Air France Safety report

[punkalouver]

From Aviation Week & Space Technology.
"Air France underwent an extensive review of its safety operations following the 2005 crash landing of an A340 in Toronto. The report was highly critical of its safety and pilot training standards."

Also: An internal report from 2006, which has been obtained by SPIEGEL, had complained about a deficient culture of safety at the airline. The report said the company lacked "a clear and objective view of performance in the area of flight safety."

Damaging Industry Report: Air France Airbus Jets Have Above-Average Crash Rate - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International (http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,635821,00.html)

Has this report obtained by Spiegel been posted anywhere?

[vovachan]

This article was mentioned in the AF447 thread. It is a load of bull - the fatal crashes are too rare an occurrence for the stats to have any statistical significance. What would be more informative is to calculate all safety related incidents of AF relative to the other airlines, but who has these stats? The regulator only probably as these rarely get reported in the media.

8 accidents out of 10 caused by human error is par for the course AFAIK.

[Gretchenfrage]

Damaging Industry Report: Air France Airbus Jets Have Above-Average Crash Rate

This needs to be split up

- AF above average crash rate
- AF Airbus above average crash rate
- Airbus above average crash rate

I know it is highly sensitive and political but needs to be addressed.
Just as the widespread complacency problem at legacy carriers.

[Leodis737]

Before getting worked-up about this:

- their last (and only previous) fatal Airbus accident was the A320 airshow crash in 1988, in which 3 died and 136 survived, despite the plane coming down in a forest;

- in the Toronto accident mentioned in the article, everyone got out alive despite a post crash fire - and the causes of the crash were not in any way related to the aircraft being an Airbus, could equally have been a Boeing.

See Aviation Safety Network for a list.

Not saying all is perfect at AF (or anywhere else), but to suggest it is an Airbus thing just seems like muckraking.

[poorjohn]

Looks like the post is about Air France, not Airbus.

[Phantom Driver]

Well, while we're on the subject of Air France, would anyone care to comment on the sort of corporate safety culture that would permit a 747 to depart Jo'burg for a night flight across Africa to Paris with wx radar(s) inop. Inevitable consequences of course, as they subsequently flew into a CB; injuries resulted in an en rte diversion.

The report on this incident (some years ago) was posted by somebody a while back in the AF 447 thread; surprisingly very little comment afterwards. Flying the Airbus at night on standby instruments in alternate law is bad enough, but in the midst of thunderstorms it then becomes Mission Impossible.

My question, which still remains open, is-how come the a/c ended up where it did when others ahead and behind were deviating. The 330 radar (if working) is pretty good. Maybe Air France MEL's are different.

[TopBunk]

Maybe Air France MEL's are different.

Or, just as likely the operating/flying philosophy. Does anyone really believe that the Concorde crash was actually caused by a piece of metal from the DC-10?

What is clear to me, is that there will be another French BEA cover up that blames anything but Air France culture (maintenance or flt ops) and Airbus. The easiest scapegoat will be the pilots who cannot answer for themselves.

[DownIn3Green]

Wouldn't be my first choice, but I've had many very nice flights on AF, and would fly on them again , if neccessary.....

[411A]

Wouldn't be my first choice, but I've had many very nice flights on AF, and would fly on them again , if neccessary.....

Likewise, however....it appears to me that AF has had the most hull losses in the last few years than any other European carrier.

[Busbert]

Having lived and worked in France, it is my opinion that 'Hofstede’s Power distance Index' is relevant to the discussion. I would bore you with details about France having the highest PDI of the western world, and indeed much higher than South Korea.

Much was made of this cultural phenomenon in the case of Korean Airlines sting of mishaps in the 80's/90's.
PDI is a good indicator of how likely a subordinate is to disagree with a superior, i.e. quality of CRM.

The Toronto crash stank of bad CRM, and this 447 crash is starting to look that way too.

Look at the number of flights heading in the same direction that day that didn't fly through the storm.

AF needs to seriously examine the effect of their national culture on their flying culture.

[Leodis737]

Likewise, however....it appears to me that AF has had the most hull losses in the last few years than any other European carrier.

Since 1st Jan 2000:
AF 3
IB 2
BA 1
FR 1
LH 0

(Again relying on Aviation Safety Network's database)

Aeroflot is harder work, but it looks like 2 + 1 (the 1 being the Aeroflot Nord 737 at Perm, Aeroflot-Nord being majority owned by Aeroflot but having a separate IATA code)

[Locked door]

I don't think you can hold BA's hull loss against them, as it was for still not properly understood reasons caused by the aircrafts design......

[Leodis737]

I don't think you can hold BA's hull loss against them, as it was for still not properly understood reasons caused by the aircrafts design......


Sure. And Ryanair's multiple bird strikes/power loss on approach could presumably have happened to anyone. Also AF Concorde - runway debris / aircraft design vulnerability.

[cessnapuppy]

Hofstede’s Power distance Index' Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions (http://www.geert-hofstede.com/) LOL Hogwash, psychobable, old (and young) wives tales, a bit of truthful observations, and poppycock. People in uncertainty avoiding countries are also more emotional, and motivated by inner nervous energy. Next up: Phrenology!

[free at last]

Not to many design events in the B777 ! :)

[pool]

.... and the one in LHR is very much RR related too.

I concurr that between AF and other european carriers there is a gap and that within AF the incident rate between Airbus and the 777 (now talking only fbw aircraft) is quite apparent ....

[Carnage Matey!]

Also AF Concorde - runway debris / aircraft design vulnerability.

Only if you believe the initial tank penetration was an unsurvivable situation. Not many with Concorde experience do.

[Capot]

would anyone care to comment on the sort of corporate safety culture that would permit a 747 to depart Jo'burg for a night flight across Africa to Paris with wx radar(s) inop


Perhaps it's the same sort of corporate culture that permits a B747 to operate from LAX to LHR (and other similar flights) with passengers and with 1 engine inop?

I know, I know, incoming, you just don't understand, the CAA approved it, it's not the same, how dare you.

But it is, isn't it, really? Safety is an absolute, not a matter for graduated risk-taking using "judgement". I've transferred bits of 100+ people from a hot mountain-side into plastic bags after a pilot took a finely-judged risk with a fully-serviceable aircraft, and I don't want to do it again.

[Carnage Matey!]

Errr but it isn't the same. Is it? They departed LAX with all engines operating, lost one and still had the capability to lose another and land safely. Somewhat different from departing with zero serviceable radars and intentionally flying blind into an area of known CB activity. One scenario involved thinking ahead and having a 'get out' option at all times. The other didn't.

[hetfield]

Oooh no, not again please!

[John Farley]

Capot

Safety is an absolute, not a matter for graduated risk-taking using "judgement".

I think I know what you are getting at but I don't think your words quite hack it. Sadly safety is NOT an absolute (since that means we must not fly) and the devil IS in the graduated risk taking which has to be done before and during every flight.

What I think you mean is that crew's (and those that support them) should always take the safer option when faced with a decision. That is certainly what I see as the crux of your point and that is something that I feel would have avoided a lot of past accidents.

I am sure I would be badly affected if I had been faced with the situation mentioned in your words following this quote. That alone means you will get no incoming from me.

JF

[Final 3 Greens]

Cessna Puppy

Hofstede’s Power distance Index' Geert Hofstede Cultural Dimensions LOL Hogwash, psychobable, old (and young) wives tales, a bit of truthful observations, and poppycock.

I am not a great fan of this research, however the one thing that one cannot fault Hofstede for was the rigour of his research and the subsequent quantitative analysis.

To describe it in the way that you do suggests to me that you don't know much about it.

[Ancient Observer]

Cultural research and impact on Safety

I'm afraid that anyone who dismisses research in to cultures, and its impact on safety probably should not be allowed to fly outside their own little culture.
Hofstede's research is the best we've got. Whilst Trompenaars has also made a contribution, and his practical "games" and tests are more fun than Hofstede, as a thinking framework Hofstede's stuff works. I commend it to you. Open your eyes and read it with an open mind.
PDI, for instance, is an issue in Eastern countries (yup, Korea included) and in Mediterranean countries, or those with that background in the ruling elite. (Much of South America).
I won't bore you with why I believe this, but it has worked for me in 20 years international experience.

[Leodis737]

.... and the one in LHR is very much RR related too.


Too?

RR & EASA are doing the right thing - fuel oil heat exchanger has been redesigned and EASA has mandated replacement (AD2009-0142 13 July 2009).


I concurr that between AF and other european carriers there is a gap and that within AF the incident rate between Airbus and the 777 (now talking only fbw aircraft) is quite apparent ....

Would be interested if you know of any evidence on the Airbus vs 777 incident rate within AF.

[captplaystation]

Suffice to say it is years since I have heard the "Atlantic Barons" flying into Hounslow West complaining about speed control / headings / holding.
Many times in the last few years in CDG I have felt obliged to interject in my semi-usable French to ask Commandant Dieu in the AF if he wouldn't mind just adjusting his knob & letting the rest of us get a word in edgeways on the frequency.
Authority (supposed or real ) is more of an issue in France than in some other
European countries . . . . . fact.

[vovachan]

>>Aeroflot is harder work, but it looks like 2 + 1 (the 1 being the Aeroflot Nord 737 at Perm, Aeroflot-Nord being majority owned by Aeroflot but having a separate IATA code)

I am aware of the Perm crash, I am not aware of the other 2. Please enlighten what are those

[Leodis737]

I am aware of the Perm crash, I am not aware of the other 2. Please enlighten what are those
2001 Il-86 Gear-up landing accident at Dubai, with 322 on board, no fatalities

2008 Tu-154 Uncontained engine failure on takeoff at St Petersburg, no fatalities (apparently has never flown again, and is classed by Aviation Safety Network as a hull loss)

[robertbartsch]

TopBunk:
Why do you beleive the French may not report their findings on AF447 accurately?

Is this based, in part, on the findings of the '88 Paris Air Show crash where the court found that someone tampered with the BBs?

[Locked door]

Or the complete coverup of the true causes of the Concorde crash?

[Will Fraser]

My memory recalls a makeshift LG repair piece of Titanium fod on a preceding Continental DC-10 TO was the direct cause of Concorde's last flight, and all I have heard of '88 Paris was a rumour that the boxes were not tampered with, they were actually replaced with different recorders with faux 'traces'. What is it ?

[robertbartsch]

I thought the South Korean culture in the 80s-90s was studied within the context of their loss record during that time period and that subsequent changes in that culture have resulted in a much better safety record.

