Will 9/11 Security rules kill pilots in an accident?

[cessnapuppy]

Schiphol crash pilot's death draws cockpit door scrutiny (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/02/27/323221/schiphol-crash-pilots-death-draws-cockpit-door-scrutiny.html)

The last 3 or so weeks, we've seen a number of aircraft fires (on take off, landing, on taxi/push back).

Scenario: A hard but otherwise survivable accident -and the cockpit door is jammed. Stunned by the impact unable to move and rescue crews unable to help :ugh:

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

Altlantic Airlines Bae 146 at Stord.

4 (1CA 3PAX) persons killed by fire, fwd pax door and service door blocked by rocks, they could not evacuate via cockpit due to security door which was locked, aft exits not available due to fire in mid cabin.

Pilots had allredy left cockpit via the windows, the commander tried to climb back in via the window to open the cockpit door but failed.

[847NAS]

Is there any reason why it is impossible to have forward escape panels on commercial aircraft ie left and right of flight crew, or even some kind of pop out/breakable glass.

The secure cockpit is now a neccisity in my view and it's removal would make pilots feel quite vulnerable, post 9/11, (again in my not expert opinion.)

What options are there? The above named incidents are catastrophic, more so beacause these were totally preventable deaths (the flight crew) and/or would usually be considered minor and totally escapable, Rest In Piece to those aviators and passengers

[wobble2plank]

All aircraft have emergency escape windows operable from the inside.

As to 'stunned' crew and access from the outside then a sturdy fire axe verses aluminium is not a bet I would take.

In the Schlipol incident the impact profile of tail first, rotate then cockpit probably killed the crew via the impact.

[FCS Explorer]

B737 FO sliding window CAN be opened from the outside. alas axe versus air plane fuselage or window - don't think that works.

[King on a Wing]

An impact activated switch which on activation cuts the power to the solenoid arming the door switch.Something like raising the guarded switch.Only that it is impact activated.AND then maybe pilot+evac command switch activated too.Simple as that...
The trickiest of soloutions lie in the simplest of forms....

[RatherBeFlying]

The pilots lost consciousness because of depressurisation. The door prevented entry of any cabin crew (on portable bottles) until shortly before the a/c ran out of fuel:(

[Gary Lager]

All post 9/11 cockpit doors on aircraft I have flown (inc. 737) had/have a ***** to allow ****** to ****** an ******, thus gaining access to the FD even if both pilots are incapacitated. I do not believe the locked FD door was a factor in the Helios accident.

(edited so that Daily Mail readers can relax once more)

[BALLSOUT]

I expect the locked door was a major factor in the Helios, I believe it was considered likely that the cabin crew had spent their time trying to open the door. They probably forgot the code. I find a lot of cabin crew forget the code under normal circumstances, never mind in a serious emergency situation.
I don't see the need to have a door code anyway, the deny function should be satisfactory to prevent entry unless the crew are incapasitated. Then they wouldn't want to deny.

[Locked door]

Ref the Helios accident,

IIRC cabin crew and a passenger were observed in the flight deck attempting to revive the pilots using the pilots oxygen masks. They were unsuccessful as they were unaware the flight crew oxygen was switched off due to poor pre flight checks. The door was not a factor.

Ref the Turkish Schiphol accident,

Regrettably the flight crew were killed by the nosewheel entering the flight deck on impact.

All commercial jets have doors that deenergise with loss of ac power, have (simple) normal and emergency access codes, automatically unlock with depressurisation and an alternative escape path. It's just a question of where the biggest threat to the safety of the a/c lies.

I dislike locking the door but right now aircraft are safer that way, if a little less sociable.

Don't get me started on not being allowed to have my wife on a flight deck jumpseat though........:ugh:

[BALLSOUT]

On the Helios, as I understand it.The cabin crew had only just managed to enter the flight deck minutes before the engines ran down due to lack of fuel.
I imagine, if they had entered the flight deck much earlier, the outcome could well have been different.
With regards to the oxygen being switched off. On all the 73's I fly, The oxy tank is located in the forward hold and can't be turned on or off by the crew.
Pull out the mask and put it on, the rest is automatic.
The switch that killed them all was the presurisation, being in manual and not automatic.
I have also flown a number of types with locked doors. None have had more than one code option. The doors remain locked untill all electrical power is removed, and they don't open on depresurisation.

