The Myth of The Silent Cockpit below 10.

[A37575]

Talking over coffee the other day, friend of mine flying Airbus machines said a new SOP in his company required the PNF to call "Speed checked" every time the flaps and gear were operated and that it seemed like a running commentary as flaps extended. Added to this were more or less continuous flight deck verbal confirmations of practically each switch, each action until the cruise where even then SOP verbalisation rarely seemed to stop.

While it could be argued that many SOP are the result of lessons learned in past incidents or accidents, it does make you wonder when does all this inter-communication stop. Verbalisation of mode annunciations is all the go under the banner of mode situational awareness. This incurs more talking.

I wonder if the School of CRM/TEM at the University of Texas has ever thought of seriously researching the flight safety disadvantages or possible potential for over-reliance on constant verbalising?

The silent cockpit policy below 10,000 ft was established to minimise distraction caused by non-operational chatter between crew members. Although many airlines endorse the silent cockpit policy, it seems to me that the welcome and guarded silence it generated was soon filled with well meaning but often superfluous operational chatter. Nature abhors a vacuum and so chatter it has certainly become.

Assuming both pilots are qualified and competent at their job and they have eyes that see, why state the bleeding obvious in so many facets of flight deck scanning?

Are we training a breed of pilots who not only spend sometimes inordinate heads down time programming their computers - but are also adept at following often superfluous fly-by-mouth SOP rather like people that whistle in the dark to help with self confidence? Put another way; is it an over-kill when we see - or rather hear - more or less constant SOP verbalising of the visually obvious?

[BOAC]

The idea should be (and is in some places) that "Speed checked" is verbalised in PNF's head only and is an important silent check. BA (short-haul) went through the system you describe for a while. I think they then dropped it.

[Airbus_a321]

@ A37575
:D:D:D
:ok:

all this bla-bla generates IMHO not more but even LESS situational awarness.
The so called "SILENT COCKPIT" is the only and best way to get max. situational awarness.
And not the bla-bla-bla cockpit, often wrongly called "Airbus procedure".

[safetypee]

“The silent cockpit policy below 10,000 ft was established to minimise distraction caused by non-operational chatter between crew members.”

This is a key point, it was a policy not a regulation.
It’s hard to understand the need for a regulated mandate with threat of punitive action when appropriate guidance and self-discipline would suffice.
In addition, it’s more puzzling why there are mandates in cultures with high individuality; a recipe for friction between operational (human) practice and the regulations.
In more tolerant cultures, safety defenses focus on guiding human behavior (policy), instilling self-discipline (training and practice), and ensuring appropriate leadership (captaincy).
A crew exercising the qualities of good airmanship should be able to judge situations where strict adherence to the policy is required, or on other occasions add to the exchange of information.

A silent cockpit in itself does not aid situation awareness, which requires perception and comprehension – skills of thought. These aid the required self-discipline, triggering self checking, questioning whether a particular conversation should be started at the time, or asking have I missed something – what should I be doing now.

Some manufacturers provide guidance (not always a rule) for calls to aid awareness. Often this information is provided to cover a wide range of cultural operations, and more recently the threat of legal response. The use of this guidance requires judgment, which if operators and individuals practiced more often, then the industry might have a less cluttered and potentially error promoting operating philosophy – i.e. SOPs for everything.
Do rules (SOPs) curtail thought?

Operators should review their SOPs – why is a speed call with respect to flap required, particularly in highly automated aircraft with speed protections. If crews are not competent in having the necessary speed awareness (‘verbalized in the head’), then operators (and the industry) should be asking why not.
Fix the root problem; don’t keep adding safety patches to a flawed system.

[411A]

All this constant verbalizing at some companies may be fine for them, as for us....the less said, the better.

[VinRouge]

So, how do you know if the PNF is actually cross checking speed and mach limits?

Mind-read?

I generally find you can overdo the whole silent flightdeck concept. If someone wants to flag up an issue or do something non-standard, then as long as its briefed and acceptable to the crew, whats the problem?

