Emirates A345 Tail Strike Captain breaks his silence

[NutLoose]

Posted on the Flypast forum by Steve Rowell, apologies if previously posted, but it makes sad reading and I feel for the guy.


Emirates A345 tail strike Captain breaks his silence!!!
The pilot at the controls of an Emirates jet that almost crashed at Melbourne Airport has revealed how he saved 275 lives.

Breaking a four-month silence, the pilot told how he managed to wrench the fully-loaded plane into the air just seconds before it almost crashed.

"I still don't know how we got it off the ground," the pilot said.

"I thought we were going to die, it was that close.

"It was the worst thing in 20 years (of flying). It was the worst thing I've felt, but thank God we got it safely around."

The pilot, a 42-year-old European man, spoke to the Sunday Herald Sun on the condition his identity not be revealed.

Realising the plane had not reached a high enough speed to get airborne, and with the end of the runway rapidly approaching, the pilot and co-pilot were desperately checking controls in the cockpit, trying to find out what had gone wrong.

At the last second, the pilot engaged a rapid acceleration known as TOGA (take-off go-around) and lifted the plane off the ground.

With 257 passengers and 18 crew aboard, the Airbus A340-500 struck its tail three times, wiped out lights and a navigation antennae at the end of the runway - some of the equipment struck was just 70cm high - and sustained $100 million damage as it barely cleared the airport boundary fence.

After limping into the air, the pilot took the jet out over Port Phillip Bay to dump its load of highly flammable aviation fuel, then returned to Melbourne Airport 30 minutes later.

Passengers had seen smoke and dust swirl into the cabin and felt the impact as the tail struck the ground, but the pilot did not tell them how bad the situation was, fearing it would cause them to panic.

The pilot said that when he left the plane after safely returning to Melbourne Airport he saw a number of the passengers disembarking, unaware of how close to death they had come.

"There were a lot of passengers left the airplane smiling," he said.

He said the landing afterwards was a "textbook landing".

"From take-off until we landed I am extremely proud of what we did from push-off to landing.

"The cabin crew were outstanding. We did extremely well under the circumstances. We kept it very, very simple."

He said he did not know to this day exactly how he manoeuvred the Airbus into the air.

"I . . . sort of reacted on instinct," he said.

"I had a feeling that (something) wasn't working, but I couldn't find out what was wrong.

"I knew I couldn't stop.

"At that point I knew we just had to go.

"And we got it off the ground, miraculously."

The accident was later described as the closest Australia had come to a major aviation catastrophe.

Tail strikes are extremely dangerous and can result in a plane breaking in two.

A report by air safety investigators found the co-pilot was at the controls when the pilot, a captain, called on him to "rotate", or lift the plane's nose.

When the plane failed to lift, the pilot again called for him to rotate the plane, which saw the plane's nose lift and its tail strike the ground.

The pilot then took over, commanding and selecting TOGA, which provides the maximum thrust the plane's engines will deliver.

Once the plane was in the air, the crew realised the take-off weight programmed into the plane's computer was 100 tonnes lighter than the actual weight of the plane.

The typing error meant the wrong take-off speed and thrust settings had been calculated.

Emirates has said there were four layers of checks that should have picked up the error, and the failure to do so was "perplexing".

The pilot did not type in the numbers, but was responsible for checking them.

The pilot said he almost collapsed after bringing the plane safely back to land.

"One of my friends almost admitted me to hospital I was so stressed," he said.

"If you have a near-death experience your body reacts in a particular way."

In multiple interviews conducted with the Sunday Herald Sun over a period of weeks, the pilot who has left Dubai with his family and returned to his home country in Europe also revealed:

HE had slept for only 3 1/2 hours in the 24 hours before the flight taking off on March 20.

THE brush with death upset him so badly he had not slept for four days after the accident.

HE and his co-pilot were ordered to resign. They were handed pre-prepared letters of resignation when they returned to Emirates headquarters.

HE was still so horrified by the accident that he could not bear to think about it.

HE needed to find a job, but did not know if he would fly again.

HE was reluctant to reveal exactly what happened in the cockpit in case his recollection was different from what Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigators would find.

The veteran pilot, who has 22 years' experience with the military and commercial airlines, said he knew Melbourne Airport quite well.

In his 4 1/2 years of flying for Emirates he had flown in and out of Melbourne many times.

"Maybe four, five times in the past six months," he said.

"Melbourne was one of the places I knew well.

"Maybe (I flew there) once every other month.

"It was quite emotional to have to say goodbye."

Since the accident, several Emirates pilots have spoken to the Sunday Herald Sun, saying fatigue was a major problem with the airline, which is one of the world's largest long-haul carriers.

The ATSB has also been told of fatigue problems, though its preliminary report into the tail strike revealed fatigue was probably not a factor.

The pilot said it was hard for him to know if he was fatigued or not, but that he had very little sleep when the near-fatal error was made.

"I had the flown the maximum in the last 30 days. One hundred hours in 28 days, it's an Emirates rule," he said.

"I'd flown 99 hours. You can fly 100 hours in a month. There a big difference in long-haul, nights, it's a mix of everything."

He said he had told ATSB investigators he had little sleep in the day before to the 10.30pm flight on Friday, March 20.

"This long-haul flying is really, really fatiguing. Really demanding on your body," he said.

"When I did that take-off in Melbourne I had slept 3 1/2 hours in 24 hours.

"You feel sort of normal, abnormal."

He said he had been in Melbourne for 24 hours before his flight.

"That (the Melbourne-Dubai flight) is the most tiring trip I have done in my career.

"You're always out of whack."

The pilot said he and other pilots tried hard not to make any mistakes, but occasionally errors happened.

"It's never on purpose," he said.

"No fingers point in our direction. It happens because of a range of things coming together at the time.

"Until now, I had a perfect record.

"I was just a pilot."

He said he had told the ATSB everything about the period leading up to the accident, and he praised the Australian investigators for their thoroughness and sensitivity.

"I told them everything about what happens. Eating, exercise, I was dead honest. It's always like that when you fly," he said.

"I was really scared of going to jail when I got back to Dubai."

He said there had been four pilots in the cockpit - he and the co-pilot, who had been at the controls as the plane taxied along the runway, and two augmenting pilots who were on board because of the length of the 14 1/2 hour flight to Dubai.

Source:The Herald Sun
__________________
Best Regards Steve

[anawanahuanana]

I don't even know where to start with this piece of trash journalism.
All I'll say is firstly the pilot didn't heroically save everyone's life, he endangered them in the first place. As for reacting on instincts? Well, with the end of the runway approaching, even a 50 hour PPL would firewall the throttle and keep pulling back until something happened.
Jesus.......... :ugh::{:mad:

[Joetom]

None of us be perfect.

Appears they did a great job after problem found, ending could have been very different.

This event will prob save others.

My best wishes to all involved. cheers.....

[kenhughes]

At the last second, the pilot engaged a rapid acceleration known as TOGA

I'm not a pilot, just a lowly aviation software engineer, but isn't the clue in the TO part of TOGA?

Why wait until "the last second" to engage it (even allowing for journalistic BS)? Wouldn't (shouldn't?) it be engaged at the start of the take-off roll?

[Beavis and Butthead]

A report by air safety investigators found the co-pilot was at the controls when the pilot, a captain, called on him to "rotate", or lift the plane's nose.

Oh dear oh deary me :rolleyes: No wonder there was no cross check of the take off performance. Investigators should start looking at the cause being only one pilot present on a 2 pilot aeroplane. :ugh:

[fullforward]

Only a complete idiot would think that this cannot happen with ANYONE of us. No matter how profissional, experienced and trained we are.
We are all subject to this.
There's even more senior captains, with brilliant 30 plus years careers, that screw up everything one day. It simply HAPPENS.
No matter what we say.
We can always minimize the possibilities, by new technologies, rules etc.

No fingers pointing at this poor guy. Could be any of us.

[barit1]

kenhughes -

You might want to study up on flex thrust (http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/313674-de-rated-power-settings-question.html), which is the SOP with virtually all airlines today. Essentially it matches the engine performance to the operating conditions (a/c mass, runway length, elevation, air temperature, ...) so the engine is operated as economically as possible.

[galdian]

Well first things first - would have been nice if interviewed by someone who has SOME concept of how an airline cockpit is structured - at the moment you simply have the pilot talking to the pilot, taking over from the pilot etc, some breakdown using PIC/Captain/First Officer/Copilot/Pilot flying/Pilot monitoring.....whatever; at the moment just a dog's breakfast with NO indication of who should have been doing what, when, why etc etc.

Secondly could this be anyone of us??? Yes, could be.

So don't point fingers??? Would be happy to do that if ANYWHERE the PIC admitted he'd failed in his job description as being the final responsibility for the aircraft, passengers and crew.
At the moment it "all just happened by mystery" is the line being pushed and that's just unacceptable crap IMHO.

Some questions should have been:
Reporter: So who is finally responsible for the safety of the aircraft??
Captain: I am as the PIC

Reporter: You have extensive of experience in commercial operations??
Captai: Yes I do.

Reporter: So not only did you fail in your designated role as PIC but your extensive experience didn't make you realise that a heavy aircraft, mid summer should have demanded a much higher power setting for takeoff??
Captain: "It all just happened by mystery."

No it didn't!

As for none of the other 3 "professional" pilots on the flight deck not twigging that it "just doesn't seem or feel right" - doesn't say a lot about the Captains of the future does it??

[Founder]

I totally agree with GALDIAN, BUT there is one big factor also to consider, that the guy had not slept for more than 3,5 hours before the flight, thats like asking for an accident to happen. And also the thing about flying maximum 100 hrs per month is a lot... EU/JAA regulations about max 90 hrs month makes a big difference but even 90 is a lot.

One has to be responsible enough to realize that when getting so few hours of sleep, mistakes happen much more easily since your max performance level is probably not more than 25-30% compared to sleeping 8-10 hours.

This captains first mistake was to even go to work that day...

[Flight Detent]

I am amused by the complete lack of realization of the current trend of technology within civil airplane flight decks with quote "We can always minimize the possibilities, by new technologies, rules etc."

To my way of thinking, and I've recently completed a career spanning some 14,000 hours flight experience, that the problem IS the current trend of 'new technologies' and carrying complete augmented crews, with everybody thinking these shiney new electronic airplanes are fool-proof!

I have been, and will continue to be 100% in favour of bringing back the best insurance the airline industry EVER had in the flight deck...the professional Flight Engineer!

How many times did the F/O or Captn find an error in the takeoff performance calculations from the FE, none of any significance that I can recall!

Don't misunderstand me...I realize that the manufacturers have "progressed" way past the reintroduction of the FE, I'm just here to tell you that I think it's gone way too far with electronics doing everything for you.
Seems to be electronics for electronics sake, rather than actually providing a better operating environment, because that is currently not the case!

Yeh, yeh...I know that all you pilots out there that have not had the pleasure of operating with an FE will tell us how they are old technology and are not needed any more, the "We can do it" guys.
But it's funny how most of the senior and retired pilots will admit that their experience flying with FEs was/is a much better experience than the current crop of multi-crew airplanes, in many ways.

And I'm not even going to mention the level of airplane operations and systems knowledge that is going lacking in the "modern" pilot group.

As someone once said, "I'll get my own coat on the way out!"

:)

[galdian]

Agree with founder - turning up probably not smartest move, also not sure how "forgiving" the Emirates empire is of grunts who cause disruptions for such spurious reasons as .......fatigue and safety.
I don't mean what they say - talk is cheap - but the actions they actually take.

Also have to wonder......what about stilnox, normison ar any other newer, hopefully improved, sleeping tablets??

I am NOT advocating for ongoing day in - day out use BUT if you work shiftwork, you have trouble sleeping, you prefer not to take/refuse to take the occasional sleeping tablet then maybe you should question your ability to perform your duties safely and without fatigue??

Maybe time to chuck it in and get a 9 to 5 job at the post office - now THAT would improve safety immediately! ;)

[Dan Winterland]

This is the second tailstrike accident to occur with a 100 tonne error in the take off performance, the other being a Singapore Airlines 747 in 2001 in Aukland. Similar incidents in more than just the tail strike aspect. The time zone differences were about the same, both Singapore and Emirates have similar working practices and the pilots will have been similarly fatigued.