[singpilot]

Patently not true. Please refrain from taking the CNN POV.

[Lazy skip]

You will find that when on battery power only this door solenoid is deactivated anyway, so i guess that after a major impact where IDG are lost if door doesn't open it's just because of major airframe deformation.

However in the 737 (that I fly) apparently there is a CB for this door system in the E&Ebay as well.

[cessnapuppy]

BALLSOUT: it was a little bit less than that, but not much less dramatic and still 100% fatal. I dont know which would have been worse, unable to get in, or stuck helpless for 10 minutes/ :(

Re: Helios SKYbrary - B733, Helios Airways, Athens Greece, 2005 (HF LOC) (http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/B733,_Helios_Airways,_Athens_Greece,_2005_%28HF_LOC%29)


That scenario is something to consider though (i'm getting a bit off topic) but we need to have a procedure to empty the air in the cabin, coupled with an air quality monitoring system - in conjunction with better scrubbers and filters.

Regarding the door, I believe the simplest and safest would be dual system where the door gets an unlock request and waits for an override for the pilots before it responds and opens.

So if there is no conscious pilot, then the door will open.
There could be a 'duress' code, where the door wont open at all when it receives that code.

Don't get me started on not being allowed to have my wife on a flight deck jumpseat though........
Or a 15 year old son? Eldar Kudrinsky

[Basil]

Gary Lager,
Not so on anything I flew after 911.
May I politely ask that you remove your posting?

[Gary Lager]

Basil - the CDLS systems are designed, as should any decent security system be, with the assumption that baddies will know how it works. That is why there is a ***** and ample opportunity for conscious pilots to deny entry to Terry Taliban who might have knowledge of such an *******, which varies between aircraft and airlines.

happy? :rolleyes:

[JW411]

I heard a tale a couple of weeks ago of a captain and F/O who inadvertently locked themselves out of the cockpit of a Boeing on the ground at a quite famous northern airfield.

It seems that repeated attempts at resetting the system by depowering the aircraft did not work and so it was that it didn't move again for 2 days.

How very embarrassing.

[Turbavykas]

Regarding the door, I believe the simplest and safest would be dual system where the door gets an unlock request and waits for an override for the pilots before it responds and opens.
It's done this way on 737. I found out while reading some manual downloaded from internet.

[cessnapuppy]

It's done this way on ***. I found out while reading some manual downloaded from internet. :eek: OMG!! TERRORIST!!!
(just some gentle ribbing at Basil :P)

I heard a tale a couple of weeks ago of a captain and F/O who inadvertently locked themselves out of the cockpit of a Boeing on the ground at a quite famous northern airfield. How exactly, would one write that up on an incident report?

Details, please! lol

[p51guy]

This is not a problem because pilots have an alternate way of getting out and once main power is removed as stated earlier the door is not locked. The door being as it is now is a wonderful deterent to hostile passengers. You know they can't get in. Let's be happy with the security improvement. Never will we let 9-11 happen again. Always make sure your FA's know the code so the Athens incident never happens again.

[pilotmike]

All commercial jets have doors that deenergise with loss of ac power, have (simple) normal and emergency access codes, automatically unlock with depressurisation and an alternative escape path.

Not true. Why state, with such an air of authority, something which although you might wish it to be true, is complete fiction?

[Skipness One Echo]

I do NOT want to know how but, if the FA knows a code to open the door and the pilots are a little hungry, busy and in a non high profile area, ie gaurd down like US domestic used to be, is there a mechanism to prevent someone threatening the FA get the code and gain entry?

Just a yes or no please, not fishing for a way round, just trying to understand.

Ta

[jetset lady]

Skipness One Echo,

Yes. Cameras and/or spy holes in the door.

Jsl

P.S. Before anyone accuses me of giving away any state secrets, both are plainly visible and in the case of cameras, there will be notices stating that they are there.

[jackharr]

Question from a pilot who retired three years before 9/11. There were no (or at least, very few) locked doors in my day.
Do you pilots really feel any safer today with mandatory locked doors?
Jack

[Locked door]

Yes I do.