You can overdo it in my opinion. You could spend more time about biting your lip rather than having your mind on that granite thats in front of you, or monitoring a system.

[Centaurus]

So, how do you know if the PNF is actually cross checking speed and mach limits?

Mind-read?


I would have thought it would be obvious that continual verbalisation of everything you see would be counterproductive. And extremely irritating. Having frequently observed in the simulator, pilots responding to a checklist challenge without actually checking that the lever, switch or system was indeed where it should be, was convincing evidence that parrot like replies such as given in a previous example of "speed checked" certainly does not prove the responder has checked that he has looked at the ASI and then at the flap limiting speed decal before selecting the required flap.

During military training (presumably civilian flying instructors as well) we were taught by our instructors to first look and confirm verbally the coast was clear before turning the aeroplane. This was important during flying training. Once training was completed and we were on our own, visual checks were still made before turning or taxiing but verbalisation was unnecessary. Clearly there are important verbal double checks between the pilots such as the airspeed indicator reading known as the 80 knot call made during the take off roll. I might add that few pilots note the ground speed read-out at the instant of that call - yet that is a good point of airmanship with regard to wind change among other things.

Some time ago I was an observer in a simulator during a selection process by an Asian airline for direct entry captains. The test consisted of a few circuits and ILS. Each candidate spoke the English language but came from places like South America, Eastern Europe, USA, Italy and other smaller countries. Candidates were assessed on their raw data flying skill and cross-cockpit communication skills. CRM in a fashion?

The two management pilots doing the assessing had very limited English language skills. One Eastern European candidate in the right seat acting in turn as PNF, talked rapidly and incessantly through out several circuits and landings and the ILS. His so called "support calls" were nothing more than continual prompting, urging and and cajoling of the PF and which probably drove the PF to distraction. Other candidates (no one knew each other before sharing the cockpit), made the occasional support call probably used as SOP by their parent airline.

The verbal diarrhoea of the Eastern European candidate got him the job of direct entry captain on the 737. He was considered a first class communicator by the non-English speaking assessors even though the they obviously hadn't a clue what the fellow was on about. As far as the assessor was concerned the more a pilot talked, it followed logically in his mind the more CRM was being lavishly spread about the cockpit.
Weeks later the voluable Eastern European candidate weeks failed to pass his line check. Perhaps he talked too much?

There will always be different opinions on the subject of SOP verbalisation. Some prefer the child's dummy comfort of verbalisation, while others prefer guarded watchful silence.

[411A]

I would have thought it would be obvious that continual verbalisation of everything you see would be counterproductive. And extremely irritating. Having frequently observed in the simulator, pilots responding to a checklist challenge without actually checking that the lever, switch or system was indeed where it should be, was convincing evidence that parrot like replies such as given in a previous example of "speed checked" certainly does not prove the responder has checked that he has looked at the ASI and then at the flap limiting speed decal before selecting the required flap.


Precisely.
Folks that have never used the silent FD concept will, I expect, never truly understand its advantages.
It goes part and parcel with the dark overhead panel concept...lights out/ops normal.

So, how do you know if the PNF is actually cross checking speed and mach limits?


We emply only professional experienced pilots at our small airline.
They know what (and what not) to do...on every flight.
A simple concept to understand.

[OzExpat]

I wonder if all the extra babble is required to make up for the lack of experience of the new super airline licence trainees? It seems to me that the best way to go is to call the deviations, not the normal.

[alf5071h]

“I wonder if all the extra babble is required to … …”
Interesting thoughts, but should you be having them below 10? ;)

Whether chatting, daydreaming, or thinking about issues irrelevant to the current situation, these all indicate poor attention management. This is the issue.
As above (#4), the industry should not require regulations to impose behavior. If an SOP is warranted then this must have additional information as to why it is important to focus attention on particular aspects in critical stages of flight. Education materials and training must support these aspects; why we should manage our attention, how we might improve it, what we should be thinking about and when this is important. Again as above, it is a matter of discipline.
Thus, yes, excessive verbalization might represent a lack of experience or weak training, poor SOPs or rule mania, but in particularly it is the critical lack of those individual qualities of self control and disciplined behavior, as seen elsewhere in modern operations.