The captain stated he only had three and a half hours sleep in the previous 24. This is typical of trying to get rest outside your normal circadian pattern and 99 hours flown in the previous 28 days is a very hard working pattern - far more than allowed under the two regulatory authorities I have worked within.

It's all good and well saying the pilots should have noticed this error earlier on the take off roll, but with the grinding chronic fatigue that comes from such a long haul lifestyle and probably combined with the acute fatigue which comes from such a long trip, the ability to notice such errors quickly is going to be markedly impaired.

It's interesting that Emirates required the pilots to resign as soon as they got back to Dubai. It's indicative of the concern the airline had that the incident may have been related to their Flight Time Limitations - which in Duabi are set by a regulatory authority which seems to be answerable to the airline and not the other way round. There has been enough written on this website in the past about Emirates duty times.

But what about the aircraft? A system which allows such a gross error to be inserted is at fault as well. The designers may think that such errors are hard to make, but this is the second in very similar circumstances. And don't forget the MK 747 Classic freighter which fatally crashed in Halifax in 2004 when the fatigued crew used the previous much lighter flight's data and went off the end of the runway. Unless they have experienced the fatigue of continued long haul operations, it is very hard for them to understand how such errors can be made and then which escape the error traps.

I used to fly 747-400s which had weight and balance computers. The system measured the pressure in the oloes and told the crew how much the aircraft weighed and where the c of g was. I was amazed that there was no system which correlated the speeds input by the crew with what the aircraft thought the speed should be be based on it's own weight measurement. It's only a simple piece of software.

So don't be too quick to blame the crew as there are many factors which led to this error. I too have seen the 100 tonne error made. In this case it was trapped early by the mechanism set up to catch such mistakes. I'm sure it has been made many more times - and been caught. The fact it occaisionally gets through system should be ringing alarm bells and probing investigation deeper than the very typical pillorying of the pilots.

[cactusbusdrvr]

I don't know abut the A340 but the A320 series has gross weight calculated by the FACs. I generally see a 2 to 4000 pound difference in the "paper" weights the load controllers calculate for flight.

The Captain evidently called for rotation at the perdetermined (wrong) weight. They should have gone from Flex to Toga at that point, if the jet won't fly off at the normal rotation rate.

[Brian Abraham]

Dan, thanks for bringing a little sanity to the thread. Those of you who want to dump it all in the crews lap have a little learning to do, and humility. Incidents, or near accidents, such as these have been with the profession probably since the Wright Brothers. Read the synopsis of of this 30 JUL 1971 accident to a PanAm 747-121. Even having a FE didn't help in this particular case.

The aircraft struck the Approach Light Structure (ALS) at the departure end of runway 01R while taking off from the San Francisco International Airport. Two passengers, in seats 47G and 48G, were seriously injured by parts of the Approach Light System structure which penetrated the passenger compartment. The flightcrew continued the takeoff and then flew the aircraft for 1 hour and 42 minutes while assessing the structural damage and dumping fuel before landing on runway 28L. After landing, the aircraft veered off the right side of runway 28L and came to a stop in the unpaved area approximately 5,300 feet from the approach end of the runway. The passengers and crew evacuated the aircraft using the emergency evacuation slides.
Upon activation of the slides for evacuation, four of the 10 passenger slides failed to function properly and were not useable. During the evacuation the aircraft tilted slowly back onto the rear section of the fuselage.
The aircraft had been dispatched for a departure from a closed runway and, upon changing to an open, but shorter, runway, the crew did not recompute the proper reference speeds for takeoff under the existing conditions.

PROBABLE CAUSE: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the pilot’s use of incorrect takeoff
reference speeds. This resulted from a series of irregularities involving: (1) the collection and dissemination of airport information; (2) aircraft dispatching; and (3) crew management and discipline; which collectively rendered ineffective the air carrier’s operational control system."

Full report and interesting reading for the Swiss cheese holes http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR72-17.pdf

Note the (1) to (3). Nothing much new under the sun, huh? Hope you critics never get to stub your toe.

[Airbubba]

This is the second tailstrike accident to occur with a 100 tonne error in the take off performance, the other being a Singapore Airlines 747 in 2001 in Aukland.

Uh, I believe this has happed a lot more than twice, sometimes the error is 100 tonnes, sometimes it is 100,000 lbs depending on the operation. And, it has happened in landing as well from a couple of incidents I am aware of. Of course, many of us have flown the same aircraft type in pounds and kilos, an insidious error can creep into numbers that might look good for the other measurement system.

I have a friend who kissed the tail on a widebody Boeing a few years ago with the 100K error. He was on a long runway and knew something was amiss at the attempted rotation. He lowered the nose slightly and tried again and it flew off with a flat spot on the tailskid. The usual factors that he had are almost always present in widebody longhaul flight, fatigue, jetlag and a three ring circus of distractions in the cockpit just before departure.

I've come close to making the 100K mistake myself with a rushed departure to make a slot time and a runway change after blockout. I took one last look at the numbers while on the taxiway and sure enough, the data for 100K less weight was what we had. On another day I hope I would have caught it but maybe not.

[411A]

As for none of the other 3 "professional" pilots on the flight deck not twigging that it "just doesn't seem or feel right" - doesn't say a lot about the Captains of the future does it??

No, it most certainly does not.

[Dropp the Pilot]

I quote from my memory but I believe I said "you will never, ever see a real-time weight read-out for a commercial flight" to which I will add:

you will never, ever see a real-time weight read-out for a commercial flight.

[ExSp33db1rd]

As for none of the other 3 "professional" pilots on the flight deck not twigging that it "just doesn't seem or feel right" - doesn't say a lot about the Captains of the future does it??


Were the relief crew on the flight deck for take-off ?

[ExSp33db1rd]

have been, and will continue to be 100% in favour of bringing back the best insurance the airline industry EVER had in the flight deck...the professional Flight Engineer!


I have a high regard for F/Engs. never flew a multi-crew aircraft without one, but ....... 50 years ago I was employed by BOAC as a young 3rd PILOT / Navigator, to navigate over the oceans and deserts, but to act as a fourth pair of eyes on every take off and landing. BALPA had concluded an agreement that there would be 3 pilots on every flight deck from that time on. I had no hands-on function whatsoever, but was purely a monitor. Since that time the 3rd pilot, and the Flt. Eng. have been removed, theoretically the non-handling pilot monitors the handling pilot, but both have many tasks of their own to perform, and it's no wonder that the monitoring occasionally breaks down. How do you equate a lifetimes' salary for an extra, non-hassled, pair of eyes against the loss of a hull and 300 + lives.

The Bean Counters have won again - and this won't be the last. The A-380 will likely carry 800 unsuspecting pax. with some airlines !

Great progress.

Best of luck.

[CargoOne]

EU OPS Subpart Q

1.2. Limit on total block times
An operator shall ensure that the total block times of the flights on which an individual crew member is assigned as an
operating crew member does not exceed
(a) 900 block hours in a calendar year;
(b) 100 block hours in any 28 consecutive days.

So Emirates are not worse than Europe.

This guy reported for duty after 3 hours sleep and was next to kill 280 people by screwing up performance calc and damaged expensive equipment and now not wishing to take responsibility. 6-digit salary is not just for flying skills but for taking ultimate responsibility.

[rubik101]

I'm not too familiar with the weights and speeds of the A340, however, if an error of similar proprtions, say 275 against 375 tonnes, was made to the aircraft I am familiar with, the 737-800, 55 against 75 tonnes, I am sure the 24kt difference from the normal V1/Vr would have been glaringly apparent. I might not be folwing SOPs strictly here but one of the first things I do when I sit down is to compute in my head an approximate Vr for the estimated weight and set that in the MCP panel. (It is almost always in the 135-155 range) If the speed later computed by the FO is more than a couple of knots different from that which I have in my window, I will get both pilots to re-check the calculations.

I'm afraid the Captain cocked up good and proper. If he was unduly fatigued, then stay in the hotel, call in sick and accept that you will be having tea and biscuits back at HQ. In future, Captains will be able to quote the experience of this unfortunate Captain when they have a similar sleep pattern.

[Massey1Bravo]

Thing is, there is no technical reason that the aircraft weight cannot be determined automatically and cheaply. It really, *really*, is as easy as taking the bits out of three £10 set of domestic scales and glueing them on to the undercarriage legs.

Actually quite a few aircraft already have them installed as an optional extra but for economic reasons they were not very popular. It's not as simple as a £10 set of domestic scales and there were big reliability problems with the system of strain sensors. They can also be wildly inaccurate in different ambient conditions.

Assuming one doesn't fly out of places where baggage handlers would get bribed to overload aircraft, the system is not needed as it's just another cost.
Much like how CX and AA decided switched off their logo lights at night to save money, even if there are safety implications.

[TiiberiusKirk]

100 ton take off weight input error?
Now there's a safety device they could easily design into the system. The computers know how much thrust the engines are set for, the time the thrust's been on, and the speed achieved. Acceleration=Force/Mass, a simple task for the computer to compare expected speed against actual and alert the pilots to the discrepancy.
For gross weight errors this could probably be detected during taxi thrust, certainly in the first few seconds of the take-off roll.

[Dani]

a so called acceleration alert. That's what most modern business jets already have installed, so I was told.

But cockpit technology in airliners always lags behind a little, mostly because of their long life span and the commercial pressure.

Dani

[FullWings]

I think this highlights the need for a gross error check before you blast off. There aren't that many things that will quckly kill you on an attempted departure (dramatic failures excepted).

Correct flap setting? Ballpark thrust? Right runway/intersection? Everything else is icing on the cake.

I can fully sympathise with the lack of proper rest - I don't know anyone in LH who doesn't suffer from that every now-and-then; it's also very rare to go 'crew fatigue' as you think you're letting the side down (or in some airlines, setting yourself up for a disciplinary). Most of us say something like: 'Had a sh!t night, let's take this slowly and watch me carefully.'

I wouldn't condemn the Captain out-of-hand, especially as he may not have said all that was reported in the article, or even in the manner it was written. Does seem to be slightly lacking in the 'mea culpa' department, though.

[Basil]

An employer disabled the weight and balance system on their 747F Classics because it was too unreliable and expensive to maintain. The system on the 744F continued in operation so these systems have been available for some time.
However, just having a readout of weight does not preclude the possibility of a transcription or calculation error unless the weight and balance output is applied directly to the FMS and engine control.
I have never seen a system such as TiiberiusKirk proposes. I'd have thought it would be very cheap to produce and may be of real value. CAA may, of course, want their cut for certicication. Back in the day, I believe the V Force used a line on the runway as an acceleration check - oops a black car has just pulled up and six big guys in black suits are getting out ;)

p.s. posted before reading Dani's comment.
Oh, yes, wasn't the original article a load of pants.

[VR-HFX]

Dan

You are absolutely correct. Fatigue is the real enemy and one that most airlines still treat rather glibly. One size does not fit all and every individual is different in how they handle fatigue.

No amount of technology is zombie-proof.

Simplicity is the best protection. I have average Vr numbers for average TOW's/sector times written on a laminated card in my wallet. It is the first thing I look at when I strap in. If the deus ex-machinus gives me a number that is 5kts away from this it is time to re-check everything.

Computers are fine but commonsense is the only thing that provides adequate insurance.

[Jumbo Driver]

I have always thought that "go crew fatigue" is rather a dumbed-down phrase, more often (but not exclusively!) used by the less well informed than by professional Flight Crew. In my opinion, it certainly contributes nothing towards properly describing the real situation.

It is a fundamental legal responsibility to ensure that you are properly rested before flight and the Operator's FTL Scheme should always be a good guide. However, as a professional, the final decision is yours. On the few occasions where you have to exercise this discretion, it will surely be because of "insufficient or inadequate rest".

Neither are you "letting the side down" - such decisions are simply one aspect of the overall decision-making processes required by the privileges and responsibilities of a professional licence holder.


JD
:)

[Dozza2k]

Feel sorry the lads only get 24 hrs in MEL after a 14.5 hr hop. So, 29ish hours flying with 24hrs off in the middle!