Can anyone shead some light on the public's view of safety; specifically, do people avoid carriers with poor safety records? Hopefully, market forces do provide economic incentives to improve performance.

[cessnapuppy]

But straight cover-up in such 'sunshine' as would surround this and other reports which conspiracy theorists bandy about the same notion, is extremely difficult if only in getting everyone onside and making sure they all keep quiet. This is just not true. A conspiratorial 'cover up' is not some huge organized and rehearsed event like Synchronized Swimming in the olympics http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/46/Synchronized_swimming_-_Russian_team.jpg/250px-Synchronized_swimming_-_Russian_team.jpg Rather, it most often is a conspiracy of like mindedness and a precognition of what the outcome is supposed to be or supposed to NOT be It takes a very firmly rooted organizational culture and an independently mandated investigative body like the NTSB for example, to properly execute a proper unbiased fact-finding investigation. Other organizations are not as fortunate nor apolitical and easily find some other cause of an accident that fits their cultural leanings and predispositions. Even a 'science' as accepted as finger print matching , 80% of 'experts' were able to make a positive id on fingerprint samples with a crime scene (when told beforehand that the prints came from a suspect already in custody) YET CAME WITH AN OPPOSITE VERDICT WHEN TOLD THE SAMPLE CAME FROM AN INNOCENT CONTROL SET OF PRINTS.Look too, at how the Egyptians investigated the air crash where the their pilot crashed the plane EgyptAir Flight 990 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EgyptAir_Flight_990) I put it to you that the Egyptian 'investigation' was as much a conspiracy as any you'll find! - Did they specifically start out to deceive or defraud? perhaps not, but they already started with the worst component in an investigation. A specific vested interest in the outcome and perhaps a predetermined belief as to what happened. I can tell you sir, that I see 'cover ups' DAILY (oft times its the same one from yesterday, but you get my drift :) ) In all cases there is the driving force of the investigation, sometimes a 'driving individual' i.e. Like a Dick Cheney who led his intimidating presence around the CIA until they 'found the Slam Dunk' to justify the war, or more commonly, a 'cloud', a pervasive 'if you know whats good for you, you dont look there - or say that- or use THAT word'.. color it, say 'possibly' instead of 'probably'. You can see even in the preliminary AF447 report, a shading of the 'coin toss' if you will...'The plane DID NOT break up in the air!' (not even a little bit? the skeptics ask) and so it goesConspiracies are not the sudden deluge, the rug lifted, and a dozen civil servants with brooms at the ready. Its more often paths NOT taken, people NOT interviewed, 'chains of custody NOT maintained' so that in the end, only ONE outcome is forthcoming. p.s. not saying that a conspiracy exists, (in this case) just saying that just because you dont smell peanuts doesnt mean there is an elephant..somewhere....

[Will Fraser]

In a culture that wants to be fooled, it is not difficult to do so. The people seldom have the discernment to know the difference between a sceptical investigation, and a 'conspiracy theory'. Blend in a predispositon for less than critical thought and the deed is done. I have seen the police and District attorneys withold evidence, for no other reason than to protect a friends blunder in scene analysis, and the defendant was facing manslaughter. Beware the buddy system, it is an all too common expression of foreordained conclusions. Be sceptical of the 'recipe' verdict, the too simple explanation, and any monetary link twixt Joe and Jack or Jackie.

This AF 'report', hmmm. with so few mishaps to point to, isn't it a stretch to cast an airline in shadow given the millions of cycles the Industry has accomplished as a whole? People also like a quick and easy solution; this sets the stage for those with a microphone or camera to start laying the foundation for an outcome they would wish. I like the cold case, the more certain the conclusion the more it begs the watchful eye.

[robertbartsch]

Cessnapuppy said, in part:
You can see even in the preliminary AF447 report, a shading of the 'coin toss' if you will...'The plane DID NOT break up in the air!' (not even a little bit? the skeptics ask) and so it goes

*****
I honestly believe the French are doing their best to find the truth. That said, I did find the timing of the preliminary report unusual in that it was issued shortly after press reports about the autopsies were hitting the airwaves and, apparently, some have suggested that they did not fully consider that evidence.

[411A]

AF Concorde, ex-CDG.
Look for the Flight Engineer, without specific direction, fire-handled an operating engine.
Bad decision.

All the rest is history.:uhoh:

[captplaystation]

Dodgy re-installation of gear bogey, overweight (due tailwind ) take off, evidence from a "pompier" (fireman) that he saw sparks /smoke long before the motor went bang ignored, (edited to say, if I remember correctly skid marks on runway to support this and the fact that the aircraft went off centre more than could have been expected in the case of an engine failure) incorrect rotation at below minimum flying speed, premeditated /uncoordinated shutdown of an engine possibly still producing (much needed ) thrust pretty much during rotation :eek: . . . . .

cover up :hmm: well, you decide.
Over emphasis on some casual aspects of why this all happened, whilst conveniently ignoring some politically/nationalistically hot potatoes ? well of course ! what deeed you expect you stoopeed fooel, we ave some pride left in zees cuntry you know. Sacre blue, zees eedeeots waant zee troof ? ? ! !

Phfaw ? :bored: :=

[lomapaseo]

It's hard to dispute a coverup when there are no facts to dispute, just what-if opinions.

On the other hand the investigative teams are like research teams. The members are not of all one mind. They compete to be heard. If you think that they can be silenced or kept away from data you are kidding yourself.

Even within tight organizations leaks will eventually occur if there is anything to be leaked. In the types of accident investigations being discussed here, there are just too many eyes and experts (including internet boards) to hide anything from.

In some of the examples discussed above I hear the same old claims which have been long ago discarded by the experts. So all that is new in this thread is the latest AF accident and patience should reveal something before calling it a coverup.

[admiral ackbar]

I agree that the investigative teams do a great job in often difficult circumstances.

However, after living in France for 7 years, I do agree to a certain extent about french society being very rigid and codified in ways that are hard for people that have not lived there to understand.

One needs to only look at the "Grande Ecoles" system which churns out the mandarins of France's government. There is a certain respect/fear/apathy that the 'rulers' rule and the people listen. I can certainly see it transferring to a Captain/FO situation, especially in a corporation that is still very much in the French government sphere of influence. Throw in accidents that involve Airbus and you add more people that went to school together to make decisions. I am not accusing the French authorities of anything, but in these circumstances if there is any western nation in which this could happen, France would be at the top of my list.

On the other hand, I am a fan of the airline and the country(well the in the air part at least, CDG ground ops are amongst the worst in the world...). Flew on them once a week, always had great service and it seems like a professionally run, world class airline. Had a good quality of life while I lived over there and we all know their TGV system and health care (examples amongst many) are world class, trying not to come off as an Air France basher.

All societies have their characteristics and quirks that give them strengths and weaknesses.

Any lessons learnt from audits like this are invaluable for everyone involved in the industry so I welcome them.

My (SLF) CAN$0.02

[cessnapuppy]

Even within tight organizations leaks will eventually occur if there is anything to be leaked. In the types of accident investigations being discussed here, there are just too many eyes and experts (including internet boards) to hide anything from. All quite true, of course, but you are missing the point - the issue isnt a 'coercive conspiracy ala something from 'Stalinist Russia', but rather a more subtle self inclusive conspiracy, where its participants consciously and more often Subconsciously[/b, rewire their mental pathways to conform :( Our job is to recognize our propensities and mitigate them. Example: The FAA and the NTSB. Both have overlapping parameters it would seem in regards to air travel, but in the case of a crash, the NTSB has sole jurisdiction. Why not a bigger role for the FAA? After all, they oversee those same airlines on a daily basis? We've already seen with Southwest et. al, that sometimes the overseer gets to 'chummy' with his charge- an FAA investigation of a crash could logically point to the FAA at being at fault, lax oversight etc. With many serious incidents being a fortuitously connected chain of 'Unfortunate Events', it's easy to point to one link of the chain as being THE link and THE cause - then ignore the rest. You can 'cover up' a murder by shining a flashlight on the murder weapon and not at the crime scene itself. [B]WIKI ENTRY on Concorde Crash..These investigators were frustrated by the lack of cooperation from French authorities, including an unwillingness to share data and the immediate resurfacing of the Concorde's takeoff runway after the crash. They alleged that the BEA was determined to place the sole blame of the accident on the titanium strip to show that the Concorde itself was not at fault. The piece of metal from the DC-10 was found 7 meters forward, and 37 meters to the right of where the Concorde's tyre blew.* *Interestingly, that indicates to me that the tire DID hit the titanium strip, as its new position seems very consistent with being struck by a moving object. The other issues remain however. As 411A pointed out: The flight engineers response and also the numerous safety violations that day: Incomplete wheel structure maintenance, near runway incursion with De Gaul's flight, Plane OVERWEIGHT for conditions. Far from being an unpredictable 'act of God', the accident can be shown to be a highly predictable failure of MAN - numerous tire incidents, numerous resulting fuel tank penetrations - uneventful does not mean safe, and the numbers eventually run out. That even now, France is going forward with criminal prosecutions is another travesty. Mock all as you will, the bizarre machinations of third world and Arab/Muslim legal process and priorities, you will find that the same lovable quirks exist in our own world, albeit with a 'superior' accent!

[wiggy]

"....... French society being very rigid and codified in ways that are hard for people that have not lived there to understand.

.......... There is a certain respect/fear/apathy that the 'rulers' rule and the people listen".

:ok: :ok:

I held off this thread for a while, having lived in France for a few years now and am mindful of the sensitivities involved, but here goes.

The French education system loves certificates and medals. From the DIY store to the local prefecture and beyond you are dealing with folks who have a formal paper qualification in their line of work and have come to expect their opinion to be paramount. The result is in many, even very minor transactions, you are dealing with a formalised authority gradient......or as the admiral put it, it's "ruler/people".

France is a fantastic country 99% of the time, but often there is resentment of correction, criticism or contradiction, no matter how well intentioned and how diplomatically phrased. I rather hope that side of the national character is absent from the flight deck.

[yggorf]

Cessnapuppy,
De Gaulle died in 1969...:p
Surely you meant Chirac...

[shortfinals]

Captplaystation, I suppose you remember that the UK AAIB were also party to the Concorde investigation? And that you have read the appendix they were permitted to add, pointing out where they disagreed?

But the AAIB did not dissent from the BEA on any substantial issues, and they certainly did not argue in favour of any of the popular bar-room-chat points you threw into the ring.