If the comments above reflect the reality of significant parts of the industry, then, as a quick-fix, guidance to direct attention by requiring calls might be a suitable defense. However, during periods of change or introduction of ‘short term’ fixes, there is often increased complexity or unforeseen opportunities for error.
Operators should not follow the new guidance blindly; question why it is being given, what are the underlying problems and do these and thus the solutions apply to their operations.
Many parts of the industry forget to think before acting.

[Pugilistic Animus]

SOPS have replaced 'airmanship long ago' in these new age companies as well CRM is used by petty little brats as a means of getting their way instead of using all available resources---what these companies fail to realize is that--these 'new ideas' and 'new techniques and methods' of doing things are DANGEROUS:mad:

here how it should look

YouTube - BAC-111 Cockpit (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVJNTO-Jrlc)

[Tmbstory]

The original intent of this was that the only talk allowed in this phase of flight had to be pertinent to the operation of the aircraft prior to the approach and landing.


Tmb

[Double Zero]

Don't just think of this in terms of airliners; I knew a , say, fast jet, pilot who rose to a great position ( no-one most of you will have heard of ) despite the fact that earlier on he had basically thrown away a perfectly good example of said fast jet, by fooling about and " last seen spinning inverted into cloud, engine/s out ".

The only way he got away with it was by having the presence of mind to verbally run through the spin recovery checks ( which in that situation were pretty much a token effort ) before ejecting, for the sake of the voice recorder and ensuing court martial; it worked for him, if not the taxpayer.

[OzExpat]

alf... I think you might benefit from reading the 2nd sentence of my previous post.

[alf5071h]

OzExpat, err.. yes, … thus clarifying my previous post.
My lighthearted comment on your thoughts was to identify the issue with all cognitive processes and not just that of speech; hence, my later points about discipline and managing attention.

I fully agree with your point that only the deviations should be called and not the normal, although there may be justifiable exceptions – see below. One problem for the industry is that due to training / experience weaknesses, ‘normal’ may not be well understood or even known at all.
In this regard, the last part of my post might have been clearer if I had described the current short term fixes as being deficient by not referring to the normal value, although it appears that many of the ‘new’ calls appear to be attention triggers as opposed to crosschecks.

Thus while ‘quick-fixes’ might defend against weak training / experience, but they do not replace the much need specific checks of critical operating parameters, e.g. instead of ‘power set’ during take off, the call should be ‘Power Set xx% (EPR)’ which refreshes memory of the normal (for the low experienced), and enables comparison with the normal or what is expected (for the more experienced pilot), and thus is an excellent error check. Calling airspeed before flap extension in a modern aircraft would be superfluous for a well trained and experienced crew, but cognitive (situation) awareness of speed is still essential.
Similarly, a deviation call should provide additional information as well as being an attention trigger, e.g. “engine 2, high TGT, 860, increasing” - system alert, parameter, value, trend.

[flipster]

I get the impression that all the verbalisation/patter is for the benefit of the CVR? Either way, the b****rs will hang you after the accident!

Ditto the silent cockpit. However, I would say that it does take a certain amount brain-space even just commenting on the view and replying.

Therefore, it is inappropriate chat that is what the silent cockpit rule tries to eliminate.

For example, last night there was a fabulous view to be seen over London and the SE of England - with Bonfire Night fireworks etc. But we were so busy dealing with an overworked London ATC, a stack of aircraft recovering in a stream to the same airport, a wx-radar fault (for the isolated build-ups that there were), an anti-ice fault (ditto), as well as completing all the the normal verbiage to complete various phase-checklists, that not one comment was made about the panorama outside to window. Had either of us started talking about the weather/view then we could have easily overloaded things. I think that is the intention of a sterile cockpit - inappropriate chatter at the wrong time. Once again, we come back to basic airmanship - that the well-meaning but over-zealous try to implement by over-regulation. I don't believe it helps that much.