Commercial Pressure on Engineering

[shoey1976]

Dear all

I'm hoping some of the longterm regulars may recognise me - I've not been on pprune for some time.

My name is Ian Shoesmith and I am a BBC News journalist. For the past three years or so, I've been interested in aviation stories and have produced a couple of major investigations into safety concerns within the industry.

They have all involved a great deal of time and resources, and we have painstakingly weighed up all of the evidence before deciding to publish our findings. Examples of my work include the following:

BBC NEWS | UK | Pilots raise fears over fatigue (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6236810.stm)
BBC NEWS | UK | Air passengers' safety 'at risk' (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7307354.stm)

Each investigation involved me speaking -- in complete confidence -- to dozens of pilots and other aviation professionals. Please be rest assured that any conversations we have will be in the strictest confidence, and completely off-record unless we agree otherwise.

At the moment, I am keen to test an allegation put forward to me by a source within the aviation engineering community. He told me that he fears safety is being compromised because engineers are coming under increasing pressure from pilots and management "not to rock the boat" and to turn a blind eye to serious defects.

He also revealed that more than 80% of all faults are reported on or after homeward legs rather than after downroute sectors. The clear inference being that aircraft -- with problems such as bald tyres, defective hydraulics, engine problems -- are being flown back to the UK in the full knowledge that they should be "no go". Furthermore, my source claims, problems with aircraft are known about, and discussed verbally, but are not written into the aircraft log if it is known the problems can be fixed quickly.

Finally, it is claimed the CAA are not being as robust as they could be owing to the fact that it benefits financially from regulating a growing industry. Parallels were drawn between the way it regulates airlines, and the way the FSA regulated the banks.

Now obviously the above allegations are very serious, and are worthy of further investigation. Anybody in the know can contact me by email: [email protected] or phone 07769 977665.

Best wishes

Ian Shoesmith
BBC News

[John Farley]

He also revealed that more than 80% of all faults are reported on or after homeward legs rather than after downroute sectors.

The clear inference being that aircraft -- with problems such as bald tyres, defective hydraulics, engine problems -- are being flown back to the UK in the full knowledge that they should be "no go".

Ian

I am not an airline pilot but as a former test pilot I am well aware of commercial pressures in many aspects of aviation.

I do not agree with the second para of the quote above. I don't see the first para as a clear inference (operative word clear) in the way you take it - merely that the crew have decided the issue is perfectly acceptable to carry back to base given their knowledge of it and its effects on the outbound leg, but they would not like to see it carried over to another day's operation. The known quality of the base engineers work is often another consideration compared to farming out a problem down route where a poorly executed repair can result in risks that are greater than the known one from the outbound leg.

Not quite a case of "If it ain't broke don't fix it" but more "If it ain't that bad let's not risk fiddling with it here".

JF

[happybiker]

The Engineering Unions ALAE and AEI have been promoting this issue for some time. As a couple of years have past since it was last aired is this another approach via the BBC?

Pilots Not Reporting Aircraft Defects When They Happen, but When It is Convenient - Business News - redOrbit (http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/1099781/pilots_not_reporting_aircraft_defects_when_they_happen_but_w hen/index.html)

Aircraft maintenance 'putting passengers' lives at risk' - Telegraph (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/733471/Aircraft-maintenance-putting-passengers-lives-at-risk.html)

[hawker750]

Ian
The UK aviation industry is the pride of Europe and possibly the World with Pilots and Engineers doing a very professional job. CAA and EASA contribute to a very robust and highly regulated industry that has resulted in an extremely high level of safety.
It is very dangerous for an amateur like yourselve to delve into things that you do not understand because inevetably you will get the wrong end of the stick, so I hope that nobody will discuss our industry with you. I also feel that you have a cheek to advertise for information on this forum.

If you want to do our Industry a service do an article on the way Airport security hassles Pilots and Engineers to such an extent that crews can operate in a unfit states of mind, but that is probly not sensational enough for yoi

[Caractacus]

The clear inference being that aircraft -- with problems such as bald tyres, defective hydraulics, engine problems -- are being flown back to the UK in the full knowledge that they should be "no go". Furthermore, my source claims, problems with aircraft are known about, and discussed verbally, but are not written into the aircraft log if it is known the problems can be fixed quickly.


I doubt any UK airline pilot would want to get airborne with any of those defects Ian. However, in respect of lesser technical problems this is exactly what happens in some airlines. The point is that the Captain has to make his decision taking into account all the circumstances of the flight. Thus a minor defect that is no problem in one set of circumstances may be a real problem in another set of circumstances. Sad but true some airlines operations departments will try and argue the toss and pressure the Captain to fly.

Some years ago I was working as a B737 Captain for an airline that is a well known household name. They Board decided to tighten up on delays. The working practice used was to 'have a quiet word' with a number of Captains on the Fleet (typically new commands) about technical delays. It was suggested or implied that it would 'help the company out' if defects were generally recorded on the last landing and not downroute as this might be less disruptive to the schedule.

In my experience a number of junior Captains picked up on this 'hint' and I noticed an increasing tendency for verbal handovers of defects that were strictly MEL items. On one occasion on a midday rotation leaving base I was verbally told of a flap defect that was clearly a no go. I insisted the departing Skipper 'put it in the book'. The flight was probably delayed all of thirty minutes whilst it was fixed.

This topic is one of those hoary old chestnuts that comes round from time to time. It's difficult to get it into the public domain and difficult to stamp out. So yes, it does happen, it's not good and the CAA need always to keep a close eye on tech log entries to make sure the defects are recorded across the network and not predominately at home operating base.

I'm also not sure that company engineers are always, by default, the best option as they too can get caught up in this culture. On occasion I have found a more objective and independent opinion from contract engineers down route. These guys, being outside company culture, can be more quick to ground an aircraft quite simply because there can be little or no comeback on them.

[Bealzebub]

At the moment, I am keen to test an allegation put forward to me by a source within the aviation engineering community. He told me that he fears safety is being compromised because engineers are coming under increasing pressure from pilots and management "not to rock the boat" and to turn a blind eye to serious defects.

Well Ian, it certainly fails this "pilots" test! When you say engineers are coming under pressure from "pilots" and management "not to rock the boat," do you mean both Captains and First Officers are making "these executive decisions?" Is it a case of "pilots" are just captains in the exciting world of tabloid journalism?