Incidentally, it's true that in recent history there have been quite a few shameless attempts by national investigators to choose the most convenient "truth", but they have not been European. Namely the Egyptian version of what happened to the Egyptair 767, but remember the NTSB was in charge of that report, the truth came out in the NTSB part of it (as diplomatically phrased as possible), and the Egyptian version was an appendix to the main report.

Then there was the Egyptian report on Flash at Sharm el-Sheikh, which avoided the truth, but the BEA was allowed to append what really happened to the back of that report too. Then finally (for today) there was the Silk Air cover-up by Indonesia/Singapore. But even there, the NTSB was allowed to append its view. In that case the Board was so angry at the distortion it publicised its own summary of what happened.

The truth will out. It always does in the end, because the industry recognises rubbish when it sees it.

The allegations about FDRs "tampered with" at Habsheim came from the French SNPL (pilots' union), which had a major industrial row going with Air France at the time and wanted flight engineers on everthing including the A320. The SNPL wanted to kill the A320 at birth, and they saw this as their chance. Well, history shows they didn't succeed, but a lot of the mud they slung has stuck in people's selective memories because the media loved the union's accusations so much at the time.

[cessnapuppy]

Degaulle/Chirac.... oops! How could I get them mixed up?? Must be some conspiracy afoot!

[vovachan]

Speaking of Habscheim, I saw the Youtube video, and did not see anything that defies explanation. You've got an ac which got very low and slow and was sinking still. So how do you expect them to get it over the top if they got no momentum and even if they floored the gas which I did not hear happen it would take a while to turn this thing around. On an ac loaded to the max.

What I cannot believe is how someone would perform a tricky low-pass maneouver on an ac loaded with passengers, with 2 low-hour pilots, with a forrest growing right at the end of the runway. What happens if you don;t clear it? So :mad: stupid

[saman]

robertbartsch

"Is this based, in part, on the findings of the '88 Paris Air Show crash where the court found that someone tampered with the BBs?"

What accident at the '88 Paris Air Show? There was no Paris Air Show in '88 so there certainly was no crash!

I can guess what you might mean but if you cannot get the basics right, then your views on conspiracy are, IMHO, worthless.

You are the weakest link - goodbye!

[Dysag]

I sincerely hope that robertbartsch is not a commercial pilot, because he seems incapable of learning or remembering anything. He has been reminded many times that the A320 accident was at Habsheim, not Paris, but the same old story still comes out.

Captain "Rambo" Asseline had never carried out any demo flight nor had ever seen that airfield and its forest. Let's hope the AF safety culture has improved since then.

I don't know who's behind this, but I respect Boeing enough to know they wouldn't use a village idiot like robertbartsch to spread BS.

[vovachan]

Captain "Rambo" Asseline

Very aptly named this captain, Vaseline+Ass =Asseline :}

[CONF iture]

What I cannot believe is how someone would perform a tricky low-pass maneouver on an ac loaded with passengers, with 2 low-hour pilots, with a forrest growing right at the end of the runway. What happens if you don;t clear it? So stupid
I cannot believe it either but ... is it a reason for keeping silent the fact that :

the flight controls didn't follow the pilot inputs ?
the engines didn't deliver on time ?

vovachan, would you post the Youtube video you're talking about ?

[TWT]

YouTube - Airbus A320 Plane Crash (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_EM0hDchVlY)

[HotDog]

Originally Posted by vovachan
What I cannot believe is how someone would perform a tricky low-pass maneouver on an ac loaded with passengers, with 2 low-hour pilots, with a forrest growing right at the end of the runway. What happens if you don;t clear it? So stupid

2 low hour pilots? Who told you that vovachan? Asseline was Air France chief check and training pilot on the A320 fleet. You would do well to read both sides of the story before you jump to conclusions.

[shortfinals]

CONF iture - if you read the report you'd know the answers to the implied questions you framed.

It's in French, but here it is: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc880626/pdf/f-kc880626.pdf

Why do I suspect you'd rather stick with your prejudices than educate yourself?

[vovachan]

2 low hour pilots? Who told you that vovachan? Asseline was Air France chief check and training pilot on the A320 fleet. You would do well to read both sides of the story before you jump to conclusions.

I did. According to the official crash report Asseline had 130 hrs on the A320 and the copilote 40 hrs. That's pretty damn low.

[Locked door]

And then they decided to do the lowest, slowest flyby possible using the alpha floor (aoa limiting) protection system to supply TOGA power at the last possible second. Their mistake was to be ignorant of the fact that alpha floor is inhibited below 30 radio. By the time they realised something was amiss and pushed the thrust levers forward it was way too late, the CFM56 (like any large jet engine) takes time to spool up.

Doesn't sound like safe decision making. Can't blame the a/c.

LD

[lomapaseo]

Their mistake was to be ignorant of the fact that alpha floor is inhibited below 30 radio. By the time they realised something was amiss and pushed the thrust levers forward it was way too late

I would hope that people would focus on the above and the lessons learned rather than the disparaging comments about the pilot.

When you talk about the crew we, as professionals (I hope) should consider the human elements of knowledge base, skill based and following rules etc. To do otherwise is going to result in a downward spiral to this thread

[cessnapuppy]

AirDisaster.Com: Investigations: Air France 296 (http://www.airdisaster.com/investigations/af296/af296.shtml) OEB 19/1 (May 1988): Engine Acceleration Deficiency at Low Altitude. This means that it was already known before the accident that the engines sometimes did not respond normally to the pilot's commands on the Airbus A320. However Air France did not inform their pilots about this anomaly. After the Habsheim accident, the engines have been modified (OEB 19/2, August 1988). OEB 06/2 (May 1988): Baro-Setting Cross Check. It stated that the current design for barometric altitude indication on the Airbus A320 did not comply with airworthiness. This could be a hint why the aircraft was as low as 30 ft (9 m) above the runway whereas Asseline affirms that the altimeter indicated 100 ft (30 m). These OEBs were sent to the company (Air France), but they had not been handed to the pilots. In fact both the engines and the altimetric system have been modified after the crash, which indicates that they did not function correctly at that time, but Airbus Industries was not held responsible of anything by the French Court, the whole responsibility was given to the pilots and to the organizers of the airshow. However, with all this, (and despite the 'black box swapping' that is alleged/proven to have happened) I would still uphold the verdict of guilty and expect the court to do the same in this case. This is because the duty of appellate courts is to 1) review for 'clear error' and 2)uphold the verdict of the lower court wherever possiblehow? well, lets say the lower judge convicts, saying 'the pilot is clearly at fault because he didnt apply the thrust in time: GUILTY'
but evidence in the case indicates that he DID apply thrust. HOWEVER there is also evidence that the pilot was negligently too low, DID NOT HAVE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AS REQUIRED (thought he was at 100 ft, whereas ears and a look out the window would have told him otherwise) and thus with that evidence considered would still be held at fault remember: the higher court looks for evidence in the record to support the lower courts ruling.* We agree with the trial court, whose ruling comes to this court clothed in the presumption of correctness.. * I see that on just about every appellate decision handed down, lol Doesn't sound like safe decision making. Can't blame the a/c. Ultimate decision is the pilot's and ultimate responsibility as well. But this does point to a culture of 'safety failure' @ AF and culture that prevented this pilot from speaking up (or not thinking about it enough to have something to say) This is why the fact that (only in America) a pilot can divert an aircraft and kick off a purser seems ultimately important to me for flight safety. If the French pilot had half the balls of that Captain (that would give him approximately 6) he would have said ' surtout pas!' when ordered to do an ultra low speed gear down fly by at as close to stall speed to show off 'stall protection' WTF?? (like, hey man, I got a NEW BULLET PROOF VEST!, C'mon...SHOOT ME!)

[Will Fraser]

It is naive to hope pilots will stop slamming other pilots. It's nice, but what pilots do, other than fly, is throw stink at each other, or defend others in the face of mountains of evidence. It was ever so. I know, I are one.

Sheltering a f/u prevents others from learning the downside of f ing up.

[John Farley]

It is naive to hope pilots will stop slamming other pilots

Isn't that the truth.

[Baron rouge]

If the French pilot had half the balls of that Captain (that would give him approximately 6) he would have said ' surtout pas!' when ordered to do an ultra low speed gear down fly by at as close to stall speed to show off 'stall protection' WTF?? (like, hey man, I got a NEW BULLET PROOF VEST!, C'mon...SHOOT ME!)

It's not a question of balls, but just that guy Asseline is a lunatic, well known to shoot at rabits in a populated area with a 22L Rifle.
He was not ordered to fly that low, neither that slow, he is a crazy guy and realy should bear all the blame as he volontarily broke the rules set for this fly.
End of story.

[CONF iture]

And then they decided to do the lowest, slowest flyby possible using the alpha floor (aoa limiting) protection system to supply TOGA power at the last possible second. Their mistake was to be ignorant of the fact that alpha floor is inhibited below 30 radio. By the time they realised something was amiss and pushed the thrust levers forward it was way too late, the CFM56 (like any large jet engine) takes time to spool up.
Here, I’m afraid you’re pushing a bit far, it has never been question to rely on the Alpha Floor protection during the fly by presentation. In their pursuit to exclusively blame the crew, the BEA would have mentioned it … but if you’re able to quote it from their report, please do !

CONF iture - if you read the report you'd know the answers to the implied questions you framed.
It's in French, but here it is: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/1988/f-kc...f-kc880626.pdf
Why do I suspect you'd rather stick with your prejudices than educate yourself?
For reading it at least once, I think I’m doing ok with the report.
But if you’re ready to educate me, please explain how the elevators didn’t follow the full back stick order and actually just did the opposite ? (page 37 in the report)


Once again, I firmly believe the crew did attempt something stupid, but it was the BEA duty to underline what went wrong in the airplane as well …

[iceman50]

CONF iture
But if you’re ready to educate me, please explain how the elevators didn’t follow the full back stick order and actually just did the opposite ? (page 37 in the report)


Because it would then have stalled and the outcome would have probably been everyone dying! He did not fully understand what he was doing with the aircraft. The design actually saved lives!:ugh:

[Willoz269]

Had this been a B737 the whole pprune community would have slammed the pilots for their stupidity.

Because it is an A320 it appears people blame the plane for not saving the pilots in their moment of stupidity.

The report should note that Asseline planned his low fly by using the main runway...when he approached, he was advised the air show display was using the cross runway. He had not briefed nor prepared for that, yet he went ahead. The runway was far shorter than the main runway and had high trees at the end of it. He approached too fast and to make sure he lost altitude, the aeroplane was in land mode...he advanced the throttles but did not select the toga switch. He assumed that by putting the throttles in the gate the response would be instantaneous.

