Kalitta B747 209F overrun EBBR 2505 2008

[borghha]

Final report now published.

http://www.mobilit.fgov.be/data/aero/accidents/AA-8-5.pdf

[Graybeard]

Excellent report, by my view.

Engine 3 ingested a Kestrel. Makes you wonder what possible prey was found in number 4.

That one was a tough call by the Capt.

GB

[lomapaseo]

The crash is not due to an engine failure, but the history of engine incidents, as well as the personal experience of the pilot with this aircraft could have had an influence on the reactions of the crew.

The pilot furthermore stated he did not take a breakfast that morning. This
could possibly influence the reaction rate of a person owing to a lowered blood glucose level


From page 48 of the report. This sounds a little subjective to me

[Smilin_Ed]

The report says:
Statistics indicate that rejected takeoffs at V1 are very seldom successful.


If that really is the case, then how V1 is calculated should be revisited.

[sleeper]

Don't forget this t/o was rejected 12 knots beyond v1, while departing with 300m less runway than their performance calculations allowed for!

seems a clear conclusion that rejects beyond V1 are not done.

[Kelly Smunt]

Seems also that with this company if the handling pilot is the co pilot and the take off is rejected say within 1 knot of V1 the captain will then take control selecting his own reverse thrust and spoilers etc.:}

[411A]

In reality, a feckup of the highest order, on the FD, on the day in question.

[SNS3Guppy]

Don't forget this t/o was rejected 12 knots beyond v1, while departing with 300m less runway than their performance calculations allowed for!


You won't find the "300m less runway" in the report, because it isn't there. The runway in question had a stop margin of 897 feet...it wasn't shorter than the performance calculations. See the TOLD card on page 16 of the report. A stop margin is excess margin after the aircraft is brought to a stop following a rejected takeoff.

The takeoff was rejected seven seconds past V1. Four seconds until the compressor stall, and the actual reject two seconds after that. The reject took place at 150 knots, which is the 12 knots above V1 to which you refer. Bear in mind that a typical 4-6 knot error in the cockpit indication on these airplanes means that the pilot may or may not have seen that much over V1, and his decision was predicated on the basis of feeling that the aircraft wasn't accelerating properly.

The captain had briefed a reject after V1 if the aircraft didn't seem capable of flight, and later stated that in his opinion the aircraft wasn't accelerating; it was at this point, with two seconds of decision time after the compressor stall, that he elected to reject the takeoff. That two seconds includes reaction and action time.

Seems also that with this company if the handling pilot is the co pilot and the take off is rejected say within 1 knot of V1 the captain will then take control selecting his own reverse thrust and spoilers etc.


There's no "seeming" about it. The company policy, as with many companies, is that the captain will handle all rejected takeoffs. Whether the first officer is flying or not, it's the captain's decision to reject the takeoff. If the first officer is performing the takeoff with Kalitta, unless the captain anounces a rejected takeoff and takes the controls, the first officer will continue.

[sleeper]

page 49 in the report:

"These performances showed a take-off margin of 300m, but this distance
takes the whole runway length into consideration. In reality, the aircraft
lined up at the B1 intersection, shorter by 300m. The crew was under the
impression they started with a positive take-off margin, while this margin
was reduced to zero."

So they performed calculations for the whole runwaylength, but lined up at an intersection.

[FCS Explorer]

That kestrel really made his exit with a bang....and still they were kinda lucky avoiding the 20 meter drop down to the railway tracks

[SNS3Guppy]

So they performed calculations for the whole runwaylength, but lined up at an intersection.


Whether the stop margin was 800+ feet or zero, they still did not depart with less runway than their performance calculations allowed. Even with a zero stop margin, the aircraft was still calculated to be able to lose the engine at V1 (or later) and continue the takeoff. They did not takeoff with insufficient runway.

[FullWings]

Some interesting learning points here - luckily only metal was bent in the process.

From the report:
The accident was caused by the decision to Reject the Take-Off 12 knots after passing V1 speed.

The following factors contributed to the accident;

o Engine Nr 3 experienced a bird strike, causing it to stall. This phenomenon was accompanied by a loud bang, noticed by the crew.
o The aircraft line up at the B1 intersection although the take-off parameters were computed with the full length of the runway.
o The situational awareness of the crew,
o Less than maximum use of deceleration devices.
o Although the RESA conforms to the minimum ICAO requirement, it does not conform to the ICAO recommendation for length.