Engineering (in case your "source" was unaware) have effective dispatch control until the aircraft is presented to the captain for his signature in the aircrafts Technical log. Not the pilot, but the captain. At this point if the captain is unhappy with the status of any aspect of the aircraft he can refuse to accept it. He may (and very often will) accept defects that have been deferred for rectification at a later point in time. This is done in conjunction with the manufacturers/regulators approved list of defects that may be deferred for all or certain types of flight operation.

Your suggestion that captains (or if you prefer "pilots") are placing pressure on engineers to act beyond the approved configuration or approved defects lists, would be downright insulting if it wasn't so risibly ludicrous. Do you think we really, collectively place ourselves and our passsengers in known jeopardy because of some compelling need to dispatch, or for fear of reprisal from our management?

Believe me if there is a "serious defect" that is not allowable or otherwise subject to special provision, it doesn't go. Where I work the engineers would normally come to that conclusion before I or any of my colleagues was required to.

He also revealed that more than 80% of all faults are reported on or after homeward legs rather than after downroute sectors.

There are items that occur downroute that might warrant a maintenance entry in the tech log, such as brake wear indicators getting close to the limit, or tyre wear approaching an unacceptable level etc. However an entry in the tech' log would simply require the captain to transfer it as a deferred entry to another part of the same tech' log and operate back to base. Such items are often entered on the return journey for action on return to base. This would account for 80% of tech log entries (if your source is blessed with an accurate figure,) occuring on the inbound sector. Human nature being what it is, this is more of a paperwork reduction excercise, rather than anything more sinister.

Engineers are professional and in my experience not the shyest of individuals when they have a point to make. Captains are also professionals who occupy a position of trust and authority, coupled with maturity, asssertiveness, and the charge to make sensible (and sometimes unpopular) decisions and judgment calls. I can perhaps understand that some of the contribution to these forums, might lead you to come to an opposite conclusion, but the reality is mercifully very different.

Finally, it is claimed the CAA are not being as robust as they could be owing to the fact that it benefits financially from regulating a growing industry. Parallels were drawn between the way it regulates airlines, and the way the FSA regulated the banks.

The CAA can defend themselves. They are an emination of the state, rather like the Inland Revenue. Similarly I doubt they have many ardent supporters in the public arena. Ask them and see what they say.

Changing the subject somewhat Ian. I am often surprised by the number of otherwise unknown journalists who are afforded extra priviliges and perks by appearing on our cabin crews "special passenger advice" lists. Given their otherwise complete lack of celebrity, I am assuming they telephone in advance to promote their particular presence? I wonder if the reception they receive has influence on the stories they subsequently write? Perhaps that needs investigating? Anyway good luck with your story. Unfortunetaly if it actually bears any resembelance to most "pilots" and engineers actual experience, I doubt it will get to end its days on the floor of many a budgies cage. I suppose we all need to make a living, you might as well do it by impuning our collective reputations.

[BOAC]

We had a lot of speculative and unsupported allegations aired on these fora by a character called 'Safety Concerns' who appeared to be an internet voice for an outfit called AEI. The allegations began over TAP, the Portuguese carrier - at least those were the first I noticed.

I invited SC to respond to a thread (http://www.pprune.org/questions/365431-aei-campaign-results.html) I opened in 'Questions' on 10 March to try to stop him/her contaminating the main thread running in Rumours at the time, but there has been no response. I ask you to review the lack of response and I would endorse the request to you to be cautious with this 'problem', which on the 'evidence' (not) presented to us is NOT a problem. I would also add that in my longish time in aviation we are not looking at a pandemic here.

[Two's in]

All the commercial pressure in the world doesn't change the fact that if you carry a snag that should be written up, as the pilot, you will probably be the first to arrive at the scene of the accident when it all goes wrong. It's not quite self-regulation, but it does motivate those who might be tempted to display their non-qualified engineering knowledge at inappropriate moments.

Ask yourself what the motivation behind these posts are to see what the real story is.

[lomapaseo]

I guess that anybody with an audience can raise safety concerns based on rumor, so called insider information or tidbits to attract readership.

A true safety professional would recognize the difference between malfunctions and imperfections and a measuarble degradation in safety.

So unless you are willing and able to put forth all the day to day defects in flight along with the mitigating assumptions in the aircraft design than all your have is emotional the "sky is falling" headlines.

And yes they certainly are commercial pressures on everybody contributing to aviation including the regulator, pilots and engineers. So what else is new?

[glad rag]

The difference Lompasso is the scope and scale of the current fiscal crisis.

Today I had two consecutive delayed flights, both requiring de-bussing, one for a worn tyre at Toulouse on arrival (!) and one for cabin conditioning/ strong sulpher smell on start up. The only delay I have had in the past 3 yrs travelling was single french air traffic/gatwick fog problem

Of course we will never know the number of GA across all the different airline companies do you want to bet that the tightening of the purse strings is having NO effect on the dispatch rates?

cheers

GR

[ballyctid]

Ian,

Here it is from an engineers point of view...

Although I am no longer at the forefront due to a career change I have been in many a situation where commercial pressure reared it's head, myself and all my colleagues never, and I mean 100% never succumned to commercial pressure. It's simple really, as long as you are right then you stand your ground and there can be no comeback.

As for carrying defects to the end of the day, yes it happens but these defects will be things that are not flight critical, I have been in situations where crews for whatever reason didn't want to do the last 2 sectors of the day and wanted to make the aircraft tech and I have asked them to carry the non critical defect to the end of days flying so it can be addressed later. On the other hand I have had a few crews who wanted to take an aircraft which I have deemed unairworthy and have had to persuade them otherwise, in one instance I consfiscated the log book from the flight deck!

Rest assured Ian, the reason why the UK and most of the leading countries in the world have very few accidents is because we as engineers and the professionalism of the flight crews will not under any circumstances take risks.

If you're looking for headline making stories do as a previous poster suggested and look into the security farce, it's the one reason why I left the day to day ritual of trying to get through security with my bottle of lucozade but I could with a tool box full of hammers, stanley knives and leathermans!!

[Stan Woolley]

Amazingly defensive bunch aren't we?

Don't know for sure but here is someone who might be able to make a positive difference in some way. There's nobody more cynical than I am but just ask yourselves if the attitudes displayed here are doing us any favours?

Or maybe everything in the aviation world is just fine?

[dixi188]

Ian Shoesmith,

You do no favours to the "PRESS" that you represent by trawling here for stories.