I guess if the miminums weren't good enough, they wouldn't be the minimums.

Chatting to an ek f/o in zrh crew security and he was saying emirates are king of the 24hr night stop!
(even after the super hop to JFK!?)

[C-N]

I wonder what happened to the FO of this flight.
I guess he was not forced to return to his country because he was a local of emirates.

I think there are lots of factors that contributed to this and one of this is Flight Ops- Dispatcher/Crew Scheduler. But the PIC has still the right to remain in his hotel as mentioned by one pruner above. It's not just the PIC's right, its also the right of the paying passengers to be safe.

But i don't know how the system works, the loadsheet/CFP and other Flight documents are given to the PIC and he signs this document and adjusting his instruments accordingly, trims and other stuff. Does this mean the docs are only signed without being cross checked with their instruments properly? how does the system work? can someone elaborate the process of handing over the loadsheet, then cross checking the calculation, then setting the instruments then the last one, his (PIC) signature.

[bud leon]

I'm really concerned about some of the comments here. Is the aviation industry really so far behind in safety mgt? I always thought it was the leader. Maybe I was wrong.

This is clearly a fatigue issue, and it seems that the responsibity lies in the culture of the company. Companies should not absolve themselves of responsibility by sacking people who have made human error. The root cause of this is a working environment which results in a pilot feeling the need to work when fatigued. I will never fly emirates if this is the company culture.

The bravado comments sheeting blame home to the pilot are ignorant in the extreme. I hope you don't fly the planes I travel in.

[galdian]

bud

sorry but why is this a fatigue issue??

the captain says he only had 3.5 hrs sleep in last 24 (Margaret Thatcher as Brirish PM allegedly had around 4.0 per night, some people function like that), he said he had almost 100 hours in last month, he said the ML-Dubai flight was a long and tiring flight etc etc....

but where did he EVER, EVER say the flight patterns and hours per month and associated time changes/varied sleep patterns as LEGALLY rostered by his employer created a fatigue issue for ALL the pilots in his company??

He NEVER does, nor does he EVER state an acceptance that he screwed up as PIC - "it's all just a mystery how this happened."

Sorry but NO - it's bloody well not! :ugh:

And for any other PIC's who are happy to take the dough but don't understand what responsibility is all about - do aviation a favour and f**k off and become a public servant.

Rant Over! :ok:

[Captain Calamity]

I have never seen a system such as TiiberiusKirk proposes. I'd have thought it would be very cheap to produce and may be of real value. CAA may, of course, want their cut for certicication.

It exists. Essentially it alerts the pilot if current acceleration/speed/distance remaining are not matching performance expectations. The work was carried out recently by a defense company as proof of concept, i'm not sure if it got taken any further. A similar project to warn pilots early if the stopping distance exceeded the runway available was scrapped as it couldn't be made to work reliably.

I'm not sure the system also warns if the AC was drastically out of trim, which would surely be the other problem with an inccorrect entry on the W&B sheet?

I know that the difference between correctly trimmed and unflyable is relatively small in my SEP, especially on a hot day. Out of interest, just how much would a weight entry error of the sort seen a Melbourne affect controllability in a big jet - i.e. how great are the margins between out of trim but controllable and unflyable?

CC

[bud leon]

galdian - because there is a significant body of research that demonstrates that sleep deprivation can threaten competent decision making. And Margaret Thatcher didn't fly passenger aircraft (although she probably thought she could).

Any management framework that allows pilots to fly in a sleep deprived state and then sacks them for human error is unacceptable. Your other comments don't reflect what I said and are not relevant.

[Brian Abraham]

you will never, ever see a real-time weight read-out for a commercial flight
Wrong, dead wrong, and rubbish, assuming you class freighters as commercial flights. Systems have been around for years, certified and reliable ones at that, as attested to by posters on various threads who have experience. Just do not pass muster with bean counters.

[B888]

"There should be no doubt: there is still no substitute for a properly trained, professional flight crew. They are the goalkeepers of aviation safety. BUT on the other hand, no matter how hard they try, no matter how professional they might be, no matter their care and concern, humans can never outperform the system which bounds and constrains them. If in contest, system flaws will sooner or later inevitably defeat individual human performance".
This quote came from the book BEYOND AVIATION HUMAN FACTORS ( by Dan Maurino, James Reason and others). It mainly describes the excellent investigation of the "Dryden accident " in Canada on March 10 1989.
In other words, it's like a Football(or soccer) match. The aviation authority are the forwards, The Company are the defenders and we, the flight crew, are the goalkeepers. If the authority or the company don't do their job of putting the proper safety systems in place, then the Threats and Errors will come directly at us and inevitably a "goal" will be scored on us.

[Paradise Lost]

It was nearly catastrophic with an 80cm high a/f lighting fixture..... and all 4 engines pushing!
Despite the assertion that "commercial flights" can't or won't use strain guages to ascertain take-off mass, I believe that such a system should be mandated at the ealiest possible opportunity. All modern aircraft have the ability to determine temperature, altitude (but not weight),and an EGPWS database from which the FMS could calculate the required climb gradient.
This would not obviate the crew from having to calculate the take-off data themselves, but it would certainly prevent the kind of gross error that occurred at Melbourne/Jo'burg etc.

[Road_Hog]

The pilot comments that he has regularly flown from Melbourne, presumably with the same type of aircfraft. Would he not of noticed that the power settings were somewhat on the low side?

[Superpilot]

I think the design could do with a rethink. If the plane has the capability to weigh itself accurately (this I'm not sure about), alarm bells should start ringing if "Thrust set" does not equal a "reasonable" power setting for that weight anyway. Obviously many factors come into such as DA and OAT but we have the perf information to hand! A lot of advanced logic which goes beyond what I'm proposing is already implemented inside Airbus aircraft. The variables are already in digital format ready to use. All that would be required at the software level is a tried and testing lookup table. Power setting / Agreed GW error > 10% = ECAM Warning. Fool proof.

[FullWings]

I've picked up a second transmission from EARTH, seems to be a bit easier to read than the first one:
Why [does] everybody here think that they are god's gift to aviation and sort of an alien pilot from outer space who is error and mistake free?

All you can do in this job is learn from others' mistakes and hope you will be here long enough to learn all the mistakes, which will never happen, we all are limited in our abilities and this shows in everything we do whether it's driving a car or any other machinery: so as long as you are limited like the rest, you have no right to criticize.

Just sit back, relax and learn so you will not be the next story. This profession as you all know is not like any other, so keep it simple, learn as you go along and try your best to keep it safe, and trust me your best will not be enough sometimes, the other option is to quit and do your affordable errors somewhere else.

Safe flying to everybody the god gifted, experienced, new and specially to the alien pilots.
Learning from mistakes? Yes, of course... But this one seems to crop up a fair bit and its consequences can be very severe indeed.

It's one of the few killers that doesn't (in most airline operations) have some sort of backup warning system, as others have posted. Going to fly into an unexpected mountain? GPS & EGPWS. No flaps? Config. warning. Big storm off the end of the runway? PWS, etc. I'm sure it COULD be done, after all, all it has to do is warn of impending doom: "You're not gonna make it!". Unfortunately it probably died a death somewhere deep into cost/benefit analysis... :sad:

[Doors to Automatic]

Super pilot

I don't even think the plane would have to weigh itself. It could assume say an 80% load factor at x kg per pax, it knows the empty weight and it can work out the fuel weight so there could easy be a query raised if the entered weight is out by 100 tonnes.

The largest factor in varying the aircraft's weight is the fuel as most large aircraft usually fly reasonably full.

[Simonta]

PPL(H) and frequent SLF alert....

I don't know anywhere near enough about the systems on modern tin but, would it be possible to calculate, to an acceptable limit of error, how fast the aircraft should be going at pre-set distances down the rwy? It should be with known characteristics of the tin, known thrust, known weight and known ambients?

What I'm thinking is, the FMC calculate 22kts at 100m, 57 kts at 200m etc etc. If you could check actual airspeed at preset points and those preset points were precisely known, then if you arrived at 500m doing 87kts when the FMC says you should be doing 97kts, then you know something is amiss and make the call with plenty of time to call stop or take some other action.

I'm also assuming that in general, the only speed checks are rudder alive, 80kts, v1 and vr?

If that's so, then there are all kinds of possible solutions, one of which would be cheap and easy..

How about marker boards at the side of the rwy, every 100m to 500m then every 500m (or whatever)? The FMC gives several checks, aa kts at xx mtrs, bb kts at yy mtrs and cc kts at zz mtrs. You simply call out the ASI at those points and.....

Or to get technical (and more costly) those boards could be electronic displays programmed by the a'craft at the threshold via a transponder (perhaps the existing transponder could be enhanced to do this?) - at board 1, I should be doing xx kts etc.

Or, you could remove any outside dependency and use the ILS localizer back course to measure progress, in terms of distance down the r'wy...

Or, a simple metre (or yard) counter on the nose wheel.

And a bunch of other increasing complexity, risk and cost solutions but the marker boards should be cheap and cheerful.

Am I missing something? Do I need to get my coat?

Cheers

[HarryMann]

Am I missing something? Do I need to get my coat?Too messy..

A stopwatch started at brakes-off and speed check or two should do it - as long as you exclude the use of calculated weight for those figures, so they should be ballpark minima based on runway length KISS

There's probably a dozen ways to catch this, as a final backstop, including better SOPs when Flex is set.
In this case I'd say the laptop calculation check routines were crap, and not progarmmed by an aviation engineer who'd have all the 'what ifs' well lined up before coding a single line!

[Flaperon777]

Rubik & VR-HFX,
I have flown a large number of modern state of the art wide bodies and ALSO some jurrasic narrowbodies.We must remember here that these modern jets are designed to calculate the MINIMUM thrust setting required for the actual aircraft weight,field conditions(length,condition etc),enviornmental conditions etc etc.This MINIMUM thrust setting gives u V speeds for that PARTICULAR field,assuming that THAT field is now a balance field.These are near optimum speeds.Therefore,with correct data entered u will have a V1 speed with just enough runway left to stop should u decide to stop.Same again for all weights.So a miscalculation of say 100T would NOT dramatically affect the V speeds rather would affect the thrust setting to a MUCH greater degree.Cause u simply wouldnt rachieve the calculated V1 by the determined point as per the computers.Only option would be apply max available thrust or TOGA.Now here's what i wonder.I wonder if application or TOGA would give him the absolute maximum thrust or the maximum derated thrust.And then how does one get absolute max thrust in a case like this.
Well,just to make my point,therefore this concept of 'ballpark' V1 speeds just wont work in a modern airplane like say the A345 or for that matter a 777 too.The speeds for say 350T would be very close to those for 250T for the same runway and conditions.The thrust setting however would change dramatically.Which is exactly what happened in MEL.
Like I say,
My 2 cents worth

[Smilin_Ed]

I have a friend who kissed the tail on a widebody Boeing a few years ago with the 100K error. He was on a long runway and knew something was amiss at the attempted rotation. He lowered the nose slightly and tried again and it flew off with a flat spot on the tailskid.

At least, there is someone out there who actually flies the airplane instead of just jerking on the yoke at some pre-determined airspeed. It probably would have saved SPANAIR at Madrid.

[Smilin_Ed]

I don't know anywhere near enough about the systems on modern tin but, would it be possible to calculate, to an acceptable limit of error, how fast the aircraft should be going at pre-set distances down the rwy?

As a military pilot I did this repeatedly over a 20 year career. One problem is that many civilian fields don't have the distance markers that are on all (U.S) military fields. Nevertheless, I considered it mandatory for all high-temperature/high-altitude/heavy-weight (or all of the above) takeoffs. If you don't have a certain speed by some predetermined distance to go, you stop and find out what's wrong.

[45989]

Just musing here. Were the crew ccq'd?
330/340 might explain a lot

[subsonicsubic]

I had a check ride that really needed to be done (GA). I paid for the examiner to attend twice. The first time,I had missed a connecting flight and was shattered when I arrived at the field. I called it off despite the expense. On the second occasion I called it of because I had collected food poisoning in the Philippines. On both occasions, despite the cost ( and in Asia the loss of face), I was in no position to perform as I should have and had no option but to cancel. I have massive sympathy for skilled aviators (especially so called Captains) who feel the urge to bow to corporate pressure and fly ac when unfit to do so.