The manufacturer advised the response of the engines was actually better than specs. Asseline realised too late that he would have issues with the height of the trees. PPPPPP.....Proper Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance....

[Will Fraser]

Ready ? OK. What I see in those vids is an increase in power (noise and exhaust) and a concomitant pitch up. Great? Right? alas, the a/c pitches nosedown and settles into the lumber. I don't think the flying pilot decided to lower the nose because of fear of a Stall, he wanted altitude, and I think he was starting to get it. Pray tell, why did the nose drop ?

[iceman50]

WILL

This has already been done to death on another thread, don't try and use it again to show your bias. If the aircraft was at alpha max pulling back on the stick would not have achieved anything the pitch up from the thrust increasing may have been endangering a stall so the alpha was reduced. What you do not see from the video is that he was also flying into rising terrain. The pitch done could also have been assisted by contact with the trees, the video is not clear enough to rule that out.
So give it a rest it WAS pilot error NOT an airbus fault.:ugh::ugh:

[llagonne66]

So after more than 21 years, after all the authority reports, after all the judicial system decisions, you have decided to play the A320 Habsheim story all over again on a post related to the AF safety culture ?

Come on ! We are on PPRuNe and not on the usual Airbus-bashing, BEA-bashing and AF-bashing French forums (crash aerien, radio coco, eurocokpit, etc.). So please be kind enough to go there if you want to vent your misconceptions and bias on the inherent safety of the A320 and let's stick with the subject of this thread.

AF pilot unions had for a long time been a very powerful force within this company. Consequently, the management (either in the past public time or in the current private one) has never dared to clash with the pilots even when they were as black as coal. At the time of the privatization, management even played pilots again other categories of staff ...

[Otterman]

I agree, hashing up the detail of an old accident is useless. But I would like to point out that in the last 25 years Air France has written off 8 aircraft. Damaged two substantially (a 747-400, and a 747-200, both off the runway). Add Air Inter and UTA (both merged into Air France) and you can add two more aircraft written off. The details can all be checked on the Aviation Safety Network website. These are Korean Airlines kind of numbers. Many of the hull losses did not result in fatalities. But as a reference BA, Lufthansa, and KLM each suffered one hull loss in the same time span. Could be bad luck. But I have wonder if the German or British authorities would not be right in there, making sure there isn’t a systemic problem, if their flag carrier was putting in these kind of numbers.

[DozyWannabe]

I don't want to derail the thread and I can't believe we're rehashing Habsheim again...

Willoz269:

You're right in most respects, but
the aeroplane was in land mode...
No, no, no, no, no.

There's not really any such thing as "landing mode", that was a press invention*. The important factor was that by going below 100ft RA on the low flypast, the captain effectively disabled all the aircraft's protections, as well as permanently disabling autothrottle manually (by pressing and holding two buttons) at the beginning of his run. Couple this with the standard high-bypass slow response from idle (a setting the engines should never have been at anyway) and you have the cause of the accident.

Regardless of culture, AF seems to have had some spectacularly bad luck of late. I for one hope it improves soon.

* - There is a flare mode, but it's not really related to approach phase.

[Clandestino]

Superb post, (http://www.pprune.org/5150708-post56.html) Will Fraser :D


What I cannot believe is how someone would perform a tricky low-pass maneouver on an ac loaded with passengers, with 2 low-hour pilots, with a forrest growing right at the end of the runway
(...)
According to the official crash report Asseline had 130 hrs on the A320 and the copilote 40 hrs. That's pretty damn low.


Habsheim accident happened exactly four months after the first A320 was delivered to AF - and that was first A320 delivery ever. With 130 hrs, capt Asseline was probably among the most experienced A320 line pilots in the world, at the time.


the flight controls didn't follow the pilot inputs

And if Q400 had that option too, Colgan 3407 would be just another flightnumber.

[punkalouver]

Habsheim accident happened exactly four months after the first A320 was delivered to AF - and that was first A320 delivery ever. With 130 hrs, capt Asseline was probably among the most experienced A320 line pilots in the world, at the time.




Just because hardly anyone else has ever flown an aircraft type(due to it being a new type) doesn't mean that 130 hours makes you an experienced pilot on type. After the first A-320 test flight flight, I would guess that the guys with a couple of hours on type were the most experienced A-320 pilots in the world as well.

He was inexperienced on type with only 130 hours, and probably in a position where there were few other pilots to talk to and pass on their own own lessons learned, therefore having to learn more stuff on his own than would be likely for a 130 hour A-320 pilot today.

[llagonne66]

Clandestino,

A320 MSN 9 was delivered to Air France on 23 June 1988 and crashed on 26 June 1988.
However, M. Asseline has participated to the A320 certification flight test program as an Air France pilot representative and that explains the 138 A320 flight hours mentionned in the BEA report (section 1.1.5).

[FrequentSLF]

I cannot understand why people is still talking about the A320 in Habsheim.
That topic has been discussed in various threads here. This thread is about AF safety.
I found disturbing that a major European Airline has 8 hull losses in 25 years, compared to 1 of BA or LH on the same period. Why?
Is because AF has more AB than Boeing? Luck? Training?
Those figures cannot be discounted easily, they have the same track record of KE or CI, which went under major review for they safety standards. 8 hull losses because of bad luck is hard to believe!
FSLF

[hetfield]

@Fslf

All true, but

I cannot understand why people is still talking about the A320 in Habsheim.why?

It perfectly fits into your arguments.....

[FrequentSLF]

@hetfield

Your right, however my point is that we should look not at the single case. Such accident has been debated all over for years, and nothing new will be added on this thread. it might fit on a wider analysis of AF safety policy. But such accident or AF447 itself taken individually will not help in understanding why AF did have so many hull losses.
FSLF

[Will Fraser]

FrequentSLF

With respect, I couldn't possibly disagree more, I hope the reasons are obvious. Tenerife isn't done, it better still smolder in the minds of anyone presuming to take control of an airliner, or almost 600 people died in vain.

I don't care if its Waldo Pepper's cousin's failed inside loop, what you forget is just in front of you.

[FrequentSLF]

Will Fraser,

Yes I do agree with you, however we should respect the topic of the thread, which in this case is not why AF crashed in Habsheim, it is why AF has a such poor safety record.
Talking only about Habsheim is avoiding the underlining problem of an major airline with a very poor safety record.
Tenerife was a very sad day for the industry but the two airlines involved since then have a much better safety record than AF.
FSLF

[Will Fraser]

My Daddy told me not to believe anything in front of the "But" or "However". Very well.

[cessnapuppy]

Talking only about Habsheim is avoiding the underlining problem of an major airline with a very poor safety record. I disagree. This had little to do with the Aircraft, not too much to do with Airbus, FBW, airplane responsiveness (or lack thereof ) -it had little to even do with technology! It had to do with real cogent issues.
1. Organizational Safety culture : Push an aircraft to the limit of its performance envelope with passengers!
2. Ignore red flags: (Damn this chick has a hairy arm!, damn she sure does live in a bad part of town!...damn, she has an Adam's apple???*)
3. Dissemination of information: Airbus had transmitted performance behavior warnings to AF *months* before the accident- these had not been sent out to the pilots These behavioral issues transcend time and technology and are thus relevant today. Similarly with the Concorde disaster, you see a trend where, over and over indicators that the mission should be aborted or at least changed pop up - yet they are ignored. These issues go to the heart of what makes a company what it is..and ultimately evolve down to the hull loss statistics that we eventually count up as if they mean something. What we need to track down, are the countless BAD DECISIONS that fortunately did not have a bad outcome. Thats where the real numbers game is! 8 Hull loses in 25 years, what does that mean? Does it mean as much if AF actually ran 18 times more flight cycles or miles than the others? ( I dont know they did, I'm just asking) 'Hull loses in 25 years'' ... thats meaningless chatter to me.* this is in no way related to any personal experience of mine, but may have been related anecdotally by a 'friend of a friend'

[hetfield]

Ignore red flags: (Damn this chick has a hairy arm!, damn she sure does live in a bad part of town!...damn, she has an Adam's apple???

Sometimes I admire the yanks of their straight language;)

Guten Abend

[Smilin_Ed]

Did Air France's accident rate change with introduction of the AirBus (up or down)?

[cessnapuppy]

If you mean total number of accidents , ever - then the answer would be yes If you mean the total number of accidents divided by miles/cycles... I would guess no, or gone down, primarily because air travel has gotten mathematically safer ? If you mean safety rate compared against similar carriers, routes and airbus equipment.. I dunno.. we'd have to find who else is flying airbus along similar routes, then add up their incident/miles ratio and see the difference

[CONF iture]

If the aircraft was at alpha max pulling back on the stick would not have achieved anything the pitch up from the thrust increasing may have been endangering a stall so the alpha was reduced
But the question is : Was it at Alpha Max ?
Please, quote it from the report ...

I cannot understand why people is still talking about the A320 in Habsheim
Because the best and only way to learn something is first to face the truth.

[Leodis737]

Did Air France's accident rate change with introduction of the AirBus (up or down)?


AF took their first Airbus in 1974 (an A300B2).

AF's hull losses in accidents were:
1940s - 22
1950s - 24
1960s - 9
1970s - 2 (one B747; one Caravelle)
1980s - 3 (one B747; one A300 caused by engine failure (GE CF6); A320 Habsheim)
1990s - 2 (one B747; one B737)
2000s - 3 (one Concorde; one A340 Toronto; one A330 Atlantic)

...data from Aviation Safety Network.

Assuming the number of flights was increasing over time, this shows a big drop in the rate of hull losses from the '70s on. So the period with Airbuses in the fleet has been the safest. Of course the accident rate since the '70s might have been equally good with Boeings instead of Airbuses.

[Me Myself]

AF pilot unions had for a long time been a very powerful force within this company. Consequently, the management (either in the past public time or in the current private one) has never dared to clash with the pilots even when they were as black as coal. At the time of the privatization, management even played pilots again other categories of staff ...

That's about the only intelligent statement made on this thread so far. In fact it's far worse than that. Management is scared dung of the unions.
Air France absorbed 2 other airlines with EXTREMELY different cultures in the span of 4 years, added to that a double digit growth leaving the compagny desperate for pilots. I can't say it had much of a choice as to the quality of the individuals involved and yes, we are now saddled with some people who would be much better off doing something else. Word from the top was " Get drivers for these newly acquired aircrafts parked outside and do not trouble me with your problems, I want those market shares". Fast growth also means..........fast promotions, so not much criticism from the ranks. I know I didn't complain.
Offenders are left untouched for fear of union retaliation. Given the multiple pilots union structure, there is a huge competition to keep / get members. This leads to pilots cherry picking according to their very individual needs. If this means defending the undefendable.............so be it.
Whatever you do, you'll always find a buckaroo willing to take up your case.