When I read a news story about aviation, I find that a lot of the information put forward as fact is incorrect. (It's not difficult to check facts, use Google)

This causes my wife to tell me to stop nit picking, but if I can see holes in stories about a subject in which I have some knowlege (40 years in aviation), what conclusions can I draw when it comes to stories about which I have little knowlege.

Anything I read in print or see on TV, I now treat with a lot of scepticism.

Slowly becoming a grumpy old man,
Regards, Dixi188.

[Sunfish]

Extract from a private message, names removed, concerning your neck of the woods, not Australia.

I also witnessed a B737 making an overweight landing in **** due to a birdstrike on departure. The a/c returned, quickly checked over and departed again. When asked about if the crew would file an ASR and make a tech log entry, the Ops supervisor replied "nah, we don't do paperwork" !!

[RB311]

Ian,

Your initial investigative premise is that "pilots" would knowingly take an unworthy aircraft into the air? One that they happen to be strapped to?

Mmmmm. Let me think about that.

It is highly unlikely.

Like several of my fellow posters, the story you should be investigating is the scandal that is UK airport security....

The daily and ritual humilation aircrew are subjected to, not just at out-stations but also at their home bases, in the UK, is utterly disproportionate and completely unjustifiable.

Shoes off, belts off, 125ml tubs of yoghurt confiscated, tooth paste tubes squeezed etc etc, not just once in a while, but all the time......

You might gain a few more sympathetic and helpful responses if instead of trying to find angles to undermine such a highly professional and constantly checked and assessed industry, you direct your illustrious journalistic inquisitation towards areas which try and throw grit into the highly engineered gearbox that is the UK aviation industry.

RB311

[h3dxb]

M.A.403 Aircraft defects
(a) Any aircraft defect that hazards seriously the flight safety shall be rectified before further flight.
(b) Only the authorised certifying staff, according to M.A.801(b)1, M.A.801(b)2 or Part-145 can decide, using M.A.401
maintenance data, whether an aircraft defect hazards seriously the flight safety and therefore decide when and which
rectification action shall be taken before further flight and which defect rectification can be deferred. However, this
does not apply when:
1. the approved minimum equipment list as mandated by the competent authority is used by the pilot; or,
2. aircraft defects are defined as being acceptable by the competent authority.
(c) Any aircraft defect that would not hazard seriously the flight safety shall be rectified as soon as practicable, after the
date the aircraft defect was first identified and within any limits specified in the maintenance data.
(d) Any defect not rectified before flight shall be recorded in the M.A.305 aircraft maintenance record system or
M.A.306 operator's technical log system as applicable.


When a pilot is not reporting, he violates JAR OPS and loses his job.
When a engineer is not reporting ,he loses his license.

I don't want to lose my license for the peanuts I earn.
When I have any doubts I ground a plane, doesn't matter from where the pressure comes from....................

[sussex2]

Commercial pressures in aviation? Of course there are as the whole thing is a business in which people attempt to make money. Pretty much a vain attempt these days but hey ho things can change.
They haven't changed mind you for about 50 years or more. What has changed is regulation on account of the unacceptable number of bodies at the end of the runway; which is why aviation, or any other method of transportion, including your average car, is now more safe then ever before.
I cannot think of anyone, except a complete maverick, who would knowingly put a flight at risk.
If you seek sensation I would look elsewhere.

[girtbar]

I think fatigue is a bigger risk than pressures that are placed on Engineering.

It might be more of an issue with a smaller outfit but the big boys (and i hope FR are included) have too much to loose if their engineering depts start making mistakes. Making the a/c serviceable is paramount, but thats not to be read as at by any means possible ie; a short cut.

Company management who are operating on bank bonus wage structures might be an area to look at, while they work their crew to the bone so they can get paid their bonus, crews are leaving work drained, tired, and about to do it all again the next day.

Banks have folded with the risks bankers took, but airline management are still operating with the same payment structures! Thats where mistakes are being made, pressure being put on etc.

[Joetom]

When you have Managers who are rewarded for good TDR (tech dispatch rate) by cash and other means that are connected by contact/control of working Engineers the lines will get a little blurred.

In the old days, many Managers had required licience cover on the aircraft to just pop their details on any paperwork as they saw fit.

Of late, many Managers don't have required licience cover on the aircraft, so they can try to apply pressure to working engineers, so work it out for yourself.

Of interest, just watched the news about a 747 flying low around NYC with a Mill Jet following, a mistake they say, more interest to me is how many people where aware of this mission and for whatever reason were unable stop it !!! Would like to think some raised it may cause a problem, but who knows !!!

[Capot]

Ian

A word in your shell-like......

The story you are pursuing is a non-story. 25 - 30 years ago I worked for a company, owned and run by an aircraft engineer who knew too many wrinkles, where the words AOG instead of grounding an aircraft merely triggered an order for the replacement component while the aircraft carried on flying. This was under the noses of a compliant CAA where corruption was not uncommon. Those days have gone, thank God, and the statistics of a steady reduction in maintenance errors prove it. You should start, and probably stop, your investigation with a cold look at the facts, and then ignore the silly gossip that the industry loves so much, especially the uninformed among us.

One budget airline that I know has the best maintenance I have ever seen, with funds to keep it so, for the simple and good reason that this saves a lot of money in the medium and long run, even in the short run. A 4-hour maintenance delay can reverberate through the entire system and cost hundreds of thousands of pounds, even if you are slow to compensate your customers. It is hard pragmatism at work.

Defects carried when they shouldn't be can be very expensive, to say nothing of dangerous, so the idea that this happens for commercial reasons is, by and large, rubbish.

Commonsense rules; as someone has said better than I can, the optimum course, and smallest risk is frequently to carry an allowed defect back to base. The notion that pilots will carry unallowed defects because of "pressure" is absurd except, perhaps, in the most extreme case where both the pilot and the person applying presssure are idiot mavericks who willingly put themselves, their passengers and their careers at risk.

The words "Accountable Manager" have a meaning that they don't have outside this industry. I am one, and I am not going to risk jail by even allowing something illegal to ne done, let alone encouraging it. The words "I take full responsibility" mean much more with us than when muttered uselessly by Gordon Brown or a banker.