Some of the rules are silly but all are intended to improve safety.

It's a sad reflection of the world we live in.

LD

[Gary Lager]

I don't.

It is a barrier to emergency egress, crew communication (critical in an emergency), positive interaction with the passengers and fosters a sense of paranoia that before long, if not already, will become taken for granted as the 'norm'.

Yes, a layered approach is important, with the FD door as the last bastion, but ffs sake let's have some common sense applied - something lacking from management/DfT in the Pablo Mason case.

What keeps us safe is Intelligence (with a capital 'I'), not bulletproof doors. I can think of 100 different ways to take out an airliner without breaching the door, the recent convictions of the 3 bad guys show that Al Qaeda can as well. So I doubt we are any safer, it just means the baddies have to be more creative!

[Ron & Edna Johns]

I feel a LOT safer with the locked doors, with my cockpit-crew colleague peering through the peep-hole, wanting to pop out to the toilet, but not daring to open the door because there is a TEN-YEAR-OLD child standing out there, waiting for the toilet himself...... :suspect:

Yep, we are much safer..... :(

[RoyHudd]

Locked door prevents terrorists gaining control of a/c by taking over flight deck.

End of story.

(If I should see a 10 year-old outside waiting for the toilet, I am not inhibited to go for a pee, obviously. Rather stupid previous comment. If I see a suspicious-looking person, having scanned with the cameras available to me, I just ding the CC and ask them to clear the area...simples....if there is a problem, I stay on the right side of the door and deal with it.)

[cessnapuppy]

If I should see a 10 year-old outside waiting for the toilet, I am not inhibited to go for a pee, obviously.
Maybe you should be, or thats what the NTSB may say, as your 'harmless' ten yr old drops to the ground clutching his groin pointing at YOU saying "that man grabbed me privates!"
You shocked,blanched, the angry mom approaching, running to rescue her 'abused' child (but runs right past you both into the now open cockpit)

.....

No, the thread wasnt and isnt about the need for the cockpit door -IN FLIGHT. It's what happens if there is an accident and pilots are unable to receive help. (Sorry if the thread title didnt make that clear :rolleyes: )

[Frangible]

With Helios the CC did get into the flight deck, but no one knows when they got there, and so what their options were. If, however, as investigators are commanded, your job is to prevent repetitions of what happened rather than explain exactly what did, you might recommend giving up the locked door on the assumption it was an obstacle to reviving the pilots. They didn't.

IIRC this was a concern of ALPA's when the doors were first mooted. It is still very difficult to get "normal" safety to do "joined up government" with anti-crazy safety. Which is more probable, an emergency like Helios or another 9/11? Answers on a postcard.

[Piltdown Man]

The initial article in Hurriyet and the subsequent report in Flightglobal, a product of "churnalism," were incorrect. None of the investigators nor rescue team co-ordinators of this event believe that any of those in the cockpit were alive following the impact. A very tough decision was taken very early on in the rescue to spend resource to save those who could be saved and to a degree, ignore those who had already perished.

This will also be one of the first accidents where the performance of the rescue teams will have been filmed from the outset. A bright minded individual working for the roads department who was passing by at the time requested that the camera operators to turn their traffic cameras towards the scene. This occurred with minutes of the crash and they remained pointed in this direction for the next few hours. Data and footage obtained from these recordings can now be used to improve the response by emergency services worldwide.

PM

[AnthonyGA]

In the case of the Helios accident (the final report for which I have right in front of me), there were no passengers entering the cockpit, and there was apparently no attempt to revive the pilots.

What actually happened, as far as the accident board could piece together, is that a flight attendant entered the cockpit just before the first engine flamed out from lack of fuel, and sat in the captain's seat and appeared to be attempting to fly the airplane. This attendant, the only male member of the cabin crew (and thus easily identified), also held a valid U.K. CPL and a valid first-class medical.

CVR evidence indicates that standard emergency procedures were used to access the flight deck, but the board was puzzled by the fact that this FA waited until 30 seconds before the engine flameout to actually open the door. A possibility is that he didn't know the proper access code and could not actually open the door until power to the locking mechanism was lost as engine failure occurred. Only the Cabin Chief normally had the access code at Helios.

