached the issue.

Yes, the Government have reservations about the noble Lord's proposal, not least because of the thorough way in which the accident has already been investigated. I believe that successive Ministers have been fully and honestly briefed on all aspects of this case. I believe that Ministers of both parties have been honest in their dealings with this House and with another place. Nothing has been or is being hidden. That is because we believe that there is nothing to hide. It follows that we will, of course, co-operate fully with any committee that your Lordships may decide to establish." .. Baroness Symons, Minister of State, 05.03.01

Does this represent progress or another opportunity for prevarication?

[Ben Leice]

B52

The first point of impact was close to the road that runs east from the lighthouse and the second a few hundred metres north and east of the first impact. In other words, the actual flightpath was a few hundred metres to the east of the lighthouse whereas the planned one was to the west of it and almost tangential to the coastline, with the sea beneath.

Apparently, the computers showed that there had been small lateral displacements to the right of their expected track but I haven't found any explanation for this. Earlier that day Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for one of the SuperTANS navigation computers to be checked because it was giving unusual GPS satellite tracking data. The check was completed but no fault was found.

[This message has been edited by Ben Leice (edited 08 March 2001).]

[Arkroyal]

3 days away and two more pages to read!

This is excellent news indeed. Well done Lord Chalfont.

To reply to K52, with respect to speed. The AAIB wind of 180/30 (which I believe is from an after cast) applied to the known impact groundspeed of 147 Kts gives an IAS of about 115 to 120, quite reasonable but not as useful to your case as the 150 kts you insist on hypothesising. Please adjust your abacus!

With respect to the choice of a low level VFR transit, the crew had no choice. An IFR plan would have fallen foul of a SALT well above the icing clearance of the aircraft.

Pulse 1. I hate speculation on this accident, as that is what led to the bizarre findings by the Air Marshals. All I would say about the route, had I been planning the trip, is that W/P 1 would have been the Lighthouse at the Mull. It would have been my intention to become visual with it, change Tans to W/P 2, which would be Corran, and visually follow the coast around to it. There is no implication that the aircraft would be flown exactly on the track between waypoints. That is why Tans was in Tactical Steer, so that at any time, a direct track to the next W/P is available.

Why the aircraft flew into the Mull cannot be 'ascertained ' i.e. 'found out for certain' (to quote K52) from the evidence gleaned. Therefore the finding of negligence is unsafe.

I will refrain from asking K52 my usual question, as he obviously cannot answer it.

[K52]

TO ALL AND SUNDRY

Now that Lord Chalfont has gained approval for a Select Commitee of the House of Lords to enquire into the finding of "negligence to a gross degree" against the 2 Pilots, I find it quite incredible that no-one who supports the view that there was a miscarriage of justice in the original findings has seen fit to pay tribute to some-one who has done considerably more than fulminate against the decision on this thread.

I refer, of course, to BRIAN DIXON - who has for years, and long before this thread opened, campaigned against that decision. I, at least, can recognise the amount of time and effort that he has put in, over the years: campaigning, cajoling, writing, and organising against what he perceives to be an injustice.

BRIAN, I know that that we differ in our views about this accident, but I for one salute you for your perseverence.

[Arkroyal]

K52

How nice to be in agreement with you!

Concur, BZ Brian :)

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Brian,

I know I've said it in private via email, but as has been pointed out it is remiss of me to let your efforts go unremarked in public. Knowing how busy you are in real life, and how useful you were to us in your former RAF existence, may I add my public thanks for all you've done? Cheers mate.

[Brian Dixon]

Thank you all for your very kind comments. I am both flattered and humbled. http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/redface.gif
There are many people who have campaigned as hard as I have, if not harder. I suppose that I have been fortunate in the fact that I choose to spout off over the internet, whereas others opted for the quiet route.

Everyone's contribution is valuable, irrespective of which side of the debate and I thank everyone for making this thread the success it is.

Finally, a tribute to the families of the pilots. They have conducted themselves with absolute dignity throughout this terrible injustice. It has been a great pleasure to know them and I assure them of my continued support.

Now, where was I......"Dear Mr Hoon, any chance of a reply to my last letter...."

Regards all
Brian
[email protected]

"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook

[Has a handle]

Having carried out the hand over to to the rearcrew(4 days prior) that flew the ill fated sorted, into the Mull, and having being 'requested' 7 days later to recover a cab to ODI from BOSC, I would simply like to intimate that there was a major - 'probably a/c & accident related problem', that has not yet been fully defined.

[Has a handle]

P.S
Equate this with flying your a/c into the ground in N.Yorks and 'not being able to eject'. v. .....1999 2 x fatalities .....

[Ben Leice]

Has a handle

Drop me an email, please.

[K52]

Ben Leice,

Thanks for that info re impact point. There is no problem with the aircraft being "a few hundred metres off track"; they were flying visually and it is quite possible that they deliberatly altered course slightly on sighting the yacht to avoid giving it the benefit of their downwash.

Ark Royal

No chance to put the abacus back together - Wife making sure I finish the decorating this weekend.

The "150 kts" is not my hypothosis - it is the finding of the BOI from the evidence of the AAIB and the trials done by Boeing and DRA Bedford. Taking into account the height and other data stored in the memory of the SuperTans at its final calculation 15-18 secs before impact and then comparing them with with the crash parameters established by AAIB produced a prerequisite IAS of 150kts and a rate of climb of 1000ft/min prior to the cyclic flare.

The finding of negligence was NOT because they crashed into the Mull. As I have said before; if they had forced landed and all had walked away then the finding would still have been negligence because of their total disregard of the rules of VFR flight and their failure to carry out an IMC abort which they were trained to do.

Has a handle

Is this just a "gut feeling" or do you have some specific information that neither the BOI or 1 Group Flight Safety staff were aware of?

[cheapseat]

K52

So you KNOW they were IMC?

[K52]

Cheapseat,

YES

The ORIGINAL evidence of the Yachtsman was that he was 2-3nm from the Mull when he saw the aircraft and that there was approx 80% cloud cover and the visibility was 1 mile in haze. The evidence of ALL the people on the Mull was that it was in fog; backed up by video evidence taken approx 10 mins brfore the accident which,when assessed by the PRU experts at Wyton, showed a visibility of approx 400 metres. The fog stretched from below the lighthouse (300ft ASL) to the top of Beinn na lice (1400ft). "The visibility below the variable cloudbase close to the lighthouse was 400-500 metres" (BOI).

At the speed the BOI accepted they were travelling at the requirements were 5 km visibility, 1.5 km horizintally from cloud and 1000ft vertical clearance from cloud. 5km equates to just under 2.7nm, thus on the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidence the were at that time, or were imminently about to become, IMC. The BOI's "most likely cause" was that, having become IMC, they selected an "inappropriate rate of climb". I do not understand how a BOI could reach such a conclusion in the full knowleedfe that the crew were trained, and practised, in the appropriate "IMC abort" procedure. In my opinion failure to take the appropriate action to either regain VMC or climb to SALT amounts to " negligence to a gross degree".

Finally, I have qouted the yachtsmans ORIGINAL evidens. That which he gave at the FAI is totally at variance with the evidence of all those who were actually on the Mull.