And I'll join those who say your target should the security idiocy that's perpetrated daily round the world. Just as a starter for 10 have a look at the process in which an aircraft goes for maintenance in an unsecured hangar and then comes back into service, and when you've done that look in depth at where, when, if and how cargo is checked. Don't be fooled by the visible, look under the stones. And then do a piece about how the lunacy in airports in nothing but a show to give Governments a warm feeling that they are Doing Something Constructive, when, as ever, the reality is that they are Doing F**k All, because Doing Something Constructive might lose them some friends.

As an example of the silly aviation gossip network that passes on misinformation with a knowing wink, read the post above again;

I also witnessed a B737 making an overweight landing in **** due to a birdstrike on departure. The a/c returned, quickly checked over and departed again. When asked about if the crew would file an ASR and make a tech log entry, the Ops supervisor replied "nah, we don't do paperwork" !!The clue is in the words "quickly checked over and departed". Now why was that? Because there was nothing wrong, that's why. What would have been bad is if no check had been carried out, but, of course, it was.

[Memetic]

dixi188

You do no favours to the "PRESS" that you represent by trawling here for stories.

When I read a news story about aviation, I find that a lot of the information put forward as fact is incorrect. (It's not difficult to check facts, use Google)

You complain about a journalist researching a story, then in the next breath complain that journalists do not check facts.

What better place to come than PPrune to ask professionals for facts and opinion before writing an aviation story if, as a professional journalist, you want to get your facts right?

The industry has learned it needs open reporting, why not adopt more open media relations? Simply clamming up achieves at best nothing, at worst allows falsehoods and errors to gain momentum.

Real communication is two way, so next time you spot an error in a story, let the journalist know, explaining why it matters.

[foresight]

There are some touchy people out there.

It is not a ‘non story’ but a story that has been going on as long as I can remember. It is a fact of aviation life and is borne of the conflict between safety and commercial interest that affects decisions in aviation every day. If a journalist wants to investigate, then he is simply doing his job. As it happens, like others, I think there will be little to be found and that current regulation and reporting systems work very well. It is neither desirable, nor within our power to keep the media out of technical areas of aviation which it seems some here would like. It may be difficult for a lay person to get a handle on certain aspects such as the tendency for tech logs to be fuller on return to base or complex engineering regulations. However that is an opportunity to educate and explain instead of getting all defensive - which might even make the guy wonder where the bodies are hidden (journalists being necessarily even more cynical than pilots). And if,by chance, there were a body (which I doubt as much as anyone) the egg will be running down some faces here.

If you want the media to look at MP’s expenses, the banking crisis or whatever, then we have no right to clam up when it comes to our patch. Like it or not, there is less deference and less trust in the expert and the professional nowadays. We won’t win it back by slamming the flight deck or engineering office door.

[Silent Running]

Like previous commentators I would suggest turning your attention to the appalling treatment aircrew are receiving from UK airport security.

Last week I was subjected to what would be termed physical assault, anywhere else in the civilized world, whilst passing through Heathrow airport terminal 3 security.

I was completely humiliated, left fuming and mentally stressed prior to a operating a long haul flight.

How much more of this do we have to endure before this sort of treatment leads to an incident; ending the lives of those people the security system is supposed to be protecting!:\

[Tom Sawyer]

Ian,
as an Engineer for a major UK carrier based at an "Outstation" I think I am well qualified to respond. Put simply there is no substantive grounds for your story. Personally I have never dispatched an aircraft with any of the type of defects you mention, unless I can legally do so under the MEL or our comapny in house dispensation procedures. Worn out tyres is simply a no-go. I grounded a aircraft of another carrier only 10 days ago due to a tyre problem and had no qualms about doing so. Due to the growing litageous nature of the aviation world it is simply not worth it, and on a personal level it is all about pride in the work you produce. Engineers have a reputation for being cynical and beligerent and this maybe comes from the fact in general we do not bow to commercial pressure, although we are of course mindful of the current economic climate. In fact, I think it is more likely the case that if we did come under any pressure from someone, we would more likely dig our heels in. No one can over ride my decision. It is under my hard earned Licence that I dispatch aircraft, I'm not going to throw it away at the behest of some bean counter who wants the aircraft back no matter what.
There are problems with the actually legislative side of aircraft maintenance, and you maybe worth discussing these with the ALAE who fight long and hard on our behalf to maintain the status of Licensed Aircraft Engineers. They are currently investigating one such situation, but it is to do with Licensing and not actual aircraft defects.
Personally, I'd rather you approach the story from the angle of the degradation of our status. To obtain an UK CAA B1 Licence these days is a long and difficult journey, approximatley 7 years. Once you hold that licence you have proved yourself to degree level. We value it, and the industry needs it (and should recognise that) to maintain and improve high levels of safety we already have.

[lomapaseo]

You complain about a journalist researching a story, then in the next breath complain that journalists do not check facts.

What better place to come than PPrune to ask professionals for facts and opinion before writing an aviation story if, as a professional journalist, you want to get your facts right?


as an Engineer for a major UK carrier based at an "Outstation" I think I am well qualified to respond. Put simply there is no substantive grounds for your story. Personally I have never dispatched an aircraft with any of the type of defects you mention, unless I can legally do so

Above we have the opinions of two separate posters.

Do any of us expect a balance story or will it be just a reciting of selected opinions some good and some bad without any qualified measurement system of "acceptable risk"

As a Ppruner I don't have an opinion on this since insufficient facts have been presented by the sources. Pprune is not the place to develop a factual data base since most of what is offered are selected opinions based on only a smattering of visible facts.

[Graybeard]

I would suggest you get comfortable with this concept and practice, Ian. Then, if you want to do a real service to humanity, investigate and report why CRM isn't being put to extensive use in hospitals everywhere. CRM is the pride of much of our industry, and it transfers readily to other disciplines.

Reportedly, some 80,000 people die from mistakes in US hospitals every year. Visualize that number of fatalities in airline accidents.

The order of command in the cockpit in some cultures is:
the Captain,
then God,
then whoever else.

It's said to be even more so in operating rooms.

GB

[matkat]

Ian, as an Engineer of over 30 years standing, the phrase about Pilots puting pressure on Engineers is frankly ridiculous, never once has any pilot(Capt.or FO) ever even hinted to me that I should sign off a defective aircraft so that they can fly it! it really just shows what you and your fellow journos know or indeed think of our industry and may I suggest that you ditch your "source" as they obviously have about as much knowledge of the industry as you have, further you try to justify your enquiry by informing us of your previous programs I would assume by the initial question that they would be as ill informed as this one looks likely to be.:=

[BAe146s make me cry]

In the UK, aircraft maintenance is generally of a high standard when compared to other non-EASA and certain (not all) other EASA states.
I have worked in many countries to recognise and appreciate that fact.