Once the door was open, the FA tried to sit in the left seat and appeared to be trying to fly. He didn't see the F-16 escort at first. At one point he sat up and remained motionless, as if unconscious. After the engines flamed out and the aircraft began to descend, as it passed through 7000 feet or so the FA appeared to see the F-16s. In response to their signals to follow them to the airport, the FA merely pointed down (as if to say that he had no choice but to go down now). Shortly thereafter the aircraft crashed. Nobody else was seen moving on the flight deck. The CVR recorded two weak attempts at a mayday call, but this was not on the radio record; perhaps the FA was too far gone to remember to key the microphone.

The CVR evidence seems to indicate an entry onto the flight deck using standard procedures, but that doesn't explain why the FA waited so long to enter (he waited hours to do so, in a depressurized airplane with an unresponsive flight deck), nor does it explain the remarkable coincidence of him opening the door only seconds before the first engine flameout. This does tend to encourage speculation that he was unable to open the door for some reason and gained access only after it unlocked on its own, by which time it was too late. The report concluded that the secured cockpit door was not necessarily a contributing factor, but there isn't enough information to know that for sure. There were some anomalies in flight-deck access procedures at the airline, but those were not necessarily contributing factors, either.

The bright side to the story is that the flight deck was thoroughly protected against any evil terrorists on board for essentially the entire flight.

There are far more accidents than terrorist attacks aboard aircraft, so it seems to me that the emphasis should be on dealing with the former rather than dealing with the latter … which means that access to the flight deck should be made easy in any emergency situation that cannot be readily provoked by passengers. If the flight deck is unresponsive, the risk of letting terrorists enter the flight deck pales to insignificance (in fact, the risk of terrorism is already vanishingly small even in normal flight), so the flight deck door should unlock in any emergency. It is not sufficient to assume that the right person in the cabin crew will be able to open the door.

There is too much paranoia in the aviation industry today in relation to the very small threat from the bad guys, whereas the standard paranoia about safety—which is far more justified—seems to be waning. This is a worrisome trend. One need only look at the numbers to see where the real concern and emphasis should be placed, and it's not on dealing with mostly imaginary bogeymen.

[BOAC]

A possibility is that he ............could not actually open the door until power to the locking mechanism was lost as engine failure occurred. ....................
This does tend to encourage speculation that he...................... gained access only after it unlocked on its own, by which time it was too late. both 'assumptions' incorrect. The report states that the door was unlocked using the correct emergency procedure BEFORE engine failure. The puzzle is why it took over 2 hours to do so - perhaps the poor steward was working through all the codes. In any case, a single engine failure should not 'unlock' the door if the other engine generator is working. There is no indication that this was unserviceable.

Yes - the door may have hindered access if, as stated, there were some 'some anomalies in flight-deck access procedures at the airline' but that was in the hands of the airline, as the AMS crash was in the hands of the pilots.

[p51guy]

AGA, On Sept 11, 2001 most everybody agreed with your statement of not worrying about terrorists. Later that day nobody agrees with your statement. The skies are a lot safer today regarding this threat. Helios did not crash because of the new procedure in my opinion. Why the FA couldn't use the code to open the door was the big problem after the depressurization. Did he forget what it was? The engines may have surged just before fuel starvation momentarily releasing the door lock. The FDR should have shown if this did happen.

[BOAC]

p51 - read the report?

[SASless]

If the FA's know the code....then they can be convinced to give it up...thus the door is not secure. If the FA's have a key to the door....it can be taken away and again....the door is not secure.

The only way to secure the door is to have it designed so only the cockpit crew can open the door from the cockpit side.

The goal is to keep Hijackers from entering the cockpit.....thus all other concerns are not relevant. Or...am I missing something!

[Mikehotel152]

Pardon me if this is already done, but perhaps the addition of a sentence in the emergency QRH, assuming such a thing exists, to the effect of 'ensure cockpit door unlocked' would help in the case of normal emergency situations?

[Gary Lager]

No no no - haven't you been paying attention? The whole point of the system design is that is doesn't matter if the terrorists know the code for emergency door opening, because that code gives a 1-2 min delay efore opening, all the time with a godawful alarm sounding in the FD, so pilots have plenty of time to assess the situation and, if necessary, completely disable the external keypad/entry system. If both pilots are so unconscious they don't deny entry to any bad guys using the not-so-secret code then you have problems anyway.