Some other observations from within the report:
It may be safer to reject a takeoff when approaching V1 only if there is doubt of the aircraft’s ability to maintain flight. The problem may be more safely handled as an in-flight problem than as a rejected takeoff.

At or after V1, unless a malfunction occurs that renders the aircraft uncontrollable, do not reject the takeoff. Statistics indicate that rejected takeoffs at V1 are very seldom successful.

The noise analysis showed further that the engine appeared to be recovering immediately after the engine stall. There was no damage found during the engine examination that would indicate otherwise.

Furthermore, a 4-engine aircraft is certified to be able to continue the take-off with the total failure of one of its engines.

In reality, the aircraft lined up at the B1 intersection, shorter by 300m. The crew was under the impression they started with a positive take-off margin, while this margin was reduced to zero.

We recommend to modify the training program of the flight crew (initial and recurrent), and related documentation, to highlight the risks involved in rejecting TO around V1, as well as the importance of respecting procedures.

An interesting one in terms of 'mindset':
...they also briefed about an abort take-off after V1 if there was a dangerous situation that would not allow the airplane to fly.
Question: what situations might these be and how would you recognise them? I have a few ideas but it's not something we discuss much in the airline because we have a "go" mentality...

[BOAC]

I understand from previous posts by 747 guys that a max TOM will not fly with two out. They say if you do not abort you simply crash at a higher speed somewhere else.:)

[punkalouver]

The takeoff was rejected seven seconds past V1. Four seconds until the compressor stall, and the actual reject two seconds after that. The reject took place at 150 knots, which is the 12 knots above V1 to which you refer. Bear in mind that a typical 4-6 knot error in the cockpit indication on these airplanes means that the pilot may or may not have seen that much over V1, and his decision was predicated on the basis of feeling that the aircraft wasn't accelerating properly.

The captain had briefed a reject after V1 if the aircraft didn't seem capable of flight, and later stated that in his opinion the aircraft wasn't accelerating; it was at this point, with two seconds of decision time after the compressor stall, that he elected to reject the takeoff. That two seconds includes reaction and action time.



Bottom line.....In a situation like this.....rejecting after V1, and especially 6 seconds after V1, you can plan on a lot of death and destruction(anything else will be fortunate), while continuing will most likely be successful with reduced margins(expect a good look at the end of the runway). It would not be surprising that after losing 25% of your power that your acceleration would be reduced and I would think that reduced acceleration could feel like no acceleration.

Regardless of any possible airspeed indication error, a significant amount of time has elapsed since the V1 call(4 seconds is significant) leaving a lot less runway and undoubtedly an increase in speed.

[SNS3Guppy]

There's no doubt what happened, and what errors occurred. The airline in question has been teaching this and pushing it hard before the incident occurred, and after...and continues to do so. The captain himself briefed what would take place, then disregarded his own brief, rejected the takeoff, didn't include the crew in the reject, didn't follow the reject procedure he had briefed and that the company provided (and trained), and ultimately lost the airplane. This much is known, and has been known all along at the company...and has been taught all along at the company.

This is not in question.

The assertion that the aircraft departed contrary to predicted performance and that it didn't have enough runway available, is in error. It did.

What could not be predicted was a rejected takeoff contrary to procedure and so late in the game. The ability to stop with a failure up to V1 was correctly planned and available. The ability to stop after that time was not available.

I understand from previous posts by 747 guys that a max TOM will not fly with two out. They say if you do not abort you simply crash at a higher speed somewhere else.


The airplane certainly will fly with two out, and it's part of every recurrent training. However, that wasn't the case here; it was one out, and only a compressor stall at that. The aircraft was fully capable of flying off, and the performance data was predicated on loss of one engine.

[GlueBall]

It's hard to comprehend why a 15000hrs captain with 3000hrs on type didn't remove his paw and didn't keep his paw off the thrust levers by V1; it's an instinctive motion that's learned and practiced over and over in the sim.

Furthermore, the absentmindedness by an experienced captain of not selecting reverse thrust [which precluded auto spoiler deployment] and the forgetfullness by the F/E of not manually pulling the spoiler handle is stupefying.

[411A]

Furthermore, the absentmindedness by an experienced captain of not selecting reverse thrust [which precluded auto spoiler deployment] and the forgetfullness by the F/E of not manually pulling the spoiler handle is stupefying.