A culture which, even unwillingly, produces a feeling of unresponsability / unaccountability among few, leads to bad things happening.
There are also a wide majority who dispear at this state of affair. But as long as the airline top management won't have the balls to face the unions head on on non negociable issues , nothing will change.

I have also read a lot of bull from self appointed " French culture specialists " enough to make my ancestors turn in their grave. To live 7 years in France to come up with THAT is a bloody waste of the time you spent with us.
Air France cockpits are not made of God and his little maids and absolutly NONE of us speaks Korean, although it does sound like it ( sometimes )when we speak english.
To question the wisdom of your captain is not only accepted but encouraged. As long as you don't call him a tart.........you're fine. Captains have been put into early retirement after reports of conduct unbecoming from F/O's. So all in all, nothing very different from what I have seen elsewhere.
Pilots come from all walks of life, Air Force, Navy, cadets, regional carriers, ex doctors, bankers, even from other countries like japan, Sweden, Belgium, Italy, UK, Germany.
Yes, french is the official language spoken here and as much as it seems to upset a few , it's the way it will always be. Live with it !
However, I do admit that in a culture that promotes individualism as the french do, it is very easy to end up with everyone having a very personal pig headed opinion just about everything.
You know the story : take a boat and 20 Brits you end up with a boat and a crew.
Take a boat and 20 frenchmen, you end up with a boat.....................and 20 frenchmen.

Now, what led a 744 Captain to take off from Jo'burg without a radar some 10 years ago ????
Simple, just a simple stupid decision taken by an idividual idiot, by no means compagny culture or policy. More important, the FO's went along with it. I talked to one of them then and he was honestly fine with that. Another idiot. Not the least pressure from the compagny. From the, then station manager ???? HOODLE, but then, she was the first to get the chop. Again it was a very individual decision which appalled all of us. I was FO then and I know that I would never have gone along with such a lunacy. The MEL at the time didn't forbid to fly at night without a radar leaving it to the Captain's judgement. That's how he got away with it, by the " letter of the law " Not a very honourable way to save your toush. The question that arises and has been an ongoing debate " Do we have to write absolutly everything or do we hope Skippers will exercise a sound judgement ?? " It's been changed since then and I can tell you one thing, according to the actual MEL, AF 447 would never have been able / allowed to leave Rio with the radar on dispatch.
One can of course challenge that, being french, lazy, undsiciplined and chronical liers, zzeeeey sho'd blattant geallic contempt forrrrrrrrrr zuch a ztupid ruuuuuule. In which case, one would be advised to take some very much needed R&R's.

In this business, there is always a certain element of perceived pressure, more than often the pressure we pilots, put on ourselves. Who likes having to cancel a flight because his guts tell him this is the best decision ?? I know I don't but I don't think twice when it comes to deciding something unpleasant that ensures a safe outcome.
Not everybody reacts the same under pressure and to turn this into a Compagny or even national culture issue is enough to make a wooden horse buck.

Taking Asseline out of the closet doesn't bring much to this debate.

[wiggy]

"To question the wisdom of your captain is not only accepted but encouraged. As long as you don't call him a tart.........you're fine. Captains have been put into early retirement after reports of conduct unbecoming from F/O's. So all in all, nothing very different from what I have seen elsewhere."

Well as I'm probably one of the "French culture specialists" you refer to can I at least thank you for your clarification.......

[BRE]

What might be added to this list is the Fokker icing accident in Pau, even if this was "only" AF régional.

Same picture: type with known susceptibility to icing, right kind of whether - but why would they consider deicing?

[Me Myself]

[quote][Thus far, I think Me Myself has probably made the most pertinent contribution (though i'd say that union power is not inherently a bad thing - you only need look at the recent Colgan accident to see that letting management drive working conditions is bad for safety)./QUOTE]


Well Dozy I agree with you but when one talks about pilots union in France, one certainly walks on egg shells..............or threads on a Brown snake.
This profession cannot do without unions, however, the french do not have the discipline to stick to one union. The minute your exact and immediate needs are not taken into account or speedily satisfied, off walks the disstified pilot to another whell where he hopes his thirst will be quenched.
This airline is plagued by the number of unions leading only to making the entire population weaker and the few elected union Shogun feeling powerfull and important since they sit at the bargaining table, have days off their roster for that purpose, in short a real little porky perk.
Reaching an agreement here isn't really the point. To be a good union leader, you have to gutt your oponent like a fish. It's win or die. God, this sounds really like a mexican revolution !!!

The system was based on protecting pilots from unfair actions on the management's part and in essence, it is a very good system.
However, it has been completly abused and only serves the purpose of the very few who do not give a dung and hide behind it.
It is indeed a cultural problem and since the french are errr............french and are bound to remain..........french, I don't forsee anything changing any time soon. When and if it does, I will be eating the dafodills by the root.

[cessnapuppy]

...(though i'd say that union power is not inherently a bad thing - you only need look at the recent Colgan accident to see that letting management drive working conditions is bad for safety). ' letting management drive working conditions is bad for safety' I dont know about that really, or if that is different than letting management drive ANY conditions, like 'salary' or 'benefits', or 'how many donuts are brought to staff meetings' The real fix is mandated federal legislation including travel time to work as duty load timeIts ridiculous to have someone travel 1/2 way across the country, sleep fitfully between two chairs in a public hallway then be pronounced fit as a fiddle and fresh to take passengers out in a snow storm. Mandating some recognition of the draining power of pre-duty travel ACROSS THE BOARD makes it a level playing field for all and takes it out of the negotiating whim of unions and management. ..since they sit at the bargaining table, have days off their roster for that purpose, in short a real little porky perk. No. If you have union representation, and if they (your union delgates) are to come from the pilot body, then they MUST have the ability to be PRESENT when negotiations take place -that HAS to, obviously, include roster flexibility (or would you rather have ALL negotiations wait until the logistical dance of all having pilot s time off coincides?)- you may well be anti-union, but the ability to represent your constituency is not a 'perk' but a vital part of the process. LOL@PJ2 graph :) who really needs more than that?

[Will Fraser]

No further legislation is necessary. The FAA, as an administrative enforcement body, has the power to fix things as we speak. Congress passed the 'ennabling legislation' long ago. If the Unions get out of Bed with management and rub their eyes a bit, fatigue and abusive rostering would be history. More and better pilots would be safer, better paid, and the nature of the equation would be more balanced. If you think it's anything but 'Pressure' that's got the Industry into this mess, you are wrong. It isn't legislation that's needed, it's Honesty.

[Me Myself]

No. If you have union representation, and if they (your union delgates) are to come from the pilot body, then they MUST have the ability to be PRESENT when negotiations take place -that HAS to, obviously, include roster flexibility (or would you rather have ALL negotiations wait until the logistical dance of all having pilot s time off coincides?)- you may well be anti-union, but the ability to represent your constituency is not a 'perk' but a vital part of the process.


Cessna, I'm not anti union, quite the contrary.
When I joined many moons ago, there was one union, the today AF ALPA. Many solar resolutions later where are at 5 !! All this for the same airline. Most of them don't total more than a hundred members for a total of 4000 pilots. Who or what do you think they represent ??? SQUAT !! Give it more time and we'll have 8 !!
Everytime some yobos do not agree with the majority, they break off and start their own little shop. I don't think this does a lot for the pilot's representation but it certainly gives their rep some valuable leisure time.
Give me Vereinigung Cockpit any time or even BALPA. Mind you, even the german pilots are embracing our bad habits with Verdi.
For the rest, I am absolutly with you.

[Will Fraser]

It's called 'Divide and Conquer', and it's not a new business model.

[cessnapuppy]

No further legislation is necessary. The FAA, as an administrative enforcement body, has the power to fix things as we speak.
(They've had 'the power' for a long time, including the ability to shut down/fine repeated safety violators: instead, FAA inspectors get censored , silenced or fired, and SouthWest Airlines continues to fly till bits get ripped off the plane at 30,000ft )
Congress passed the 'ennabling legislation' long ago. If the Unions get out of Bed with management and rub their eyes a bit, fatigue and abusive rostering would be history. But isnt that PRECISELY why we need legislation?? So that it's NOT up to the whims of a Union in Bed with management, and the FAA failing to exercise their regulatory authority?We can wander around in a futile quest like Diogenes searching for an 'Honest Man' or we can enact (yes, yet another bloody law) but maybe with teeth to enforce what almost honest men will not

[Will Fraser]

cessnapuppy. Of course you are correct. You fall into the trap that catches all those who have no cynicism. I am God's own cynic. I call for honesty, not law. The Law is there, and another one won't help. The trouble is greed, dishonesty, and downright fraud. With all due respect, Congress is for those who are gullible enough to believe in it.

Aside. It is a Shame that the way out is to ask folks whose job it isn't, to do the work of others whose job it is, but are too craven and criminal to do it? If demanding work rules that accomplish safety and a better lot for the pilots also does what the FAA should be doing; is that a bad thing?

As a pilot and SLF, I think I prefer Damocles.

[Bruce Wayne]

If the discussion relates to the higher numbers of hull losses by AF, over the past 25 years, it is fair to look at the hull losses themselves before we can debate AF corporate culture / CRM / Airbus over Boeing / Training et al as contributing factors..

AF hull losses

Jun 2009 - A330 - undetermined.

Aug 2005 - A340 - Runway Excursion (Long touchdown & Overrun)

Jul 2000 - Concorde - FOD damage and fuel leak ignition

Mar 1999 - B747 - Nose Gear failure (landing)

Mar 1999 - B737 - Runway Excursion ( wind & poss. lack of c/l lighting)

Dec 1994 - A300 - Hijack & W/off due responsive action

Jan 1994 - A340 - H/pump O/heat & fire - not in service

Anyone else have any hull losses in past 25 years to add ?

[DozyWannabe]

Will Fraser:
The FAA, as an administrative enforcement body, has the power to fix things as we speak ... If the Unions get out of Bed with management and rub their eyes a bit...
We're getting into US-related specifics, and as this is an AF topic, we're probably taking our eyes off the ball here. In answer to your post, the problem is not that unions are in bed with management - the problem is that the FAA was set up with an almost schizophrenic charter whereby it has to regulate the industry but at the same time "promote" it. So you have a situation where the NTSB makes recommendations, but if airline management thinks the recommendations are too onerous financially, they get the airline lobby to petition the FAA against enforcing those recommendations.