My heart goes out to the crew involved. No one makes deliberate mistakes in the cockpit. We all fly to the best of our abilities.

[barit1]

If you don't have a certain speed by some predetermined distance to go, you stop and find out what's wrong.

An old colleague once flew B-47's and B-52's - That was their SOP.

Now, with INS/IRS onboard, the raw data (from accelerometers) is already there. Unfortunately, it's not displayed to pilots - only to accident investigators. :}

[Joetom]

Many many examples of aircraft in poor config, power/flaps/trim etc etc, learning should be the nbr 1, but blame often wins, that blame is more horrible than anyone i know.
.
Humans make mistakes, the crew did a super job from prob point, well done to them, cheers.....

[Airbubba]

At least, there is someone out there who actually flies the airplane instead of just jerking on the yoke at some pre-determined airspeed. It probably would have saved SPANAIR at Madrid.

I sure agree with you on this one. Some of the sim folks seem to teach a 2g pull at liftoff to reach target climb speed because it works in the sim. I always rotate a little slow, try gently adjust for the wind and am in no great hurry to yank the plane into the air unless the runway is short.

[Smilin_Ed]

An old colleague once flew B-47's and B-52's - That was their SOP.


I have a tiny bit of time in the B-47. It was SOP for every takeoff, regardless of conditions.

[Basil]

If you don't have a certain speed by some predetermined distance to go, you stop and find out what's wrong.
An old colleague once flew B-47's and B-52's - That was their SOP.

Yes, as I said, same check as V Force (p.s. the guys in black suits were coming for someone else so it's OK.)

This incident reminds me of an occasion when we set the correct thrust but my Vr bug was 10kn less then that of the FO. His was correct. I was PH. Company SOP was if no 'Rotate' call then rotate as bugged. I did a VERY SLOW rotate halfway through which FO (very competent and experienced) calls "Rotate"

Nothing like as serious as setting wrong thrust but we both learnt about cross checking and FO learnt 'don't trust captains no matter how experienced they are'.

[mickjoebill]

What is the a typical $$$ saving gained per takeoff by using reduced thrust?


Mickjoebill

[Andyismyname]

Pardon me for butting in, as a lowly Cabin Crew member,.........but, if the Captain had only had 3 1/2 hours sleep, which admittedly can happen on occasions on long-haul, surely you should either 'go sick', complaining of 'fatigue'......... or raise the point with your colleagues, and make sure you all triple check everything. Or is that being too idealistic?

[Aerozepplin]

The whole thing makes me angry, and I can see why it often takes an accident (LAX 727 for TCAS etc) to force changes to the industry. As mentioned before the fact that the crew we instantly dismissed is mind boggling. They screwed up, but they also just managed to save the aircraft and passengers. More important than pointing fingers would be to have a discussion like there is above about how to avoid this happening. Its already been suggested that they crew should be used for their experience to construct a system to avoid this sort of thing, and that sort of pro-active response would seem logical to me.
When the airline has a PIC with 3.5 hours sleep to their name there are more at fault than the crew (despite this being common from what I hear).
I know that if I had a problem in my infinity smaller/slower/easier Piper Arrow and I'd only slept a couple hours it'd quite possibly end poorly.

[411A]

When the airline has a PIC with 3.5 hours sleep to their name there are more at fault than the crew

Nonsense.
The Captain had plenty of time, provided by the company, to rest/sleep.
IF he did not use the time effectively, he pays the price...and he did.

[rubik101]

Flaperon 777. Sir, you are talking nonsense. you argue that the speeds would not vary so much to be very noticeable, hidden by the different power settings for take off power.
On a dry runway, in still air at ISA, the difference in V1 for the 737-800 with Flaps five, using the same proprtional difference as the event on the A340, is 121 kts as against 143kts. I wouldn't spot the difference? Then I shouldn't be there.
Reduced or derated power is a red herring of no relevance in this argument.

[bpp]

runway distance markers, built in weight and balance systems....how about using your approved company procedures! I believe the report stated they missed the weight problem numerous times. Why do we always make excuses for people not doing their jobs? As far as sleeping only 3 1/2 hours, I aggree with 411A on this one.
bpp:ugh:

[BYALPHAINDIA]

But the 'Eggsperts' would say that 'Technically' the pilot would have not been asleep for the 3.5 hours or whatever it was?

Read in the past that there is a timespan before you actually are in sleep mode.

So the pilot would have maybe had less than 3 hours sleep?

Add to that a previous busy sector, A possible rush on the slot time etc, And a 'Rather' long A/c to handle on T/o.

The only person/s who know EXACTLY what went wrong were the crew on the day.

Any other speculation is inevident & meaningless.

And reading some of the previous posts, It is just pure drivel!!

The pilot obviously knew he was tired, So technically should have informed EK asap.

Maybe he did inform EK, But they pushed him around in his wheel 'Again' for another long day's work?

It sounds like EK washed their hands of the pilots as soon as they discovered it was pilot error/fatigue?

Getting rid of them before the media call round.....

But simply getting rid of the pilots who used their training and saved the lives of 280 and a bill pound A345 does not solve the problem.

Maybe if EK concentrated their time & money on their Flight crews instead of their 'OTT Cabin crews' who you see on their OTT adverts are NOTHING more special than any other Airline (They will disagree) then incidents like this may be preventable.

It's common knowledge that when you are in the middle east expect to come 2nd place to a lady!!

So guys if you ever have to repeat this incident - Don't expect ANY form of thank you for it!!

Arabs - They never change their stripes!! Lol.

[Schnowzer]

My heart goes out to the crew involved. No one makes deliberate mistakes in the cockpit. We all fly to the best of our abilities.

Nope, no one makes deliberate mistakes but sometimes action or inaction by the crew leads to them. Sometimes it is a reasonable mistake, sometimes not.

When the airline has a PIC with 3.5 hours sleep to their name there are more at fault than the crew (despite this being common from what I hear).

During the 36 hour lay-over? It helps if you go to bed.

The interim report said:

98.9 hrs in last 30 days, 229 in the last 90

Yep a hard month but 70/month over the last 3 including 4 Melbourne flights. That pairing leaves at 10am local is 28 hrs total flight time with 14 in a bunk pretty much on Dubai body clock time, and a 36hr layover; most guys bid for it because it is so benign. The onward flight to NZ done by the augment crew is much more tiring.

Thrust levers moved to the TOGA detent, aircraft passes end of runway 16.

The old timers and mil pilots talk about distance to go markers. The crew passed the 900m/600m/300m to go lights firmly attached to the ground but still did not select TOGA until off the end of the runway.

All facts above from the independent sources. Why not wait for the ATSB report and then judge whether it was a reasonable string of errors for the crew to make, whether they spotted any of the clues to their predicament and what other factors are involved. Maybe it wasn't the big bad airline that was at fault, maybe they contributed but blind defence of the crew is equally silly particularly based on a tabloid newspaper article.

The same thread has been going on in the ME forum forever.

[bud leon]

"Why not wait for the ATSB report and then judge whether it was a reasonable string of errors for the crew to make, whether they spotted any of the clues to their predicament and what other factors are involved. Maybe it wasn't the big bad airline that was at fault, maybe they contributed but blind defence of the crew is equally silly particularly based on a tabloid newspaper article."

But that is just the point. The company sacked the pilots before a full investigation, and any acknowledgement that there might be underlying root causes. Contemporary safety management recognises the interelatedness of the human-machine-environment interface, the importance of culture and unavoidability of human error. There may be inmportant lessons to learn regarding the nature of this work involving multiple time-zones, inability to sleep and fatigue. So the wrong decisions regarding fitness to fly may have already stemmed from fatigue.

Clearly, the company has already made up its mind. That says to me a company with a bad safety culture. I'm very impressed with the commentary from older pilots on this forum regarding flying ability and personal responsibility, but refusal to accept the complex implications of fatigue states is antiquated, as is the notion that an organisation is never implicitly responsible for its employee's errors.

[Aerozepplin]

Agree about the sleep (despite the tone of my earlier post).
I don't know much about the long haul airline industry, and I'm sure the company provides the required rest period. Mainly what I feel is that dismissing the pilots outright won't help improve the situation.

For those in the big-plane industry is dismissal the usual route for an incident like this?

[Schnowzer]

Bud,

Wouldn't disagree. Emirates safety culture has been dented but whilst accepting the principle in any other industry if you cost your employer money through reckless action you would be locked up. Look at the financial industry.

I do not know if they were reckless but by 'resigning' they retained benefits and have a chance of getting their lives back. If they were found culpably negligent and then fired, the chances of getting a job in the future would I suspect be reduced. If a decision was taken that they were legally responsible for the damage under UAE law, I shudder to think what might result.

Maybe there are other angles to the story.

[White Knight]

Byalphaindia - there was NO previous sector, just a 36 hour layover and I have yet to experience a slot time in Oz......

[Airbubba]

Apparently these guys were sacked not because they made a mistake but because they did not do the required crosschecks. The CVR was enough for the airline to immediately give them walking papers.

Also, the EK pilots are nonunion, living in a somewhat benevolent dictatorship where the govenment and the airline are both headed by Sheikh Mak. If things go south, you don't have a lot of job protection.

[Colocolo]

Schnowzer:


The onward flight to NZ done by the augment crew is much more tiring.


Is it a crew that is waiting in Melbourne, or are they coming from Dubai?

Just to clarify.

Thanks in advance

Colocolo

[TheChitterneFlyer]

It's only too easy for some of you guys to sit in your comfy armchairs at home and pick the bones out of this.

Layovers of 18 to 30 hours should be looked at very closely. How can anyone sleep twice within that period? Having arrived in Melbourne after a long duty period; gone to bed because you're tired, and then try and get another sleep period in the bank before you go and fly again... it's impossible. Do this several times and the effects are cumulative... fatigue has set-in and you will make mistakes.

This isn't a first and it won't be the last!

Until such time as you too have experienced a batch of 24 hour layovers and the fatigue that goes with it... don't preach at this guy for making what was a simple mistake.

As for those who advocate 'going sick' and staying at the hotel... EK management will hand you your coat when you return to base. The airline is equally to blame!

TCF

[VR-HFX]

Flaperon777

What has de-rate got to do with the basics?

On the 744 a 100T difference in T/O wt can give you V1,VR and V2 numbers that are approx 25-30kts different. Using a ZFW of 230t, fuel 120t you should get roughly 150/160/170. Take off 100t and you will get 125/130/145 ish.

That to me is not insignificant.

[Dan Winterland]

The pilot stated it was a 24 hour layover, the most common in long haul and the worst for getting rest. CAD371 reduces duty times for rest periods of 18 to 30 hours as it is recognised that the quality of rest is reduced, or quality rest hard to take.

Don't understand that? The take this example of a pattern I was very familiar with.

Departure from LHR at about 7pm UK time. Land at JFK about 10pm NY time, but 2am body clock time. By the time you get to the hotel, it's now 4am body time. Go to bed. Wake up at 3am NY time which is 8am body time because it's when you usually get up and the wake up time your circadian rhythem is programmed for. So you've just had four hours sleep.

You mooch around for most of the morning, then at about 1pm NY time you go back to bed and try to sleep. Except you can't because it's 6pm body time and you're circadian rythem says it's not time to sleep yet.

It's now 5pm NY time and the wake up call goes off which is a bit of a b#gger because you finally dropped off to sleep about 20 minutes ago. You get up, go to the airport for the 8pm NY departure time, for which you aren't feeling at your best for because it's now 1am UK and body time and you have had 4 hours and twenty minutes of low quality sleep in the last 36. You now fly for 7 hours back to LHR landing at 8am feeling like death.

Now imagine you do this 5 or 6 times a month, for 900 flying hours a year, but not always to New York. Perhaps to other time zones in the opposite direction. Now some of you (who obviously haven't flown long haul as a pilot) may begin to understand how this pilot felt at the start of his duty.