I would expect...'par for the course' at the company in question.
The accident speaks for itself, together with the actions of the crew concerned.

[SNS3Guppy]

You have some particular insight into the company, do you?

[None]

On October 20, 2004, Kalitta Air Boeing 747 (N709CK), with five crew members onboard, experienced mechanical difficulties with one of the four engines and diverted to land safely at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. No one was injured. It was discovered after landing that the number 1 engine had separated from the airplane as it climbed through 16,000 feet over Lake Michigan.[8] The engine was later recovered for inspection.

On May 25, 2008, a Boeing 747-209F/SCD (N704CK serial number 22299/462)[11][12] from the company's fleet overran runway 20 at Brussels Airport. The plane broke in three and came to a complete stop in a field bordering the runway. There were four crew members and one passenger onboard and no injuries have been reported. [13][14] The aircraft was loaded with 76 tons of goods, half of it being diplomatic mail, and was supposed to take off to Bahrain.[15] On December 23, 2008, Belgian investigators announced that the cause of the accident was the ingestion of a Kestrel bird into engine 3 [16

ENG08IA022 (http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20081003X63355&ntsbno=ENG08IA022&akey=1)
NTSB Identification: ENG08IA022
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier Kalitta Air
Incident occurred Saturday, April 19, 2008 in Newark, NJ
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/22/2009
Aircraft: BOEING 747, registration: N704CK
Injuries: 5 Uninjured.
The cargo airplane experienced an in-flight engine fire in the No. 3 engine during climb. The flight crew declared an emergency, shut down the engine, discharged two engine fire suppression bottles to extinguish the fire, and dumped fuel in preparation for landing. The aircraft landed without incident and there were no reported injuries. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed that heat distress and fire damage localized in an area of the engine's accessory raceway where various oil, fuel, and hydraulic lines and hoses were located. The lines and hoses were pressure tested to isolate the source(s) of the flammable fluid leak and three tubes were found to leak. Those three tubes were sent to the manufacturer for further evaluation; however, due to the extensive fire damage, it could not be determined which of the three tubes was the original source of the flammable fluid leak. There were no life limit or required pressure tests in place for any of the three tubes.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
An engine fire in the No. 3 engine due to the failure of, and subsequent flammable fluid leak from, one of three fuel or hydraulic lines located in the engine's accessory raceway that ignited when the fluid came in contact with the hot engine cases. Contributing to the incident were the lack of adequate inspection and test requirements and appropriate life limit or inspection interval requirements by the manufacturer.
Full narrative available

On July 7, 2008, a Boeing 747-209B (N714CK serial number 22446/519) crashed shortly after departing from El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá at 3:55 am. The plane was en route to Miami, Florida, with a shipment of flowers. After reporting a fire in one of the engines, the plane attempted the return to the airport but crashed near the village of Madrid, Colombia. The plane's empennage hit a ranch house, killing a 50-year-old man and his 13-year-old son who lived there (a report of this crash on AirDisaster.Com (http://www.airdisaster.com) indicated a third fatality on the ground). The crew of eight survived with light to serious injuries.[17][18][19

[411A]

You have some particular insight into the company, do you?

It's former title (same owner and management), American International, yup, sure do.
With a very few exceptions, I have never seen so many misfits gathered together in one company.
Most reasonable folks, had a close look, and gave it a very firm pass.
Not likely to change, either.
I say once again, the BRU accident speaks volumes.
Poor operational control, poor training, poor management.
A bad combination.
GlueBall said it best...
Furthermore, the absentmindedness by an experienced captain of not selecting reverse thrust [which precluded auto spoiler deployment] and the forgetfullness by the F/E of not manually pulling the spoiler handle is stupefying.

[WhalePFE]

Whether the stop margin was 800+ feet or zero, they still did not depart with less runway than their performance calculations allowed. Even with a zero stop margin, the aircraft was still calculated to be able to lose the engine at V1 (or later) and continue the takeoff. They did not takeoff with insufficient runway.

Not true! Intersection B1 gave them about 9100'. TOLD was figured for 9800 feet. Definately a contributing factor.

[TowerDog]

Pretty much the same thing happened here:

B-747 aborts after V-1, Capt "forget" to use thrust reversers.

The # 1 engine was overhauled by Konnie's folks and came apart right at V-1.:sad:

The Tradewinds plane departed the end of the runway at 80 or 90 knots.