Back to the topic at hand - if the consolidation of the various French state-owned airlines into AF have caused the various impasses that Me Myself describes, and safety is being adversely affected as a result, then serious questions need to be asked within the unions and airline management, and a new accommodation must be reached.

[Ex Cargo Clown]

Jul 2000 - Concorde - FOD damage and fuel leak ignition

Errm, how about W&B issues and F/E with an uncommanded engine shutdown.

Oh, and the engineering problems with the wheel spacer.

Oh, and I forgot the tailwind "problem".............

[steamchicken]

Statistical power (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_power).

Given that the Conc and AF447 represent 66% of the sample since 2000, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that any estimate of the baseline rate of accidents based on a total of ONE data point is predestined to fail.

Further, if French culture is inimical to working with complex technology, how does the world's biggest nuclear power industry manage? Seems to work better than that in the UK, US, Russia, or indeed anywhere else.

[FrequentSLF]

Further, if French culture is inimical to working with complex technology, how does the world's biggest nuclear power industry manage? Seems to work better than that in the UK, US, Russia, or indeed anywhere else

I think we can exclude that the French culture is inimical to working with complex technology. Actually I do think that the poor safety record as more to do with Air France culture that French culture.

[ZFT]

….and yet all the DGAC inspector pilots I’ve had the pleasure of dealing with over the years were Air France pilots also and without fail came across in a most positive, safety conscious and cooperative fashion.

[Rwy in Sight]

The last few answers prompt me to kindly ask you to differentiate more between the French high tech safety culture and AF's one; if that make sense. Without concrete data, it seems the French TGV and Nuclear power stations are very reliable (knock wood). How do we explain that? On the other hand other nations with similar institutions tend to have a more balanced record.

Not sure if that makes sense?

I have theory for the AF but I dont' want to express it as yet.

Rwy in Sight

[Me Myself]

And why would you keep us in the dark ? That's a shame.
Then I'll put my 2 pence in :

- As I mentioned above, AF merged with 2 airlines in the 90's. One was UTA ( privatly owned ) a small outfit dating from the days where the french empire was split. UTA in west Africa and the Pacific, AF the rest of the world.
- Domestic ? In the 60's no one would deem himself to such a low job and it was left out until some ex navy admiral convinced the governement that something had to be done. And they did a superb job. In those days Marseilles was some 10 hours from Paris by train, suddenly with the Caravelle and later Mercure and A300, it went to just 60 minutes. Added to that their splendid on time record due to the automatic landing ( a first then ) Air Inter changed the face of the country by its price structure making suddenly possible to move from side to the other...........well through Paris, good old centralized state. Still.
However, their quality of service back in the cabin which was more of a cattle truck class really, was total crap. No seating, 5 francs ( which would almots be 10 euros today ) for an orange juice. ( No Mr fruitcake O'Leary, you didn't invent a damn thing ). Being the only mean of transport to the provinces, they were holding the governement by the balls and they squeezed more than a few times to get what they wanted not realizing the TGV was poping its nose.
Not really realzing there was no competition,or abusing this situation ( whichever ) led them to develop this culture toward the governement " We demand, you guys deliver " That was then their idea of collective bargaining which they brought along with them.
Air Inter grounded ? The country was chocking..........and everybody knew it.
In a way, they were like the aussie pilots of the late 80's. Look what happened.
The 1980's came as a bit of shock but it's not until the 1990's that they realized they some heat under the toushy and denial wasn't on anymore. For the most disconnected from reality knocking, they even thought they were going to fly to the french West Indies and make a bundle of money !!! When in fact, according to market laws, they were heading toward oblivion.
French were absolutly fed up by their numerous and ongoing strikes and TGV started offering some real alternatives.
The french governement however keen to ditch them, wasn't going to let the airline ( they owned ) go down and be worth less than toilet paper.They decided to merge them with AF, which by the way, was the only sensible idea they had had in a very long time. Air Inter should never have existed in the first place had AF not been so stupid and arrogant.
Most of the pilots joining Air Inter were those who had not been able to make it into AF or UTA, sometimes because Air Inter was the only one recruiting, some other times ( or most if I had a death wish ) because they didn't cut the mustard. Let's be fair and say that when given the choice, an homeopathic proportion chose to go to Air Inter. When not given the choice in times of harships, everybody, including me, wanted to join Air Inter.
A handfull chose to leave Air Inter when Air France started recruiting again in the 90's and started at the bottom of the seniority list, choice they were going to regret when the merger took place.
At any rate, this created a real culture of resentment toward AF that only grew with the years. A kind of Robin Hood culture.
Due to their short route structure and their collective agreement, Air Inter pilots were making a lot more money than Air France. You had A300 captains making more money than AF Jumbo captains who spent 20 days away from home then and were the laughing stock of Air Inter pilots calling AF L/H bunk pilots .............etc as opposed to them who saw themselves as the real deal. Not really full blown love and without the buffer and look alike civilized manners the anglo saxon culture offers.

These were the circumstances under which the merger occured and it did turn very bloody.
Not having given a hoot about long haul for years, Air Inter pilots suddenly demanded to be immediatly promoted so they could keep there salaries or at least keep the level of salaries they had before the merger.The AF S/H route structure with long routes like SVO or TLV, was indeed hammering them and the claim is they lost 20 % salary in the process.
Of all the indignities, they also had to be requalified with Air France SOP's, and this didn't go down too well.
In my view, Air France made a big mistake but as we all know, ironsight is very easy. We were in time of abundance and we could have paid them what they were earning ( roughly long haul salary ) before the merger. Today, they're all, or almost, on long haul anyway or have left. On the long term, the cost would have been very marginal and it would have eliminated the resentment they were feeling ( or maybe not ).
On the other hand, AF pilots were not about to let pass a 747 command having patiently waited 17 years to get there and it was ......errrr.......agreed that one Air Inter for ( not sure ) 4 Air France pilots would have access to long haul for a period of 8 years. After a few years, this system was creating such a huge resentment among Air Inter pilots that it was ditched all together and for once, AF management didn't consult AF ALPA, or if they did, they didn't give a damn about their disagreement and we went to a one to one basis which in turn, left a few AF pilots stranded on short haul for ever . These however, even screaming murder, went on faithfully ploughing not even stopping working for one second. Very different culture regarded by Air Inter, who regard themselves as the real testoterone pumped up blokes, as pussy's culture.
This brought a slight measure of peace, although some well known pains you know where, remained unamended pains you know where.
Just a slight side step here : There were 2 sets of attitudes. Those who said " Well, that's life, let's make the best out of it " and we never had a problem with them ( the majority ) and they are now happy long haul skippers and the others who decided they were to go down with the ship or even make the ship go down. Some left cashing loss of licence insurance money depleting the cash register in the process and those staying saw their premiums go up or their coverage go down. Thanks a bunch folks. Some younger stayed and started being pain in the toush and are now unhappy long haul skippers. They also are the noisest. I know, 15 000 Eur a month cruising the planet in a shiny 777, that really sucks. Who would want that, I'm asking you ?
It was refelected in all sorts of attitudes, from refusing to wear the AF uniform to clearly not giving a hoot in a thousand of ways.
In any airline, this kind of attitude would have been met by " Thank you but no thank you and let's call it a day ". Not the case here as everything got nasty and political.
On top of that AF was starting to look as a solid airline even attracting the interest of KLM. Social peace was indispensible and at ( almost ) any price. Flight managers could do all they wanted...............exept reprimand a stray away pilot, if they did..........they got hammered or locked in some dark closet having no respect from the top and absolutly SQUAT from the ranks. Among other habits, they also imported their very volatile union culture leading to the over bidding we are witnessing today.
Bear in mind all this happened in the span of almost 15 years during which, AF growing the way it was, was offering tremendous career opportunities to most.
Only a year ago, everybody was talking about all the new aircrafts ordered, people being picky about the type of course offered. Short haul command ??? Nay, I want to enjoy the tropics and my pinacolada's a bit more ; I've got time.
Today, the music has stopped and everyone has a huge hangover, more so after 447. The temptation to look for scape goats is huge and right now, seeing threads like this one, full in your face, with an almost centenial name tarnished.............well, yes, hurts.
But let's not stop at the booboo clinic and let's move on.
The devil hides in the best of intentions but my opinion is that in the hope to create this huge airline, social peace got paramount, even at almost any price and some basics got forgotten on the way. There was a huge elephant in the room no one wanted to see having such a grand time.
I'm not going to point the finger at anyone because, like many, I did gain from it, a lot and no one forced me to attend the party. However, clearly, things need to change and that's everywhere from top down.
AF 447 has adressed world wide, what airline training has become. We have in 12 months witnessed the best ( Sully ) and the most tragic ( 447 ) and these are the 2 sides of the same coin.
No flying an airliner isn't an easy thing to do and I say this to the beancounters, the journos as well as to some of our cocky young pilots full of cum who think they can cruise across the ocean watching DVD's thinking they're hot shots while granpa is resting in the bunk. You don't pay attention................you hurt.
No, you are not by birth right promised a short haul command in 7 years and a long haul in 10 and no granpa won't walk so you can have your whim satisfied. By the look of it, patience is going to become a very trendy vertue...................if you're lucky enough to keep your job.
No, aircrafts have not become so easy to fly that a monkey could fly them, in fact as we painfully know, the gap between normal and tricky has become wider.
We have to go from boredom to shear panic mode in seconds. That you must learn..............unless you're married to a neurotic which makes you an expert.
Finally, this job carries huge responsabilities and those who think they can do it in a cheap, slack, fast food manner need to be cut lose without the slightest hesitation.

[mickk]

The quotes from the lone survivor in the press this week certainly rule out a lot of things.

[draughtsman99]

AF's hull losses in accidents were:
1940s - 22
1950s - 24
1960s - 9
1970s - 2 (one B747; one Caravelle)
1980s - 3 (one B747; one A300 caused by engine failure (GE CF6); A320 Habsheim)
1990s - 2 (one B747; one B737)
2000s - 3 (one Concorde; one A340 Toronto; one A330 Atlantic) Since Concorde was brought down by hitting bits that fell off a USA owned and maintained aircraft - is it fair to use it in a discussion about AF safety?