Here is one very real outstanding UK aircraft maintenance standards issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
To quote Tom Sawyer::: 'To obtain an UK CAA B1 Licence these days is a long and difficult journey, approximatley 7 years. Once you hold that licence you have proved yourself to degree level. We value it, and the industry needs it (and should recognise that) to maintain and improve high levels of safety we already have.'
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course there are exceptions. The UKCAA converted 20+ approved
mechanics to EASA Part 66 status in September 2006 in less than a week for the largest UK airline. There was a deadline to meet in September 2006 and the all powerful commercial requirement was there. The UKCAA also converted at least one individual for the 'bearded one's' airline. These conversions are permitted as long as the regulatory conversion procedure is followed.

Personnel have to meet the minimum training & experience criteria, therefore they would all need thorough assessment. No assessments were carried out and the individuals concerned did not perform any examinations. EASA Part 66 Licences were then issued by the UKCAA incorrectly. Many thousands of UK/EASA registered aircraft at various European line stations (& Beardy's guy at KJFK) have been and continue to be certified by these individuals daily since then.

EASA have since proven upon a standardisation inspection at the UKCAA that the required conversion procedure was not followed. There is an outstanding and uncorrected EASA finding on these conversions.

With respect to the above, what EASA/EC will actually enforce remains to be seen. EASA/EC were 'forced' into taking action with INAC of Portugal only recently.

This '20+ approved mechanics-to-part 66' issue remains an open case pursued by the ALAE (1981). The UKCAA remain convinced the licences are legal but evidence collected externally and retrieved by the FOI act so far by the ALAE (1981) would suggest otherwise.

The UKCAA 's poor comparison 'Its only 20 or so out of 14,000 Licences issued' doesn't work well with those that have worked hard on courses, with long study and final examination to attain the Part 66 licence correctly.

There has to be consequences for Competent Authorities, Organisations AND Individuals when it comes to wrongful interpretation of regulations & deliberate violations (for mere convenience) in the MRO industry.
One word. Standards.

BAe
Licenced Avionics Technician
www.alae.org (http://www.alae.org)

[bizdev]

Ian,
Whenever a defect or comment is written into the Tech Log it is transfered, along with the rectification action taken, into the airline's maintenance organistion computer system. Each defect is given a specific ATA code, for example Air Conditioning defects are chaper 21, hydraulic are chapter 29. The codes are further broken down to indicate a more specfic area of the system.

This information (PIREPS - Pilot Reports) is used by maintenance organisations to monitor aircraft reliability, recurring/repetative defects, rogue components etc.

However, I suspect that if you ran a PIREP report against home reported 'defects' compared to defects raised at outstations, you may well see an 80/20 split. However you need to be very carefull the way you interpret this - it does not mean that pilots are carrying derects to home base. Many 'defects' are observations to give engineers a heads-up of a developing problem e.g. "no1 pneumatic pressure is reading 50 psi lower than no.2". Not in itself a defect - the pressures may be in limits - but a possible indicatiion of a Pressure Reducing Valve about to give trouble.

You know what they say about statistics!

Hope this helps
Bizdev

[hawker750]

Ian
BizDev and about 90% of the rest have told it to you straight. We pride our industry and the professional standards of the people in it (CAA, EASA, Pilots, engineers, dispatchers and all). We have expensive and time consuming practices that make our industry as safe as possible. Every "journo" article about avaition I have read is invariably full of misquotes. innaccuracies and simple untruthes. So back off this one
I would hate to read another similar article.

[mrmagooo]

In my experience, as pretty much everyone else has stated, I have never been under pressure from pilots to just sign off defects or management for that matter. If there is a defect I and the crew work together so I get a full understanding of the defect, even this involves the crew bus waiting outside while I get a full Q&A session with the Captain (after it has been written in the tech log).

As people have said look at the security issue, especially as Capot pointed out with regards moving aircraft, that is an absolute farce, anybody involved with it knows how flawed it is. :ugh::ugh:

[TURIN]

Ian, your aim is a tad off.

Commercial pressures exist but they never manifest themselves through the Flt Crew.

30 yrs on the job, 20+ as a certifying Engineer and I have never had a Captain ask me to "Pen off" a defect.

Pressures come from a much more subtle direction. The people who know nothing or very little about what makes an aircraft tick or what hoops engineers and flt crew have to jump through to gain the privelage of doing their job. It is they, the station managers and gound staff, with 400 passengers all demanding why their holiday is delayed, they who ask the (to us) stupid questions and direct their stress levels upon us who are trying our damndest to fix whatever happens to be delaying them. They have a drip, drip effect on, especially line engineers, as they want the aircraft two hours ago, the crew are going out of hours, there's a 'jet ban' at *** after midnight etc, etc.
I could give examples but I know they would be used out of context and without reservation.
Yes, commercial pressures exist and can be cause for concern, but it is not through sensational journalism that an answer will be found. It is through the constant vigilance and professional attitude of Licenced Engineers, Flt Crew, Dispatchers etc that will stop the smoking holes in the ground.

I trust the media about as far as I could comfortably spit a rat, I never buy newspapers and take TV news with a pinch of salt. The wild speculation and panic surrounding Swine Flu being the latest prime example.
If you want facts Shoey, get access to CHIRP.

Good Luck. :ok:

[shoey1976]

Dear all
Thanks to everybody for taking the time to respond to my questions, both on pprune forum and in PMs.
From experience using pprune, a good proportion of what is written here must be taken with a pinch of salt (as with all sources!). But there are a number of gems which have led me to question my starting premise (as did an experienced captain contact of mine, when we spoke recently).
Bashing the media is very easy to do, and indeed we do collectively deserve it. I'm not immune from that, but like 99% of people working in the aviation industry, I do take a great deal of pride in my work: in getting things right; in being balanced. I hope my track record in aviation matters backs this up.
Finally thanks for suggesting other potential stories eg the effect of increased security. Will certainly take a further look whenever I can get time away from my day-job as a producer on Radio 5 Live.
Cheers, and feel free to get in touch any time...
Ian

[TrafficPilot]

I'm a journalist, reporter and a Pilot. I've been working in commercial news radio (IRN/LBC) for over 20 years. Flying is my first love and I now combine radio broadcasting and flying in my current job.