Sure, it's easy to say he should have got some rest in his 24 hours off, but that's very hard when your body is saying it's not time to sleep. And he could have called in and told crewing that he wasn't rested enough to fly. But many long haul pilots get to this level of fatigue and if this was done then the majority of long haul flights would be cancelled.


There were three pilots on this crew. All managed to let this error slip through the stated four levels of protection. There is no disputing that they :mad: up. But rather than just blame the pilots solely, lets look at the other factors which led to this accident. Because unless these problems are addressed, it will happen again. Maybe nextime with fatal consequences.

(An almost duplicate post of Chitterne's - he posted his while I was writing mine!)

[TopBunk]

Well said Dan.

Folks, those of you who don't operate as crew in the longhaul area and those of you who fly substantially less than a full 900 hour roster really shouldn't comment on the management of rest patterns on the dreaded 24-hour slips.

It frequently just isn't possible to sleep on demand for a few hours before pickup.

The example Dan gives which is quite typical, ie Europe to US Eastern Seaboard with a red eye flight home after 24 hours. In that rotation, the flight home is exactly when your body is screaming at you to go to bed and sleep.

And as for those comments/suggestions to go 'crew fatigue' - it's the job, you have to find a way to cope, often by catching a half hour of controlled rest at a quiet time in the cruise in the seat, and yes, tell your oppo that you feel like death warmed up and take things slowly.

If things go wrong then the adrenalin rush will kick in and your alertness will increase immediately.

In the MEL case, it seems to me that a lack of rigour in the checking process possibly due to defficient SOP's and a possible lack of mental modelling for the take off let them down.

Bad show on the airline management though, nonetheless.

[Edited to add: 2008 = 870 flying hours, 520 time zone changes, 57 nights out of bed = lost sleep]

[Flying Fred]

Dan Winterland,

A frighteningly accurate post.

As I read it, I found myself chuckling, particularly at the "wake-up call going off 20 min after you have fallen asleep" bit. Last time in New York, your timeline is almost exactly what happened to me. I am about to go eastbound now with an 8hr time change, though thankfully with a longer slip which helps with the sleep.

The cumulative effects of duties like this should not be underestimated when it comes to functioning well on the flight deck. However, the more enlightened airlines recognise this to some extent and put in place SOPs to prevent the kind of error that appears to have been made here. If those SOPs are not adhered to, then the crew are on thin ice when it comes to any subsequent incident.

FF

[Flying Fred]

Top Bunk

Agree with everything you said.

What's up with this forum? That's two accurate and informative posts in a row that appear to have been made by people who have actually done the job.

People will start talking! :D

[Wiley]

Dan W, great post, and very accurate. What's the old saying about long haul pilots? "The best two hours sleep you'll ever get on an oversight usually starts 20 minutes before your wakeup call."

In the case of Emirates pilots doing DXB-JFKs (or DXB-MELs), with Dubai being UTC+4, you can add another four hours to the "out of circadian synch" they suffer than a pilot operating LHR-JFK - and that's not taking into account the absolutely bloody awful unique-to-EK "aft torpedo tube" crew rest with no sit up capability that the EK777s have. (The 354's crew rest is somewhat better, but not a lot.)

-------

Airbubba you are correct in what you say, ("Apparently these guys were sacked not because they made a mistake but because they did not do the required crosschecks.) However, as I understand it, you are incorrect in saying The CVR was enough for the airline to immediately give them walking papers.As I understand it - and I heard this straight from the horse's mouth, (i.e., Mr Ed himself), so it must be 100% true - :):):):) after the sorry experience of the police and the lawyers getting involved and laying criminal crarges against a Kiwi Dash 8 crew some years ago, the Oz investigators have not made the CVR available to anyone, including EK management.

However, at the time of this accident (and perhaps even moreso after it), I think it would be pretty safe to assume that with four EK pilots (just about any four EK pilots!!) gathered in one small cockpit, something politically incorrect regarding EK senior management would likely to be said by at least one of them.

I too (along with about 30 other captains at that particular meeting) heard directly from Mr Ed a very different version of events about the way the operating crew volunteered their resignations than what the captain has told the Sunday Herald. As stated above in my first paragraph, of course I am certain - 100% - that the reporter must have got it wrong, because, like every other EK pilot, I know Mr Ed would never lie to me.

[yoyonow]

Dan/Topbunk,

Excellent posts and the main points very well made. However, to keep the thread accurate. This was a 4 man crew, the operating crew having just had 38 hours in MEL.

I do not know the crews previous rosters but having done 90+ hours in 28 days then the Captain was probably fairly fatigued. Like it or not, given the present climate and rules, this is part of ULR flying. As a professional one is in a position (obliged) to mitigate this fatigue risk. How that is done is up to the individual. As a starter for 10 though I would suggest that recognising that you are not always at your peak and therefore a more pedantic approach to SOPs may not be a bad idea.

[FullWings]

Sure, it's easy to say he should have got some rest in his 24 hours off, but that's very hard when your body is saying it's not time to sleep. And he could have called in and told crewing that he wasn't rested enough to fly. But many long haul pilots get to this level of fatigue and if this was done then the majority of long haul flights would be cancelled.

So true, especially the last bit. Until you've done 800-900hrs a year of LH flying, it is difficult to believe that this might be the case.

I think you get used to running at 80% and make allowances in the way you operate. I get asked a lot, as I'm a LH pilot, 'What's the secret of overcoming tiredness and jet lag?' and I say, 'There isn't one: you just know how you'll be feeling in advance and make allowances for it.' A bit like a hangover isn't a great surprise after you've been drunk more than a few times. Of course this includes all the things like exercise, good diet and (attempted) rest but as diurnal mammals we are just not built to function well during our personal 'night'.

I remember when I flew SH, reading the company incidents digest and being amazed at some of the things that went on in LH. Now, having got the t-shirt, I'm amazed that there are so few...

And as for those comments/suggestions to go 'crew fatigue' - it's the job, you have to find a way to cope, often by catching a half hour of controlled rest at a quiet time in the cruise in the seat, and yes, tell your oppo that you feel like death warmed up and take things slowly.

If things go wrong then the adrenalin rush will kick in and your alertness will increase immediately.

In the MEL case, it seems to me that a lack of rigour in the checking process possibly due to defficient SOP's and a possible lack of mental modelling for the take off let them down.
My thoughts as well.

The cumulative effects of duties like this should not be underestimated when it comes to functioning well on the flight deck. However, the more enlightened airlines recognise this to some extent and put in place SOPs to prevent the kind of error that appears to have been made here. If those SOPs are not adhered to, then the crew are on thin ice when it comes to any subsequent incident.
I agree with that too. Although, it has to be said, some SOPs are easier to follow than others. However, if you start missing lots of checks at the beginning of a flight, someone else should really point this out...

[Lamyna Flo]

Dan W and Chitterne - great posts. I have several mates currently flying the route concerned and all echo what you have posted. Anyone suggesting going crew fatigue is either not in possession of the full facts or is being overly simplistic about the problem, IMO.

[White Knight]

Chitterne - it was a 38 hour layover! And as ULR goes I think one of the more 'restful' patterns that we do at EK..
And it was not a 'mistake' but a major violation of SOP:ugh:

[Jimmy Do Little]

I don't know abut the A340 but the A320 series has gross weight calculated by the FACs. I generally see a 2 to 4000 pound difference in the "paper" weights the load controllers calculate for flight.

True, but the FACs only make that calculation after take-off, once the aircraft has acquired a state of equilibrium.


The Captain evidently called for rotation at the predetermined (wrong) weight. They should have gone from Flex to Toga at that point, if the jet won't fly off at the normal rotation rate.


True again. This captain stated somewhere that he had flown this aircraft from this airport, many times. I don't expect everyone here to agree with me on this, but with that level of experience, the fact that the take-off was not going according to plan, should have been evident a some point sooner than it actually did become apparent.

I've had an experience in the Airbus where the FAC weight was later found to be considerably greater than the load sheet (Specific Airport where an error in loading process was ultimately discovered)

But, during the take-off, we (Both crew) noticed what appeared as "Lesser" performance than expected at an early stage of the take-off (100 knot call-out) and reacted at that time. Take-off, flight and landing were uneventful. Similarly, this was an airport that we both operated from regularly, and the load sheet weight was "Typical" for that station, although the actual weight was much greater.

I only reflect on this because I'm a bit surprised that a crew with this experience level didn't see it coming sooner.

That said, I completely agree that this could happen to anyone. Thankfully, the only damage was to aircraft and pride.

Just my 2 cents worth....

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

TopBunk and Dan - Spot on:ok:

WhiteKnight - Why so judgemental and protective of EK:confused: I would hope we as an industry have moved on from "Pilot Error -> Case Closed" - We are in the era of the organizational responsibility now:)

[411A]

We are in the era of the organizational responsibility now
Oh, are we?:}

A daft idea, in many ways, considering that the Captain in this particular case apparently hardly used the companies 'organizational responsibility' (IE, providing suitable hotac, for actual rest) to his best advantage.

He screwed up, case closed.

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

You don't think there can be organizational factors involved in a company that hands out prepared resignations to the involved crew members before the investigation has even started?

Sure the crew screwed up - The crew will always be the ones closest to the accident - but the key point is why did they screw up? - if this crew could make this mistake, it could happen to others too I am sure.

The only really dangerous types are those who believe that it could not happen to them.

[White Knight]

Captseeareem - I don't see ANYTHING in my post that is defending EK old chum:ugh:

Sadly neither Topbunk nor Dan (who also incorrectly stated that there were 3 crew) work for EK and are most unlikely to know;
a) our SOPS (how the loadsheet confirmation procedure works on our flightdecks - which is where the 'mistake' SHOULD and WOULD have been picked up if done correctly)
b) the guys concerned (having spoken to said captain I know his thoughts on the matter)
c) the flight pairings and rest patterns.

Sure they have knowledge of longhaul ops but they are different at different airlines - capisch?

Sorry you got those torpedo tubes Wiley - got to say the 345 bunk is a delight - except for it being at the back of the aeroplane:=

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

Sorry if I misunderstood you WhiteKnight.

I just get kind of peed off over simplistic Pilot Error conclusions - as they often leave many factors leading up to the mistake uncovered.

[BYALPHAINDIA]

Capt SEA, I agree with that.

A union official should have (If they have one) at EK?

Being contacted and Intervened before they were given their dismissals?

That alone is bad practice and maybe an illegal violation of the pilot's rights, By not giving them the chance to explain the reasons of the incident before any form of dismissals are made.

And the Aviation Inspectorate in the country of the incident consulted also on the decision.

If it was myself involved, I would have ran an experienced Solicitor/Lawyer against EK for a case of unfair dismissal, Regardless of money just for THE PRINCIPLE.

The pilot's are maybe going down that avenue?

And as Capt SEA said this has probably happened before on similar flights, But unfortunately this was an unlucky day.

I blame the Airline for this by 'Spinning their crews' round in a wheel as much as they can until they are so fatigued they are 'Talking, Walking & flying as zombies!!

But EK do not seem to have made any form of discussion on the issue of crew fatigue & adequate rest.

When the Joe public read this what ideas will they get about flying with EK??

[White Knight]

byalphaindia - NO union at EK! Those of us here knew that when we joined. It's the way the middle east is:oh:

Sadly the company employee manual is quite explicit about warnings and terminations - not fair but those of us here did sign the contracts. Maybe it could be fought in court but sometimes it's better to sign the resignation letter and go with your provident fund than get sacked and lose a large lump of it. (Not that they're worth much at the moment!!). It'll probably be easier to get another job following enforced resignation rather than a direct sacking - something else to think about.
It may not be right but that's the gamble you take working in the sandpit...

[vapilot2004]

When we first started flying FMC & PMS equipped aircraft it was SOP to cross check the wunderkind box numbers against dispatch data and QRH human generated results.

A recommendation I read long ago suggested two-pass entry for safety critical human-typed data into the management computers. The paper also included the idea of two-crew entry measures with separate source data streams. Each method could have caught some but not all slip of the finger/byte errors. The final suggestion was thrown out due to the numerous minor-difference tail chasing exercises the process would have required to stay legal.