YouTube - Tradewinds Boeing 747 Rejected Takeoff Crash (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wj8UPEfO1Oo)

[SNS3Guppy]

It's former title (same owner and management), American International, yup, sure do.
With a very few exceptions, I have never seen so many misfits gathered together in one company.


Old news, old company, and in other words, you know nothing about whence you speak. Further, few of those "misfits" are employed at the current company, meaning your "information" is outdated and without credibility.

Not true! Intersection B1 gave them about 9100'. TOLD was figured for 9800 feet. Definately a contributing factor.


Not at all. If the stop margin were zero, it wouldn't be a contributing factor, if the captain followed his own brief and continued the takeoff. The problem wasn't too little runway, and it certainly wasn't less runway than calculated for takeoff. Certainly there was less stop margin than calculated, but the fact is that enough runway lay ahead to either reject the takeoff or continue it...if abiding the principle of no rejects above V1.

When the calculations were made, no consideration was given (and never is) to a rejected takeoff beyond V1...consequently the additional stop margin is irrelevant in light of poor decision making and poor actions on the part of the captain. Seven seconds after the time to reject the takeoff had passed before the captain rejected the takeoff, and at that point, had he available that extra stop margin, it still wouldn't have mattered.

[411A]

...if the captain followed his own brief and continued the takeoff.

Which he did not.

...in light of poor decision making and poor actions on the part of the captain.

Looks like some of the misfits are still present.
Why are we not surprised?:rolleyes:
The Connie leopard does not change its spots.

[SNS3Guppy]

Rather a broad brush with which you paint, given you know not whence you speak. If you had worked there recently, you might have some credence...but you speak about a company which no longer exists. Shame that you live in the past.

[Air1980]

Don't worry SNS3, old man 411A seeks to opine on everything, all the time.

[WhalePFE]

In addition to starting the T/O Roll 700' farther down, the TOLD card was figured with a full reduced setting. If you rerun the numbers minus the 700' it requires a MAX thrust setting.

[JamesA]

Towerdog,
My information is that Ck does not overhaul Q motors. They are outsourced to another company.

[CR2]

Strange one... well under MTOW. -Q motors (I always understood to be pretty powerful) "fake" 820K LBS a/c limitation (833K with gear mods). 690K actual TOW....WHY reject? I have read the report and still can't figure it out. 20/20 hindsight etc, but FFS this was a birdstrike affecting one engine after/at (+- depending on point of view) V1. Its a "GO" situation.... errr.... right???? :(:(

[lomapaseo]

Towerdog,
My information is that Ck does not overhaul Q motors. They are outsourced to another company.

agree, nor would it be significant unless directly in the causal chain

hopefully we can stick to the factual report in this accident

[TowerDog]

Towerdog,
My information is that Ck does not overhaul Q motors. They are outsourced to another company.

Now perhaps, but 2 or 3 years ago I had numerous comprssor stalls on Q engines over hauled by Connie's boys.

It sure was a factor in Medein and perhaps in Bogota, not so in Brussels perhaps if indeed a bird ingestion was the primary cause of the failure.

agree, nor would it be significant unless directly in the causal chain


On the other hand the PIC was spooked from earlier engine problems or compressor stalls and decided to abort after V1..Wonder who overhauled those engines?

[sb_sfo]

Rather a broad brush with which you paint, given you know not whence you speak. If you had worked there recently, you might have some credence...but you speak about a company which no longer exists. Shame that you live in the past.

SNS3Guppy- are you saying that since they started buying used JAL airplanes, they are going to start maintaining (not to mention flying) them correctly? They have just about run out of the ex-China airplanes, haven't they?

[SNS3Guppy]

I said nothing about JAL or China, thanks. Kindly put words in your own mouth.

[411A]

The sad fact is, sb_sfo, that although the name of the company changed, the folks in charge, and some of the misfits they hired, did not.
Connie seems to attract those who just simply do not have the professional ability to operate within the bounds of what others would consider...reasonable.
The BRU accident proved this beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sad fact is... the few rather competant folks there were totally overshadowed by those that were substandard in their operating ability.
Once again, the BRU accident proved this quite conclusively.

[SNS3Guppy]

Once again, the BRU accident proved this quite conclusively.


If you mean that the EBBR incident proved that you're going by ancient misguided information and that you don't know what it is you're talking about, then perhaps so...but an aircraft didnt' need to be lost to prove that.