I'd also like to see Ian pick up on the issues regarding pilot fatigue in commercial flight operations. There is definitely a story there which needs reporting to a wider audience before a major accident happens.

TrafficPilot

[Pugilistic Animus]

I am glad to see an ethical journalists, researching their facts on a valuable Website, and not attempting to disguise himself. It's a good thing to be able to educate the media,...so that less sensationalism appears

Ian did the right thing IMHO:ok:

PA

[Busbert]

The tyres/brakes thing could be a red herring.
Several airlines (indeed most that I have dealt with in the UK) have differing criteria for tyre/brake removal at home base rather than outstation.
The criteria for outstation is the approved limit (e.g. worn to base of groove), with the criteria for home base being slightly less (e.g. for tyres it might be 1mm groove depth and under)
This is to ensure that there is enough rubber/carbon to last the day's operation, so that wheel/tyre changes (= delays) are greatly reduced during the day, and the logistics are better as there is less to ship back from outstations.

A well run outfit will have varying criteria for outstation/home base for such items with a soft limit for home base and a hard limit (approved minima) for outstations. This saves money for the airline, making best use of materiel and manpower, but without affecting safety/airworthiness.
The amber zone/red zone philosophy is something that 'good' airlines use.
To the uninitiated, it would look suspicious (bulk of servicing/component changes conveniently done at home).

The anology would be topping up the oil/water on your car at the start of a trip before it hits the low level mark, rather than just waiting for the red warning light to come on the dashboard.

[PJ2]

Ian;

FWIW, and there are so many very good contributions which express thoughts very well on this issue, specifically I think the contributions by Capot and TURIN are well worth considering in terms of pointing where you might look, and possible take the story you're working on. There are others here too who provide solid grains of truth but I think these two posts are good advice. I agree wholeheartedly with posters who highlight the issues with security and the attitude towards and the inappropriate treatment of crews - at times it is about power, not effective security measures - at other times it is simply about processes which assume the guilt of professional airline crews sometimes combined with the occasional opportunity to embarass or even harass crews - 'nuf said.

Specifically to both TURIN's and Capot's post in terms of the issues raised, in the U. S. and Canada the FAA and Transport Canada are handing over the responsibility of flight safety to the airlines and stepping back from their traditional regulatory and oversight roles. This is called "SMS" - Safety Management Systems". Most airline managements are still badly confused about how it works. Essentially, airline managements from the CEO down must, under the current business model, keep both commercial and safety priorities balanced. This is not always successful as the experience in the United States reveals; - there have already been a number of high profile incidents where airlines were caught not doing the safety job when no regulator was looking. You might examine this phenomenon in relation to American Airlines, Southwest Airlines and United Airlines. In my view it is only a matter of time before the same issues emerge in Canada. Whether "SMS" and the regulator's approach to safety oversight is the same in Britain I cannot say - you'll have to determine that for yourself. That said, where they obtain at all, the principles are the same regardless.

I strongly agree with other posters, especially the engineers and maintenance people who have offered their important view. I see enormous integrity within the dispatch, maintenance and middle flight ops management ranks - the notion of commercial compromise at those levels within most organizations does not have either broad or solid foundation. What I see in senior and executive management ranks is an inability to "talk safety" or to "talk technical" - the processes which keep the enterprise that they are leading, safe, are not the least bit understood, nor in my experience do they seem even mildly interested, leading one to ponder if these leaders know that they're in the aviation business first and all the rest, second.

The question you raise is an important one but you might consider stepping back from the specific aspect of "dispatching with bald tires" etc, (which, see above), to what is perhaps a less sexy, less easily conveyed, less easily understood perspective of organizational accidents - those kinds of accidents which occur when everyone is doing what they think is exactly the right thing - accidents/incidents which occur not because people are negligent, careless or lacking in professional or personal integrity but which occur because of a social/organizational phenomenon known as the "normalization of deviance" - legitimating a violation of what had been heretofor an established normality within an organization.

It is these kinds of factors which make possible the fact that good people with the highest/best intentions can make poor decisions when circumstances permit. A simple example can be reducing standards of safety because such reduction 'has been demonstrated by studies, etc' to have nil effect upon levels of safety, (ie, no recorded incidents) but has a measurably positive effect upon 'the bottom line' - ergo, the process is normalized, (instituionalized within the organization) and soon becomes "invisible" because of it's normalcy, until an accident occurs. A specific example might be the use of a fork-lift to raise an engine into te mounting bolts when the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) specifies special tools/machinery. The thinking is, 'the process worked many times without failure or result', so it becomes "normal". - Until an engine breaks away from the wing, breaking hydraulic lines causing the retraction of the LEDs, the crew follows legitimate SOPs and reduces speed to V2 and the slatless wing stalls, rolling the aircraft to 90degrees right after takeoff. Of course many will recognize this accident as the 1979 American Airlines DC10 at Chicago.

There are dozens of other examples; we might examine recent accidents such as the Spanair MD83 at Madrid, where everyone normalized the abberant behaviour of the TAT probe and resultant cockpit indications, ostensibly under the usual time pressures we all experience in this industry, (iow, I'm not saying time/commercial pressures caused the accident - but such were part of the circumstances we experience in every departure, not just that one).

The Challenger and Columbia space shuttle accidents are precise cases in point, and are well worth studying (lots of literature available) to bring this point home - and these accidents (other than the shuttle) occured in a far more robust regulatory environment than we have today - we have today the "privatization of flight safety" where the government is stepping back from it's normal role.

I understand you're not researching for a paper but for perhaps an article or a series of articles. I think the public in general, would be interested in these processes because they occur to them in everyday life - we all normalize deviance to some extent and think nothing of it - that is why such processes can have such serious consequences in high-risk environments but not, usually, in everyday life.

Anyway - just some thoughts...thanks for coming here to consult.

PJ2

[al446]

That is possibly the best constructed post I have ever read.

[bvcu]

Also put into context 'bald tyres ' , 747 classic AMM stated 'worn tyres are a maintenance issue not a safety issue' , very useful with FE's trying to get wheels changed down route !!! Both airlines under FAA , also station handling manual for A340 and 777 permitted rtb from outstation with worn tyres , from a large european carrier . Note this is for wear , not for damage which is a different , i.e safety issue. The point i'm making is some defects may appear to be kept until return to base , but is perfectly safe . I think the relevant question is where crews are put under pressure where they dont have a routine turn round done by engineering , i.e they're doing it themselves very commonly esp on shorthaul and charter. Any problem then requires a call to MCC , calling out a locally based engineer then is a cost , if available , so putting 'pressure ' on crews to carry on .