Waste of time for the statistical results was the final verdict. The possibility of bad numbers shared upstream fouling the entire system was one of the key arguments against the proposed two-stream procedures.

[TheChitterneFlyer]

I'd like to add that I was once in a similar situation... multiple layovers of between 18 and 30 hours rest periods. I approached my doctor, who appreciated my situation and gave me two weeks leave of absence. My company insisted upon a 'second oppinion' and made an appointment, on my behalf, to see the senior medical officer of the HKG (CAD). He subsequently reccommended 'six months' leave of absence! My company's response was not helpful; they insisted that I couldn't leave the country because I was on sick leave! A phonecall to the senior medical officer with my company response resulted in my company releasing me to travel wherever I wanted to go to!

The truth of the matter is that my 'company' were implicit in breaking my FTL recommendations, but that they would never admit to doing so. Three months later, having regained my medical category from a HKG approved AME, my company accepted my (early) return to duty. The whole process started again; I stated that I would resign if the situation didn't comply with the HKG (CAD) FTL rules. The situation didn't improve... it got worse... I submitted my resignation... it was accepted! So... if you want to keep your job with your company... you have to comply! So much for FTL rules!

The continuance of an 18 to 30 hour rest period policy, by my company, resulted in a realistic cumulative fatigue issue. Did anyone care? NO! I stood my ground in the belief that the regulatory authority would support me... bull****! My whole personality changed... I was becoming a different person... my company didn't support me. I sold my assets and departed the country... a very 'pissed-off' individual. So... some of you cease to acknowledge that fatigue is a serious issue? I can tell you different. If you haven't been there... you don't understand 'Jack ****'!

Your airline will want to bleed you of every flying-hour that they possibly can; even to the point of breaking the rules. That's called efficient crew rostering! I challenged the system... I failed! Therefore, why should anyone even think about being loyal to their organisation?

Given the repetitave nature of a cumulative 24 hour layover, the perception that this guy made a serious error of judgement is incomprehensible.

From a technical viewpoint, it's my understanding that the captain entered the wrong 'derate' into the FMC, which resulted in a longer 'take-off run' than the available field length? It was all too late and that it was only picked-up when the 'field remaining' was somewhat too short! Well, bugger me, why didn't the F/O question the data that was being entered (during the pre-flight prep?).

The 'airline' was resonsible for repetitative (wrong) scheduling of 'circadian low' schedules. The F/O was also responsible for not picking up on the wrong data entered by the captain. The 'relief crew' were also responsible for not being more pro-active in monitoring the departure.

It's called 'CRM'... how many of you guys would have picked-up on the error made by the skipper? How many of you would have recognised the fact that he was tired? From a management point of view... why haven't you recognised the ridiculous schedules that are being asked of your crew?

I'm now retired, but I do still recognise the failings that an airline is blinded by.

Don't shoot the guy who's trying to deliver the company product; especially when the product is wrong!

Who will listen? No-one apparently!

TCF

[C-N]

Wt Summary Section on the upper right hand part of the CFP shows TOW and again the same numbers shown in loadsheet, so there's a min of 2 flt docs showing this, and as there are 4 crew, which means a total of 8 docs or more in FD with T.O.W

I've heard ground staff in other airlines are the ones setting and entering this, not sure with FMC, but trim settings in other pax ac are setup by ground crew themselves.


vapilot2004,
The proposed two-stream procedures is indeed useless as the entering of data is irrelevant, the doublchecking of data entered is.

[Schnowzer]

Chit / Dan,

Here is why it is a decent layover and why guys like to do it:

1010 Local - Leave Dubai
1600 Dubai in bunk for 6 hours watch a movie or 2 and chill (Yep there are 500 channels of TV available)
Arrive Melbourne, go to hotel and have breakfast
0000 Dubai (7am Mel) into bed and sleep for 7hrs, wake on alarm
Get up go and do something (my choice is play or watch sport, tucker and wine)
2100 Dubai (4am Mel) Back to bed and sleep
0600 Dubai (1pm) get up golf, run, cycle.
1500 Dubai (10 pm local) get on jet and take-off.
In the Bunk at 10pm Dubai, wake up 61/2hrs later, spot of brekky, land the jet and have a full day back at the ranch.

So if you are sensible for the lay-over and stay on Dubai time it is a breeze. A lot of guys do the trip to get some rest, get to do something in the afternoon and generally have a very pleasant lay-over. When I have done the trip I have ended up with as much sleep as at home (no kids). Now if you arrived at the hotel and went straight off ballooning or surfing you are asking for trouble.

Colo, The augment crew slip for 24hrs onto the Auckland sector and will move off Dubai time. On arrival in Mel they try to stay awake as long as possible and fortunately move into a daylight flight but that pattern is by far the most demanding which is why they do not operate the return from Mel.

So White Knight has made the point about facts in his last 2 posts:

Fatigue and rostering could have been a factor but shouldn't have. The ATSB didn't think so.
He made the point about the difference between a mistake and a violation of SOPs.

Whilst Dan made some valid points about fatigue and there has been lots of good background information, some of it is out of context. Its important to look in the mirror before pulling off but not if you are in a moon rocket. I dislike all sorts of practices but most have no bearing on the incident being discussed. No discussion of fatigue in the Air France thread because technical speculation makes people more comfortable. Best will in the world this thread will just be fluff from people with no actual insight, different axes to grind etc until the final report comes out. Then we will know!

[Dan Winterland]

"He said he had been in Melbourne for 24 hours before his flight.''

"When I did that take-off in Melbourne I had slept 3 1/2 hours in 24 hours".

Armed only with only the information from the article, I had assumed it was a 24 hour layover.

[C-N]

his YMML blocks-on and blocks-off times are not mentioned anywhere

[Al E. Vator]

Good Lord, I find this all very disturbing.

Firstly what sort of a crappy airline is Emirates?

Do they think that by sacking the pilots their inadequate fatigue management will be improved? Discipline them perhaps in some sort of 21st Century way, but to sack them and thus sweep the whole thing under the carpet? So I gather as far as EK are concerned there is no longer a problem?

Profoundly stupid. What a rotten airline and rock-ape management style.

Secondly, it is distressing how certain individuals on this forum (like galdion) are so vitriolic towards fellow(?) aviators. Of course there will always be retired old fools like 411A sitting in the desert trying to get a rise out of younger peers but the depth of anonymous venom from so many computer-warriors is disappointing. I suspect few of the really vitriolic posters have ever been in charge of a long-haul airliner so essentially their posts are nothing more than uneducated drivvel. Everyone has an opinion but those posts are a waste of bandwidth on a forum such as this.

Operationally I always live by the idiom "There by the grace of god go I". I also try to double and triple-check anything that will kill me/my passengers. However I have been rostered on some stupid patterns and have even found myself falling asleep on descent, try as hard as I may not to. Pilots are homo-sapiens and we get tired, no matter how hard we try to prepare for back-of-the-clock ops or fight fatigue when airborne. No 9-5 manager ever seems to comprehend that. How much money you get paid has no relationship to your physiological ability to fight waves of tiredness.

Bottom line is that yes these pilots screwed-up and they did a good job afterwards. Whether they screwed-up because of fatigue, systematic weaknesses, complacency, laziness or stupidity needs to be thoroughly assessed (and should have been BEFORE taking action against the crew).

There needed to be a measured and methodical analysis of the accident and I haven't seen much in the way of measured and calm anything so far.

The way Emirates handled the matter and the way some ill-informed, uneducated, jealous or ignorant PPRuNe posters comment leaves me saddened about the apparent lack of intellect in our industry nowadays.

The combination of primitive airline management and Big-Brotheresque finger-pointing colleagues is not a step forward for the industy.

[411A]

FD crew who do NOT avail themselves of the hotac provided to actually rest/sleep, are just asking for trouble.
Apparently true in this case.

IE: NO fault but their own.

Harry Truman said it best...'can't stand the heat, keep out of the kitchen.'

[captplaystation]

I haven't had the time to read through this thread, so if the point has been made forgive me. Those of you jumping on the criticise the crew bandwagon should be mindful of the fact that there were 4 in the cockpit, and still the error was missed.
Something missing from their 'robust' procedures methınks.

[MarianA]

Hi,

Please allow this glider pilot, occasional SLF, with an interest in all things aviation a question. Be gentle.

Near the beginning of this thread there have been a number of suggestions on how to add an automatic cross-check for an error like this. Most quite complicated. But I have been thinking from the start that there is a very simple way. There very propably is a big error in my thinking, please point it out.

As flight crew you give the aircraft systems a set of data as data entry or via sensors. Mass, runway you are going to use, propably wind, temperature etc..

From that data you use a mix of aircraft computers, separate computers (laptops) and pilot decisions and finally arrive at a thrust setting and V-speeds to use for the takeoff. These are calculated so that you make good use of the available runway, save your engines, the company some money and still make a safe departure.

Now. Amongst all of these numbers shouldn't there be an expected acceleration somewhere? You plan to reach a certain speed covering a given distance, and that works out to some Xm/s^2 in the end. Averaged across the distance and lots of details I don't exactly understand of course. But some number will pop up.

I understand that in normal day to day operation you will expect widely varying values for that accelaration X because of wide variation in the input data making it impossible to judge by feel whether it's about right or not and will take you airborne in the available space.

So why not have the aircraft systems calculate that X, compare to what you actually get when you start your takeoff roll and warn of any large discrepancy here?

Measuring acceleration is certainly already done by inertial systems aboard and if the data is not available GPS would propably be good enough for that. The rate of change of distance covered over time. Not a critical system, a simple add-on, collateral use of available data.

Now when that warning pops up you would of course not know what the problem actually is. A 100t error in mass? Engines not producing the thrust expected? Aircraft stuck in mud? Whatever.

But you would be informed of a problem that you can't feel in your bum (because you don't know what to feel for) right at the start of your roll instead of halfway down the runway. And that is bound to be a good thing with little downside, or not?

For a mass-error like in this case it also does not matter at all at what point in the chain that produces that figure the error is actually made. And there seems to be plenty of opportunity for that from what I read.

[BOAC]

Be gentle. - well, you could read the thread before posting!

[Air Tourer]

I have some questions. What exactly are the 4 checks that should have been done to stop this incident.

Posters like Al E. Vator go on (maybe rightly so), but are short on what to do about it. What is a 21st. Century admonishment? Is the crew given a desk job? Will pax fly with them again after the facts are known.? (If ever.) What new hours are suggested, and if crews get say a week of in MEL (or whatever) what guarentee they will even then get enough sleep?
Too tired to know how tired they are? Been there done that. . . But they apparently functiond well enough after T.O. :)

The F.O. apparently made the error initially. How much sleep did he get?
Are the voice recorders going during the pre flight when the error sans xchecks were going on?
Did the 2nd crew have any roll to play, or were they perhaps a major disruption with non-op comments etc. (Or vica versa even).

Poor confused me. One top pilot on A.net tells me he has no idea of what runway length is left, (or gone), yet one on AvHerald who abandoned TO at well after Vr and stopped in time, tells that he knew exactly what runway he had left.

So what does Al E. Vator suggest with EM. Pilot boycott? Pax boycott?
Why complain about other Pilot's criticizing the crews here? It's only a chat forum not a court. Why say EM is sweeping it under the carpet, when the sacked pilots are now free to say what they like?
(To be seen to be doing something more like.)

Me? I don't know, but depending too much on computers? Almost like having a God like chief pilot on board running things. What could go wrong?

[Geepers Eprs]

good lord, are you lot still at it...unbelievable:confused:

[Lancman]

The vast majority of changes in aircraft design and operating techniques over the years have resulted in lower costs while still at least maintaining the same level of safety. The use of flexible power take-offs is the only one that I can think of that has actually reduced the level of safety, including the margin for error.

[Al E. Vator]

Air Tourer, you quite rightly ask what should be done to the pilots in this case: IMHO they should have been taken off-line, given a right bollocking, put into the simulator (if only to be seen to be retraining) and then perhaps docked a years' seniority or whatever EK use to 'reward' longer-serving crew.