The actions of one man do not a company make, and his actions are most certainly not what is taught by the company, nor is the company lax in it's teaching and application of the rejected takeoff in training. Further, it's not what the captain himself briefed.

Really you have no solid ground on which to stand, save for has-been memories of something you know not. Perhaps if your experiences were recent in any way, shape or form, and you were not living in the past, your commentary might have some relevancy. Alas, it does not.

[lomapaseo]

Tower Dog

On the other hand the PIC was spooked from earlier engine problems or compressor stalls and decided to abort after V1..Wonder who overhauled those engines?

hang in there we probably can find a link eventually:}

[TowerDog]

hang in there we probably can find a link eventually

Aye, don't go looking too hard, but you mentioned:

agree, nor would it be significant unless directly in the causal chain


My point, if I have to explain..Guess I do:

Poorly overhauled engines have caused accidents..:sad:

[cactusbusdrvr]

That was a very thorough report. Although the crew thought that the runway was dry they had set the numbers for a wet runway, they were still good even at the intersection.

A lot of factors should have led to a "go" decision. Rather than dwell on how the captain screwed up (or didn't, if that's what you prefer) we should take this report and reflect ourselves how we would handle this situation. Reports are there to learn lessons from, not place blame.

[Sleeping Freight Dog]

Also what can't be ignored, is the fact that the thrust reversers were
not deployed, contrary to the the stated requirements of the company
procedures??? or is there an unwritten rule some where that reversers
are not deployed with a suspected engine failure??

[TowerDog]

or is there an unwritten rule some where that reversers
are not deployed with a suspected engine failure??

NO...:sad:

Full reverse on anything before V-1.

[TowerDog]

...if the captain followed his own brief and continued the takeoff.

Which he did not.


Quote:
...in light of poor decision making and poor actions on the part of the captain.

Looks like some of the misfits are still present.


Rumor says the Captain was a US-Air type, not the regular lifer non-sced.:=

[cactusbusdrvr]

If he was original US Air then that makes it more likely that he screwed up.:rolleyes:

Where was the "no reverse" call? or the "no spoilers" call? This illustrates that there must be crew coordination and backup. If the skipper screws up then the F/O and the F/E need to step up and make the calls.

[LeandroSecundo]

Hi,

Methink Kallita Air is a top notch company

The airline provides domestic and international scheduled or on-demand cargo service and support for the requirements of the Department of Defense Air Mobility CommandIf the US Dept of Defence use them .. they can be only the best !
BTW.. the flight at Brussels was hired by the US Dept of Defence.

Bye.

[oceancrosser]

Hi,

Methink Kallita Air is a top notch company


If the US Dept of Defence use them .. they can be only the best !
BTW.. the flight at Brussels was hired by the US Dept of Defence.

Methinks you have big tongue in cheek! :}

[JamesA]

Towerdog,
I take it you are a current or ex- Connie driver. My informant told me, the man himself wouldn't invest in tooling necessary for -7Q overhaul. Therefore, he never had the approval to carry out overhauls on the motors. I know a number of current CK crew who were of the same opinion as yourself until corrected.

As for the general opinion of CK crews, I have met up with several of them and found them a pretty good bunch with the mandatory quota of tossers, as per all companies.

[Trentino]

LeandroSecundo

me think you suffer blunt trauma or...

me think you making a funny

[sb_sfo]

LeandroSecundo:
If the US Dept of Defence use them .. they can be only the best !
BTW.. the flight at Brussels was hired by the US Dept of Defence.Think Arrow Air at Gander- also a DoD operation. Need I say more?

[Earl]

LeandroSecundo,
Think you should check your numbers.
Quite a bit of cargo is being hauled now by the russians with the IL-76.
Been in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan last month, quite a bit
Who would have ever thought 20 years ago we would see so many Russian planes on a US controlled military field.
Guess National decided on the cheapest bidder to move the goods!
I doubt Kalitta's good or bad reputation has anything to do with it!!!

[SNS3Guppy]

Think Arrow Air at Gander- also a DoD operation. Need I say more?


Yes, perhaps you should say more. A lot of good men died. Are you attempting to draw a parallel between that event and the one in Brussels? Are you attempting a condemnation on the United States Department of Defense? Are you attempting to insinuate that the DoD could have prevented either loss? Are you attempting to suggest that those who contract with the Department of Defense are, by some affiliation, substandard? Yes, you really do need to say more.