[aj138]

Seems to mee the point of the original has been lost. As a concerned Experienced LAE i am going to bring in back into line. I can confirm that several airlines i have carried out maintenance for on, both customer and own fleet have caused me to review my position at these airlines. The first one gave me cause to live because my conscience couldn't take it the second one asked me to leave as i had highlighted real safety cultural issues. I went down every avenue to address my concerns and due to the plain ignorance and lack of understanding of the role of an LAE and the of holding a CRS they shoo-shooed me and told me to wind my neck in.

The final nail or event which caused me to leave the first airline luckily enough didnt turn into the potential nightmare that it could have, but as the flight crew that day will tell you if it wasn't for me standing up and saying "i don't care what the procedures say" a major incident was averted.

This was down to flight crew making wrong decisions about systems they have limited knowledge on. And this is the issue Crews are not qualified to make decisions about aircraft servicability on thier own.

Yes arguments could be made that Maintrol were consulted. Well As seems to be the case more maintrol's are being brought into the realms of the sub part M (Airline) side and not under the part 145 (maintenance) side. This smells of commercial riding roughshot over safety and having dealt with a lot of airline maintrols ( one who even decided the aircraft with a major hydraulic leak should be given a CRS as the leak was such that it could just about make the sector with the current leak rate) most of them are there to get the aircraft home rather than get the aircraft serviceable.

I can give you lots more personal examples of issues which have given me cause for concern. Some may say have you followed the SMS/ Error reporting route? well let me tell you no one is more qualified to understand the aspects of engineering and these Error reporting processes. They are paid lip service to both by the airlines and the NAA's. They are processes that just are there to give the public the perception that "we take safety seriously".

You take the LAE away from the safety equation then watch things crumble. The LAE is the last line of defence he is the one that has hopefully been trained to the highest levels for the previous 7 years and then jump through hoops before he can sign to say that that multi-million pound machine carrying hundreds of passengers is fit to fly.

[PJ2]

aj138;

If I may offer a thought - the discussion never left the original topic or got lost. Rather, it became for a moment an overall perspective encompassing those serious issues which you eloquently raise in your post. In my view your post is another extremely relevant and important contribution to this discussion to which regulators, line managers and senior airline executives alike must hearken to. I completely agree with your assessment of SMS - rather, the weaknesses and, though it is a good safety concept, the folly of SMS as it is presently being implemented.

Re:
The first one gave me cause to live because my conscience couldn't take it the second one asked me to leave as i had highlighted real safety cultural issues. I went down every avenue to address my concerns and due to the plain ignorance and lack of understanding of the role of an LAE and the of holding a CRS they shoo-shooed me and told me to wind my neck in.

The final nail or event which caused me to leave the first airline luckily enough didnt turn into the potential nightmare that it could have, but as the flight crew that day will tell you if it wasn't for me standing up and saying "i don't care what the procedures say" a major incident was averted.
and,
This smells of commercial riding roughshot over safety and having dealt with a lot of airline maintrols ( one who even decided the aircraft with a major hydraulic leak should be given a CRS as the leak was such that it could just about make the sector with the current leak rate) most of them are there to get the aircraft home rather than get the aircraft serviceable.
and, most importantly,
Some may say have you followed the SMS/ Error reporting route? well let me tell you no one is more qualified to understand the aspects of engineering and these Error reporting processes. They are paid lip service to both by the airlines and the NAA's. They are processes that just are there to give the public the perception that "we take safety seriously".
Like Security itself and the commentary upon the structural sham, your last comment has much to say regarding the corporate box-ticking that goes on in the name of SMS and flight safety programs. I know cases where flight data has been dismissed or simply not believed, ostensibly because it is commercially inconvenient. Under SMS, where managers are responsible for costs as well as safety, the conflict is irresolvable - most of the time, because the regulator is in essence, absent. SMS expects airlines to employ collected flight data and incident reports as well as a host of other robust and readily-available safety programs to first, know what their fleet of airplanes and their pilots are doing on a daily basis from which the organization may make changes in their operations as part of the SMS self-audit process. Unless that process is vigourously implemented, supported with appropriate resources and protections for the safety data in terms of confidentiality, (the absence of which will destroy any trust), SMS will become (and is already, in some quarters), a sham and public relations exercise. That is, until the accountable executive(s) are, under SMS, put in the oak chair to face prosecutors after an accident.

Ian, THIS is the story, if you're going to tell one at all - there are sufficient details in contributions such as this one and others, and sufficient perspective regarding the larger picture of the de-regulation of flight safety, to write from the "10,000ft view" and the view "on the ground" - What is being offered here is a view of "why" there is increasing risk in an aviation safety system which has, ironically through its very success, become taken-for-granted. You have other posts which offer details which illustrate "what" and "how" within this larger perspective.

Because this is an informal arena and not a place where the highest rigor in terms of statements and research is conducted or expected, you must put flesh to these understandings and perspectives. I submit that there is more than enough research within our industry to back up what is being said here in response to your question and post. I was with a highly respected airline which, despite it's well-deserved safety reputation and impressive record, is changing, placing on more occasions than I care to mention, commercial interests ahead of safety priorities when they knew, through flight data and not mere pilot reports, that they had to act otherwise and did not. Like your concerns, ours were summarily dismissed. It is the felt comfort with the operation and certainly not the dismissal of our input, that is so concerning at present.

[h3dxb]

I heard about cases like yours, and I heard also about MOE's losing customers due to strict following the rules.

In my 18 years Line on stations all over the world, it happend sometimes that crews were insisting the work which has to be done, but they tried it only for a minute............ (the dumb ones dies earlier :ok:)

I saw different cases that Crews were happy to get their planes fixed, or at least deferred to home base. But when the same plane came unfixed back, it was AOG (ok it helped a lot that every 14 days the FAA came for a coffee to my office :suspect:)

I think Ian was planning a trip, and after all the horrible stories about tired flight crews and Flu and what else, he wanted to know, that we are still safe,

yes Ian You can fly, because we are proud of our work.

we keep them flying ................... SAFE :ok:

[theavionicsbloke]

Guys I don't think we should slam Ian too much here.

I think he should be commended for being up front about who he is and what he is doing.