Sacking them will not remedy the situation one iota. It's sweeping the dirt under the carpet. Sooner or later the dirt spills back out.

Outdated relics like 411A crankily sit in the safety of their comfy armchairs at their typewriters and rattle off stuff like No Fault but their own etc etc and that is typical of the 1930's managerial style still occasionally exhibited by airlines like EK. It's a sign of limited intellect to simply say you did it so you're fired. There are usually many factors leading up to the incident. It's a bit like sacking Gordon Brown because the UK economy is stuffed. Yes he's in charge but there were many factors outside his control that led to this situation. It might feel good to kick Gordon's ass but it won't resolve the problem.

If I am correct, some years back the EK CRM instructors were told they would no longer receive allowances for conducting the classes, so they all elected not to present CRM any more. If my story is right, I understand they were then contacted by a senior manager and told that they were engaging in industrial action, which is banned in the UAE. They were then informed the penalty for this behaviour was imprisonment. Most returned to their CRM presenting. Maybe my story is completely wrong (happy to be corrected) but there are big worries when any organisation uses such tactics. Resentment, fatigue and fear do not a happy or safe airline make.

Obviously unless there are more of these instances few passengers will boycott EK but I suspect what will happen is you may see pilots voting with their feet when the economies resume growth and the pilot shortage again starts to bight (as it really was in 2007). Heaven knows there isn't much going for living in the Middle East!

And yes Geepers Eprs we lot are still at it because it's clearly an issue that affect us all.

Aviation managerial skills seem to be retreating backwards into the 19th century and we all bear the brunt of it. Bollocking our own only serves to strengthen the hand of those managers.

[Smilin_Ed]

One top pilot on A.net tells me he has no idea of what runway length is left, (or gone),This is stupefying. Just plug in some numbers and accept the answer, no matter how unreasonable. Putting in a wrong number might be a simple mistake, but in this case, the consequences were deadly. It reminds me of an accounting professor, after cautioning her students to make sure the answers were reasonable, was asked how to know what's reasonable. Were the EPR results reasonable? Clearly not. :ugh: Computers are great aids, but "Garbage in, garbage out."

[barit1]

MarianA -


I understand that in normal day to day operation you will expect widely varying values for that accelaration X because of wide variation in the input data making it impossible to judge by feel whether it's about right or not and will take you airborne in the available space.

Almost right, except that flex thrust tends to even out the thrust-to-mass variation, so that the primary variation in X is due to field length and elevation. :8


Measuring acceleration is certainly already done by inertial systems aboard and if the data is not available GPS would propably be good enough for that. The rate of change of distance covered over time. Not a critical system, a simple add-on, collateral use of available data.


So true, as has been pointed out several times.

[galdian]

Hi Al.E

Sorry you believe my posts nothing more than drivel, I have points to raise which I believe are valid, apologies if you find them not worth consideration.

Cutting to basics:
- yes I am a pilot, shorthaul, do my 90-95 hours with just an F/o, no supp crew, I get tired occasionally
- I am not generally vitriolic towards my fellow aviators but I will be critical towards those who do not understand, or accept, the ultimate responsibility of Command/PIC
- to my knowledge the captain involved has NEVER stated that, yes, he made an error, the buck stops with him
- he makes generalised statements that only allude to fatigue - there well may have been a fatigue factor - but it is others who are talking about fatigue directly NEVER the captain concerned
- there were a total of 4 persons on the flightdeck who are all paid to be professional pilots and NONE of them twigged "it just didn't seem right", if the captains of the present and future can do no more than push buttons and are incapable of thinking/feeling about what's happening and incorperating commonsense then god help the airline industry.

When this captain accepts responsibility AND drives the argument about the factors that may have contributed to this situation to raise awareness/create discussion and hopefully put some pressure on regulators I will start to have some respect.
I remain convinced that present and future captains who do not understand, or accept, the final responsibilty should do aviation a service, and improve aviation safety immeasurably, by retiring and getting a 9 to 5 job at the post office.

And yes - there are a whole heap of issues surrounding Emirates (and others) that should be confronted and dealt with by regulators around the world; if only wishing made it so!

I'm just amazed no-one's jumped in yet and blamed it on a faulty thronomeister!;)

cheers all :ok:

[bud leon]

White Knight: "It may not be right but that's the gamble you take working in the sandpit..."

Well its not the gamble I want to take flying on this airline.

[yarpos]

as a mere piece of SLF doing AU > EU frequently, I read on these forums maybe 18-24 months ago that Emirates was driving its crews too hard. I thought then that seeing I have the choice, I would stick with my usual suspects of QANTAS, Singapore and Cathay (used to like BA too until they dumped Melbourne). I realise that there are issues in all airlines but Emirates attitude and reaction generally and to this incidents has my gut telling me to stay away.

Reading all the above leads me to think the default settings will stay in place for a while longer.

[ChrisVJ]

With Respect:

Those looking for admissions of responsibility may wish to take into account that the captain may have been advised, or decided himself, that such an admission would be inadvisable in case future action, legal or otherwise, might be affected by it being brought up.

I remember very well in the UK having minor traffic accidents (and I am not necessarily equating the two, only the attitude) and being told "Don't say anything, don't say sorry, don't sympathise with the other party."

After any event where there may be repercussions one would be wise to keep one's mouth firmly shut and that is notwithstanding some places now have "I'm sorry" laws.

[MRGTC]

Have I missed it or has no one noticed that the MTOW A340-300 vs the A340-5/600 is about 100 tonnes? Do Emirates pilots fly both (and A330's as well). If yes that would explain a lot and if no then I will STFU!

[gehenna]

Yes, we fly the A330 (MTOW 230T) the A343 (MTOW 275T) and the A345 (MTOW 372T)

[MRGTC]

Well that would explain the weight factor (100T difference). Has this not been highlighted before?

[C-N]

But I suppose there's no need to enter MTOW as it's a constant, only TOW.

[Dani]

Of course it's not very good if you fire a crew that made a mistake, but I can understand that EK's management had to do it.

After already the second similar incident, they had to blame the pilots. If they wouldn't, the company would be blamed, and that would put a very bad light on the company. That's why they fired them right away, before they got a final acident report. The pilots have been sacrified.

It's a pitty, but that's how it is.

Dani
(not EK Management)

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

Have I missed it or has no one noticed that the MTOW A340-300 vs the A340-5/600 is about 100 tonnes? Do Emirates pilots fly both (and A330's as well). If yes that would explain a lot and if no then I will STFU!

An interesting point - and AFAIK the commander's previous employer only operated A330 and A343.

[ExSp33db1rd]

...........there were a total of 4 persons on the flightdeck


Were they all on the flight deck ? Do relief crew sit on the flight deck for take-off on this aircraft / Airline ? If so, are they part of the operating crew, which could impinge on their ultimate, eventual, duty hours available ?

If not part of the operating crew I wouldn't have expected them to have been involved in the take-off calculations, although from a self-preervation point of view I might have expected them to say something as the runway was slowly being eaten up before them with slow acceleration, even as a passenger down the back I time the take off roll, and have a mental point beyond which I might start to get worried !

[Norman Stanley Fletcher]

Usual array of the 'I would have done so much better' brigade like galdian and others. Great to know you are such a top bloke mate, but I imagine the rest of us feel nothing but a sense of 'there but for the grace of God go I'. Also, some of the comments by non-aviators are frankly embarrassing in their content. Maybe if you have no knowledge or experience on this issue it would be best to keep your thoughts to yourself.

Murphy's law states that if it can go wrong it will go wrong - nowhere is that more evident than here. This is a top class captain (and possibly FO too) who went through a rigorous selection process to join Emirates. Were the Company just completely wrong and did their recruitment procedures fail in some way? No - they got a couple of highly professional aviators whose sole failings were to be human. Sure, they should have done better, but as long as such errors can happen they will happen. I guarantee that as a result of that incident procedures will have changed - therefore we have to say the procedures were incorrect. It is really not good enough to hound the crew, and crow quietly to yourself about how that would have never happened to you. Standard Arab fare as that may be, particularly if the crew is not Arab themselves, you have to tackle the systemic failing.

[galdian]

ChrisVJ

Very fair point, was only thinking of the incident and all its implications, might well be some legal reason regarding "responsibility", sadly that may not assist any investigation looking to ultimately improve methods, systems etc.

NSF
- where have I ever indicated (or "crowed" as you so inaccurately state) that this could never happen to me??

I make errors and mistakes all the time - as all humans do, it's unavoidable, however the ones I don't pick up are hopefully always so small to have no impact on overall safety.
What I HAVE said or implied is that I can never imagine making such a huge error as in this case as that would go against all the training, procedures, methodology, instinct, commonsense, gut feeling and occasional pure rat cunning I've accumulated whilst flying.

However thanks for thinking I'm a great bloke - big call seeing we've never met but in this instance, however you came to your judgement, your call's spot on! :ok:

Cheers all.

[GMDS]

Were they all on the flight deck ? Do relief crew sit on the flight deck for take-off on this aircraft / Airline ? If so, are they part of the operating crew, which could impinge on their ultimate, eventual, duty hours available ?

1. Yes, they were on the flight deck, as EK in its sublime wisdom decided that augmenting crew do not need a normal seat.
2. No, they are not part of the operating crew, as EK in its sublime wisdom does not want them to participate in vital operations, such as calculating TO weights or doing outside checks etc.
3. No, these hours do not count. They can only log the hours in the drivers seat as augmenting crew.

At EK, due to its sublime wisdom, the augmenting crew have three functions:
1. To be a pain in the a$$ during cockpit prep, TO and Ldg, because they are confined to sit in the two jump seats without any assigned task, therefore basically beeing only a element of distraction.
2. To be forced to lay down in the torpedo tube in the most remote part possible of the aircraft. This tube does not allow at all sitting up or eating. You can barely drink and read and can only watch the screen if your spine resembles the one of Houdini. During your sometimes 7 hours of torture, you are not allowed to sit in a empty pax seat to decently rest or eat, even if the whole class is empty (unless risking beeing reported by one of our collegues on board).
3. Augment the operating crew, which remains the best part of the flight.

[rdr]

firing a pilot without a proper and thorough investigation does send a chilling msg to all in the industry about a companys culture. perhaps its the emerging sign of the times, however, its definitely a place to avoid employment.
as far as fatigue is concerned, we as pilots will always be tired, save the odd day when one might be at his chirpy best.

my opinion with hindsight in tow, is that it is a systemic, as well as a
procedural issue.

on most flights, i have noticed skippers keeping the loadsheet to themselves, as if to protect the crown jewels. rarely do they xcheck the numbers on a manual loadsheet, and even rarer, is there an attempt to concur or physically show the f/o, the numbers in question. mostly he will blurt out the numbers, followed by the f/o calculating the required data. the pressure on making schedule plays a part too as invariably, the loadsheet appears a minute or two before departure time. lmc's notwithstanding, there is a general rush to close the doors and get going.
unless there is a strong SOP, a mistake can be made at the 3 areas of required reference, namely the loadsheet, rtow charts/opt (on board performance tool), or FMC insertion.
and the unfortunate recipent of any penalty is quite correctly, the professional who signs above the dotted line. the buck has got to start, or stop somewhere.

[CaptSeeAreEmm]

At EK, due to its sublime wisdom, the augmenting crew have three functions:
1. To be a pain in the a$$ during cockpit prep, TO and Ldg, because they are confined to sit in the two jump seats without any assigned task, therefore basically beeing only a element of distraction.
2. To be forced to lay down in the torpedo tube in the most remote part possible of the aircraft. This tube does not allow at all sitting up or eating. You can barely drink and read and can only watch the screen if your spine resembles the one of Houdini. During your sometimes 7 hours of torture, you are not allowed to sit in a empty pax seat to decently rest or eat, even if the whole class is empty (unless risking beeing reported by one of our collegues on board).


Scary stuff:eek:

[Obie]

So, someone tell me...

just how does the 'augmenting crew, augment' (add)...

to the operation? :confused:

[C-N]

someone mentioned its 14hrs enroute, so the crew should divide that 14hrs into 2, as they can not operate, by regulation, more than 10hrs or more than 12hrs for some. So the 2nd half of the flight will be by the 'augmenting' crew.