[punkalouver]

That Arrow Air crash was never 100% agreed upon. The Safety Board at the time was so divided(5 to 4), that two fully separate reports were published. One said it had to be ice on the wings, the other(dissenting report) said it couldn't and strongly suggested explosion of weapons carried on board.

It led to the end of the Canadian Aviation Safety Board eventually replaced by the Transportation Safety Board(investigates all transportation accidents).

The CVR was destroyed and the old FDR provided little info.

Any thoughts or theories from Arrow Air drivers at the time would be appreciated.

Here are some excerpts from the report on fatigue and maintenance.
Gander : The Untold Story - Canadian Aviation Safety Board Majority Report (http://www.sandford.org/gandercrash/investigations/majority_report/html/_2-9.shtml)
Gander : The Untold Story - Canadian Aviation Safety Board Majority Report (http://www.sandford.org/gandercrash/investigations/majority_report/html/_2-8.shtml)

Here is the dissenting report.
Gander : The Untold Story - Canadian Aviation Safety Board Minority Report (http://www.sandford.org/gandercrash/investigations/minority_report/html/_cover_page.shtml)

[JW411]

Well, I was flying with Arrow at the time. I knew the three guys in the flight deck (and the girls down the back for that matter) and had flown with the F/O and the F/E on the DC-10. They were first class operators and so was the captain who used to be Chief Pilot.

Most of us who were around at that time were of the opinion that they were blown out of the sky by a PLO bomb which had been put on board in Cairo and was timed to go off over US territory. The unscheduled fuel stop at Gander meant that it went off shortly after take-off.

One thing I know for sure is that there is no way that the crew would be screwing around with going flying covered in ice or anything like that. They were real professionals.

[lomapaseo]

Most of us who were around at that time were of the opinion that they were blown out of the sky by a PLO bomb which had been put on board in Cairo and was timed to go off over US territory. The unscheduled fuel stop at Gander meant that it went off shortly after take-off.

One thing I know for sure is that there is no way that the crew would be screwing around with going flying covered in ice or anything like that. They were real professionals.


As long as were on thread drift

The issues in choosing between the two causes "Ice" or "explosives" is that with a possible explosive the evidence is there to be seen.

While with ice the evidence melts and a flight performance analysis is used to choose between the two possibilities.

[JW411]

"With a possible explosive the evidence is there to be seen".

Normally I would agree with you but when the aeroplane is already stuffed full of explosives then it might be a little bit more more difficult to isolate exactly which bit came from where. In addition, it might also be politically expedient not to come to that conclusion. That is probably why half of the investigation board refused to go along with the icing theory.

I have even read a report that suggests that they (the US authorities)wanted the crash site covered over as quickly as possible for reasons that might involve a geiger counter.

[TowerDog]

Towerdog,
I take it you are a current or ex- Connie driver.

Negative..Ex-Evergreen, Ex-Tower Air, Ex-Tradewinds and ex a few other 747 operators.

[RetroFire]

Where I come from, taking off from an intersection with out take off data for that intersection is illegal, no matter what anyone thinks about how the aircraft will perform at whatever weight.

Was there any mention in the report of the flight engineer recaculating the T/O data for a B1 departure?

[WhalePFE]

They did not take off from an intersection. Read the report, they declined a POS & HOLD because they needed full length. If anyone has ever flown out of EBBR, the way they taxied onto the runway they were not able to get the full effect of RWY 20. RWY 20 is not normally used and they were thinking full length the whole time. We are all aviators, read the report, learn from others misfortunes and don't eat your own!

[GlueBall]

RetroFire: "Where I come from, taking off from an intersection with out take off data for that intersection is illegal"

That's interesting, because just the other month, at JFK 13R we took intersection PD because another airplane was sitting at PE intersection with a delay. We didn't have Runway analysis for PD, but because the pavement length altogether is 14,500+ feet, we used our collective good common sense and took off at PD; . . . because our manual, at the very beginning, says something to the effect that we are not constrained from using common sense. And if we would have had an abort of sorts, we would still be "legal" because the pavement length still exceeded operational criteria. No abacus needed. :ooh:

[MU3001A]

Was there any mention in the report of the flight engineer recaculating the T/O data for a B1 departure?

Checking out EBBR on Google maps, it looks like they should have been able to achieve close to the full published length of 9,800' from B1, according to the satellite photo.

[WhalePFE]

Approx. 9100'

[MU3001A]

I would have thought it should be possible to achieve a little better even than that, close to the length available from W4.