If you don't like the fact that a journo has the common sense to attempt to enquire somewhere that he can get an accurate feel for an issue then you don't have to comment in the thread.

There are problems in the industry as with any other. It is not squeaky clean and it has its bad apples just as any other industry and profession.
That’s Life, that’s fact.
Some bad apples (normally In management) are driven by a combination of lack of technical appreciation, knowledge or experience and over confidence in their own abilities. They think they know better, try to be super clever but eventually, it catches up with them!!

Commercial pressure is part of the job. We get it right 99% of the time but not always.

[nnc0]

In this business, anybody who would knowingly succumb to pressure and sign off a blatantly unsafe item is the rare exception rather than the rule.

PJ2 is absolutely spot on though. Commercial pressures are overcoming safety concerns in the backrooms and boardrooms and SMS is expanding this normalization of deviance at a head spinning pace. It's not so obvious at ground level when a single job card or MEL is signed off or an aircraft is dispatched, but at 10,000 ft the view is a whole lot different.

For all of you who say Ian's concerns are baseless, you really need to take a step back and get some perspective.

The big boss says safety is job 1 but his bonus is based on raising profits. Those profits come from increased revenues and lowered costs. He then put's like minded folks in all the senior decision making roles. From what I've seen, these are not experienced operational folks. Oh sure, in good faith, he has some token technical folks and pilots in the mix to keep him and his cohorts honest and hold him to his word but the reality is that they are neophytes when it comes to arguing for budget approvals and expenditures. The financial types win 80% of the time and the operational experts lose. The result is that that money for equipment upgrades / maintenance / repairs is becoming harder to get. Engineering/Maintenance scramble to improvise. Equipment deteriorates faster. MEL devs and extensions increase. Routine maint gets deferred. Flt crews get issued new SOPs and QRH procedures to address the inadequacies. etc.

Each little issue on it's own is minor. Cummulatively, they're leading in one direction.

Where is the regulator in all this? A clue lies in the reason SMS was implemented in the first place. There regulator doesn't have enough inspectors. Inspectors have been relegated to examining the SMS processes in place and they're still reading all the process documentation. They don't even audit or review anymore. They "sample".

Nobody wants to see safety deteriorate but having at first embraced SMS and living with it for 3 yrs I'm actually now pondering the inevitable and for the first time in nearly 20 yrs giving some consideration to packing up the job I love and moving on before somebody gets hurt.

[Safety Concerns]

PJ2 careful you are earning my respect.

I really do wonder what those who claim everything is so rosy want to achieve.

Its like saying partners don't cheat cos mine don't. Wake up.

Ian if that is your name, all credit for coming on here openly and listening to a whole bunch of hippocrites slagging off journo's but continue to buy newspapers.

[TURIN]

PJ2
That is possibly the best constructed post I have ever read.

I'll second that, outstanding. :ok:

[Ancient Observer]

PJ2's contribution is, as ever, well worth a read. May I highlight one aspect of his broad brush?
He writes "there is increasing risk in an aviation safety system which has, ironically through its very success, become taken-for-granted."

That is a huge cultural issue. When people become satisfied with what is going on they often stop working the safety issue in the diligent and terrier like way that the UK has used for many years. There is no substitute for simply working the safety issues. If Aviation moves in to a culture where it stops doing that, then we will have a problem.
However, there is one bright light..........in the final analysis, Aviation is the ultimate self-regulator. A captain is not going to fly an unsafe plane as her life will be at risk along with the passengers, and an Engineer won't release an unsafe plane as her License is the basis of her lifestyle. I've seen a number of instances where individuals have stood up to the "career limiting" risks for the sake of safety. Long may it continue.

[shoey1976]

Cheers Safety Concerns!
Yup, Ian Shoesmith is the moniker I'm stuck with I'm afraid -- if you google me + bbc news you'll find me.
Thanks to everybody who has PMd me since my last post; and contributed to the debate on this forum.
I guess I was always asking for trouble by repeating the allegations made by my source, and suggesting pilots (and yes, I know the difference between Captains and First Officers - my choice of language was probably a bit sloppy) were somehow the bad guys.
From the way this thread appears to be going, it seems that if there is a problem at all, it exists within engineering itself (ie top management putting too much pressure on the guys and girls at the sharp end)??
Thanks again, and please feel free to PM / email me (using anonymous email address if you'd prefer)
Ian
[email protected]

[aguadalte]

EASA/EC were 'forced' into taking action with INAC of Portugal only recently.
I would like to highlight that EASA cannot take any action
against anybody. EASA does not have any enforcement power against a
Member State of the Community.
EASA is, by law, performing periodic and ad-hoc standardization visits
to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA) of all EASA countries (the 27
EU countries + Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) in the
fields of initial and continuing airworthiness. They raise findings, if
any, and report to the visited NAA, its government, and the
Commission. They then agree and monitor a corrective action plan that the
NAA has to complete. In case the action plan is not properly
implemented, the only action that EASA can take is to issue a
supplementary report to the Commission, which will decide any further
actions.
Your intentional misleading words of alleged "action" from the part of EASA to the Portuguese agency INAC are wrong. I really expected much more correctness from the part of some individuals who claim for responsibility and fairness within the industry.:=

[lomapaseo]

aguadalte


I would like to highlight that EASA cannot take any action
against anybody. EASA does not have any enforcement power against a
Member State of the Community.
EASA is, by law, performing periodic and ad-hoc standardization visits
to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA) of all EASA countries (the 27
EU countries + Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland) in the
fields of initial and continuing airworthiness. They raise findings, if
any, and report to the visited NAA, its government, and the
Commission. They then agree and monitor a corrective action plan that the
NAA has to complete. In case the action plan is not properly
implemented, the only action that EASA can take is to issue a
supplementary report to the Commission, which will decide any further
actions.
Your intentional misleading words of alleged "action" from the part of EASA to the Portuguese agency INAC are wrong. I really expected much more correctness from the part of some individuals who claim for responsibility and fairness within the industry

Thank you for the clarifications. It seems to be a natural tendancy for any of us to simplify the role of aviation regulation to a single visible body.

I'm afraid that you might have to copy and paste your quote in numerous other future threads as well, while of course leaving out a supposition that other's ignorance is intentionaly misleading

cheers

[Litebulbs]

Have a look at the poll being run on Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers (ALAE) - Welcome (http://www.alae.org). Interesting reading.