[BRE]

"After already the second similar incident, they had to blame the pilots."

The other incident was not take off weight, but the unstick technique, AFAIK.

[Jetjock330]

So, someone tell me...

just how does the 'augmenting crew, augment' (add)...

to the operation?I hope this helps to understand augmented crew in a more simpler way.


Augmenting crew:

Long haul sectors two man crew over 7 hours:-

When a flight is scheduled for more than more than say 7 hours with two man crew, a multi sector table is used which all depends on the sign on to duty time. This may mean that a single sector for two man crew showed a duty of say 11:15, however, as the scheduled flight is over 7 hours, a multiple sector of 3 on the table used. This then reduces the two man operation to say 9:30, which would prevent a two man crew doing a 9:45 sector, THEREFORE, the Company arranges a 3rd pilot on the flight deck, which eliminates the clause of a two man operations and now the operation retains its original 11:15 operating AND NO ONE relieves NO ONE.

It is not requirement to relieve anyone. This 3rd pilot acts like and old flight engineer sitting sideways in a 3 man crew operation. If it is a first office being augmented, then he may relieve the F/O, but is is not a requirement. The captain will sit the entire flight without being relieved as it is not a requirement and visa versa if it was another captain being called out on the augmented crew.

In short, Augmented crew just relieves the table from being seen as a multiple entry and shortened duty, but no one is required to leave the cockpit for rest anywhere or at anytime.


In-flight relief is something different which is used to extend the 11:15 duty, thus by now resting the 3rd man in a bunk or cabin seat.

[C-N]

Augmented crew also discussed previously,
http://www.pprune.org/tech-log/362872-augmented-crew-flight-deck-protocol.html

[C-N]

rdr,
on most flights, i have noticed skippers keeping the loadsheet to themselves, as if to protect the crown jewels. rarely do they xcheck the numbers on a manual loadsheet, and even rarer, is there an attempt to concur or physically show the f/o, the numbers in question. mostly he will blurt out the numbers, followed by the f/o calculating the required data. the pressure on making schedule plays a part too as invariably, the loadsheet appears a minute or two before departure time. lmc's notwithstanding, there is a general rush to close the doors and get going.

unless there is a strong SOP, a mistake can be made at the 3 areas of required reference, namely the loadsheet, rtow charts/opt (on board performance tool), or FMC insertion.
and the unfortunate recipent of any penalty is quite correctly, the professional who signs above the dotted line. the buck has got to start, or stop somewhere.

True, the loadsheet appears just minutes before pushback, but the numbers are already briefed and shown to the operating crew one hour, maybe more, before they enter the aircraft, as all of this are also in their FPL. Also, it's true the PIC signed all the required docs, yet copies are also provided for all other crew.

[Cornelis]

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I've heard that Emirates does the performance calculation with the help of lap tops. They only use one when there are two available (spare). I've flown the A-320 and we used both laptops where at the same time the captain and the co-pilot independantly performed the calculations with data obtained from the load sheet and the ATIS. Then the FMS (performance part) was programmed by the captain and again checked by the co pilot. Seems to me that there something wrong with the SOP's regarding performance calculation and data entry. Still, also on the 747-400 it is possible to insert the ZFM where the GW should be entered, and although equiped with a Mass an Balance system (ERF) there is no comparison to trigger an alert should faulty entries be made. Hope you did the maths with the proper GW so you "önly" end up with wrong speeds but thank god with the right amount of thrust. It happens more often then described in this thread that a take off is made with faulty numbers punched in the box. It can happen to all of us, hope the emirates crew will be allright regarding there jobs careers etc. Good luck to all of them.

[crazypilot]

Similar incident - did Thomson fire their pilots also or deal with it differently?


Crew's data-entry error led to laboured 767 take-off: inquiry
David Kaminski-Morrow, London (20Jul09, 12:24 GMT, 233 words)

Incorrect data entry during take-off calculations has been identified as the reason that a Thomson Airways Boeing 767-300 laboured to become airborne from Manchester last year, and suffered a tail-strike in the process.

After receiving the loadsheet the crew had inadvertently entered the zero-fuel weight, about 118t, into the computer-based system for calculating take-off speeds, instead of the proper figure of 172t.

This data-entry error, says the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch, would have generated "significantly slower" take-off speeds than required. The calculated velocity for rotation was 21kt lower than the true figure.

During the take-off roll for the flight to Montego Bay, however, the captain felt the aircraft might be heavier than calculated, and delayed the 'V1' call by around 10-15kt after sensing "sluggish" acceleration.

Nevertheless, as the aircraft rotated, its tailskid struck the runway. The captain - while not the flying pilot - applied full power. In response to a brief stick-shaker activation, the co-pilot reduced pitch and the 767 climbed away safely, although the crew opted to dump fuel and return to Manchester.

The AAIB indicates that the crew may have been distracted by taxiway works in progress at Manchester as well as time pressures from a 15min pushback delay.

Since the 13 December incident, it adds, Thomson Airways has instructed pilots to extract take-off weight data from loadsheets independently, and reminded crews that checking loadsheets for "gross errors" remains "good practice".

Source: Air Transport Intelligence news

[galdian]

To follow on from a few previous posts (and will require input from Emirates pilots as the ones in the know);
- there were 4 qualified, paid-as-professional pilots in the flight deck, yes??
- Emirates as procedure (and legally as per their rules and regs) expects the additional crew to sit there, shut up and do/say nothing??
- do Emirates P&P manuals/Ops manuals have any directions/notations about qualified crew, if not operating but in the cockpit during prep and takeoff, having no part or, more importantly, being forbidden from ever speaking as they are not the "official crew" for that portion of the flight??
- do Emirates P&P manuals/Ops manuals require the PIC/Captain as part of his total crew brief to tell augmenting crew, who are seated in the cockpit although they are only augmenting crew (augmenting the take-off?? just how exactly??) to sit down and shut-up...just in case they say something that resonates and turns a possible disaster into an oversight that was corrected...but might create a duty limit problem??

Just asking - and not that evil word 'RESPONSIBILITY' anywhere insight until 4 words ago! ;)

GMDS - love your "sublime wisdom" lead-ins, go over the top of some in general, over the top of most yanks, damn fine job there!! :ok:

[mwansleeben]

More people WILL die untill the lawsuits get to expensive, only then will the airlines/goverments change the rest requirements................. it's a problem anywhere in the world, not just in the UAE. :ouch:

[MTOW]

Has the aircraft reached Toulouse? Anyone have any idea of how much fuel they burned getting there?

---------------------------------------------------

Edited to add: Jetjock330, your summation of three pilot ops may be true for airlines like SQ, (where with only one captain on board, he must remain in the seat at all times except for short "physiological breaks").

However, in EK, FOs are checked out for cruise PNF duties from the left seat and the captain can leave the cockpit to take his rest - (in the 777, in the roof and about as far from the cockpit as it's possible to be, and not a lot less remote from the cockpit in the 345), leaving the FO occupying the RHS in charge.

The captain MUST in fact take his rest in the very remote location, as he is forbiddden from taking it in an empty seat in Business of First Class, probably because the company would get only 1/3rd the rest taken in credit to extend the flight duty rather than 1/2 the rest time for rest taken in a bunk.

At least one of the FOs took great exception to some captains suggesting that having the only captain on board, (in some non normal situations, almost certainly not able to get back to the cockpit for quite some time if at all), might not be an ideal situation. He felt this was an insult to his and his colleagues' professionalism.

(The FO who made that comment on the company chat site is a captain now. I'd be interested to know whether a year or so in the LHS has changed his then very strongly held opinions on the subject.)

[Desert Dawg]

A/C is in TLS and a.f.a.i.k. the entire tail section (from the rear production join) is being replaced, including the rear pressure bulkhead.

I heard (from a reliable source in eng.) the plane was fully fueled with approx. 204 tons of fuel before the transit to DXB. Dunno how much it burned en-route. Dunno how much fuel it had when transiting from DXB to TLS

This will cost EK a few Dirhams...!:eek:

[GMDS]

MTOW

Concerning this FO and his feeling insulted or how strong he feels as skipper today:

It has been discussed ad infinitum and has nothing, I repeat, nothing to do with FO's capacities and how they or others feel about it - please!
The only and most important issue here is, that EKs FOM states that under certain emergencies the captain HAS TO BE IN THE LHS and consequently how and whom the ratpack of lawyers will sue in a incident where the skipper could not make it to the cockpit due to our mighty managers foresight to place us in a coffin, some 100 meters away from the grandstand with 350 panicking passengers in between.
The skipper signed responsible for the whole flight. Now just who will be held by the ba;;s in front of the judge with any screw up? Will EK back you up??
The answer lies in MEL ....

[Jørgen Staffeldt]

Easy to say Cactus.....have you been there? - Other than maybe in a SIM?

[raymer]

it was good reaction
try to be more perfect:D

[MrMachfivepointfive]

Desert thingy ... Max TCAP on a 345 is in the high 170s. The other 30 tons might have been high octane duty free items?

[Silvershadow]

Crazypilot

The pilots involved with the Manchester incident were given more training on the computerised take-off performance then some line training. They are now back at work.

A more enlightened management!

[A-3TWENTY]

Just two type of persons will point fingers to the unfortunate Captain:

Those who don`t fly and those who fly but are stupid.

The problem is that pilots are the cheapest part of the system.

When a pilot doesn`t die in an accident or incident , investigation will kill him.

[eliptic]

He said he had been in Melbourne for 24 hours before his flight.


If he was in Melbourne 24 hours before, why just 3 hours sleep?

[MTOW]

GMDS, I suspect you misread what I was trying to say. In short, I believe we both hold exactly the same opinions of TC's rather 'unusual' decision to put the resting crew about as far away from the cockpit as is possible, particlarly with EK's use of a three man crew.

No reflection on the abilities of my FOs, but I pray to God I never find myself the bunny who's signed for the aircraft and unable to get back to the cockpit until it's far too late to have any say in what immediate course of action should be taken after a major emergency.

There's only one thing certain: some poor sod of an EK captain WILL one day find himself in that situation, as sure as God made little apples.

Oh, and of course the other certainty - that the outcome, if not perfect, will be 'spun' to high heaven by the EK PR machine to ensure no ca ca adheres to EK. I leave it to the imagination of the reader as to who the ca ca will therefore be stuck to.

[Jet II]

Please correct me if I'm wrong, but I've heard that Emirates does the performance calculation with the help of lap tops. They only use one when there are two available (spare).

that changed rapidly after the accident - now two are used and cross-checked.

[GMDS]

Got it, MTOW!

It might seem like a slight thread drift if we pound on this, as the MEL operation works with 2 sets of crews. However EK flies into PER with the constellation of 1 skipper and 2 FOs. We raise the issue of inadequate rest facilities as to demonstrate the abismal consideration this company shows when it comes to issues for its tech crews. I am astonished at the laxnessnes of the Australian authorities in this respect. Allthough the inquiry for the MEL incident is one thing, having involved the airline with the most LH/WB flights in and out of Australia (after the local one), should trigger more attentiveness to such matters. I assume that with the Qantas A330 incident, having a 3 man crew as well, they should be more sensitive to shoving skippers into some remote coffin over their territory .... but then again authorities mostly only step in when the s#!t has already hit the fan.

Trends are here to warn us, and crews speaking out as well. It is way too simple to just condemn the involved. Basically this reduces us (and the authorities) to the level of most airline mangers.

[Desert Dawg]

@Mach5.5

I was chatting to a source in EK engineering (and another in MCC) who mentioned that the a/c was fully fueled at +200 tons with only 2 crew aboard on the DXB inward sector...

If my source was wrong on the fuel load, then I stand corrected....:ok:

(If you look here Aircraft Family - A340-500 Specifications (http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/a330a340/a340-500/specifications.html) you can see the max fuel weight for the A340... Is this correct?)

Me - "...Desert Thingy...."? Naaaaah, Just call me Desert Dawg:ok:

[Jibba Jabba]

"I am astonished at the laxnessnes of the Australian authorities in this respect."

GMDS

CASA is party of shivers looking for a spine to run up.