[cessnapuppy]

Since Concorde was brought down by hitting bits that fell off a USA owned and maintained aircraft - is it fair to use it in a discussion about AF safety?
Because the concorde had a history of exploding wheels -and a further history of wheel fragments impacting the low slung fuel tanks and causing leaks (but to this point,no fire)
That the Concorde in question was overweight and that the wind had shifted to a tailwind, extending their take off time - a prudent thought might have been to recalculate the take-off parameters. If they were not overweight and insisting of taking of in a tailwind perhaps they would have survived a loss of a tire or even an engine.
Their response to the fire is another thing.
You could be cruel and say its 'pilot error' because the Captain is always responsible, even to the point of getting out of bed that morning. Or you could be accurate and note that a few decisions made in another direction would have the Concorde flying today? That disaster was waiting to happen. In a way, it was exactly like our own shuttle disaster! For years we watched chunks of foam flail away at the heat shield on blast off - the one thing that prevented the shuttle from burning up on reentry... we played the numbers and we lost. The house always wins

[Me Myself]

That the Concorde in question was overweight and that the wind had shifted to a tailwind, extending their take off time - a prudent thought might have been to recalculate the take-off parameters. If they were not overweight and insisting of taking of in a tailwind perhaps they would have survived a loss of a tire or even an engine.


Cessnapupp

Your quote reminds me of a passenger I had once out of London being some 15 minutes late. Right after gear up, we heard a loud bang explosion like noise. It was dark and we didn't have a clue about what had happened.
We turned back to LHR, as always LHR ATC was great and found out we had hit a goose. Plenty of blood and feathers under my window.
Lufthansa engineering came for the inspection during which one pax started complaining about being delayed.............and probably scared too.
I explained that as cock up and fate had it, we had a goose on our conscience.
The answer was baffling, a bit like your quote
" Had you left on time...................you would never have hit that goose"
According to witnesses....................I did look like a Goldfish for a few seconds.

[cessnapuppy]

LOL... interesting story, but would not have mattered in YOUR case, since you collided with the 9:30 goose. If you had left on time, then you would have simply collided with the 9:15 goose, so it's not totally your fault (tho I still blame you ! :)

Previous tyre incidents In November, 1981, the American NTSB sent a letter of concern, which included safety recommendations for the Concorde, to the French BEA. That communiqué was the result of the NTSB's investigations of four Air France Concorde incidents, during a 20 month period, from July 1979, through February, 1981. The NTSB described those incidents as “potentially catastrophic,” because they were caused by blown tyres during takeoff. The NTSB also expressed concern about the lack of adequate remedies, on the part of the French, as well as improper crew responses to those incidents.Runway debris and animal incursions (including geese) are a fact of life to be planned for and prepared. No doubt Air France is undertaking legal action against Branta canadensis (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_Goose)

All is not lost however, the unity and resolve shown by the pilots in demanding new pitot probes is an example of a more proactive approach I hope.

[vovachan]

Since Concorde was brought down by hitting bits that fell off a USA owned and maintained aircraft - is it fair to use it in a discussion about AF safety?

Yes. A blown tire is a non-event. I cannot believe AF continued to operate the Concorde with this known design vulnerability, and they got away with it for so long.

[Me Myself]

All is not lost however, the unity and resolve shown by the pilots in demanding new pitot probes is an example of a more proactive approach I hope.

Cessnapupp...................;by God, you've gone to the dark side :))

Unity and resolve is something I have never seen when it comes to french unions.
Bickering ??? Plenty.
" Thou shall not covet thy neighbour's member " simply does not apply.
Had the situation not been so tragic, I would have rolled on my back reading the outrageous claims of " having saved the day " some made, even live on the tele.
As a member of the most representative union ( at least by numbers ) I can tell you these guys closed the door to the stable once the horse had already bolted.

You have a point with your tyre and NTSB thing.
Mr Above post, AF didn't get away with it, they lost an aircraft, a crew, 98 passengers and a great deal of their reputation. Nobody got away with anything I'd say.

Can we go center field here ?
What are we exactly debating ?? I thought it was AF or even french safety culture and ability to operate complex technology. Some even implied we were so goofy we couldn't operate a toaster. Some others marvel at our nuclear plants ( let me tell you no one marvels round about Cherbourg where the water almost glows in the dark ) our TGV and our health system...........which by the way is turning to complete crap. But, that's beside the point.
I tried to explain, in my very humble opinion, where part of the problem may come from and it is certainly a lot more complicated than that.
I very much believe in my boat and crew story ( see above ) and the lack of management purposely displayed all these years to achieve a greater goal....................if that makes any sense because it almost doesn't to me !
A valid point however has been made earlier. France has indeed a Mandarin culture in the industrial world and remembering my early years as a school boy, freedom came when I was sent abroad.
The system was very rigid and questioning your elders absolutly not tolerated.
So yes, in a big industrial outfit like AF or National railways, speaking out requires some courage and this leads to slow down in the decision making process. Nuclear plants ?? I suppose they are so scared to blow us to Mars that they are really extra carefull. Dunno.
Non pun intended, but around a pool, give me well behaved french kids instead of ( sorry, it's going to sting a bit ) noisy little american brats.


Taking into account the loss of 22 hulls in....................zxuze moi ????
1940 ????
Do you have an idea of what kind of stuff was flying in those days, not that I was born ??? Just looking at the pictures makes me freak. 22 was probably an outstanding record for the time.

I think we should start looking post war, let's say 60's ??
In the 60's, with the kind of culture I just described, it came clear there was a problem that needed to be adressed, and fast. Almost all the skippers then had joined right after the war logging...............well, zero time as an F/O. Straight from heaven !! They got to fly all the new toys coming on the market right to the Concorde and many of them turned out to be tyrans. Pan Am wasn't any better, according to a fantastic book " Sky Gods " written by an ex Delta Skipper.
Some are now dead tyrans having slammed at least 2 707's in a mountain directly related to poor CRM.
When I joined, AF hadn't had a hit in 20 years. This brings me back to my merger theory.
Over to you...............and please, leave Asseline in his dark closet.

[punkalouver]

This might be the report here:

http://www.bakchich.info/IMG/pdf/Rapport_Colin__Juin_2006_bis.pdf

In French of course.

[cessnapuppy]

I seem to get from your posts there is a problem of immiscible elements: you see it here too, the sometimes gentle (and not so gentle) antagonism between the old school pilots and the new school pilots.. interesting to see that dynamic in a cockpit! So are you saying that AF basically started to breakdown (internal cohesiveness) after the different mergers? i.e. the newly assimilated units just did not merge well or work together? What are we exactly debating ?? I thought it was AF or even french safety culture and ability to operate complex technology. Just AF safety culture, but thinking out loud, the specific sense of national identity and cultural pride identified by the Concorde, and later, by Airbus... would that affect the ability to look critically and act proactively regarding any faults? CONCORDE SST : F-BTSC ACCIDENT (http://www.concordesst.com/accident/accidentindex.html)

[Me Myself]

Cessnapupp

The answer to your first question is a loud yes. The merger with Air INter was very poorly handled. UTA wasn't so bad, they came with a long haul only network which was easy to integrate and it didn't do too much damage, still you always have the few who stay in mourning for ever.
Air Inter brought with it the whole of the domestic network. Very good for AF as a whole, not so good for those who want to sun themselves under the tropics. I mean, Marseilles isn't really my idea of fun.
For the rest I think I explained extensively how it went.

Second question, the answer is a definite no. No one here, exept the street pundit, does really give a hoot about pride Concorde and Airbus. By the way, Airbus is a consortium and not a french product, this being skillfully reminded whenever there is a purpose to serve.
I guess, it is just hard for people to take a good look at themselves even more when the spot light is on you. I suppose this is only human and not specifically french. As I said earlier, speaking out loud what you think is a risky exercise in a big french corporation with a very strong national culture.
Don't expect the sort of AA confession. " Hi, I am Me Myself and I am a jerk of a pilot " which by the way..........I am not :))

[australiancalou]

In France no matter how good you are at work only important is your education background and diploma...and on top of all: your relationships!
This leads to a very bad SMS in management.
Say people they are what the Earth has the best made and you have a good chance to improve your accident record list.
That doesn't mean this can explain all the AF accidents.
Remember the Tenerif accident and the authocratic behaviour of the KLM chief pilot (peace to his soul).
Proudiness and self confidence have nothing to do with aviation safety and that's unfortunally the way people behave in AF and probably in other majors...
An other thing I would like to point out concerning the French management.
At the opposite of the anglosaxon system French managers (In the airlines at least) are most of the times choosen in the "friends tank" more than in the "tank of good guys" and if possible the chief will choose a guy that is not good enough to take his own position:rolleyes:;):O

[ATC Watcher]

Many thanks Me Myself for those fantastic posts about that AF inside history that I remember quite well. The Unions description is a typical French situation , not limited to AF, we have exactly the same mess in ATC.

Having left France, my home country, 30 years ago , and re- trained to different safety philosophies when I was still young and impressionable, I always looked in the past at the "French cultural exception " with a mix of amazement and sympathy. Like the sympathy one has for the small outsider fighting against the big US Anglo-Saxon machine. It was Ziegler-David fighting Boeing-Goliath, French on the R/T at all costs, Concorde with an "e" in the end, landing an helicopter on top of Mt Everest, just to name a few .

Now a few years later, a lot of incidents/accidents later and looking at the end result (St Odile, Gonesse, Brest, Cayenne/Toronto , Pau, South Atlantic etc..) this feeling has turned to real embarrassment.

I do not want to bring Asseline out of the closet again but It is amazing to think that for a few meters more, the crowd would have cheered and, as training Capt on the first A320s in AF then, he would most probably be chief OPS at AF today.

To change a culture normally takes a generation , but AF managed to pass on that culture from generation to generation.

The Dutch were in a similar situation in the 70s and 80s with blunt overconfidence causing an accident every 3 years , but managed to turn that around completely. The French (and AF) unfortunately has not done that yet. I hope they get the message this time.
The name of the imminent replacement of Gourgeon is already known apparently but will he read and learn from the Colin report and start changing the culture ?

[punkalouver]

Sounds like you are saying that there is a cowboy element at the company that is looked upon favourably, with rules coming in second.

True?

