Squishy Captains

[jolly girl]

Going through the "Stroppy FO" thread, I came across some interesting comments:

"But to address your point about management training for captains. I think it's a good idea in principle. I didn't receive any specific management training but I'd have certainly benefited from it in the "early years"!."

"'m an F/O and fly with 1 or 2 captains who are quite frankly a CRM disaster, whilst I would never sit back whilst they did something they shouldn't (yes captains do it too ) "

"I work with a couple of captains who have terrible CRM.. To cap this off, one has terrible hands on skill and the other is poor on the SOP front..."

So let's turn it around a bit... lets say you have a Captain who instills (?) a negative power gradient on the flight deck... his/her cockpit is a democracy where everyone has an equal vote, SOPs may or may not be adhered to, you are unsure whether he/she has the big picture at any given time, and there are moments you question whether he/she has any air sense. This Captain is well established and is seen as an asset by management. What, in this environment, is an FO to do?

[Tee Emm]

That problem is more common than people may think. Apart from keeping a wary eye on his flight path control and general decision making, you are stuck with this type. At least his character is probably less dangerous than the arrogant authoritarian because you can subtly prompt him. You cannot do the same with the Captain Queeg type of character who will disregard your advice on principle.

[IGh]

In the first slot above the question posed is about interactions with the weak-RESPECTED-captain, dealing with an incorrect power-gradient.

The first "role-reversal" case that came to mind is described in the AAR mentioned below: weak Captain? Or is it just too early in their interaction?

From AAR91-05 [NW1482 /3Dec90 DC9 DTW incursion-collision],
“Analysis”, Section 2.2.2, “Role Reversal in Cockpit”, pg53:

“… a nearly complete and unintentional reversal of command roles took place in the cockpit of the DC-9 shortly after taxiing began. The result was that the captain became overly reliant on the first officer. The captain essentially acquiesced to the first officer’s assumption of leadership. This role reversal contributed significantly to the eventual runway incursion.

“… the role reversal began when the captain asked the first officer if he was familiar with DTW and was told ‘yes’….

“… the first officer … was not as familiar with the layout as he had led the captain to believe…. he meant to convey the fact that he was familiar with the pushback and radio frequency changeover … rather than the layout of taxiways….

“Numerous examples of this domination were evident before and during the early part of the taxi sequence, as the pilots became lost in the fog.”
Section 3, “Conclusions”, pg77; Findings #10 and #11:
“10. A reversal of command roles occurred during the accident sequence … first officer made most of the decisions regarding taxi activity and the captain tacitly relinquished his command role.

“11. The first officer misled the captain concerning his familiarity with DTW and failed to follow the captain’s direct instructions on three occasions prior to the runway incursion.”
Weak captain? Or maybe an overbearing FO? Or is just early together?

The Board points out that the FO was just beginning his second flying career, at age 43, a former USAF B-52 IP, & new to airline ops, finished airline-IOE just five months prior: the FO was still in his probationary period with the now merged NWA (after NW’s marriage with the Banana-Republic conglomeration).

Those two men had just met, flying their first leg together; mishap occurred just after initial taxi-out, after the first push-back of that first trip.

AAR pg52 & 53 states that the FO exaggerated his prior military accomplishments during pre-taxi conversation, “tendency to embellish his stature in the eyes of the captain”.

[Bullethead]

tendency to embellish his stature in the eyes of the captain

Over the years I've seen quite a bit of this behavior from both ex-military and ex-general aviation types who have previous command experience and who apparently have trouble accepting the new position in their flying life as a co-pilot rather than a Captain.

Everyone has a different background and various and interesting stories to tell. I listen to them all and find all the stories fascinating. One thing I never do is get into a pissing contest by bringing up my background, which after flying for over 35 years, in the airlines and in the military, has had some interesting moments.

Quite often after being given a severe 'listening to' any adverse pressure on the cockpit gradient disappears.

Regards,
BH.