[Gary Lager]

Pardon me if this is already done, but perhaps the addition of a sentence in the emergency QRH, assuming such a thing exists, to the effect of 'ensure cockpit door unlocked' would help in the case of normal emergency situations?

There are lots of situations that could be engineered by bad guys just for that purpose.

Leaving it unlocked in an emergency should be a judgement call, not an automatic process. Good judgement is what Captains get paid for.

[Mikehotel152]

Point taken Gary, though 'opening/unlocking' doors is a standard item on most emergency checklists for light aircraft, and for similar reasons.

[mini-jumbo]

Yes, but the reason it's there on light aircraft is because of structural damage preventing the door being opened in a crash, thus blocking your ONLY exit. Unlocking the flight deck door prior to a crash landing wouldn't ensure access, as it would unlock with a loss off AC power. If it doesn't open, it's most probably obstructed or damaged.

[p51guy]

BOAC, I read the final report and concure that the code alarm was steady when he opened the door. It said continuous chime but I assume they meant alarm. It was translated into english. The last time I read the preliminary I don't recall that part. It would have been helpful to have a longer CVR to understand why it took so long to enter the right code.

[Basil]

Not all terrorists are bright fully briefed individuals.
e.g.: Glasgow airport attacker 'Doctor' Abdullah or Mr Reid, the 'shoe bomber'.
Why assist our enemies by discussing security on a public forum?

[BOAC]

It would have been helpful to have a longer CVR - NB CVR would not record that! Did you also see that the 'engines' did not 'surge' - and would not 'release' the door if they had?
Why assist our enemies by discussing security on a public forum? - for one: amongst other things it might just preserve the life/health of a member of the c/crew if 'they' knew that obtaining the code would not necessarily give them access? See 'Gary Lager'. The more 'they' realise we have our security 'tight' the better.

[Chu Chu]

Seems to me that cockpit doors aren't there to protect aircraft, but to prevent them from being turned into weapons. Increased or decreased risk to pilots or passengers isn't irrelevant, but it's only part of the equation. The real issue is whether the doors are designed so that they reduce the risk of attack to all possible targets at an acceptable cost to convenience and flight safety. Not an easy question, but I think it's the right one.

[p51guy]

Yes, I said in my last post after reading the final report that the code was used so that is what released the door. I agree, them knowing the code won't help them, may prevent an incident in the back some day. No one said anything on this thread that can be used by anybody. The longer CVR may have helped explain what the FA was doing prior to the 30 minute tape. Chimes, knocking on door, etc. I'm done.

[Basil]

The more 'they' realise we have our security 'tight' the better.
A view not without merit, however the presence of effective barriers at Glasgow Aiport did not deter the poorly briefed and equipped attackers.

I think we will just have to agree to differ.

[lowcostdolly]

As a CC I rarely read the F/D forums. This one caught my eye as 9/11 affected me personally at the time. The procedures and more importantly the rationale's behind them affect my role as a CC now.

I have flown for quite a long time babies permitting. I knew the days when there were no barriers. A welfare check of the pilots consisted of putting your head round the open door and checking they were engaged in operating duties or reading the paper ;). Likewise if you guys wanted tea you asked through same open door and if the CC were on the service you made it yourself stopping in the galley to talk to a few pax.....those were the days!!

Since then we have had Kegworth, 9/11 and Helios to name but a few. SOP's and aircraft modifications have been put in place and rightly so to try and prevent these from ever happening again. What we have not done is address the human element and the bad guys will exploit this.

As CC my very limited hijack traing tells me I must not allow access to the flight deck. It then goes on to tell me I must not actively resist the hijackers/co operate where possible etc??

As a human being with a gun to my head/knife to my throat would I enter the access code? Highly likely I'm afraid. Then it's over to you guys who have the option to deny entry.

What would you do really and what training/psycological preparation do you get for this eventuality?

Then we have the differences in approach to this problem. All airlines now have a secured flight deck door monitored by video, spyholes and SOP's. Why are the SOP's so different airline to airline for the same problem?