[cessnapuppy]

Flight deck crew Flight Captain:

* French
* 58 years old
* Entered Air France in 1988
* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in February 2007
* 11,000 flight hours, including 1,700 on Airbus A330/A340
2 co-pilots:
* French
* 37 and 32 years old
* Entered Air France in 1999 and 2004

* Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in April 2002 and June 2008
* 6,600 flight hours, including 2,600 on Airbus A330/A340
* 3,000 flight hours, including 800 on Airbus A330/A340

One question. (before I get to the main) Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm? In AF447 you had a very experienced pilot, close to the end of his flight career at 58 with a lot of experience but less experienced in that particular aircraft than the copilot A situation similar to Colgan -Where the younger female copilot had much more hours on that particular type of plane than her senior, and at one point it seemed to me, was interjecting her own orders into the recovery attempt (?) based on what you guys know internally at AF is there room in the culture for a kind of conflict? i.e. The young studs wont heed the older pilot because they have more experience than him on that type or he's an old fart mired in the past? Or was it they felt compelled to fly through the storm out of some sense of deference or not to be seen as 'weak'?
... I may be grasping at straws, but that night, a bunch of other planes navigated that stretch (with diversion) but otherwise no incident..
There is a particular flaw with the human risk evaluator that, once having committed to a course of action -any action - FURTHER RISK EVALUATION STOPS. It may be appropriate, as primates swinging from limb to limb, you dont have time to rethink - but as pilots should we ever stop?
You see it at Tenerife - the Captain made up his mind to take off, and the copilot made up his mind to say nothing.. all data henceforth, was taken as added confirmation authority for a decision already made.

[PJ2]

cp;
Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm?

No.

If anything may have been at play with any encounter with a thunderstorm (and not diverting around it), it would be the perception of risk/danger through a clear understanding of what the radar returns were indicating. From experience, I know there is a wide range of such understanding in new-hires and veterans alike. Part of that picture is training, standards and checking at an airline. In fact, that is the very reason I posted a long discussion on the use of radar right at the beginning of the second thread on AF447. Others added to the knowledge-base on that thread which I think was really the finest demonstration of professionalism at work.

We cannot possibly know of course if this factor played a part.

In AF447 you had a very experienced pilot, close to the end of his flight career at 58 with a lot of experience but less experienced in that particular aircraft than the copilot
The difference is not material. Like most who fly, I have flown with those less, and those with more time on the particular equipment. Within a hundred hours (hard time) on type, (two months, roughly) and given the kind of training one is offered during a type certificate/IFR, one knows the airplane well enough.

That doesn't mean one can play the airplane like a pianist plays a concerto on grand piano. It means that the differences in experience are largely immaterial. It is simply "time in" that really counts.

In the book "Outliers (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outliers_(book))" by Malcolm Gladwell the author posits a 10,000hr "bench-mark" at which point something becomes part of oneself, intuitively. I wouldn't suggest the same for airline pilots but nor do I consider a thousand hours in anything doing any kind of flying, "experienced".

PJ2

[ATC Watcher]

Punkalouver :Sounds like you are saying that there is a cowboy element at the company that is looked upon favourably, with rules coming in second.

True?


Interesting that you use the term : "cowboy" I would not use it the way I understand it ( no rules at all ) " but rather, if you bend the rules and get something extraordinary then it is worth it . Like buzzing the TWR in the Top Gun film if you know what I mean. There was that element in the past , yes ,but I am not sure it is still there today in AF probably no, only an insider can tell. But the glorifying of that past era is still firmly anchored in the French culture.

Cowboy makes me think of the title of the biography book of Ziegler " the Airbus cowboys " just out.
Cowboys d'Airbus, Bernard Ziegler tous les livres à la Fnac (http://livre.fnac.com/a2411366/Bernard-Ziegler-Cowboys-d-Airbus)
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.

[Dysag]

Luckily for Airbus, during much of that 'cowboy' era Ziegler had to report to the greatly admired and
totally bull****-free Roger Béteille.

[BusyB]

I understood AF had not done the mods that BA had in putting some sort of sandwich in the fuel tanks. If they had it may well have helped.

I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong:ok:

[ATC Watcher]

Busy B :
I'm sure I'll be corrected if I'm wrong
You are and you will, don'worry ( by someone who knows more about CONC than I do. );)

Dysag :
correct ! fortunately for Airbus there were many more people like Beteille , still are today.

[CONF iture]

One question. (before I get to the main) Is there a sub culture that might view 'diverting around weather' to be'somewhat of a pussy/coward' and do you think there may have been a subconcious need for the younger pilots to 'prove we can DO THIS' and ride through the storm?
The question is which element make you state the AF447 crew flew through what you call the "storm" ?
The last known position was 3 NM west of track.
Why the BEA did not explicitly mention it in their preliminary report ?

Cowboys d'Airbus, Bernard Ziegler tous les livres à la Fnac (http://livre.fnac.com/a2411366/Bernard-Ziegler-Cowboys-d-Airbus)
Reading it ( in French again , sorry ) makes you understand that bending the rules was an institution in those ( not too far away) days.
Has he devoted a chapter to tell his own remarkable feat of arms (http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,872735,00.html) ?

[ATC Watcher]

CONF iture :
Has he devoted a chapter to tell his own remarkable feat of arms ?
No the book starts in 1967, His " Valee blanche " exploits are not mentioned .

When I first met him in 1972 he was giving a lecture to us in Toulouse and introduced himself lke this (from memory ) Hi, Your remember the jet that cut the cable in valee Blanche doing low level, > It was me... Now I am head of flight testing Airbus... In those days he was impressive .

In the book he describes many interesting annecdotes unknown (to me at least) like the first in flight presentation of the A300 in le Bourget in 1973:

Just after take off in front of the officials there is a fire in the cabin. " What to do, : At his first public appearance the A300 gets on fire ? No , I pull the column and started to do the "circus" presentation. What else to do ? The F/E managed to control the fire, and when we landed there was smoke but no more fire..." ( page 132)

[Locked door]

Yes BA had modded the fuel tanks many many years before when their own safety audits identified the risk of a tyre disintegrating. Further mods were made post the A/F crash which were probably unnecessary but couldn't do any harm.

[Algy]

Not the most important thing in the world now, but did BA really mod the fuel-tanks earlier? There were BA/AF differences but I don't recall fuel-tanks being one of them, and in fact the fuel tanks were incredibly difficult to access when the Kevlar liners were eventually installed post-crash. (I may well be failing to remember another twist to that complex story though.)

Excerpt from an Air Transport Intelligence story on 16 August 2000:

"Discussing the history of previous Concorde tyre incidents, CAA head of aircraft certification Derek Blackall, says there have been around 70 incidents since 1976, the most significant being to an Air France aircraft at Washington Dulles Airport in 1979 after which a series of actions were taken.

Those were: the introduction of a flat-tyre detection system; the strengthening of the wheels themselves to let them take an overload factor of two instead of the original 1.5; and the movement of some systems around the landing gear bay to reduce their vulnerability.

Blackall notes that Air France uses Goodyear tyres and British Airways has Dunlop, although no significance has so far been attached to that.

Another difference is that British Airways has incorporated an Aerospatiale-designed modification to the water deflector which was intended to "reduce the energy of fragments that come off in the event of a tyre burst" whereas Air France did not take up the revised system.

Blackall says it is not yet possible to tell "if that made a difference" in the case of the Paris crash."

[Me Myself]

I do not want to bring Asseline out of the closet again but It is amazing to think that for a few meters more, the crowd would have cheered and, as training Capt on the first A320s in AF then, he would most probably be chief OPS at AF today.

ATC
I ve had to leave the thread for a while as I also have heaps of other interests.
Having said that, you are right on the money, the crowd of streeet pundits would have cheered and Asseline would have been the next chief of Op s. and the french as a people would nver had had a doubt as to their God given right to rule the aviation planet, if not the whole planet, but again, another story.
Your remark sums up the french psychie and the fly by example is a good one.


However, that was then ( 20 years ago ) and now is well.............now !

All this doesn t explain 447 and no, F/O s even if tempted, do not shut the old man s mouth. If they do...............they re toast. Of course some try but then, jerks old or young are a self breeding specie...............regardless of nationality: Some spiffing examples on this site.
447 captain had very little experience on type..............and on long haul, exactly 2 years since he was an ex Air Inter pilot. I would not call that a lot of experience.
I was lucky to spend 10 years of my life as a long haul F/O and I can humbly say this is where I became a LH skipper in the making.
Most probably the 2 F/O s were sitting up front and I would agree with what has been said above regarding the interpretation of the radar image. What will need to be adressed too, is the chain of command when the captain is taking his break. It s not enough to say " Boyo, you re in charge !!! " when you ve never been trained to decide.............and this takes training, this from personal experience.
Once again, what we need is real management, by that I mean someone who has the power to say " You don t like that rule ?? Here are your marching papers " Simple as that. We also need an upper management who does not go cherry picking on a report taking what he knows will not anger some of multiple unions AF has. This Colin report was to be taken as a whole, not as " A la carte " menu like it was.
Everybody knows how not to crash an airplane, just follow some very simple............maybe boring ( but who CARES ?? ) rules and plough the field until retirement. I know, not really glamourous but if that s what you re after, you should have joined the Air Force.
I for one, take tremendous pride and satisfaction when checking out immigration at seeing families and friends happily waiting their loved one s I have delivered in one piece. I have seen too many times on TV what the worse case scenario can be. Nothing boring about that I can tell you and I get a high coke wouldn t give me.
Call me corny and sentimental:..................who CARES

In France no matter how good you are at work only important is your education background and diploma...and on top of all: your relationships!
This leads to a very bad SMS in management.
Say people they are what the Earth has the best made and you have a good chance to improve your accident record list.
That doesn't mean this can explain all the AF accidents.


Australiancalou

I find your naivity very touching. Is there a country on this planet where anyone is chosen solely for his abilities ??? Not even in the Land of Opportunities. Try to join the UK senior Civil Service and you ll find out you d better be a friend of Sir Humphrey. Look, he even hired Bernard as a secretary. How scary is that ?
The Old boy s club has been around since the cave man.

The name of the imminent replacement of Gourgeon is already known apparently but will he read and learn from the Colin report and start changing the culture ?

Yeah, a name is sort of flying around but I personally think this is just a lot of bollocks. Some unions are applying a tremendous pressure to get rid of the ruling team and what better way to mine the field than throwing a name and see if it flies. The name that is being flight tested is of a presently locked in a dark closet guy who had his days in glory and got ditched for an unbeknown reason to me. The air is too thin for me up there and the pole much too greasy.
One thing I didn't mention in my previous posts are the different groups shredding each others in order to get the top jobs. We're talking Free Masons, political parties and depending where you stand, you get the bunny; but you sure have to fight for it.
I would be very surprised if there was any change at the very top, at least something significant, for we have far too much on our plate to be able to afford the commotion of a change.